

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: BRAZIL
 2. SUBJECT: (U) 2d Light Inf. Bn. Conducts Realistic Practice Alert
 3. ISC NUMBER:
 4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 16-18 December 1967
 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Sao Vicente, Sao Paulo 16-18 Dec 1967
 6. EVALUATION: SOURCE A INFORMATION 1
 7. SOURCE: Personal Observation
 8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 809 0001 68
 9. DATE OF REPORT: 5 January 1968
 10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
 11. REFERENCES: DIRM 1.M.4
 12. ORIGINATOR: OUSARMA DEO DE JANEIRO BRAZIL
 13. PREPARED BY: *Arthur S. Moura*
 ARTHUR S. MOURA, COLONEL, GS
 US Army Attache
 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: *Jerry J. Hunt*
 JERRY J. HUNT, COLONEL, USAF
 US Defense Attache

15. SUMMARY:

(U) This IR describes the plans, actions, and results of a test alert carried out by the 2d Light Inf. Bn. in Sao Vicente, Sao Paulo.

(Leave Blank)

1. (U) The CO of the 2d Light Inf. Bn., COL LAURO ROCCA DIEGUEZ, told me on 15 December 1967, while I was visiting his unit, that he planned to pull a surprise alert on his unit on Sunday afternoon, 17 December. He had decided to conduct the exercise to test three plans:

- The ability to recall his men on short notice.
- The defense of his garrison.
- The defense of critical non-military facilities in Sao Vicente, Santos, and Cubatao.

2. (C) What COL DIEGUEZ failed to mention as a likely catalyst for the test,

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

USCINCSO
 COMUSARSO

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GP-3
 DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
 INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY
 DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

Declassified Per E.O. 12958
 Defense Intelligence Agency
 By *ADK* Date *14 Sep 84*
 NOT Reviewed for Public Release

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396
 1 SEP 62

REPLACES DA FORM 1046, 1 AUG 60,
 OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev 10-64),
 AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE
 USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

GPO 894-282

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND53094*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 809 0001 68

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

ORIGINATOR:
OUSARMA RIO DE JANEIRO BRAZIL

(Leave Blank)

was the fact that he had persuaded the federal government to depose the interventor of the municipality of Sao Vicente and that the announcement had just been made on 15 December. By massing his 600 men in a business-like show of strength involving the actual seizure of key facilities, DIEGUEZ probably hoped to dissuade the deposed interventor from any thought of resistance.

3. (U) At 1500 on 17 December, COL DIEGUEZ appeared at his headquarters and told the duty officer to implement the recall plan. According to DIEGUEZ, his staff had assured him that the entire battalion would be in place within two hours. He thought that a four-hour interval was more reasonable. The duty officer immediately telephoned local radio stations and the press and requested that announcements be made urging members of the 2nd Bn. to report to their unit. Available personnel within the headquarters manned telephones to call unit members who, under the plan, were to call certain other individuals or to alert them through personal visits. By 2100 hours, six hours after the recall was sounded, DIEGUEZ had managed to assemble 80% of his total strength. The nearly 500 men who reported to the Quartel were placed in an alert posture and directed to execute previously rehearsed plans for the defense of the garrison.

4. (U) COL DIEGUEZ had previously organized a 25-man "guerrilla" force to go into action against garrison defenses at 0400 on the morning of 18 December. The force was made up largely of officers and NCO's and realism had been stressed in briefings and rehearsals. DIEGUEZ had observed several weak points in garrison defenses and he sought to have the "guerrillas" capitalize on them. Some of his techniques were:

a. Place four "guerrillas" in the meat delivery truck that routinely delivered meat every day.

b. Since it often took days to replace light bulbs throughout the garrison, DIEGUEZ had arranged to have numerous good bulbs removed from sockets in order to promote confusion in the dark.

c. Two NCO's of the "attack" force were to rouse sleeping EM in the barracks and seek to harangue them into defecting to the side of "glorious and victorious Communism."

5. (U) The 0400 attempts to seize the garrison by the "guerrillas" were totally frustrated by the alert officers and men. The meat truck which had previously enjoyed free access was stopped and searched, and its clandestine passengers discovered and detained. The dental officer, who had volunteered to act as one of the "guerrillas", sought to force his way through the main gate by alleging to the soldier sentry that he had an urgent case to take care of. The soldier was unimpressed and denied entry; when the lieutenant tried to brush him aside, the soldier slammed his rifle butt into the officer's jaw and knocked him unconscious. The NCO's who sought to stampede the sleeping soldiers with Communist slogans were overpowered immediately and forced to scream for officer help to avoid being lynched. In the case of the missing light bulbs, those within the garrison immediately produced flashlights and kerosene lamps, as well as quick replacements for the bulbs. All attempts to penetrate the garrison were unsuccessful and the defenders acted with vigor, enthusiasm, and excellent responsiveness to control by NCO's and officers.

6. (U) With the garrison secure by 0600, COL DIEGUEZ put into effect the plan for the defense of key areas in the vicinity. Organic transportation was used to take two rifle companies to the CUBATAO oil refinery area, and lesser elements to the SANTOS-SAO VICENTE telephone exchanges, water works, power plants, and radio stations. The details moved out swiftly and with a minimum of confusion, and upon arrival at their assigned areas immediately deployed into effective defensive formations. The defense of the garrison was left in the hands of headquarters and service company and the battalion band. Despite the fatigue of the men and the fact that musicians, cooks, and clerks normally do not participate in such activities, those observed by me appeared to be enthusiastic over their involvement and quite

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c
1 SEP 62REPLACES AF FORM 112A, JUL 61 WHICH MAY BE
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

GPO 942025

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND53094

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 809 0001 68

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

ORIGINATOR

OUSARMA RIO DE JANEIRO BR/ZIL

capable of defending the compound. The exercise terminated at 2100 hours on 18 December.

(Leave Blank)

COMMENT: (C) This training exercise was superbly conceived and professionally executed. DIEGUEZ is a hard-working leader who refuses to condone mediocrity. He firmly believes in the huge sign painted across the rear wall of his headquarters building: "The best are regarded only as good here." His unit has extensive responsibilities in the SANTOS lowlands (Baixada Santista) area and he appears determined to develop capabilities to meet any challenges. Moreover, since the local Bishop, stevedores, "out" politicians, and others keep tensions at a constant high pitch, DIEGUEZ - who has a low tolerance for such activities - firmly believes that periodic displays of effective military muscle constitute a powerful deterrent.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

REPLACES AF FORM 112A, JUL 61 WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

GPO 942025

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AND53094