

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage law, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: BRAZIL
 2. SUBJECT: (C) Military High Command Forces Meeting Upon President
 3. ISC NUMBER: *R.D.*
 4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 21 October 1968
 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Rio de Janeiro 22 October 1968
 6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2
 7. SOURCE: (1) An active duty General Officer who has access to this type of information and exercises considerable influence over Majors and LTC's; (2) A retired Major General who is influential in hard-line circles. Both are reporters of tested reliability.
 8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 809 0361 68
 9. DATE OF REPORT: 23 October 1968
 10. NO. OF PAGES: 3
 11. REFERENCES: DIRM 1.C.1
 12. ORIGINATOR: USDAO RIO DE JANEIRO BRAZIL
 13. PREPARED BY: *Arthur S. Moura*
 ARTHUR S. MOURA, COLONEL, GS
 US Army Attache
 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: *Jerry J. Hunt*
 JERRY J. HUNT, COLONEL, USAF
 US Defense Attache

REC'D CO-3 01 NOV 1968

15. SUMMARY:
 (U) This IR deals with a meeting which President Costa e Silva held in Laranjeiras Palace in Rio on 21 October 1968, with members of the Military High Command.

(Leave Blank)

1. (C) President Costa e Silva met at 1740, 21 October 1968, for one hour and fifty minutes, with the following high ranking military leaders:

Army Minister LYRA TAVARES
 Navy Minister Admiral Augusto Haman Rademaker
 Air Force Minister Marcio de Souza e Mello
 Armed Forces General Staff Chief General Orlando GEISEL

305000-331
 307130-254
 110040-
 312740-
 223240-
 0000
 1111

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

USCINCSO
 COMUSARSO

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GP-3
 DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS.
 NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED;
 DOD DIR 5200.10.

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPLACES DA FORM 1040, 1 AUG 60.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 53094

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 809 0361 68

PAGE 2 OF 3

ORIGINATOR

USDAO RIO DE JANEIRO BRAZIL

(Leave Blank)

Army Chief of Staff Adalberto Pereira dos Santos

Navy CNO Admiral Jose Moreira Maia

Acting Air Force Chief of Staff Lieutenant Brigadier
Armando Serra de Menezes

Military Household Chief General Jayme Portella de Mello

National Intelligence Service Chief General Emilio
Garrastazu Medici

The meeting was presumably called by the President on 18 October 1968, but reliable information indicates that the Service Ministers practically handed the President an ultimatum to convene such a meeting.

2. (C) According to both sources, the Armed Forces Ministers agreed that the time had arrived to direct representations to the President concerning the state of anxiety within their respective services. A consensus reportedly developed among the General and Flag Officers of the three services that, unless the government took immediate and firm action to contain agitation, the young officers would ignore their leaders and take matters into their own hands. The strongest pleas for a new attitude on the part of the government toward subversion, apparently originated among Captains at the Officers' Advanced School at the Vila Militar, and Majors and LTC's at the Army Command and General Staff School.

3. (C) The active duty source quoted in this report said that each service minister presented a lengthy report on the state of officer discipline within his service. The Chief of the National Intelligence Service is said to have reported at some length on the recently broken up clandestine student Congress in the State of Sao Paulo. In his report General Medici presumably said that captured documents clearly linked the frustrated Student Congress with the Latin American Student organization in Havana. The links reportedly involved doctrine, tactics, and financial support.

4. (C) In their reports, the three service ministers stressed that officer discontent stemmed mainly from the uninhibited subversive activities of certain elements within news media, the Congress, and the University environment. The Military Ministers urged that the President assume a firm posture against individuals identified as agitators within each of the previously mentioned sectors. In this connection, the ousting from Congress of Marcio Alves and others like him was identified as an irreversible demand from the Officer Corps of the three services. The President was also told that, in the event, the Supreme Court or the Congress refuse to strip offending Congressmen of their mandates, the individuals will be subjected to severe bodily harm by military personnel. As far as the University sector is concerned, the security services reportedly have pinpointed approximately three hundred (300) individuals who are considered the most radical in the State of Guanabara. The Military Chiefs desire that action be taken against this hard core of agitators.

5. (C) In the judgment of sources, a very strong consensus has developed within the Armed Forces on a new approach toward subversion. The consensus is said to extend to the state militias with their approximately 172,000 men. The active duty source said that the support of the state militias is the result of two circumstances:

a. The effective unifying activities of General MEIRA MATTOS, Inspector General of State Militias; and

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 53094

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 809 0361 68

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGE

ORIGINATOR

USDAO RIO DE JANEIRO BRAZIL

(Leave Blank)

b. The feeling with the militias that their public image is at an all time low and that they must cling to the regular forces as a means of survival.

In the view of both sources, as well as others who have commented on the subject in recent days, there is no desire on the part of the Armed Forces to either impose a state of siege or to close down the Congress. Moreover, there is no real desire to replace President Costa e Silva. The general feeling appears to be that the government has available to it the necessary legal machinery to curb the abrasive and subversive actions of the most controversial and most dangerous activists.

COMMENT: (C) I am fully convinced that the high level meeting was, in fact, imposed upon the President. Recent statements by Army Minister LYRA TAVARES, as well as reports of meetings and petitions involving junior officers, all attest to the development of an environment of acute political fermentation. It remains to be seen whether the President has, in fact, "gotten the message." In the event he fails to take discernible measures to placate those who have generated these pressures, the officers--supported by the NCO's--could finesse the established hierarchical channels.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 53094