<mods:mods xmlns:mods="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-4.xsd"><mods:titleInfo><mods:title>Puzzles of Human Behavior: Revealing Intentional Action Understanding in Typically Developing and Autistic Individuals</mods:title></mods:titleInfo><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart>Korman, Joanna</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">creator</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart>Sobel, Dave</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">Reader</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart>Sloman, Steven</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">Reader</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart>Cushman, Fiery</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">Reader</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart>Malle, Bertram</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">Advisor</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name type="corporate"><mods:namePart>Brown University. Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">sponsor</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:originInfo><mods:copyrightDate>2016</mods:copyrightDate></mods:originInfo><mods:physicalDescription><mods:extent>xxi, 203 p.</mods:extent><mods:digitalOrigin>born digital</mods:digitalOrigin></mods:physicalDescription><mods:note type="thesis">Thesis (Ph. D.)--Brown University, 2016</mods:note><mods:genre authority="aat">theses</mods:genre><mods:abstract>It is well documented that typically developing (TD) adults use of the concept of intentional action to understand ordinary, everyday behaviors.  In seven studies, this dissertation explores two possible limits on the application of this concept.  First, for TD social perceivers, is the use of this concept limited to the understanding of ordinary, easy-to-understand behaviors, or does it also extend to puzzling behaviors?  And second, is the use of the concept of intentional action limited to TD social perceivers, or is it also employed by high-functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD)?  In Studies 1-4, TD participants were invited to explain puzzling social behaviors.  Participants’ open-ended responses were classified using the F.Ex coding scheme (Malle, 1998) according to whether they cited mental state reasons – derived from the concept of intentional action – or causal background factors and personality traits.  Overwhelmingly, participants persisted in providing as many mental state reasons in response to puzzling behaviors as they did in response to ordinary behaviors in previous studies, while they mostly decreased their use of background factors and traits.  Study 5 explored the role of two key components of the concept of intentional action – belief and desire – in TD adults’ understanding of behavioral puzzles.  Consistent with predictions, participants produced desire explanations when the action lacked a clear goal, while they provided beliefs when the means by which the action’s goal was achieved was puzzling.  Finally, Studies 6 and 7 presented high-functioning ASD adults with a modified version of the Faux Pas task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999), which depicts a mildly puzzling intentional action.  These studies used open-ended as well as forced choice measures to probe participants’ understanding of the action.  Two key findings emerged.  First, participants with ASD showed an intact ability to use the concept of intentional action to understand behavioral puzzles.  Second, in the presence of enriched background information about an action, ASD participants demonstrated a surprising adeptness in making appropriate mental state inferences.  Although both TD and ASD adults use the concept of intentional action to understand behavioral puzzles, they do so via distinct mechanisms.          </mods:abstract><mods:subject><mods:topic>theory of mind</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:subject><mods:topic>intentionality</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:subject authority="fast" authorityURI="http://id.worldcat.org/fast" valueURI="http://id.worldcat.org/fast/00822484"><mods:topic>Autism</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:subject><mods:topic>action explanation</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:subject authority="fast" authorityURI="http://id.worldcat.org/fast" valueURI="http://id.worldcat.org/fast/00866477"><mods:topic>Cognition--Social aspects</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:language><mods:languageTerm authority="iso639-2b">English</mods:languageTerm></mods:language><mods:recordInfo><mods:recordContentSource authority="marcorg">RPB</mods:recordContentSource><mods:recordCreationDate encoding="iso8601">20170616</mods:recordCreationDate></mods:recordInfo><mods:identifier type="doi">10.7301/Z0KK998X</mods:identifier><mods:accessCondition type="rights statement" xlink:href="http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/">In Copyright</mods:accessCondition><mods:accessCondition type="restriction on access">Collection is open for research.</mods:accessCondition><mods:typeOfResource authority="primo">dissertations</mods:typeOfResource></mods:mods>