

discovered and applied, first in Russia, then in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe and in China, a magic formula for holding power, once a successful revolution had been brought about, whether by internal collapse, civil war, or military intervention from outside. This formula, which also served Hitler, Mussolini, and lesser fascist dictators very well (it was by no means the only feature common to communism and fascism in practice) might be summarized as follows: unlimited propaganda plus unlimited terror.

After a communist take-over, all means of information, entertainment, and instruction — the schools, the press, the radio, theater, and the arts — were pressed into the service of glorifying the all-powerful state and the ruling Communist Party. It was expected that this would prove especially effective with a younger generation that had no knowledge of foreign countries, no knowledge of previous conditions.

And, for those who did not accept the propaganda, there was ruthless unrelenting terror, ranging from loss of a job, denial of the right to publish writings, to the more extreme measures: arrest, exile to forced labor, execution before a firing squad. Diabolical as this technique was, from the standpoint of the free-

dom and dignity of the individual human being, it was also diabolically effective as a means of organizing and regimenting people and repressing and discouraging any organized resistance and dissent.

Dissension Sown Abroad, But Prohibited Domestically

So, while the communists used every conceivable trick and device to extend their sway by setting class against class, race against race, group against group in non-communist lands, they insulated themselves against movements of protest and revolt in the countries they ruled by this steady application of the method of propaganda plus terror. With this were linked two characteristics of all communist regimes, regardless of other differences: one-party political dictatorship and economic collectivism in the sense that the state, in one form or another, became the sole employer, operating through various agencies all mines, factories, farms, stores, and other economic enterprises. It is difficult for one who has not lived under it to imagine the crushing weight of concentrated power represented by a state which combines the political power of the most absolute despots of the past with the economic mastery represented by a monop-

oly of possession of all economic enterprises.

Imagine a government operating without any of the safeguards for the individual written into the United States Constitution, directing the contents of every newspaper, of every radio broadcast and, on top of this, managing all the economic production facilities, with the functions of management and labor organization alike controlled by the single ruling party. That affords a fair picture of what the communist state is like and of how difficult it is to organize opposition or resistance to its monstrous grasp.

Signs of Internal Weakness

Yet, with communism, as with Mohammedanism and other world-conquering movements, internal schism among the communist states has clearly set in, creating difficulties which were not foreseen in the first years of the Russian Revolution which Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin envisaged as merely the first step toward world domination through world revolution. The first breach in the granite façade of international communism occurred in 1948, when Josip Broz Tito, the communist dictator of Yugoslavia, seceded from the overlordship of Moscow.

Tito's breach with Moscow did not mean that Yugoslavia ceased

to be a communist dictatorship. But the Yugoslav dictator resented the idea that his power, even his life, might depend on the reports of the Soviet agents whom Stalin sent into Yugoslavia to spy on and supervise his activities. A veteran of the communist movement, he had built up such a tightly organized political machine in Yugoslavia that he was able successfully to defy Stalin's efforts to destroy his regime by all means short of war, including economic blockade and incitations to subversion. Sitting on the fence politically between East and West, although maintaining a generally "anti-imperialist" attitude in foreign relations and retaining a somewhat modified, maverick communism at home, Tito received large quantities of United States aid (considerably reduced in recent years). He also extracted some Soviet help when Stalin's successors decided to restore more normal state relations between Moscow and Belgrade, although continuing to censure Tito as a revisionist more or less severely when matters of communist theory were under discussion.

Stalin's death in 1953 was followed by several signs, in the Soviet Union and abroad, that communism was not the impregnable frozen fortress it had seemed to be. There were anticommunist re-