JOEL BARLOW TO BIS FELLOW CITIZENS Of the United States-. LETTER II. On Certain Political Measures proposed to their consideration. Paris, 2©th December, 1799. Fellow Citizens , IN my first letter to youl signified an intention of addressing you a second time on political sub- jects ; and of suggesting certain measures which appear to me to be within your power, for secu- ring your own liberty both civil and commercial, and for laying the foundation ot a pacific inter- course among all maritime nations, on apian wdiich may perpetuate itself and become univer- sal. Some of my observations may appear super- fluous, as being already familiar to the minds of thinking men ; and some of my theories may be thought impracticable because they are not fami- liar. Could I know beforehand what would really prove superfluous, and what impracticable, 1 would certainly retrench all that should come under both these descriptions; though it might go to the whole contents of my work; for my object is to aid the exertions of those who wish to do good ; and not to embarrass them in the choice of means. The art of governing a nation is the art of sub- stituting a moral to a physical force. It it only in A ( 2 ) their rudest state, antecedent to government and previous to any experience, that men can be sup- posed to be impelled or restrained altogether by the action of other men, applied as bodily strength. The right of the strongest , among individuals, or in sections of the same society, supposes the ab- sence of that controling power which is held over them by the society at large; and which, being confided to the hands of the magistrate, consti- tutes the moral force with which the government usually acts. As the absolute independence of one man upon another is incompatible with a state of society, personal strength becomes no longer necessary to personal protection ; but, on the contrary, it is a general maxim , that individual safety is best secur- ed where individual exertion is least resorted to. Our submitting to any force whatever, whether physical or moral, is the choice of self-interest; re- suiting in the first case from real defeat, and in the last, either from calculation or from habft. The consciousness of public power gives rise to public opinion ; and while experience teaches us to calculate their energy, it brings on the habit of respecting their authority. We thus refrain from mutual injury by an habitual sense of conve- nience, which resembles the instinct of self-pre- servation, and is almost as strong in us, as that sensitive horror which prevents our stepping off a precipice. Hence great societies may be moved, millions of persons protected, industry and virtue universally encouraged, idleness and violence com- pletely restrained, without lifting the hand of one man upon another. These reflections open to our view an immense career of improvement, and explain the theory of the whole progress of society, past, present and to come. Great strides have been taken in this ( 3 ) wonderful career; and a considerable elevation in the ascending scale of improvement is already at- tained. Whoever will compare the present state of the species with what it was when every thing was decided by bodily strength; when man, after having forced a bit of food from the elements, 01 robbed it from the savage beast, was still obliged to dispute its possession with his fellow man : who- ever looks back to that state of painful privation, precarious toil, and perpetual danger, which sad- dened the existence of unassociated men, and will then turn to himself, and contemplate what he now enjoys in his protected industry, in the com- forts of life assured to himself and family, in the love and good will of his neighbors, and even of distant nations, where virtue and talents are res- pected, must be convinced of a progress in human affairs, and of a tendency towards perfection. And he will not deny the truth of this general theory, though the period of a few years, taken in any one section of the great circle, may not present to his discernment any perceivable amelioration. The perfectibility of human society is not ajsub- ject of idle speculation, fit only to adorn the pa- ges of a book. It is a truth of’the utmost impor- tance in its practical tendency. No maxim is more essential to the legislator of a nation or to the ne- gociator of treaties; and it ought especially to be present in the minds of all men who are called to administer a representative government. If such men have talents and information worthy of their place, and a proper zeal for performing its duties, they will not content themselves with the thought- less routine of official functions, just necessary to escape impeachment ; they will not thinkit enough to avoid crimes themselves, or to punish them in^ others; but they will call forth the energies of their own genius, and that of their fellow citizens, ( 4 ) to interrogate the native resources of their £oun- try, theelements of national happiness; they will second the designs of nature, by accelerating the progress of improvement, by exploring the objects of industry, multiplying the means of subsistence, creating new inducements for peace and harmo- ny with neighbouring states, and removing every occasion for jealousy and war. An enlightened magistrate will not be satisfied with himself, as having done his duty, unless he can say on quitting the administration, that he leaves the nation better than he found it. Neither can he be said to have served his own country well, unless he has communicated benefits to other countries to which her relations extend. There is no absolute independence of nations any more than of individuals. Men are everywhere surrounded with wants, and every where incum- bered with superfluities; the necessity of asking aid, and the ability of granting it, are mutual, perpetual, and universal ; they keep up a constant exchange of commodities, a circulation of the vi- tal fluid of society. Our mutual wants and aids are the elements of our civilization ; they have al- ready civilized individuals to a great degree, con- vinced them of their relative dependence, and taught them the art as well as the convenience of living together in peace, They have made some progress too in civilizing states ; and their energy must be infallible in carrying on the work of harmony and happiness, till nations shall stand in the same relation to each other as families do at present in the best regulated community. The civilization oj States is the great object to be aimed at in the present age of the progress of human affairs. It is that part of general improve- ment which has been the least understood, and the least investigated, both as to the means of (M bringing it forward, and the consequences that would result from its success. So little has it been studied, so ill have the principles of society been applied to it, even in theoretical discussion, that its possibility is still regarded as a problem. Ma- ny persons imagine that states or nations never can be civilized, more than they are at present ; that among them the savage principle, or the right of the strongest, will always be resorted to. And as it is evident that individual improvement being constantly interrupted by the quarrels of nations, cannot be carried much farther, unless those na- tions will agree to live in peace, they say there is no reason to hope that human society w r ill ever attain a greater degree of perfection than what we see at present. This w'ould evidently be the case, if nations were never to civilize** that is, if a sense of mutual dependence were not to produce the same effects in the great sections of society, called slates, as it does in the small sections called fami- lies. But why should we despair of these effects? The mutual dependence of men is universal, and it is perpetual; it is not only sure to serve asaper- manent source of reciprocal confidence, but as an in creasing source ; it increases with our factitious wants; it becomes more sensible in proportion to our knowledge of distant countries and of their productions, in proportion to the acquisitions we make in science, to the accumulation of superflu- ities, and the infinite researches of industry. A particular people , whatever extension we give to the meaning of the word, whether it means a parish or an empire, is every where a physical and moral agent, whose interests are analogous and re- ciprocal with those of another people of a like description, who inhabit a neighbouring territo- ry. Each of them has a real interest in the pros- perity of the other; because prosperity creates ( « ) certain relative superfluities, which, being exchang- ed between the parties, supply their relative wants. 1 his interchange of commodities creates an inter- change of affections ; it begins among individuals, and extends in regular progression with their knowledge, to every country and every portion of mankind. Nature has certainly placed no barrier in this long course of improvement. Whatever barriers are perceived in it are unnatural and accidental ; they will therefore be removed by the develope- ment of the human faculties, though by slow de- grees. 1 here is no reason why civilization, after having softened the temper of individuals, and harmonized the component parts of a state, as act- ing among themselves, should forever stop short at that point, and leave the slate a savage without, while it is social and peaceful wdthin. For in this case itacts by its physical force abroad, and by its moral foi'ce at home ; which supposes bn the one side a w'ant of experience, which borders on the rudest condition of savage man; and. on the other it indicates a sense of convenience and the habits of social life. To make this matter a little plainer, and show that our hopes of progressive civilization are well founded, let us recur to first principles, and ex- plain the causes which seem to impede its pro- gress in certain stages of its career. What do we mean by the word nation? and what is that pre- cise portion of mankind which necessarily forms a body politic, independent and unsocial, benificent within and ferocious without? it is certain that the necessary limits of a nation are not geogra- phical; neither are they numerical. In both these respects they arc perpetually changing, and are al- ready exceedingly various. One of them, the Chi- nese, is supposed to contain three hundred mil ( 7 ) lions of inhabitants ; another, the Dutch, which does not exceed three millions, is established in the four quarters of the world ; its different branch- es being separated by the widest oceans, and yet united in interest, friendly and social, like a fami- ly. The territory now' covered by one Federal Re- public, the United States, was lately inhabited by at least two hundred different nations at a time, all independent, sovereign, and savage towards each other, as the nations of Europe are this day. France itself, a few centuries ago, was composed„of a great number of independent states; which have been united one after another, under the name of pro- vinces, for the purposes of exterior defence and the splendor of the crown : but never till the pre- sent revolution, were they completely incorpora- ted in one national body, for the objects of inte- rior commerce, or attached to each other by a simi- larity of political rights and pecuniary burthens. It seems then that the tendency of civilization is to diminish the number of nations, and to in- crease their size and prosperity. But this kind of progression, as applied to independent nations, is limited by the nature of things. The few men to whom the government of a state must be confided, cannot extend their knowledge nor multiply their attentions to such a degree as the affairs of a great people would require. France, in her present li- mits, presents a mass of population arid territory sufficient for at least twenty integral and well con- stituted states. Her legislative body is represen- tative ; it is twice as numerons as any legislative body ought to be; and yet it is not the fifth part so numerous as a proper representation of the peo- ple would require, ft is incumbered with much more business than it can treat with that attention which the business deserves ; and yet not half the affairs which are necessaay to the people are ever ( 8 ) brought up for its deliberation. This republic , for tne purposes of interior or local legislation and police, should be organised into about twenty sub- ordinate republics; while, for the purposes of general legislation , exterior relations, defence, commerce, «.anals, roads , and every common con- cern , they should remain concentrated in one great union, or community, with a national le- gislative and executive, restricted in their powers to the simple objects of great national interest; which objects should be defined with the utmost precision in their general constitution (i). In pursuance of such a system there would be no danger that France would become too extensive or too populous for her internal convenience. And the several nations that are now forming re- publics in her neighbourhood ought to constitute them on the same plan as those of France, and make part of the general confederation. This system should be adopted , and this confederation joined by every European people , as fast as they become free; though it should extend through tins (i) The terms federal , confederacy , and others from the same original, have been proscribed in France during the organiza- tion of the republic , because their ordinary meaning refers to a different state of things from what the condition of France admits ; and different from what would be their appropriate meaning in this country, were the system adopted which I sho uld recommend ; and which appears to me the only one capable of preferving liberty here, and of civilizing Kurope. To federalize , applied to states, usually signifies to bring towards a union , but not into unity , those that were before distinct and independent. But as France w as already one integral ftate , to federalize France would seem to be to divide and dismember that which was before united , which, in the vocabulary of the revolution , w'as another word for anarchy and intestine war. The federality which I would propose for France and for 1 u- rope would not carry with it any fuch idea, 'i he integrity of the republic, for every purpofe of safety, and harmo y of parts , would nqt be altered by it. ( 9 ) quarter of the world. It would present a great union of Republics, which might assume the name of the United States of Europe, and guarantee a perpetual harmony among its members. This beneficent system of federalizing appears to be the only resource that nature has offered us, at. least, in the present state of political science, for avoiding at once the two dangerous extremes of having the republic too great for an equitable ad- ministration within, or too small for security with- out. On this principle, if wisely pursued, no con- federated republic will be too great, and no mem- ber of it too small; as all subjects of jealousy will be done away by the nature of the association. The new republics of Europe must resort to this principle, if they mean to hold the ground they have gained, in changing their feudal for their re- presentative constitutions. Could w r e flatter our- selves that they would resort to it at the end of the present war, then we might hope to see the There has been a great deal of false reasoning on this subject. It is now believed by most of the philosophers in Europe to be a great misfortune to our United States, that they were in seve- ral states, and not in one state. This would truly be a misfor- tune , had we not adopted the federal principle ; but now it is one of our greateft advantages. I am sorry to see that M. de Liancourt , in his late Travels in America, has given countenance to this Eu opean fentiment, which I consider a very unfortunate one for the progress of society. His book, whicli contains a vast quantity of fads and information , will have a tendency to accredit this doctrine in the minds of many perfons who had not before adopted it. If that able and laborious enquirer after truth will reflect on the calamities which I fhall notice in this letter , as what would be the consequence of a dissolution of our federal system , and will contemplate the principle of that system in its vast extent, as a new means of civilizing states and preventing wars, I hope he will find occafion for changing his opinion. See vol 7, page 221 , of his Travels. Paris edition* B ( 10 ) moral force of nations take place of their physical force, the civilization of states keep pace with that of individuals, and their commercial relations es- tablished on the principles of peace. Infinite credit is due to the conductors of our American Revolution, for the wisdom and energy with which they seized the occasion or establish- ing our interior and federal governments in the forms which they now possess. The two most con- soling principles that political experience has yet brought to light, are those on which we have foun- ded our constitutions— I mean representative de- mocracy, and the federalizing of States. It is tine, that neither of these principles was wholly of our own discovery. Rut what little experience had been made of either of them by othei nations was extremely imperfect, was attended with little suc- cess, and had by no means united the opinions even of the most sanguine in their favor. In no in- stance had the two principles been bi ought toge- ther and wrought into one system; nor had they ever been attempted both by the same people. Democracy had been disgraced by the pretended experience of some of the states of Greece, though in reality no such thing as democracy ever did ex- ist in Greece or Rome. It has been concluded, and very justly, that pure democracy , or the immedi- ate autoeracv of the people, is unfit for a great state; it might be added, that it is unfit tor the smallest state imaginable, even a little town. Rut representative democracy is applicable to a state of any swie, and under any circumstances wheie men have the use of their reason; though neither this nor any other principle hitherto discovered, is suf- ficient of itself to regulate the concerns of a great people; ‘as no one interal government is capable of bestowing equal and adequate benefit.-, on e\eiy part of an extensive and populous country. Rut, (u > . ... happily for mankind, the representative principle is a fit companion and a sure guide o t lat o er precious experiment which oui country as a op Id with such singular propriety, the principle of confederation. The union of these two theories, as organised in America, is a vast improvement on the wisdom of former ages ; and I cannot but hope that they will be so far cherished by us, and imita- ted by others, as to change very greatly the face of human society. , It is essential to the interests of America, and would be a compliment to her wisdom, to see her political system, in both its parts, adopted by other coun tries. It would be the surest pledge of peace from abroad, and the strongest guarantee against a relapse of principle at home. But for ourselves, there is one maxim which ought not to be foigot- ten ; that these two pillars of the edifice, the repre- sentative principle and the federal principle, should never be separated. Though one of them a one may promise liberty, and the other of them alone may promise peace, yet we cannot be confident that either liberty or peace will become extensive or permanent, unless these well assorted princi- ples are united in one system, and kept msepaia- ble in their practice. Let us convince ourselves of this truth by exa- mining the effect of each principle apart, as ope- rating without the aid of the other, first j the fe- deralizing of states, whose governments were mo- narchical or aristocratical, has not obtained any brilliant success, either in ancient or modern times. The Amphictyonic Council of the Creeks was a body of so little consequence in a political view', that it would not be worth noticing in this place were it not for a certain practice among wn- ters on governments, of seeking models foi eveiy thing In the annals of that pompous people. 1 ie ( 12 ) Aniphictyons had no regular constituted authori- ty, except in matters of religion. They never pre- vented a foreign war offensive or defensive, it would be difficult indeed to say they never pre- vented a domestic war among the states, because such a thing might be done with so little rumour as to escape the notice of history ; but it is certain that they excited several domestic wars, and those of the most cruel and exterminating kind, being wars of religion. On the whole, it appears that this congressional institution, notwithstanding its solemn pretensions of confederating the States of Greece, was more detrimental than beneficial to the people. W henever their common country was invaded, whether by Persians, Macedonians or Ro- mans, about half the states in every instance join- ed the invading enemy. The power of the Am- phictyons was effectual only in directing, on cer- tain occasions, the united vengeance of several powerful states against a weaker one, for having slighted the authority of the priests, for having put into cultivation certain lands which religion had devoted to sterility, or neglected some frivolous or barbarous duty enjoined by an insidious oracle. As to the Corinthian, the Peloponesian and the Arcananian leagues , they were only alliances or coalitions against an enemy , temporary in their nature, and not extensive in their effects. The other examples from Greece which are sometimes cited as confederations , such as the Arcadian , the Beotian, the Po’ian and the primitive Achaian , present something more regular and permanent in their constitutions. But they w'ere each of them too diminutive to merit the name of an association of states. The primitive Achaian, for instance, was the union of twelve small boroughs into one small republic. It may be considered rather as a model of representative democracy in a single state, (i3) than as a federal system ; and in this view perhaps it approaches nearer to modern republican repre- sentation, than any other example left us by the ancients. The subsequent, or great Achaian league was indeed an association of states, whose object was laudable and well defined. It suffered less from a defect in its federal principle than from the corrup- tion of its members. It retrieved in a partial de- gree the liberties of Greece from the rapacity of Alexander's successors, preserved them with con- siderable energy for more than a hundred years, and finally yielded them with some appearance of dignity to the irresistable fortunes of Rome. The Lycian league was not unlike the latter Achaian, either in its object or its destiny. It caused itself to be respected by the Romans as long as the Romans retained any respect for themselves ; but no institution could stand before the corrup- tions of their monstrous and debilitated empire. The Etruscans, and some other early tribes in Italy, had likewise their several confederations. But their constitutions are so little known, and they refer to a state of society so different from ours, that for every purpose, except for displaying an empty erudition, their investigation would be as useless to us as that of some of the native tribes of North America, the Six Nations or the Ilascah Ians. Examples of these imperfect associations are not rare. It is probable that the history of the human race would present them in every corner of the earth, if its affecting and monotonous page could be completely laid open before us. 1 hey shew the feeble efforts of inexperienced societies to defend themselves against the effects of each other's inexperience. The German Empire, the Swiss Cantons, and the United Netherlands present us three great cx ( M) am pies of the confederation of states in modern Europe ; the former still subsisting, the two latter but lately overturned. It requires but little obser- vation to discern the constitutional defects in the Germanic body: it is a confederation of princes, and not of nations. With this radical vice in its organization, it is impossible that its object should be peace, or its policy justice ; and without pur- suing these, no society of men can be tolerably happy, no union of states can be sincere, no por- tion of the earth can greatly increase itspo pulation, 6r present that progressive augmentation of bene- fits which nature has placed within our reach, and science is teaching us how to realise. National happiness is never the object of a state, w^here the interest of those who govern is in any measure different from that of the people. The pursuits, therefore, of the Germanic Princes are mutual en- croachment instead of mutual assistance; the ob- ject of their union is war, and not peace ; their constitution is military, and not commercial. Hence all the compulsory provisions that are made in it have reference to warlike preparations, con- tingencies of men and money, for recruiting armies and discouraging industry. There is no public provision made for the encouragement of useful arts and manufactures , no power lodged in the federal Diet for establishing a general system of canal or river navigation , for equalizing the duties on the objects of commerce, allowing a free ex- change of the produce of labor, even in the most necessary articles of life. Titer c is no inhibition which prevents any prince or stale irom beginning a war without the consent ol the Diet , from building forts and raising armies" wilh the manifest intention to invade each other's territory , from entering into foreign alliances and oilier treaties, for involving the empire indestruc- ( 15 ) five wars. But , on the contrary , every facility and every temptation are held out for m test me wars among the states, asifno federal ^subsisted between them ; while their interior commerce from state to state is shackled with all those restrictions which hoslile jealousy has invented among the most independent and ferocious monaichies of EU Manv other defects might be easily pointed out in tire Germanic constitution. We may find some of them in the books that treat on this subject, but where is the advantage of searching them? The fundamental defect, which is the souice of all the rest, is not noticed in any book , but stales ns in the face on the first reflection: a confedera- tion of Princes stands no chance or being benehcia to the people. You might as well expect to ren- der service to the sheep by confederating the wolves that should be set to watch them.. . , The Swiss Cantons and the United Neiheilanc s have been more fortunate in their federal systems. Considering the feebleness of the means wuh which they began, the quantity of force agam^t which they rose, and the vyeignt of ehoit y*at ha* been frequently made to destroy tnein, nmy a hibit wonderful monuments of tne eihcacy m - .nanized liberty in political homes. Inough ho Swiss Cantons had scarcely the appearance of a federal constitution, their acts of union oeing littfe more than treaties of alliance, which external danger generally kept them -from violating, a - though that of 'the United Netherlands was very impel feet, yet these were not the jadical dc.u which brought on the decline and oyei lino. v o either of their celebrated systems. 1 uc original defect, in each ease, lay in the constitutions of the particular states of which the union was com- ppsed. The representative pnumpte was oitgi.uu/ (i 6 ) unknown and never understood in either coun- try. _ Without this principle, the people cannot exercise their rights, unless it be in the form of mobs: the necessary consequence of which is to throw the active power into the hands of a few where it soon becomes habitual and hereditary 5 no longer the property of the nation, and no longer exercised for her benefit. ' It would be as impracticable to establish a rational system of fede- ral government - among aristocratical states, as among principalities or monarchies. For the prin- ciple is the same m each ; the supposed interest of the people. Inn plan fora perpetual peace, projected two centuries ago by Henry IV . new modeled and pro- posed with great zeal in the early part of the pre- sent century by the abbe de St. Pierre, and after- waids embellished with the nervous eloquence of “ bonsseau , must have been h fruitless experi- ment, if attempted on the model of either of its illustrious patrons. The project was to league all the Christian Powers of Europe in one confedera- tion , guaranteeing to each its own form of go- vernment, and its limits as then existing; to estab- lish a permanent Diet , composed of delegates from every state , with power to settle all disputes that might arise between the several states; to prevent any of them from raising armies on their own ac- count, building forts or rleets to act against each other, or forming any foreign alliances; but all exterior relations and all measures ofdefence should jc on ected and managed by the general Diet, in the name of the Confederacy. . "b * s possible that by the means which Henry had in his power, this sublime conception might have been realised so far as to organize the constitution and begin trie operation, had not an untimely prevented the experiment by depriving the ■■■■■■ (i7) world of its author. Rousseau has detailed the reasons why this project could not be carried into effect at any period since the days of Henry, nor by any influence short of that which lie possessed among the powers of Europe. But the same writer supposes that were it once adopted, its benefits would be so conspicuous and universal as to secure its continuance. I question the probability of this supposition. What could secure the members of this Diet from corruption? There is but one ef- fectual mode of securing them ; and that is to make it the interest of none of the parties to corrupt them; no other principle can be relied upon with safety. In an association of this magnitude, it is not enough that it should be the interest of each of the associated states to preserve the constitution ; but it should be the interest of those who govern the associated states. Now as long as these were governed by hereditary princes, who had an in- terest in extending their private dominions to the detriment of each other, it must be expected that they would seek to encroach as much as possible , and violate the constitution by every means in their power. And as the federal government , if well administered, would prevent their doing it by force , the more effectual way would be to cor- rupt the members of the Diet , "so as to palsy the operation of the constitution, suspend its protec- tion of the weaker associates , and re-establish the right of the strongest,, as in the present state of Europe. This is a favorite state of society for princes ; a state of hazard , inviting them to plun- der, and so far exposing them to be plundered in their turn , as to afford a constant pretext for armies and navies. It is what they call independence; and notwithstanding it leads them every ‘day to commit crimes for which they would ham; a lum- C ‘ ( i8) dred subjects, they will not agree to be restrained by law ; though the same law would restrain their neighbours who prey upon themselves; though it would greatly increase their revenues, by increasing the population and the quantity of productive la- bour within their dominions ; and though it would greatly lessen their expences , by reducing to al- most nothing their constant preparations for de- fence. - But if the powers of government in every associ- ated state wrnre in the hands of the people , in whom the right resides , and if these powers were ex- ercised in all cases by an equal representation , freely chosen and frequently renewed , then would there be no person interested in extending the limits of any onestateto the detriment of another; (lien would no person attempt to corrupt the Diet to violate the compact, and throw Europe back into a state of national animosity and princely plun- der ; then the farmer would be on his own farm, and the artisan in his own shop; and whether his habitation were included in the limits of Prussia ox of Austria , whether it were called protestant or catholic, would not be to him a matter of in- terest; he would find equal protection in each district, by laws made and obeyed by his own delegates. “ A Confederation of States, whose interior go- vernments should, be founded on these principles, might indeed extend through Europe with the pro- ject of Henry IV , and be as lasting as was imagined by the fervid benevolcnee of St. Pierre ; but it would not be a confederation of hereditary pro- prietors of nations. ' Hence we may conclude, so far as ihe expe- rience of mankind will enable us to judge from practice, and so far as the nature of the ease will strengthen our conclusions from theory, that no ( 19 ) considerable advantage ought to be expected Horn the federal principle among states , unless the states themselves are constituted on the representative principle ; so as that the system in both its branches may be the work of the people , carried on for their benefit, by persons of their own choice, and tinder their own control. Second ; In the other branch of the present examination, to discover the effect of the repre- sentative principle, without the aid of federaliz- ing, we shall receive but little light from the ex- perience of ciny nation. Thoic is no 6X3. in pit 3 within my knowlege, of a complete representative government of an elder date than those Oi oui own country •, and those were effectually federalized as soon as they were formed, and befoie. it is true that the government of Connecticut and hhode- Island were as perfectly representative before the American revolution as they are now ; and some other of their sister colonies had been at some pe- riods nearly so. But their common tie with the monarchy of Great Britain, answered some of the purposes of a federal union. They were not inde- pendent, and no state on earth, in my opinion, ought to be called independent. For as no state can really be so in fact, it is only a source of false; ideas and of endless calamities to have them so in form. . France, and the other ndw republics in Europe, cannot be said as yet to have had much experience of the representative principle. Their practical governments are hitherto revolutionary •, and must of necessity continue so till the end of the revolu- tionary war which has been excited to dcstioy them. There being therefore no example of real repre- sentative government, except in the American States , and these being united by strong federal ( 20 ) tics, we are driven to theoretical inquiry alone o i the opinion we ought to form of the operation of the republican principle among individual and an onfederated states. We should begin by observing that such states must necessarily be small , for the reasons already noticed ; otherwise the representative energy can- not be well preserved , nor the benefits of’ equal government be experienced by every portion of tfie people. If the states are small, their territo- iics contiguous, and their governments indepen- dent, they will necessarily be rivals; there will probably be mutual restrictions on their trade , for t he sake of revenue ; there will be forts and armies and generals ; it will not be long before some citi- zen s in each state will conceive themselves to have a private property in their respective governments, and an interest in extending the dominion of their own state, to the detriment of the others; they will have sycophants to flatter this fatal ambition , places and patronage. at their disposal, and a num- ber of new departments and tjjeir appendages to be created at the moment of a rupture with their neighbours. r l he Hi st cannon fired between two rival stales in this situation, may be taken as the signal of the departure of liberty from them both. The power in each state becomes military ; military power is necessarily concentred in a few hands, where it soon becomes hereditary. The rest of the history of such states might as well be written before they exist , as after they are extinguished. But it would not he worth writing at all; it would be but the repetition of some indifferent chapter in the great history of despotism and war. Since then, my fellow citizens, it is to you that we must turn for the best practical lessons on the subject of government, in both the principles. ( 2 I ) ,qn- which your system is founded, you will at least acknowlege the importance of maintaining, those principles. And I hope at the same feme that you will not be averse to making sucklim- provements in your situation as the nature, of you? system will admit, without changing its theory,. Tour objects are: 1 , to secure the continuance of interior liberty, in the United States; and^yrto take such an attitude in vindicating your eortyftefr cial liberty , as to gain the confidence of other Powers , and lay the foundation of.perpetual pqacje , at least between you and them;, possibly between all commercial nations. These two objects are so essential to your own prosperity , and at the same time so accordant with that desire which is natural to uncorrupted minds, of extending benefits :ip other sections of the human race, that yon yy ill indulge me in a few observations upon each.' " • ■ i. ■ uv 1 ::;;: - The means of securing interior liberty in the United States. ‘ • . ,v ;1 ■ '■■■ " y. ‘"u _ : <'•:) ^ I will not go into an examination of the state Constitutions, nor propose to your consideration those amendments of which some of them appear susceptible; because it is at all times a delicate subject ; and to give it. a candid discussion requires a moment of less fermentation than the present. It is not a work of immediate necessity; though some parts of it should not be neglected till your population is very greatly increased, and till cer- tain habits founded on constitutional defects be- come too inveterate to be easily removed. But there are other objects of a more general concern/ ( 22 ) which may be noticed with less danger of giving offence; and which doubtless demand an early at- tention. The face of things in North America is chang- ing so exceedingly fast, that every political step you take ought to have a special reference to the time to come , as well as to the time present. No government should have so little to do with tem- porizing, and so much to do with system, as that of the United States. The science of politi- cal perspective ought to be rendered familiar to those who aspire to be your guides; so that the great events which are sure to happen, may be classed and measured, and their places assigned them, before they come into being. Without this precaution , it would be impossible to go right; with it, the task of governing would he so easy that honest men would scarcely go wrong. The approaching changes in our situation should be distinctly noticed, and their consequences pro- foundly meditated, i, Our nation is young in respect to the date of its independence, the habits of thinking . incident to this condition, and the trial we have had of our political institutions. 2 , One half of the territory within our limits remains unoccupied, on the other half the population is small , compared with what it is capable of becom- ing; and the increase must be rapid. 3, Exten- sive and flourishing colonies are springing up be- yond our frontiers in every direction, These are of various extraction , principally Spanish , French and English ; all of them , from the impulse given them by their mother countries, are doubtless un- friendly to us ; but all of them , from real interest, similarity of circumstances, and future inevitable events, are capable of becoming our natural and best friends , and, with proper management, our fellow citizens. Not many years can pass before ( 23 ) these colonies will shake off their foreign depen- dence, and burst the ties which now bind them to European governments. These are some of the principal circumstances to be consulted in supporting the interior of our system. The events are easy to foresee; they must be provided for; and it depends on you from this moment to say whether they shall redound to our advantage, and to the extensive benefit of ages and nations; or whether they shall bring destruc- tion to our hopes, and overturn the fairest fabric of human policy that the world has hitherto seen, I will waste no arguments in proving that it is essential to the interest of the United States to continue their federal union, whatever may be the increase of population and tlic addition of new states within our present limits. Taking this to be a position which will not be denied by those for whom I write, I will content myself with no- ticing the means by which alone the union can be preserved. First : The United States , t0 maintain their federal system entire , through all their limits , and under approaching circumstances, must be/ out of debt , or nearly so. The annual call for money, for federal purposes, must be moderate. Otherwise the people in different districts, who see with what simplicity and economy their own stale governments are carried on, and who know that much the greater part of their real interests arc regulated there, will begin to calculate, and en- quire whether their part of the expences of the confederation does not exceed its benefits. Such enquiries indeed would be of a nature not to be pursued with the utmost fairness: nor could we expect calculations of this sort to be conducted with all that foresight which Lite subject would re- quire. There is no doubt but prudence would m--: oictate to any district of the Union to submit ti* very, great expences, rather than withdraw from if, and become a rival nation. But experience teaches us -.that in political resentments we are not to expect much prudence or true policy. T Q ,^ ee P frontier districts attached to the Ufiiou, we must rely more on their passions and their sense of present convenience, than on their prudence and their calculation of future conve- nience. We should not forget that the United States are to be held together by interest, not by loree. And the federal government should conduct 1 .l # e r ations 1,1 suc ^ a manner as that this interest s 1 . a'wavs be felt by every state, and act upon the inhabitants, as a steady principle of union • since there, is no other on which we can depend. ,. J, iT the oU governments of Europe the people of different districts are held together under one head by .the co-operation of several causes which do not existwitu us. A military force, ora standing army, acts; as a constant pressure on them, both by the terror it excites, and the great number of places it ojiers to the nobility and the ambitious of everv class. To this is added a superstitious veneration or , a .reigning family, who never fail to he painted to then subjects as the centre of every virtue and the particular favorites of heaven; so that with- drawing from their government is considered as re- bellion against God. . Then comes the machinery of a state religion, which is kept in continual plav by a host of artful men, who teach that every thin'"- beyond their own dominion is heretical and repro- )ate. And farther to discourage every wish for a (.range, the people are so hemmed in by nations as miserable as themselves, that they perceive that gioat taxes and other vexations are not to be avoid- ed by shifting their allegiance, and looking to the ( 25 ) right, instead of the left, for the centre of their government. We shall deceive ourselves exceedingly if vye suppose that any of these causes are to operate in the western and southern districts of the United States. Our system of policy does not admit of standing armies ; and if it did, we could not sup- port one sufficiently strong to restrain a whole peo- ple who have arms in their hands, who should think themselves oppressed, and determine to be free. No superstition, that is likely to be lasting or extensive, is yet established among us, in favor of any one man or family ; for notwithstanding the pains that are taken to deify some of our citizens, and to propagate an opinion that tney can do no wrong, these' efforts are ridiculed by the mass of people whom they were intended to deceive. . As to religion, the sects are so numeious in America, and the people are so convinced, that whate vei con- cern they may have in it must be personal and not political, that the general government cannot hope to establish a uniformity of worship, and therefore can never make it a powerful engine of state. And with regard to the last article above mentioned, that of being surrounded by nations habituated to oppression, this is totally wanting in our country. If therefore the federal government becomes op- pressive to the people of the frontier states, or only appears to be so, there is no other example o op- pression in their neighbourhood with wnicn to compare it; their reasoning in this case wiL be very short: “-Nothing binds us to this boasted Union; it is at least an inconvenience to us; let us shake it off, and be our own Union; or, it we are not strong enough for that, let us form auotaer with the Spanish or English colony in our neigh- bourhood, where every encouragement is hex! out ( ) to us ; where, having no national debt, we shall have no taxes, but for the current expences of a government, which, being of our own formation, shall be kept within the bounds of economy.” These good people will not perhaps reflect on the immense inconveniencies which would after- wards arise both to them and us from our new condition of two or more rival nations, bordering on each other, having each an extensive line of forts and garrisons, standing armies and frequent wars to maintain ; which would inevitably plunge ns all into the gulf of monarchy, nobility, and priest- hood ; from which we never could arise, or regain the ground we should have lost. ■Should this letter reach the inhabitants of the frontier states and districts ol our common coun- try, 1 beg, *on the one hand, that they will not be offended at the apprehension that 1 express, that a disposition may one day arise in them to dissolve their union with their sister states ; and they will pardon my fears if no such event is likely to occur, but, on the other hand, if these apprehensions are well founded, I entreat them to listen for a moment to the voice of the most disinterested fiiend that will probably ever discuss the subject. Let them look at the condition of Europe, and contemplate its history through the bloody, series of modern ages. It is divided into rival states, that call themselves independent ; which is another word for the ferocity of savage life, and a licence for organized violence. These states are separated from each other by triple or quadruple ranges of fortified towns, whose inhabitants, from age to. age subjected to military law, are shut up at night like cattle, and pursue their labours by day under the shade of the bayonet, within the view of an in solent soldiery, whose ranks are supplied by drain- ing the country of its best young men, and whose ( 27 ) pay and provisions are drawn from the hard indus- try of those who remain behind. The commerce of these independent nations is so harrassed with duties and imposts, m passing through different dominions, that very little ot it can be carried on. A barrel ot sugar, brought into the middle of Germany, must have paid at least six or eight different taxes. And when the consumer has any produce of his own labor lo send abroad it is loaded with as many more burthens, betoie it ean arrive at market. . ...... . .1 Such is their condition m their best times, the times of peace; but in the years of war, which aie about half the years of every generation ot these unhappy men, immense armies are set m motion; whole countries are overspread and exhausted > the marches of successive hordes of friends and enemies, confederates and allies-; whose- undistin- guished voracity excites equal terror among the in- habitants. Sieges, battles, hospitals,, prisons, .pesti- lence and famine, sweep oft hau the population o each country, and force their princes at last to a temporary cessation of butchery, which they call peace. Perhaps the halves of some provinces are severed from one dominion, and annexed to anoth- er; and this they call conquest- - This occasions a new line of frontier, and new ranges of fortifica- tions to be run through an interior country, cut- ting up the cultivated fields, and forcing the own- ers (who cannot fly from the devastation; to uol .y at the new trenches and ramparts, to prepare this- transfiguration of nature, and be reat y .01 ano ici This picture is not overcharged ; and if it should be thought inapplicable to the present subject, be- cause modern Europe is governed y .eicii y princes, and the projected independent govei mnen o of America expect to be republics, let us 00.x acn (28) for another example to the states of anciect Greece. Those stales were most of them called republics, and were independent of each other; and among the five or six hundred years of their political ex- istence, from the commencement of history till they became a Homan province, i believe there was not a single year when i hey can be said to have been completely. ai peace among themselves. .. o; the evil is rot altogether in the nature of ttie inte- rior government ; though this in itself, when bad, is a gi eat source of calamities . a still greater soi ree, if possible, is in the indepenoence and rivalship of neighbouring governments. What a long and unin ten upted senes of. wars between In gland and Scotland was arrested by. the union of the two crowns, and afterwards of the two kingdoms ! — And how much more extensive and more°la men ta- ble would have been the scenes, ©^slaughter among the American States, had we left them independent of each (other, after effecting their independence from Great Britain. Since, then, we have found the means of avoid- ing these disasters, — since we have established a union of interests and of s tads, which may bid de- fiance to every possible enemy but ourselves, shall we, not have the wisdom to preserve this union? ohad we, on the one side, indulge in the prodigali- ty of increasing our debt, and in a proud indiffer- ence to the opinions of an irritable and powerful portion of the nation ; and on the other side, will tnat portion run wild with an untimely resentment, and not consent to a small and temporary sacrifice, rather than plunge themselves and their brethren, vvijji all their intermingled posterity, into calami- ties without measure and without end ^--calami- ties which are inseparable from a disjunction of the states, and the frightful experiment of independent and rival governments, whose tempers will have been already imbittered by the act of separation? . ( 29 ) It is doubtless to be lamented that ihe debt of lbs United Slates has risen to shell a formidable size; and that there still seems to be a disposition to increase it, from pretences so frivolous as to be clearly seen through by those whom they were in- tended to blind and mislead. It is impossible that the smallest portion of the American people has been made to believe that there was any conceiva- ble danger of an invasion from France; and the resentment occasioned by the creation of that part of the debt which has been raised on this pretence must therefore' be sharpened by the impudent at- tempt to impose on their understanding. That great and wanton augmentation of the fe- deral debt in the year 1790, which arose from the assumption of those of the individual states, was founded on a very singular argument: it was aid that this measure would have a tendency to cement the federal union. Why was it not foreseen that precisely the contrary must be the effect. While the state remained the debtor and its own citizens the creditor, neither of them could find relief by withdrawing from the union ; the citizens in fact were 'all debtors, and as many of them as chose to be were creditors. Rut now they would both find relief by withdrawing; for by that act all the citi- zens of such a state would cease to be debtors, while the creditors would remain the same. These would have only to sell their stock and receive pay- ment ; and. then that s’ate would have nothing more to do with the burthens of the late wag nor with the subsequent accumulation of the national debt. If there can be an argument proper to en- gage a staLe or district to withdraw from the union, this is certainly one. Perhaps I mistake the present temper of the Ame- rican people; but it appears to me that the greatest risk we run of a dismemberment of the empire, r 3o ) arises from the magnitude of the debt. There are many other reasons why its progress ought to bo arrested where it is, and the capital diminished as fast as possible; but the greatest of all reasons is the preservation of the federal system, on which our liberty and happiness most essentially depend. This argument, I apprehend, has not been suffi- ciently attended to. America* Besides the magnitude of our debt, the manner of funding it has had a pernicious influence on the policy of our government with foreign powers. The payment of the interest was made to depend in a great measure on the duties to be levied on im- ported merchandize, which were by law appro- priated for fifteen years to this object. This made every stock-holder a partizan of our commercial connections with' that country whose commerce w'ith us was supposed principally to secure this re-, venue; however injurious those connections might become to the general interest of the United States. It is greatly owing to this unfortunate measure that our commerce has suffered so much during the present war from English and French depredations. For no one will deny that the latter were occasioned by our tame submisson to the former. Second: As the government belongs to the peo- ple, and not the people to the government, it is proper that the latter should be as accommodating as possible with regard to the place of its residence. The existing law, by which the Congress has pledg- ed itself to remove to the Federal City at a certain time, ought to suffer no delay in its execution, after that time arrives. If that law had carried the Federal City eighty or a hundred miles farther up the Polowmac, it would have been still more central, and doubtless would have had a greater effect in preserving the union entire, <3i) The article is trifling in itself; but every thing in this world goes by appearance. It would have been a mark of attention, a complaisance, an ac- commodation to our western brethren, that would have been worth millions in fixing their affections. It is doubtless too late to think of changing the re- solution already taken by the legislature ; but it would doubtless be impolitic to admit of a new delay, as many persons apprehend, in carrying it into effect. Third: The opening of roads, and the improve- ment of water communication between the central and the frontier states, should be objects of con- stant solicitude, not only to the state legislatures and to Congress, as far as may be in their power, but to patriotic individuals and companies, where- ever they can reconcile private interest with so great apublic benefit. A facility of intercourse for the objects of com- merce, travelling and the transportation of letters, would have a powerful effect in assimilating our manners, and inspiring that confidence and friend- ship so necessary to the political union of men who feel themselves able at all times to change .their connexions at pleasure. A system of small canals, as projected by one of our most estimable citizens, on a plan so extensive as to take place generally of public roads in the most frequented routes, may one day be presented to the consideration of the federal government. This is not the moment to enter into a developernent ot the project, either in its political or fiscal operaiion. I will only observe that in both these views it would greatly serve to harmonise the interests of the states, and to strengthen their present union. Fourth: A universal attention to the education of youth, and a republican direction given to tiie elementary articles of public instruction, are among ( 32 ) the most essential means of preserving liberty in any country where it is once enjoyed ; especially in the United States. The representative system must necessarily degenerate, and become an insrument of tyranny, rather than of liberty, where there k> an extraordinary disparity of information between the generality of the citizens and those wdio aspire to be their chiefs. And as to the federal ties be- tween the different states, how shall they be main- tained, but by extending the views and enlightening the minds of those whose votes are frequently to be consulted, and whose actions are always irre- sistible by their numbers, and the direction which they take. Ignorance is every where such an infallible in- strument of despotism, that there can be no hope of continuing even our present forms of government, either federal or state, much less that spirit of equal liberty and justice on which they were found- ed, but by diffusing universally among the people that portion of instruction which is sufficient to teach them their duties and their rights. We must not content ourselves with saying, that education is an individual interest and a family concern; and that every parent, from a desire to promote the welfare of his children, will procure them the necessary instruction, as far as may be in his power, which will be enough for their station. These assertions are not true; parents are sometimes too ignorant, and often too inattentive or avaricious, to be trusted with the sole direction of their chil- dren ; unless stimulated by some other motive than a natural sense of duty to them. Neither is it merely a family concern ; it is a civil and even a political concern. The legislator and the magistrate neglect an essential part of their duty, if they do not pro- vide the means and carry them into effect, for giving instruction to every member of the state. ( 33 ) This may be done with very little expence, and with much less trouble than is generally ima ined. The subject appears to me to be too much neglect- ed in the United Staets in general, considering Miatf the preservation of liberty depends in a great mea- sure upon it. ... Fifth : What shall we say of thorn gigantic colo- nies that are forming on our frontiers, to the west- ward of the Mississipi. and to the northward of the lakes? These are germs of empire, which offer an immense field ot meditation to the Ame. ican politi- cian. How soon, and by w'hat combination of events, are they to become independent states?- - When’ that day arrives, are they to be our rivals, and consequently our enemies, after the example of the states of Europe? Ur can the way be pre- pared and they be persuaded to adopt our princi- ples, to form with us a,great union of political in- terests, and make of the whole but one. eonferated empire? These questions hurry the mint! into an awful train of thought, which is difficult to metho- dize and delicate to communicate. Yet no branch of the enquiry is useless; since it contemp ates an event the most important that can probably affect our Constitution ; and one which a prudent con- duct on our part may modify in a very considerable degree. I do not mean that it will be our duty to interfere in their present concerns, or to take any part in any dispute that may happen between t!*ein and their present governments, wulhaview to hasten or retard the moment ot their separation. But it is essential, that we should so conduct our own affans as to set such an example of rational liberty ana public happiness, as they cannot fail to admire, and must therefore wish to partake. Our frontier states, which border on tneirs, must necessarily entertain an intimate and extensive in- E / ( 34 ) tercourse with them. Reciprocal migrations and niterinainages will be numerous between them-, their commerce will be active ; their manners, lan- guage and modes of education will be the same on both sides. Tim probability is, that if we do not induce them to join themselves to us, they will in- duce some of our extensive districts to quit us, and join with them. i United States should be c.eai of debt, and should exhibit the singular phe- nomenon of a wise, impartial, and energetic govern- ment, leserving so much power to individual states as tliall enable the people to regulate the great mass ot their most interesting concerns at home, where they are best understood, and yet continuing a sufficient force in the federal head to insure at all tunes the means of giving protection and obtaining respect, there can be no insuperable objection^ and tijcie may be a powerful inducement, for those new nations, to form their state governments after Urn model of ours, and to join our confederation. 1 am aware of the inconvenience that might arise from the magnitude of this projected empire; as the coienies in question aie spreading over a surface at leasL equal to that of the present United States. Ihe dejection is weighty, but my answer is at hand; >y encountering this inconvenience, which is new, and theiefore loimidable in appearance, we avoid ■ 1-iose that are infinitely more serious ; though from being familiar and thought unavoidable they ans less attended to. T here is no political inconve rnence so great as^ the neighbourhood of indepen- dent and rival nations. Their commercial restric- tions, l heir military preparations, their fortified frontiers, their interfering jurisdictions, their whim- sical and undehnable points of honor, give so many Caucasians of dispute in the minds of 0 passionate or ambitious men, that such nations, if not always at ( 35 ) war* must be always in such a warlike posture as to present a perpetual image of the savage state, ^ degrade the morals and devour the substance of the people. Besides, I apprehend, that if we well consider the nature of a federal government, we shall have, less reason to dread the extension of its limits. The objects of its legislation are few, according to our present system ; and I have no doubt but this might still be simplified, without risk oflessenkrg its ener- gy. If its simplification should be found practica ble, this circumstance may add to the inducements- that our neighbours may one day have to join us in confederation, and may diminish on our side the inconvenience which many will apprehend from the first viewoflhe case. Though the Achaian and the Lyeian confede- racies were the most perfect that history has trans- mitted to us, we ought to recollect, that the former was overturned by refusing to admit the state of Sparta as a member ; and the destruction of the latter was brought on by its- excluding sixty cities which desired to join it. The interest w r e shall have in inducing new na- tions to join our union, instead of being our rivals, is a stong argument, in addition to many others, for preserving at least as much power to our indivi- dual states as they now possess, and for not suffer- ing any encroachment from the federal government. It is convenient, as well as inviting, for every sec- tion of a free people to' regulate as many of their own affairs at home as is consistent with the inte- rest of the whole. And when their federalizing with us depends on their own choice, they will be more likely to do it if the requisite sacrifice of pow- er should be small, than if i t should be great. I hope none will infer from the observations in this article, that I am an advocate for conc/uest, ia ( 36 ) any case whatever; and still less that I would ex- tend the limits of a dominion by colonies and foreign possessions. Nothing is more destructive to liber- ty, both at home and abroad, tiian this sort of po- licy, There is no do. bt (all other circumstances being equal) but small dominions are preferable to large ones. It is only to avoid the greater evils of the independence and rivaiship of states, that I would consent to an extension of limits. And this would be scarcely tolerable, but on the federal plan ; which I regard as one of the most usefid and most consoling experiments to be found in the history of government. There is no knowing yet to what extent it may be carried. Sixth : The more 1 reflect on the nature of poli- tical liberty, the more I am convinced that a mili- tary establishment of any magnitude is extremely incompatib e with it. The most effectual way of preventing this, as well the surest mode of pro- viding for the defence ot the country, is by a uni- versal attention to arming and disciplining the militia. When every citizen is a soldier, and every soldier will be a citizen, military exercise, to a certain degree, should be considered as a part of education ; and though a subordinate pat t, it should not be neglected. But it is happy for us that military life,, as an exclusive object, is not yet become a profession in the United Slates. There are very few evils of a political kind that would be more subversive of their liberty. Ambition, which has been so de- structive to national happiness, could scarcely be taken in a bad sense, but for its usual association with military fame. And if excellence in warlike achievements, in themselves considered, without regard to the cause, should once become an object of pursuit with the young men of America, it would soon be found impossible to keep us out of unne- ( I * 3 7 ) cessary wars, and all th in. series and degradations of character that they entrain. 'I he epidemy would seize, as usual, the ric hest and most influen- tial families i the rage v\ ould become fashionable ; it would be made an object of real profit, as well as of supposed honor. And how many votes, in the freest governments in Europe, have been given for war, from no other motive than that of provid- ing places for sons, brothers, cousins, or the voters themselves? War has hitherto been considered in America, I belreve by every class of people, as a calamity to be avoided, in all possible cases by all rational means. It probably may be avoided, as long as we aie out of the neighbourhood of independent nations; and as long as the ambition of our leading men shall be directed to the true interests of society. II. The means of vindicating our commercial liberty. I noticed to you in my former letter that the American commerce, so far from requiring the pro- tection of a navy, was of a nature capable of pro- tecting itself and us against the aggressions of all those powers with which it is principally carried on. This idea requires some developement, which I will endeavour to give it in this place; and 1 do not despair of establishing the principle so clearly, that it may serve as ihe basis of a system which you will mature in your cooler inomen ts, and carry into practice on all future occasionsj When pieseni passions shall have subsided, and an interval of peace shail be restored to Europe, there yvill be a proper occasion for you to come to a definition and declaration of the rights of neutral commeicc ; and ( 38 ) at the same time to declare the manner in which' you will defend those rights. With regard to what are the rights of neutral commerce, and what in my opinion ought to be so declared and maintained by you, I cannot express my ideas with more precision than I have done in a memoir and the project of a declaration written at the desire of one of the members of the French government a few days ago y at the moment when drey were framing their new constitution. Our intention then was to cause such a declaration to be prefixed to the constitution. But that work was to be hurried through with so much precipitancy that its authors concluded to adjourn to a future day, as a subject of consideration to the legislative body, the declaratory act first proposed to be con- secrated in a more solemn form. I will subjoin a cppy of the memoir and proposed declaration as an Appendix to this letter, only observing that, by what I can discover of the prevailing disposition of this government, the principles therein contained are gaining ground, and will probably one day be enacted. (1) Although it would have been desirable that France, or some other first rate Power in Europe, should take the lead in establishing doctrines which tend Lo so great a change in the maritime law of nations, yet the position of the American govern- ment is such, that it is not necessitated to wait the decision of any foreign Power, before pronouncing its own. For of all subjects touching the law of nations, it is that on which it is the most easy to discern what is right; and of all governments in the world, that of the United States is the bestable to carry into effect its own decisons on that subject. Vou have only to mark out the ground which is (i). It would facilitate the intelligence of what follow?, to Juul the appendix before proceeding with the let ter . < 3 9 ) just; and that ground is tenable by you. Refering then to the Appendix for what 1 have to observe on the nature of the lights to be defended, I will close this letter by suggesting the most eligible means by which you may defend them, ^Iiad the French Republic adopted the projected declaration, 1 intended, in consequence of the in- vitation held out in the seventh article, to put into some channel of consideration a proposition to the following effect: ‘‘There shall be a treaty, called the Maritime Convention , formed by and between as many Pow- ers as may choose to be parties to it in the hist instance ; and it shall be afterwards acceded to in- definitely by such other Powers as may at any time think proper to subscribe to its conditions, “ The object of this Conven tion is : 1 , To define and declare the rights of neutral commerce ; which shall be done in the instrument itself: 2 , A ge- neral and mutual guarantee of those rights, among the parlies, by the operation of commerce alone; without resorting to an armed force by land or sea, in any case provided for in this Convention. But if such resort should hereafter be found necessary, - it may be authorised and regulated by a subsequent treaty, which shall be regarded as supplementary to this, and predicated on the practical insuffi- ciency of the penalties herein prescribed. These I presume, however, for the reasons I am going to explain, will always be found sufficient; and in such case it would doubtless be more detrimental than beneficial to provide for any armament at all. “To effectuate this mutual guarantee among the parties, there shall be established a Chancery of the Maritime Convention, composed of one dele- gate from each contracting Power, to assemble at some convenient place, not within the limits of any ©1 the great maritime nations, but if possible in one (4o) of the Hanseatic towns. The Chancery shall he always rrr session in time of war; that is to say, when one or more of the contracting parties, or any other maritime Power of Europe shall be at war. When no such war exists, the Chancery shall name, out of its own body, a committee of vacation; which shall remain pe maneilt during the time of peace. The nomination of the com- mittee of vacation shall be notified to the several contracting parties; its powers shall be the same in peace as those of the whole Chancery in war; ana it shall have moreover the power of convoking the other members on extraordinary occasions. “If the rights of neutral commerce, as declared by this convention, shall be violated in the pro- perty of any one of the contracting parties, or in that of their citizens or subjects, By the order or by the citizens or subjects of any other of the con- tracting parties, or by those of any other Power not a party to this convention, complaint thereof ^sliall be made within a reasonable time by the Power offended, both to the Chancery and of the Maritime Convention, and to the offending Power, accompanied always with such proofs as the nature of the case will reasonably admit. The Chancery shall decide on the first view of the case, and with- out citing either party, whether the complaint is well founded or not; and, if well founded, it shall immediately decree the sum of damages in money Which it shall find to be just, and shall notify the same to the offending Power, “If within three months after notification made to the offending Power, it being in Europe, or in six months, it being in America, the full sum de- creed in damages is not paid into the hands of the Chancery, then the offending Power shall be de- clared by the Chancery to be under the Ban of Commerce , until full payment shall be made, not (40 only of the sum already decreed in favof of the complainant, but of the other sums forfeited to the other contracting parties by this neglect, and payable as compensations, as explained below. “ The effect of the Ban of Commerce declared by the Chancery shall be, that every Power, being a party to the Maritime Convention, shall with- draw all commercial intercourse from the ban* dieted Power, its citizens or subjects, until the Ban shall be removed by the declaration of the Chancery*! Which removal of the Ban, shall be made immediately on payment being received of the several sums before mentioned. “ By withdrawing all commercial intercourse, in the sense of this Convention, is understood pro- hibiting the vessels of the bandicted Power, and those of its citizens or subjects, or any goods, wares or merchandize of the produce or manufac- ture of their country or dominions, to enter the ports or country of the party withdrawing such in- tercourse ; and likewise prohibiting its own citi- zens or subjects from frequenting the ports or places of the bandicted Power, refusing to clear any vessel, whether national or foreign, for any such port or place, and laying them under bonds not to frequent them during any voyage for which a clearance may be granted. But the obligation to withdraw commercial intercourse shall not neces- sarily extend to recalling ambassadors, other pub- lic agents or consuls. “In cases where payment is compelled by re- sorting to tlqe Ban of Commerce, the offending Power shall be held to pay to the Chancery for each contracting party wnich shall have concurred in executing the Ban (as a compensation for da* mages done their commerce in executing the same) a sum equal to the sum decreed in favor of the ot- F r*o .fending Power. A new decree to this effect shall S° fortl1 with the declaration of the Ban of Com- merce ; and the same Ban shall be continued till these several sums, together with the one first de- creed, shall be acquitted. “But although, for the sake of expediting the operations of the mutual guarantee contemplated in this Convention, it is ordered that the Chancery shall pronounce immediately on the ex parte hear- ing of the first complaint, and shall suffer no delay in executing its decree, yet it is provided that the sum paid on such decree for .the complainant, if paid without resorting to the Ban of Commerce, shall remain in the hands of the Chancery /or six months, to wait a reclamation and a rehearing of the cause ; which shall always be had by the party paying, if demanded within six mon ths after volun- tary payment. And on this trial both parties shall be invited to ’appear. But in no case shall final judgement be delayed more than one year after such payment. From this final judgement of the Chancery there shall be no appeal ; and the money shall be paid over without dely to the party having- right. Sums paid for the other contracting parties" as compensations for executing the Ban, shall never remain in the Chancery, but shall be paid over to them without delay, and cannot be reclaimed. “ Wlreu the Chancery, on the final hearing, shall reverse its first judgment, and restore the money to the reclaimant, it may likewise decree an ad- ditional sum in damages against the first com- plainant, as a fine imposed on him, if there be cause; that is to say, if Iris complaint shall finalh appear to have been ill-founded, and brought with a fraudulent design. The sum of damages so de- creed 4 shall in no case exceed the amount of the first decree ; it shall be notified in the same man- taer, a like term shall be allowed for payment, and ( 4 %\ tiis same mode of compulsion, by declaring t I j e Ban of Commerce, as before prescribed. On final payment to the Chancery, the sum shall be paid over without delaj to the party having right. And in cases where payment of damages shall be com- pelled, by resorting to the Ban of Commerce, an equal sum shall be paid to each of the Powers ex- ecuting the same, as in cases of first decrees. But. there is no rehearing of a cause where payment on the first decree has "been compelled by the Ban of Commerce. “ The penalty and mode of compulsion here pro- posed, for a breach of the Maritime Convention, appear to me abundantly sufficient for the object* whether of prevention or atonement : 1, because' they are of a nature similar to the offence,— a com- mercial deprivation for- a commercial violence : 2, because those maritime Powers, which are most likely to commit these aggressions, are the most dependent on that extensive intercourse and ex- change of commodities, of which tire Ban. of Com- merce would be asudden and almost insupportable suspension: indeed most of our nations- have now become so commercial,, that no greater evil could be inflicted on them by their neighbours,, than w hat is here contemplated,. provided, this Conven- tion becomes as general as may be: expected: 3 , because the great objection to the Armed Neutrali- ty of the year 1780* and what would always pre- vent such a plan from being carried into effect on a scale sufficiently great to produce any permanent amelioration,, was the unwielcliness of the compul- sory measures necessary to command’ respect. To seek redress in all cases by arms, and to have its success depend on contingencies to be furnished in naval, armaments by a number of independent Powers, is a mode so expensive, so uncertain, and so unmanageable, that it never can be relied upon j. ( 44 ) andifit could, the remedy might be worfe than the disease; as it might involve in war the Powers which armed for the sake of peace. V A objection would have arisen to the project of Henry IV. for pacifying Europe by land. 1 he mode of compulsion would have been unma- nageable, and probably dangerous to the nations it was meant to protect. The mode of compulsion in the plan of unarmed neutrality here projected IS simple, analogous to the object, easy and unex- pensive in its execution, and exceedingly pungent A sincere desire in the contracting parties to preserve the peace of Europe, against all the other pretexts on which it is usually violated, may pos- sibly induce them to extend the powers of the chancery in question, to all other branches of the rights of nations, as well as to those relating to commerce. In that case they will doubtless a|ree upon and declare a new code of public law, or Law of Rations, complete in all its parts; and commit the conservation of it to this body of delegates. “ I shall not pursue this branch of the subject at present, because it would require immense de- tails. In an operation so new, it will be best to begin with that part whose simplicity and daily utility shall recommend it to the most prejudiced observers. And if once the Maritime Convention ? an , „ ° r § amze( J’ lts principle may be extended as it shall be found practicable. I will not however lose this occasion of making one remark ; that the commercial mode of compulsion here suggested would probably be the most proper for all cases to which this chancery or any other arbiters of nations might apply their powers. In such high and deli- cate concerns much will depend on the mode ofcom- pulsion as well as on tho nature of the penalty. They should both be moderate 5 and, if possible. (45) let them be commercial, and not military. The commercial will go by weight and measure, and will always be kept within the intended bounds; the military will run wild, and excite passions of false glory,* incompatible with the object we have in view." Such is the basis of a project, which might have been offered to the consideration of the Maritime Powers, had the way been opened by some public manifestation of a desire to discover the best mode of preventing national disputes. 1 introduce it here in the form of an imperfect sketch ; as this is not the channel, and as there exists at present no good occasion, to offer it in the form of a finished project. But though these crude conceptions may be of some utility, in exciting future attention to a theory of so much importance, yet this is not the princi- pal reason for my inserting them in this letter. I design them as introductory to what I have to say on the practical system which the United States may adopt for themselves' without any further delay. Your situation does not require you, on this sub- ject to stop short at theories, or to wait till you can persuade other powders to join you in reducing them to practice. But, on the contrary, by commenc- ing the system for yourselves alone, you will con- vince them of its good effects, and leave them to join you at theirleisure. It is probable indeed, that contrary to most other experiments, it would ope- rate with more precision on a large scale than on a small one; yet the trial which you alone would be able to give it would doubtless be successful. If so, the example would spread, and your efforts might finally point out to Europe the great deside- ratum of good men, the means of establishing a perpetual peace. You would prove beyond con tradiction that an unarmed neutrality is better than a.n armed one. ( 46 ) Your commerce, both active and passive, is un- commonly interesting to the principal • maritime 11a- loris of Europe, as a great source of nourishment to their manufactures and their agriculture ; and it likewise affords a considerable-source of revenue to their governments. There is not one of those na- Sions, to whom a sudden suspension, of its inter- course with you would not be a very serious evil.. We must acknowlege at the same lime, that it would he an evil to you ; but if your system, is well com- bined, the event will probably never occur. It is. only contemplated as an extreme case; a measure ot resort; and if ever put in practice, it will be to- avoid a much greater evil, that of war, or that of u n resen ted oppressi on.. The state of your agriculture and population is such compared with the extent of your territory that tne rate of interest will necessarily continue to be higher in the United States than ,in Europe for a great nuinbei of years ; and cprisequently our citizens will continue to be indebted* to those of the manufacturing nations in very large sums ; pro- oably not less than twenty or thirty millions of dol- lars will be the average of the general balance. To bring the whole subject into one view, and at the same time to save repetition, 1 am obliged to refer to what I noticed in my former letter on tins head, and on that of our European stock-holders, or the' public creditors of the United States- These several circumstances offer the materials out of which your system of defence may be easily formed. Every part of the operation, appears to be completely in your power, and must continue to be so ; for these advantages, can not fail you at least for half a century to come. Your object is to remain- at peace with all man- l. md, and to maintain a perfect neutrality whenever the powers of Europe are at war. You ought there- <47 ) fore to publish a solemn declaration of this inten- tion, and likewise a clear definition and declaration of the rights of neutrality which you mean to enjoy. In the same declaratory act should be contained an explanation of the means by which you will seek relief and compensation for every violation of those rights; from every foreign power, whether in time of war or peace. Your mode of compelling compensation might vary according to circumstances, there being seve- ral productive sources within your power, from which it may be drawn. You hav-e the sequestra- tion of private debts due from our citizens to the subjects of the offending power; you have the se- questration of such portions of your public debt as may be due the subjects of such power ; and, isi cases where these could not be found in sums suf- ficient to compensate the injury sustained (which is a thing scarcely possible) you have the suspension of all commercial intercourse with such powrnr, till compensation shall be made. Which compen- sation, when you resort to this last mode of com - pulsion, should be augmented in proportion to the probable inconveniencies that would result to your- selves from carrying it into effect. I say it is scarcely possible that this last mode need ever be resorted to, not that we are at pre- sent indebted either publicly or privately to the subjects of every maritime power in sufficient sums to furnish the government with a certain resource ; but I say it because we are sufficiently indebted to those among them who would be most likely to violate our rights, and because the return of peace and the customary run of confidence will soon ob- tain us sufficient credits with the others. The dif- ference in the rate of interest wall always warrant such a calculation ; and we know that such was uniformly the fact before rite present unprecedented ( 4 *) war. Besides, it ought to be observed, that most or the maritime powers are strongly interested in extending and maintaining the rights of neutral commerce ; and would wish to aid our pacific mode or defence, rather that defeat its object by violating its principle. ° It would not become me to go into the details necessary for lire organization of the plan. My object is only to invite your attention to the mea- sure by showing that there is a foundation on which i t may be established. But, what are the real and defensible rights of neutral commerce,-* what shall . the manner of proving arid notifying their viola Hon to the offending power , — what the rule of es- timating damages according to the different modes of compelling compensation, —what the constitution of the tribunal to be charged with receiving com- plaints , deciding on the first enquiry , and re-hear- ing the cause in case of disputed facts,- and what shall be the penalty against a citizen for preferring a fraudulent complaint, are questions which can only arise after the basis of the institution shall be found agreeable to your ideas of policy and justice. I am not inattentive to certain objections which may be made against some parts of the system ; neither am I confident of being able entirely to remove them. Those that should be raised against the principle of sequestering debts, are so fully an- swered in my former letter, that I have nothing new to add in this. But it will be said that a sud- den suspension of our commercial intercourse with any one of the great maritime powers, would create such a shock in the affairs of our merchants, and in the receipts of duties destined to the public trea- sury, as greatly to affect our interest. To this it must be replied: i, That generally speaking, in pro- portion to the amount of our commerce with any foreign power, is the amount of our debts to the ( 49 ) %'libjecls o f that power ; and there is nearly the same proportion between the debts we owe its subjects and its ordinary and well known disposition to in- fringe the rights of neutrals, and tyrannize at sea. The minor powers, to whom we owe little, have also little or oiir commerce, and are at the same time little disposed to tyrannize at sea ; because it is not their custom, being against their interest. These Facts render it almost impossible that the case, to which the objection is raised, will ever happen with a great commercial nation, where the shock of suspension would be greatly felt by us. They also render it very improbable with a minor nation'; and if it should happen there, the shock would be but small, But if we consider, that to any of these powers, whether great or small, the shock of a sudden suspension of our trade would be more sensible than it would be to us, and that Lhey must always foresee this effect, from the mo- ment of the declaration of our mode of defence, we shall be still more .'convinced that the event will never happen. a . Though the evil attending this extreme case, if it should occur. Would be considerable, it must not be forgotten, that a much greater one is avoided by it ; — - the evil of being humbled under every species of maritime insult, and of becoming the foot-ball of rival powers who strive which shall kick us the hardest, — or else that other evil (whe- ther greater or less than this) of a war ; in which there is no calculating the calamities to a young republic, in fiscal derangements, commercial dis- tresses, or loss of domestic liberty. During the present state of hostility in which Europe is involved, iniquitous and piratical as it is, there is no doubt, had we been prepared with a system of neutrality and defence like what is here G ( 5o proposed, but it would have carried us through without an insult, or none that would not ha^e been atoned without delay. Neglecting this pre- caution, how many millions have we suffered in property ? what humiliation in character ? And who can tell, after seven years plunder, whether we are not to be dragged into the war at last, or which side we are most likely to take? My great anxiety to serve the cause of liberty, and accelerate the progress of civilization, has alone induced me to address you these letters. I can have little hope however that my arguments will produce any immediate effect in exciting your at- tention to theories so abstracted from the great passions of the day. But principles remain, when the books that first contained them are forgotten; and I have so much confidence in those J here ad- vance, as to believe that they will descend to some future friend of humanity, who will find a more fortunate moment for their reception, and place them before the world in a clearer point of light. The prospect of thus contributing to a distant good, has made me write with pleasure ; and it ought to •engage you to read with patience. JOEL BARLOW. APPENDIX. MEMOIR ON CERTAIN PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC MARITIME LAW t; WRITTEN FOR. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT Paris, 5 Dec. 1799a ■ The several constitutions which- the French nation has hitherto given herself, have been pre- faced by a declaration of the Rights of Mart. It migh t not be improper that the present one should carry with it a; declaration- of th e Rights of nations-, I mean some of those great principles which would' tend to the preservation of tranquillity in Europe, and which would favor a state of peace rather than a state of war. A proper understanding of the Rights of Man is doubtless leading to great ameliorations in his civil state, and will throw much light on the science of interior legislation, of which, you may hope to profit as soon as you shall have passed the vicissi • tndes of the revolution. A proper understanding of the Rights of Nations, will perhaps enable you to avoid as many errors and as great evils in your exterior concerns ; and it ought likewise to be re- garded as one of the great objects ol the' same re- volution. (5a) Ic is probable that your new constitution will hasten the epoch of a general peace. This peace will have been so dearly bought, that you must widi to render it as permanent as possible; and you will doubtless be willing to adopt the means most proper to attain the end. You ought at this moment to ask yourselves, What are the most usual causes of war in the present stale of Europe, and now are these causes to be avoided in future? Is there not something vicious in the present organization of the great society of nations, relative to each other, especially in what is called the Ma- ritime Law of Nations, as- now understood in Eu- rope? Many articles in this maritime code are evidently calculated to favor a state of war, and to threw advantages into the hands of belligerent powers*, to the prejudice of neutrals. This of it- self is one inducement to war; and if it can be proved, that some of these articles might be amend- ed, is is hoped that no time will be lost in adopt- ing such amendments.. 1 i. T he whole system of privateering, and Letters of marejue and reprisal, ought to be forever abol- ished. It is easy to demonstrate the evils that arise nom this system, both in its general principleas it afreets the state of society in Europe, and as it ap- plies to the interest of the French nation in parti- cular. It is one inducement for vicious individuals, in all maritime countries, to wish for a state of war. Men of broken fortunes in the seaports, such as cap- tains of vessels, and other sailors, whose irregular conduct pi events their obtaining employment in icgulai business and peaceable times, — secretaries of state ministers, and chiefs of departments, who expect large gratifications for the commissions they obtain--- and other classes of men loo variousand too vile to oe specified in this place, all promise them- selves great profits from a loose piratical warfare; and ( 53 ) never fail to do all in their power to bring on bos--' tilitles, by irritating the parties at home and abroad. When their system of sea robbery is once li- censed, by a declaration of war, all bounds of mo- rality, and every tie of civil society are broken, with these classes of men. All means are lawful by which they can seize the property of others, whether friends or foes, neutrals, allies, or fellow- citizens. Every species of plunder, homicide, fraud and cruelty, that human ingenuity can in- vent, are practised without disguise; as they are sure to go unpunished by their own or any other governmen t. Vast quantities of property belonging to neutrals, being unjustly taken and destroyed, are clearly lost to all parties, and must be paid for by the go- vernment that allows such devastation; unless it avoids the payment by provoking such neutrals to take part in the war, and thus extend its ravages beyond the original intention of the parties. But this is not all. This terrible sacrifice of morals gains other classes of society. The regular- merchant leaves his accustomed business, and launches into the most extravagant speculations, founded on the cruelties and murders of an occupa- tion which he has not the courage to exercise him- self; though he renders himself equally guilty, by hiring others to do it for him. The contagion of unusual cupidity extends to every sort of people in the commercial towns. Sea robbery becomes the fashion of the country; manufactures are deserted for a more seducing prospect of gain ; and all the sea coast of every country at war, presents the af- flicting prospect of society relapsing into a state of barbarity and piracy", w r orse than the savage stale from which our arts and sciences have drawn 11s. Such are the general effects of privateering as observed in all European nations, But France ( 5 4 ) lias a. peculiar interest in prohibiting this vile arm degrading warfare. It never fails to deprive her of her seamen, and to cripple her national marine in a gieatei degree than it does her rivals the English The reason of this is obvious. France is an il cultural nation, rather than a commercial on. Her commerce is so little, in proportion to her military navy, that it is with great difficulty she can man her national ships in case of need,' She is obliged therefore to take landsmen to supply the oeficiency ; and she endeavours to balance the want of skill, by an augmentation of numbers. For this reason, the crew or a French ship is vastly more numerous than that of an English; they light to less advantage, and lose many more pri- soners. This is peculiarly the case with your pri- va leers. Hence it is that your privateers in the present war, have done little more than people the i nghsh pi isons with the best of your seamen. In- deed the maritime part of the present war, offers a vanety ol the most terrible examples of the fatal consequences of the system of privateering, in every light in winch the subject can be pla 1 therefore, as there can he no possible benefit mismg fiom the system, either in this or any other war— as your whole naval force can always be oisplayea to the best advantage in national ships, JliC . un - ei hie sole giuoari-ce of the supreme exe- rutive power,— as you will thus take away one of ! ’ 1 c inducements which bad men have to provoke hostilities and bring on a war,-- as vou will thus avoid doing injustice to neutrals abroad, restrain the violence of wicked men at home, and shut up a scnool of immorality which threatens destruction jo the whole system of human society, it is to be hoped that privateering, will be hereafter forever prohibited m France. ( 55 ) 2. Another branch of the maritime law of Eu- rope, which ought to undergo a serious consider- ation, at this time, is that which regards the rights of neutrality; especially in some contested points which are susceptible of a clear definition and a solemn declaration. The question whether the flag of a friend shall protect the cargo of an enemy, has been agitated in Europe for a century and a half, without being finally settled at this day. The practice of the Romans was in favor of the nega- tive; and that was sufficient fora long time after the revival of commerce to settle the practice in the early part of modern times. But the inconve- nience of this was found to be so great to neutrals, without procuring any solid advantage to belli- gerents, that the contrary practice began to be re- commended about the middle of the last century. It was found to be so much more convenient for all parties to allow the flag to protect the property, that the number of treaties in which the modern practice is adopted is almost as numerous, within the period above mentioned, as of those in which the ancient usage is maintained. The following is the list of treaties in which it is stipulated that the flag shall protect the cargo, in all cases except in contraband of war: In Holland, 1646 Hanse-Towns, '*55 1655 i6 59 1662 1678 v 1697 l 7'3 *739 1662 England, Spain, Holland, Idem. Between France and <| Idem. Idem. Idem. Denmark, Idem. Sweden, England, Idem. J J l l 5 ( 50 ) iktwen England and Between Holland and f Fertug&l* I Sweden* I Spain, Idem. I Idem, f Holland, Lldem. ^Portugal, ! Sweden* Idem. | Idem. ^Naples, lii 1654 i 6$6 1667 i* 1670 » i 7 i 3 j :668 J 1674 In 1 1661 I 166 7 > i6 75 1679 J 1752 Between Spain and Between Denmark and f Auiiria, (_ Denmark, 1725 1742 In 1756 1749 Between, Ruffia" and (.Armed neutrality.} Between die United States and f Holland, 1 1 In j Pruffia, < Sweden, 1 > 1780 Denmark, \ Naples:. 1 J f France, 1 \ In 1778 : Holland, 1780 1785 1785 Pruflia, > ^ Sweden, i j lo this list may be added all Lite treaties that have been made by the Powers of Europe with the Ottoman Empire, and with the several States of Barbary, as well as those between America and the Stages of Barbary; it being an invariable prin- m — (S 7 ) ciple among those Mahomedan Powers to respect the flag of a friend and all the properly it covers(i). It will be remarked that 1 n gland has been the principal opposer of this modern law, since the ac- cession of the house of Hanover. During the last century and in the beginning of the present, her name is found in many treaties which recognize the new principle ; and it is probably owing to her op- position to the genes al wishes of i urope during this century, that this advantage in favor of neutral com- merce is not universally adopted at this day. I find no instance since the year iyi 3, in which she has acknowlegedit ; and she has madesuch a consider- able figure in naval wars and the tyranny of the seas, since that period, as to cause other nations to vary in their policy continually ; sometimes forgetting their true interest, and yielding to her ambition in Supporting the Roman practice, and sometimes re- curring to the more rational system, which they ought never to abandon. Rut it is time that this question should settled irre- vocably ; and France at the moment of her regene- (O* i is not the only point in which the States of Bar- bary have adopted principles of public law more rational, and approaching nearer to civilization than those ef Europe. 1 hey admit no such thing as contraband of war ; but allow a neutral vessel to carry any article, at any time and to any place, without examination. They make no maritime war without a public declaration ; and do not allow hostilities to commence till a certain number of days after the war is declared ; thirty days when the party is border- lng on the Mediterranean ; a longer term, if at a greater dittance. k he number of days is fixed in the declaration. All the : veflels, fubje&s and property of the party, then within their jurildi&ion, or that arrive during this interval, are Cent away with p afTports ; and not fuffered to be molefted in their homeward voyage, though met at fea after hoftilities are begun. - ome of thefe principles may be fometimes violated by a paf- honate prince; but. they are acknowleged as law, and are ge- nerally obferved with the mod fcrupulous honelty. II (. 58 ) ration is in a condition, if not to dictate the princi*' pic, as immediately binding on other nations, atleast to adopt it for herself as an inviolable maxim, and to recommetid it by her great example. A sense of interest will induce all other nations to recognize it immediately, except the English. And if the English should continue to oppose a measure so just, so convenient, and so interesting to every tna- ritime power, it will attack those powers on all fu- ture occasions to the interest of France, as their common benefactor, and oppose them to England as their common oppressor. No nation can be more interested in the adoption •of this measure than the French. Your resources •in agriculture and manufactures are immense. The •encouragement of your industry artd the increase of your wealth depend on a free exchange. As long as you have such an insatiable rival as the English government in its present form, you can hardlv ■expect to avoid naval wars, however sincere may- be your Wishes to avoid them. Your object then is to establish such liberal principles with respect to neutral commerce, thatyour agricultural and manu- facturing interests may suffer as little as possible, from a naval War which may obstruct your own navigation. England has such a prodigious mercantile marine, that she has little use for neutrals as carriers of her commerce. But if you allow neutrals to be her carriers it would tend to weaken her marine; as it would lessen the number of seamen in her service. English seamen would get into neutral employ for the sake of higher wages, which neutrals could then afford to give; and such seamen would rarely return to their country . 1 Whereas allowing neu- trals to carry for the French would nourish their agriculture and manufactures, the great resources of the nation. ( 5 9 ) It seems therefore necessary, that France should, not only recognize the principle in all her future treaties, that the Hag shall protect the cargo, but that such should be declared by the people at the head of the constitution, in order that all nations may see that a future legislative or executive can- not deviate from it. 3. There is another case in the rights of neu'rar lity which deserves to be examined; in which I shall endeavour to establish a doctrine that will ap- pear new, but 1 hope it will likewise appear just. It is this, that there ought to he no contraband of war. If, for fiscal or other purposes, a government chooses to prohibit the importation or exportation of certain articles, these may be contraband witii respect to its own nation. But this is private con- traband, and has nothing to do with public mari- time law, Contraband of war supposes an abridge- ment of neutral right in favor of belligerent force ; which is immoral and absurd. No principle is more clear in itself, or laid down wi h more precision by Wolff and his followers, on the law of nations, than this : that a nation, remaining neuter while her neighbours are at war, retains all the rights which she possessed before the war began. If this be true, there is nothing more contradictory than to say, that certain articles which .were lawful for that nation to carry to a certain country in time of peace, are not lawful in time of war. If the right existed before the war, it cannot be annihilated by any act ot the belligerent powers; and for them to abridge the exercise of it, is a violation of justice and an act of hostility towards the neutral nation, which affects not only her navigation and com- merce, but likewise her manufactures- and her agriculture. If the Russian has been in the habit of carrying cordage to the French in time of peace, and the American lias Been in the habi t of carry- & (60) ing them tobacco ; and afterwards the English bc