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Essays on Experimental and Behavioral Economics

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Abstract:
This dissertation studies determinants of cooperation in social dilemma experiments. To study the effects of time preferences and information about others' pro-social behavior on cooperation, I use laboratory and online experiments. In the first chapter, I explore the effects of time preferences on cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game experiments. I implement a novel experimental design in which subjects play repeated games in an experimental session in the laboratory, but stage game payoffs are paid over a long period of time. I exogenously vary subjects' discount factors by changing the timing of stage game payoffs (weekly or monthly) and I vary present bias by introducing a delay for the first stage game payoffs. I find that patience promotes and present bias reduces cooperation. In the second chapter, I study the relationship between individuals' time preferences and cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma experiments. In Amazon's Mechanical Turk, I implement a novel experimental design in which subjects play one repeated game over weeks - one stage game each week. Results are that, first, consistent with a model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and its application to repeated games, the degree of present bias is negatively correlated with cooperation. Surprisingly, there is no relationship between discount factors and cooperation. Second, subjects with time consistent preferences are less likely to deviate from their plan of action. Third, subjects with time varying preferences are more likely to break cooperative relationships. Finally, the degree of present bias and the discount factor measured at the beginning of the experiment can predict attrition and the length of participation of subjects in later weeks. In the third chapter, I employ a two-phase experimental design to study one mechanism of how systematically manipulated beliefs can promote or deter cooperation. By exploring correlations between behavior and beliefs in a public good game, I conclude that high trusting and high trustworthiness environments positively adjust people's beliefs on the cooperativeness of others, which in turn results in higher contribution.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Brown University, 2017

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Kim, Jeongbin, "Essays on Experimental and Behavioral Economics" (2017). Economics Theses and Dissertations. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. https://doi.org/10.7301/Z079434W

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