

passed to the press protesting naval promotion policy. At the time that Admiral Baptista resigned as Minister of the Navy he made a speech during the ceremony transmitting the office to his successor Admiral Paulo Bosisio which was considered to be, at best, in bad taste. The speech was highly critical of then President Castello Branco's decision in the matter of embarked aviation. The character analysis on the most recent Form 1396-1 corresponds well with what would be expected from the Admiral in a discussion of Brazilian oceanographic policy, e.g. the Admiral seldom replied to a direct question with a direct answer, often "beat around the bush" in expressing his own views and clearly indicated that he thought "U.S. tries to mold other countries after their own image and what is good for the U.S. is not necessarily good for Brazil." He also certainly gave evidence of strong nationalistic leanings.

Additional insight has been provided into the Admiral's thinking by conversations at a luncheon hosted by Admiral Baptista late in September and attended by Minister Belton, the Naval Attaché and Admiral Hilton Augusto Berutti Moreira. At this luncheon Admiral Baptista indicated that as head of the hydrographic office he was consulted in ruling on research projects proposed by foreign scientific organizations in Brazilian waters. He and Admiral Berutti stated that the recent decrees affecting oceanographic research had been drafted jointly by the Brazilian Navy and Itamaraty and that both had been in complete accord as to the wording. (Comment: Previously reported information available to the Embassy would indicate that the matter was considerably more complex than this, e.g. see Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Petrobras and Navy Roles in Oceanographic Decree - Neves, Varcellos, Rôlo and Hudson, dated September 23, Rio 10154, Rio 12782, Rio 13970, and Rio A-899, all of 1968, and Rio A-59 and Rio 1681.) A U.S. law similarly regulating oceanographic research had been consulted as a model in drafting the Brazilian decree, according to the two Admirals, and certain portions of the Brazilian regulation were identical to those of the U.S. (Comment: BEGIN NOFORN. The Department will recall that some months ago the Embassy queried the Department for U.S. legislation on this subject and the Department's response to that inquiry revealed no U.S. legislation resembling to any significant degree the Brazilian regulations. The Embassy Scientific Attaché was prompted to make this request because of having been confidentially told by a Foreign Office source that Brazilian Navy officials were justifying their position on the basis that "their decree" paralleled American practice. The Foreign Office source was informed of our inability to locate comparable American

legislation in early August. (State 196344 of July 4, 1968) END NOFORN.) In these discussions the reason Admiral Baptista gave for the requirement of 180 days advance notice was that the U.S. research operations are planned and budgeted well in advance, and that the U.S. organizations would thus have no difficulty in meeting this requirement, as opposed to Soviet or other foreign countries which were not so well organized. The U.S. would thus stand to benefit from this arrangement. In addition, the 180 day period would allow Brazil to submit the names of the scientists embarked in Soviet/Communist units to the U.S. for a check on espionage activities prior to the appearance of the Soviet units. Admiral Baptista stated that regulations such as this were tailored to government policy and usually in connection with economic/commercial interest. He stressed the fact that in Brazil Petrobras has a monopoly on oil exploration, as opposed to the situation in England where exploration on the North Sea was conducted on a competitive basis by various commercial enterprises. These comments of Admiral Baptista's express a point of view which is consistent with that set forth in Enclosure A. This point of view, however, particularly as it relates to the background of how the oceanographic decree came into being would not seem to accurately reflect the Navy's role or responsibility in the formulation of the decree. Sources in the Brazilian Foreign Office and Brazilian scientific community have consistently credited the Navy with a much larger role and responsibility. This point of view has been independently verified with reliable sources in the foreign scientific community and local diplomatic corps.

Admiral Baptista's record would seem to indicate that he is clearly a man with definite opinions, however loath he may be to talk about them directly. Given sufficient provocation he not only could but has voiced vigorous dissent from official policy. The only logical conclusions therefore, with respect to Brazilian oceanographic policy, would seem to be that: (a) he supports the policy, or (b) he has been sufficiently intimidated by previous bouts with officialdom that he does not feel equal to the task of challenging them publicly, or even discreetly. Certainly he made it clear that he felt the decree was primarily politically motivated and that only higher authority could do something about securing a more reasonable implementation. Given present circumstances the difference between the two conclusions is unfortunately somewhat academic because under either conclusion it would appear that we can expect a rigid implementation of the decree.

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Given the foregoing circumstances this Embassy is inclined to believe that a cautious go-slow approach which avoids direct challenge and confrontation is probably the tactic most likely to succeed. It would appear that a direct challenge to the oceanographic decree at a high level would run a considerable and perhaps unwarranted political risk. The reporting officer is inclined to accept Admiral Baptista's judgement that, at this point in time, a negotiated modus vivendi is the best way to seek a solution to the problems posed by the decree if it is important to us to open up the possibility for cooperative oceanographic research with Brazil.

BELTON

WB by [signature]

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American researchers to the conclusion that the decree was specifically designed to stop any further foreign research in oceanography in Brazil and had the further effect of isolating the Brazilian oceanographic community from cooperation with foreign oceanographers. In the same connection it was also indicated that we understood from hearsay that oceanographers from countries other than the United States might be interpreting the decree in the same way. In response to all probes of this type the Admiral refused to indicate either that it was or that it was not the intention of the decree to shut off cooperative research.

4. At several points during the discussion the Admiral indicated that he felt it was essential for "wise men and patriots" of both governments to sit down and discuss the matter, if a satisfactory modus vivendi was to be found. He stressed that by "wise men and patriots" he did not mean necessarily government officials, although when pressed for who he did mean, he responded "why does not someone talk to Costa e Silva" and "be sure and leave some role for the Army so there will not be a rock in the road."

5. It was pointed out that oceanography is an old science undergoing new and rapid development and that the new technology which is being developed has many useful applications. The Admiral at this point went into a lengthy discussion of foreign assistance, emphasizing repeatedly that those who desire to assist should comply with the wishes of those to be assisted. The oceanographic decree spelled out, in the Admiral's view, the conditions under which "assistance" could be accepted in this field. When it was pointed out to the Admiral that these conditions were so strict as to deter cooperation and that no scientific community has ever been able to thrive in an isolated atmosphere, he appeared totally unimpressed. Although he did not respond directly, he implied that if isolation was a price that had to be paid, it would have to be accepted. (Comment: Presumably this is the case in his view because at least among other things the motives of those giving assistance are something less than pure for the reasons indicated in point 2 above.)

6. Although not specifically germane to the subject of oceanographic policy, during the discussion the Admiral also commented positively on the current university problems in Brazil. He gave no indication of having any patience whatsoever with any aspect of student demands, even legitimate ones, and indicated he was in favor of a thoroughgoing root and branch reform of the whole educational system which would scrap both American and European models. The rejection of the historical university structure and role was in his view justified by the clear breakdown of the system in today's world.

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Attachment B

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Biographic Data: - Admiral Ernesto de Mello Baptista

Present position: Director General of Hydrography and Navigation.

Service: Navy (Line Corps)

Date and Place of Birth: December 15, 1907, Natal, Rio Grande do Norte State, Brazil.

Race: Caucasian

Citizenship: Brazilian

Religion: Catholic

Marital Status: Married

Age: 60

Hair: Brown Bald or Balding: No

Height: 5'7" Weight: 170 Build: Stocky

General state of health: Apparently good

Name of Spouse: Lygia - married about 20 years. She is quite attractive and always well-dressed. Speaks little English.

Children - 3

Loreley Varela de Mello Baptista - born 16 Apr 1950

Paulo Emilio de Mello Baptista - born 8 Aug 1945

Gilda Varela de Mello Baptista - born 1 Oct 1944

Education of Admiral Baptista:

Brazilian Naval Academy - 11 Apr 1925 - 1928

Hydrography & Navigation School - 1935

Naval War College - 1947 - 1948

Naval War College - superior course - 1953

National War College - 1963

Career Promotions:

Escola Naval, 1925 - 1928

Guarda-Marinha, 20-12-1928

2.^o Tenente, 3-10-1929

1.^o Tenente, 27-8-1931

Capitão-Tenente, 16-7-1933

Capitão-de-Corveta, 7-5-1943

Capitão-de-Fragata, 25-7-1949

Capitão-de-Mar-e-Guerra
30-1-1954

Contra-Almirante, 9-3-1959

Vice-Almirante, 18-2-1964

Admiral, 1968

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