

AIRGRAM

POL 18 BRAZ-CUBA
PROCESSED

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-312

CONFIDENTIAL

NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM : AmConGen, SÃO PAULO

DATE: April 11, 1963

SUBJECT : Adhemar de BARROS Winning General BEVILACQUA's Allegiance.

REF : São Paulo Airgrams 292 of March 28, 1963, A-300 of April 4, 1963.

POL 18 BR¹CUBA

Summary: Second Army Commander Bevilacqua has just made an emotional speech in favor of Governor Barros and the Governor's "Brazilian Alliance for Progress." This act capped a series of indications that General Bevilacqua is being won over to Barros and, in consequence, away from leftist/nationalism. But the General's recent promotion seems to show that he has not lost President GOULART's favor. One therefore cannot conclude that at this moment he supports either Goulart or Barros without reserve. This would seem to make the General an important moderating influence in the political and military balance of power.

Until he assumed command of the Second (São Paulo-based) Army, General Pery Constant Bevilacqua was considered one of the most extreme leftists/nationalists in the Brazilian Army. He was often mentioned in the same breath with General Osvino ALVES. But something new has come over General Bevilacqua. For example:

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: DCProper/el 4-5-63 Content: and Classification Approved by: SCLyon

Clearances:

1. He has persistently spoken out in public against the abusive practices of labor unions. His definition of abuses, unfortunately, is much too sweeping. In addition to opposing political agitation by unions, he appears to be against economically-motivated strikes which would be considered legitimate in the United States. For the purpose of this report, however, the important thing to note is that the General has spoken against not only the independent, democratically oriented unions, but also those controlled by the Government and influenced by the Communists. There is clearly a conflict between his position and President Goulart's political base in the labor movement.

2. Of late Bevilacqua has frequently been seen in the company of Governor Adhemar de Barros, a conservative and a declared anti-Communist who keeps his mistrust of Goulart barely under the surface. The General recently referred publicly to Adhemar as "my old friend." (See airgram 300.)

3. Adhemar himself appears to have increasing trust in the Second Army Commander. In a recent private conversation, he said that Bevilacqua was strong and reliable "although a little bit crazy." (See first report under reference.) The "little bit crazy" description, while not very charitably phrased, must have something to it: Adhemar, the American Army Attaché in Rio, and the Consulate General all made more or less the same assessment independently. It might be more accurate to say that Bevilacqua is confused, emotional, and chimerical. It is possible to find psychological explanations in his family history, religion, and education, but the important point in this context is simply to note that the General does show signs of some degree of mental instability. At the same time, he means well and takes very seriously his own concept of democracy. This combination of factors is extremely susceptible to the influence of Adhemar de Barros, who is a clever politician, a charismatic leader, and convincing preacher on the subject of democracy. Adhemar undoubtedly considers Bevilacqua's conversion worth any effort. The Governor is deeply worried about the possibility of federal intervention in São Paulo -- an intervention which would be very difficult to bring about if the Second Army commander opposed it.

4. The latest and strongest evidence of the General's conversion came on April 2, during the formal inauguration of Barros' "Brazilian Alliance for Progress." At the end of the ceremony, Bevilacqua made an impassioned extemporaneous speech in praise of Governor Adhemar and the Aliança Brasileira. The following brief excerpts are from a press version which is believed accurate:

"... at this instant I contemplate the future Brazil ... which will arise from this sacred manger of São Paulo...."

CONFIDENTIAL

Sao Paulo
A-312

PROCESSED

3

"We are here observing the thrill of this second cry of Ipiranga [the first was the Brazilian declaration of independence from Portugal]... and the National Army ... comes to attention to salute the greatness of the Brazil which arises [in São Paulo]....

"Governor Adhemar de Barros, a little while ago you said that you were a politician but that you were not engaging in politics [in the Aliança Brasileira]. I maintain the contrary: you are engaging in politics with a capital P.... because politics is the art of promoting the happiness of the people."

During this speech by the General, the Governor wore an eminently satisfied smile. He had reason to do so; Bevilacqua's words seemed to furnish definitive proof of a most significant conversion.

At the same time, one must remember that Bevilacqua was just promoted to four-star General. This promotion saved him from forced retirement and allowed him to remain in one of the nation's most important commands. While the Consulate General cannot assess the intricacies of the politics which were involved, it is reasonable to suppose that the promotion would not have come if the President had lost all faith in Bevilacqua. Goulart must consider it essential to have support -- or at least not to have opposition -- from the São Paulo military.

The evidence, then, indicates that Bevilacqua extends at least partial support to each of two political opponents: Adhemar de Barros and João Goulart. Since Adhemar's party theoretically forms part of Goulart's Government, the General may be preferring to notice their superficial alliance and refusing to see the underlying mistrust. While it is strictly speculation, one guesses that he might support either against an illegal move by the other, but that he would be unlikely to support a coup in either direction. This hypothesis has the drawback of being based on a very unpredictable individual. If Adhemar has been able to bring Bevilacqua around this rapidly, it is easily conceivable that some other influence could reverse the process in the future.

Daniel M. Braddock

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

CONFIDENTIAL

1