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C O N F I D E N T I A L 047 SECTION ONE OF THREE FM ARMA JAN 69

1. (C) THE PRESSURES WHICH EXPLODED ON 13 DEC 68 IN THE FORM OF INSTITUTIONAL ACT NO. 5 (IA-5) REFLECTED SOME ESTABLISHED HIGH-LEVEL ALIGNMENTS WITHIN THE ARMY. MOREOVER, NEW ALIGNMENTS WERE FORGED. SOME OF THESE MAY HAVE BEEN OF A TEMPORARY NATURE AND THE RESULT OF THE EMOTIONAL MOTIVATIONS OF THE MOMENT; OTHERS COULD BE MORE SUBSTANTIVE, BOTH IN DURATION AND PURPOSE. THIS MESSAGE SEEKS TO IDENTIFY THESE ALIGNMENTS AND IS THE RESULT OF INFORMATION GATHERED ON A CONTINUING BASIS FROM RELIABLE SOURCES WHO HAVE ACCESS TO OR ARE THEMSELVES PARTICIPANTS IN THE SHIFTING CURRENTS OF PERSONAL LOYALTIES.

2. (C) IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA "DECIDED" TO IMPOSE IA-5 OR HAD THE DECISION IMPOSED UPON HIM. WHATEVER THE TRUTH, THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT MOST ARMY OFFICERS APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S HAND WAS FORCED. SOME EVEN CLAIM THAT THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND DECIDED ON THE NIGHT OF 12 DECEMBER THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE DEPOSED (NO SUCCESSOR INDICATED) UNLESS HE TOOK DRAMATIC MEASURES BY NOON ON THE 13TH. PERHAPS THE BEST WAY TO ANALYZE THE SITUATION THAT EXISTED ON 12-13 DECEMBER IS TO IDENTIFY THE POSITION OF THE KEY 4-STAR GENERALS DURING THOSE EVENTFUL HOURS:

A. ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES: HE REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF ARMY PRESSURES BETWEEN

ACTION: DIA-15

INFO: NSA-2 CIA-4 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1(32) WGS/JEM

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1730 AND 1900 ON 12 DECEMBER AND CAME AWAY CONVINCED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD KEEP PROMISE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION THE FOLLOWING DAY. GENERAL LYRA SO INFORMED THE SCORES OF EXCITED OFFICERS WHO SOUGHT HIM IN HIS OFFICE BETWEEN 1900 ON THE 12TH AND 0230 ON THE 13TH. TO ALL TALK OF THE ARMED FORCES TAKING MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS--WITH OR WITHOUT COSTA E SILVA--GEN. LYRA TAVARES STEADFASTLY SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT AND OPENLY STATED THAT HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD HAVE TO GET A NEW ARMY MINISTER AS WELL AS A NEW PRESIDENT, SINCE HE WAS A LOYAL MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT.

B. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF ADAIBERTO PEREIRA DOS SANTOS: WAS NOT CONSULTED BY ANYONE AND DID NOT TAKE ANY MEANINGFUL INITIATIVE. GENERALLY, IT WAS ASSUMED THAT HE WAS IN FAVOR OF THE PRESIDENT, BUT HE LACKED EITHER THE PRESTIGE OR THE FOLLOWING TO PLAY A DECISIVE ROLE.

C. GEN. ORIAND GEISEL, CHIEF OF ARMED FORCES STAFF: WHILE NOT OCCUPYING AN ARMY BILLET AND THUS NOT LEGALLY A MEMBER OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND, HE IS, NEVERTHELESS, THE SECOND SENIOR ACTIVE DUTY GENERAL WHOSE VIEWS ARE SOUGHT AND RESPECTED. HE GENERALLY FAVORED A HARDENING BY THE GOVERNMENT AND SOUGHT OUT THE PRESIDENT (THE FIRST TIME HE HAD GONE TO COSTA E SILVA WITHOUT A SPECIFIC SUMMONS) TO IMPRESS UPON HIM THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION. GEISEL PLAYED HIS ROME WITH THE EXTREME PROPRIETY FOR WHICH HE IS NOTORIOUS, THUS, HE FAILED TO CALL ON THE JUNIOR GEN. SYSENO SARMENTO TO MORTGAGE HIS SUPPORT. MOREOVER, HE HARBORED RESERVATIONS OVER PLACING SO MUCH POWER IN COSTA E SILVA'S HANDS.

D. GEN. AUGUSTO FRAGOSO, COMDT. OF SUPERIOR WAR SCHOOL: ANOTHER 4-STAR GENERAL WHO DOES NOT BELONG TO THE HIGH COMMAND BECAUSE HE OCCUPIES A TRI-SERVICE BILLET. MOREOVER, HE IS NOT TOO POPULAR OR INFLUENTIAL AMONG HIS COLLEAGUES. IN THIS SITUATION, HOWEVER, HE CAME FORTH TO LYRA TAVARES AND PLEDGED SUPPORT FOR THE MINISTER.


F. GEN. SOUZA AGUIAR, CHIEF OF SUPPLY: EXPRESSED HIS FULL SUPPORT FOR "LEGALITY"--MEANING THE PRESIDENT AND LYRA TAVARES.

F. GEN. ALVARO ALVES DA SILVA BRAGA, 3RD ARMY CG: REPORTEDLY REMAINED FULLY RESPONSIVE TO ARMY MINISTER'S DIRECTIVES AND KEPT TIGHT CONTROL OVER HIS PERSONNEL

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TO AVOID EXCESSES.

G. GEN. JURANDYR DE RIZARRIA MAMEDE, CHIEF OF WORKS AND PRODUCTION: THE ONCE RESPECTED AND POLITICALLY INVOLVED MAMEDE IS TIRED AND SEEMINGLY DIVORCED FROM THE MAINSTREAM--THROUGH SOME CONTENT HE IS LAYING LOW WAITING FOR AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT. AT ANY RATE, ON THIS OCCASION, HE MERELY NODDED SLEEPILY.

H. GEN. ANTONIO CARLOS DA SILVA MURICY, CHIEF OF PERSONNEL: GEN. MURICY WAS ONE OF THE KEY BALANCE WHEELS IN THE CRISIS AND APPARENTLY THE MAN WHO DID THE MOST TO SUSTAIN LYRA TAVARES' AUTHORITY. THOSE CLOSE TO GEN. LYRA SAY THAT HE ASSIGNED MURICY THE PRINCIPAL TASK OF STAYING GLUED TO 1ST ARMY CG SYSENO SARMENTO TO RESTRAIN HIM IN THE EVENT HE SHOULD DECIDE UPON SOME RADICAL COURSE OF ACTION. MURICY WAS EMINENTLY SUCCESSFUL IN DOING THAT AND IN ALLOWING HIMSELF TO SERVE AS AN ESCAPE VALVE FOR HOTHEADS WHO ESPOUSED RADICAL COURSES OF ACTION.

I. GEN. SYSENO SARMENTO, CG, 1ST ARMY: HE RETURNED TO RIO AT 2000 ON THE NIGHT OF THE 12TH FROM A WEEK-LONG INSPECTION TRIP IN BRASILIA AND GOIAS. HIS HARD-LINING AND AMBITIOUS STAFF STAGED AN IMPRESSIVE 100-OFFICER GREETING PARTY AT THE AIRPORT TO IMPRESS UPON HIM THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION. THIS WAS FOLLOWED WITH THE PRESENCE OF THIRTY GENERAL OFFICERS AT HIS ARMY MINISTRY HQS. AND A NON-STOP INSISTENCE ON ACTION. SYSENO RESPONDED BY GOING TO LYRA TAVARES WHO TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS SATISFIED THE PRESIDENT WOULD DO THE RIGHT THING ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. SYSENO INDICATED THAT HE WAS UNDER PRESSURE TO GET SOMETHING DONE THAT NIGHT. LYRA AUTHORIZED HIM TO GO TO THE PRESIDENT--WITH THE NEAR CERTAINTY THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT RECEIVE SYSENO; THEREBY DEFLATING HIS PRESTIGE WITHIN THE ARMY. THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT HAPPENED. THE MAJOR COMPOSER OF SYSENO'S SUDDEN PROMINENCE WAS HIS CHIEF OF STAFF, RG HENRIQUE CARLOS DE ASSUMPCAO BARROSO. IT IS PROBABLY FAIR TO SAY THAT SYSENO WAS THE PRINCIPAL 4-STAR INSTRUMENT OF PRESSURE UPON THE PRESIDENT.

J. GEN. ALFREDO SOUTO KALAN, CG IV ARMY: AN INTELLIGENT AND LOYAL MAN WHO RESPONDS TO THE HIERARCHICAL PROCESS AND THUS KEPT A FIRM LID ON HIS AREA WHILE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE ARMY

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MINISTER.

K. GEN. MANOEL RODRIGUES DE CARVALHO LISBOA, CG. 2ND ARMY: LISBOA IS BLINDLY LOYAL TO THE PRESIDENT AND GEN. PORTELLA, BUT HE PROVED AN INEFFECTIVE COMMANDER SINCE HE COULD NOT EVEN BE LOCATED ON THE NIGHT OF THE 12TH. SOME OFFICERS IN OUTLYING AREAS--SANTOS, FOR INSTANCE--TOOK MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS IN THE ABSENCE OF CENTRAL GUIDANCE FROM 2ND ARMY HQS. DESPITE THE CONFUSION AT LISBOA'S HEADQUARTERS, MAJOR UNIT COMMANDERS ARE IDENTIFIED WITH THE PRESIDENT AND REMAINED LOYAL ON THE ASSUMPTION A REAL CRACKDOWN WAS FORTHCOMING.

3. (C) IN THE IMPORTANT 4-STAR AREA, THE PRESIDENT APPEARS TO HAVE ENJOYED THE SUPPORT OF ALL OF THE ARMY'S TOP GENERALS EXCEPT GEN. SYSENO SARMENTO. THE LATTER IS BELIEVED FUNDAMENTALLY LOYAL TO THE PRESIDENT BUT APPARENTLY SUCCUMBED--AT LEAST TEMPORARILY--TO THE HEADY VAPORS FED HIM BY THE FOLLOWING GENERALS-- EACH FOR HIS OWN REASONS:

A. MG AUGUSTO CEZAR DE CASTRO MONIZ DE LARAGAN, CHIEF OF REMOUNT AND VETERINARY: THIS FINE OLD SOLDIER WITH A STERLING PROFESSIONAL REPUTATION APPARENTLY IS IN THE THROES OF ADVANCED ARTERIOSCLEROSIS AND HIS ALREADY NOTORIOUSLY SHORT POLITICAL FUZE IS EVEN SHORTER. HE WAS ONE OF THE MOST EXCITED AROUND SYSENO AND URGED VIGOROUS AND IMMEDIATE ACTION--TO INCLUDE DEPOSING THE PRESIDENT.

R. MG AFFONSO AUGUSTO DE ALBUQUERQUE LIMA, MINISTER OF THE INTERIORS: THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT GEN. ALBUQUERQUE LIMA AND SYSENO HAVE BEEN CARRYING ON A CONSPIRATORIAL ROMANCE FOR QUITE SOME TIME, WITH SAO PAULO AS THE FOCAL POINT. ALBUQUERQUE LIMA WAS IN THE FOREFRONT IN AGITATING YOUNG OFFICERS DURING THE WEEKS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING JAN 5 AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT HE CONSIDERED HIMSELF A FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE FOR COSTA F SILVA IN THE EVENT THE NIGHT OF 12-13 DECEMBER HAD PRODUCED THE REMOVAL OF THE PRESIDENT. IN SUCH A SITUATION, SYSENO UNDOUBTLY WOULD HAVE EMERGED AS THE ARMY MINISTER.

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A. GEN SYSENDO AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY HE WILL PROBABLY BE REMOVED FROM COMMAND OF THE 1ST ARMY. SOME PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS WANT THE PRESIDENT TO ACT IMMEDIATELY--LARGELY TO SACK THE DANGEROUS HENDRIQUE CARDOS IN THE BARGAIN--BUT OTHERS PREFER TO GIVE GEN SYSENDO A BIT MORE "ROPE."

B. MINISTER ALBUQUERQUE LIMA: HE MUST EITHER RETIRE OR REVERT TO ACTIVE DUTY BY 15 MARCH AND THE FEELING IS THAT HE WILL REVERT. REVERT, THUS, HE WILL COME UNDER THE FULL CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENT AND ARMY

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MINISTER WHO WILL EXERCISE GREAT CARE IN HIS ASSIGNMENTS AS WELL AS IN THE PERMISSIBLE LATITUDE HE CAN ENJOY IN POLITICAL STATEMENTS.

C. MG ARAGAO: HE WAS ONE OF THE LEADING CONTENDERS FOR A FOURTH STAR PRIOR TO HIS ACTIONS ON THE NIGHT OF THE 12T IT NOW APPEARS THAT HE WILL BE PASSED OVER AND ALLOWED TO FADE FROM THE SCENE.

D. MG CASTILHO: HIS RECENT ACTIONS ARE REGARDED WITH A CERTAIN TOLERANCE, PARTICULARLY SINCE HE IS AN STEEMED PROFESSIONAL WHO IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO THE DISCIPLINARY FOLD; CASTILHO NOW KNOWS THAT HIS PROMOTION POTENTIAL IS DIRECTLY PEGGED TO FUTURE GOOD BEHAVIOR. HE PROBABLY WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM COMMAND OF THE VILA MILITAR AND FIRST INF. DIV.

F. BG RAMIRO: HE HAS JUST ABOUT COMPLETED A NORMAL TOUR AS CG OF THE ARMORED DIV. AND CAN EXPECT EARLY RELIEF; THERE IS EVEN TALK THAT HIS REPLACEMENT WILL BE GEN. TASSO VILLAR DE AQUINO, A RELIABLE LYRA TAVARES MAN.

F. GEN JOSE PINYO: HIS REASSIGNMENT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED AND HE WILL GO TO THE STATE OF PARANA AS CG OF 5TH DIVISION ARTILLERY; HIS REPLACEMENT AT THE OFFICERS' ADVANCED SCHOOL IS SOLIN LYRA TAVARES MAN, GEN OLAVO VIANNA MOOG.

G. RG CARLOS ALBERTO: HE COULD BE MOVED BUT MIGHT JUST AS EASILY STAY ON SINCE HE IS GENERALLY RESPONSIVE TO THE PRESIDENT, AND PARTICULARLY TO GEN PORTELLA, CHIEF OF THE PRESIDENT'S MILITARY HOUSEHOLD.

H. GEN MONTAGNA: SAFELY RACK AS CG OF COAST ARTILLERY NOW THAT GEN FROTA--A LYRA TAVARES MAN-- HAS TAKEN OVER AS CG OF THE FIRST REGION.

I. GEN CALDERARI: HAS BEEN BROUGHT IN BY GE

LYRA AS CHIEF OF HIS PERSONAL STAFF WHERE HE WILL BE UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY AND VERY BUSY; HIS SUCCESSOR AT THE FIRST BRIGADE IS EXPECTED TO BE LYRA TAVARES MAN GEN. ARGUS LIMA.

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DIVISION: THE INTELLIGENT BUT EXTREMELY VAIN AND AMBITIOUS GEN. RAMIRO CHARGED AROUND ON THE NIGHT OF THE 12TH-13TH WITH FIRE IN HIS EYES. DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE SERVED ON COSTA E SILVA'S STAFF FOR MANY YEARS AND OWES HIS PROMOTIONS AND CURRENT KEY POWER ASSIGNMENT TO THE PRESIDENT, RAMIRO'S LOYALTY TO THE PRESIDENT ON THAT FATEFUL NIGHT IS OPEN TO SERIOUS DOUBT.

F. BG ~~HENRIQUE CARLOS DE ASSUMPCAO CARDOSO~~, SYSENO'S CHIEF OF STAFF: GEN. HENRIQUE CARDOSO HAS BEEN MANIPULATING GEN. SYSENO FOR A GOOD MANY YEARS. HE IS BRIGHT AND AMBITIOUS AND HE APPEARS SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE TO PUSH SYSENO ALL THE WAY TO THE PRESIDENCY. NATURALLY, HENRIQUE CARDOSO WOULD DERIVE SOME BENEFITS FROM THAT UNLIKELY OCCURRENCE. HENRIQUE CARDOSO'S HOLD ON SYSENO IS SO NOTIRIOUS THAT PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA REPORTEDLY CALLED IN SYSENO ABOUT TEN DAYS AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF IA-5 AND ASKED HIM: "DO YOU THINK YOU WILL EVER BE ABLE TO COMMAND ON YOUR OWN WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF HENRIQUE CARDOSO'S ORIENTATION " THE IRONY OF HENRIQUE CARDOSO'S RECENT AGITATION IS THAT HIS CAREER WAS SAVED FROM THE JUNK PILE UNDER GOULART THROUGH THE INTERVENTION OF THEN GENERAL COSTA E SILVA.

F. BG JOSE PINTO DE ARAUJO RABELLO, COMDT. OF OFFICERS' ADVANCED SCHOOL: GEN JOSE PINTO REVEALED HIS UNEASINESS IN OCTOBER WHEN HE SANCTIONED A "CAPTAINS MANIFESTO" BY STUDENT OFFICERS AT HIS SCHOOL. HE IS AN INTELLIGENT AND RESPECTED OFFICER, BUT HE ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BE CARRIED AWAY BY THE REAL AND IMAGINED GRIEVANCES OF JUNIOR OFFICERS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT JOSE PINTO ACTED FROM CONVICTION RATHER THAN AMBITION.

G. BG CARLOS ALBERTO CABRAL RIBEIRO, CG 2ND INF BRIGADE, NITEROI: THE HARD-LINING GEN. CARLOS ALBERTO IS REGARDED AS A COSTA E SILVA MAN, BUT IN THE RECENT SITUATION HE SIDED WITH GEN. CASTILHO AND THROUGH HIM WITH GEN. SYSENO. HE WAS ONE OF THE "TIGERS" WHO HAD TO BE CONTAINED SINCE HE WANTED TO TAKE OVER THE STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO AND PURGE EVERY POLITICIAN SUSPECTED OF CORRUPTION OR SUBVERSION.

H. BG CESAR MONTAGNA DE SOUZA, ACTG. CG. 1ST MIL. REGION: THE VERY HARD-LINING MONTAGNA FOUND HIMSELF IN THE 1ST REGION BILLET AS THE HEAT GENERATED DURING

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SYSENO'S ABSENCE ON THE INSPECTION TRIP. HE WAS SWEEPED ALONG BY THE EUPHRIA OF THE MOMENT, EVEN THOUGH HE NORMALLY SUBORNIDANTES HIS NATURAL IMPETUOSITY TO THE MODERATE INFLUENCES OF ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES.

1. BG ARNAIDO JOSE LUIZ CALDERARI, CG 1ST INF. BRIGADE: GEN. CALDERARI'S EMERGENCE AT SYSENO'S SIDE WAS STARTLING IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT HE SERVED COSTA E SILVA AS CHIEF OF THE BRASILIA ADVANCED ECHELON WHEN THE PRESIDENT WAS WAR MINISTER AND AS SUR-CHIEF OF THE PRESIDENT'S MILITARY HOUSEHOLD.

MORFOVER, THE PRESIDENT ENRUSTED HIM WITH THE KEY 1ST BRIGADE WHICH INCLUDES THE "CUTTING EDGE" MAP-SUPPORTED UNITS. IT COULD BE THAT CALDERARI LATCHED ON TO SYSENO IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISSUADE HIM FROM RASH ACTION AGAINST COSTA E SILVA, BUT MY OWN RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH CALDERARI HAVE SHOWN HIM TO BE VERY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE PRESIDENT'S "SOFTNESS."

4. (C) SINCE NEITHER THE PRESIDENT NOR LYRA TAVARES APPEAR IN ANY MOOD TO HAND OVER CONTROL OF BRAZIL'S DESTINEIES TO GEN SYSENO AND THOSE AROUND HIM, AND SINCE BOTH REALIZE THE NARROW MARGIN BY WHICH THE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE PREVAILLED ON 12-13 DECEMBER, IT FOLLOWS THAT THEY WILL TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS TO SHORE UP THE POSITION ON CENTRAL AUTHORITY. IN THE PROCESS, THEY WILL SAFFGUARD AGAINST LIKELY CONTINUED CONSPIRATORIAL ACTIITIES BY TOSE WHO ARE UNHAPPY WITH THEIR PERSONAL STATUS AS A RESULT OF IA-5. THE FIRST STEP IN THE PROCESS OF CONSOLIDATION OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN WITH THE RETENTION OF LYRA TAVARES AS ARMY MINISTER FOLLOWING HIS STATUTORY RETIREMENT FROM ACTIVE SERVICE ON 31 DECEMBER. OTHER MEASURES IN THE OFFING ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. COMING, HE REVERTED TO HIS ROLE AS THE SUISCIPLINED SOLDIER. DESPITE THE FOREGOING ASSESSMENT, THERE ARE THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT CASTILHO ACTED OUT OF PERSONAL AMBITION SINCE HE STANDS TO RETIRE FOR AGE IN JUNE, 1970 UNLESS PROMOTED TO 4 STARS, AND CHANCES ARE EXTREMELY SLIM THAT HE WILL BE PROMOTED UNDER ROUTINE CIRCUMSTANCES. THUS, HAD HE GENERATED COSTA E SILVA'S OVERTHROW, HIS DETRACTORS BELIEVE HE WOULD HAVE SOLVED HIS OWN TENURE PROBLEM QUITE NICELY.

D. BG RAMIRO TAVARES CONCALVES, CG OF THE ARMORED

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C O N F I D E N T I A L 047 SECTION TWO OF THREE FM ARMA JAN 69
C. MG JOAO DUTRA DE CASTILHO, CG OF THE 1ST AINF
DIV AND VILA MILITAR; OUTSTANDING SOLDIER CASTILHO
BECAME THE PRINCIPAL LIGHTNING ROD FOR THE TORRENT OF
ROILS GENERATED AT THE VILA MILITAR FOLLOWING THE
CONGRESSIONAL VOTE ON THE MARCIO MOREIRA ALVES CASE.
CASTILHO IS LOYAL TO LYRA AND TO THE PRESIDENT SINCE
HE WAS THEIR CHOICE FOR THE POWERFUL POSITION HE OC-
CUPIES; ON THE OTHER HAND, HE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT MANY
THINGS WERE WRONG AND CHANGES WERE NEEDED URGENTLY IF
THE ARMY WAS TO REMAIN COHESIVE AND STRONG. THUS, HE
ASSUMED AN INTRASIGENT AND EXTREMELY HARD POSTURE,
EVEN THREATENING TO MARCH WITH HIS MEN INTO DOWNTOWN
RIO UNLESS A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT
BY NOON ON THE 13TH. ONCE HIGHER AUTHORITY (LYRA,
MURICY, AND PROBABLY OTHERS) HAD ASSURED CASTILHO THAT
ACTION WAS FORTHCOMING, HE REVERTED TO HIS ROLE AS
THE DISCIPLINED SOLDIER. DESPITE THE FOREGOING
ASSESSMENT, THERE ARE THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT CASTILHO
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D. BG RAMIRO TAVARES CONCAIVES, CG OF THE ARMORED

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