

**(UN)MAKING THE RACIAL STATE:**

**Decolonization, Race, and The Ideal Bureaucrat in Bolivia**

By

Marcelo A. Bohrt

A.A., Brookhaven Community College, 2007

B.A., The University of Texas at Austin, 2009

M.A., Brown University, 2012

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Sociology at Brown University

PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND

MAY 2018

© COPYRIGHT 2018 by Marcelo A. Bohrt

This dissertation by Marcelo A. Bohrt is accepted in its present form  
by the Department of Sociology as satisfying the  
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Date \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
José Itzigsohn, Advisor

Recommended to the Graduate Council

Date \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Patrick Heller, Committee Member

Date \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Paget Henry, Committee Member

Date \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Mara Loveman, Committee Member

Approved by the Graduate Council

Date \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Andrew G. Campbell, Dean of the Graduate School

## CURRICULUM VITAE

### MARCELO A. BOHRT

School of International Service  
American University  
bohrt@american.edu

4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW  
Washington, DC 20016  
(202) 885-6701

#### ACADEMIC POSITIONS

---

2016- Assistant Professor of Race and Global Studies, School of International Service,  
American University

#### EDUCATION

---

2018 PhD BROWN UNIVERSITY, Sociology  
*(Un)Making the Racial State: Decolonization, Race, and the Ideal Bureaucrat in Bolivia*  
Committee: José Itzigsohn (Chair), Patrick Heller, Paget Henry, Mara Loveman (UC  
Berkeley)

2012 MA BROWN UNIVERSITY, Sociology

2009 BA THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, Sociology  
Phi Beta Kappa

2007 AA BROOKHAVEN COLLEGE, DALLAS COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGES

#### AREAS OF INTERESTS

---

Sociology of Race and Ethnicity; Political Sociology; Cultural Sociology; Bureaucracy and Organizations;  
Immigration; Research Methods; Ethnography; Latin America

#### PUBLICATIONS

---

##### *Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Journal Articles*

**Bohrt, M.A.** and J. Itzigsohn. 2015. "Class, Race, and the Incorporation of Latinos/as: Testing the  
Stratified Ethnoracial Incorporation Approach." *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity* 1(3):360-77

### *Manuscripts Under Review*

**Bohrt, M.A.** “*Sine ira ac studio*: Race and the Boundaries of State Bureaucracy in Bolivia.”

**Bohrt, M.A.** “The Intersection of Class and Race in Political Incorporation: Class, Generation, and Latino/a Political Participation.”

**Bohrt, M.A.,** D. Graizbord and P. Heller. “State Density and Thinness: Toward a Spatial Measure of Developmental State Capacity.”

### *Manuscripts in Progress*

**Bohrt, M.A.** “Bureaucracy as Racial Project: A Comparative Analytical Framework for Ethnoracial Conflict and Change in State Bureaucracy.”

**Bohrt, M.A.** “Writing Indigeneity into Diplomacy: Understanding Localized Translations of Indigenous Representation Demands into Statecraft in 21st Century Bolivia”

**Bohrt, M.A.,** J. Itzigsohn, and A. Ocampo. “Contemporary Ethnoracial Inequality across the Class Stratification System in the United States.”

### **PUBLIC SCHOLARSHIP**

---

#### *Multi-Media Publications/Presentations*

**Bohrt, M.A.** and D. Graizbord. 2012. “A Cartography of the 21st Century Developmental State” Video Poster. Presented to NSF-IGERT Video & Poster Competition (NSF-IGERT competition using media to promote the understanding and dissemination of scientific ideas).

<http://igert2012.videohall.com/presentations/298>

### **PEER REVIEWED GRANTS**

---

2013-2015     Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant, Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences (SBE) Program, National Science Foundation

2013-2014     Mellon International Dissertation Research Fellowship, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation - Social Science Research Council

### **AWARDS & FELLOWSHIPS**

---

2017             Conference Travel Award, School of International Service, American University  
2015             Craig M. Cogut Dissertation Fellowship in Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Brown University – *Declined*  
2015             Beatrice and Joseph Feinberg Memorial Fund Award, Brown University  
2014             Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Sociology, Brown University  
2014             Edgar Lewis Marston Fellowship, Brown University

|      |                                                                                                                                                                       |
|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2014 | Tilly Graduate Student Travel Award, Social Science History Association                                                                                               |
| 2013 | Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences Senior Fellow, Brown University                                                                                             |
| 2013 | Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences Travel Award, Brown University                                                                                              |
| 2012 | NSF-IGERT Research Poster & Video Competition Judges Choice Award Winner                                                                                              |
| 2012 | Congress Student Travel Fund Award, Latin American Studies Association                                                                                                |
| 2012 | Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences Travel Award, Brown University                                                                                              |
| 2011 | Pre-Doctoral Fellowship, Integrated Graduate Education Research and Training (IGERT) on International Development, National Science Foundation (two years of funding) |
| 2010 | Graduate Fellowship, Brown University                                                                                                                                 |

## INVITED TALKS

---

|      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2017 | "Disputing the Racialized Ideal Bureaucrat: Ethnoracial Boundary Work in the Bolivian Foreign Ministry," Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA (February)                               |
| 2016 | "(Un)Making the Ideal Bureaucrat: Ethnoracial Boundary Work in the Bolivian Foreign Ministry," School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC (December)                                                       |
|      | "(Un)Making the Ideal Bureaucrat: Ethnoracial Boundary Work in the Bolivian Foreign Ministry," Department of Sociology, Simmons College, Boston, MA (November)                                                                       |
| 2015 | "From Chicago Boys to Chuquiago Boys': Race, Bureaucracy, and the Bolivian State Decolonization Project," Department of Sociology, The University of Texas at Austin, TX (May)                                                       |
| 2012 | (with D. Graizbord) "Urban Transformation in South Africa: Project Overview and Ongoing Research," Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences (S4) Winter Institute on GIS and Inequality, Brown University, Providence, RI (January) |
| 2011 | "Spatial Inequality and Development in Bolivia," 9th Annual Wits-Brown-Colorado-APHRC (WBCA) Colloquium, Brown University, Providence, RI (April)                                                                                    |

## CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION

---

### *Paper Presentations*

|      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2017 | "Race, Modernity, and Bureaucratic Practice." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Social Science History Association (SSHA), Montreal, Canada (November)                                                                                   |
|      | " <i>Sine ira ac studio</i> : Race and the Boundaries of State Bureaucracy in Bolivia." Paper presented at <i>Decolonizing the Social: A Jr. Scholars Workshop</i> , Pardee Center for Global Studies, Boston University, Boston, MA (April)        |
| 2016 | "Come on! A Choquehuanca is Foreign Minister': The Discursive (Re)Negotiation of Ethnoracial Boundaries in Bolivia's State Bureaucracy." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association (ASA), Seattle, WA (August) |

- "Class and Latino/a Voter Turnout." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association (ASA), Seattle, WA (August)
- "Class-Based Ethnoracial Political Incorporation: Social Class, Generation, and Latino/a Political Participation." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society (ESS), Boston, MA (February)
- 2015 "State Bureaucracy and Ethnoracial Projects: Bolivian Diplomacy under the Morales Administration." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Social Science History Association (SSHA), Baltimore, MD (November)
- "The Ethnoracial State Bureaucracy: Race/Ethnicity and the Transformation of Bolivia's State Bureaucracy." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association (ASA), Chicago, IL (August)
- "The Colonial State has Died': Negotiating the Decolonial State Bureaucracy in Bolivia." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems (SSSP), Chicago, IL (August)
- "Indigeneity and the Remaking of Bolivian Statecraft." Paper presented at the XXXIII International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA), San Juan, Puerto Rico (May)
- "Within the Racial State: The Ethnoracial Bureaucracy and its Transformation in Bolivia." Paper presented at the 4th annual conference of the American Sociological Association (ASA) Sociology of Development Section, Providence, RI (March)
- 2014 "'From Chicago Boys to Chuquiago Boys': Race and the Reconstruction of the Archetypal State Bureaucrat in Bolivia." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Social Science History Association (SSHA), Toronto, Canada (November)
- (with J. Itzigsohn) "Class, Race and the Incorporation of Latinos/as: Testing the Stratified Ethnoracial Incorporation Approach." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association (ASA), San Francisco, CA (August)
- 2013 "The Rise of Indigenous Parties in Latin America: Subnational Event-History Analysis of Success in Bolivia." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association (ASA), New York, NY (August)
- "Decolonizing the State: The Struggle Over Race, Power and Status within the Bolivian State Bureaucracy." Paper presented at the XXXI International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA), Washington, DC (May)
- (with D. Graizbord) "State Capacity and Spatial Transformation in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Toward a Middle-Class Developmental State." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Los Angeles, CA (April)

“Fighting for the Bowels of the Earth: Explaining Violence Between Unionized and Cooperativized Mine-Workers in Bolivia.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Association (ESS), Boston, MA (February)

2012 “Who, Where and How? Political Participation and the Intersection of Ethnicity and Place.” Paper presented at the XXX International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA), San Francisco, CA (May)

(with D. Graizbord) “Enhancing Capabilities in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Toward a Spatial Measure of State Impact.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society (ESS), New York, NY (February)

(with J. McPike) “Unpacking the Growth Machine: Exploring Urban Development Politics in Providence through the Greening of the Knowledge District Project.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society (ESS), New York, NY (February)

2009 “Assimilation, Gender and Political Participation: The Mexican American Case.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America (PAA), Detroit, MI

#### *Panel Organization and Related Service*

2017 Presider and Discussant: “Race in Global Perspective.” Annual meeting of the American Sociological Association (ASA), Montreal, Canada (August)

2015 Mini-Conference Co-Organizer: “Ethnography of Contemporary Latin American States.” Annual meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, San Juan, PR (May)

2014 Panel Co-Organizer: “(Trans)Formations of the Racial State”; Panel Chair: “Shared, Negotiated and Contested Sovereignities at the State Margins.” Annual meeting of the Social Science History Association (SSHA), Toronto, Ontario, Canada

2011 Discussant: “Unexpected Participation in Latin America.” Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Brown University, Providence, RI (October)

#### **TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

---

##### *Undergraduate Courses*

2017 F SISU 206: Introduction to International Studies Research, American University

2012 F SOC 1270: Race, Class and Ethnicity in the Modern World, Brown University  
(Co-taught with J. Itzigsohn)

##### *Graduate Courses*

2013 S SOC 2210: Ethnography and Qualitative Methods  
(Co-taught with T. Andia and G. Baiocchi)

## PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

---

### *Editorial*

Ongoing      Reviewer: *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity; Social Forces*  
2013-      Editorial Board Member, *Observatorio del Racismo*, La Paz, Bolivia  
2015-2017      Managing Editor, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Watson Institute  
for International and Public Affairs, Brown University (2015-2017)

### *Service to Brown University*

2011-2012      Colloquium Committee, Department of Sociology, Brown University

## ACADEMIC AFFILIATIONS

---

2017-      Faculty Affiliate, Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University,  
Washington, DC  
2016-2017      Visiting Scholar, Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice, Old Dominion University,  
Norfolk, VA  
2014-2016      Visiting Scholar, Department of Sociology, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX  
2013-2014      Research Affiliate, Escuela de Gestión Pública Plurinacional, La Paz, Bolivia  
2011-2017      Graduate Fellow, Graduate Program in Development, Watson Institute, Brown  
University, Providence, RI

## LANGUAGES

---

Spanish: Native Speaker  
English: Fluent  
Italian: Fluent

## PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS

---

American Sociological Association (ASA)  
Social Science History Association (SSHA)  
Latin American Studies Association (LASA)

## REFERENCES

---

Available upon request.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Since I left Bolivia as a teenager in 2002, I have had the privilege of joining scholarly communities that propelled my intellectual curiosity and laid the foundations on which I now build my research and pedagogical agendas. The United World College of the Adriatic, Brookhaven College, The University of Texas at Austin, and Brown University have been the sites of my formative intellectual years. It was away from home that I learned the most about Bolivia as the distance and encounter with another social world created the space to question what I had so far taken for granted. The production of this dissertation was motivated by a want to connect with Bolivia and a desire to join the efforts to document, if only a small piece of, the historic moment that my country is currently undergoing.

In the path to envisioning, proposing, and completing this dissertation, I was fortunate to count on the guidance and support of my committee members. I am extremely grateful to José Itzigsohn. I have benefited greatly from his supportive and committed mentorship and friendship. This dissertation exists, in no small part, because of his guidance and humanity. Through joint scholarly and pedagogical collaborations with him, I have learned that a different sociology is possible and worth advocating for. I am also indebted to Patrick Heller, the first person I spoke to at Brown, for advocating on my behalf from the start and providing endless help and encouragement. Our collaborations and thought-provoking conversations helped me cultivate a comparative disposition even when my project was not explicitly so. Both José and Patrick created and protected a space for me to explore new ideas. I also thank Paget Henry and Mara Loveman for their trust, support, and feedback.

While at Brown, I was also privileged to meet and befriend many brilliant and generous scholars, whom I sincerely admire. A special thanks to Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Claudio Benzecry, Nitsan Chorev, Michael Kennedy, Richard Snyder, and Barbara Stallings. I am specially indebted to my friends and colleagues Tatiana Andia, Aisalkyn Botoeva, Ricarda Hammer, Cedric de Leon, Diana Graizbord, Jamie McPike, Michael Rodríguez-Muñiz, and Trina Vithayathil. Their encouragement and feedback meant a lot to me as I waddled through the doctoral program and life. I am particularly appreciative of Diana Graizbord and Michael Rodríguez-Muñiz, who played a central role in my personal, professional, and intellectual growth.

I am also fortunate and grateful to have crossed paths with fellow sociologists Sinem Adar, Karida Brown, Orly Clerge, Jorge Derpic, Weeam Hammoudeh, Peter Klein, Juyoung Lee, Johnnie Lotesta, Syeda Masood, David Levy, Tina Park, Omar Pereyra, Gayatri Singh, and Alexander White. Thanks also to my friends and colleagues in other disciplines, including Carla Alberti, Poulomi Chakrabarti, Diego Díaz, Susan Ellison, Liise Lehtsalu, and Oscar Sosa. A special thanks to staff members Karl Dominey, Amanda Figgins, Carrie Honeman, Shane Martin, Joan Picard, Laura Sadovnikoff, and Kristen Soule, whose kindness and dedication make graduate students lives so much easier and better

This research would not have been possible without the financial support of national funding organizations and Brown University. I am grateful to the National Science Foundation and the Social Science Research Council for research support. Within Brown University, I would like to acknowledge the Department of Sociology and the Feinberg Family, the Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs, the Graduate Program in Development, the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, and the Graduate School.

While conducting my research and writing up findings, I benefited from institutional affiliations in Bolivia and the United States. I am grateful to the Observatorio del Racismo and the Escuela de Gestión Pública Plurinacional (EGPP) in La Paz, Bolivia. A special thanks to Khantuta Muruchi, Andrés Calla, and Arian Laguna at the Observatorio, and to Iván Iporre, Tania Paz, and Regina Guzmán at EGPP for their support. Thanks also to Sharmila Rudrappa and Javier Auyero at the Department of Sociology at The University of Texas at Austin for hosting me as a visiting researcher. I am appreciative of the welcoming community of scholars I found at UT-Austin. Thanks also to the Department of Sociology and Criminology at Old Dominion University and, specially, to Ruth Triplett for extending a visiting position while I wrote.

A big thank you to the many people in Bolivia, including current and former public servants at the Foreign Ministry and other government institutions, who generously offered me their trust and time and shared various aspects of their personal and professional lives with me. Thanks to the leadership of *Cancillería* for allowing me to conduct this research and document a piece of the institution's history, as well as to the ministry's employees for welcoming me into their team. I can only hope that they found my contributions to their work as valuable as theirs have been to my project. I am also grateful for research assistance from Arian Laguna, Andrea Toro, Gonzalo Meruvia, and Guillermo Villarroel. Lastly, a thank you to my relatives in La Paz and Santa Cruz for their support, generosity, and kindness during many research trips home.

I am indebted to many friends, in addition to the many others listed earlier, whose friendship and support I have been able to count on. A special thanks to my same-wavelength friend Eleonora Schinella, who helped me discover the passion of writing. I am very grateful also to Juan Carlos Acero, Camila Afanador-Llach, Andrea Caceres, Oscar Curet, Judith Gallego, Ana María Hernandez, Jim Mossman, Ömer Özak, Lucía Ramírez, Ana María Rodríguez, Chris Richter, Stefan Siebert, Santiago Tellez, and Yara Terrazas.

My deepest gratitude to my family for their unconditional love and support, and for always believing in me. Thanks to my parents, Marcelo and Lita, whose capacity for love and understanding never ceases to amaze me. I am so grateful to know that I and my sisters have made them proud and that they see in us the value of uprooting their lives to come to this country. I am indebted to my sisters Francis and Samantha and my *abue* Chabela for their love, support, and encouragement. Francis made it possible for me to go back to school and embark on this career path. Thanks also to Saul, Charity, and Tomás, as well as to my five unbelievably sweet nieces and nephews, with whom I get to be a silly kid and melt worries away.

Not enough words or actions will ever exist to show my eternal appreciation for Martha, my *compañera* of ten years. I would have never had gathered enough courage to see this through if it weren't for Martha and her unwavering love, encouragement, and support. I admire and love her deeply and thank her for reminding me of the important things in life. Our small family, including la gata Lucrecia, fills me with immense love and joy. Now, let's go see the world.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|                                                                                               |     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS                                                                              | x   |
| TABLES & FIGURES                                                                              | xiv |
| ACRONYMS                                                                                      | xv  |
| <br>CHAPTER 1 Introduction: Race and State Bureaucracy                                        |     |
| Introduction                                                                                  | 1   |
| Research Aims & Arguments                                                                     | 5   |
| The Politicization of Race and Bureaucracy in Bolivia                                         | 13  |
| The <i>Altered Moment</i> in Bolivia's State Bureaucracy                                      | 18  |
| Ethnography of Race and State Bureaucracy                                                     | 24  |
| <i>The Research Site</i>                                                                      | 26  |
| <i>Methods</i>                                                                                | 32  |
| Chapter Framework                                                                             | 37  |
| <br>CHAPTER 2 Analytic Framework: The Ideal Bureaucrat, Racial Projects, and the Racial State |     |
| Introduction                                                                                  | 40  |
| Race and Representative Bureaucracy Research                                                  | 43  |
| A Multilevel Analytic Framework to Race and the State Bureaucracy                             | 45  |
| <i>The Racial State and Racial Formation Theory</i>                                           | 45  |
| <i>Critical and Relational Research on Race and Organizations</i>                             | 51  |
| <i>Boundary Dynamics in Cultural Sociology</i>                                                | 54  |
| Conclusion                                                                                    | 60  |
| <br>CHAPTER 3 Competing Racial Projects and the Ideal Bureaucrat                              |     |
| Introduction                                                                                  | 63  |
| Modernizing White Elites and the 'Indian Problem' in Postcolonial Bolivia                     | 68  |
| <i>The Social Darwinist Narrative of Race and Modernity, 1880-1910</i>                        | 72  |
| <i>The Neocivilizing and Anti-Mestizaje Narrative of Race and Modernity, 1910-1952</i>        | 76  |
| <i>The Indigenist Mestizaje Narrative of Race and Modernity, 1952-2005</i>                    | 79  |
| Decolonization and Changing Narratives of Race and Modernity                                  | 85  |
| <i>The Colonial Problem and Under Development</i>                                             | 88  |
| <i>Indigeneity and the Carriers of Modernity and Decolonization</i>                           | 92  |
| <i>Rejecting Homogeneity, Embracing Heterogeneity in the Plurinational State</i>              | 96  |
| Decolonization and Foreign Relations                                                          | 99  |

|                                                                                      |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Implications for the Denaturalization of the Ideal Bureaucrat                        | 101 |
| CHAPTER 4 Pioneer Indigenous Bureaucrats and the Ideal Bureaucrat                    |     |
| Introduction                                                                         | 104 |
| The Ethnoracial Composition of the National Bureaucracy Before 2006                  | 110 |
| Pioneers and the Racial Logic of Bureaucratic Appointments                           | 114 |
| <i>The First Indigenous Peasant Ministers</i>                                        | 115 |
| <i>The First Indigenous Vice President: Víctor Hugo Cárdenas</i>                     | 120 |
| Two Different Pioneer Indigenous Trajectories, One Boundary Strategy                 | 124 |
| <i>Mauricio Mamani: A Career Trajectory</i>                                          | 124 |
| <i>Paulino Guarachi: A Militant Trajectory</i>                                       | 137 |
| Conclusion                                                                           | 151 |
| CHAPTER 5 The Old Guard, the Ideal Bureaucrat, and the Disruption of Social Paradise |     |
| Introduction                                                                         | 153 |
| The Decolonization Threat                                                            | 158 |
| The Professionalization Project and the Making of the Old Guard                      | 161 |
| The Old Guard's Notion of the Ideal Bureaucrat                                       | 173 |
| <i>The Architects and Archetypes of the Modern Diplomatic Service</i>                | 177 |
| The Unworthy New Guard Diplomat                                                      | 184 |
| Conclusion                                                                           | 191 |
| CHAPTER 6 The New Guard and the Committed Ideal Bureaucrat                           |     |
| Introduction                                                                         | 193 |
| A New Guard for a Decolonized Foreign Ministry                                       | 195 |
| The New Guard's Notion of the Ideal Bureaucrat                                       | 201 |
| <i>An Unprecedented Foreign Minister as Architect</i>                                | 210 |
| The Unworthy Old Guard and their Racist Bureaucracy                                  | 217 |
| Institutionalizing the Decolonized Ideal Bureaucrat                                  | 223 |
| Conclusion                                                                           | 231 |
| CHAPTER 7 Conclusion                                                                 |     |
| Introduction                                                                         | 233 |
| Synthesis of Findings                                                                | 236 |
| Toward a Theory of the Racial State                                                  | 243 |
| Project's Relevance and Looking Ahead                                                | 250 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                         | 253 |

## TABLES & FIGURES

- Figure 1.1: Iván Iporre, Executive Director of the EGPP, at the Decolonization Summit, 10 October 2013
- Figure 3.1: Front cover of “The Future is Indian,” a publication of the Viceministry of Decolonization, showing President Evo Morales Ayma and the Presidential Palace
- Table 4.1: Ethnoracial composition of the public administration sector in urban Bolivia in 2001 by occupation group, using different proxies for race/ethnicity
- Table 5.1: The old guard’s ‘ideal bureaucrat’ criteria.
- Figure 6.1: Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca (right) and his successor, Fernando Huanacuni (left), participate in an Andean indigenous ceremony led by two *amautas* at *Cancillería’s* Tiwanaku Hall (formerly known as Honors Hall) on the occasion of the leadership transfer.
- Figure 6.2: Audience at the yearly accountability meeting of the Ministry of Foreign Relations held in *Cancillería’s* Tiwanaku Hall on February 14<sup>th</sup>, 2014.
- Table 6.1: The new guard’s ‘ideal bureaucrat’ criteria.

## ACRONYMS

|          |                                                                                                                                                                    |
|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ADN      | Acción Democrática Nacionalista / Nationalist Democratic Action                                                                                                    |
| ASP      | Asamblea para la Soberanía de los Pueblos / Assembly for the Sovereignty of Peoples                                                                                |
| CEDLA    | Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario / Center for Labor and Agriculture Development Studies                                                     |
| CERD     | Committee Against Racial Discrimination                                                                                                                            |
| CNLCN    | Consejo Nacional de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico / National Council for the Fight against Drug Trafficking                                                         |
| COB      | Central Obrera Boliviana / Bolivian Workers' Confederation                                                                                                         |
| COE      | Círculo de Oficiales del Ejército / Army Officers' Club                                                                                                            |
| CONDEPA  | Conciencia de Patria / Patriotic Conscience                                                                                                                        |
| CSUTCB   | Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesino de Bolivia / Single Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia                                             |
| DS       | Decreto Supremo / Supreme Decree                                                                                                                                   |
| EGPP     | Escuela de Gestión Pública Plurinacional / Plurinational School of Public Administration                                                                           |
| FENACOAB | Federación Nacional de Cooperativas Agropecuarias de Bolivia / National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives of Bolivia                                         |
| MACA     | Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos y Agropecuarios / Ministry of Peasant and Agricultural Affairs                                                                    |
| MAS-IPSP | Movimiento al Socialismo – Instrumento Político para la Soberanía de los Pueblos / Movement Toward Socialism – Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of Peoples |
| MBL      | Movimiento Bolivia Libre / Free Bolivia Movement                                                                                                                   |
| MIP      | Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti / Pachakuti Indigenous Movement                                                                                                      |

|       |                                                                                                                 |
|-------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| MIR   | Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario / Leftist Revolutionary Movement                                         |
| MNR   | Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario / Nationalist Revolutionary Movement                                     |
| MRTKL | Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberación / Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Liberation Movement           |
| MUSEF | Museo de Etnografía y Folklor / Ethnography and Folklore Museum                                                 |
| NEP   | New Economic Policy                                                                                             |
| PDES  | Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social / Social and Economic Development Plan                                    |
| PND   | Plan Nacional de Desarrollo / National Development Plan                                                         |
| PNI   | Plan Nacional de Integridad / National Integrity Plan                                                           |
| PRI   | Proyecto de Reforma Institucional / Institutional Reform Project                                                |
| RREE  | Relaciones Exteriores / Foreign Relations                                                                       |
| SAFCO | Sistema de Administración, Fiscalización y Control Gubernamental / Auditing and Financial Administration System |
| SAI   | Servicio Agrícola Inter-Americano / Inter-American Agricultural Service                                         |
| SNAP  | Servicio Nacional de Administración de Personal / National Service of Personnel Administration                  |
| UDP   | Unidad Democrática y Popular / Democratic and Popular Unity                                                     |
| UN    | United Nations                                                                                                  |

## CHAPTER 1

### Introduction: Race and State Bureaucracy

#### Introduction

“The mission that I am in charge of is that of the decolonization of public administration,” explained Iván Iporre, Executive Director of Bolivia’s Plurinational School of Public Administration (EGPP for its acronym in Spanish), from a stage platform lined by red velvet drapes. Thus began Iván Iporre’s afternoon lecture entitled “The Decolonization of Public Administration,” at the First International Summit on Decolonization, Depatriarchalization and Fight Against Racism and Discrimination<sup>1</sup>, on 10 October 2013, in La Paz, Bolivia.

**Figure 1.1.** Iván Iporre, Executive Director of the EGPP, at the Decolonization Summit, 10 October 2013



Source: Viceministerio de Decolonización

<sup>1</sup> First International Summit on Decolonization, Depatriarchalization and Fight Against Racism and Discrimination, La Paz, Bolivia, 8-11 October 2013.

The Decolonization Summit was held at the Army Officers' Circle (COE), the Army's social headquarters and convention center, located in an affluent white-*mestizo* neighborhood.<sup>2</sup> The Hall's décor communicated a new plurinational state project and identity through an abundance of new symbols of state, now heavily influenced by symbols of Bolivian indigenous groups which the indigenous movement took up over decades of social mobilization. On each side of the platform on which Mr. Iporre stood, large banners depicting indigenous and socialist revolutionary figures read "Viceministry of Decolonization" and "Decolonization." Viceminister of Decolonization Felix Cárdenas and Head of the Depatriarchalization Unit Elisa Vega, both well-known indigenous leaders turned bureaucrats, watched Mr. Iporre from the panelists' table. The table was decorated with Bolivia's two official flags – one republican, one indigenous. The latter was consecrated as an official symbol of the state upon the approval of a new constitution in 2009. As protocol mandates, both flags, the *tricolor* and the *whipala*,<sup>3</sup> also stood at the center of a row of fifteen national flags lining the back of the stage.

At the same time, the old Army's coat of arms, permanently affixed to the stage's wooden podium, was a constant reminder of an exclusionary republican history. Given its military entanglements, some social movement organizations frowned upon the choice of venue for the summit, which they perceived as a troubling contradiction between the event's objectives and the Army's historic role in the subjugation of indigenous peoples and repression

---

<sup>2</sup> The inauguration festivities, which included a theatrical reenactment of Bolivia's history, from the Spanish conquest through the early 2000s, by Grupo ARBOR, was held at the *Coliseo Cerrado* in downtown La Paz.

<sup>3</sup> A square multicolor checkered flag. *Whipala* is an Aymara word meaning flag.

during authoritarian regimes. For others, instead, the installation of a decolonization summit in this very venue represented the depth of the process of change the country is undergoing.

Organized by the Bolivian Viceministry of Decolonization, the three-day summit's official objective was to exchange ideas and insights and to produce regional guidelines on decolonization, depatriarchalization, racism, and discrimination. Hundreds of public servants and representatives from civil society and indigenous peoples organizations, including delegations from Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, participated in the meeting.

Director Iporre is an urban *mestizo* engineer with extensive NGO and university-level teaching experience on rural development. He has been in charge of EGPP since its inception in 2009,<sup>4</sup> was among roughly fifteen Bolivian and international featured speakers at the summit, including activists, practitioners, and scholars.<sup>5</sup> Among the guest speakers was also Bolivia's first indigenous Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca.

In his lecture, Iván Iporre spoke of using the state to transform the racist and colonial Bolivian state, its institutions and agents, underscoring the role of a new army of public servants guided by a new ethos in the state decolonization process. He asserted, "We are before a colonial state that emanates racism. A state that has been created and developed as a control tool [...] This colonial state structured a fundamentally racist institutionality that seeks to erase [indigenous] peoples." He then explained, "How do we dismantle the institutionality of that colonial state? [...] Evince it! [...] We have to put the state in crisis to achieve that change.

---

<sup>4</sup> President Evo Morales Ayma mandated the creation of the Plurinational School of Public Administration (EGPP), as a decentralized public entity within the Ministry of Education, via Supreme Decree 212 of 15 July 2009, in the context of the 2009 Constitution and the 2006 National Development Plan (NDP).

<sup>5</sup> The speaker lineup included special guest Guy-Patrice Lumumba, son of assassinated Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba.

And, in this case, two actors emerge that have a fundamental task: public servants within the state and social organization.”

To be effective carriers of decolonization, Director Iporre argued that public servants had to learn from the historical struggles and experiences of indigenous peoples and social movements, who offer an alternative system of public administration and service. “We have [...] the Western system and, on the other side, the Indigenous system,” he said as he pointed toward a projector screen that had been set up for his talk. The white projector canvas displayed a split table with a column for each system: Western and Indigenous. “We used to live looking West and forgetting that indigenous system, which has values, has concepts, has institutionality, has public administration!” he exclaimed. The director explained that the EGPP is not only tasked with the training of public servants but must also develop a training curriculum built on the fundamental concepts and theory of the Indigenous system. For him, this task is crucial for the training of a new generation of decolonized public servants.

EGPP reflects an emerging new vision of public service and an inchoate effort to codify it and institutionalize it. The articulation of this new vision became possible following the 2005 landslide electoral victory of the *Movimiento al Socialismo – Instrumento Político para la Soberanía de los Pueblos* (Movement Toward Socialism – Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of Peoples, or MAS-IPSP for its acronym in Spanish). As a result of this victory, Evo Morales Ayma became Bolivia’s first indigenous president and the MAS secured control of the executive and legislative branches. In this context, indigenous men and women have accessed public service in unprecedented numbers and occupied authority positions within the national state bureaucracy that had been previously reserved for the white-*mestizo* population (Soruco,

Franco, and Durán 2014). The spectacle of the decolonization summit represents the ongoing symbolic and material transgression and contestation of the ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy unfolding in Bolivia today.

### **Research Aims and Arguments**

Modern states are built on ethnoracial exclusion and inclusion, offering their members resources, including symbolic and material resources, such bureaucratic authority and jobs, and denying them to others, within or without their boundaries (Wimmer 2002). In the pursuit of rights, recognition, and equality, ethnoracial movements across the Americas have contested the discriminatory practices that precluded their participation in the state bureaucracy.<sup>6</sup> They have demanded policies that would actively promote their inclusion in it and, in cases like Bolivia, created political parties to gain access to it through electoral means (Marx 1998; Omi and Winant 1994; Paschel 2016a; Van Cott 2005, 2008; Winant 2001; Yashar 2005).

Concomitantly, international organizations have advanced mandates and proposals for ethnoracial and gender inclusion in government, which are underpinned by political theories of multiculturalism (Kymlicka 1995) and representative bureaucracy (Maravić, Peters, and Schröter 2013). This “emerging global discourse [has] connected democratic legitimacy to social diversity in decision-making bodies,” positing that inclusion in decision-making processes would counteract inequalities across economic, political, and social life (Williams 2000).

---

<sup>6</sup> I use ‘state bureaucracy’ to refer to the set of organizations – legislative, administrative and policing – that make that make up the state apparatus.

Thus, in recent decades, members of formerly excluded ethnoracial populations, to varying degrees, increasingly staff offices in the state bureaucracy. As of 2014, 78 countries worldwide, including Bolivia and fourteen other Latin American states, have mandated ethnic and/or gender government quotas or reservations, while dozens more have adopted other informal strategies of inclusion (Htun 2015a). Given growing policy interest on representative bureaucracies and their promise for democratic governance (Maravić et al. 2013; Williams 2000), this study critically interrogates the ethnoracial entanglements of state bureaucracy and the ethnoracial politics of representative bureaucracy building.

Studies on the transformation of the character of racialized societies – where social, political, and economic resources are differentially distributed along racial lines (Bonilla-Silva 1997) – have highlighted the centrality of race to modern political institutions (e.g., Marx 1998; Wimmer 2002; Winant 2001). However, as an object of study, ethnoracial recomposition and representation in state bureaucracy has primarily been the domain of public administration studies (Bradbury and Kellough 2011; Kristov 1974) and political science (Phillips 2003).

Sociological scholarship on ethnoracial movements, state ethnoracial categorization, and ethnoracial policy often recognizes the role of state institutions and agents in shaping racial inequality and processes of identity formation. Despite a growing sociological interest on the relationship between race and state, scholars have seldom theorized how race shapes bureaucratic practice, structure, and spaces, where the state materializes through the practices carried out by the personnel that fills its physical spaces. That is, research seldom investigates how race shapes ongoing processes of state-building, including bureaucracy-building. Ethnoracial change in state bureaucracies, however, presents an opportunity for critical

sociology to examine the conceptual and material nexus of race and state, and to overcome the sociological analytical isolation of race from “more general [sociological] concerns” (Magubane 2016:376), such as the study of states or bureaucracies.<sup>7</sup>

I posit that processes of ethnoracial recomposition in state bureaucracies threaten not only the material but also the conceptual ethnoracial boundaries of the state, i.e. the ethnoracial meanings that underpin state authority, bureaucratic hierarchies, and statecraft. They problematize and reveal the structures of power on which the racial architecture and meaning of state bureaucracy rest in various sociohistorical milieus. As sociologist Nirmal Puwar argues in *Space Invaders*, interrogating the altered moment, “when women and racialised minorities take up privileged ‘positions’ [in elite institutions] which have not been ‘reserved’ for them,” “sheds light on how spaces have been formed through what has been constructed out” (Puwar 2004:1); that is, those devalued and excluded racial others. The altered moment thus causes disruption and dissonance, invites negotiation and complicity, and activates processes of boundary maintenance among those variously invested in them (Epstein 1992; Puwar 2004). In particular, as I show here, it unsettles the formal and informal criteria of bureaucratic worth.

Drawing upon participant observation, interviews, primary documents, and secondary sources, this dissertation examines the politics and practices of ethnoracial recomposition in the Bolivian national bureaucracy in the context of an unprecedented constitutional mandate to “decolonize” the state. In the wake of his election, President Morales convened a constituent

---

<sup>7</sup> In sociology, the political sociology of states and the sociology of race have, for the most part, seldom conversed with one another directly, and instead developed independently (James and Redding 2005). As Goldberg argues, “[t]he modern state is constitutively formed and fashioned through race in a way which state theory has almost exclusively ignored” (Goldberg and Giroux 2014a:69).

assembly with the goal of refounding the old homogenizing republic into the Plurinational State of Bolivia (Artaraz 2012; Monasterios, Stefanoni, and Alto 2007; Schavelzon 2012). Approved in 2009, the new constitution mandated the state “[t]o constitute a just and harmonious society, *founded on decolonization*, without discrimination or exploitation, with full social justice, in order to consolidate the plurinational identities” (Art.9, Sec.1; emphasis added).

In line with the decolonization mandate, the administration created new state entities to oversee and support the advancement of a decolonization process more broadly defined, as Director Iporre’s lecture reveals. These included a Viceministry of Decolonization and a new Plurinational School for Public Administration (EGPP for its acronym in Spanish), as well as various other directorates and units across state agencies. Yet, the changing ethnoracial composition of the national bureaucracy is perhaps the most visible outcome of the Morales administration’s efforts to “decolonize” the state (Soruco et al. 2014; Stefanoni 2011).

Specifically, this study focuses on the historically most select and professionalized sector of the bureaucracy: The Ministry of Foreign Relations, commonly known as *Cancillería*. Since 2006, the state decolonization project has visibly changed the ethnoracial composition of the national bureaucratic corps (Soruco et al. 2014; Stefanoni 2011), including in *Cancillería*. Indigenous women and men have come to occupy bureaucratic posts that were the prerogative of the white-*mestizo* population. In addition to proposing broad structural state reforms, its main architects have variously promoted the revalorization of indigenous practices and epistemologies in the administration of state affairs, domestic and foreign.

Notably, as the introductory vignette reveals, state decolonization in Bolivia constitutes a rarely observed type of altered moment. In most other contexts in the Americas and earlier

periods in Bolivia, initiatives to incorporate formerly excluded ethnoracial populations into decision-making spaces of the state have followed the logic of compromise with and concessions to ethnoracial movements and international organizations. Traditional state elites have thus far directly and/or indirectly controlled the *magnitude* (how much access), *depth* (to what spaces of power), and *terms* (under what criteria and conditions) of ethnoracial recomposition.

Instead, following a landslide electoral victory in 2005, leaders of an indigenous movement in Bolivia have governed the recomposition process. In this context, I argue, the decolonization state project has not only expanded the magnitude and depth of recomposition but also attempted to write indigeneity into state bureaucratic practice, seeking to redefine the terms of incorporation.

Bolivia's trajectory is puzzling. In light of existing work on race in organizations, which would lead us to expect the formerly excluded to have little recourse but to navigate the normativity of whiteness by upholding it or conforming to it (e.g., Puwar 2001, 2004; Wingfield and Alston 2014). Our existing frameworks for race in organizations, whether public or private, cannot account for such ethnoracial dynamics. I suggest that this is the result of an almost exclusive empirical focus on the aforementioned, more common types of altered moments, which yield what philosopher Linda Alcoff calls "the politics of recognition, in which people of color must clamor for recognition from an all-powerful majority" (Alcoff 2006:256). The relative scarcity of empirical studies that interrogate situations in which the historically marginalized negotiate from positions of power, which Alcoff (2006) refers to as the politics of power

negotiation, has stymied theorization of the conditions and processes under which counterracist state projects materialize.<sup>8</sup> This dissertation addresses this shortcoming.

Synthesizing racial formation theory, insights from the literature on race in organizations, and the cultural boundaries conceptual toolkit, this dissertation offers a multi-level analytical framework for understanding how race shapes bureaucracy building and its politics. This framework focuses on the *ideal bureaucrat*, which I conceptualize a set of criteria of bureaucratic worth that defines what actors are authorized or de-authorized to govern bureaucratic practice and manage state affairs. I argue that the ideal bureaucrat articulates the material and conceptual ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy, making it a key site of demarcation of and negotiation over the ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy. As a classification system, the ideal bureaucrat is the ongoing product of both (1) social and occupational closure processes of state bureaucratic spaces, and (2) symbolic struggles among state elites to impose the markers of suitability for state authority.

In any given period and context, the dominant notion of the ideal bureaucrat emerges out of multi-level struggles over the meaning of race vis-à-vis the state and its bureaucracy. On the one hand, the ideal bureaucrat is embedded in circulating narratives of race and modernity, which conceptually link race and state-making projects, and in centuries of white male control of state symbolic and material resources. On the other, oppositional ethnoracial projects develop and mobilize competing definitions of the ideal bureaucrat in their efforts to (re)define

---

<sup>8</sup> I follow Goldberg (1997) in conceptually distinguishing racism – as race-based exclusionary relations of power – from racist expression, as assertions of that power to rationalize or to effect racial domination. Counterracism, then, refers to “a praxis committed not only to transform the significance of racial categories but to contest the exclusions of racist practices” (Goldberg 1997:12).

the meaning of race and (re)distribute symbolic and material state resources along ethnoracial lines.

Moreover, this framework directs attention to the critical link between macro- and micro-level racial projects – defined as “simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial identities and meanings, and an effort to organize and distribute resources [...] along particular ethnoracial lines” (Omi and Winant 2015:125) – in understanding processes of bureaucratic recomposition and (re)structuring. The relative position of competing ethnoracial projects within the state differently shapes the *magnitude* (how much access), *depth* (to what spaces of power), and *terms* (under what criteria and conditions) of ethnoracial recomposition, as well as how bureaucrats *on the ground* navigate race and racism within the state bureaucracy.

This dissertation provides an account of state decolonization in the Bolivian *Cancillería*, and how, *in the context of a radical institutional challenge*, new and old members of Bolivia’s *Cancillería* interpret, negotiate, and rearticulate the *ideal bureaucrat on the ground*. That is, it documents the racial politics of bureaucracy when the formerly excluded assume state power and negotiate incorporation from this position: How does race shape the experiences of the formerly excluded in state spaces? How do the formerly excluded navigate and negotiate race and racism within these settings? How does state decolonization shape their ethnoracial experiences and negotiations?

I show that indigenous movement control of the executive enabled the deployment of state resources toward the production of alternative official narratives of race and modernity.

In turn, I argue, this expanded the symbolic and material resources available to indigenous new entrants in negotiating and navigating race and racism in the bureaucracy.

The new guard is not a homogenous bloc. They are partly public employees from historically excluded ethnoracial populations hired after 2005, but time of entrance and ethnoracial self-identification are not sufficient or rigid membership criteria. Like Salman (2009) notes of the emerging political elite, the diplomatic new guard is composed of three sectors: progressive middle-class white-*mestizos*, upwardly mobile urban indigenous people, and rural leaders of the indigenous and peasant movement. The commonly used term ‘indigenous,’ moreover, encompasses Bolivians from various ethnoracial groups and regions. The Aymara, Quechua and Guaraní populations constitute the majority of the indigenous population, and almost half of Bolivia’s inhabitants. As of 2009, moreover, the Bolivian state recognizes 36 ethnolinguistic groups. Estimates of the size of the indigenous population range from 40 to 70 percent, depending on the selected indicator (Ciudadanía 2012).

While the new guard may have differing backgrounds and trajectories, they perceive they occupy a similar structural position in the country’s ethnoracial order. By narrating their experiences of discrimination by an old bureaucratic guard in terms of service and employment, members of the new guard locate common experiences in a shared ‘othered’ position and racialized society. This, in part, enabled them to mobilize new criteria of bureaucratic worth, and explains why this study does not emphasize this heterogeneity.

As I explain later, the new guard shares a common vision of bureaucratic worth. This emergent competing notion of the ideal bureaucrat represents a profound challenge to the dominant criteria of worth that sustained the authority of an older generation of white-*mestizo*

bureaucrats, which I call the 'old guard.' Furthermore, it proposed to redraw the ethnoracial boundaries of the Foreign Ministry. In politicizing the racialization of the ideal bureaucrat, decolonization politicizes the ethnoracial foundations of bureaucratic capital in the field of power (cf. Bourdieu 1998a), which have been historically insulated from racial politics under the veil of universality.

### **The Politicization of Race and Bureaucracy in Bolivia**

Across the social sciences, the politicization of race and ethnicity in Bolivia and other Latin American countries has been an important object of study (see Van Cott 2010). Studies of indigenous politics in Latin America, for example, have examined the causes and consequences of identity-based movements and parties, focusing on questions of identity, citizenship, parties and elections, and state reform (Van Cott 2010).

In Bolivia, scholars have studied the indigenous movement and the MAS party in relation to changes in state-indigenous juri-political relations, including citizenship and indigenous rights and recognition (e.g., Postero 2006; Sieder 2002b; Van Cott 2002; Yashar 2005), and the formation and performance of indigenous political parties (e.g., Albó 2002a; Madrid 2005; Van Cott 2005). More recently, decolonization has also captured the attention of social scientists who have examined the social and political transformations it proposes, the elite politics that have surrounded it, and the consequences and contradictions of decolonization across various policy arenas (e.g. Choque Canqui 2010; Ernst and Schmalz 2012; Farthing and Kohl 2014; Kohl 2010; Postero 2017; Schavelzon 2012). Despite this intense

interest, studies have not examined how race shapes state bureaucratic transformations and politics in the region and Bolivia.

Indigenous peoples in Bolivia, and in Latin America more generally, have faced centuries of political as well as economic and social exclusion that have had lasting, visible effects (for a collection of studies on ethnic inequality in Latin America see Hall and Patrinos 2006; see also Wade 2010). Yet, to the surprise of many, Evo Morales Ayma became Bolivia's first indigenous president on January 22<sup>nd</sup> of 2006. This was, thus, a significant accomplishment of the Bolivian indigenous peasant movement's political arm, the MAS-IPSP. His inauguration followed a landslide electoral victory that gave the MAS-IPSP the presidency and control of Congress. Morales's arrival to power "reflected the end of dominance by a minority white elite and the accelerated integration of Bolivia's majority indigenous population into government" (Kohl 2010:112).

While a long history of resistance, repression and consent characterizes the relation between indigenous peoples and the state in Bolivia (for historical studies see Gotkowitz 2007; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987a), the politicization of ethnoracial difference in Bolivia surprised observers who had previously considered it of little consequence (see Yashar 2005). Prior to the 1990s, as I discuss in Chapter 3, white-*mestizo* state elites sought to build a homogenizing state in which belonging was conditional on the erasure of indigeneity (Canessa 2005). Up to 1952, in fact, indigenous Bolivians were disenfranchised and subject to corvee labor obligations (Klein 2011; Mesa, Gisbert, and Gisbert 2003).

In the 1970s, a powerful national indigenous movement (re)emerged that put ethnoracial exclusion at the center of political debate (Postero 2006; see Van Cott 2002; Yashar

2005). In this decade, indigenous grassroots organizations led by university-educated indigenous intellectuals began organizing around ethnoracial demands. It is noteworthy that during the 1970s and 1980s, the Bolivian government reported to the United Nations Committee against Racial Discrimination (CERD) that ethnoracial discrimination was non-existent or, at the very least, not an issue in the country (Comité Nacional Contra el Racismo y Toda Forma de Discriminación 2012a).

The Indianista and Katarista movements advocated for a multinational state and the need to overcome neocolonial structures of racial and class oppression (Albó 1994). They formed the country's first indigenous political parties in the highlands, such as MITKA, MRTK, MRTKL, FULKA, MKN/KND and Eje Pachakutik. Their electoral success, however, was limited, collecting, on average, 2 percent of the vote between 1979 and 1993 (Van Cott 2005). Nevertheless, their influence in civil society and mobilizations intensified in the 1980s and 1990s, motivating the emergence of an indigenous movement in the lowland and a coca growers' movement in the valleys (Yashar 2005).

By the 1990s, a national indigenous movement and identity consolidated around demands for recognition and the reform of the 'difference-blind' state into a non-exclusionary pluricultural one (Van Cott 2008). The indigenous movement managed to influence the white-*mestizo* governing elites, securing a 1994 constitutional reform that recognized the country as pluricultural and multiethnic. Concretely, this involved group rights, territory, and recognition of indigenous institutions and specific politico-administrative competencies vis-à-vis the state (Sieder 2002b). The 1990s reforms, thus, reconfigured the relationship between state and indigenous people, albeit only in limited ways.

The consolidation of a national indigenous movement and structural reforms of the state that same decade made way for electorally competitive indigenous parties in the country (Madrid 2008; Postero 2006; Van Cott 2005). The Movement Toward Socialism party (MAS, in Spanish) emerged in this socio-political context of the mid-1990s. Indigenous and peasant leaders of the MAS-IPSP conceived it as the political arm of the indigenous movement. In this period, MAS and another indigenous party, the Pachakuti Indigenous Movement (MIP) party, were much more successful. MIP obtained 6 percent and 2 percent of the national vote in the 2002 and the 2005 presidential elections, respectively (PDBA n.d.). In turn, MAS finished second with the 22 percent of the vote in the presidential elections of 2002. In 2005, it won the election with an unprecedented 53.7 percent of the vote, 25 percentage points ahead of its closest contender (PDBA n.d.).

The emergence and electoral performance of the MAS-IPSP, thus, was partly due to important changes in the political opportunity structure in the 1990s (Moreno 2003; Rice and Van Cott 2006; Sabatini 2003; Van Cott 2003, 2005). The decentralization reforms and the decline of the traditional parties that accompanied a strong neoliberal reform program in 1990s Bolivia improved prospects for electoral success at the local level (Van Cott 2005). As Sabatini (2003) argues, the decentralization reform made away with the patronage structure of the traditional parties and allowed local, more autonomous leaders to emerge. In turn, structural adjustment programs weakened the political influence of the labor movement, a political void that national indigenous and peasant organizations filled.

However, the emergence and political success of the MAS-IPSP must be understood primarily in the context of a consolidated national indigenous movement that contested the

social meaning of race/ethnicity in Bolivia, deeply transformed indigenous subjectivity in the country, and brought the question of ethnoracial exclusion to the center of political debate.

In fact, the MAS party had a primarily indigenous leadership, strong ties with indigenous organizations across the country, and embraced indigenous culture and demands (Madrid 2008). While the MAS national platform in the early 2000s drew on the demands for indigenous rights and recognition that took the country by storm in the 1990s, it also viewed recognition as empty without meaningful redistribution of power and the eradication of institutionalized racism. At the same time, it articulated an inclusive ethnoracial discourse that “helped the party take advantage of [institutional and political] developments” (Madrid 2008:484), securing support from indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians, including progressive white-*mestizos*.

The electoral success of the MAS and MIP parties in the 1990s and particularly the 2000s enabled greater if still small participation of indigenous people in Congress, both as elected officials and civil servants, and other areas of the state bureaucracy (for discussions of the presence of indigenous elected officials see Cárdenas 2011; Chávez 2012). Before 2006, decentralization reforms in the country had already helped indigenous participation in government rise meteorically but this occurred almost exclusively at the local level (Albó and Tacuri Quispe 2004). In Chapter 4, I examine the trajectories and experiences of the pioneer indigenous bureaucrats, interrogating how they navigated dominant racialized notions of the ideal bureaucrat at the time. Their presence within the bureaucracy preceded the post-2006 accelerated period of incorporation into the *central* bureaucracy and across its hierarchy.

### **The *Altered Moment* in Bolivia's State Bureaucracy**

Almost four decades ago, political scientist Cynthia H. Enloe (1978:342) wrote, “[i]n Latin America almost by definition an Indian (of whatever particular ethnic group) has to slough off his Indian-ness in order to gain access into a bureaucracy. Where Indians as Indians are found in Andean and Mexican bureaucracies they are clustered at the lowest levels.” Bolivia’s central state bureaucracy fits this description. For most of Bolivia’s republican history it has been the prerogative of white-*mestizo* elites. Today, the decolonization of public administration represents a concerted effort to transform the racialized meanings and structure of the state bureaucracy; that is, an altered moment.

Leaders of the indigenous movement and the Morales administration have put the issue of ethnoracial exclusion from the national bureaucracy at the very center of political debate. As Mr. Iporre echoes in the opening vignette, the new administration viewed the stigmatization of indigenous men and women and their exclusion from state spaces as the epitome of a colonial state.

As many of his speeches reveal, for President Morales the absence of Andean surnames marking indigeneity, like Condori or Mamani, in the bureaucracy’s payroll exposes the coloniality of the Bolivian state. During his first inauguration speech, he noted,

We have to put an end to the colonial state. Imagine, only after 180 years of democratic republican life, we [indigenous people] were able to get here. We can be in the Parliament. We can be in the presidency, in the mayoral offices. Before, we didn’t have that right. [...] And that colonial state is still now in force. Imagine, it is not possible that in the National Army there is not a general [whose surname is] Condori, a General Villca, a General Mamani, a General Ayma. There aren’t any yet. There it is, the colonial state.

Much like in the rest of the state bureaucracy, the army's higher ranks were reserved for upper-class white-*mestizo* elites.<sup>9</sup> The new administration politicized this form of inequality, promising to change the composition of the upper-ranks of the Army and the central bureaucracy, and to promote dialogue around discrimination.

Bolivia state elites drew and redrew the boundary between indigeneity and the bureaucracy over the nineteenth and twentieth century. As historian Herbert Klein (2011) has noted, the efforts of a white Spanish-speaking and Western-oriented elite to maintain its monopoly over state power against the indigenous population and non-whites shaped Bolivia's political development. The Indian question – or how to incorporate the purportedly 'backward' indigenous population into 'modern' national life – was continuously present in the white and mestizo imaginary that historically shaped Bolivian state building (Klein 1992).

In Chapter 3, I discuss the narratives of race and modernity that state elites mobilized in the 20<sup>th</sup> century to demarcate the boundaries of state power around whiteness through the devaluation of indigeneity and other forms of non-whiteness. In the second part of this chapter, I focus on the competing narratives of race and modernity that the Morales administration and decolonization proponents have mobilized since 2006.

Since 2006, the Morales administration's project of state decolonization is at the center of an epochal transformation in ethnoracial relations in Bolivia, featuring a direct attack on an entrenched ethnoracial hierarchy, whose bottom ranks are disproportionately occupied by the

---

<sup>9</sup> Only in 2004 the state begins to take direct action against the stigmatization and exclusion of indigenous Bolivians in the Army's upper ranks. In 2004, the Carlos Mesa administration created a pilot Equality of Opportunity for Indigenous-Native-Peasant Candidates Program. The program continued until 2011 admitting 95 candidates (Tellería Escobar 2016).

indigenous population (Postero 2006), and the state apparatus that sustains it. The state decolonization discourse, strongly articulated by EGPP Director Iporre in this introduction's opening vignette, reflects a radical symbolic break with a historically dominant racist narrative of indigenous backwardness and exclusion.

Once in power, the Morales administration advanced a state decolonization project focused on two fronts: economic structure and epistemology (Ernst and Schmalz 2012). On the one hand, it proposed the transformation of an unjust economic system built by and for white-*mestizo* elites, and the neocoloniality global economic relations. It sought to break with Bolivia's dependency on and subjection to foreign power, particularly the United States. On the other, it has articulated an epistemological critique that ultimately calls not only for the incorporation of indigenous people into government decision-making but also for the revalorization of indigenous practices and knowledges that a racist colonial system had sought to erase. It draws on an imagined indigenous past to guide the reconfiguration of the state (Johnson 2010). Philosophically, it "questions fundamental assumptions about modernity and Western democracy in the pursuit of a completely new relationship between individual, society, and government" (Kohl 2010:108).

The decolonization of public administration was conceived as a crucial step in the broader official state project. Decolonization in the state bureaucracy seeks to unsettle the white normativity of bureaucratic spaces. It departs in significant terms from the bureaucracy-building project advanced in the 1990s: a World Bank-funded state modernization project (The World Bank 2000a, 2000b). The 1990s state modernization project entailed a series of reforms

of central-level state institutions envisioned as necessary to guarantee an “efficient, dignified and stable system based on competence and merit” (DS 25156 of 1998).

Modeled after the bureaucracies of OECD states, the World Bank-funded state modernization project promised to build a rational state bureaucracy that would substitute what many scholars and practitioners have described as a “neopatrimonial state” (Malloy and Gamarra 1987). The 1990s, thus, saw the creation of the National Service of Personnel Administration (SNAP, for its acronym in Spanish) charged with the promotion and regulation of the civil service career.<sup>10</sup>

The decolonization of public administration, or the state bureaucracy, reflects an emerging new vision of public service and an inchoate effort to codify it and institutionalize it. In stark contrast to the pre-Morales period, as its proponents postulate, decolonization seeks to undo the country’s colonial racial legacies by addressing racial inequality and institutional racism (Mandepora 2011), not only through the inclusion of indigenous men and women in positions of power, but through the articulation of a new state structure (Blaser 2007), and a new cultural logic for state agencies (Bautista S. 2012).

In particular, it is important to note that decolonization encompasses an official discourse of revalorization of indigeneity and the principles, practices, and ways of knowing associated with it vis-à-vis Eurocentric epistemology. As I discuss in Chapter 6 for the Foreign Ministry, this entailed the implementation of various institutional reforms across agencies and

---

<sup>10</sup> President Hugo Banzer Suárez mandated the creation of the National Service of Personnel Administration (SNAP), as a decentralized public entity within the Ministry of Finance, via Supreme Decree 25156 of 4 September 1998, in the context of the 1994 Constitution and Law 1178 of 1990 on Government Management and Control, which created the Integrated Governmental Financial Management and Control System (SAFCO).

the creation of educational curricula to train a new generation of decolonized civil servants. The decolonization of public administration thus moves beyond personnel changes and regime-policy realignments in state agencies that commonly follow elections (see Oszlak 2005).

The government's efforts to transform public administration and particularly promote a new notion of the ideal bureaucrat emphasizes the role of civil servants as protectors and carriers of decolonization. As the Vice Minister of Decolonization has suggested, it is through them that decolonization shall penetrate the entire will of the government. The constitution mandates that public servants speak an indigenous language in addition to Spanish. Many public servants today often point to the presence of *mujeres de pollera* (indigenous women in the traditional skirt) and the use of *ponchos* and hats in the ministries as evidence of a changing ethnoracial landscape. *Wiphalas*, *aguayos* (weavings), *amautas* (Aymara spiritual guides) and coca leafs are now commonplace within bureaucratic spaces and in state events.

The Morales administration's decolonization agenda has drawn strong critiques from former white-*mestizo* political elites and the old bureaucratic guard, which is the theme of Chapter 5. At the level of public debate, spokespersons contrasted the new guard to, what they claimed was, a meritocratic and technical political and bureaucratic old guard. Unlike the old guard, the new guard, they argued, was based on interested politics, ethnoracial preferentialism, and lack of capacity and honesty. The old-guard also depicted the decolonization agenda variously as promoting racial animosity and conflict, drawing on ideological fundamentalism, and proposing a return to premodern ways of life.

Members of the old guard often recount the arrival of these new bureaucrats as a violent invasion and understand their presence as a direct affront to the established codes that organize bureaucratic spaces. As old-guard bureaucrat Ana<sup>11</sup> notes,

I think there was a big confusion on the part of indigenous people that when [President] Evo came to power, they felt they were lords and masters of the country. [...] So, when Evo arrived, I think they were very confused, thinking that it was now their right, that they were owners of the country. They had to come in [to the bureaucracy] and you had to leave, even if they did not have degrees, even if they had nothing.

Ana's appearance, middle-class status, European surnames, and 'proper' Spanish, among other traits, immediately signal her privileged position within Bolivia's racialized social system. For her, the new indigenous guard's claim to the bureaucracy is illegitimate. Implicit in her diatribe about new face of the central state bureaucracy is an ethnoracial boundary that has reserved the bureaucracy and its resources for white-*mestizo* Bolivians (see Klein 2011; Larson 2004).

Her words also reveal a discourse that professes the meritocratic and apolitical orientation of the bureaucratic old guard and stands in contrast to what she perceives as the unsuitability and lack of capacity of the new indigenous guard and their allies. In reality, average educational attainment among state employees is higher today than in the 1990s (Soruco et al. 2014). At play, however, is an ethnoracial ideology that casts indigeneity as unfit for statecraft in indigenous-majority Bolivia. Old guard bureaucrats perceive the attires, bodies, behavior, ideas, trajectory, and speech of the indigenous members of the new guard to stand in tension with their notions of what an ideal bureaucrat is. Consistent with what critical race scholars have noted for various contexts, modern state authority has been naturalized in white bodies and culture (Goldberg 2002; Omi and Winant 1994; Puwar 2001, 2004).

---

<sup>11</sup> Interview with the author. Name has been changed to protect confidentiality.

The changing and contested bureaucratic landscape seems to be blurring the politically constructed separation between the state sphere and the indigenous sphere that has historically informed state bureaucracy making in Bolivia. In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, I elaborate on this new notion of the ideal bureaucrat and show how new and old bureaucrats understood it, contested it, and reappropriated it *on the ground*. This study thus shows that the ethnoracial exclusion and hierarchies that ethnoracial movements in Bolivia and other contexts have problematized and fought are not only fought in the interplay between the state and racial movements or in the most visible parts of the state, such as the legislature, but also within ordinary and less visible areas of the bureaucratic apparatus. The state, as a set of organizations that act and structure (cf. Skocpol 1985) is not an extrasocial or extracultural space, but is itself a social space within which power and privilege can be challenged and renegotiated (Bernstein and Mertz 2011).

### **Ethnography of Race and State Bureaucracy**

This dissertation ethnographically interrogates the racial discourses and practices in which dominant notions of the *ideal bureaucrat* are embedded and examines the clash of rival ethnoracial projects seeking to redraw the material and conceptual ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy. While the empirical focus lies primarily on the altered moment within the Bolivian Foreign Ministry, its main objective is to understand how the national state bureaucracy is racially constituted and the conditions that shape ethnoracial recomposition processes and politics in the bureaucracy. This dissertation adopts an ethnographic

methodology that combines interpretive political ethnography (Baioocchi and Connor 2008; Schatz 2009; Weeden 2009) with the extended case method (Burawoy 1998).

First, ethnography of political actors and institutions, such as states and their bureaucrats, sheds light on the more obscure and intricate aspects of political dynamics through a “close-up and real-time observation of actors involved in political processes” (Baioocchi and Connor 2008:139). As political ethnographer Lisa Weeden (2009:85) notes:

Ethnography is an especially good way to gain insight into actors’ lived political experiences, to observe how people make sense of their worlds, to chart how they ground their ideas in everyday practices and administrative routines, and to analyze the gap between the idealized representation and actual apprehension of events, people, and political orders.

Thus, political ethnography entails the discovery of the context specific logics and meanings of political activities (Weeden 2009). Political activities include, I argue, the most mundane activities and interactions of bureaucratic spaces.

Second, adopting the extended case method (ECM) approach, I locate this everyday politico-bureaucratic life in its extralocal and historical context (Burawoy 1998). An ECM ethnographic approach seeks to expand and reconstruct preexisting theory, which guides research and analysis, and directs attention to power effects as limitations of reflexive science.<sup>12</sup> Like political ethnography, ECM entails “*the extension of the observer into the world of the participant*” (Burawoy 2000:26 emphasis in the original), moving with participants through space and time. Yet, an ECM approach to everyday politico-bureaucratic experiences and processes also involves extending out from the research site, moving “*beyond social*

---

<sup>12</sup> As Burawoy (1998) notes, there are important *power effects* in ECM: domination, silencing, objectification, and normalization. These can be addressed through attention to the researcher’s position in the power hierarchy during data collection and analysis, attention to new voices that may push toward a reframing of the tentative theory, and attention to the assumptions made in the theorization of the case.

*processes to delineate the social forces* that impress themselves on the ethnographic local” (Burawoy 1998:15 emphasis in the original). As Burawoy explains, this necessitates viewing the everyday world “as simultaneously shaped by and shaping an external field of forces” (Burawoy 1998:15): cultural, economic, and political as well as national, international, and transnational.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, the ethnographic methodology of this dissertation approaches the state bureaucracy as a lived social world, an “arena for social life and political action” (Bernstein and Mertz 2011:7). It simultaneously “studies up,” putting elite state spaces, which are often out of the reach of social science research, under the spotlight (Puwar 2004). Turning the ethnographic gaze upon the everyday life of the Foreign Ministry under state decolonization, this dissertation thus diverges from most studies on race and the state, which predominantly focus on contentious racial politics *only* at the macro-level (Saperstein, Penner, and Light 2013). This approach, I argue, allows us to follow the mundane experiences and processes through which states are racially constituted in most closed-off spaces of its bureaucratic apparatus. It can shed light on the constitutive role of cultural schemes and dynamics in the state (Steinmetz 1999), or the “cultural constitution” of states (Sharma and Gupta 2006).

### ***The Research Site***

This dissertation primarily investigates these questions within the Foreign Ministry in post-2006 Bolivia. *Cancillería* was founded in 1884, becoming one of Bolivia’s first five ministries (Gumucio

---

<sup>13</sup> In order to avoid *objectification* or the reification of social forces, it is important to understand forces as “only the historically contingent outcome of processes” (Burawoy 2000: 27).

Granier and Aliaga Palma 2005). Today, it is one of twenty-one ministries composing the executive branch. *Cancillería* manages the state's foreign relations and policies. Given its position as one of the most influential executive institutions, the Ministry's headquarters are located across the city's main square steps away from the Legislative Assembly and Presidential Palace buildings. Two adjacent buildings, a three-story 19<sup>th</sup> century republican structure and an eight-story modern annex, house the Office of the Minister, the Plurinational Diplomatic Academy (ADP, for its acronym in Spanish), and most directorates. Across the street, a smaller historic building houses additional directorates and provides direct citizen services.

The Morales administration posited that it was necessary to radically transform the Ministry, which would play a central role in the decolonization process. It viewed members of the diplomatic corps as elites too eager to put international interests before the nation. It also emphasized *Cancillería's* significance as a symbol of white-*mestizo* power. Today, therefore, *Cancillería* is at the center of decolonization efforts in Bolivia. Led by David Choquehuanca – an Aymara Indian and a salient thinkers and supporters of decolonization – the agency has encountered the project of decolonization firsthand.

*Cancillería* represents an extreme and unlikely site of boundary contestation. White-*mestizo* elites have historically maintained a strong monopoly over *Cancillería* and Bolivian diplomacy. As in other countries, including the United States, members of the most privileged segments of society, predominantly white, have traditionally filled the Foreign Service (see Lusane 2006 for a discussion of race and the U.S. State Department). In Bolivia, white-*mestizo* elites restricted and policed access to *Cancillería* through party and social networks, the diplomatic career, and the diplomatic academy.

Relative to other organizations of the central state bureaucracy, white-*mestizo* elites historically insulated *Cancillería* from the democratizing demands of indigenous movements. Embedded in an international field of diplomacy, white elites constructed these institutions adopting to significant extents formal and informal international norms of diplomatic practice. In part, this embeddedness helped justify *Cancillería's* insulation, further making it a *least likely* subject of ethnoracial contestation in Bolivia.

In the 1990s, the ministry was at the forefront of the state modernization project, advancing a strong professionalization and organizational autonomy agenda. In 2005, 220 employees were registered in the diplomatic career. Today, over 50 percent of the old personnel have been supplanted by new civil servants, many of indigenous origin. This *exacerbates* the politics around notions of bureaucratic worth as members of formerly excluded ethnoracial populations access its ranks and decolonization proponents implement reforms.

The Ministry features a two-system personnel structure consisting of a Central Service and a Foreign Service (hereafter, CS and FS). At the time of this study, the ministry had 556 salaried employees: 312 CS employees in the city of La Paz, the country's seat of government, and two small regional offices in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz; and 244 FS workers stationed and locally employed in 33 foreign countries.

Jobs in the organization are hierarchically ranked along a seventeen-tier salary scale, which groups jobs along four broad categories: leadership, executive, diplomatic, and administrative support. The leadership includes the Foreign Minister and three Deputy Ministers (Foreign Relations, Trade and Integration, and Institutional and Consular). The executive level includes 15 General Directors and 26 Ambassadors. The bulk of the Ministry's

personnel occupy positions in the diplomatic and administrative support categories with 273 and 229 employees, respectively.

Like other state agencies, the ministry also has a number of non-salaried, temporary and/or part-time workers, and unpaid personnel, but data on them is not available. The Plurinational Diplomatic Academy had 32 non-staff students enrolled in its two-year Master Program in Diplomacy and International Relations, many of whom were also interns in the ministry.

Documentary evidence helps historically contextualizing the Ministry's current composition. I used publicly available personnel lists to classify employees as indigenous or non-indigenous based on surnames.<sup>14</sup> In 1999, *Cancillería* reported that 70 percent and 45 percent of diplomatic and executive personnel in the CS and FS, respectively, were academy graduates.<sup>15</sup> An examination of the list of graduates before 1999 reveals that only three out of 160 graduates were indigenous, based on the surname criterion. This suggests that the number of indigenous Bolivians in the diplomatic and executive ranks of the Ministry was likely in the single digits, an estimate supported by anecdotal evidence gathered during fieldwork. By contrast, at the time of this study, roughly 40 indigenous men and women occupied positions at the diplomatic and executive levels, using the surname criterion. The surname criterion, however, underestimates the indigenous population because, historically, indigenous-origin families Hispanicized their surnames to escape stigmatization.

---

<sup>14</sup> In Bolivia, surnames are markers of race. In fact, Morales often pointed to the absence of surnames, such as Quispe or Mamani in state personnel lists to highlight the exclusion of indigenous Bolivians from the bureaucracy.

<sup>15</sup> Declaration before the Foreign Policy Committee of the Chamber of Deputies of the Republic of Bolivia. "Política Exterior Boliviana: Desafíos en el Nuevo Milenio" Comisión de Política Internacional y Culto, H. Cámara de Diputados, La Paz, Bolivia. Armando Loayza Mariaca "Desafíos Institucionales de la Política Exterior Boliviana" pp.45-55

### *Access to the Research Site*

Between 2012 and 2014, I conducted 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork in La Paz, where Bolivia's executive branch is headquartered. I also carried out brief research trips to the cities of Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Sucre in Bolivia, a large city in Northern Africa, and a large city in North America. I carried out the bulk of data collection (discussed further in the next subsection) between September 2013 and September 2014. Although I conducted research in and about various spaces of the state bureaucracy and many state events, my primary field site was the Bolivian Foreign Ministry, where I conducted eight months of participant observations between February and September of 2014.

The possibility of research access to *Cancillería* emerged during a preliminary research trip to La Paz between June and July of 2012. I grew up in a white-*mestizo* middle-class family in urban Bolivia. In Bolivia, public sector jobs, particularly jobs in government offices have historically been a significant source of employment for the urban white-*mestizo* middle class. For this reason, although I did not grow up in La Paz and left Bolivia as a teenager, I had acquaintances variously connected to the public sector. This network facilitated connections with new and old bureaucrats currently and formerly employed in various government agencies, including the Foreign Ministry. In the tense context of social and political transformations unfolding under the Morales administration and the decolonization project, these personal relations *vouched* for my reliability. During this preliminary trip, I broached the possibility of conducting research in *Cancillería* the following year.

Upon my return to Bolivia in September 2013, I asked my primary contacts within the Foreign Ministry for help formalizing the Ministry's institutional support and obtaining the

necessary authorizations. In order to move forward with the process, I was asked to turn in a presentation letter, a research proposal, and a curriculum vitae. However, the process stalled over the next three months. The approaching end-of-the-year holidays combined with changes in the ministry put my request on hold.

In the meanwhile, I attended and participated in various government-organized public events concerning decolonization. These included key events, such as the 1<sup>st</sup> International Summit on Decolonization, Depatriarcalization, and Fight against Racism and Discrimination (October 9-12, 2013 - La Paz), the Plurinational Meeting for the Recovery of Bolivia's Historical Memory (October 17-19, 2013 - La Paz), and the General Meeting of the National Committee Against Racism and All Forms of Discrimination (October 29-30, 2013 - La Paz). In these events, I identified the channels through which state sanctioned discourses of decolonization and new narratives of race and modernity are promoted and distributed. My presence in a dozen meetings and conferences became crucial to the task of documenting various positions and initiatives relating decolonization, since such events often brought intellectuals, public officials, and social movements together to discuss decolonization conceptually and methodologically.

Most importantly in terms of access, through my participation in these meetings, I identified and connected with key government officials in the decolonization project, which created opportunities for research and collaboration. As I attended meetings, held informal conversations, conducted interviews, and gathered documents, my network of government officials and state bureaucrats connected to the state decolonization project grew. In December and January, I began exploring other potential field sites, including the Plurinational Legislative Assembly and the Public Management Office in the Ministry of the Presidency. At around the

same time, the director of another state agency, whom I met at a public event, invited me to work with his agency in writing a report on what “decolonized public administration” meant for public servants.

In late January, my request to access the Foreign Ministry began moving forward once more. Upon an in-person interview with a *Cancillería* executive, the Ministry leadership granted me access. Three factors were, I believe, central in securing access. First, the settling of changes within the organization enabled my contacts to begin, once again, to advocate on my behalf. The support of white-*mestizo* left-leaning *Cancillería* bureaucrats signaled that I was a *compañero* or comrade and had the “right kind politics,” which is distinct from political party militancy. Second, my growing knowledge of and connections with key government officials related to the state decolonization project further legitimated my research project. Third, a temporary increase in personnel needs in the organization facilitated my access to *Cancillería*. This was the result of Bolivian taking on the Chairmanship of the Group of 77 plus China and the responsibility to organize a Summit of Head of States and Government in Bolivia in June 2014. The Summit commemorated the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the group of states. In exchange for research access, I provided support in various directorate-level projects and participated in a Ministry-wide taskforce charged with organizing a high-level diplomatic summit.

## ***Methods***

Although participant observation is understood as the *sine qua non* of ethnographic research, the ethnographic toolkit is diverse. It draws on various tools of social science research while maintaining the ethnographic sensibility. This dissertation’s argument draws upon data from

participant observation, interviews, focus groups, and documents. Intensive, long-term involvement provides much more complete data about a political process than other methods alone, providing a solid empirical grounding for conclusions (Maxwell 2005). Data from a diverse range of individual and settings, using various data collection tools, as in this research project enables triangulation and overcomes the particular weaknesses of, for example, interviews alone (Maxwell 2005).

### *Ethnographic Observation*

Between February and September of 2014, I held an unpaid and temporary position in the Viceministry of Foreign Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Relations. Working full-time in the ministry, I was able to encounter unique ethnographic opportunities in diplomatic practice. I became integrated into the office dynamics by partaking in the day-to-day. I was also able to accompany Bolivian diplomats to several diplomatic meetings in Bolivia, in Northern Africa, and in North America, as well as to *Cancillería*-organized meetings with members of civil society. My participation in all these meetings was funded through research grants, entailing no expenses for the Foreign Ministry. In daily field notes, I documented informal conversations, organizational practices, meetings, events, and spaces, remaining attuned to the rich texture of bureaucratic life.

In *Cancillería*, I set out to trace and document official changes in the organization's institutional logic, or organizing principles and practices, particularly since the onset of the project of state decolonization. I documented how the organization's leadership understood decolonization and translated it (or not) into day-to-day changes. In addition, I documented the

experiences with and interpretations of institutional changes by old-timers and new entrants, paying particular attention to their status claims and the practices and discourses that sustained such claims. I also sought to capture the interactions of an old generation of mostly white-*mestizo* bureaucrats and a more ethnoracially heterogeneous new guard. I remained attuned to the types of boundaries that structure interactions within state organizations and their entanglement with race; to bureaucrats' framing of self and their place within the organization, as well as their views of others; to the strategies and discourses through which they 'do race'; and to the ways in which they participate in institutional change.

### *Interviews*

During research, I supplemented dozens of informal conversations with diplomats and bureaucrats with semi-structured in-depth interviews with 50 current and former employees of the central state bureaucracy, including high-ranking officials and mid-level bureaucrats. The interview sample for former and current civil servants was the product of a snowball sampling technique whereby current and former diplomats introduced me to other public servants. I conducted the interviews in the respondents' locations of choice, including their homes, coffee shops, and offices. I recorded all interviews using an audio recording device, except for six cases in which interviewees did not grant me permission to record. I also took detailed notes of the interview setting, the interviewees' self-presentation, and the interviewees' body language as I posed the interview questions. I have transcribed all interviews and their accompanying notes.

Interviews lasted between one and five hours, with a modal interview time of two hours, sometimes taking place over two meetings. The interview guide included questions

about public servants' professional trajectories, their experiences at work, and their understanding and experience with the decolonization project. Through their responses, I examined the criteria by which they evaluate their bureaucratic worth and that of other current and former occupants of the bureaucracy. I also explored the discursive strategies through which they assert their worth relative to their criteria and discredit the worth of contenders. In short, I examine how they draw the line between the worthy and the unworthy bureaucrat and (re)draw the ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy.

In addition, with the support of EGPP, I conducted 8 focus group interviews, plus one pilot interview, with a total of 47 mid-level public servants from across the twenty ministries that composed the executive at the time. The composition of the focus groups was determined along two factors, gender and ethnoracial identification. Two groups were conducted for each population segment: indigenous women, indigenous men, non-indigenous women, and non-indigenous men. Eight mid-level ministry employees were invited to participate in each group. In practice, each group included between four and six participants, a response rate of slightly over fifty percent. Group interviews were conducted in classrooms of the Plurinational School of Public Administration. With the prior consent of all participants, I recorded the group interviews using an audio recording device. A research assistant also took copious notes, creating a backup for content, but also capturing the interactions and body language of participants as they engaged with the questions and each other.

Each semi-structured group interview lasted two hours, touching on three broad topics: state decolonization, the decolonization of public administration, and organizational changes. These focus groups created a setting in which civil servants could discuss and debate how they

understood and experienced decolonization and what they perceived had changed in Bolivia's public administration. This enables the identification of the range and diversity of experiences and understandings of state decolonization on the ground, the categories through which they describe their experiences, and the frames through which they understand this process (Hennink 2007; Morgan 1996).

### *Documentary Materials*

With the support of two research assistants, I collected three types of documents: state documents on decolonization, newspaper clippings relating to diplomacy and decolonization, and historical *Cancillería* documents. Concerning official documents on decolonization, I gathered reports, proposals, speeches, pamphlets, and books produced by various state agencies, such as the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Cultures and its dependent Viceministry of Decolonization, the Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of Development Planning, and the Offices of the Presidency and Vice Presidency, among others. These were crucial to identifying the various dimensions and objectives of the state decolonization project. I supplemented these with news clippings and opinion columns from two newspapers of national circulation, *La Razón* and *El Cambio*, published between 2006 and 2014. These clippings provide important information about state initiatives concerning decolonization as well as the foreign ministry and the controversies that variously surrounded them. Lastly, at the Ministry's library and archive, I gathered *Cancillería* institutional reports published between 1970 and 2005.

## Chapter Framework

Six chapters, including the conclusion, follow this introduction. Chapter 2 elaborates on the analytic framework. Synthesizing racial formation theory, insights from the literature on race in organizations, and the cultural boundaries conceptual toolkit, this dissertation offers a multi-level analytical framework for understanding how race shapes bureaucracy building and its politics. As noted earlier, this framework focuses on the *ideal bureaucrat*, which I argue articulates the material and conceptual ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy, making it a key site of demarcation of and negotiation over the ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy.

Chapter 3 examines how the Morales administration's state decolonization project has attempted to *write in* indigeneity into the state and its bureaucracy contesting the naturalization of state power in white-*mestizo* bodies. It interrogates the ideological fabric weaved for over a century of Bolivian republican history against which the official state decolonization project positions itself. Having laid out the macro-political struggles and discourses through which indigeneity was *written out* of the state apparatus in Bolivia in nineteenth and twentieth century, the chapter argues that in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the state sanctioning of an oppositional ethnoracial project enabled the production of alternative official narratives of race and modernity and the articulation of a nation-state building project in ways that blurred the symbolic boundary between indigeneity and statecraft, which was produced and reproduced over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Chapter 4 looks at pioneer indigenous bureaucrats, namely indigenous entrants to the state bureaucracy before 2006, and how they navigated the boundary between bureaucracy

and indigeneity under the gaze of modernizing white-*mestizo* elites. It examines their experiences as they confronted and navigated a racialized ideal bureaucrat norm that naturalized state power in white-*mestizo* bodies (cf. Puwar 2004). Pioneers entrance took place in the context of (1) white-*mestizo* control of the central state bureaucracy, and (2) a hegemonic state discourse that articulated modernity and indigeneity as antithetical, whether under the veil of national *mestizaje* or multiculturalism. This chapter shows that, in this context, indigenous access to the central bureaucracy was highly restricted. They navigated the boundary between bureaucracy and indigeneity by conforming and upholding dominant white-*mestizo* criteria of bureaucratic worth. Despite their compliance with these criteria, pioneers nonetheless encountered racism often and had to plead with gatekeepers to see beyond their stigmatized identities.

The subsequent two empirical chapters focus on meso- and micro-level understandings and negotiations of the racialized ideal bureaucrat in the Foreign Ministry. Chapter 5 examines how members of the old diplomatic guard in *Cancillería* defined the ideal bureaucrat and, thus, drew the boundary between the worthy and the unworthy over the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and in the context of state decolonization. It identifies the criteria through which old guard diplomats define their group and distinguish it from others, particularly new indigenous entrants and their allies. It then traces the formation of the old guard's *esprit de corps* and notions of the ideal bureaucrat, interrogating whose "own culture and image" defines this classification system. Lastly, the chapter analyzes how old guard diplomats respond to the hegemonic rise of the decolonization project.

Chapter 6, instead, examines how members of formerly excluded ethnoracial populations and their allies in *Cancillería* negotiate the ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy in the context of the Bolivian state project of state decolonization. First, it examines the criteria through which new guard diplomats define their group and distinguish it from others, particularly old guard diplomats. I show that, unlike pioneer indigenous bureaucrats, in the Bolivian context of decolonization, that members of the new diplomatic guard contest the old guard's racialized notion of the ideal bureaucrat that organized these spaces, attempting to delegitimize their criteria and unsettle white normativity. It then analyzes how new guard diplomats respond to the old guard's criteria of worth and claim to governance of the Bolivian diplomatic field, discussing the strategies through which they discredit the old guard's claims. Finally, the chapter discusses the basis of the new guard's notions of the ideal bureaucrat and emerging *esprit de corps*, as well as its efforts to institutionalize it.

The conclusion provides a synthesis of this dissertation's findings and discusses the analytic framework put forth in this introduction under the light of the empirical findings. It then discusses the relevance of these findings for theories of race and the state and for policymaking and representation.

## CHAPTER 2

### Analytic Framework: The Ideal Bureaucrat, Racial Projects, and the Racial State

#### Introduction

The publication of Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol's edited volume *Bringing the State Back In* (1985) consolidated a state-centered sociological approach to politics that altered how sociologists conceptualized the state vis-à-vis society and its role in political processes. Influenced by Weber's writings, these analysts conceptualized the state as a set of organizations – administrative, legal, extractive, and coercive – with unique functions and missions (Amenta 2005). State-centered analysts theorized the causal role of the state in two ways: as actor and as political institutions (cf. Skocpol 1985). On the one hand, institutionally, “their organizational configuration [and activities] affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others)” (Skocpol 1985:21). On the other hand, at a meso-organizational level, state organizations and actors appear as participants in politics, pursuing certain interests and operating within particular institutional logics (Amenta 2005).

The following year, sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant published their paradigm shifting monograph *Racial Formation in the United States*, now in its third edition. In it, Omi and Winant reconceptualized race as a master analytic concept and “a fundamental dimension of social organization and cultural meaning in the U.S.” (Omi and Winant 1994:viii), strongly rejecting the reduction of race to other categories of analysis. Their racial formation

theory foregrounds the social construction of race and its ongoing contestation in civil society and the state. It also advances a novel race theory of state. They argue that the state – composed of institutions, policies, and social relations— “*is* inherently racial. Far from intervening in racial conflicts, the state is itself increasingly the preeminent site of racial conflict” (Omi and Winant 1994:82). It maintains an “unstable equilibrium” through the politics of absorption (cooptation) and insulation (declaring various functions non-racial).

Both of these contemporaneous theoretical developments, namely state-centered political sociology and racial formation theory, shifted sociological understandings of the state and politics. Yet, they have seldom conversed with one another (James and Redding 2005).

In spite of this theoretical chasm, some sociologists have taken up the relationship between race and state as an important object of study. Scholarship on ethnoracial movements, state ethnoracial categorization, and ethnoracial policy often recognizes the role of state institutions and agents in shaping racial inequality and processes of identity formation (for reviews see James and Redding 2005; Saperstein et al. 2013). Studies have focused on state racial practices, examining state racial categorization or the use of racial criteria in citizen services (e.g., Loveman 2014; Loveman and Muniz 2007; Mora 2014; Nobles 2000; Watkins-Hayes 2009). Research shows that states and their apparatuses variously incorporate racial criteria and objectives in their activities, encode and enforce racial politics in policies, and organize racial identities (e.g., Cazenave 2011; Evans 1997; Lentin 2007; Zolberg 2008).

Existing sociological research on race and the state, however, has yet to center the role of race in the *ongoing* construction of modern states and their apparatuses. Though seemingly

a subtle distinction, I posit that this entails an ontological shift from race and state bureaucracy as discrete phenomena to race as constitutive of state bureaucracy.<sup>16</sup>

States and their bureaucracies are not neutral instruments of domination, as David Theo Goldberg argues in *The Racial State* (Goldberg 2002). Rather, as he painstakingly demonstrates, modern states were conceived through modern racial thinking as projects of racial configuration, as instruments of and for homogeneity (Goldberg 2002; Goldberg and Giroux 2014b). Thus, in addition to examining the racial effects of the state (as actor and institution), it is necessary to interrogate how race, as a historically situated cultural formation, (re)shapes the boundaries of the state apparatus, conceptually and materially; that is, not just what the state produces or does racially in society but also how racial thinking structures what falls within and beyond statecraft.

Synthesizing racial formation theory, insights from the literature on race in organizations, and the cultural boundaries conceptual toolkit, this chapter develops a multi-level analytic framework for understanding how race shapes the ongoing construction of state bureaucracy and its politics. This framework focuses on the *ideal bureaucrat*, which I argue articulates the material and conceptual ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy, making it a key site of demarcation of and negotiation over the ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy.

The rest of this chapter is organized along three main sections. First, I briefly discuss the existing research on race and representative bureaucracy, highlighting the ways in which this

---

<sup>16</sup> In pointing out the need for such shift, I draw on sociologist Zine Magubane's (2016) call to question the racial ontology of American sociology's conceptual matrix.

literature fails to capture the constitutive relationship between race and state. Second, I elaborate on the proposed framework, discussing the key insights I build on from racial formation theory, the literature on race in organizations, and the sociology of cultural boundaries. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of these insights and a brief discussion of the implications of this analytic framework.

### **Race and Representative Bureaucracy Research**

As an object of study, ethnoracial diversity and representation in state bureaucracy has fallen outside the realm of sociology. Instead, it is primarily the domain of public administration studies (Bradbury and Kellough 2011; Kristov 1974) and political science (Phillips 2003).

Research on representative bureaucracies in these fields has examined three broad questions. First, scholars have examined the matter of passive representation, or how representative is the demographic composition of state bureaucracies across time and place (e.g., Cajías de la Vega 2011; Llorens, Wenger, and Kellough 2007; Riccucci 2009; for Bolivia see Albó 2007; Albó and Tacuri Quispe 2004; Cárdenas 2011). A second set of scholars have shifted their attention onto active representation, or whether the presence of members of marginalized ethnoracial groups in state spaces leads to better government legitimacy, policies, and service provisions, among other outcomes (Bradbury and Kellough 2008; Grissom and Keiser 2011; Hong 2017; Theobald and Haider-Markel 2008; for Bolivia see Zegada and Komadina 2014; Cárdenas 2011). Lastly, political scientists have theorized and empirically examined the causes behind the adoption of different types of active incorporation policies (Bird 2014; Htun 2015b; Hughes 2011; Tummala 2015), and whether such policies are

compatible with democracy (Mansbridge 1999; Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom, and Nicholson-Crotty 2011; Phillips 2003).

The theory of representative bureaucracy acknowledges the existence of ethnoracial and gender discrimination and exclusion in state bureaucracies and the societies in which they exist. It is in tension with neo-Weberian and New Public Management approaches, which minimize the significance of race, ethnicity, and/or gender in state bureaucracies (see Maravić et al. 2013). Representative bureaucracy's emphasis on group rights and representation, moreover, runs into liberal conceptions of democracy based on individual rights and political equality (see Lijphart 1980). Yet, existing research on race and bureaucracy in these scholarly fields does not tell us much about the processes underlying the perpetuation of ethnoracial inequality within state institutions.

With few exceptions (e.g., Watkins-Hayes 2009), representative bureaucracy theory and research does not conceptualize bureaucracies and bureaucratic identities as inherently racial. Rather, they attribute the causes of organizational ethnoracial inequality to its occupants' attitudes, bad policies, or other external factors. In light of dominant conceptualizations of state bureaucracies as essentially race-neutral instruments, a preoccupation with how (or whether it is even possible) to reconcile them with multi-racial societies underlies much of this research. This preoccupation, however, erases the documented racial ontology of European Enlightenment political theory (Go 2016; Goldberg 2002; Von Vacano 2014) and the historical "co-articulation of race and the modern state" (Goldberg 2002:5; see also Quijano 2000).

## **A Multilevel Analytic Framework to Race and the State Bureaucracy**

Instead, in order to examine the changing dynamics of racialization of the Foreign Ministry, this dissertation offers an analytic framework for race and bureaucracy that synthesizes three bodies of literature: (1) theories of racial formation and the racial state; (2) critical and relational research on race and organizations; and (3) boundary dynamics in cultural sociology. This framework focuses on how competing macro- and micro-level ethnoracial projects develop and mobilize differing notions of the *ideal bureaucrat* that define which kinds of actors are authorized or de-authorized to govern bureaucratic practice.

### ***The Racial State and Racial Formation Theory***

In their seminal theory of racial formation, Omi and Winant (1994) lend the state a central role in processes of racial formation both as a cause and effect. In order to understand what they mean by the “racial state,” it is necessary first to unpack the key concepts of their work. They define racial formation as “the sociohistorical process by which racial identities are created, lived out, transformed, and destroyed” (Omi and Winant 1994:55). In other words, racial formation is the process of race making— defining the meaning of race, creating racial categories, and classifying people racially— and the production of a social system stratified by race<sup>17</sup> (Omi and Winant 2015).

Racial projects, in turn, are the building blocks of racial formation. They variously articulate structure and signification in their attempt to “produce, extent, subvert, or directly

---

<sup>17</sup> Omi and Winant define race as “a concept that signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies” (Omi and Winant 2015:110, emphasis in the original).

challenge that system of racial patterning” (Omi and Winant 2015:125). Specifically, they define racial projects as “simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial identities and meanings, and an effort to organize and distribute resources (economic, political, cultural) along particular ethnoracial lines” (Omi and Winant 2015:125). Thus, race is political; permanently produced and contested at the macro-, meso-, and micro-level through contending racial projects.

Conceptualizing race as political entails that the racial order of white supremacy is durable but unstable, especially in a global context dominated by liberal political discourse. In Omi and Winant’s (2015) Gramscian framework, the state significance rests in its power to solve the contradictions of an unstable (socially, economically, and politically) racial order through force and/or consent (also see Winant 2001). In fact, they argue that since the post-Civil Rights Movement United States,<sup>18</sup> the state has changed from an instrument of domination through force to domination through *hegemony*, “secured by a complex system of compromises, legitimating ideologies [...], adherence to established political rules and bureaucratic regularities, etc.” (p.84). In the interplay between the state and (exclusionary or egalitarian) racially-based political movements “seek to rearticulate the dominant ideology” with redistributive implications (p.86). States absorb and insulate ideological elements and certain demands and personnel through reforms in the process of reestablishing unstable equilibrium.

---

<sup>18</sup> Taking a more global perspective of racial formation, Winant (2001) identifies World War II as the breaking point from racial despotism to racial hegemony.

While racial politics permeates society, taking place at various levels and sites of social life, Omi and Winant (1994) view the racial state as “the preeminent site of racial conflict” (p.82). As they note, “racially based political movements [...] are inconceivable without the racial state [...]” (p.86). Moreover, “the racial state [...] has been historically constructed by racial movements; it consists of agencies and programs which are the institutionalized response of racial movements of the past” (p.86).

Accordingly, they conceive states as “composed of *institutions*, the *policies* they carry out, the *conditions and rules* which support and justify them, and the *social relations* in which they are embedded” (Omi and Winant 1994:83, emphasis in the original). Institutions are variously racially oriented, but not necessarily coordinated toward the same racial objective. Through policies, they “organize and enforce the racial politics of everyday life” (p.83). Policymaking and political mobilization, in turn, rest on conditions and rules that “integrate the disparate racial policies of different state agencies, define the scope of state activity, establish ‘normal’ procedures for influencing policy, and set the limits of political legitimacy in general” (p.83). However, state activity is not entirely autonomous. It penetrates “society” but it is also penetrated and, thus, relatively constrained by its relationships with non-state actors and broader “cultural and technical norms” (p.84).

States are “targets and operators of intersecting racial projects” (Omi and Winant 2015:147). On the one hand, states and state practice are targets of racial projects because they are racially structured. Racially oriented collectives and movements advance their competing projects on the state because (1) it is historically implicated in racial exclusion, (2) the promise of political equality undergirds the nation-state it symbolizes, and (3) it wields

symbolic and distributive power. This process shapes state structure and practice as states variously and to varying degrees engage competing racial projects. On the other, states and state practice are operators of racial projects in that they have racial effects. States variously incorporate racial criteria and objectives in their activities, encoding and enforcing the racial order in its policies and institutions, and organizing and regulating racial identities. That is, they play a significant role in race making, racial stratification, and racial politics.

Scholars have extended the insight that the interplay of racial projects, ideologically linking the meaning of race and social structure, structured the state to a historical examination of the racial foundations of modernity and its institutions, including the modern state (Goldberg 2002; Winant 2001). In his essays on racial formation as a global process, Winant (2001:19) argues that modernity is a global racial formation project, whereby “race has been a constitutive element, an organizational principle, a *praxis* and structure that has constructed and reconstructed world society since the emergence of modernity...” The world became modern as it took on racial configurations through conquest, nation-state formation, enslavement, and subjugation. Regarding nation-state formation, racialized conceptions of national identity were central in enabling the construction of “instrumentalities, institutions, and capabilities for action” (Winant 2001:23). On the other, this capability for action and racialized collective national imaginaries and beliefs enabled imperial projects as well as later stages of nation-building from colonial subjects (Winant 2001).

Articulating a strong version of the Omi and Winant’s racial state, scholars such as Goldberg (2002; see also Goldberg and Giroux 2014a), Lentin (2007), and Bracey (2015)

variously contest any conceptualization of the state that portrays it as an essentially race-neutral instrument. In *The Racial State* (2002), David Theo Goldberg argues:

... race is integral to the emergence, development, and transformations (conceptually, philosophically, materially) of the modern nation-state. Race marks and orders the modern nation-state, and so state projects, more or less from its point of conceptual and institutional emergence. The apparatuses and technologies employed by modern states have served variously to fashion, modify, and reify the terms of racial expression, as well as racist exclusions and subjugation. (p.4)

Goldberg (2002) views states as implicated in the management of the racial order of white supremacy. However, he challenges what he perceives as a “conceptual discreteness about the state and race” (Goldberg 2002:4) in Omi and Winant’s conception of the racial state. The latter, he argues, conceive the state as a potentially neutral instrument of domination that becomes inflected with racial meanings (Goldberg and Giroux 2014a). Instead, for Goldberg (2002) modern states did not take on racial meaning but were themselves conceived through modern racial thinking, including European liberalism, as projects of racial configuration, as instruments of and for homogeneity against the threat heterogeneous ways of being (Goldberg 2002; Goldberg and Giroux 2014a).<sup>19</sup>

These historical and global extensions of racial formation theory provide two important insights for the study of the articulation between ongoing racial formation and state formation processes. First, states are continuously shaped by multi-level struggles over the meaning of race and the distribution of state resources along ethnoracial lines. Second, the concept of race has been central to the formation of states and their apparatuses. This highlights the need to

---

<sup>19</sup> Jung and Kwon have more recently called to rethink the modern state not as taken-for-granted nation-states but as empire-states or colonial-states in which racial domination and inequality is not an anomaly but “the basic building blocks and products” (2013:934). Rather than viewing homogeneity as the driving thrust of states, they view hierarchical heterogeneity as the organizing principle of modern states, like the United States. While not all states might be empire-states in the way the United States, their critique indicates the need to examine the differentiated spaces and demands of inclusion and exclusion that co-exist within modern states.

historicize the state's relationship to race, such that the centrality of race in state formation is afforded its appropriate analytic weight in the study of contemporary racial politics. To echo Omi and Winant (2015), this implies that "*race is a master category*" co-constituted with but irreducible to other categories of analysis (Omi and Winant 2015:106, emphasis in the original).

Ideologically and practically imagined and conceived through the concept of race, modern states are inherently racial, founded on the devaluing of non-European ways of being. As I show in the next chapter, the national community and political leadership in Bolivia has been imagined in white-*mestizo* and Westernized terms (see for example Irurozqui 1994; Larson 2005). Race historically shaped membership in the state, but also who could hold and exert state power. This literature, however, has been less attentive to the bureaucracy itself and how race organizes these spaces, authorizing and de-authorizing actors' claims to bureaucracy. Yet, it suggests that the racial character of the state bureaucracy's personnel composition is the product of macro- and micro-political struggles over the meaning of race vis-à-vis state practices.

The tendency in this literature is to focus on macro-level processes, such as conflict between racial movements and state actors over policy. For example, Omi and Winant's (1994, 2015) empirical application of racial formation in the U.S. focuses on racially-oriented movements, such as the black civil rights movement, and how they target the state in their efforts to rearticulate the meaning and structure of race in the country. Other scholars have extended and engaged this model to other national contexts, such as Brazil, Colombia, the European Union, and South Africa, among others (e.g., Goldberg 2002; Lentin 2007; Paschel 2016b; Winant 2001). Instead, this study seeks to link the macro-political processes to micro-

level racial politics within state bureaucracies, and from practices oriented toward the population (i.e. state effects) to the (re)articulation of the boundaries of statecraft. To this end, I bridge theories of the racial state with insights from the literature on race and organizations and the study of boundaries in sociology.

### ***Critical and Relational Research on Race and Organizations***

Research on race in organizations helps us to begin to understand the role of race in the everyday life of state bureaucracies. Until recently, much like in the public administration literature on representative bureaucracies, the primary focus of the study of race in organizations has been on the determinants of organizational demography. Scholars documented ethnoracial and gender disparities along various dimensions, and examined various structural-, organizational-, and individual-level causes (Reskin, McBrier, and Kmec 1999; Smith 2002). Yet, as Vallas (2003) argues, this line of research “produced remarkably little understanding of the social processes that underlie such disparities and shape the work situations of historically excluded groups” (p.380). Attention to cultural dynamics in the institutionalization of ethnoracial inequality has opened new directions in the study of race in organizations.

Research on race in organizations from critical and relational scholars have focused on race as an organizing principle of organizational processes, practices, and interactions. These works have responded to calls to rethink the relationship between ‘race’ and ‘organization’ (Nkomo 1992; Vallas 2003). In her critique of organizational theory, Nkomo (1992) argues that organizations are not race-neutral; rather, race is integral to organizational dynamics. Acker

(1990) elaborated a similar feminist critique. She posits that gendered assumptions underlie organizational processes and shape gender disparities at work. She later elaborated on the racial and class dimensions of organizations (Acker 2006). Most recently, Puwar (2004) discusses the naturalized coupling of elite spaces, such as government and universities, with white male bodies, and the hegemonic culture of masculine whiteness that organizes such spaces.

Central to these critiques is the racialization and gendering of the ideal worker, and the way such symbolic construct organizes the workplace. Here, the presumably universal worker is the image of a white man. As Acker (1990) notes, “images of men’s bodies and masculinity pervade organizational processes” (p.139), shaping expectations about work commitment, identity, and behavior (Kelly et al. 2010; Maldonado 2009). For Puwar (2001), the somatic norm is “the corporeal imagination of power as naturalised in the body of white, male, upper/middle-class bodies” (p.652). As she notes, “these bodies are valorised as the corporeal presence of political leadership and management” (Puwar 2004:141), while women and non-whites are deemed, in various ways, unfit for it. Nkomo’s (1992) notes that organizational theory’s silence on race has resulted in a sort of “faulty generalization” (p.489), which takes white males and Western knowledge as the universal basis of organizational science.

Recent research in organizations has made important inroads showing how the racialized ideal worker norm produces a racialized organizational structure and experience (Pierce 2012; Reitman 2006; Wingfield and Alston 2014). Puwar’s (2001, 2004) pioneering studies of minorities in the British Civil Service and Parliament shows that their presence produces disorientation as the archetypal senior civil servant is imagined as white. Minorities

and women are also assumed to be more junior and less competent than their white colleagues. In turn, their career success entails displaying an excess of competence, but also complicity in adopting the social codes and language of white upper/middle class statesmen. Puwar (2004) finds comparable boundary dynamics in the British Parliament, academia, and the arts.

With the exception of Puwar (2001), these studies have, however, examined organizational domains other than public bureaucracies. In a recent synthesis effort of studies in the U.S., Wingfield and Alston (Wingfield and Alston 2014) develop a theory of racial tasks to explain the reproduction of racial hierarchies in predominantly white organizations. As “organizational practices and norms... are guided by racialized assumptions that create certain expectations for workers of color and maintain racial hierarchies” (p.238), minority employees’ trajectories depend not only on performance, but the additional burden of performing ‘racial tasks’—ideological, interactional, and physical tasks of upholding, conforming to, and enforcing whiteness.

Building on this literature, I use the concept of the ‘ideal bureaucrat’ to refer to the criteria of bureaucratic worth that defines which kinds of actors are authorized or de-authorized to govern bureaucratic practice. These are thus normative expectations or criteria through which actors are classified and evaluated as worthy and unworthy in state bureaucracy.

For the most part, however, these studies have focused primarily on the *dynamics of reproduction* of the normativity of whiteness that underlies conceptions of the ideal bureaucrat or worker. In part, this reflects the durability of ethnoracial boundaries. But it also reflects the

scarcity of cases in which formerly excluded ethnoracial populations might be able to negotiate not just inclusion but the terms under which inclusion takes place. This is what philosopher Linda Alcoff (2006) has referred to as the shift from a racial politics of recognition to a politics of power negotiation (cf. Alcoff 2006), whereby formerly excluded ethnoracial populations can mobilize state resource to challenge the racial order. To understand the politicization and politics around notions of the ideal bureaucrat, this dissertation turns to the cultural sociology of boundary dynamics.

### ***Boundary Dynamics in Cultural Sociology***

The study of boundaries in sociology has sought to understand and theorize the structure of social relations. Beginning with Weber's studies of status group formation on the basis of shared religious ideas (see Weber 1958, 1967) and continuing with the Bourdieu's work on social groups and distinction (e.g., Bourdieu 1984), a main concern in this literature has been "understanding the role of symbolic resources... in creating, maintaining, contesting, or even dissolving institutionalized social differences (e.g. class, gender, race, territorial inequality)" (Lamont and Molnár 2002:168).

Various analysts have detailed the symbolic distinctions that allow the reproduction of social groups (most notably Bourdieu 1984, 1998b). Boundary theory directs our attention to the symbolic boundaries on which ethnoracial inequalities rest, distinguishing between *social boundaries* and *symbolic boundaries* to highlight that their relationship is dynamic, but also that the latter may persist despite the blurring of social boundaries (Epstein 1992). Here, *social boundaries* are understood as objectified forms of social differences that structure interaction

and access to material and nonmaterial resources, while *symbolic boundaries* or resources, are schemes of knowledge through which individuals make sense of their world and act (Lamont and Molnár 2002).

Drawing from the cultural boundaries toolkit, I conceptualize the racialized ideal worker norm as both a social boundary and a symbolic boundary. On the one hand, it is the product of social closure processes whereby white men hoarded (cf. Tilly 1999) state bureaucratic spaces and privileges (Puwar 2004). On the other hand, the ideal worker norm is also a classification system, product of symbolic struggles to shape the markers of suitability and the criteria for membership after their own culture and image. It can be described as instituted history and enacted history; “the same history inhabits both habitus and habitat, both disposition and position... history in a sense communicates with itself, is reflected in its own image” (Bourdieu 1981:306). In this sense, Bourdieu (1994) conceptualizes the bureaucratic microcosm as a space within which actors endowed with different configurations of social, economic, cultural and symbolic capital struggle over the state and its profits. This, he argues, is a struggle over the monopolization of the universal and the constitution of their point of view into a legitimate one (Bourdieu 1994:17).

The ideal bureaucrat is also a symbolic resource. Those invested in it can mobilize and defend it in the protection of privilege from competing classification systems. The concept of *boundary work*, thus, provides a second important insight: boundaries are drawn and contested on an ongoing basis in daily struggles over the power to impose a vision of legitimate divisions that structure interaction (cf. Bourdieu 1989).

A study of the way state agents do *boundary work*, defined as the process through which people “construct similarities and difference between themselves and other groups” (Lamont 2002), helps us understand how race is written in and out of bureaucratic practice, i.e. how the ethnoracial boundaries of the bureaucracy are (re)produced and contested. In particular, it directs our attention to “the role of symbolic resources... in creating, maintaining, contesting, or even dissolving institutionalized social differences...” (Lamont and Molnár 2002:168). It entails a focus on the “symbolic representations and subtle processes of valorization and vilification that actors deploy in their effort to shape the social environment to their own advantage” (Vallas and Cummins 2014:243); for example, symbolic constructions of the ideal bureaucrat as white and symbolic representations of indigenous people as backward.

As a symbolic construct, the racialized ideal worker norm is (re)produced and contested through various boundary drawing practices and strategies. In *The Dignity of Working Men*, sociologist Michele Lamont (2002) shows how white and minority working-class men in the United States and France construct “their sense of identity, worth, and status” and “perceive social hierarchies by interpreting differences between themselves and others” (p.2). In the United States, for example, she finds that white American workers understand their worth morally, based on work ethic and responsibility. Most mobilize these moral resources to *draw* strong boundaries between themselves and black workers, whom they view as irresponsible and lacking work ethic. This boundary work contributes to the reproduction of racial inequality. While black workers also use moral criteria to *draw* boundaries between themselves and whites, their racial boundaries are weaker, as they primarily attempt to *bridge* racial boundaries by emphasizing racial equality on the basis of socioeconomic success, competence, religious

beliefs, physiology, and citizenship.<sup>20</sup> In another study, Lamont and her co-author show that successful black professionals emphasize their intelligence and professional competence as a strategy to discredit racist stereotypes and to sustain their legitimate membership in the middle class (Lamont and Fleming 2005).

These boundary dynamics are, in turn, activated under varying macro- and meso-level conditions, and are shaped by national and global discourses, which Lamont refers to as cultural resources. She defines *cultural resources* as “narratives made available by national historical and religious traditions and various sectors of cultural production and diffusion-intellectuals, the educational system, the church, the mass media” (Lamont 2002:7). Most importantly, she argues that boundary work is not reducible to individual experiences and attitudes alone. Rather, individuals “borrow from the general cultural repertoires supplied to them by the society in which they live, relying on general definitions of valued traits that take on a rule-like status” (Lamont 1992:7). Thus, cultural resources shape individual-level boundary drawing processes through context-resonant narratives.

Arguably, Lamont’s *cultural resources* are the product of what sociologist Andreas Wimmer (2002) theorizes as a *cultural compromise* in processes of ethnic and nationalist inclusion/exclusion. As he explains,

A cultural compromise emerges when the actors sharing a communicative space can agree that certain values are valuable and that certain modes of classifying the social world make sense. [...] A cultural compromise has no life of its own and exists only in its manifold interpretations and variations, nourished and colored by the specific experiences and social positions of individual actors. When the balance of power changes, the cultural compromise may dissolve into a series of subcultural variations or even counter-cultures that challenge the hitherto accepted rules of making meaning. [...] Those that have taken part in the negotiation stabilize the achieved compromise by closing their ranks, controlling access to the group and marking its boundaries with diacritic elements such as

---

<sup>20</sup> Lamont (2000) finds that some white workers also spouse anti-racist claims that attempt to bridge racial boundaries on the basis of economic success and universal human nature.

certain dress styles or modes of speaking. [...] A cultural compromise thus entails a certain way of defining the borders of between us and them, a blueprint for organizing exclusion and inclusion. (Wimmer 2002:8)

What Wimmer emphasizes here explicitly is the constitutive link not only between everyday boundary drawing processes and cultural resources but also between such national historical cultural narratives and the fundamental role of ethnic thinking in the constitution of modern forms of political and cultural membership – that is, the nation state. This resembles the argument of racial state theorists that race has been integral to the constitution of the modern state, such as Goldberg (2002).

Boundary theory thus alerts us to the multiple boundary dynamics, discursive or otherwise, that might ensue around the racialization of the ideal bureaucrat. These might include maintenance or reproduction, but also contestation, dissolution, shifts, among others (Pachucki, Pendergrass, and Lamont 2007). Similarly, Wimmer (2008) describes several boundary making strategies, such as expansion, contraction, inversion, repositioning, and blurring. The first entails expanding the range of people included. Contraction, in turn, entails reducing it. Inversion refers to challenges to the hierarchical ordering of ethnic categories. Efforts to change one's categorical membership amount to repositioning, akin to assimilation or passing strategies. Finally, boundary blurring consists of efforts to diminish the significance of ethnicity as a principle of organization by emphasizing other boundaries (Wimmer 2008).

In addition, Wimmer (2008) develops a framework to explain why the process of ethnic group formation produces different outcomes, leading from the macrostructural level to the agency of individuals and aggregates and back. He proposes three determinant forces of ethnic boundary strategies: institutional factors, the hierarchical positioning of actors, and the

structure of political alliances. As he explains, change may be driven by exogenous factors, endogenous factors, and what he calls ‘endogenous drifts,’ the diffusion and adoption of new strategies within a particular field. As Wimmer explains, “in a nutshell, the model explains the varying features of ethnic boundaries as the result of the negotiations between actors whose strategies are shaped by the characteristics of the social field.” (Wimmer 2008:973).

Despite these useful insights and conceptual toolkit, existing research has three major limitations. First, while works like those of Lamont and her collaborators place cultural meanings at the center of the analysis, they are often “divorced from the organizational and institutional contexts within which boundary work is likely to be most consequential” (Vallas and Cummins 2014:237; also see Pachucki et al. 2007). This research thus moves in a new direction by ‘entering’ the state and examining the interrelation between class and professional boundaries as these interact with race to shape and transform bureaucratic practice.

Second, much less is understood about micro-dynamics of boundaries, that is, the mechanisms through which they are activated, maintained, disputed and transformed (Lamont and Molnár 2002). This study moves in this new direction by breaking with the emphasis on theorizing reproduction, but also grants race its appropriate analytic weight in boundary work processes and circulating and competing national historical narratives.

Third, while providing a useful toolkit, the boundaries approach often reduces the analytic distinction between different categories of differentiation or boundary making, such as race and ethnicity. For example, Wimmer (2008) and others (e.g., Brubaker 2009; Jenkins 1994) define race as a subtype of ethnicity. Specifically, Wimmer defines ethnicity as “a subjectively felt sense of belonging based on the belief in shared culture and common ancestry. This believe

refers to cultural practices perceived as ‘typical’ for the community, to myths of a common historical origin, or to phenotypical similarities” (Wimmer 2008:973). In doing so, Wimmer and others fail to attribute race its proper historical and analytic weight as a master category (cf. Omi and Winant 1994), diminishing the role of racism in the constitution of modernity (Hall 1992; Wade 2010; Winant 2001).

Contrary to these approaches, this dissertation analytically centers the role of racial thinking in the construction of the state’s administrative apparatus, constituting bureaucracy on the devaluing and erasure of racially othered (non-European) ways of being and knowing (Goldberg 2002). I view race and ethnicity as overlapping analytic concepts in that “both race and ethnicity involve a discourse about origins and about the transmission of essences across generations” (Wade 2010:20). However, to reduce race to ethnicity is, as Peter Wade argues, “to blur the *particular history* by which these [racial] identifications come to have the force they do” (Wade 2010:19, emphasis in the original). Racial categories and identifications “invoke, distantly or immediately, a long history of colonial encounters, slavery, discrimination, resistance, and so on” (Wade 2010:19). In doing so, this work recognizes that, as Goldberg (2002) argues, “race marks and orders the modern nation-state, and so state projects, more or less from its point of conceptual and institutional emergence” (p.4).

## **Conclusion**

To recap, synthesizing racial formation theory, insights from the literature on race in organizations, and the cultural boundaries conceptual toolkit, I have developed a multi-level analytic framework for understanding how race shapes bureaucracy building and its politics.

This framework focuses on the *ideal bureaucrat*, which I conceptualize as a set of criteria of bureaucratic worth that defines what actors are authorized or de-authorized to govern bureaucratic practice and manage state affairs. I argue that the ideal bureaucrat articulates the material and conceptual ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy, making it a key site of demarcation of and negotiation over the ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy.

As a classification system, the ideal bureaucrat is the ongoing product of both (1) social and occupational closure processes of state bureaucratic spaces, and (2) symbolic struggles among state elites to impose the markers of suitability for state authority. At any given time and context, the dominant notion of the ideal bureaucrat emerges out of multi-level struggles over the meaning of race vis-à-vis the state and its bureaucracy. On the one hand, the ideal bureaucrat is embedded in circulating narratives of race and modernity, which conceptually link race and state-making projects, and in centuries of white male control of state symbolic and material resources. On the other, oppositional ethnoracial projects develop and mobilize competing definitions of the ideal bureaucrat in their efforts to (re)define the meaning of race and (re)distribute symbolic and material state resources along ethnoracial lines.

Moreover, this framework directs attention to the critical link between macro- and micro-level racial projects – defined as “simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial identities and meanings, and an effort to organize and distribute resources [...] along particular ethnoracial lines” (Omi and Winant 2015:125) – in understanding processes of bureaucratic recomposition and (re)structuring. The relative position of competing ethnoracial projects within the state differently shapes the *magnitude* (how much access), *depth* (to what spaces of power), and *terms* (under what criteria and conditions) of ethnoracial

recomposition, as well as how bureaucrats *on the ground* navigate race and racism within the state bureaucracy.

The starting point of this approach entails identifying the changing criteria of bureaucratic worth in the Bolivian Foreign Ministry as indigenous Bolivians join its ranks. Then, it is necessary to examine how these are articulated with racial discourses and identities, defining which kinds of actors are authorized to make claims and participate in diplomatic practice. This is what I set out to do over the following chapters.

### CHAPTER 3

#### Competing Racial Projects and the Ideal Bureaucrat

##### Introduction

Elisa Vega Sillo was another featured speaker at the Summit on Decolonization. Her long black tunic, the colorful woven mantle draped over her shoulders, and an off-white hat visually signal her indigenous (Kallawayaya) identity. Standing behind the podium, Elisa Vega followed her greetings to the audience with a personal anecdote to illustrate the changes the country is undergoing and particularly the opening of the state to indigenous people. “I can’t believe Indians are in power!” she began her anecdote. She uttered the words, but they are not hers. They belong to the alarmed white woman who approached Elisa Vega on the streets of Sucre, Bolivia’s historic capital, to offer her work as a domestic servant in her home. Upon seeing Elisa Vega, her appearance and apparel, walking downtown, the woman somehow assumed she was looking for a job. Domestic service is one of the few occupations historically available to indigenous women who migrated to the predominantly white-*mestizo* cities. As she narrates it, the white woman was horrified when Elisa explained to her that she was in the city to participate in the recently established Constituent Assembly (2006-2007). As a well-known peasant leader in the *Bartolina Sisas*<sup>21</sup>, she had been nominated to and elected member of the

---

<sup>21</sup> National Confederation of Peasant Indigenous Native Women of Bolivia “Bartolina Sisa,”

Assembly. Today, she is Head of the Depatriarchalization Unit at the Viceministry of Decolonization. To the woman, however, Elisa Vega was a transgressive indian –in this context, a derogatory term for an indigenous person— leaving her proper place in society (service) to invade the realm of whiteness (state power).

The central state bureaucracy has for most of Bolivia's republican history been the prerogative of white-*mestizo* elites. As historian Herbert Klein (2011) has noted, the efforts of a white Spanish-speaking and Western-oriented elite in an indigenous-majority country to maintain its monopoly over state power against *cholos*<sup>22</sup> and indians<sup>23</sup> shaped Bolivia's political development. Like in much of the Andes, racial categories in this national context have been understood and defined in terms of cultural difference, placing indians, *cholos*, *mestizos*, and whites along a ladder between barbarism and civilization (Gotkowitz 2011). As Canessa (2005:21) notes:

In the Andes, essentialized differences between people are produced through cultural processes. That is, the racialized differences between indians and non-indians are understood to be rooted not in immutable characteristics but, rather, in social and cultural practices, which nevertheless produce differences that inhere in the body: difference is essentialized and even seen as biological, but these differences are produced through practice and are therefore mutable.

In contemporary Bolivia, “what shapes the socially reproduced classification system is the racial perception of the other through the racial categories, ‘indian,’ ‘*cholos*,’ and ‘whites’” (Loayza Bueno 2010:76; see also Barragán 2011). In these contexts, the boundaries of whiteness were drawn around white European Hispanicized culture, but particularly against *cholo*-ness and

---

<sup>22</sup> In the complex Spanish colonial caste system, *cholo* referred to the offspring of a *mestizo* and an indigenous person, or indian. *Mestizos*, in turn, were the offspring of a Spaniard or Creole and an indigenous person. Today, “‘Cholo’ is a local term to refer to a [...] *mestizo*, especially one who maintains deeper indigenous roots.” (Albó 1994:79). In everyday usage, *cholo* is commonly a pejorative term; “for whites it is analogous with ‘uncouth,’ ‘vulgar’ and, from a social perspective, the ‘inferior’” (Loayza Bueno 2010:91).

<sup>23</sup> *Indio*, or indio, is a colonial racial category that lumps together native Andean peoples (Postero 2006).

*indigeneity*. While the patterns of political exclusion and incorporation of the indigenous population variously changed over the 20<sup>th</sup> century, an ideology that casted indigeneity as backward and unfit for statecraft persisted alongside white control of the central bureaucracy.

In 2006, the electoral victory of Morales and the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) marked a significant turn in the exclusion of the *cholo* and indigenous population from political life in the country (Kohl and Bresnahan 2010). At the same time, the administration's state decolonization project problematized more than the ethnoracial composition of the central state bureaucracy. Viewing state institutions as embodying the worst of modernity, namely racism and individualism, it articulated a radical critique of the very racial foundations of the bureaucracy. It politicized marked ethnoracial inequality in the country as well as dominant narratives of race and modernity that underpinned the naturalization of state power in white-*mestizo* bodies and the exclusion of indigenous people from state spaces. Much like those of other indigenous people in the state, Elisa Vega's anecdote above reveals that indigenous people do not fit notions of the ideal bureaucrat. Decolonization proponents have articulated alternative narratives and proposed the construction of new state institutions and public servants that draw on the experiences, knowledge, and practices of indigenous peoples. In the administration's vision, "The Future is Indian," the title of a 2014 publication of the Viceministry of Decolonization denotes.

In this chapter, I examine the alternative narratives of race and modernity through which decolonization writes indigeneity into the state and its bureaucracy and attempts to denaturalize the white-men/state-men metonymy, as well as the ideological fabric weaved for over a century of Bolivia's republican history against which the counter-racist intention of

decolonization proponents becomes evident. Here, I follow Goldberg (1997) in defining racism as exclusionary relations of power; racist expressions as assertions of power that define objects and subjects; and counterracism as actions that transform the significance of racial categories and contest the exclusion of racist practices.

**Figure 3.1.** Front cover of “The Future is Indian,” a publication of the Viceministry of Decolonization, showing President Evo Morales Ayma and the Presidential Palace.



Source: Viceministerio de Descolonización (2014)

This chapter argues that in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the state sanctioning of an oppositional ethnoracial project enabled the production of alternative official narratives of

race and modernity that blurred the symbolic boundary between indigeneity and statecraft produced and reproduced for over a century. These changing narratives of race and modernity, in turn, reclaimed and revalorized the role of indigeneity in the modern state building project, placing it at its center. They also provided a coherent narrative that legitimized the changing ethnoracial composition of the bureaucracy. Rather than an inversion of the social order within the central bureaucracy, this emergent narrative represents a hybrid conception in which indigeneity becomes the moral guiding compass of modern bureaucratic practice.

The chapter is organized around four sections. I first discuss the macro-political struggles and discourses through which indigeneity was *written out* of the state apparatus in Bolivia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I then examine the changing narratives of race and modernity through which the Morales administration has attempted to *write in* indigeneity into the state and its bureaucracy and how they contest the white-men/state-men metonymy. The third section briefly situates the Foreign Ministry in the context of the state decolonization project. The last section situates this discussion and the findings in the context of the broader dissertation argument.

The analysis and argument advanced here are based on primary and secondary documentary sources. For the historical section, I draw primarily on key secondary sources that have examined nation-state building in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Bolivia through a racial formation lens. The works of historians Marie-Danielle Demelas (1981), Marta Irurozqui (1994, 2001), and Brooke Larson (2004, 2005) have been crucial in reconstructing the racial ideologies that shaped the ethnoracial boundaries of the public sphere since the late 1800s and through the twentieth century. For the contemporary sections, I examined key official

government documents in which the MAS-IPSP intelligentsia codified the official decolonization discourse. Specifically, I examined the published MAS-IPSP government programs for 2006-2010, 2010-2015, and 2015-2020 (MAS-IPSP 2005, 2009, 2014); the 2006 National Development Plan (PND 2007); the 2016 Social and Economic Development Plan (PDES 2015); the Patriotic Agenda 2025 (Ministerio de Autonomías 2014); and President Evo Morales Ayma's inauguration speeches (2006b, 2006a, 2010, 2015b, 2015a).

### **Modernizing White Elites and the 'Indian Problem' in Postcolonial Bolivia**

In this section, I posit that the notion of the ideal bureaucrat that the MAS-IPSP confronted in its march to and through the central bureaucracy is rooted in dominant narratives of race and modernity that white statesmen and intellectuals anchored around the 'indian problem.' These narratives shaped debates around political belonging and leadership. I discuss three historical narratives of race and modernity that rearticulated the boundary between indigeneity and the state after independence. These, however, also reveal the endurance of particular themes in the modernizing projects of the white elite: the incompatibility between ethnoracial heterogeneity and modernity, the backwardness of the indigenous population, and the white/modernity and white-men/states-men metonymies.

As in many Latin American states, indigenous-state relations in Bolivia have been structured around politics and ideologies of exclusion and exploitation that have targeted the indigenous population (Roper, Perreault, and Wilson 2003). Race shaped the development of the Bolivian state and its institutions since independence. In the context of a Spanish Crown in crisis, Creole pioneers (cf. Anderson 1991) secured independence and embraced the liberal

values of the French Revolution. At the same time, local elites found themselves at odds in reconciling the repudiation of the colonial system and their notions of citizenship with their efforts to secure state power, control and exploit the indigenous labor force, and reaffirm their racially determined status as whites if no longer Spaniards.

At the time of Bolivia's birth in 1825, over 72 percent of its 1.1 million inhabitants were considered indians (Bonilla 1997). Whites and mixed-race (*mestizos*) accounted for roughly 9 percent and 18 percent, respectively, while the black population represented less than 1 percent of the population (Bonilla 1997). While the official state language was Spanish, less than 20 percent of the population spoke the language and only about 10 percent were literate in it (Klein 2011).

In the midst of a post-war economic crisis, unsettled social order, and a bureaucracy lacking the financial and human resources to conduct the cadastral surveys and censuses, white-*criollos* recommitted to the colonial system in order to maintain local power relations and control social mobility (Klein 2011; Larson 2004). The large-scale pre-independence regional Indian uprisings, such as those led by Tupac Katari and Bartolina Sisa in La Paz, and the Haitian Revolution loomed heavy on their minds as portents of a potential loss of power (Klein 2011), especially in the context of post-war crisis. In this context and amidst Creole racial fears, the 'indian problem' trope –or what to do with what they perceived as a backward indigenous population in a modernizing liberal republic— emerged as a powerful narrative shaping the white Creole elite exclusionary state-building project (Klein 1992).

Ultimately, Creole rulers opted to preserve hierarchical colonial racial system, where race and class determined a person's relationship to the state, to ensure their own survival and

that of the young Republic. The colonial system provided a guaranteed source of state revenue and public labor to finance the bureaucracy's operation. In August 1826, Bolivia reinstituted the tribute-land pact, which remained in *de jure* effect until 1882. In addition to appeasing the indigenous population and helping maintain local power relations (Larson 2004), it enabled the development of a state bureaucracy that could employ members of the elite, the predominant source of employment for citizens, and put resources extracted from the indigenous population at the service of elite projects (Irurizqui 2012). Accounting for between 40 and 60 percent of state revenue (Klein 2011), indigenous tribute kept the Bolivian government afloat for its first five decades during which military strongmen, or *caudillos*, ruled and consolidated the territory.

Creole elites also instituted limited citizenship, granted only to adult men literate in Spanish, who had a job or trade "without subjection to another [person] as a domestic servant" (CPE 1826). Estimates suggest the criteria for citizenship reserved political rights almost exclusively to upper-class whites, or roughly 10 percent of the population (Klein 2011). Ethnoracial distinctions thus organized political, economic, and social rights and duties in the new republic and shaped the development of the Bolivian state since independence. They also shaped social interactions, as Larson (2004:206–7) explains:

To be perceived as Indian, or as one of the amorphous mixed strata (*mestizos, cholos, castas*), was not simply a legal-administrative fiction, but an everyday reality, reconstituted through daily practice. Landed and regional elites often saw Indians as belonging to one seamless race, destined by birth, history, and biology to a life of field labor, servility, and humility. By contrast, they tended to distrust the racially ambiguous plebe as a threat to caste and the larger social order.

The status quo relatively reestablished, the centrality of the 'indian problem' waned until the 1880s.

Various historical studies have characterized liberal-oligarchic state period between 1880 and 1950 as a decisive period in post-colonial race relations in the country (e.g., Irurozqui 1994; Klein 2011; Larson 2005; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987b). During this period liberal intellectuals and statesmen reinscribed colonial racial distinctions in a modern political system, “reorganiz[ing] the nation-state around rigid concepts of race, culture, and geography [...], while securing the boundaries of whiteness, urbanity and civilization” (Larson 2004:247). They articulated a nation-state building project “managed by and reserved for the privileged. [...] In fact, the excluded sectors constituted the opposite of what the elite sought to achieve. They were the antithesis of the progress and modernization they sought and, therefore, they could not be considered apt for a new Bolivia seeking to break with its backwardness” (Irurozqui 1994:17). Drawing on racial thought, they attributed Bolivian underdevelopment to its racial heterogeneity, a feature they perceived absent in the Western nations after which they modeled their state building projects (Irurozqui 1994, 2001; Larson 2004, 2005).

In the first decade of the twentieth century, moreover, the apogee of Andean nationalist racism (Canessa 2005), they fashioned what Larson (2004:243) has called an “informal system of apartheid,” which kept sought to make indians into a docile rural labor force and soldiery while controlling the social mobility and political aspirations of *cholos* and *mestizos*. They also bestowed upon themselves the ‘burden’ of giving these populations gradual access to the advantages of civilized life and to decide when these populations would be ready for citizenship (Irurozqui 1994).

### ***The Social Darwinist Narrative of Race and Modernity, 1880-1910***

The period between 1880 and 1910, when social Darwinism emerged as the main frame of reference for liberal elites, marked an important period of rearticulation of the meaning of race in the Bolivian state project (Demelas 1981). These naturalist narratives of racial rule became dominant in latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as state dependence on indian tribute gradually declined due to increased silver production and nitrate mining booms. Economic recovery also led to urban growth, drove up urban demand for food and thus agricultural land and labor, and shifted the balance of power from the military toward traditional and emerging economic elites (Klein 2011).

Following the loss of Bolivia's coastline in the War of the Pacific in 1879, mining elites took over the state apparatus and advanced European-style economic and political liberalism as well as railroad construction (Klein 2011; Larson 2004). The white Creole elites aspired to model the country after Western powers in order to "modernize" it against the military *caudillo* governments and tribute-land pact of the previous decades, which they perceived to be anachronistic (Irurizqui 1994; Larson 2004). In particular, they viewed tribute and indigenous communities as an obstacle for the mining and landholding elites, who demanded land and indian labor. Moreover, the white Creole elites desired the recognition of the European elites they identified with.

In this context, *Creole* elites established a party system and limited-participation parliamentary regime, which legitimized their social position and granted them exclusive control over access to the public sphere and the bureaucracy (Irurizqui 1994). Two parties formed, the Conservative and the Liberal, which mapped onto regional and industry cleavages

of the white elite, but shared an interest in the preservation of the social order and their own social positions (Irurozqui 1994). Government affairs shifted onto the hands of a growing number of professional politicians, primarily educated lawyers, that “while committed to a liberal conception of parliamentary government and constitutional law, believed strongly in a caste system and rule by a white oligarchy” (Klein 2011:159).

The new elites also abolished the tribute and advanced violent land reforms that disposed indian communities of their lands. This led to land dispossession for indigenous communities through legal and illegal practices, and the absorption of indians into *haciendas* as labor through sharecropping arrangements. At the same time, their policies generated widespread mobilizations among the indigenous population.

Once again, the ‘indian question’ and fears of ‘race wars’ became the chief preoccupation of state elites, who viewed the indian as a threat and burden. They also perceived the *mestizo* and *cholo* populations that increasingly encroached their urban spaces and often met the criteria for citizenship as dangerous to order and progress and naturally incapable of freedom and democracy because of their degenerate mixed race (Demelas 1981; Larson 2005). This did not impede them from mobilizing *cholo* citizens as voters in their intra-elite competition to control the state and its spoils.<sup>24</sup> Thus, at various times they accused each other of populism and of stirring the indian and *cholo* masses (Irurozqui 1994).

---

<sup>24</sup> Although citizens still constituted less than 20 percent of the population (Klein 2011), urban educational reforms of the liberal parties led to a growing numbers of upwardly mobile *cholos* and *mestizos* who became literate and entered the electorate. According to the Constitution of 1878, citizens were registered adult men, literate in Spanish, who “have a property or an income of at least 200 bolivians that have not been earned through domestic service” (CPE 1878).

In this context, social Darwinism, in addition to being the cutting-edge science of the period, promised white elites the teleology of progress and provided a coherent narrative to justify racial rule and inequality (Demelas 1981).<sup>25</sup> Through social Darwinian theories, these intellectuals and statesmen reinterpreted national history. Historian Marie-Danielle Demelas (1981:62) characterizes this new narrative of race and modernity as follows: “The republic’s instability [...] is not due to the ambition of bosses, the whims of the peoples or a birth curse; its cause is found in the racial composition of the country; *caudillos* [...] have been tyrants because they had Indian blood and as such could not but be corrupted, eager for simple pleasures, vainglory and merciless revenge.”

For example, Gabriel René Moreno, one of the most important intellectuals of the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, described indians and *mestizos* (the mixed-race population) as lazy and stupid. He wrote: “The tendency of *mestizos* to laziness, litigiousness, obsequiousness, intrigue, which are the root cause of *caudillismo* is notorious; to that it must be added the stupidity and cowardice of the Incaic indian, all that perpetuate the despotism of our society” (Gabriel René Moreno, quoted in Demelas 1981:62). White intellectuals used European technologies of anthropometry, ethnography and linguistics to document and understand the root of indian and *mestizo* deviance (Demelas 1981; Irurozqui 1994). While attributing the woes of the past and present to the degenerate indian and mixed races, they imagined a white future in which these inferior races would have disappeared.

---

<sup>25</sup> It is worthy pointing out that, while social Darwinism became the dominant racial project, other projects circulated in the period, including the Catholic Church’s civilizing project, repudiated by these secular modernists, as well as others advanced at the margins by subaltern populations, including that of an indian nation.

Importantly, as Demelas (1981) notes, the most salient social Darwinists held important state posts in the late 1800s and eventually took control of the state at the dawn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Many of these intellectuals, in fact, went on to serve in Bolivian diplomacy and later the Ministry of Foreign Relations, which was created in 1884 at the onset of the mining elites' modernizing thrust.<sup>26</sup> For example, Gabriel René Moreno, who also believed that indian and *mestizo* brains lacked the capacity to understand liberty, served as secretary of the Bolivian legation to Chile in the 1870s.<sup>27</sup> Another adherent of social Darwinist thought turned statesman was lawyer Bautista Saavedra, who joined the ranks of the Foreign Ministry in 1903 and developed as a diplomatic expert on borders, eventually serving as Director of Borders. Saavedra became a salient figure in 1899 as the defense lawyer in the court proceedings against Pablo Zárate Willka, the leader of an indigenous rebellion in 1899. In his defense, Saavedra described indians as having an 'inbred hatred for white people' and a 'primitive character' that oscillated between submissiveness and savagery, sustained by the *ayllu*, or indigenous community (Larson 2005). In 1920, Saavedra became president of the country.<sup>28</sup> Other social Darwinist intellectuals turned diplomats included, Julio Méndez, Manuel Vicente Ballivián, Modesto Omiste, and José Rosendo Gutierrez, among others.

---

<sup>26</sup> President Gregorio Pacheco of the Conservative Party, a Creole mining entrepreneur and one of the country's wealthiest men of his time, established the ministry as an independent state agency in 1884. Before 1884, Foreign Relations had fallen within the purview of other ministries, such as the Ministry of Interior. By the turn of the century, the Foreign Ministry had 15 functionaries, including the ministry, and nine diplomatic missions in the Americas and Europe (Gumucio Granier and Aliaga Palma 2005).

<sup>27</sup> Today, the flagship public university in the City of Santa Cruz, his hometown, is named "Gabriel René Moreno Autonomous University."

<sup>28</sup> In 1948, the Bolivian government created the Province "Bautista Saavedra," in his honor, one of the twenty provinces that makeup the Department of La Paz.

### ***The Neocivilizing and Anti-Mestizaje Narrative of Race and Modernity, 1910-1952***

As social Darwinism began to lose legitimacy in the scientific circles, if not in quotidian discourse, in the first decade of the twentieth century, elite racial thinking moved away from biological determinism into combinations of biologism, environmental determinism, and historicism. Thus, 1910 marks the emergence of a 'neocivilizing narrative' (Larson 2005), marking a second period of rearticulation of the dominant narratives of race and modernity in the country. As Historian Brooke Larson (2005:248) describes it:

Bolivian nation-builders sought a peculiar kind of *neocolonial modernity*. It would subjugate and transform Indians into a disciplined and patriotic labor force and soldiery. Furthermore, it would reinscribe race-ethnic divisions in order to preempt the possibilities of 'dangerous' Liberal-populist pacts by containing the spread of literacy and suffrage [...] Bolivia would steer a middle course between the extremes of racial assimilation and extermination [...] It would do so by transfiguring virtuous pre-political Indians into wards of an enlighten seigniorial class or secular civilizers of the modernizing state *and* by expelling subaltern political (cholified) subjects from the nation's public sphere [...].

This period also marked the birth of an inchoate national indigenous movement, as opposed to the mostly local organizing of the past, that mobilized against the civilizing crusade and land dispossession carried out by the elite's bureaucratic apparatus (Larson 2004).

This narrative change and its timing followed global shifts in racial conception and rule based on racial superiority and inferiority to racial historicism, viewing racial rule as the product of historical development, which Goldberg (2002) identifies. No less contemptible, modes of racial governance of the latter were more paternalistic and tended to "politeness, coded significance (the very implications of 'progress' tending to hide assumption about inferiority), and tolerance as veils for continued invocation of racial power" (Goldberg 2002:79).

The encroachment of urban *cholos* and *mestizos* in electoral politics, mobilized by the vying elite parties, and growing indigenous unrest in the countryside, worried emerging elite intellectuals, who continued to grapple with the 'indian problem' in Bolivia's persistent

underdevelopment. Its most important representative was the internationally renowned literato Alcides Arguedas, whose influential ideas produced a so-called “cult of anti-*mestizaje*” (Larson 2005) that rearticulated the boundary between indigeneity and statecraft. In the early 1900s, Alcides Arguedas served in the Bolivian Foreign Service and become one of its most distinguished members.

The emergent racial thinking of this new generation of intellectuals, Larson notes, “marked an important departure from late-nineteenth-century theories of Indian decadence, attrition, and death through social-Darwinism processes of natural selection and survival of the fittest” (Larson 2005:231–32). While continuing to understand Bolivia’s ethnoracial heterogeneity as the root-cause of underdevelopment and maintaining their distrust of transgressive mixed races, i.e. *cholos*, these intellectuals, like Arguedas, viewed indians as a permanent and necessary feature of the country. They reimagined the indian as redeemable through authoritarian paternalism and ethnoracially differentiated education, which would turn them into a rural class capable of contributing to the modernization of the country through its labor (Larson 2005).

In this ‘neocivilizing narrative,’ whites emerged as an indian-civilizing vanguard that would also protect it against the uncivilized, parasitic, and despotic provincial *mestizos* and the semi-acculturated, semiliterate, politically volatile, and socially transgressive urban *cholos*. In their view, the first oppressed them, while the latter were portents of what an improperly civilized indian produced: either hoards easy to manipulate but volatile, or *cholos* that invaded orderly white urban space and violated the codes of deference and authority (Larson 2005). This narrative “remapped the racial and spatial segregation of modernizing Bolivia under the

contradictory impulses to civilize Indians, contain the urbanizing mobilizing masses, and redefine citizenship around restrictive notions of whiteness” (Larson 2005:232).

White Bolivian thinkers of the time viewed indians and *cholos* as unfit for participation in political life. Most intellectuals of this period viewed *cholos* and *mestizos* as embodying the worse of whites – audacity, arrogance, adventurousness, and fanaticism of the Spaniard – and of indians – passivity, primitiveness, and pusillanimity (Larson 2005). Politically mischievous and saboteurs, mixed race populations thus constituted an ungovernable mass leading to the decadence, degeneration, and demoralization of the body politic. For example, historian, lawyer, and statesman Manuel Rigoberto Paredes considered that the conquest and domination of the indian had “dimmed the lights of his intelligence and conditioned him for only mechanical, agricultural, or pastoral labor” (quoted in Larson 2005:234).<sup>29</sup> Paredes served in Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the central bureaucracy in the 1920s and 1930s.

Franz Tamayo was another influential thinker of this period. Like Arguedas, he is thought of as one of Bolivia’s most influential intellectuals of the 1900s. Tamayo strongly believed that indiscriminate schooling had created an electorate of 30,000 *cholos* “all of [whom] were ill from the same political unawareness, the same parasitic spirit, the same laziness, and the same immorality” (quoted in Larson 2005:245). His call for a civilizing and ethnoracially differentiated pedagogy influenced the state education initiatives of the first half of the twentieth century. Franz Tamayo held various diplomatic posts throughout his trajectory and briefly served as Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1932 and 1933.

---

<sup>29</sup> Himself a *mestizo*, Paredes emphasized his white ascendance and distanced himself from indigenous culture, embracing Western values and norms.

Ultimately, this neo-civilizing narrative built on the same themes of the earlier period, namely the incompatibility between modernity and ethnoracial heterogeneity and the purported backwardness of the subaltern races. However, it now drew on historicist conceptions of racial difference rather than biologicistic or naturalistic ones. It also reinforced the naturalized relationship between whiteness and modernity, whiteness and political-bureaucratic leadership, and indigeneity and manual labor.

### ***The Indigenist Mestizaje Narrative of Race and Modernity, 1952-2005***

In the 1930s, the oligarchic state began to fall apart, facing growing pressures from members of the white-elite that adhered to nontraditional political ideas, such as socialism, as well as upwardly mobile non-elite whites and *mestizo* urban workers, who began to organize around alternative political projects outside the political arena and to demand its expansion (Klein 2011). These new political ideologies began to erode traditional beliefs within the white ruling classes as Marxist thought made its way into the universities, and labor and indigenous mobilizations gained national attention (Klein 2011). New groupings, such as the national Socialist Party and the National Federation of University Students, began to debate economic dependence, demand redistribution and labor rights, and condemn indian servitude (Klein 2011). As Klein (2011:200) describes it, “the essentially middle- and upper-class white electorate, by ever-increasing majorities, showed its opposition to the prewar system of politics.”

The increasingly fractured traditional governing elites sought to preserve their power through a combination of repression and mild social concessions to labor. Two events gave the

traditional elite its most damaging blows: the 1930s economic depression, which intensified labor mobilizations, and the Chaco War with Paraguay between 1932 and 1935. The disastrous human costs of the war, disproportionately born by *mestizo* and *cholo* workers and the indigenous population in an ethnoracially stratified national army, helped consolidate support around these new demands and delegitimize the oligarchic elites. Following the war, new parties emerged that put the aforementioned issues at the center of political debate, and altering the character of the political system from intra-elite to class politics (Klein 2011).

Led by urban middle-class white intellectuals influenced by European National Socialism, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) eventually emerged as its most prominent grouping. Alongside MNR were the Party of the Revolutionary Left (PIR) and the Revolutionary Workers' Party (POR), which shared in their opposition to economic dependence and their support for the labor movement. On the issues of indigenous service obligations, the latter two showed support for the emerging indigenous movement, while the MNR's initial position toward such demands, in turn, was indifferent or hostile.

The efforts of the traditional oligarchy to maintain control of the bureaucracy and suppress indian mobilization in the countryside ultimately catalyzed the social revolution of 1952. Out of the Revolution of 1952, the MNR emerged as the ruling party comprising white-*mestizo* intellectuals and politicians, and radical *mestizo* and *cholo* leaders of the workers' movement (Klein 2011). They abolished the literacy requirement and abolished indigenous service obligations, effectively extending universal citizenship (Klein 2011). They also reimagined the state in positive terms, now becoming a guarantor of the population's welfare through the extension of health and education services and playing an active role in the

economy. The MNR, in fact, nationalized the mines and shifted resources toward welfare programs (Klein 2011).

While the revolution abolished *de jure* political ethnoracial discrimination, post-revolutionary white-*mestizo* elites reinscribed race into the political system in new ways. The new state elite adopted a modernizing state capitalist project articulated with an indigenist *mestizaje* ideology advanced by progressive leftists intellectuals, partly inspired by the Mexican Revolution (Tórrez Rubín de Celis, Carrasco, and Cámara 2010). They advanced a *mestizaje* agenda that would build a new national identity, never mind it entailed the denial and erasure of the indigeneity. In fact, the MNR “redubbed the ‘indios’ ‘campesinos,’ and its policy had been to ‘integrate them’ into national life, downplaying their cultural distinctiveness. The party’s long-standing tradition was geared toward a unitary ‘nationalism’ driven by the state as part of an effort to consolidate the ‘Bolivian nation’” (Albó 1994:66). Yet, *indigenismo* was adopted by the rising white-*mestizo* middle classes to delegitimize the power of the old oligarchy in terms of oppression and colonialism, but was nonetheless immersed in a paternalistic gaze of the indian still in need of civilization and modernization (Canessa 2005).

These narratives were evident, for example, in the massive land reform the MNR carried out in 1953, distributing *hacienda* lands to the peasantry and indigenous communities, as well as its educational reforms. In fact, once in power, the MNR reluctantly carried out the reform in an effort to demobilize the armed indigenous and peasant movement (Ticona Alejo 2000). It also recognized communal lands but was ambivalent in terms of recognizing the *ayllu* as a political entity (Ticona Alejo 2000). In fact, the MNR’s primary goal was for land reform to lead

to the modernization of agriculture and increased productivity. Its leaders viewed the *ayllu* as primitive and archaic and hoped it would disappear (Ticona Alejo 2000).

Alongside its efforts to “modernize” the countryside, the MNR expanded universal education. However, public rural education for the next fifty years was primarily concerned with the assimilation of the indigenous population into Westernized, Spanish-speaking white-*mestizo* culture (Canessa 2005). As Canessa (2005:15) explains, indigenous acquisition of citizenship “was accompanied by powerful assimilationist policies that sought to turn ‘indians’ into ‘Bolivians,’ leaving little space for any expression of indian or indigenous identity.” *Mestizaje* in this particular context revalorized past indigenous civilizations, but consisted primarily of whitening through assimilation to the “outward behavior and mores of the dominant classes” (Canessa 2005:15). It offered the possibility of personal and racial improvement, while simultaneously maintaining the rigid racial hierarchy on which ‘improvement’ depended (Canessa 2005).

The MNR also promoted the unionization of the rural indigenous population as peasants at the local level, incorporating peasant and worker unions into the political system through a corporatists and tutelage model. While formerly excluded segments of the population – indigenous peasants and *cholo* workers— now had significantly more influence in the political system, the result was nevertheless a stratified political system. Indigenous peasants and workers partook in national politics only through the unions and federations that negotiated with the government (Albó 1994). Instead, the new white-*mestizo* elites continued to control political parties and, therefore, the central state bureaucracy. In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, access to the central bureaucracy was granted to indigenous and *cholos* only in very

restricted spaces of governance, such as agricultural and labor matters, and mostly in the framework of electoral or appeasement strategies.

Twelve years after the revolution, the army ousted MNR President Víctor Paz Estenssoro, due to a variety of factors beyond the scope of this chapter (see Klein 2011 for a discussion). In part, however, it had to do with the significant loss of support from urban white middle class, who feeling they paid the costs of the reforms that benefited labor and rural indigenous populations, shifted *en masse* their support the Bolivian *Falangist* Party (FSB), a conservative Catholic party with fascist leanings (Klein 2011).<sup>30</sup>

During the eighteen years of military rule, the army maintained assimilation policies while also advanced an authoritarian modernization project, which overtime would come to view the increasing demands of the indigenous peasant unions as an obstacle to development, responding with violent repression (Ticona Alejo 2000). By the 1970s and 1980s, the country's military rulers saw ethnoracial discrimination as non-existent, arguing that the constitution now recognized everyone as citizens (Comité Nacional Contra el Racismo y Toda Forma de Discriminación 2012b).<sup>31</sup> Ultimately, as Aymara sociologist Esteban Ticona Alejo (2000) notes, despite opening up opportunities for the social mobility of indians, *cholos*, and *mestizos* the revolution did not change the contours of highly racist social system.

---

<sup>30</sup> First, the MNR devalued the national currency in an effort to control the inflation that ensued the revolution. Second, facing an economy in crisis, the MNR sought financial assistance from the United States, which required the MNR to make concessions to U.S. capital and simultaneously curtail the opposition and power of workers, organized in the Bolivian Workers' Confederation (COB). As the MNR fractured and FSB strengthened, MNR-allied army officers overthrew Paz, coopted the peasant unions with rural investment and preferential produce price policies, and suppressed labor, initiating an 18-year period of authoritarian military regimes (Klein 2011).

<sup>31</sup> This is illustrated by Bolivia's reports before the United Nations Committee against Racial Discrimination (Comité Nacional Contra el Racismo y Toda Forma de Discriminación 2012b).

In sum, I have so far shown that dominant narratives of race and modernity in Bolivia have variously attributed economic and political underdevelopment to its ethnoracial heterogeneity, and particularly its purported 'indian' problem. White-*mestizo* elites historically struggled to reconcile their desire to build a modern nation-state worthy of international (Western) respect with an economic and political reality marked with instability. In their intellectual and political debates, these state-building elites found the root-cause in the country's massive indian and *cholo* population, whose ways of life purportedly proved an obstacle to their modernizing aspirations. They thus saw it necessary to civilize and gradually incorporate the indian into the nation while simultaneously variously keeping it at the margins of political life (Larson 2004).

While the racial paradigms underpinning the narratives of race and modernity that informed the state building projects of the white elites have changed, their basic themes have been astoundingly durable. White-*mestizo* intellectuals and statesmen imagined themselves as carriers of modernity and thus defined themselves natural holders of state power by defining the racial others – indians and *cholos* – as unfit for statecraft. Tórrez et al.'s (2010) study of elite representations of indians and *cholo* mobilizations in the press between 1899 and 2003 shows in exhaustive detail the continuity of representations of indigenous Bolivians as backward, easily-manipulated, and intellectually hindered. Throughout the period of study, they show that elites continued to emphasize the need to put indians on the path to modernity and represent rebelling indians as deviants and barbarians who threaten to invade or take over white spaces.

## Decolonization and Changing Narratives of Race and Modernity

It is a decolonizing revolution because it is founded in the visions and knowledge of indigenous originary peasant nations and peoples, which is enriched with a process of intercultural, intracultural and plurilingual dialogue of knowledges, strengthening a revolutionary action with the participation of all nations, peoples, communities and neighborhoods of the country, in the context of respect for difference. Decolonization in Bolivia is a transformational and democratizing force in society that promotes the total elimination of racial and cultural discrimination, advances the recognition and strengthening of knowledges, know-how, and science of indigenous-native-peasant nations and peoples and the urban population, recovering the most positive aspects of modern and western society.

National Plan of Economic and Social Development, 2016-2020: 9

The investments in education and health that followed the Revolution of 1952 led to a growing and increasingly more educated electorate. In this context, a young generation of university-educated Aymara indigenous Bolivians emerged, who began to question the assimilationist elite project of the post-revolutionary white-*mestizo* elite, which the peasantry had “at first accepted and internalized enthusiastically as the path of liberation” (Albó 1994:58). In the 1970s, this new generation of indigenous activists and intellectuals formed the Indianista and Katarista movements and the country’s first indigenous political parties in the highlands, though with limited success, and advocated for a multinational state and the need to overcome neocolonial structures of racial and class oppression (Albó 2002a).

Their mobilizations and influence on indigenous subjectivity would eventually lead to the politicization of race and ethnicity in the 1990s as well as the institutional reforms that would enable the rise of Morales’s MAS-IPSP party that decade. As anthropologist Xavier Albó (1994:58) describes this historical turn in Bolivia:

In the 1980s, amid this disenchantment and the process of becoming independent from the pseudotutelage of the government, the leadership of the entire peasantry nationwide turned to the Aymara. [...] As their friendly relations with the state brown down, they recalled the rebellions they had led since colonial times and the massacres that, as a result, were carried out in their communities just prior to 1952. They began to recollect their ‘long history,’ going back to before the 1953 agrarian reform, and with this they began to question the state and offer an alternative for the country.

The Katarista movement's proposals, including a plurinational state, "were embraced as part of the ideological framework of other political sectors in Bolivia" (Albó 1994:61). The politicization of race and ethnicity in Bolivia, and Latin America more broadly, surprised observers who considered race/ethnicity in the region of little consequence (Yashar 2005).

In the 1990s, the national indigenous movement and identity consolidated around demands for recognition and the reform of the 'difference-blind' state into a non-exclusionary pluricultural one (Van Cott 2008). Concretely, this involved group rights, territory, and recognition of indigenous institutions and specific politico-administrative competencies vis-à-vis the state (Sieder 2002a). The movement managed to influence the white-*mestizo* governing elites, securing a 1994 multicultural constitutional reform that recognized indigenous authorities, customary law, and special indigenous jurisdictions. However, this reconfigured the relationship between state and indigenous people only in limited ways, and the reforms suffered a political backlash in 1997, which drastically cut political and material support (Van Cott 2008). The movement, nonetheless, contested the social meaning of race/ethnicity, transforming ethnoracial subjectivity and awareness as well as the political landscape.

As I discussed in the introduction, it is in this context that the MAS-IPSP raised to become an electorally viable project of the indigenous peasant movement. It is thus here that I turn my attention to the MAS-IPSP decolonization agenda, and the changing narratives of race and modernity that have sought to undermine the long history of naturalization of modernity and political leadership in white-*criollo* and white-*mestizo* male bodies.

Control of the central bureaucracy enabled MAS-IPSP leaders and intellectuals to produce and mobilize new 'official' interpretations of the misfortunes of Bolivian development.

They, in fact, conceived knowledge production and distribution as essential to the advancement of the decolonization project, which demands new state discourses, practices, and structures. Their project entailed breaking the “historical mode of cultural production in which a small elite controlled and disciplined the production and diffusion of discursive representations” (PND 2007:17).

Government documents in which decolonization proponents laid out their tenets and strategy reveal that, relative to the prior century, modernization and heterogeneity remain central concerns around which their political project is framed. Yet, the official decolonization discourse offers a rearticulation of the relationship between race and modernity in the country’s past and future. State decolonization thus constitutes a state-directed oppositional racial project (Omi and Winant 1994). It is oppositional because, on the one hand, it rearticulates the hegemonic meaning of race in statecraft; on the other, it engages in efforts to distribute state resources along ethnoracial lines. It is state-directed because it directly mobilizes the state apparatus toward both ends, rather than securing them through concession.

The decolonization project thus redraws the symbolic boundary between statecraft and indigeneity that white-*mestizo* elites erected as they embraced Western liberalism and reconditioned as excluded segments of the population demanded citizenship. Rather than simply inverting the white/other binary, decolonization proponents launched an attack on the precepts that they understood sustained it. First, the state decolonization discourse contests the ‘indian problem’ trope that has, explicitly or implicitly, informed twentieth century ruling elites. Instead, it posits that a neocolonial order, which white-*mestizo* elites have been invested in, constitutes the root cause of Bolivia’s underdevelopment. Second, it rejects the

ethnoracially homogenizing state of the previous century in favor of an inherently heterogeneous 'plurinational state.' Lastly, the architects of state decolonization redefine the symbolic places of indigeneity and whiteness in the indigenist *mestizaje* that crept into the elite state project following the Revolution of 1952.

### ***The Colonial Problem and Underdevelopment***

The theoretical framework of this [development] strategy is based on the conviction that the limitations and frustrations of the country's development are the product of an ethnic, cultural and political domination system steeped in racism and rooted in various forms of colonialism.

National Development Plan 2006-2010, p.12

A common theme in presidential speeches and government documents is racism and colonialism as the crux of underdevelopment. This is, for example, clearly articulated in the above quote from the 2006 National Development Plan (PND), made into law in 2007. The use of concepts like race and colonality and a social constructivist sensibility represents an important break with the varied notions of the 'indian problem' that modernizing elites mobilized throughout the twentieth century. In doing so, decolonization proponents enunciate a 'colonial problem' that problematizes the power relations and essentializing racial narratives that shaped the boundaries of citizenship and national belonging. As the following paragraphs demonstrate, the 'colonial problem' then highlights the investment of white-*mestizo* elites and the global capitalist system in a racial order enforced and reproduced through the state.

In the official decolonization discourse, colonialism emerges as the primary force shaping the post-colonial history of the body politic, and producing and reproducing an racialized social system (cf. Bonilla-Silva 1997). This is recurrent theme in historical overviews

presented in government documents, such as the MAS Government Plans and the National Development Plans. For example, the 2006 PND observes,

Republican colonialism institutionalized the inequality and exclusion [...] of the majority indigenous population from the very moment of the Republic's founding and its first Constituent Assembly in 1826 because it denied them the right to own means of production – mainly land – and access to education and health, as well as the possibility to partake in national decision-making. Yet, it imposed upon them the continuity of the indigenous tribute—inherited from the colony— as well as personal servitude and unpaid labor in favor of their lords. (PND 2007:x)

As this excerpt suggests, the Creole elite created a state fundamentally based on ethnoracial inequality, economic and political, inscribed in the country's founding Charter. While certain practices, such as the indian tribute, were colonial inheritances, the unequal design of the state was not simply a passive continuation of colonial society but an actively advanced Creole racial formation project, which nonetheless built on the colonial categories of classification. One that went hand-in-hand with state-building, nation-building, and modern capitalism.

In this historical narrative, non-indigenous elites revised and reconstituted 'colonial republicanism' over time – "[it] was reproduced since the dusk of the nineteenth century until the first five years of the current century" (PND 2007:xi). The first renovation project occurred in the nineteenth century. At this time, it posits, mining and landed elites would adopt an export-led modernizing strategy that "[took] advantage of the institutionality of republican colonialism, particularly unpaid labor" (PND 2007:x), further concentrating concentrate wealth and power. The next historical turning point, the Revolution of 1952, presented an opportunity to address the colonial situation. Yet, the state capitalism model that ensued failed because it did not confront this colonial problem. Instead, new regional oligarchic elites used this political opening to capture state power and suppress social movements and their virtuous demands.

The resulting crisis brought along the third and final re-articulation of the colonial system: the neoliberal period. The substitution of the state by the market as the primary allocator of resources transferred power and wealth into even fewer non-indigenous hands. Most importantly, it itself rested on and advanced the neocolonial social and symbolic order.

Take, for example, the following government characterization of the neoliberal project:

For neoliberalism, indigenous peoples and pluricultural and multiethnic diversity are inconsequential because they do not contribute to economic growth, except as cheap labor or potential consumer. In this logic, the community and indigeneity were sentenced to be diluted by colonialism and globalization. (PND 2007:7)

In other words, neoliberalism rearticulated a dominant homogenizing narrative of race and modernity that envisioned the *assimilation* of indigenous people into a Western world.

Essentially, decolonization proponents understand neoliberalism as yet another assimilationist project that devalues indigenous people and indigeneity. That is, neoliberalism conceives indigeneity as anachronistic, a vestige of pre-modern life.

According to this narrative, the deepening inequality and discrimination under “neoliberal colonialism” ensued into another economic and political legitimacy crisis and widespread social mobilization. The election of Morales in 2005 marked a turning point, which the party portrays as the end of the reproduction of the neocolonial system. An administration buttressed by the indigenous and peasant movement and led by an indigenous man represents an opportunity to finally address the colonial problem. To this end, the Morales administration developed a 200-page National Development Plan made law in 2006 as “a tool that will uproot the deep social inequality and inhumane exclusion that oppress the majority of the Bolivian population, particularly the indigenous- and native-origin population” (PND 2007:x).

Overall, the PND proposes to replace the export-led development model with diversified and inclusive economic policies. Most importantly, it views this policy objective as entirely dependent on the “dismantling of colonialism and neoliberalism in the country [...] and constructing a new society with a plurinational and community state” (PND 2007:25). The proposed solution to the colonial problem is partly about the abolition of an economic set up that depends on it. The PND argues,

The main objective centers, therefore, on the suppression of the original causes of inequality and exclusion in the country, which entails changing the export-led model and the basis of colonialism and neoliberalism that sustain it. That is to say, to dismantle not only economic but also the political and cultural, colonial and neoliberal arrangements erected by the dominant culture that permeate into interstices of the state organization and minds of people through individual social practices in detriment of solidarity and complementarity. (PND 2007:4)

Yet, as this quote reveals, for decolonization proponents a solution to the colonial problem also entails the transformation of the dominant (non-indigenous) Western culture that permeates social and state practices and thought. It produces “individual social practice,” i.e. individualism, that erodes worthy “solidarity and complementarity,” the imagined hallmarks of indigenous political organization.

For the MAS-IPSP decolonization proponents then Bolivia’s underdevelopment is therefore not the result of an ‘indian problem’ but that of a colonial problem, which white-*mestizo* elites have been invested in. The PND, and other documents, reveals that for the new administration, the crux of the matter is that throughout Bolivia’s modernizing history, “the various development theoretical currents correspond to Western civilizing logics, whose language hides domination and social control systems that endorse colonial power and knowledge practices” (PND 2007:7). Yet, these “were presented as technical instruments, without ideology and separate from the political and historical conditions of national reality”

(PND 2007:7). Underdevelopment, or the so-called backwardness, that dismayed the modernizing statesmen of the 1900s, has its locus not on indigenous culture but on Western culture. The colonial problem is a deeply engrained racialized social system.

### ***Indigeneity and the Carriers of Modernity and Decolonization***

The new development vision, anchored in cultural plurality, convergence, and complementarity of knowledges, seeks to abolish the lineal progress myth that seeks to divide cultures along modern and lagging or primitive and advanced. This developmentalist trap leads to the erasure of other temporalities, memories, contributions to the construction of interhuman relations and relations with time and space, whose strategic horizon is that of preserving other meanings of the relation between humanity and nature.

Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2006-2011: 10

The enunciation of a 'colonial problem' as the root-cause of Bolivian underdevelopment problematizes a second central precept of twentieth-century dominant narratives of race and modernity. It undermines the symbolic indian/modernity or *cholo*/modernity antitheses, wherein whiteness is modernity and future, and indigeneity, and proximity to it, is backwardness. As I have previously noted, racial thinking, in the form of biologism and environmental determinism, shaped how white-*criollos* organized the boundaries of the nation-state in the late 1800s and early 1900s (Larson 2004). In this ethnoracial order, white statesmen and intellectuals placed themselves on top on the basis of their purported embodiment of modernity, its values and culture. Conversely, they defined *indios* and *cholos* outside the boundaries of whiteness and modernity and as the negative symbol against which the modernizing project should be carried (Larson 2005). Post-revolutionary *mestizaje* ideologies in Bolivia, while granting indigenous culture a renewed, more positive role in national identity, maintained nonetheless the indigenous past and white-*mestizo* future formula (Canessa 2005).

Decolonization, in turn, reclaims indigeneity from this hegemonic white-*mestizo* gaze, radically rearticulating its meaning vis-à-vis modernity. Indigenous peoples and peasants thus emerge as “the legitimate historic promoters of a democratic transformation in the exercise of political power” (PND 2007:12–13). Moreover, “the new proposal of development is based on the concept of *Vivir Bien* of the Bolivian native- and indigenous peoples” (PND 2007:8). That is, this majority population previously represented as lacking, if not incapable of, a modern political project emerges as a historical agent of change and architect of modern institutions.

Reclaiming indigeneity and representations of indigenous people involved the deployment of moral claims that sought to redraw the symbolic boundary between indigeneity and statecraft. This entailed simultaneously “symbolic representations and subtle processes of valorization and vilification that actors deploy in their effort to shape the social environment to their own advantage” (Vallas and Cummins 2014:243). Through descriptions of indigenous practices and epistemologies, decolonization proponents attributed indigeneity positive values, and vilified the values that Western-oriented white-*mestizo* elites historically attributed to themselves. For example, the PND notes,

[*Vivir Bien*] is about living as part of the community, under its protection, in harmony with nature; ‘to live in equilibrium with our surroundings.’ It also means to ‘*Vivir Bien* with you and with me,” which is different from the Western ‘living better,’ which is individualist, one separated from others, and even [living better] at the expense of others and apart from nature. (PND 2007:8)

Thus, whereas Western liberalism and capitalism are buttressed by the values of “individualism” and “competition,” indigenous social relations and political organization rest on “solidarity” and “complementarity.” Some of these claims echoed romantic indigenist representations of indigeneity as noble way of life, but the Morales administration did not reject capitalism, but instead proposed capitalist system with redistribution, and particularly

redistribution along ethnoracial lines. Furthermore, the decolonization discourse revalorizes indigeneity not only at the margins of the nation-building project, but as the foundation of a new national identity and state institutionality.

Decolonization proponents understood it necessary for the project's success to decenter the Hispanicizing monocultural project that the elite had advanced through the state. They noted, "To decrease the centrality of the dominant culture is imperative for decolonization because colonial heritages rest on ethnoracial representations, discourses, and ideological structures. The nerve center of coloniality is control of language and knowledge" (PND 2007:16). In this vein, the MAS administration implemented an indigenous-language requirement for public servants, advanced an education and health reform that recognized indigenous science, and promoted the incorporation of indigenous people in spaces of power, among dozens of other initiatives and policies. But MAS leaders and spokespersons also seized their newfound state power to represent the other. For example, in his first inauguration speech in Congress, Evo Morales listed the various virtues of the indigenous, peasant, and 'humble' people that form the base of the MAS-IPSP party, noting that "we're not exclusionary," "we're not going to oppress anyone," "the Quechua Bolivia, the Aymara urban worker is not corrupt," and describing indigenous people as "humanity's moral reservoir" and "the reservoir of scientific knowledge on life, to defend life, to save humanity" (Morales Ayma 2006a). Through these descriptions, Morales represented the vanquished traditional rulers and bureaucrats as discriminatory, exclusionary, oppressive, and corrupt, among other contemptible traits.

At first sight, this might appear as a reversal of the indian/white dichotomy, wherein indigenous people are good and whites bad. The perception of a reversed order was prevalent among some white-*mestizo* spokespeople who variously evoked fears of a 'race war' in the media and public events, as I discuss in more detail in a later chapter. In reality, government spokespersons went to great lengths to reaffirm the inclusionary character of their project. In fact, Madrid's (2008) study of the rise of the MAS party in Bolivia finds that its success was partly dependent on the inclusionary ethnic discourse it mobilized. Dependent on relatively delicate alliances between indigenous communities in the highlands and lowlands, peasant organizations, urban *cholos*, and progressive white-*mestizos*, the MAS leadership understood the strategic need of an inclusive project.

The MAS leadership had witnessed the limited electoral support that indigenous leader Felipe Quispe, also known as *el mallku* (indigenous authority), had secured in the 2002 elections. Quispe's position was a radical one, advocating for the establishment of an indigenous Aymara republic to replace the white-*mestizo* republic and the return of all the land to their original and rightful indigenous owners. By contrast, MAS decolonization proposed "reconstituting the national without the prevalent ethnocentrism and seeking an egalitarian relation among human beings and peoples" (PND 2007:13). That is, they rejected the ethnocentrism inherent in the white-*mestizo* elite modernizing projects and not white-*mestizos* or all aspects of their 'culture.' In theory, they sought to decenter the dominant culture in order to grant all citizens in a multiethnic and multicultural Bolivia equal opportunity to contribute to the drawing of national boundaries and their content.

### ***Rejecting Homogeneity, Embracing Heterogeneity in the Plurinational State***

This [development] process seeks to improve and expand human choices, conditions, and capacities on the basis of respect for difference without *homogenizing* communities, peoples, and individuals, but instead strengthening their cohesion through *heterogeneity*.

Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2006-2011: 12, *emphasis added*

The third break with the precepts of the dominant narrative of race and modernity mobilized by white-*mestizo* elites in the twentieth century relates to the ethnoracial heterogeneity and modernization. Including Bolivia's multicultural turn in the early 1990s, modernizing elites had variously conceived the country's ethnoracial heterogeneity as an obstacle to modernization. The eugenicist projects of the first-half of the twentieth century failed to promote the European immigration that some elites believed would help improve the country's racial stock. Instead, their main solution entailed racial and cultural homogenization through assimilationist educational projects advanced throughout the state. As Canessa (2005) notes, rural education in Bolivia throughout the twentieth century was primarily about assimilating the indigenous population into a white-*mestizo* national culture.

The inherited state apparatus thus embodies and advances this homogenizing project. It is understood both as an institution and actor shaped by a small non-indigenous elite, and which advances their interests and reproduces the ethnoracial order. Yet, while the state can be a tool of domination, the decolonization proponents did not conceive this as inescapable. In their view, the state could become a tool for liberation. If captured and deeply reformed, culturally and structurally, the apparatus has the potential to transform the social order because it has the power to legislate and regulate, to distribute resources, to name, count and recognize, and to produce culture and promote values, significantly altering the life conditions of marginalized and excluded Bolivians. Much like Omi and Winant (1994) would expect,

decolonization proponents viewed the state as the preeminent site of ethnoracial conflict. This was not the only understanding of the state put forward by national theorists of decolonization. In fact, others viewed decolonization and the state as contradictory calling to move beyond the state form (see Gosálvez and Dulon 2010). Yet, in the codified MAS project, harnessing the country's heterogeneity laid the foundation for its transformation. Heterogeneity then emerges as a force and requisite for dismantling the state colonial structures that hinder development.

This heterogeneity, or interculturality as is often described, constitutes the basis of a new institutionality for a new state, namely the "plurinational communal state." This state is "the expression of diversity instead of homogeneity" (PND 2007:78). The PND further notes,

This strategy leads to the construction of a new society founded on the energy and capacity derived from the country's multiculturalism and diversity of practices of solidarity carried in urban and rural communities; on the construction of a new national organization based on the new institutionality that emerges from our multiculturalism; affirmed in a new decolonized and communal State; and founded in urban and rural social multidiversity, as an expression of the diversity of interests in and aspirations of change toward *Vivir Bien*, today and tomorrow. (PND 2007:5–6)

In this account, it is only through a new state institutionality that reaffirms and advances heterogeneity that the domination systems that burden development can change. It is thus necessary to "[suppress] the current structure of colonial domination and racial discrimination" through interculturality, understood as the opposite of ethnocentrism (PND 2007:14).

Importantly, this discursive rearticulation of heterogeneity/homogeneity problematized the ethnoracial foundations and homogenizing force of the state apparatus and its agents. For this reason, the project proposed more than only the inclusion of the formerly excluded in state spaces, which it did. For example, "To achieve this objective [to democratize the state] it is crucial to change the current constitutive foundations of power and the current policies, and to incorporate in spaces of power, in the national decisions and public administration, indigenous

peoples, peasants and social movements” (PND 2007:81). It also proposed, as already noted, the decolonization of the state “from within its structures, practices, and discourses” (PND 2007:15). As the PND explains,

The colonial composition of the state apparatus and the urgency to dismantle all the explicit and implicit mechanisms that connote and denote this coloniality is due to the fact that it is engrained in the State structure and its quotidian workings. The continuous construction of the colonial penetrated all social spheres and in them converged elements of domination, ethnic exclusion, racism and hegemony, mystified by the liberal and neoliberal modernization of certain segments of society. [...] To decolonize the state means to recognize ourselves as we are, diverse and multiple, in a long process that begins in social subjectivity and ends with a collective understanding of a new national identity. [...] The political institutionality and constitution of the Executive Branch have a colonial base, as such it is necessary to dismantle colonialism by changing the [old] state institutionality for a new one. (PND 2007:15)

That is, it questioned not only the exclusion of indigenous men and women from the state bureaucracy and its monopoly by a small non-indigenous segment of the population, but also the racist foundations of its institutional logics.

State decolonization thus proposes to transform the state in several dimensions. On the one hand, it calls for a radical transformation state structure, arguing for a territorial-administrative reconfiguration as well as for a new constitution. Second, it proposes to transform the state as actor in policy and the economy. On the one hand, the state should redistribute economic and symbolic resources through new policies that favor the most socially disadvantaged and excluded segments of society. On the other, a radical democratization of the state should enable citizen participation in all areas of policymaking, spaces of decision-making, and monitoring mechanisms. Third, the project proposes a transformation of the state as organization, proposing changes to composition and the logic of public administration, which entails a deep politicization of what legitimately constitutes bureaucratic expertise, practice, and technology. In this vision, the bureaucracy and its agents are understood to reproduce the

colonial homogenizing state through their quotidian administrative operations, actively repressing and excluding indigenous experiences and practices.

In the structure-culture decolonization critique, the construction of a new type of state is thus essential, as the PND explains in its sections: “Construction of the Decolonized State: Protagonist and Promoter of Development” and “The Way to Decolonize the State from within the State.” And, this state should supplant “[t]he malformed oligarchic State, centralist, patrimonialist and corrupt, entrenched in representative democracy, exacerbated social discrimination, political exclusion, and the denial of indigenous rights” (PND 2007:8). Yet, careful to reaffirm the inclusionary objectives, proponents also noted that this “does not mean to substitute a seigniorial hegemony with an indigenous one” (PND 2007:16), but to expand the forms and institutions of modernity and to democratize the state. In the theory of social change that the architects of decolonization articulated, the state thus constitutes a transformational and redistributive tool, but not one that its new occupants could simply fill and wield in favor of their political project. First, they viewed it necessary to extirpate its engrained coloniality.

### **Decolonization and Foreign Relations**

This discussion of the changing narratives of race and modernity codified in the decolonization project help understand the past and present ideological fabric on which the representations of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Bolivian diplomacy are embroidered. It is worth recalling that decolonization identifies a ‘colonial problem’ at the root of Bolivian underdevelopment, a system of ethnoracial domination and exclusion instituted and reproduced in the white-*mestizo* republic. Yet, decolonization also identifies a second form of colonialism that has shaped

Bolivian society and state, namely the imposition of foreign mandates and interests over those of the majority with the complicity of white-*mestizo* elites. As such, it characterizes Bolivian ruling elites throughout the twentieth century as responsive to foreign capital, foreign governments, and since the second half of the 1900s to international financial institutions and multilateral organizations.

Thus, early on, the administration asserted the need to radically transform the Ministry and diplomatic practice, which would play a central role in the decolonization process. It viewed members of the diplomatic corps as internationally-oriented elites all too eager to respond to put international interests before the nation's. This critique is most cogently articulated in the 2006 National Development Plan, which notes,

Bolivia's foreign policy, with few exceptions, was always marked by dependency and the acceptance of foreign agendas. [...] Bolivia, prey of internal colonialism, went even further than ideologues in the North pointed to. Bolivia's role in the global stage lacked proposals, always following the cause of dominant currents. The Ministry of Foreign Relations and Cult essentially was an 'administrator' of foreign relations. (PND 2007:173)

The administration also emphasized *Cancillería's* significance as a symbol of white-*mestizo* power, partly due to the Ministry's high position in the executive structure. Again, the NDP notes, "Foreign Policy was made taking into account, fundamentally, the interests of a few families and of a few business sectors. The Ministry did not work for the Nation, but for the sinecures and privileges of a few. Civil society, social movements and, *in particular, indigenous peoples* were totally absent from these processes" (PND 2007:173, emphasis added). More informally, high-level party officials repeatedly criticized Bolivia's "cocktail diplomacy," depicting its old diplomats as "enemies of the people," in the public media.

In line with the new government's efforts to incorporate indigenous men and women at the highest echelons of the bureaucracy, President Evo Morales appointed David

Choquehuanca, a 44-year-old Aymara intellectual and activist, as the country's first indigenous Foreign Minister. Morales and Choquehuanca had been collaborators since 1984, when they met at a meeting of a young peasants association in La Paz (interview with David Choquehuanca in Quiroz 2015). Choquehuanca's explicit mission was to develop a new foreign policy informed by the thought and culture of the indigenous population, primarily oriented toward the development paradigm of *Vivir Bien*, or living well (RREE 2014).

### **Implications for the Denaturalization of the Ideal Bureaucrat**

As I have previously noted, this dissertation argues that the ethnoracial structure of the state bureaucracy is the product of competing ethnoracial projects that seek to (re)articulate the meaning of race vis-à-vis statecraft and seek to redistribute state resources along ethnoracial lines. In attempting to delineate the ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy, vying actors develop and mobilize ethnoracial projects with competing 'ideal bureaucrat' notions. Dominant notions of the ideal bureaucrat are thus historically situated sociopolitical products that organize the bureaucracy along ethnoracial (and gender) lines by authorizing and de-authorizing claims to participate in its governance. As such, the 'ideal bureaucrat' is not only a symbolic resource in processes social closure in the bureaucracy but also the site of struggle over the bureaucracy's ethnoracial boundaries. If members of historically excluded ethnoracial categories do not *fit* the 'ideal bureaucrat,' it is because it has been actively constructed against them. Following Omi and Winant (1994), I have noted that ethnoracial projects take place at the macro-level, in public discourse, and at the micro-level, in everyday experience.

The ideological fabric discussed, which indigenous intellectuals have weaved since at least the 1970s and the MAS has codified into a formal and legally-mandated decolonization agenda, thus constitute the basis of a symbolic struggle over the boundaries of the ideal bureaucrat. In “decreasing the centrality of the dominant culture,” the changing narratives of race and modernity that the decolonization platform mobilized not only redrew the symbolic boundaries between indigeneity and the state. They also undermined the ideological precepts on which dominant notions of ideal bureaucrat as embodied in Hispanicized white-*mestizo* bodies rest.

First, the ‘colonial problem’ problematized white investment in a racialized social system and state. This identified a problem and assigned responsibility to the white-*mestizo* elites that claimed authority over statecraft. Second, the rejection of the indian/modernity antithesis, the vilification of (neo)liberal values, and the reclamation of indigeneity from the hegemonic white-*mestizo* gaze enabled decolonization proponents to reimagine the as carriers of decolonization. This identified indigenous people as the architects and agents of a new institutionality both symbolically and in practice. Third, in revalorizing ethnoracial heterogeneity and evincing the state bureaucracy’s role in the homogenizing neocolonial project, the decolonization formula politicized bureaucratic composition and institutional logics. This identified the state bureaucracy as the key tool to fix the ‘colonial problem’ so long as indigenous people and practices permeated its interstices. In sum, these three interrelated discursive moves positioned those at the bottom of the racialized social system – indigenous people, peasants, the ‘poor,’ the ‘humble,’ or the marginalized – not simply as the natural but as the righteous ‘ideal bureaucrats.’

President Evo Morales articulated this clearly during his inauguration ceremonies. January 22<sup>nd</sup> of 2006 upset the power imaginaries of thousands of white-*mestizos* in the country (Ticona Alejo 2011). On that day, with his right hand over his heart and his clenched left fist raised, Morales took the oath of office to become Bolivia's 65<sup>th</sup> president, but his choice clothing and posture accentuated the spectacle. Dressed in a custom-designed black suit, adorned with Andean weavings –having forgone wearing a tie and a traditional Western suit— Morales looked like no other head of state in the country's history. That day, photographs of an Andean ceremony at the pre-Columbian archeological site of Tiwanaku filled the newspapers. During his speech, while carefully acknowledging the supporting role of non-indigenous militants and sympathizers, Morales stressed the indigenous population's protagonic role in the peaceful "democratic and cultural revolution" his administration would spearhead. He announced, that indigenous people now had an opportunity to teach ruling elites how to govern. As he declared, "I just want to tell you from this sacred place, with your help, brothers and sisters, Quechuas, Aymaras, Guaraníes, we want to teach to govern with honesty, with responsibility, in order to change the economic situation of the Bolivian people." Through this brief sentence, Morales inverted an ideology that construed indigenous people as unfit for modern governance or state administration, not least to govern themselves. An indigenous man, Evo Morales, and indigenous people would now establish a governance model to be followed, as they are the carriers of the ideal traits for this task.

## CHAPTER 4

### Pioneer Indigenous Bureaucrats and the Ideal Bureaucrat

#### Introduction

I arrived to the Obelisk Square, a well-known landmark in downtown La Paz, a few minutes earlier than former Minister of Peasant and Agricultural Affairs Mauricio Mamani. Mauricio is one of the first three indigenous men to join a president's cabinet. The square is a highly transited site, a popular stop for the rather busy buses and mini-buses that connect La Paz and El Alto. Through the crowd lining up to board, I saw Mauricio emerged out of a public mini-bus. He is a short and energetic 80-year-old man with dark skin complexion and whitened hair. He speaks Spanish with a marked Aymara-inflection, which immediately signals his indigeneity in Bolivia. On the day we met, Mauricio was wearing a grey business suit and a sweater. Through chitchat, I learned that he had made a long mini-bus trip to meet with me, traveling from one of La Paz's neighboring towns, where he now lives. We went into the *Café Confitería Club La Paz*, an old and understated coffee shop just across the street and ordered coffee. Without much fanfare, Mauricio jumped right into the interview, giving me a fifteen-minute lecture on the pre-Hispanic, colonial, and republican history of highland indigenous (Aymara and Quechua) populations in Bolivia.

Mauricio is a social anthropologist that has written extensively on indigenous culture and agricultural practices in western Bolivia. In 1985, Mauricio campaigned for Víctor Paz

Estenssoro, the MNR's presidential candidate and one of the party's founders. If the campaign was successful, Mauricio, who self-describes as ambitious, aspired to secure a bureaucratic post. In the general elections, the MNR obtained 30 percent of the vote, second to *Acción Democrática Nacionalista* (Nationalist Democratic Action, or ADN), the party of former military dictator Hugo Banzer Suárez. Yet, because no party succeeded in securing an absolute majority of the vote, constitutionally the decision fell on the National Congress, which negotiated a Paz Estenssoro presidency. Mauricio's investment paid off.

He recounts, "I did good campaigning and Paz Estenssoro, in 1985, gave me the Ministry [of Peasant Affairs]." Mauricio received the news that he would be appointed Minister of Peasant Affairs only a day before the inauguration. He recalls an impromptu and hurried meeting at Paz Estenssoro's private residence in which the president-elect told him he would be joining the cabinet and asked him to attend the swearing in ceremony wearing a dark dress suit. Mauricio had arrived to the meeting bearing copies of his published books as gifts for the president-elect.

Mauricio's immediate road to this high-level post, however, was filled with obstacles that highlight the necessarily resourceful ways in which members of historically excluded ethnoracial populations individually navigate race and racism within the state bureaucracy.

Mauricio recalls,

I didn't own a dark suit, so [I got] a used one. I started ironing it. In the newspaper, it said that [Raúl] Pérez Alcalá would be sworn in as Minister of Peasant Affairs. It had his picture and all, but Paz had asked me [...]. How's that possible? I didn't know what would happen. Well, I'm ironing, cleaning my old dark suit. [The oath] was in the afternoon, at six in the afternoon, but just in case I headed to the oath ceremony at 2pm. Everywhere was full of people. There was a closed-off perimeter [around the government buildings]. They weren't letting anyone through.

To Mauricio's surprise, the police officers guarding the area would not grant him access. They asked Mauricio for proof that he, in fact, would be minister. He did not have any.

I asked Mauricio if the party had given the other appointees credentials. They were not, but Mauricio believes that they were not asked for one because they were well-known politicians. It is also likely that unlike Mauricio, an indigenous man who made his way to the oath ceremony by bus and on foot, the rest of the new cabinet and high-level party members were white-*mestizos* who arrived in private cars. In other words, because of his clothes, mode of transport, accent, and physical appearance – cultural, social, and phenotypical markers of race and ethnicity in Bolivia – Mauricio did not fit normative notions of the ideal bureaucrat, highly policed in the inner-citadel of the state, which he was about to enter.

Mauricio tells this anecdote quickly, but it took him nearly four hours to arrive to his ceremony, making it just in time. At the first barricade, to no avail, Mauricio pleaded with one of the policemen to let him through. Amidst the commotion, Mauricio sneaked through the barricade. He recalls:

"swoosh, I skirted around. Damn, one down! I went through the first barricade. [At the second one] damn it, what do I do? I gave an officer a little bit of money. Please, let me through. 'Ok. I'll look in another direction and you go through,' he told me. Swoosh. Two barricades down. Now, I'm at the gate of the [Presidential] Palace. I didn't know what to do. They weren't letting me through. [...] I was running out of time. It was already 5:30pm. Damn, the oath ceremony is at six. What do I do? I look at the newspaper again, 'Pérez Alcalá, Minister of Peasant Affairs.' They [policemen] make fun of me. 'I don't believe you,' they said. 'Who's this guy,' they said. When all of a sudden, a guy comes out of the Palace with a megaphone, 'gentlemen of the diplomatic corps please make a line,' and swoosh, the diplomatic corps lines up. I start looking around. Where are the Japanese? (*Mauricio laughs*) There they are! I approach the Japanese and the cop is checking credentials. When he comes to us, I start speaking Japanese with the Japanese. Of course, I had learned it. He looks at me strangely, but he sees me with the Japanese and lets us in. (*Mauricio laughs*) I'm in. I wonder, what's going to happen now. I see Pérez Alcalá surrounded by a lot of people. I'm standing there alone. The guy is there, wearing a tie, looking proper. [...] The ceremony starts. They call names for the oath. Such and such minister and then they say, 'Minister of Peasant Affairs, Mauricio Mamani.' (*Mauricio laughs*) Gee! Pérez Alcalá stopped halfway to the stage. They fooled him, poor guy. [...] That's politics. I took the oath and became minister.

\*\*\*

Existing scholarship on how indigenous entrants navigate race and racism within the state bureaucracy is limited. Yet, Mauricio Mamani's oath anecdote vividly illustrates much of what we know about this topic in Bolivia and other national contexts, such as the United States. Mauricio self-identifies as an indigenous Aymara man. Mauricio's dark complexion, his indigenous surname, and his 'broken' Spanish—i.e. Aymara-inflected Spanish, as opposed to 'standard' Spanish, namely that of urban middle- and upper-class monolingual Spanish speakers—mark him as indigenous man in Bolivian society.

Most of Mauricio's experiences in the state unfolded under the homogenizing gaze of white-*mestizo* elites that viewed the erasure of indigeneity and ethnoracial heterogeneity in an indigenous-majority country as the key precondition for Bolivian political and economic development. At the same time, these elites recognized the potential political force the indigenous population represented, seeking to mobilize it for political gain while also keeping it at the margins of political life through exclusion and later cooptation, as I discuss in the previous chapter.

Mauricio's ordeal points to a common challenge that race scholars have identified, namely that members of historically excluded ethnoracial populations do not fit dominant notions of the ideal bureaucrat that naturalize state authority in white bodies and culture (Enloe 1978; Puwar 2004). In fact, Mauricio describes that his arrival to the state bureaucracy in the 1960s as a mid-level specialist on agricultural matters was the moment when he shed his leather sandals for a suit and dress shoes. Quite literally and figuratively, Mauricio shed visible markers of his indigeneity in order to fit into the white-*mestizo* notions of bureaucratic suitability.

This chapter examines the experiences of pioneer indigenous entrants to the Bolivian central state bureaucracy as they confronted and navigated a racialized ideal bureaucrat norm that naturalized state power in white-*mestizo* bodies (cf. Puwar 2004). By pioneer indigenous bureaucrats, I refer to mid- and upper-level bureaucrats of indigenous origin who accessed the state bureaucracy in the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century before decolonization became the state-sanctioned ethnoracial project. Pioneers' entrance took place in the context of (1) white-*mestizo* control of the central state bureaucracy, and (2) a hegemonic state discourse that articulated modernity and indigeneity as antithetical, whether under the veil of national *mestizaje* or multiculturalism.

Notwithstanding important differences in racial formation, as I will show in more detail later in this chapter, Mauricio's experience resembles those of ethnoracial minorities in the United States (Lamont and Fleming 2005; Wingfield and Alston 2014) and the United Kingdom (Puwar 2004). In both cases, minority access to the state is a concession of ruling elites, who control key spaces of power. Moreover, in the U.S., minorities' experiences in organizations unfold in what Omi and Winant (1994) describe as a hegemonic racial project consisting of "the retreat of social policy from any practical commitment to racial justice, and the relentless reproduction and divulgation of this theme at the level of everyday life – where whites are now 'fed up' with the 'special treatment' received by non-whites, etc." (p.75).

While different, these hegemonic racial projects share an underlying liberal ideology that limits race-specific demands and insulates certain spaces of the bureaucracy from racial conflict. Their ideological strength and backing by the state constrains the symbolic and resources of formerly excluded ethnoracial populations in renegotiating organizational

ethnoracial boundaries. Although scholars of race in organization have generally attributed demographic composition the key role in shaping ethnoracial boundary dynamics (for a discussion see Vallas 2003), this study argues that the overall demographic composition of the organization is less important to boundary work than compositional changes in key authority posts of the bureaucracy. Control of bureaucratic authority posts enables bureaucratic contenders to alter, to varying extents, the culture and structure of state organizations along particular racial projects.

This chapter shows that, in the pre-2006 context, pioneer indigenous bureaucrats navigated the boundary between bureaucracy and indigeneity by conforming and upholding dominant white-*mestizo* criteria of bureaucratic worth. While adherence to such criteria enabled access and some level of upward mobility within the bureaucracy, gatekeepers and citizens nonetheless often held pioneers suspect and discriminated against them because of their indigeneity. This highlights the metonymic relationship between bureaucratic merit criteria and whiteness. Moreover, their experiences highlight the absorption, cooptation, and insulation strategies through which, Omi and Winant (1994) argue, the racial state resolves racial conflict and reproduces the hegemonic ideology. Their access served the short-term electoral and/or legitimacy needs of white-*mestizo* political elites vis-à-vis the indigenous electorate and was possible exclusively in areas dealing with narrowly defined rural or indigenous issues.

Pioneer indigenous bureaucrats within the mid- and upper-levels of *Cancillería* have been very few. As I discuss in the next chapter, pioneer indigenous entrants to the Foreign Ministry before 2006 were likely in the single digits and at lower levels of the organization. I

was thus unable to identify and interview any old-guard pioneer indigenous diplomat. As a result, this chapter draws on interviews conducted with pioneers from other central-level agencies. I believe that these experiences are indicative of the kinds of dynamics of exclusion and indigenous experiences in *Cancillería* prior to 2006.

The rest of the chapter is organized in three sections. The first section draws on primary and secondary statistical data to examine the level of participation of indigenous Bolivians in the state bureaucracy before the first Morales administration. Second, I provide an overview of indigenous bureaucratic leadership in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and early 2000s, which preliminarily shows the racial state logic underlying their bureaucratic appointments. Next, I discuss in-depth and contrast the trajectories and experiences of pioneer indigenous bureaucrats Mauricio Mamani and Paulino Guarachi. While their trajectories differ, both adopted similar strategies in navigating the racialized ideal bureaucrat norm.

### **The Ethnoracial Composition of the National Bureaucracy Before 2006**

In their recent study on the social composition of the Bolivian bureaucracy, Soruco et al. (2014) show that Spanish monolingual speakers have dominated public sector employment in urban areas between 1989 and 2012, relative to those who speak an indigenous language and Spanish and those who speak an indigenous language only. Using population survey data from the National Statistics Institute (INE), they show that Spanish monolingual speakers, on average, accounted for 59.5 percent of public sector employment between 1989 and 2005, and 62.1 percent between 2006 and 2012. The opposite is true in rural areas between 1996 and 2012. There, monolingual Spanish speakers are a minority: on average, 25.3 percent between 1996

and 2005, and 31.7 percent between 2006 and 2012. In most cases, indigenous-language monolingual speakers accounted for less than 1 percent of public sector employment.

Their analysis provides a useful but rough sketch of the ethnoracial composition of public-sector employment in Bolivia. The rise of Spanish monolingualism among the increasingly urban indigenous-origin population in recent decades has reduced the effectiveness of language ability as a proxy for race/ethnicity. At the same time, the category of urban public-sector employment encompasses occupations beyond what might be defined as the central bureaucracy and public administration proper, which has accounted for between 25 and 45 percent of public-sector employment between 1989 and 2012. In fact, their analysis does not distinguish between occupation groups, which are hierarchically organized.

To provide a first approximation of the ethnoracial composition of the national bureaucracy overall and across occupation groups prior to the arrival of Morales to power, I turn to individual-level data from the 2001 INE national census (see Table 4.1.), particularly the IPUMS International 10% sample (Minnesota Population Center 2017). I constrain my analysis to urban respondents who indicated public administration as their employment sector and use three proxies for race/ethnicity: language ability, maternal language, and reported self-identification with an indigenous ethnic group.

Based on the language ability criteria, I find that Spanish monolingual speakers account for 57.5 percent of public administration, virtually the same percentage Soruco et al. (2014) report for 2001 using the INE survey data. However, my analysis further reveals that the proportion of Spanish monolingual speakers is closer to 70 percent among management, professionals, and clerical employees. Instead, those who speak an indigenous language are

**Table 4.1.** Ethnoracial composition of the public administration sector in urban Bolivia in 2001 by occupation group, using different proxies for race/ethnicity.

| Occupation Group | Language    |                | Mother Language |                | Ethnic Group       |                |
|------------------|-------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|
|                  | Spanish (%) | Indigenous (%) | Spanish (%)     | Indigenous (%) | Non-Indigenous (%) | Indigenous (%) |
| Managers         | 70.1        | 29.9           | 93.6            | 6.4            | 55.0               | 45.1           |
| Professionals    | 65.7        | 34.3           | 91.8            | 8.2            | 54.6               | 45.4           |
| Clerks           | 70.3        | 29.7           | 90.3            | 9.7            | 54.4               | 45.6           |
| Service          | 38.9        | 61.1           | 70.3            | 29.7           | 33.4               | 66.6           |
| All              | 57.5        | 42.5           | 84.0            | 16.0           | 47.0               | 53.0           |
| N                | 5,719       |                | 5,719           |                | 5,714              |                |

*Source:* Instituto Nacional de Estadística de Bolivia 2001 Population and Housing Census (10% sample). IPUMS, International.

overrepresented among low-level occupations in public administration, where Spanish monolingual speakers account for 39 percent of all employees.

An alternative proxy for race/ethnicity in Bolivia is that of mother language, or the language a respondent learned to speak at home before the age of 5. Using this criterion, the underrepresentation of indigenous Bolivians among urban Bolivians employed in public administration prior to the Morales government is even more stark. The analysis reveals that those who grew up speaking Spanish account for 84 percent of urban public administration employees. Among managers, professionals, and clerks, only 1 out of 10 employees reported an indigenous language as their maternal language. Among service occupations, the proportion of respondents whose mother language is an indigenous language rises to nearly 30 percent.

Finally, in the 2001 census, INE asked Bolivians for the first time whether they belong to one of Bolivia's ethnic groups, such as Quechuas, Aymaras, or Guaranies, among others, or not. Using the ethnic belonging criterion, 47 percent of urban public administration employees are non-indigenous, suggesting a predominantly indigenous Bolivian public administration. However, examining the ethnoracial composition across the occupation ladder reveals that non-indigenous Bolivians account for nearly 55 percent of managers, professionals, and clerks. Among low-level workers in urban public administration, non-indigenous Bolivians account for only 33.4 percent of employees; indigenous employees are the majority among low-level workers.

It is worth noting that the analysis presented in Table 4.1 does not discriminate by level of government or particular cities, such as La Paz, where the bulk of the national bureaucracy concentrates. It is likely that in 2001, the proportion of indigenous bureaucrats

was significantly lower in the national-level bureaucracy than at other government levels, especially urban municipalities. This is because the decentralization reforms of the 1990s led to an increased presence of indigenous men and women in municipal-level governments (e.g., Albó and Tacuri Quispe 2004). Yet, these reforms did not bring a change of similar magnitude in the national bureaucracy, which only saw significant compositional changes under the Morales administration (Soruco et al. 2014)

### **Pioneers and the Racial Logic of Bureaucratic Appointments**

As Enloe (1978) notes, in the Andes, indigenous people's access to the bureaucracy has historically been limited and dependent on shedding all markers of indigeneity and assimilating to Hispanicized *mestizo* culture. As a result, documenting the experience of indigenous entrants, rural or urban, to the higher-levels of the national state bureaucracy in the 20<sup>th</sup> century presents two challenges. On the one hand, the stigmatization of indigenous identity in Bolivian society at large and the bureaucracy in particular means that access rates before the democratic transition of 1982 were extremely low. This makes the universe of pre-1980s pioneer indigenous bureaucrats in the central state bureaucracy rather minute. On the other, under homogenizing and whitening national discourses, the ideological erasure of indigeneity from national life has also meant the erasure of a political history of indigenous participation, if very limited, in the state bureaucracy.

Social scientists like Xavier Albó (2002b, 2007), Victor Hugo Cárdenas (2011), Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (1987b) , and Esteban Ticona Alejo (2000, 2010), among others, have sought to address these historical erasures, documenting primarily the history of the indigenous

movement and, in some cases, their inroads into elected office. Yet, the primary focus of those studies tends to emphasize political and movement trajectories rather than the experiences of racism these pioneers encountered or the strategies through which they navigated race in predominantly white-*mestizo* state spaces. An exception to this is the work of Patricia Chávez (2012) on the experiences of indigenous legislators before and after the election of Evo Morales (Chávez 2012).

However, less is known about the experiences of indigenous participation in the central state bureaucracy, or public administration, particularly its middle and upper echelons, which are generally considered the technical and political spaces of bureaucracy. Drawing on secondary sources, this section documents early indigenous inroads into bureaucratic leadership in an effort to begin filling this empirical gap and to identify shared aspects in their trajectories that enabled them to cross the ethnoracial boundary into top-level posts in the bureaucracy.

### ***The First Indigenous Peasant Ministers***

As noted in the previous chapter, after the Revolution of 1952, having defeated the former white oligarchy, the upwardly mobile white-*mestizo* MNR post-revolutionary leaders granted universal adult suffrage and citizenship. The nationalist promise of citizenship, however, became conditional on abandoning indigenous identities (Ticona Alejo 2000). At the same time, the MNR party organized the participation of the peasant and worker population primarily through trade unions (Albó 1994), creating a stratified system that reserved trade union leadership posts for peasants and workers, and a central state bureaucracy for urban white-

*mestizos* party militants. This system also inserted indigenous Bolivian into white-indian relations of tutelage and patronage in which white-*mestizo* political parties and the strong worker unions patronized indians, refusing to engage them or their demands in meaningful ways (Ticona Alejo 2000).

One early case of indigenous access to the central state bureaucracy took place in 1959, when the MNR leadership appointed José Rojas, a Quechua peasant union leader from Cochabamba, Minister of Peasant Affairs. The appointment, which lasted six months, was reportedly an effort to maintain peasant support in post-revolutionary Bolivia (Dunkerley 2003). Historian Dunkerley notes that Rojas was removed from his post because of “excessive manifestations of his provincial behavior and, one could venture to say, because of the MNR leadership’s disdain for a man who insisted on speaking Quechua but happily rode across the countryside on a chauffeur-driven limousine” (Dunkerley 2003:134).

Indigenous access to the executive arm of the state became more visible, if still small, in the 1980s with the return to the democracy and the emergence of Indianista Katarista leaders and parties. The Katarista and Indianista movements of the 1970s and 1980s rejected the state of political *pongueaje*, or servitude, of the indigenous population and demanded indigenous political autonomy and equality (Ticona Alejo 2000). Although in their most radical iterations these subaltern currents entailed the outright rejection of all *q’ara*<sup>32</sup> proposals, i.e. those made by white politicians, many Katarista and Indianista leaders adopted a ‘pragmatism without compromise,’ whereby they could take advantage of political opportunities through alliances with white-*mestizo* parties that could grant them access to power (Ticona Alejo 2000). In order

---

<sup>32</sup> “Derogatory Quechua and Aymara term meaning ‘white, elite, city-dweller’” (Shakow 2014:234).

to take back control of the peasant unions throughout the highland from a state increasingly antagonistic to indigenous demands, this younger generation of indigenous leaders created the Single Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) in 1979. By the 1990s, CSUTCB became the central organization of the indigenous peasant movement.

Aymara sociologist Ticona Alejo (2010) traces the first appointments of indigenous ministers to the early 1980s, including Zenón Barrientos, Mauricio Mamani, and Simón Yampara, among others. In the 1990s, following administrative decentralization reforms, the participation of indigenous people in the upper levels of municipal bureaucracies rose meteorically (Albó 2007). Yet, while indigenous participation in municipal bureaucracies grew significantly in the 1990s, indigenous access to the central state bureaucracy continued slowly. The central bureaucracy remained primarily a white-*mestizo* space. Who were those pioneer indigenous bureaucrats?

Zenón Barrientos Mamani, an Aymara peasant and labor leader born in the 1920s in Province Ladislao Cabrera in Oruro, became the first indigenous Minister in democratic Bolivia (Rocha Sánchez 2014). He was appointed Minister of Peasant and Agricultural Affairs by President Hernán Siles Suazo of UDP and sworn in on 10 October 1982, serving until 1983 (Paxton 1983). A member of the MNR, Barrientos had been a revolutionary commander of the peasant and worker forces during the Revolution of 1952 and was committed to the party's nationalist and modernizing state project (Dunkerley 2003). During the period of military regimes in Bolivia, he was persecuted and tortured, eventually going into exile until the return to democracy in 1982 (Rocha Sánchez 2014). Upon his return, he joined forces with Siles's Leftist National Revolutionary Movement (MNR-I), which won the election as a result of

coalition with other left-wing parties. Barrientos died in poverty and virtual oblivion in an elderly home in La Paz in 2014.

Unlike the *MNRista* Zenón Barrientos, Simón Yampara Huarachi belonged to a younger generation of university-educated Aymara indigenous peasant leaders that formed the Indianista and Katarista thought currents that reclaimed indigenous identity and asserted indigenous political autonomy. In fact, this self-described Katarista worked closely with Jenaro Flores, the most important indigenous peasant leader of the period, in the creation of CSUTCB.

Born in 1952 in the Aymara community of Jach'a Champi in Oruro, Simón Yampara left his community to attend school in Oruro and eventually became one of the first indigenous men to access Major University of San Andrés (UMSA), the country's flagship public university in La Paz, where he majored in sociology (Arkonada 2010). Yampara served as Minister of Peasant and Agricultural Affairs after Zenón Barrientos, but under the same administration. Before his appointment, he had served as Director of Colonization in the same ministry. In 2010, he unsuccessfully ran for Governor of La Paz. He is currently a professor and researcher at the recently founded Public University of El Alto (UPEA) (Bustillos Zamorano 2014). In today's Bolivia, Yampara is better known for his Katarista academic work.

The first indigenous woman to lead a ministry in Bolivia was Tomasa Yarhui Jacomé, appointed Minister of Peasant and Indigenous Affairs in 2002, twenty years after Zenón Barrientos. She belonged to the cabinet of President Jorge Quiroga of ADN, who facing growing indigenous peasant mobilizations appointed her in an effort to appease the indigenous movement. On the occasion of her oath ceremony, Yarhui told the BBC,

I think that historically in our country, women and particularly indigenous women have not been valued. Now is our time. That's why I put aside my personal and legitimate interests. I was about to win an uninominal election for

deputy, but I have thought more about the peasant movement and I think this opportunity is precisely to work for women. And, we peasants want to take over power and do a different kind of politics that is fundamentally at the service of the community, at the service of peasants. (Tomas Yarhui in Anon 2002)

Born in 1968 in the Quechua peasant community of Kollpana in the Department of Chuquisaca, Yarhui left her community at the age of 8 to enroll in school in the city of Sucre, though she returned at the age of 12 tired of the ethnoracial discrimination she suffered in the white-*mestizo* city (Anon 2014). Upon her return, she became actively involved in the local peasant union as secretary of minutes, an early achievement she attributes to an NGO working in her community that convinced her father of her bright future as a union leader (Ariñez 2014). By the age of 17, Yarhui had become a female representative of the Bartolinas in the Chuquisaca Peasant Union Confederation and gradually made inroads into CSUTCB (Ariñez 2014). Of her activism, Yarhui notes in an interview with *La Razón*, “we were not radical, but the lack of justice and the pervasive discrimination was painful. Rural demands were ignored. That’s when I started fighting in political life, and the *Movimiento Bolivia Libre* (MBL) came about” (Ariñez 2014).

In 1999, Yarhui ran for municipal council in Sucre, the city she had left years earlier due to the discrimination she had encountered. As she notes, “As a result, I became the first councilwoman *de pollera* in the Municipality of Sucre. The citizenry did not see that as something normal, like today” (Ariñez 2014). Though her tenure as Minister lasted only six months, the last months of the Quiroga administration, Yarhui continued her activist and political career. She served as senator for her department between 2006 and 2011. In 2014, she ran for vice president for the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) alongside former President Jorge Quiroga.

### ***The First Indigenous Vice President: Víctor Hugo Cárdenas***

Before the inauguration of Evo Morales Ayma in 2006, the highest executive office that an indigenous Bolivian had reached was the vice presidency. In 1993, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada of the MNR and his running mate Víctor Hugo Cárdenas Conde of the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Katari (MRTKL) won the presidential election. The MNR-MRTKL ticket was the product of political marketing research, which suggested Sánchez's mate "should have opposite and complementary qualities to the presidential candidate, who was a mining businessman, member of the white oligarchy, had close links to the United States [...] and was one of the main architects of the neoliberal model installed in 1985" (Albó 2002b:70).

As Albó (1994) notes, "this alliance was difficult to imagine from the standpoint of the MNR, whose 'nationalism' meant making the country into a homogenous Bolivia, and the Kataristas, who had always been critical of the MNR on that very point" (p.56). Indigenous leaders were polarized by the alliance with some viewing Cárdenas as a traitor and other embracing the opportunity to govern (Albó 1994). Nevertheless, Cárdenas became Bolivia's first indigenous vice president.

Born in 1951 in the Aymara community of Sank'ay Jawira in Ingavi Province, La Paz, Cárdenas was the son of topographer turned rural teacher, who had changed his last name from Choquehuanca to Cárdenas in the 1940s in order to access higher education (Albó 2002b). Like other pioneers, Cárdenas left his community at a young age to attend school in the city of La Paz. In 1977, he obtained bachelor degrees in literature and pedagogy from San Andrés Major University, where he later taught for over twenty years.

In the 1970s, Cárdenas was actively involved with the emerging Aymara Katarista movement that created CSUTCB and the first indigenous party, the Tupac Katari Revolutionary Movement (MRTKL). Upon the country's transition to democracy in the 1980s, he became involved in politics, serving as a national deputy between 1985 and 1989 for his party MRTKL and running for President with MRTKL in 1989. At the turn of the decade, among Katarista leaders, Cárdenas had the greatest name recognition in the electorate, which was "due mainly to his intellectual style, which was easier for the middle class to digest" (Albó 1994:64); in other words, because of his academic credentials, professorial trajectory, and other cultural markers, Cárdenas more closely fit dominant notions of the ideal statesman.

As an elected official, Cárdenas had greater leeway to transgress white-*mestizo* codes of behavior in state spaces because his post was not dependent on the white-*mestizo* political elite downplaying inconvenient aspects of his indigeneity. Significantly, in his inaugural speech, Cárdenas stated,

After 500 years of colonial silence and 168 years of republican exclusion, we have come forward to tell the truth. Ours has been a history of permanent struggle for freedom and justice, for multicultural and multiethnic democracy. Today we are entering the age of a new *pachakuti*, of fundamental change. We Bolivians, united, are beginning to transform those 500 years of exclusion and marginality. (Victor Hugo Cárdenas on 6 August 1993, quoted in Albó 1994:68)

As Albó documents, Cárdenas also uttered various untranslated phrases in Quechua, Aymara, and Guaraní directed at his indigenous audience. On the day of his inauguration, Cárdenas participated in the protocolled oath ceremony and two events with indigenous representatives, during which he wore a vicuña shawl, which indigenous leaders gave to him to symbolize the mandate they bestowed upon him. He wore it in all public events thereafter (Albó 1994). He was accompanied by his wife Lidia, a woman *de pollera*, and Guatemalan indigenous activist Rigoberta Menchú (Albó 1994).

Despite this leeway, however, Cárdenas also moderated his discourse, avoiding Katarista terms like 'plurinational' that could anger the political elite (Albó 1994:80). According to a close advisor of Cárdenas, the MNR old guard was wary of Cárdenas because they saw him as harbinger of indigenous empowerment (interview with the author). At the same time, the MRTKL and the allied leftist party MBL were relatively pigeonholed within the Sánchez administration, tasked primarily with questions concerning indigenous recognition and rural development.

This overview of the trajectories of the high-level pioneer indigenous bureaucrats provides some preliminary insights into the factors that enabled them to cross the ethnoracial boundary of the bureaucracy. Virtually all of these pioneers had trajectories of leadership within indigenous peasant unions, with CSUTCB being a common denominator among the latter generation of indigenous leaders, like Cárdenas, Yampara, and Yarhui. A second commonality among these pioneers is their militancy in or alliance with predominantly white-*mestizo* political parties, such as the MNR, the MNR-I, and MLB, without which access to the upper echelons of the bureaucracy could not be possible.

For white-*mestizo* parties, these indigenous leaders were valuable electoral and political assets. They had great instrumental value, as the MNR-MRTKL, or Sánchez-Cárdenas alliance, reveals. These leaders could secure votes but also help white-*mestizo* state elites to coopt indigenous peasant demands and appease mobilizations. Their leadership trajectories within the peasant unions meant that they enjoyed great political capital and mobilization power among the large indigenous peasant electorate. Moreover, the structural adjustment programs that the MNR implemented in 1985, in response to Bolivia's acute economic crisis, weakened

the labor unions' control of the powerful Bolivian Workers Central (COB), the national trade union federation. This strengthened the influence of the peasant unions within COB, through CSUTCB, and, thus, the political capital and mobilization power of indigenous peasant leaders. As I will discuss later, Mauricio is an exception to his common trajectory of peasant union leadership.

In the context of white-*mestizo* control of the bureaucracy and a homogenizing hegemonic state project, cabinet appointments of indigenous leaders were limited to the Ministry of Peasant and Agricultural Affairs and, later, the Secretariat and Ministry of Peasant and Indigenous Affairs. This pigeonholing of top-level pioneer indigenous bureaucrats to the areas of the central bureaucracy dealing with rural development reveals the racial state logic of bureaucratic organization and appointments.

In the dominant national narratives of race and modernity, indigenous leaders represented the particular, namely indigeneity and difference, while white-*mestizo* leaders stood for the universal. Hence, while appointments to other state ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Relations, were no less political, white-*mestizo* elites did not view indigenous leaders as suited for managing these spaces as much as they did not view indigenous experiences and issues as fundamentally germane to their operations. In fact, while containing "indigenous issues" within one ministry, state elites insulated the rest of the state bureaucracy from racial politics and competing racial projects.

This is particularly evident in Cárdenas's experience. His electoral success granted him greater leeway in the content of his speeches, which incorporated indigenous critiques of the political and social system, and the use of indigenous symbols and languages within the

Executive. Yet, Cárdenas often had to restrain his critiques and proposals, avoiding concepts like 'plurinational,' in order not to antagonize white-*mestizo* elites. Moreover, even Vice President Cárdenas and his team were principally tasked with all matters pertaining to rural development and indigenous recognition. In short, much like Wingfield and Alston (2014) show in U.S. organizations, the positions of pioneer indigenous bureaucrats depended on their ability to behave according to the expectations of white-*mestizo* political elites and in ways that did not threaten white-*mestizo* normativity. At the same time, their appointments and access followed the racial state logic of absorption and insulation that Omi and Winant (1994) theorize.

### **Two Different Pioneer Indigenous Trajectories, One Boundary Strategy**

In this section, I draw on in-depth life interviews with two male pioneer indigenous bureaucrats, Mauricio Mamani and Paulino Guarachi, to examine their trajectories into and experiences within the central state bureaucracy. What were their paths into the higher levels of the state bureaucracy? How did they experience their entrance into white-*mestizo* bureaucratic spaces? How did they navigate the racialized ideal bureaucrat norm and the devaluing of indigenous bodies in these spaces?

#### ***Mauricio Mamani: A Career Trajectory***

In 1985, President-elect Víctor Paz Estenssoro (MNR) appointed Mauricio Mamani Pocoata, an Aymara social anthropologist, to lead the Ministry of Peasant and Agricultural Affairs (MACA). Born in 1935 in the Aymara community of Irpa Chico in Ingavi Province, La Paz, Mauricio was

among the first three indigenous men in Bolivia to secure a cabinet-level appointment following democratization. Prior to his cabinet appointment, Mauricio had held various other jobs, including posts in the Bolivian national bureaucracy and international organizations. In this section, I discuss Mauricio's trajectory into the central bureaucracy and identify how this indigenous state pioneer navigated race within it.

In part, the accumulation of institutionalized forms of cultural capital valued in the bureaucratic field (Bourdieu 2000), namely educational credentials, gradually enabled Mauricio's entrance to the central bureaucracy. Yet, as I will show, despite accumulating this capital, his ethnoracial status regularly made him a suspect occupant of the bureaucracy. For an indigenous man growing up in 1930s and 1940s Bolivia, this was no easy feat. At the time of his birth, Mauricio points out, "school attendance was forbidden. Indigenous people, their children, could not go to school. Why? Because the indigenous person had to work the land and nothing else."

Mauricio's parents were small farmers in a community that had managed to survive the pressures of *hacienda* predatory expansion in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. They were primarily Aymara speakers and illiterate. Relative to his parents, young Mauricio benefited from expanding, if still limited opportunities for formal education in rural areas. At home, Mauricio's father pushed him to learn how to read and write. Mauricio remembers that illiteracy had been a painful experience for his father and other indigenous soldiers during the Chaco War (1932-1935) with Paraguay because they were unable to read and write letters from the frontlines, having to pay others to do so for them. Moreover, the Chaco War, whose human costs were disproportionately borne by indians and *cholos*, had made his father aware of ethnoracial

exclusion in Bolivia, who put hope on education as a path to inclusion. Many returning indigenous soldiers, like his father, thus wanted to expand educational opportunities in the countryside, often recurring to grassroots schools housed clandestinely in private homes. Young Mauricio also benefited from some limited expansion of state rural education in the 1940s, that the white political oligarchy granted in the interest of persevering power amongst intensifying demands for inclusion.

Having to leave the community and learning to navigate white-*mestizo* educational spaces is an experience Mauricio shares with Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, Simón Yampara, and Tomasa Yarhui. In fact, upon completing primary education in a public school near his community, Mauricio left and enrolled in middle school in the nearby, primarily mestizo town of Viacha, an unusual deed for an Aymara person at the time. His uncle had to literally plead with the school's reluctant principal to let an indian enroll in the town's primarily mestizo middle school.<sup>33</sup> He also had to get a job to help with room and board.

Later, Mauricio enrolled in the *Escuela Normal de Warisata*<sup>34</sup>, a rural teacher training college in the neighboring Omasuyo Province. At the time, Mauricio explained, high school and teaching diplomas were completed concurrently. In 1958, at the age of 23, Mauricio graduated and returned to Irpa Chico, where he became a teacher in the local public school and the elected leader of the local rural teachers' union.

---

<sup>33</sup> Mauricio did not recount this particular experience during our interview in 2014. Instead, it is documented in an interview with Mauricio in Buechler (2016).

<sup>34</sup> The name of Mauricio's teachers training college evokes the *Escuela Ayllu* or *Escuela Normal de Warisata*, which was founded in 1931 and shut down by the government in 1940. Its founders envisioned the *Escuela Ayllu* to serve the needs of rural Aymaras, a radical alternative to the state education policies that sought to erase indigenous culture. After the 1955 educational reform, however, a new *Escuela Normal de Warisata* opened its doors, but now under the race-blind and modernizing logic of the post-revolutionary regimes. The school was no longer aligned with the *Escuela Ayllu's* original philosophy of Aymara education.

Mauricio's teaching job, his first experience as a public employee, lasted only two years. Though taking place at the margins of the state apparatus, it represented an initial transgression of its ethnoracial boundary. Mauricio recalls that, at the time, rural teachers were not only poorly remunerated but were also not afforded the same prestige as urban (predominantly non-indigenous) teachers. Non-indigenous urban teachers, Mauricio recalls, "had a sense of superiority and looked down on us, the poor." In post-revolutionary Bolivia, as today, the terms rural and poor indexed indigeneity.

Low pay, discrimination, and the risks that accompanied union militancy and leadership in the Cold War-period motivated Mauricio to leave the education bureau when he had the chance. In 1960, a fortuitous encounter with a foreign anthropologist altered Mauricio's professional trajectory, eventually leading him into the urban white-*mestizo* world of experts.

He recounts,

[The public school] paid little. A *gringo*, William Carter, came to do his thesis on agrarian reform, which the whole world saw as a novelty. [...] He comes to do his thesis, William Carter of Columbia University in New York, and I meet him by chance and he offers me a job as his field research assistant. Well, I had studied a bit of sociology and a little about principles of anthropology at the teachers college, but only very little. So, he prepares a course and, in that course, he teaches me field research methods and makes me quit (*Mauricio chuckles*) teaching. There, I incorporate myself into anthropological research and become part of the anthropological field, and I like it.

Carter hired Mauricio not only because of his communal ties but also because of his ability to speak and write in Aymara and Spanish. Mauricio then turned all of his attention to the research assistantship, conducting fulltime fieldwork research for Carter's dissertation.

Mauricio's first employment experience in the Bolivian central bureaucracy, an upper-middle class white-*mestizo* world, followed the conclusion of Carter's research project. At Mauricio's behest, Carter helped him secure another source of employment. Mauricio joined the Cooperatives Directorate at the Inter-American Agricultural Service (SAI), a U.S.-financed

Bolivian government agency charged with providing technical assistance in the implementation and monitoring of agrarian reform. For Mauricio, entering this world entailed shedding the cultural markers of his indigeneity. He recalls,

That day, for the first time I took off my *ojotas*<sup>35</sup> (*Mauricio chuckles*) and put on dress shoes. Gee! I had to dress well, with a tie. [William Carter] got me a job in the Directorate of Cooperatives at the Inter-American Agricultural Service, funded by the American Embassy. He got me a job there. You had to show up well dressed. [...] I worked there for two years.

The policing of clothing within the bureaucracy and the exclusion of fashion registers indexing indigeneity reveal an institutionalized notion of the ideal bureaucrat that is inherently non-indigenous.

Later in the interview, I asked Mauricio if at the time it would have been possible to wear *ojotas*, a poncho, a traditional hat, or a *pollera*, as some do in the bureaucracy today. He responded, “No, no, no! With a suit, white shirt, and well shined dress shoes. Otherwise, the doorman at the Inter-American Agricultural Service wouldn’t let you in. You had to look *bien* to enter, be clean, shower daily.” To be perceived to look *bien*<sup>36</sup> and clean, a proper bureaucrat, Mauricio had to conform and transform his body, to acquire a new embodied form of cultural capital. That a state organization predominantly serving indigenous people, the majority of the population engaged in agriculture, denied them entrance to its premises based on clothing, also highlights one of the mechanisms of ethnoracial exclusion from the bureaucracy.

In 1963, during his tenure at SAI, Mauricio managed to get a yearlong scholarship, like he had seen many of his coworkers do, to study cooperative production techniques in Israel. Mauricio spent several months working in a Kibutz and living with a Bedouin group in the Negev

---

<sup>35</sup> Sandals made of leather or rubber, traditionally worn by rural indigenous populations in the Andes.

<sup>36</sup> The literal translation of *bien* is good. However, in Bolivian society, to be *bien* connotes class status and ethnoracial origin (Loayza Bueno 2010).

Desert. As he describes these experiences, “he was already acting like an anthropologist, conducting research, but I wasn’t one.” Upon his return, with William Carter’s advice and help, Mauricio enrolled in the social anthropology program at the Pontifical Catholic University of Lima in Peru. As he recounts, Carter also got him a full-ride scholarship for working professionals from the Ford Foundation. He takes great pride on this because it meant his recognition as a professional despite not yet having a university degree.

Mauricio graduated university in 1974 and returned to Bolivia. After Lima, Mauricio had secured a well-paying research job in the Ethnography and Folklore Museum (MUSEF), a dependency of the Central Bank of Bolivia. His unprecedented hiring occurred under the direction of Hugo D. Ruiz, a ceramic artist, who for the first time hired Aymara professionals, including Mauricio, linguist Juan de Dios Yapita, and historian Roberto Choque Canqui<sup>37</sup> (Oporto Ordoñez 2010). An editorial note in *Fuentes*, the official periodical of the Bolivian legislative archive, quotes Ruiz explaining, “Never before had it been proposed to form a multidisciplinary group conformed of white and indigenous intellectuals to observe our social-historic reality through two visions, official and a counter-official (Oporto Ordoñez 2010:53). The same note points out that MUSEF’s links with indigenous intellectuals earned it the derogatory label ‘*museo de los indios*,’ or ‘the indians’ museum,’ among the white-*mestizo* intelligentsia (Oporto Ordoñez 2010:55). At MUSEF, Mauricio and his Aymara contemporaries had broken an important glass ceiling.

But Mauricio was not satisfied with his professional achievements as he aspired for political posts. In the roughly ten years between returning from Lima and becoming Minister of

---

<sup>37</sup> In 2009, Aymara historian Roberto Choque Canqui became the first Viceminister of Decolonization of Bolivia.

MACA, Mauricio's ambition grew and he began to pursue political posts within the bureaucracy. His ambition was a driving force in his trajectory within the state. He recalls that "since I was ambitious, I was no longer content with just that [MUSEF]. I began liking politics and wanted to be in politics. I wanted to land political posts. So, in my search for those political posts is when I came to occupy the post of Deputy Director of the Province of Ingavi in Viacha." Mauricio thus returned to Viacha, the *mestizo* town that decades earlier had nearly denied him enrollment in middle school, as a high-level local official.

In 1982, de facto President Guido Vildoso, an army general and the army's choice to oversee Bolivia's transition from military authoritarianism to democracy, put Mauricio in charge of the Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Investigation Division of the Anti-Narcotics National Council (CNLCN), an agency directly under the purview of the Office of the President. He explains that, in part, his move to a high-level post in the national bureaucracy was facilitated by his growing status as an expert on agriculture and, particularly, coca leaf cultivation and use. He had collaborated on various research projects with national and international organizations and educational institutions. For example, between 1979 and 1981, he was the supervisor of the Rural Development Services' Traditional Practices Project in the Bolivian highland region. He had also authored an anthropological book with Xavier Albó, titled *Esposos, Suegros y Padrinos entre los Aymaras* (Albó and Mamani n.d.), and published opinion columns that appeared in various newspapers.

However, his tenure at CNLCN was short, lasting less than four months. Unhappy with the nature of the job, which entailed the surveillance and control of coca growers, predominantly of indigenous origin, and made him a target of bribe offers, Mauricio left CNLCN.

Mobilizing his growing professional network –social capital he accessed as a result of his institutionalized cultural and now political capital— Mauricio learned about a scholarship opportunity for a postgraduate degree in museology at Doshisha University in Kyoto, Japan. According to Mauricio, a Japanese colleague in Bolivia helped him gain admission within a couple of days. He left for Japan the following week.

Mauricio returned from Japan to a now democratic Bolivia. In 1983, he joined MACA as the National Director of Community Development. Simón Yampara, then Minister of MACA, recruited him. Mauricio recalls, “He called me to the ministry and said to me, ‘you’re a criticizer. To criticize you’re damn excellent. Well, now, I want you to help me. I want you to be director of communities.” To secure his political post, however, Mauricio had first to lobby and negotiate with the peasant unions to secure their backing. The UDC alliance to which Yampara belonged would not approve the hiring without first the political support of the peasant unions. Since Mauricio had not been a member or leader of the unions, like Yampara, he had to gather the backing of indigenous leaders during a union congress.

By his own assessment, Mauricio’s term was a successful one though it was cut short by political scheming. His solid connections with personnel at the U.S. Embassy, cultivated through his collaborations with Carter and international agencies, such as USAID, enabled him to secure foreign aid to invest in his program. His success, he believes, is what ultimately led to the loss of backing from the peasant unions and his abrupt removal. Other political actors began to vie for his post. After leaving MACA, he took a position with Rural Development Services, a USAID-funded American NGO, which extended productive loans to peasants. In part, the job entailed

traveling throughout the Andean countryside, visiting and cultivating ties with indigenous peasant communities.

The severe economic crisis of the 1980s forced President Hernán Siles Suazo of UDP to step down and call early elections in 1985. Former president and MNR presidential candidate Víctor Paz Estenssoro invited Mauricio to join and support his campaign, particularly by mobilizing his social networks in the countryside. Unlike other indigenous bureaucratic pioneers of the time, Mauricio's extensive ties with indigenous peasant communities and unions were largely the result of his professional trajectory, conducting research projects and supervising rural development initiatives, rather than of direct involvement with the unions. These ties, nonetheless, and his indigenous origins still made him a valuable party asset, a bridge between predominantly urban white-*mestizo* party leadership and the indigenous rural unions.

Mauricio jumped on the opportunity. He travelled throughout the highland countryside to campaign for the MNR. "In politics," Mauricio explains, "everything entails money. You campaign for the party, which costs money. If you don't campaign, you have to donate dollars for the party." He spent a significant amount of his money campaigning for the party, dipping into his savings. This was Mauricio's party contribution. It was also a personal investment, a wager that if it succeeded, the party would reward him with post in the national bureaucracy. In the 1985 general elections, the MNR obtained 30 percent of the vote, second to ADN, the party of former military dictator Hugo Banzer Suárez. However, with no party receiving an

absolute majority of the vote, constitutionally the decision fell on the National Congress, whose members ultimately negotiated a Paz Estenssoro presidency. Mauricio's investment paid off.<sup>38</sup>

As a member of the president's cabinet, Mauricio's behavior was policed with greater scrutiny to ensure his adherence to the norms and expectations that regulates white-*mestizo* state spaces. For example, within days of taking the position, Mauricio received a stern talking to from President Estenssoro for failing to follow state protocol and instructed him to undergo training on "on how he has to behave when he is minister." He recounts,

Now, the first cabinet meeting. I went on foot, running. There was no car in the ministry. Well, the car was old. I told the driver, 'go fix the car. I'll go on foot.' At the first meeting, cars go by, vroom, and all the ministers get out and I don't have a car (*Mauricio laughs*) so, I go on foot. [...] It turns out spies from the Palace had followed me because I had gone walking. [...] At 7am, the phone rings and it is Paz Estenssoro. 'Come to the Palace,' he tells me. I go to the Palace at 7am. 'Why were you running in the street yesterday?' He swore at me like you couldn't believe, but, oh well. 'Why were you running? You are no longer Mauricio Mamani. You are now a state minister. Anything happens to you and I am responsible. You shouldn't do that. Let's see, protocol, take this guy to a room and teach him how he has to behave when he is minister.' [The protocol guy] gets a blackboard and makes me sit there alone. He teaches me. [...] It was interesting. I learned.

Another anecdote concerning his wife also vividly illustrates the marked distinction between the indigeneity and state bureaucracy that Mauricio had to learn to navigate. He tells me that his appointment raised an important question at his home. Mauricio and his wife, Dominga Callisaya, an Aymara woman *de pollera* also from Ingavi Province, had to figure out what she would wear to state events. He explains,

Now, at home that was an issue. [Simón] Yampara had been minister also, before me, with UDP, but his wife wore [Western] dresses, although she was *de pollera*. They forced her to change [her way of dressing] to [Western] dresses. Later, I was the second, right? with MNR. So, now I have this problem at home. What's going to happen to my wife? My wife is *de pollera* (*Mauricio chuckles*), but she couldn't be and my children told me, 'you can't make mom change her way of dressing.' She has to go to the Palace like she is. It was understood that all the women, the ministers' wives, had to do social work and that is led by the president's wife. So, what do we do? Well, my wife had to go to the Palace, and she goes like that (*Mauricio chuckles*) *de pollera*. [...] They say that on that day there were two people with different clothing: a Japanese woman with a kimono and (*Mauricio laughs*) my wife *de pollera*, everyone

---

<sup>38</sup> Shortly before Mauricio, Simón Yampara Huarachi, an Aymara sociologist who led the MACA Directorate of Colonization, had briefly served as Minister of MACA.

else dressed the same. This was the first time that a woman entered the Palace wearing *pollera* and it was my wife, Dominga Callisaya.

I asked Mauricio if anyone said anything to his wife about her clothing. He answered,

No, no, no. They accepted her, at least. Paz Estenssoro only laughed, but they accepted it. [...] She wore a shawl made of vicuña wool, very nice clothing, and for the first time. Later you saw it with Remedios Loza, already as deputy, later with Víctor Hugo Cárdenas [his wife] and like that, but the first woman to enter the Government Palace *de pollera* was my wife.

While the President, other high-level officials, or protocol agents of the Executive ultimately let Dominga Callisaya wear her traditional clothing, this was for them a matter of amusement, something seen as peculiar. For Mauricio a return to his *ojotas* or sandals was not even a consideration.

Mauricio's tenure as minister was short-lived, lasting only four months. Once again, Mauricio describes being the victim of a *mala jugada*, or dirty tricks. This *mala jugada* ensued in a corruption scandal that brought down his administration. While he does not go into the details of how his term unraveled, it is evident that Mauricio left MACA in humiliation and feeling betrayed. With his reputation tarnished, Mauricio could not find another post. He recalls,

It was like that that I left MACA, disappointed. I lost my money, my savings, and that person, damn it, played me dirty and I left disappointed. I had invested my money in that. After one leaves a political post, bam, one falls to the floor and it is difficult to pull yourself up. Who's going to hire one? I worked as a carpenter for a time. I had a workshop in El Alto. Disappointed. I couldn't find a job.

Mauricio views the aftermath of his falling off the favor of the administration as a universal experience of high-level officials with similar fate. However, it is also evident that Mauricio's social and financial position was particularly precarious. I have yet to find a former state official who went from a high-level cabinet post to a trade occupation, such as carpentry.

Eventually, Mauricio found a way out. “My studies in Japan, having been minister, enabled me to compete for international jobs because that’s curriculum. So, I applied for international jobs.” Mauricio joined the faculty at Casa de las Americas in Madrid, Spain, and left the country. He later taught at the European Youth Parliament before returning to Bolivia. Mauricio retired from the bureaucracy the year Morales took office. His last long-term job was as director of anthropology in the Ministry of Culture, where he worked for nearly four years. He has continued to collaborate with international agencies on research about coca leaf until recently.

Despite his political aspiration, Mauricio understands his experiences at MACA as proof that he is not a good politician. Regarding his removal from the Directorate of Community Development at MACA, he recalls, “I wasn’t a politico. If I had been a politico, I should have led that group [that pushed me out]. Instead, I just left them be.” Similarly, considering his trajectory as MACA Minister, he notes, “To do politics you have to be a thief, and I am not.” He views himself as an honest person and as lacking the ability and desire to play dirty, but his experiences also suggest that his political capital was weak in the absence of indigenous movement or long-term party militancy. Thus, he self-describes primarily as a *técnico*, a technical expert.

Mauricio takes great pride of being one of the first indigenous Bolivians to be appointed to the presidential cabinet. In his narrative, his bachelor’s degree played a key role in assuring his own sense of belonging in the bureaucracy throughout his trajectory. While Mauricio had originally aspired to attend Cornell University, a degree from PUCP was nonetheless a respected academic accomplishment. In the 1970s, only a small proportion of the Bolivian

population had completed university degree (Klein 2011), even less from well-respected foreign universities.

MB: In the past, people who worked for the state were primarily non-indigenous men, right? For you, how was the experience of arriving to those spaces?

MM: Look, in the first place, I didn't have any complexes, and maybe even had a slight superiority complex because I was [a graduate] of the Catholic [University] of Lima.

MB: Because of your academic credentials?

MM: Yes, yes. So, I didn't have- I never felt discriminated. People used to say there was discrimination, but no, I never felt it.

Reflecting on the scarce presence of indigenous people in the bureaucracy during his time there, he notes, "I think they weren't able to study. They lacked [formal] training because I have been the only one, let's say, exceptional, in this case, but also thanks to Carter. No one has opportunities like that and I have learned so many things from Carter. He taught me many things." Speaking of another indigenous public servant, Mauricio explains, "Poor him. He didn't go to university. It's not his fault. It's the system's fault." While Mauricio does not adhere to the Katarista Indianista discourses of younger indigenous leaders, he nonetheless has a structural understanding of ethnoracial inequality in education in the country informed by the discourses that shaped the post-revolutionary period.

Thus, Mauricio attributes his pioneering trajectory to his educational achievements, particularly his post-secondary education. A brief biographical note appearing in a MACA-USAID publication in 1983, a couple of years before his cabinet appointment, refers to him as "one of the first descendants of the Aymara race to have finished his professional studies at the university level," and "an internationally renowned authority on Andean culture" (Hatch 1981).

Yet, it is also evident that Mauricio attributes a central role in his professional trajectory to William Carter. His over two-decade connection to the American anthropologist from a

prestigious educational institution helped Mauricio cross the ethnoracial boundary of the state bureaucracy and to surmount the 'system' to some extent. Although the exchange might have been far from symmetric, while Mauricio facilitated Carter's access to Aymara communities, Carter facilitated Mauricio's access to urban white-*mestizo* spaces of expertise.

### ***Paulino Guarachi: A Militant Trajectory***

In 2001, amidst growing mobilizations in the countryside, President Jorge Quiroga of ADN appointed Tomasa Yarhui Jacomeo,<sup>39</sup> a Quechua leader of the Bartolina Sisa Confederation and a MLB militant, to the post of Minister of Peasant and Indigenous Affairs. As noted earlier, Tomasa Yarhui was the first indigenous woman in the country to be appointed to a cabinet position. In turn, Minister Yarhui appointed fellow party militants Paulino Guarachi Huanca, an Aymara indigenous leader, and Guido Chumirai, a Guaraní indigenous leader, as her highlands and lowlands viceministers, respectively. In this section, I focus on Paulino's trajectory into the central bureaucracy, seeking to identify how this indigenous state pioneer navigated race and racism within it.

Paulino was born in 1956, over two decades after Mauricio, in the Aymara community of Jilatiti Chipanan in Ingavi Province, roughly 100 kilometers from La Paz. He notes that the state "converted [his *ayllu*] into the canton of Santo Domingo. My birth certificate says Canton Santa Domingo de Machaca." Paulino's parents were farmers, who pushed by land shortages in their community uprooted six-year-old Paulino and his siblings from the highland plateau to a

---

<sup>39</sup> In 2014, when I was conducting research, Tomasa Yarhui was running for Vice-President of Bolivia alongside Jorge Quiroga, who went on to found a new party, Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC). I was unable to establish contact with her to request an interview.

town near Caranavi in the Yungas region of La Paz, an area known for its fertile soils. In their new home, his parents cultivated rice and corn and raised some cattle. Prior to his appointment as viceminister, he had reached high-level leadership positions in the indigenous peasant movement, served in another bureaucratic post, and worked for various national and international organizations.

For his parents' generation, Paulino explains, the educational achievement of their children was a primary concern. As Ticona Alejo (2010) notes, in post-1952 Bolivia, education promised incorporation into the national society, at least in theory. What they all wanted, Paulino notes, is for "the child to become good professionals." Like Mauricio's parents, Paulino's parents wanted a different life for him and his siblings, "a better future." He recalls, "they always told us, 'study!' Be something! If we can help you in some way, we will."

Growing up in post-revolutionary Bolivia, he completed primary school in a local public school in Yungas. At age 15, however, his parents made Paulino leave Yungas and relocate to the city of La Paz, so he could enroll in secondary school. His parents set him up in a rented room and left him some food supplies. Yet, in order to sustain himself through four years of high school and help his family back home, Paulino had to work during the day and attend school at night. In high school in La Paz, he showed a strong inclination for leadership, which he would continue to cultivate throughout his life. He was elected student president of his class and the school. During this time, Paulino also sought to reconnect with his home *ayllu* Jilatiti Chipanan by visiting the community during its festivities and social events.

In 1976, Paulino graduated high school and completed the compulsory military service. He then enrolled at Arrieta Higher Education Institute, pursuing a technical degree in

accounting. During this time, Paulino also helped with youth training in an Adventist Church. As sociologist Esteban Ticona Alejo (2000:62) documents in his book *Organización y Liderazgo Aymara*, “[Paulino] warmly remembers his teacher Samuel Coronel, a Katarista and Indianista adherent, who taught him to understand Bolivian reality, that is, that he was Aymara and to not let others walk all over him, all of which reaffirmed his cultural identity.” During this period, influenced by revolutionary communist thought, Paulino became a militant of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) party.

In fact, Paulino belongs to a younger generation of indigenous Bolivians that in the 1970s, influenced by Katarista and Indianista currents, variously reclaimed indigenous identity and political autonomy vis-à-vis the central state and traditional parties. Though he left Jilatiti as a young boy, he describes having always felt drawn to it and the highland. He explains,

I think that the place where one is born or the country where one has been born obviously sows one's identity, at least territorially, even more so in my case with the cultural identity of being Aymara, for example. [...] One's main identity is above other secondary identities. [...] That's why even though I left for Yungas at six years of age, I haven't lost the ability to speak Aymara, for example.

In his own words, Paulino believes that “one is marked by the place where one has been born.”

Thus, he identifies as both Bolivian and *Colla*, making reference to the Collasuyo region of the Inca empire.

Although his life history and trajectory are closely linked to his Aymara identity, it is evident that this strong sense of symbolic and social belonging was not inevitable. Growing increasingly aware and critical of ethnoracial exclusion in Bolivia, Paulino cultivated these ties through a series of calculated and serendipitous actions. He recalls, for example, that during the first event he attended in his home *ayllu*, a town festivity, people thought he was a tourist and even potentially thief, which led to his interrogation by community members. He was a

teenager living in La Paz and had traveled alone to the town he had left as a kid when his family relocated to Yungas. He recalls, however, “little by little they began to know me. I found out where the main meeting was and I went to introduce myself and I started to build links little by little.”

In 1982, Paulino completed his degree and passed his National Institute of Accounting (INCOS) license exams. Unable to find employment in the city, Paulino returned to Yungas in 1983 as a rural school teacher, teaching mathematics and social studies (Ticona Alejo 2000). In 1984, Paulino left once again for La Paz to work as an accountant with the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives (FENACOAB). His work entailed administration as well as outreach activities with the cooperatives. For Paulino, FENACOAB was a political school: “It was a very important school in my becoming a leader, as well as to know the peasant movement, to know the country and its different regions” (Ticona Alejo 2000:72). In other words, this work experience enabled Paulino to accumulate political capital in the indigenous movement.

During his tenure at FENACOAB, Paulino also had a transformative, if painful, experience that would shape his political trajectory and give a deeper meaning to his leadership and political involvement. He recalls during our interview,

It happened to me when I was working in the national federation of cooperatives. I was an accountant by training and one of the activities we carried out was providing training for cooperatives on administration. How to manage cash flows, ok? sales, calculate production costs, topics like that, and since I spoke Aymara, I felt capable that with that skill I could teach. Then, one day I arrived to one of the cooperatives in an Aymara community, like mine, ok? Everyone was sitting down. When I arrive, I hear them whispering to each other, ‘if he looks like us, how’s he going to teach us?’ So, one feels bad when you hear that not even your own people value you. It’s tough. It generated in me this [reaction], ok? that we must overcome this. That has driven me too. It has driven me to take leadership posts in my community until I reached CSUTCB with that desire to change people’s mentality.

While at FENACOAB in 1984, Paulino also participated in the 6<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) as the head delegate of the Agricultural Cooperatives. For Paulino, his

participation at the COB congress was a “like a school” that helped him understand the centrality of party politics to the labor and peasant unions (Paulino Guarachi in 1994, quoted in Ticona Alejo 2000:73). As he explained in our interview, Paulino’s link to the labor movement through COB, both as a representative of the cooperatives and later of the peasant unions, made him aware of the dominance of “laborism” in these spaces. The dominance of labor concerns came at the exclusion of indigenous identity politics. To make their identity claims permeate these spaces, he and other indigenous peasant leaders and party militants had to build political blocs through which to question indigenous marginalization in the labor movement. As he notes, “we met and we built the bloc to go to the COB congress and propose it to them and to question them why only the superiors can lead the COB and why not an Aymara.”

After roughly three years, Paulino grew tired of the increasingly monotonous nature of his deskwork at FENACOAB. He wanted to work directly with people, so in 1987 he ventured in a new direction, taking a research assistant position with the Center for Labor and Agriculture Development Studies (CEDLA). He notes that he abandoned his accounting career without knowing what research was: “I did not know how to conduct research. I did not understand a damn thing about how to carry out research.” At CEDLA, Paulino worked with founder and researcher Miguel Urioste, an economist and statesman. His job entailed conducting interviews and participant observations in rural peasant communities. He would transcribe and translate interviews and fieldnotes conducted in Aymara into Spanish. Today, he primarily works as a lead researcher in Fundación Tierra in La Paz. He has authored and co-authored many studies.

Since the second half of the 1980s, Paulino intensified his involvement with his community and his party – now the Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL), a predominantly white-*mestizo* splinter party of MIR. In 1987, he attained his first leadership post at the local-level, when he was elected Organization Secretary of the indigenous peasant unions of Ingavi Province (Ticona Alejo 2000). That same year, Paulino partook in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Congress of Peasant Unity a national-level CSUTCB congress, now combining his position as a peasant leader and MBL militant (Ticona Alejo 2000). In a 1988 CSUTCB Congress, Paulino was elected Press and Propaganda Secretary and, thus, becoming a member of CSUTCB’s executive committee.

In 1992, his turn arrived to become the appointed leader, or *Mallku*, of Santo Domingo de Machaca, which was his springboard into the national-level leadership of the indigenous peasant unions. He recalls,

In '92 they told me, ‘now you’ll be *Mallku*.’ Gee! There, it’s a whole ceremony to become *Mallku* and [it entails] a lot of dedication and resources. So, I worked part-time. I had to be there. But that enabled me to later become Executive Secretary of CSUTCB. As *Mallku*, I had to participate in all municipal and provincial events, so the province started to reckon that I could represent them, so I had the support of the entire province.

In 1992, at the 5<sup>th</sup> CSUTCB National Congress in Sucre, the MLB nominated Paulino for the position of Executive Secretary, the confederation’s top leadership post. He won the race with 55 percent of the vote, though his party militancy was a divisive factor (Ticona Alejo 2000). In 1993, MBL joined the governing coalition MNR-MRTKL of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, Bolivia’s first Aymara vice-president. This led many CSUTCB members to call Paulino the “*dirigente oficialista*,” or the government’s peasant-union leader, questioning his autonomy (Ticona Alejo 2000).

Paulino’s tenure as Executive Secretary of CSUTCB coincided with the remembrance of the 500 years since the Spanish conquest denominated “Meeting of two worlds,” which

indigenous peasant organizations organized to counter the official celebrations. Paulino attributes great significance to the debates around the *500 años* in shaping the future of the indigenous peasant movement in Bolivia.

In those events we debated what should be the political project of the peasant movement that the CSUTCB would generate. We also spoke of the Political Instrument because, since CSUTCB was a claims-making space, of fighting, it could organize road blockades, all that, but it did not have influence in the political field; that's why though we should begin building the Political Instrument, which we had named the Assembly of Nationalities. (Paulino Guarachi, quoted in Bustillos Zamorano 2014)

However, intense regional divisions within CSUTCB and around the organization of the *500 años* pitted Paulino against another popular peasant leader, Juan de la Cruz Villca (Ticona Alejo 2000). The division and conflict made internal governance difficult and, ultimately, led him to resign about sixteen months after taking office.

The political capital that Paulino gained through his combined involvement with the indigenous movement and the MBL party played a significant role in gaining access to the national bureaucracy. Following his tenure at CSUTCB, his involvement with the MBL continued to grow. As mentioned, now allied with Sánchez's MNR and Cárdenas's MRTKL, MBL was part of the governing coalition (1993-1997). In 1996, Paulino's party granted him a post in the administration, appointing him Undersecretary of Rural Development at the newly created National Secretariat of Popular Participation (SNPP), which was under the direction of Carlos Hugo Molina, one of the main architects of the Law of Popular Participation (LPP).

At SNPP, Paulino oversaw the Directorate of Planning and the Directorate for the Promotion of Production. He worked on the nation-wide implementation of popular participation and the design of municipal participatory planning, normatively and methodologically. A significant part of his job entailed assessing and addressing the various

issues and demands that emerged around the implementation of municipal participatory planning, as well as evaluating the quality of participatory processes. During his time there, he participated in the creation of various rural development programs that responded to local needs identified through participatory planning, including the national programs of irrigation, technical assistance, and food security, among others. He views SNPP as the most interesting bureaucratic job he had because he enjoyed the creative horizon that the implementation of a new program allowed. He recalls, “It was a whole platform for thinking. It entailed reflecting, thinking, daring, risking, ok? to tell the municipalities to do things. To give them the confidence to do them, not limit them.”

Paulino frames his motivation to enter the national public bureaucracy – “to hold public office and, on top of that, in a technical office” — in terms of his personal mission to fight racism, or “change people’s mentality.” For Paulino, fighting racism consisted primarily of demonstrating his competence. He notes,

At that time, [...] we had Víctor Hugo Cárdenas as vice president and indigenous participation in the past had been invisibilized, I mean, there was none, very few emerged like when Simón Yampara became minister of peasant affairs, but for a very short time, during the UDP [administration], and Mauricio Mamani was another minister, also in that period, after UDP, with MNR, right? who had Aymara roots and took that post. So, there were very few who were in those spaces and the challenge was to break that vacuum, to make indigenous participation visible, not only in between elections as electors but also holding public office. Personally, I accepted the invitation to hold this post zealous to visibilize it, to show that an Aymara face, an indigenous face can also do public administration. That [indigenous people] should not only be messengers or drivers, or have clerical jobs, but also carry out high-level office and this was what motivated some of us in that moment to take on these responsibilities. In my particular experience, years before, I had been elected Executive Secretary of CSUTCB. I was a visible figure, but peasant union leaders were seen as charlatans, as lacking the ability to manage. So, we had to break that. We had to break myths that indigenous people could not occupy those spaces but that those spaces were reserved for those with a university degree, so to say. So, I think it was a process of learning and also of showing that we could also do public administration.

The above reflection reveals that, while some indigenous men had managed to reach high-level posts, indigenous presence in the national public bureaucracy was minimal. Most importantly, it highlights, on the one hand, the racialized hierarchical structure of the bureaucracy, whereby

indigenous “faces” primarily occupied low-level menial or clerical occupations; on the other, an underlying ideology that disqualifies indigenous “faces” in public administration. In a slip of tongue, even Paulino uses “those with a university degree” to refer to white-*mestizo* bureaucrats. Later in the interview, he more explicitly states, “those posts were reserved for whites. You [indigenous person] couldn’t even think about it.”

Despite being heavily influenced by a counter-hegemonic Indianista and Katarista discourse of indigenous empowerment, Paulino narrates navigating and fighting racism in the national public bureaucracy through competency claims and performance, much like the successful black elites that Lamont and Fleming’s (2005) report on. He notes, “I was in a strictly technical space and I had to handle myself well, so I told myself, ‘I’ll show them.’ [...] We had to gain their trust first and then we could take control when the balance of force has changed.”

Upon probing him about what “gaining trust” meant, Paulino explained,

To gain their trust or to demonstrate that we could do public administration to indigenous people and to white people because they have always thought we couldn’t. [At SNPP] I negotiated various programs and projects that a technical team developed and I had to understand them and I had to present the entire proposal to the international cooperation and convince them, and if I hadn’t understood I wouldn’t have been able to convince them. So, of course, I had to be included in everything, even if I hadn’t written almost any of it. They wrote it and I had to read them, discuss them with people and later negotiate.

To gain the trust of his technical team, conformed primarily of white-*mestizos*, Paulino worked hard to demonstrate his competence. As undersecretary, he said to himself, “I have to study,” and enrolled in the law program at the main public university in La Paz. His boss, Tomasa Yarhui had a similar experience going through the state bureaucracy. As she noted in an interview with *La Razón*, “It’s not enough to be a union political woman. I felt I was missing something: a profession. Sometimes because I did not have a degree I was told I was nothing, even if I worked harder. So, I decided to study law” (Ariñez 2014).

It is noteworthy that Paulino's perceived distrust among his team was not theoretical. He recalls that when he arrived as undersecretary, "some functionaries quit because of that mentality, a mentality of 'how's it possible that an indian is going to manage here? I'll resign.' Three people left." He knows this because, he heard the office rumors about their leaving because they did not want "an indian commanding them." In addition, other functionaries feared losing their positions, expecting Paulino and the MBL to clean house and hire a new team. Instead, Mauricio sought to appease their concerns by reassuring them that their positions were safe and organizing social events that would help them know each other better. Paulino was undersecretary until the change in administration in 1997, when former military dictator Hugo Banzer became president.

Paulino recalls that at the time, indigenous peasant demands were intensifying and the movement strengthening. This threatened white-*mestizo* elites control of the central bureaucracy. He notes,

Now, what was my impression at that moment? We're speaking of 2002. A very strong demand for a Constitutional Assembly, ok? Two, the water war that had taken place in Cochabamba. Two road blockades that consolidated the indigenous movement, ok? So, among segments of the urban political class, they were seeking to put a brake to that and even to organize a coup d'état. They no longer thought that an election would give them [the government].

At the time, Felipe Quispe, an indianista Aymara leader and Executive Secretary of CSUTCB was at the forefront of these mobilizations. Peasant and indigenous unions elected him in light of the election of Hugo Banzer to the presidency in 1997 and his backlash against the decentralization reforms of the 1990s, which included resource cuts to SNPP. According to Paulino, Quispe's radical political stances worried the white-*mestizo* elite. Quispe was widely portrayed by the mainstream press as promoting a race war (Tórrez Rubín de Celis et al. 2010).

In 2001, Banzer, who was terminally ill with cancer, stepped down and was succeeded by Vice President Jorge Quiroga (2001-2002). While Banzer had adopted a combative stance toward the indigenous movement, Quiroga sought to appease it. Part of his strategy entailed the appointment of well-known indigenous peasant leaders to high-level bureaucratic posts. According to Paulino, this is how access to the bureaucracy often happened for indigenous leaders. He explains, “it happened because of fears, because those spaces were limited, they’d say, ‘enough! This one is being a pain in my ass, let’s appoint this person here.’”

When he took power, Quiroga appointed Tomasa Yarhui to lead the reestablished Ministry of Peasant and Indigenous Affairs. In 2002, Yarhui invited Paulino to join the Ministry as Viceminister of Peasant Affairs. At MBL, Tomasa Yarhui and Paulino had been, as he describes it, “like the peasant indigenous representatives, let’s say.” Yarhui (Quechua) and her viceministers Paulino Guarachi (Aymara) and Guido Chumirai (Guaraní) took office in a context of political instability and uncertainty. They understood their mission to be that of defending democracy and articulating the indigenous movement and the white-*mestizo* political elites.

Paulino recalls,

You also heard calls from both sides for civil war. So, you said, damn! What do you do in that context? Do you believe in democracy? Are you with one or the other front because that’s the kind of backdrop you had. So, before taking our posts, we spoke with Tomasa about those issues and we said, ‘look, we have to bet on putting the country on the road of democratic processes, ok? We have to convince those who do not want to understand indigenous peasant empowerment as a reality, right? and [convince them] to accept the democratic process, [indigenous people’s] political participation.

He describes their role in the executive “almost like the Church,” referring to the mediating role the Catholic Church has often played in the country in moments of labor conflict. With Tomasa Yarhui’s team, the Executive became a mediator between the indigenous peasant movement

and the party system, organizing meetings between the movement and the political elite and translating indigenous demands for the political elite.

This was not the first time Paulino played this role as educator to white-*mestizo* political elites and mediator between them and the indigenous movement. He had done so as an active militant and “indigenous representative” of his MLB party. He recalls,

The helm, the party’s center, was in the hands of white people, but indigenous empowerment also enabled incorporation [of indigenous peoples]. That’s another shortcoming of the political participation issue. One thing is to be a filler, to participate passively, and have a post in a national directorate. Another thing is to have your own opinion and debate opinions on equal ground. This has also been part of the MBL’s structure; to educate. I often organized and held these conversations, reflecting together, so that we could overcome that, so that they could learn to listen. White people, some white politicians listened, learned to listen and tried to understand what indigenous peoples think. We always invited people like Víctor Hugo [Cárdenas], Xavier Albó, or Silvia Rivera, for this type of reflections, so that they, who were highly educated, could help them understand.

It is his impression that it is this type of workshops that helped his party have a close relationship with and influence on many social organizations of the indigenous peasant movement. Yet, it is noteworthy that even in these workshops and discussions, the personal experiences and thought of indigenous leaders on their own were not compelling, convincing, or legitimate. The promotion of understanding of indigenous empowerment and tolerance for the participation of indigenous people in the country required legitimate intellectuals, namely those holding the appropriate institutionalized credentials, to act as interlocutors.

As viceminister, Paulino felt that the need to generate or gain trust was extended beyond his particular bureaucratic office and team, as his work now required collaborating and with other state ministries. He recalls being perceived and often feeling out of place,

PG: We had to connect with the rest of public administration. That’s another space, ok? of meeting people, of garnering trust. Because when they see you, they look at you as if you were from another planet. Where did this man come from? How capable is he?

MB: Given what you were telling me, I suppose that as an indigenous person in a powerful post they tested you even more.

PG: Much more! (*Paulino laughs*) Often, I didn't notice. Later I began receiving invitations to attend cocktails at the embassies and I seldom attended because you had to wear a certain formal way and you don't always feel comfortable. Later, I understood that it was necessary because ambassadors invite you, people invited you that wanted to share with you. One sometimes doesn't go because of a certain fear, but then you understand it is necessary.

Like Mauricio, Paulino is also clear that change of clothing – shedding the markers of indigeneity – was a crucial strategy to access bureaucratic office. For these pioneers, conforming to the fashion notions of the urban white-*mestizo* professionals was necessary. He explains, “Everyone who came here from the countryside, changed their clothing and that’s how they secured [access].” Yet, as the anecdote above reveals, this transformation of the embodied was not easy, “you don’t always feel comfortable” dressed in other types of clothing.

Paulino’s experiences with foreign professionals and diplomats also highlighted the differentiated treatment that indigenous pioneers faced by white Bolivians. He notes,

When I held these posts, I think we can see a difference, one, with foreigners in the embassies, who come quickly to greet you. When they don't know you, they at least ask you what you need. So, you introduce yourself. You say, I am so and so and of course they tend to you. Instead, white Bolivians don't even greet you, don't even ask you. So, you often spend time in front of them in anonymity and you have to find a way to introduce yourself and it is really uncomfortable to say I'm so and so and I have such post, especially in social gatherings. As they get to know you, things change, but when they don't, it shocks you.

This sense of being invisible or, at the very least, being held suspect is a common one among indigenous pioneers. Their bodies did not fit dominant notions of the ideal bureaucrat in organizational spaces where indigenous entrants occupied the bottom echelons.

Like Mauricio, Paulino takes great pride on having been one of the few indigenous Bolivians in the national bureaucracy in the 1990s and early 2000s. He attributes his trajectory into the bureaucracy not to his academic credentials but to his militancy of the indigenous peasant movement and a political party. He notes,

These [high-level] spaces, like minister or viceminister, are filled entirely on the basis of a political decision. It's not because of competence. I mean, I wouldn't have got the job through a competitive application process because I

wasn't an academic, I didn't have a master's degree, I didn't have a PhD, I hadn't held a similar position elsewhere. They always ask that in your resume. But, it was a space of political decision and my party was part of the government. [...] My party trusted in me. Of course, I was representing not only my [peasant indigenous] sector but also a political party who controlled that space. That's how it happened. That's how I accessed. Now, the second time I no longer accessed because of the negotiations of a political party but directly through an invitation from the minister, because of trust, because of other merits.

In fact, in Paulino's own understanding of his trajectory, his involvement with indigenous-peasant and labor congresses and events "are the main university of [movement] leaders."

Influenced by an emerging decolonization discourse, Paulino frames his trajectory within and outside the state bureaucracy in terms of a struggle against the exclusion of indigenous Bolivians from spaces of power and the racist ideologies that sustain white monopoly of the state apparatus. At the same time, Paulino rejected what he saw as two types of exclusionary proposals from more radical Indianista Katarista intellectuals and leaders. On the one hand, he rejected the separation of structural and cultural struggle around which Indianista Katarista factions formed. On the other, he also believed in indigenous autonomous participation in the state without excluding *q'haras*, or whites.

In entering the national bureaucracy, Paulino saw an opportunity to challenge those "myths," as he calls them, that devalue indigenous people. He thus views himself as part of a historical moment in which indigenous subjectivity changed. He notes,

We can no longer expect that what used to happen in the '80s could happen now in the 2000s. The '90s and the first decade of the 2000 have been key to make that change of valuing your own people and the election of Morales was in great part due to that of believing in your own people because that used to be impossible. Those positions were reserved for whites. I think these ruptures have continued and, in that sense, you have to recognize Victor Hugo's important footprint, and that of those of us who have also participated. All that made possible an empowerment, a reaffirmation of people's identity that led them to vote for one who looks like them.

As in Mauricio's case, however, Paulino's tenure as viceminister was short-lived, lasting no more than six months, the last stretch of the Quiroga administration and its governing coalition. Following his tenure as viceminister, Paulino worked as a project coordinator for a

rural development project in the Bolivian highland financed by Denmark. He also took on other consulting short-term projects. Since 2003, he has been working as a researcher for Fundación Tierra, a non-governmental organization whose focus is on sustainable rural development for indigenous peasant populations. He is still actively involved with his community and his region's indigenous peasant unions. In 2011, he run unsuccessfully for legislative office with the Movimiento Sin Miedo (MSM) party.

## **Conclusion**

The contrast of their trajectories and experiences shows that, despite their different trajectories into the bureaucracy and understandings of race and modernity, Mauricio and Paulino ultimately navigated race and racism in the bureaucracy similarly by demonstrating their professional competence and conforming to its Hispanicized monocultural norms.

Mauricio aligned with the modernization and *mestizaje* discourse of the Revolution of 1952 and found his way into the bureaucracy through his prestigious educational credentials and his status as an agricultural expert and scholar. In turn, Paulino, younger than Mauricio, embraced the emerging Indianista Katarista discourse that reclaimed indigenous identity and autonomy, articulating an internal colonialism critique, and found his way into the bureaucracy primarily through the accumulation of political capital in the indigenous movement and political party. Yet, both Mauricio and Paulino navigated the bureaucracy by emphasizing their competence and often pleading with white-*mestizo* state elites to see beyond their stigmatized identities.

The similarities and differences in Mauricio's' and Paulino's trajectories and experiences also provide a test of this dissertation's broader argument. On the one hand, through the case

of Mauricio, it asserts the racialization of bureaucratic notions of worth. Despite his accumulated political capital and institutionalized form of cultural capital, namely his academic credentials, Mauricio adhered to the codes of behavior of a Hispanicized monocultural space only to find himself repeatedly held suspect. On the other, through Paulino's trajectory, I show that individual adherence to a decolonization discourse alone does not significantly alter the strategies through which indigenous entrants navigate race within the bureaucracy. It is only when the decolonization discourse moves from the margins to the center of the state, i.e. it becomes a state-sanctioned project, that new boundary work resources become available to indigenous entrants, even at the highest levels of the bureaucracy.

## CHAPTER 5

### The Old Guard, the Ideal Bureaucrat, and the Disruption of Social Paradise

#### Introduction

Yesterday, with the help of a librarian in the Diplomatic Academy, I was able to get my hands on a copy of a special issue of the *Revista de la Academia Diplomática Boliviana*, the academy's flagship journal. It was published in 2004 to commemorate the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the academy. It includes the speeches delivered by the then President, the Minister, and the Academy Director during a commemorative ceremony held in April 2004. It also contains a history of the Bolivian Diplomatic Academy, articles written by members of each of eleven graduating classes, lists of graduates and courses, and many photographs. I couldn't believe this bit of fieldwork serendipity.

Last night, after work, I sat down at my desk and began to peruse the 12 pages listing all the graduates of the diplomatic academy as well as a handful of diplomats who had graduated in foreign diplomatic academies with the support of scholarships from the ministry. I did not recognize many of the names, but I knew some of the graduates listed because I am working with them or have heard about them in conversations with some of the career diplomats and the administrative staff. I looked through the photographs, printed in black-and-white, trying to identify some of my current colleagues at *Cancillería*. I found some but was unable to identify many. This morning I decided to bring the journal to work and show it to my career diplomat workmates. I had hoped to learn who was who and where they were now, to whatever extent possible. I was enthused by the issue's contents as a data source.

I approached Clara with the journal opened to her class photograph. I had found her name and class photo last night. Her face showed a big grin as she stared at it. "We were the class of the legs," she said chuckling and pointing at the class photo. All the women were sitting in the front row wearing very short formal skirts, which revealed a lot of leg. The men stood behind them wearing suits. She started reading through the names of her and other graduating classes, smiling, sighing, and chuckling as she called out names and recognized faces in amazement and evident nostalgia. Two of the administrative staff in the office had been employed in *Cancillería* just as long as Clara. Curious of what was happening, they approached Clara's desk, immediately joining in the collective reminiscence spectacle that was unfolding. "Remember him?" "Oh! Look here is so and so," the names came flowing too fast for me to keep up as their eyes jump from face to face and page to page. "Oh! Here's Pedro!" I recognized Pedro. We've been working together for the past several months as well, though he has been in *Cancillería* for over two decades. They all laugh at his youthfulness and trendy mustache. Clara picks up the phone as one of the clerks temporarily takes over the journal. "Fernando," she calls out, "you've got to come see this." Almost immediately the office door opens, Fernando walks in, and joins the scene. It doesn't take long before they've found Fernando's class photo. He was a man at least twenty years younger than. Much like Clara and the clerks, Fernando begins to reminisce about the faces and names he finds. "She's posted in such place." "Man, I wonder what became of that guy." I don't dare to interrupt. I have become but a spectator of the moment Clara, Fernando, and the two clerks were sharing.

Perhaps I shouldn't have been surprised at their emotional and nostalgic reactions to the publication. But I was. I had approached the list of names and the class photographs as a mere

list of *Cancillería* employees and aspiring diplomats. To me, it was a source of quantitative data. To my career diplomat workmates this was a family album. It elicited memories of classmates and coworkers who over the years, if not decades, had become friends and mentors. In the promise of careerism, most of them had expected to spend the rest of their professional diplomatic lives walking through the halls and offices of *Cancillería*. The spectacle I saw unfold before my eyes was a manifestation of the *esprit de corps* that the senior old guard had cultivated; a body that, in their eyes, the new government had figuratively and literally dismembered and disfigured.

*Fieldnote excerpt from July 8<sup>th</sup>, 2014*

\*\*\*

For sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, *esprit de corps* is founded on an “enchanted adherence to the values and to the value of the group” (Bourdieu 1998b:183). In elite institutions, such as the *Grandes Écoles* that Bourdieu studied in *The State Nobility*, the group and its *esprit de corps* is constituted around a “modal habitus [...] with the enchanted experience of a *social paradise*,” the loss of which manifests in nostalgia for a space “perfectly suited to their dispositions” (Bourdieu 1998b:182 emphasis added). This chapter examines how members of the old diplomatic guard in *Cancillería* defined the ideal bureaucrat and, thus, drew the boundary between the worthy and the unworthy over the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and in the context of state decolonization.

This chapter has three objectives. First, it examines the symbolic boundaries through which old guard diplomats define their group and distinguish it from others, particularly new indigenous entrants and their allies. In doing so, it identifies the criteria by which these actors

judge their worth and those of others as diplomats in a particular institutional space, such as *Cancillería*. Second, the chapter traces the formation of the old guard's *esprit de corps* and notions of the ideal bureaucrat in order to uncover the "modal habitus" on which this social paradise was founded. That is, it interrogates whose "own culture and image" defines this classification system, product of symbolic struggles to shape the markers of suitability and the criteria for membership. Lastly, the chapter analyzes how old guard diplomats respond to the hegemonic rise of the decolonization project. How do they respond to the new guard's claim to governing the Bolivian diplomatic field?

I find that the old diplomatic guard viewed the arrival of Morales and the MAS party to power as a threat to their notions of the ideal diplomat and a modern Foreign Ministry. Senior and junior members of the old guard shared into a common vision of diplomacy as a hyperspecialized profession. In their view, in a modern state, diplomacy is (1) reserved for those with the necessary formal training and a general disposition for diplomatic practice, and (2) oriented to the national interest rather than to any particular political ideology. Career diplomats, thus, understand their organization as an archetypal Weberian bureaucracy, and themselves as its specialized, career-oriented, and apolitical staff. In short, they conceive themselves and their organization as the embodiment of Weber's principle of rational modern bureaucracy: *sine ira ac studio*, 'without anger or bias.' I am not claiming here that the Bolivian Foreign Ministry is the embodiment of a Weberian rational bureaucracy, although in the 1990s the Ministry was considered a model of the professional civil service career state elites advanced in the broader national bureaucracy that same decade.

This Weberian understanding of bureaucracy and the old guard's *esprit de corps* was strongly shaped by efforts in the 1980s and 1990s to professionalize the Ministry. Those who led the effort, primarily white-mestizo men from political elite families, wanted a Ministry better suited to respond to the demands of a modern and globalizing world. Their efforts had led to what they view as a modern Foreign Service law, comparable to those of respected neighboring countries, which established a diplomatic career system and created a Diplomatic Academy as a recruitment and access mechanism. In doing so, the senior old guard built a dominant notion of the ideal bureaucrat around a gendered and racialized class habitus. That is, old-guard notions of the ideal bureaucrat carry the gender and racialized class imprint of its original advocates, primarily white-*mestizo* men from elite families.

The analysis, however, reveals that the old guard's defense of their criteria of worth is embedded on dominant narratives of race and modernity, which I discussed in Chapter 2. They discount the worth of indigenous prospects and worldviews, while also erasing the racialized class trajectories on which their 'Weberian' understandings of the ideal bureaucrat are embedded. That is, the old guard's classification system, distinguishing the worthy from the unworthy, not only map the worthy onto the 'modal habitus' of a senior old guard but also map the unworthy onto indigenous entrants. That is, in drawing the boundary between the worthy and the unworthy in response to the decolonization discourse, the old guard also brighten the boundary between bureaucracy and indigeneity.

The chapter follows in five sections. The first shows that old guard diplomats perceived decolonization and the entrance of the new guard as a threat to their notions of the ideal bureaucrat. The second section focuses on the diplomatic professionalization project and the

construction of an old-guard *esprit de corps*. Next, the analysis identifies the components of the old guard's dominant notion of the ideal diplomat. In the fourth section, I describe the valued trajectories of the senior old guard, highlighting the gendered and racialized class imprint of dominant notions of the ideal diplomat. Lastly, the analysis examines how the old guard responded to the new guard's claim to the governance of the diplomatic field, drawing on circulating discourses of race and modernity to discount the worth of indigenous new entrants.

### **The Decolonization Threat**

In Chapter 2, I showed that the Morales administration asserted the need to radically transform the Ministry and diplomatic practice, which would play a central role in the double-decolonization process. It viewed members of the diplomatic corps as internationally oriented elites all too eager to put international interests before those of the nation. It also portrayed *Cancillería* as a significant symbol of white-mestizo power, partly due to the Ministry's high position in the executive structure. However, efforts to transform the ministry and its ethnoracial boundaries did not unfold on a clean slate. The new guard encountered a ministry still largely in control of white-*mestizo* career diplomats. The entrance of the new administration and its new guard threatened their collective identity and the notions of the ideal diplomat on which it rested.

Early on, the old-guard leadership urged the administration to safeguard the professional and modern service they had built. The leading editorial in *La Razón*, a major national circulation newspaper with a conservative tint, that appeared four days after President Morales's first inauguration in 2006 encapsulates such calls from the old state elites:

These circumstances force the Foreign Ministry to act skillfully, combining the already existing experience in the country's Foreign Service with the innovative ideas of the new administration. At this juncture there is no room for ideological fundamentalisms, rather there must be a total openness with the currents that travel the modern world, such as competence, knowledge, and the mastering of foreign languages. (La Razón 2006e)

Similarly, within a week of Morales's inauguration, noting the expectations that the his election generated worldwide, Manfredo Kempff, a retired career diplomat, former interim Foreign Minister, and regular newspaper columnist wrote,

In the Cabinet, everything is worrisome, although surely things will be gradually fine-tuned until they are at their best. [...] Some ministers have experiences in their areas of work, but many have surprised us because they don't have the slightest idea about their portfolios. The Foreign Minister, who made all his colleagues raise their arms and shout *jallalla!* during his oath ceremony. [...] But, when someone asks him about international affairs, he disappears. This can be solved with good advisors, whom he will find in the Ministry. (Kempff Suárez 2006a)

In his columns, Kempff emphasizes the claim that diplomacy in the modern world is hyperspecialized practice. In early February, Manfredo urged the new administration to not "leave [the Ministry] dismantled or at the mercy of empirics and rookies," which would be a "brute institutional coup" (Kempff Suárez 2006b). He adds, "diplomats cannot be improvised overnight" (2006b). In his view, technical knowledge, and not ideology, is the key to a *modern* ministry. His words and those of the above editorial suggest that the administration's leadership and ideas, perhaps including a proposal that public servants speak an indigenous language, are at odds with the demands of modern foreign relations, if not modernity itself.

Of course, while Manfredo's regular column made him a visible commentator, he was not the only one. In fact, dozens of Op-Eds and columns were published by other diplomats, public figures, and political analysts calling the government to protect the service and surround itself with qualified professionals. Career diplomat Carlos Trigo Gandarillas wrote, "The importance of President Evo Morales Ayma personal efforts during his trip to Chile is recognizable, but he must have the support and execution of a Professional Foreign Ministry..."

(Trigo Gandarillas 2006). A sub-editorial of *La Razón* in July of 2006 similarly noted, “Bolivia needs a diplomacy that is professional, intelligent, friendly, universal, open to all countries [...]. It is that exactly that *Cancillería* is there for, to fill the Foreign Service structure with the best people for the strategic purposes of the country in the rest of the world” (La Razón 2006f).

According to several career diplomats, many career diplomats left the service of their own accord early on and over the years because they found their politics irreconcilable with that of the government (interviews with the author). For example, one diplomat notes,

During this time the law was neglected, which discouraged functionaries and many left the service. In reality, today there must be but 15 percent of the functionaries from the time we’re talking about. A capital has been lost, a fundamental human resource that was very well trained because all of these functionaries were already above the rank of first secretary with postings abroad. They already had experience abroad. It was an investment of the state. [...] Sadly, ideological politics of a different nature have not permitted to keep that human resource and almost all of them left. All of them are working outside, in other activities, abroad. At any rate, the objective that we had worked on for over 20 years was damaged. (Interview with the author)

While a significant number of old guard diplomats left for a variety of reasons, including being pushed out, it is noteworthy that that the “political differences” observed by old-guard diplomats betray the asserted apolitical stance of the ‘Weberian’ ideal bureaucrat, which I discuss later in the chapter.

Where did this unison narrative of diplomacy as a hyperspecialized profession, reserved for those with the necessary formal training and a general disposition for diplomatic practice, come from? To understand the threat decolonization posed to the old guard, it is necessary to situate it in the context of the organizational project that immediately preceded the arrival of MAS to government. The 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s were marked by the advancement of a diplomatic professionalization and institutionalization project, which essentially sought to establish a legally backed diplomatic career. This project itself was framed around discourses of

“the national interest,” “state modernization” and developmental “maturity,” the elusive objectives of the 20<sup>th</sup> century modernizing elites. The following section traces the professionalization project and the making of a diplomatic guard joined by a common understanding of diplomacy and diplomatic worth.

### **The Professionalization Project and the Making of the Old Guard**

The old guard is composed of two generations: senior and junior diplomats. Senior diplomats accessed the ministry, for the most part, after the 1960s. Junior diplomats, in turn, accessed the ministry primarily through the diplomatic academy amidst the professionalization push of the late 1980s. Shortly before the Morales administration, senior diplomats filled most of the executive and upper-level diplomatic posts in the Central and Foreign Service, supervising the work of junior functionaries. Senior diplomats also taught the most specialized courses in the Diplomatic Academy. It is not surprising that old-guard interviewees often describe the relationship between the senior and junior old guards as one of apprenticeship and mentorship.

At the time of their entrance to the ministry, the senior old guard represented a new profile of *Cancillería* employees. Their entrance coincided with three broader trends that were reshaping the central bureaucracy in Bolivia after the Revolution of 1952. First, the country saw a growing number of university-educated professionals enter the labor force. Second, partly advanced through U.S. cooperation, the MNR government promoted an initiative to modernize the Bolivian state bureaucracy, which in practice entailed learning best practices for civil service and service provision from the North, particularly the United States. The so-called modernization of the state bureaucracy sought to promote effective service delivery in order to

promote high government approval and, thus, keep the Bolivian far left at bay. The third trend was the overall growth of public employment, including state-directed enterprises and public administration. In *Cancillería*, employment grew in part due to the increasing importance of multilateral diplomacy and economic integration initiatives in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century; as many career diplomats noted, diplomacy became “more complex.” Between 1930 and 1965, the *Cancillería*’s Central Service and Foreign Service grew from less than twenty functionaries to roughly 60 functionaries. That number more than doubled by the following decade, surpassed 200 by the 1980s, and reached over 300 in the 1990s.

Following the Revolution of 1952, the MNR reorganized the ministry and its personnel. Specifically, it fired *Cancillería* functionaries that had composed the Diplomatic Service during the first half of the 1900s. Instead, according to career diplomats Jorge Gumucio Granier and Gustavo Aliaga in *The Republic’s Chancellery*, following the Revolution of 1952, “the demands and needs of the revolutionary diplomacy were fulfilled by men of the revolution, although many of them did not have the training or capacity that the situation required. However, early on, the zealotness and their felt sense of responsibility for the success of the revolutionary transformations seemed to justify this” (Gumucio Granier and Aliaga Palma 2005:67). They further note that, at the time, “The learned public opinion viewed it as a top priority to have professional diplomats, who should have an adequate formation for the appropriate performance of their duties” (Gumucio Granier and Aliaga Palma 2005:68).

In 1954, partly driven by some members of the party’s intelligentsia, the MNR instituted a new diplomatic statute, which defined *Cancillería*’s structure and responsibilities, created a diplomatic institute for the training of diplomatic functionaries, which began to operate in

1956, and loosely established a diplomatic career. At the same time, the MNR leadership implemented the new statute softly. For example, after 1959, the diplomatic institute ceased to operate until the mid-1970s. Similarly, as several senior diplomats noted, parties or the ruling coalition primarily determined admissions and promotions in turn.

The senior old guard trained and accessed the ministry under the direction of such “nationalist functionaries,” without much experience in diplomacy (Gumucio Granier and Aliaga Palma 2005:69). Rather than men with formal training in international relations or law, most of their predecessors and many of their contemporary joined the ministry’s ranks through party merits. As a senior old guard diplomat noted, at the time, “we had functionaries that had been there 15, 20, 25 years and did not have diplomas. They did not have any training anchored in international relations theory. Rather they had learned through practice.” Instead, members of the senior old guard were not only enrolled in university or had already secured bachelors’ degrees but also were formally trained internationalists, some having taken courses during the few years the diplomatic institute operated. Thus, an important difference between what I call the senior old guard and their non-career contemporaries and predecessors was their academic credentials and professional identities.

The primary cleavage lied in their identities within the ministry. The senior old guard viewed their former bosses and many of their contemporaries primarily as ‘*políticos*.’ In other words, they understood their former bosses’ trajectories into and within the ministry as the result of their party militancy, particularly in the MNR and its splinter parties, and their political aspirations. They rotated in and out of *Cancillería* as their political parties secured posts in Congress and built coalitions with those who controlled the state bureaucracy, whether other

parties or army coalitions, periodically benefiting from political spoils. Members of the senior old guard, in turn, viewed themselves primarily as professional diplomats. They did have political party affiliations, though in their eyes their loyalty was primarily to the institution.

The senior old guard resented the system of political booty. They particularly disliked what they perceived to be arbitrary mechanisms of hiring and promotion by which inexperienced but politically connected individuals would access the ministry at high ranks or experience bigger and more regular promotions than those who had diplomatic expertise. Similarly, their own promotions would occur in a relatively arbitrary fashion in which their performance was not always the primary criteria and which party bosses seeking to fill particular posts with party militants could veto. Although party militancy was not always a condition for their access or job security, allegiance or at least not opposition to the ruling coalition in turn was necessary. They thus also resented periodically finding themselves outside *Cancillería* when political conditions changed.

Their identities as professionals were also reinforced by their mode of access to the ministry. At the time, new hires accessed through direct (political) invitations or entrance examinations that tested skills in writing, foreign languages, and foreign relations. Most members of the senior old guard followed the entrance examination route. For example, a senior old guard diplomat noted that he took his entrance examination with eight other candidates, but only two of them were hired a couple of months later. He had language skills that helped with the exam, which partly consisted of translating diplomatic documents. Another career diplomat recalled taking the examination after having completed his degree in

international relations in Europe, and a month later being invited to an in-person interview during which he was “grilled.” He eventually was called to fill a job opening.

However, while entrance examinations were, in theory, open, vacancies were seldom publicized. Instead, recruitment took place through social networks. As I discuss in more detail in the following section, *Cancillería* entrants before the 1990s belonged to the national new and old white political elite. During my research, I met and learned of dozens of career diplomats who were the children or grandchildren of high-ranking army officers, diplomats, elected officials, industrialists, state ministers, and renowned intellectuals. Alberto, a younger senior old guard diplomat, explained to me that *Cancillería* not only had *roscas políticas*, or cronyism, but also “a strong oligarchic tendency, built around families. It was a family-based nucleus.” He further noted, “it was a bit elitist, so the children of politicians were there, beyond whether you stood behind the regime in turn or not, but [because of family] you had preferential treatment.” Their family’s political pedigree often vouched for their political stances, which were predominantly nationalist or conservative.

By the 1970s, members of this new generation of professional diplomats, who today comprise the senior old guard, had variously managed to rise through the ranks of the ministry. They then began to push for a law that would reorganize and regulate the Bolivian diplomatic service, in both its Central and Foreign Service branches. Their primary objective was to isolate *Cancillería* from party politics and patronage, and institute of a career system with a clear institutional hierarchy, predictable promotions, and job security, filled by professional diplomats. They understood this step as imperative in advancing and protecting the “national interest,” as they call it, in international matters. Their objective was to rid the service of what

they understood as its main malady, namely improvisation. Based on interviews and informal conversations, it is also evident that the prestige of Bolivian diplomatic practice depended on the institutionalization of the diplomatic career. While the institutionalization of the diplomatic career in Bolivia had yet to get off the ground, these younger diplomats aspired to follow the path of some of Bolivia's neighbors and their modern career systems and diplomatic academies. At the same time, their consecration as professional diplomats also would reinforce their acceptance into international diplomatic circles. Yet, the push for the law was unsuccessful because political parties and ruling coalitions had no incentive to give up their discretion over *Cancillería* jobs and diplomatic appointments.

In addition to advocating for a new Law of Foreign Relations, the senior old guard's efforts toward the professionalization of the ministry included, for example, the reactivation of the diplomatic institute in 1974. The creation of the Antonio Quijarro Diplomatic Institute in 1974 was a first step toward the creation of a diplomatic academy as a permanent feature of the ministry. The institute, however, served primarily as a professional development office for those already working in the ministry rather than a gatekeeping mechanism. Its first program served sixty *Cancillería* employees (Gumucio Granier and Aliaga Palma 2005). The following year, the institute became the Antonio Quijarro Diplomatic Academy.

In this context, the new academy played an important role in generating internal widespread support for a Foreign Relations Law. It served as a mechanism that would enable "empirics" to join the professional diplomatic service and safeguard their jobs. Only in the 1980s the academy was opened to outside applicants. *Cancillería* functionaries were in a

privileged employment position, however, as outsiders were not guaranteed access to the ministry. Without a law, the Academy's role in *Cancillería* was ambiguous.

It was only in the mid-1980s that members of the senior old guard advocating for the professionalization and institutionalization of foreign relations employment found allies in Congress. In 1985, Bolivia's government addressed a deep economic crisis through the implementation of a structural adjustment program and significant state reforms. It was during this time that "state modernization" proposals took center stage in political debates. As a result, the so-called *cuoteo político*, or political patronage, came under scrutiny and critique among the electorate but also, and perhaps most importantly, among international agencies that provided Bolivia with significant amounts of financial funds in the form of loans and aid. It is also likely that demands for the institutionalization of the service fell on more friendly ears because political parties themselves were undergoing generational changes in which a younger generation of technocrats began to fill party leadership posts and elected office.

In 1985, "the Undersecretary General of *Cancillería*, Valentín Abecia Baldivieso, began to prepare a set of legal norms that would allow the modernization of the ministry's activities" (Gumucio Granier and Aliaga Palma 2005:80). By 1988, the ministry had finished developing a Foreign Relations bill. A key ally in the development and promotion of a Foreign Service Law Bill was the politician Mario Rolón Anaya from Cochabamba. As a senior old guard functionary described him, he was "an extraordinary representative, very respected because he was an influential intellectual, with a solid education, a great orator." Born in 1927, Rolón had studied Law at the public university in Cochabamba. Throughout his trajectory, he had worked in the Cochabamba District Court, directed a national newspaper, and taught Law, while also actively

participating in political life. Through his political career, Rolón had been elected senator and led various state ministries, including *Cancillería* (in 1981). He had also been appointed to represent Bolivia at the level of Ambassador in many of its legations, including Bolivia's Permanent Mission to United Nations and the Organization of American States (Vargas Aguirre and Montecinos Luque 2004).

During his time as a diplomat, according to an interviewee, Rolón developed an understanding for the complexities of diplomacy and the need for developing professional diplomatic cadres, presumably having witnessed firsthand the costs of "improvisation." As a result, while in Congress, Rolón helped develop the Foreign Relations Service bill. In this task, he hired a professional diplomat as a consultant tasked with reviewing other country's Foreign Service Laws, such as those of Peru and Brazil, whose Foreign Services were widely respected. In 1988, Rolón "presented to the upper chamber a bill for the 'Law of Foreign Relations' that reflected the interests of *Cancillería* and gathered the concerns of Senator Rolón and other distinguished people linked to the diplomatic practice" (Gumucio Granier and Aliaga Palma 2005:80). Yet, according to interviews, convincing members of Congress to support the law involved not only lobbying but also thorough demonstrations of what diplomatic negotiations looked like. These sought to illustrate the hyperspecialized nature of diplomacy and challenge the widely held belief that diplomatic service was about living a high and comfortable life.

Their efforts finally succeeded at the beginning of the 1990s. In February of 1993, President Jaime Paz Zamora of MIR signed the bill into law, "Law of the Foreign Relations Service," instituting a diplomatic career ladder and a diplomatic academy. Its first article read,

The Foreign Relations Service is the instrument in charge of the execution of the Foreign Policy of the Bolivian state; composed by functionaries, professionally trained, as members of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Cult in the country and abroad and organized in the diplomatic structure that this law and its regulations guarantees.

With the backing of the law, the Diplomatic Academy obtained formal credentialing through an affiliation with the Pontifical Catholic University of La Paz, Bolivia. Continuing what they had done since the 1970s, the senior old guard gave the old “empirics” a chance to train in the academy and become formally incorporated into the diplomatic career. Similarly, younger professionals who had accessed the ministry but did not have degrees specifically in foreign relations also went through an academy’s special program, designed to be compatible with their work schedules. For example, Alberto accessed the ministry as a university student in the 1980s through political connections, without going through the academy. In the mid-1990s, he enrolled and completed the Diplomatic Academy program, which as he describes it, “allowed me to regularize my presence.”

The old guard had successfully cultivated a strong *esprit de corps* around a career-diplomat collective identity, based on educational and professional merit, legal-rational authority suited for a modern society, and the national interest. The result was, as a participant in this process described it, that “we built a very united body, full of solidarity, compact, in the entire foreign relations service. They now felt protected with the same rights by law.” The promotion and high-level appointment of professional diplomats thus symbolized their victory in an effort to impose their principles of vision and division (cf. Bourdieu 1989) within *Cancillería*. As former Foreign Minister Agustin Saavedra observed on the occasion of the appointment of a career diplomat as Ambassador to Uruguay, “all of us who belong to the

diplomatic career feel at the same time proud that such a worthy and experienced professional of the Ministry was taken into account for such a high rank” (Saavedra Weise 2003).

This professional diplomat identity secured loyalty to the diplomatic career and *Cancillería* above all other sympathies. When I asked him whether anybody had opposed the professionalization agenda within the ministry, a senior old guard diplomat noted,

No, there were no dissidence problems because even if there were parties within the ministry, [people] who belonged to different political parties with different ideologies, some of those parties were even in the opposition, but for [functionaries] their loyalty to the service was first [...] The truth is we didn’t have big problems, everyone self-identified with the Ministry [...] In addition, we weren’t many, we all knew each other, we had already been there for years.

Manfredo Kempff, a career diplomat and former interim Foreign Minister, described the professionalization period as a time “when love for the [diplomatic] career was absolute and the defense of the institution was sacred” (Kempff Suárez 2006d). Effectively, the law consecrated the old guard, senior and junior, and facilitated the formation of an *esprit de corps* around their criteria of worth underlying their notions of the ‘ideal diplomat.’ Moreover, they understood themselves not only as essentially different than the rest of the bureaucracy but as an elite corps of experts representing and advancing the interests of the “nation.”

The senior old guard inculcated this *esprit de corps* and the notions of the ‘ideal diplomat’ underlying it in the junior old guard through training in the Diplomatic Academy and work in the bureaucracy. At the time the leadership was committed to filling *Cancillería* and its Foreign Service with graduates of the Academy or others with comparable training in international relations. Unlike their mentors, the old guard’s junior members entered the ministry amidst the professionalization push in the mid-1980s but primarily after the approval of Law 1444. Cohort sizes at the Diplomatic Academy grew significantly from less than 10

students in the four cohorts between 1975 and 1985 to an average of 23 students in the seven cohorts between 1987 and 2003. Following the approval of Law 1444 of the Foreign Relations Service and the changed legal status of the Diplomatic Academy within *Cancillería* in 1993, 106 aspiring diplomats graduated from the academy, roughly 55 percent of all graduates since 1975.

With the new law, and the stability it provided, senior old guard diplomats sought to attract what they viewed as “the best talent,” a message that incoming academy students heard repeatedly through speeches. For example, during the celebration of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Diplomatic Academy in 2004, the key note speakers – President Carlos Mesa, Foreign Minister Juan Ignacio Siles, and Ambassador Jorge Gumucio then Director of the Academy – emphasized the graduates’ role as defenders of the institutionalization of the diplomatic career, which they viewed as an essential step toward building a modern Bolivia.

In fact, President Carlos Mesa opens his speech noting, “Institutionalism; institution. The basic concept in the construction of a *mature society* goes through those two words. Today we commemorate the half a century of an essential institution of this Ministry and a key institution in Bolivia’s foreign relations” (*emphasis added*). For President Mesa institutionalization was a sign of national “maturity,” “advancement,” and rationality. While defending the existence of “a consistent logic and line of action in crucial topics,” Mesa contrasts the new *Cancillería* to a prior time of “improvisation,” which “in some way used to characterize our Ministry,” “bureaucratization,” “lack of initiative,” and “reluctance.” For Mesa, politicians’ involvement in the Ministry is important, but warns that their presence in diplomacy must adhere to a “framework, proportion, and context of rationality.”

Similarly, Director Gumucio linked the professional guard to modernity and the “national interest,” explaining, “Professionalization is the best investment to reach the superior *objectives of the Nation* and that goal of *modernizing* Bolivia’s diplomatic structures and practices inspired the actions of authorities that sought to institutionalize the formation of the Foreign Ministry and the Diplomatic Service’s cadres” (*emphasis added*). Addressing the academia graduates, Director Gumucio reminded them of their distinctiveness, “you form part of that important and growing nucleus of professional male and female diplomats [...] You must always be aware that you represent a *unitary nation*, multiethnic and pluricultural, constituted in democracy.” In turn, Foreign Minister Siles described the Academy as “the very heart of the Ministry” due to its role in cultivating an “*esprit de corps*.”

Old-guard notions of the ‘ideal diplomat’ were also inculcated in the classroom. Those who taught the most important subjects in the diplomatic academy were, for the most part, senior old guard career diplomats. They were also enforced in the office through hierarchical work relationships in which senior old guard diplomats occupied supervisory roles. They oversaw and trained junior diplomats. For example, Jorge, a junior old-guard diplomat, notes that Gabriel, a senior old guard diplomat who was his Director, would review all the Directorate’s outgoing correspondence for content, grammar, and spelling, marking up every error and scolding those who failed to do a good job. Other junior old-guard diplomats recall being reprimanded when their formal attire did not live up to their superiors’ expectations. As a senior old guard diplomat notes, even clothing was an essential part of their work: “Training, how you handle things, the norms because the diplomat has to even know what he’s going to wear in different occasions, that’s where it starts.”

At any rate, the academy promised those who completed the program a chance, not a promise, to join *Cancillería*. Those who managed to secure entrance into the diplomatic career joined at the rank of third secretary, the lowest diplomatic rank in the career ladder, but found relatively stable jobs, predictable promotions, and deployment rotations. The cultivation of *Cancillería's esprit de corps* was effective. Andrea, a junior member, points out, “the person who wants to be a diplomat is not there for the money because many of them could be making so much more money, but [...] because they like the profession.” Claudia, another junior diplomat notes, “we were an elite within public service, within what is public administration. [...] It was something else, another level.” In other words, the senior and junior old guard effectively saw *Cancillería* as a Weberian paradise.

### **The Old Guard's Notion of the Ideal Bureaucrat**

The previous section discussed the professionalization project that led to the formation of a career diplomat guard and its *esprit de corps*. It noted the centrality of academic credentials and professional experience in international relations as a criterion distinguishing the worthy and the unworthy. This section, in turn, examines how the old guard understands the ideal bureaucrat. It delves more deeply into the criteria through which members of the old guard define the ideal diplomat, distinguishing worthy and unworthy diplomats.

As noted earlier, old-guard diplomats, particularly junior members, often point to senior members as paragons of the ideal diplomat given their diplomatic training and disposition. Claudia, for example, describes her most admired former bosses, all men, as true intellectuals,

who were capable of “[telling you] from memory all about a topic” and were “great teachers.”

She, for example, describes one of her former bosses as follows:

[A] career diplomat educationally prepared in both law and international relations, a Masters in International Law. He started as a messenger because his father wanted him there. [...] He truly did the career. [...] He not only was a completely fair person, but a person apt for diplomacy and very well academically prepared. [...] He did not hurt anyone. He let people be.”

As Claudia’s description reveals, behind formal credentials, lies a less palpable type of qualification that characterizes the ideal diplomat, namely a diplomatic disposition. For the old guard, the term “education” does not only denote academic training, but also a particular racialized class habitus that manifests in how one carries oneself through diplomatic spaces and social life. That is, “education” refers to the norms of behavior of the white upper classes.

For example, Manfredo Kempff, who has often used his opinion columns to deliver lessons to the Morales administration on how to properly conduct diplomacy, points to this diplomatic attitude as key to the model diplomat. In one of his columns, Manfredo reminisces about former members of *Cancillería*, which he calls the “Old House.” He recalls a deceased diplomat, who he considers the embodiment of the “model diplomat, intelligent, educated, cultured and captivating” (Kempff Suárez 2006d). The ideal diplomat does not only have the credentials of formal training, but also a cultured and captivating personality. In many ways, Manfredo himself embodies the old guard’s notion of the ideal diplomat. Not only do junior members describe him as such. He is also an accomplished career diplomat, having held the post of interim Foreign Minister, and a published fiction and non-fiction writer.

The old guard, thus, attributes great importance to the ability to carry oneself in a manner deemed appropriate culturally and emotionally. Rodrigo, a senior old-guard diplomat, explains,

The diplomat has to be a complete person. You have to know, know history, geography, informatics, about art, dress well, behave well, control your nerves, be present at all needed moments, have a measured position, you can't be the protagonist. The diplomat has to have great discretion on matters. The worst diplomacy is the one conducted in the streets, "I'll sue this guy!" No, the diplomat has other avenues. The diplomat has to be a good negotiator, like those who we were talking about, who negotiate with an iron fist and silk gloves. [...] You have to be balanced in life. [...] You cannot be a guy that is always drunk, in scandals with women.

Andrea, a junior old-guard diplomat, echoes these traits, describing the "textbook diplomat" as "presentable, well dressed, having good interpersonal skills, well-trained, well-versed."

I have found that this diplomatic disposition maps onto broader definitions of white-*mestizo* upper-middle class culture and status markers often described by members of the old guard, whom I asked what defines class in Bolivia. For example, Claudia, raised in La Paz, is an upper-middle class woman, who self-identifies white. Growing up, she attended reputable private schools. She describes class status in Bolivia as primarily determined by,

[...] the culture one has. Because of culture, of education. The level of education is fundamental. [...] For me, it is a combination, not just one [education] or the other [money]. In my view, you have to have a mid-point in order to know how to carry yourself. I mean, not one extreme or the other because you may have money and be a huge ignorant. [...] But the education you have been given, what you have absorbed in your life, that is key!

For Claudia, education and culture, in the form of knowledge but also manners and composure, are interchangeable terms, as are ignorance and the lack of ability to carry oneself.

This overlap between diplomatic disposition and class status markers is also revealed by Rodrigo, who explains,

You can't have a diplomat that is a poor guy. [...] A diplomat has to have a certain status. You have to arrive to a country and bring certain [material] things with you. I used to bring paintings, adornments for your home. [...] You have to have some capital of your own.

He describes some of the diplomats that run the ministry when he started as "classy" and "cultured." This combination of formal education and culture are the key criteria by which old guard diplomats judge their own worth and that of their colleagues and challengers.

I asked other senior old guard diplomats who had reached high levels of the Central and Foreign Service what it took to get promotions during their careers. All of them coincided that the diplomat's key skill is negotiation, especially for those aspiring to reach the highest ranks of the career ladder. However, in their descriptions it is evident that this diplomatic skill entails more than the mastery of a technique and knowledge of history, treaties, communications, etc. In fact, as they note, this book knowledge is important, but diplomacy is learned through practice and, most importantly, is a "vocation." One senior old guard diplomat noted that his first important promotion, for example, was the result of a superior noticing his "natural talent" for diplomatic writing. They often described "natural" traits that cannot be taught in the classroom, like reliability, seriousness, discretion, honesty, emotional restraint, psychological stability, grace, charm, and decorum as foundational to effective diplomatic relations and negotiations. A diplomat notes, "this was evident quickly because you would go to embassies or diplomatic receptions, etc. so you always had to show formal behavior, be careful, etc. That was a big point in your favor. People wouldn't take their chances with someone who goes to a reception and, for example, has 50 whiskeys."

Thus, formally, notions of diplomatic worth rest on the criterion of germane educational credentials and experience. The law made having a degree in the field of international relations a prerequisite for access to the diplomatic career. Informally, however, the old guard's notion of the ideal diplomat criteria carries the racialized class imprint of its advocates, the senior old guard. Junior and senior old guard diplomats thus came to share into a common understanding of the traits that define the worthy diplomat that mirrors the racialized class habitus of its predominantly white-*mestizo* male occupants from elite families.

### ***The Architects and Archetypes of the Modern Diplomatic Service***

An analysis of the backgrounds and trajectories of several senior old guard diplomats reveals shared commonalities among those professional diplomats who shaped *Cancillería's* emerging and coded notion of the 'ideal diplomat' in the 1980s. The senior old guard was composed primarily, though not exclusively, of white-*mestizo* men from the national economic and political elites. Many were the children or relatives of public figures, including national politicians and diplomats, high-level army officials, and literati. Before the Morales administration, they had risen to the highest levels of the diplomatic career, occupying *Cancillería's* leadership and executive posts, overseeing the Diplomatic Academy and its curriculum as well as teaching its courses, and composing the diplomatic career's Merit Evaluation Panel within the ministry.

Before David Choquehuanca, seventeen men had served in the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs since the transition to democracy in 1982: 9 career diplomats, members of the senior old guard, with academic credentials in international law and/or diplomacy; 6 career politicians, most of whom had degrees in law and/or economics, except for a sociologist; 1 historian who also had a degree in law; and 1 businessman.<sup>40</sup> At least 9 of the post-1982 Ministers of Foreign Affairs belonged to families of the white political or military elite, including Juan Ignacio Siles of the Siles family of politicians from La Paz; Carlos Saavedra of the renowned Saavedra family of Santa Cruz; and Marcial Tamayo, who was the grandchild of Isaac Tamayo, a

---

<sup>40</sup> It is important to note that the lines between diplomats, scholars, and politicians, however, are often blurry. Here, I categorize these former ministers based on their professional trajectories, including their academic degrees and employment history.

politician and diplomat from La Paz, and nephew of Franz Tamayo, who had been Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 1930s and an influential politician, writer, and pedagogue; to name a few. Two former Ministers were also descendants of business and academic elite families.

It is unclear what the family backgrounds of the other six former ministers were. A review of their biographies by former *Cancillería* employees Vargas Aguirre and Montecinos Luque (2004) suggests that at least two, both with political careers, might have belonged to upwardly mobile urban *mestizo* families that found political openings in post-1952 Bolivia. Nonetheless, all 17 post-1982 Ministers of Foreign Affairs had grown up in urban Bolivia and held advanced degrees, including from foreign universities.<sup>41</sup>

For example, David Choquehuanca's predecessor was Armando Loaiza Mariaca, one of the main proponents of and actor in *Cancillería's* professionalization project. Transitional President Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé<sup>42</sup> appointed him Minister of Foreign Relations in June 2005. Born in the city of La Paz in 1943, Loaiza was an accomplished professional diplomat with 37 years of uninterrupted service in the ministry. Loaiza came from a white Bolivian family that belonged to the 20<sup>th</sup> century political elite. His father, Armando Loaiza de la Vega, was an Army General, a rank that in the 20<sup>th</sup> century was only attainable for white Bolivians. His mother, Frida Mariaca Arguedas, belonged to a white political elite family. She was the daughter of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the sister of one of Bolivia's most renowned painters.

---

<sup>41</sup> This analysis is based on the biographies and diplomatic trajectories of Bolivian Foreign Ministers collected and published by Vargas Aguirre and Montecinos Luque (2004).

<sup>42</sup> Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé, an independent, became president by appointment in June 2005 following the resignation of Carlos Mesa Gisbert of the MNR ticket, who had served since October 2003. Mesa, in turn, became president when Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada resigned and fled the country in October 2003.

According to his sister, María Loaiza, Armando Loaiza had demonstrated a diplomatic inclination since childhood. As she notes, “He was always very discrete, very diplomatic in his way of being since he was a boy and young man. He held many leadership posts in school and was always very distinguished. When he graduated, he wanted to study international law” (Rojas 2016). In the 1960s, however, Bolivian universities did not offer a degree in international law or international relations. Having the means to do so, Loaiza thus left Bolivia and enrolled in the undergraduate program in International Law at the University of the Republic in the Uruguayan capital Montevideo.

When he returned to Bolivia, Loaiza was one of the few international relations professionals in the country. He later pursued advance degrees, including a Ph.D., in international law and diplomacy in Chile and Switzerland. He joined Cancillería in 1969, climbing to the highest executive ranks before reaching the Ministerial office. In the Central Service, he became Undersecretary (or Viceminister) of Bilateral Relations in the early 1990s and Director of the Diplomatic Academy in 1994 and again in 1998. In the Foreign Service, he was posted in the Bolivian missions in Caracas, Geneva, and Brussels. In 1993, he was appointed Consul General in Santiago in 1993 and a year later, Ambassador to the Vatican. Before his appointment to Foreign Minister, Loaiza had been serving as the ambassador to Uruguay. His appointment as minister ended when the Morales administration took office in January 2006.

Much like his sister, who described Armando as “distinguished,” “discrete,” and “diplomatic in his way of being,” senior old guard descriptions of Armando do not simply highlight his academic preparation but emphasize other traits relating to how he carried himself. On the occasion of his appointment as Ambassador to Uruguay in 2003, career

diplomat and former Foreign Minister, Agustín Saavedra Weise wrote a column congratulating the government for the decision. He described, Loaiza as, “Austere, of calm but firm speech, cordial and gentle, Armando possess a proven talent that has distinguished him throughout his productive diplomatic career. [...] To that [trajectory] we must add numerous writings and essays, published in diverse national and international media outlets.” Further adding, “I’ve known Armando Loaiza for decades. Together, for many years, we have walked through the old *casona* on Ingavi Street that houses our beloved *Cancillería* in the seat of government. I know his ability, his gift for social relations, and his solid experience” (Saavedra Weise 2003). Similarly, when Loaiza died in 2016, Ramiro Prudencio Lizón a fellow career senior old guard career diplomat, noted that in his long career, Loaiza had “always demonstrated your intellectual honesty, your experience, and your excellent preparation. Because of this, your representation in the countries where you carried out a diplomatic mission was always valued, because you did it with grace and dignity” (Prudencio Lizón 2016).

Another example is Javier Murillo de la Rocha, who an old-guard diplomat described as a “proper diplomat and true gentleman.” He is a career diplomat with a similarly long trajectory to that of Armand Loaiza, though not uninterrupted, who served as Foreign Minister between 1997 and 2001. Born in La Paz in 1942, he was “the son of a prestigious officer of the Bolivian Army who was a key actor in the 1930s decade and during the Villarroel government” (Vargas Aguirre and Montecinos Luque 2004:331). His father, General Murillo, had been military attaché to the Bolivian embassies in the United States and Brazil in the 1950s. This gave Javier Murillo the chance to live abroad and learn foreign languages. Murillo majored in Law at the

national flagship public university, San Andrés Major University in La Paz, and later obtained an advanced degree in international law in Belgium.

Murillo joined *Cancillería* in 1962, when he was 19 years of age and beginning his second year of the law program. He entered the ministry at the lowest level possible, which was that of office assistant. He had applied for the opening at the behest of a diplomat who he had as a professor at university and who was acquainted with his father. The diplomat identified Murillo as a promising candidate and encouraged him to take the entrance examination. Within two months, he had joined the ministry and was beginning to learn the “technical” aspects of diplomacy on the ground while completing his undergraduate degree.

Murillo rose from office assistant to Director of Press within five years, when he was less than 25 years of age. By 1969, he was named chief of staff of the Undersecretary of Foreign Relations. His first foreign post arrived in 1970, when he was designated Deputy Consul in Santiago, Chile. At the age of 32, Murillo had already reached the post of Undersecretary of Foreign Relations and soon was posted at the United Nations in New York as Deputy Permanent Representative of Bolivia. His career is an extensive and accomplished one, including positions in the national and international diplomatic bureaucracy. In 2001, following his tenure as Foreign Minister, Murillo became Bolivia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

Similarly, Manfredo Kempff, another former Foreign Minister and diplomat, is the son of a renowned Bolivian philosopher, who was appointed Permanent Representative to UNESCO in the 1950s, elected national senator in the 1960s, and held various academic positions throughout his life. Antonio Mariaca, also a career diplomat and former Deputy Foreign Minister, is the son of a Bolivian painter of international fame and the grandson of a Supreme

Court President. In fact, Mariaca is Armando Laoiza's first cousin. Antonio had majored in International Law in Spain, determined to return to Bolivia to join the Ministry, where his older cousin had already joined the diplomatic career.

The shared gendered and racialized class background of the senior old guard, at least of its most successful members, is evident in many cases among mid-level diplomats as well. For example, Alberto, who had a career of two decades, comes from a lineage of accomplished national politicians. His relatives arranged for Alberto to join *Cancillería* in the 1980s without going through the diplomatic academy. Earlier, I noted Alberto's more critical description of *Cancillería*, which he sees as relatively elitists. Although he embraces the career diplomat identity, his views are relatively unusual and, as he notes, coherent with his political stances. Jorge's experience is similar to that of Alberto, accessing *Cancillería* first and years later going through the Diplomatic Academy training. He too comes from a lineage of accomplished national politicians. Despite not having reached the executive positions of *Cancillería*, both Alberto and Jorge attained the high-level "Counselor" rank of the diplomatic career. When they joined the ministry, they encountered within it former classmates from school and university.

The "professionalization" period also led to a diversification of the diplomatic corps in terms of gender and class backgrounds. A growing number of junior members of the old guard came from the upwardly mobile white-*mestizo* and *mestizo* urban middle class rather than political or intellectual elite families. According to female junior old guard diplomats, in the 1990s men primarily made up the senior old guard, with the exception of a handful of women. Among the senior old guard that taught in the academy, I only found one woman, Ambassador Julia Uriona de Olmos, who also led the academy twice sometime in the 1970s and 1980s.

Another female junior diplomat noted that when she entered, she knew of a handful of female senior old guard diplomats, and worked with two of them. Although I do not have official records of employees, anecdotal evidence does indicate that the women to men ratio was highly skewed in favor of men. Women, in turn, were often found in the clerical non-diplomatic posts of the ministry. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the proportion of women grew significantly in the ministry.

Despite these changes, the number of indigenous entrants was likely very low. Using the surname criterion, I identified only three graduates with indigenous-origin surnames, the first one of whom graduated in 1989. It is unclear, however, whether they joined the career and how many career diplomats had indigenous backgrounds.

This section has sought to demonstrate that the most valued and successful professional career trajectories among old guard diplomats in the Bolivian *Cancillería* share a common profile: white-*mestizo*, male, and elite background. The fact that these senior old guard, architects of the professionalization project and *Cancillería's esprit de corps*, are the archetype of an ideal diplomat among themselves and junior diplomats reveals the gendering and racialization of the ideal bureaucrat. It also highlights that the formal criteria of worth of the old guard, namely educational credentials and professional experience in foreign relations, erases the gendered and racialized class imprint of the ideal bureaucrat. This emerges in more informal discussion and definitions of the ideal bureaucrat, which highlight an ability to carry oneself in a manner deemed appropriate, that is, the embodied cultural capital of the white-*mestizo* elites. In the next section, I show that this “appropriate manner” is not only defined

along the traits of a particular segment of Bolivian society but also against the indigenous population.

### **The Unworthy New Guard Diplomat**

“The outsider is not a public servant that is worth it. It is those of us from the old school who are,” Claudia tells me during our interview, referring to the post-2006 new entrants as outsiders. As she succinctly puts it, the new guard does not meet the criteria of worth of career diplomats, like herself. Members of the old guard question the legitimacy of the new guard based on the two criteria described above: diplomatic training and an appropriate disposition, or way of carrying oneself. A close examination of such claims reveals they draw on racist ideologies to draw ethnoracial boundaries between the new and old guards as well as the worthy and unworthy diplomat, as I show in Table 5.1.

**Table 5.1.** The old guard’s ‘ideal bureaucrat’ criteria.

| <b>“WEBERIAN” BUREAUCRAT</b> |                     |
|------------------------------|---------------------|
| <b>Worthy</b>                | <b>Unworthy</b>     |
| Modern                       | Backward            |
| Consensus                    | Conflict            |
| Technical                    | Ideological         |
| Trained                      | Untrained           |
| Foreign languages            | Indigenous dialects |
| Cultivated                   | Ignorant            |
| Mannered                     | Unrefined           |
| Merit                        | Race                |
| <b>Bureaucracy/Whiteness</b> | <b>Indigeneity</b>  |

Career diplomats view the new guard as overwhelmingly lacking diplomatic training, which in their opinion has pernicious effects for the national interest in foreign affairs. Early on,

career diplomats and conservative news media described Bolivian diplomacy under Morales as “improvised.” For example, a 2006 La Razón editorial titled “Delays in the Foreign Service” noted:

The matter of the Bolivian diplomatic representations abroad [...] is taking a worrisome turn, which may carry some problems in addition to those that have, in fact, already occurred due to a new diplomacy with a strong *improvisation* component, and which has already drawn internal critiques, that may not be less severe in the international community, though concealed for obvious reasons. (La Razón 2006d, emphasis added)

The editorial attributes such improvisation to the lack of *Cancillería* professionals capable of handling a “profession, which beyond the frivolities of which it has been accused of, is incredibly complex” (La Razón 2006d).

In another column, Manfredo described *Cancillería*’s new guard diplomats as “shoddy MAS-militant analysts and political scientists, who do not even analyze anything or know anything about politics, even less international politics.” Similarly, Diego, an old-guard career diplomat, perceives “disorder, very serious, too much improvisation, even though there’s a new law. They’ve even changed people’s ranks, some were moved up, directors were demoted.” The new entrants thus lack respect for the career law and are taking the country back to improvisation.

Furthermore, career diplomats not only perceive the new guard as lacking formal training on foreign relations, but also portray them as lacking any formal schooling. Claudia, for example, describes the new guard as, “MAS militants [who] have not even finished secondary school. So, that’s where conflicts began. [...] They are mostly leaders of the coca growers’ union.” Similarly, Rodrigo, a senior old-guard diplomat, notes, “*Cancillería* professionals today do not hold degrees in foreign relations, are not university graduates, are not academy graduates, they come from the peasant unions, are party militants.” Old guard diplomats, thus,

contrast the access and trajectory of the new guard with what they understand as their own meritocratic access and trajectory.

It is true that, for the most part, new-guard diplomats had no formal training in diplomacy at the time of their arrival. However, in Claudia's and Rodrigo's view, the new guard are not only untrained in diplomacy but uneducated peasants, namely indigenous people, who militate an indigenous party, the MAS-IPSP. The myth of a new guard lacking a university education or even altogether formal schooling is a popular one among bureaucrats, particularly former ones. In reality, studies show that the levels of educational achievement today are, on average, higher than in the 1990s (see Soruco et al. 2014). These descriptions draw on circulating stereotypes of indigenous Bolivians as lacking education and ignorant (Loayza Bueno 2010).

The second criterion on which the old guard questions the legitimacy of the new guard is that of a diplomatic disposition. They perceive members of the new guard as violating the social codes of the diplomatic world. They do so in their daily dress. Rodrigo, for example, recounts sneeringly that a foreign official once told him, "You and your wife represented Bolivia with great dignity, but today there's a guy that is preposterous, a guy who wears sandals and pants that are unthinkable, with a poncho, with an Andean whip." Indigenous community leaders typically wear such garments.

Career diplomats also portray new entrants as violating social codes in their way of life. Rodrigo notes of a high-level Bolivian ambassador, a self-identified indigenous man, who wears indigenous garments,

that poor one in the [multilateral bureaucracy], who [...] bought a little bed and slept in his office, in Downtown [foreign city], in an office building, which did not have a private bathroom. [...] Imagine that! A guy there, living there. Horrible! Shameful! To put your bed there! The things these guys have done!

Similarly, members of the old guard view them as lacking a sense of proper interpersonal interactions, or lacking manners. For example, Claudia describes an interaction with a new guard employee as follows, “Yesterday, she already didn’t address me as *señora*, but said ‘Hi, Claudia!’ and my friend [said] ‘what’s the matter with this *imilla*? She’s already disrespecting us.” *Imilla* is an Aymara word meaning “girl.” However, white-*mestizos* in Bolivia have historically used the term to refer pejoratively to a young woman of seemingly indigenous origin. As Loayza (2010:91) explains, “the [racial] categories *chola*, *cholo*, *imilla* o *llocalla* have pejorative meanings that serve to mark the inferiority of the ‘other.’” These claims of a general lack of diplomatic disposition among new-guard diplomats draw on racist ideologies that portray indigenous people as unrefined and brutes.

Members of the old guard also perceive new entrants as inherently confrontational and aggressive, resulting in a style that is diametrically opposed to diplomacy. They describe members of the new guard as conducting conflict diplomacy that is informed not by the institution and knowledge, but by “ideological fundamentalism,” which is how many perceive the decolonization discourse. In an opinion column, the senior old-guard diplomat Marcelo Ostria describes foreign relations under Morales as “erratic, provocative, strident and, surely, unproductive” (Ostria 2006). He explains:

Caution and wisdom in the making and implementation of foreign policy signal seriousness and arouse respect in the international realm. Unfortunately, this is not the current case, whose actions, clumsy statements and allusions towards countries with which we have normal relations are not constructive. Unleashing verbal duels or showing animosity towards other countries who traditionally were friends is a mistake, to say the least, that will put the possibility of encouraging agreements beyond reach.

Similarly, Rodrigo tells me that today the administration's foreign policy actions are "out of tune," acting without proper assessment and offensively, in a manner that "goes against the essence of Foreign Relations." He tells me that once Morales complained that he was treated differently in international diplomatic summits because he was an indigenous man, but that evidently his being confrontational and aggressive style did not help his case. He, thus, contrasts what he calls, "diplomacy that is conducted in the streets – 'I'll sue this guy'" with the diplomacy of "union" and "consensus" conducted by gentlemen. The idea of the street diplomacy refers to a well-known contention repertoire of the indigenous movement, consisting of street demonstrations and road blockades, while that of suing refers to one of the Morales administration's main diplomatic actions, namely taking Chile to the International Court of Justice over a maritime dispute.

Similar critiques were directed at the new Foreign Minister, David Choquehuanca. As I discuss in more detail in the next chapter, Minister Choquehuanca's ethnoracial origin, professional trajectory, and organizing vocation were new to *Cancillería*. So was his unabashed indigenous identity and displays of his indigenous culture through language, clothing, and rituals. His actions and statements caused much controversy among the old political elite and evoked dozens of explicitly racist reactions and mockery. Not only did the old guard voice its serious doubts with the appointment of an educator and union leaders who lacked any experience in foreign policy, but it also launched harsh critiques against what they read as the Minister's mystic and indigenist discourse.

For example, writing about Choquehuanca's swearing in ceremony, journalist Javier Echalar referred to the minister as a "picturesque and unique specimen of politics worldwide."

He further wrote,

The brand new Foreign Minister has left us dumbfounded. He arrived to the offices of the Foreign Minister with a mortal blow, catching its functionaries on a turn and making them *jallallar*, while he asked them to play follow-the-leader moving his arms like the Macarena. [...] Mr. Choquehuanca showed the perplexed diplomats that he is boss in the Ministry. The act displayed an authoritarian character that did not admit any concessions. For the rest, I have serious objections with that *jallalla* thing, as it is a word that is so similar to that despicable German 'Heil.' (Echalar 2006)

For Echalar, the *Jallalla* – an indigenous celebration ritual that consists of lifting one hands out toward the sky while shouting '*jallalla*,' a Quechua and Aymara word denoting joy, hope, and well-being – is a matter of mockery. Yet, most noteworthy in his diatribe is the linking of the *jallalla* to Nazi Germany's 'Heil,' with the intention of portraying the new indigenous rulers of Bolivia as authoritarian and racists against whites. The analogy Echalar articulates evokes ideas of racial hatred and the racial revenge of indians, seeking to invert the racial hierarchy.

Career diplomat, Kempff also often mocked Choquehuanca's statements and actions in the press. In an opinion column on 28<sup>th</sup> March 2006, Kempff wrote, "It is horrifying that the Foreign Minister goes on with his weekly anthology of nonsense. [...] And yet, the President says that the Chancellor is being criticized by racists, when the minister himself has said that what he wants is to be a *Yatiri*, not to be reading international law texts" (Kempff Suárez 2006c). Kempff responds to qualifications of his statements and those of others as racist by arguing that because the Minister himself has expressed his desire to be a *Yatiri*, an indigenous spiritual guide, the racist stereotypes about indigenous peoples they attribute to Choquehuanca and others are justified. These types of statements also circulated in everyday

life in the country and within the Ministry, where many old guard diplomats expressed concern with the new leader of Bolivian diplomacy.

A close examination of such legitimacy claims reveals these are articulated, implicitly and explicitly, with ethnoracial beliefs. This is evident in the manner that Claudia describes her experience working under the new administration. At the time of our interview, she feared her future in the ministry. As she notes, “There’s no relationship whatsoever [with the bosses]. It is better if you don’t talk. It is better if you go unnoticed. It is better if you’re in the background and you have a low profile. Better because otherwise you may find yourself amidst conflict.”

Claudia experienced the ethnoracial re-composition of *Cancillería* as a turn of tables, whereby an old school of ‘capable’ diplomats has been replaced by indigenous outsiders, whom, she believes, have secured these jobs exclusively on the basis of their race. As she notes, “[The minister] is not bad, I repeat, but he hates you because you’re white. I mean he is 100% indigenist. He believes we’re superfluous and that they are the owners [now].” In her view, as a result, they have “destroyed the ministry.” Today, “it is a ministry of indigenous affairs because he has lowered the level to the floor.” Other functionaries also echo the feeling that indigenous people have overtaken the ministry and that preferential treatment for indigenous people is evident. They attribute the perceived decline of educational levels to such preferentialism. Yet, Claudia’s statement captures the logic that divides the ministry and indigeneity. For her the opposite of a modern foreign ministry is a ministry of indigenous affairs; in other words, indigeneity.

Old guard public and private judgments of the new guard reveal that their notion of an ideal bureaucrat also draws on dominant national racial discourses that have historically

equated indigeneity with backwardness. These operate primarily implicitly, though at times are made also explicit. To them, new entrants are not worthy state agents. They perceive the change of guard as a setback in their modernizing project. As career diplomat and former interim Foreign Minister, Manfredo Kempf publicly wrote, “it is contrary to the currents that travel the modern world, such as competence, knowledge, and the mastering of foreign languages” (Kempff Suárez 2006b).

## Conclusion

In the old-guard’s modernizing state logic, in a *modern* state, diplomacy consists of consensus and is reserved for those with the necessary technical knowledge and formal training. In addition, diplomacy requires a general disposition for diplomatic practice, including foreign language abilities and a cultivated and mannered character. It is through this set of criteria that members of the new guard judge their worth and those of other bureaucrats as diplomats. They predicate a notion of the ideal bureaucrat that they understand as meritocratic and, in theory, race-neutral and accessible to anyone.

The old guard as a state elite and its *esprit de corps* was constituted around a shared modal habitus, producing the “enchanted experience of a *social paradise*, where everyone has every chance of recognizing in everyone else a *like-minded person*, a neighbor so socially similar that he is able to love himself in him” (Bourdieu 1998b:183). After all, it was over the course of over a century that *Cancillería* and its occupants became instituted history and enacted history; “the same history inhabits both habitus and habitat, both disposition and position... history in a sense communicates with itself, is reflected in its own image” (Bourdieu 1981:306). However,

this chapter and the ones that precede it, also show that the formation of the old guard, and state elites more broadly, is also inextricable from the constitution of the Bolivian state bureaucracy through race as well as white monopoly of state spaces over the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. The modal habitus in which these diplomatic elites share, and on which the value and values of the group rest, has been constituted through racial and racist distinctions. While never static, it nonetheless bears the racialized class imprint of those for whom *Cancillería* and other state spaces have been reserved.

Upon their arrival, however, the new diplomatic guard encountered a dominant racialized 'Weberian' notion of the Ideal Bureaucrat that maps onto the white-mestizo old guard, and naturalize their monopoly of the ministry. Underlying the old guard's bureaucratic notions of worth are dominant ideologies of cultural difference in manners and education, backwardness and civilization, that defines not only the racial categories in Bolivia, but also the worthy and unworthy in bureaucracy, as I have discussed in Chapter 2. These ideologies construe indigeneity as backward and discounting the worth of indigenous new entrants. This is similar to what minorities in other periods in Bolivia and in other national contexts experienced. For the old guard, today's *Cancillería* has ceased to be a *social paradise*. They can no longer take the white normativity on which it is constituted for granted. What is more, it not only ceases to be an aspired utopia of rationality but it morphs into an undesirable dystopia taken over by those against whom both the boundaries of the bureaucracy and those of whiteness were drawn. Its occupants now lament, explicitly and implicitly, its destruction, disorder, ideological fundamentalism, and general shoddiness.

## CHAPTER 6

### The New Guard and the Committed Ideal Bureaucrat

#### Introduction

This chapter examines how members of formerly excluded ethnoracial populations and their allies in *Cancillería* negotiate the ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy in the context of the Bolivian state project of state decolonization. In particular, it examines the symbolic boundaries through which new entrants define the new diplomatic guard and distinguish it from others, especially old guard diplomats. It documents how new guard diplomats respond to the old guard's criteria of worth and claim to *Cancillería*, discussing the strategies through which they discredit the old guard's claims. It also examines the new guard's efforts to codify and institutionalize a new notion of the ideal bureaucrat, interrogating whose "own culture and image" defines this classification system. In doing so, it identifies the criteria by which these new entrants judge their worth and those of other as diplomats in a particular institutional space, namely *Cancillería*.

I show that, in the Bolivian context of decolonization, indigenous new entrants mobilize a competing notion of the ideal bureaucrat alternative to the one discussed in the previous chapter. New indigenous entrants and their non-indigenous allies use social and political movement commitment criteria to judge their own worth and that of the former occupants of *Cancillería* and the bureaucracy more broadly. Upon their arrival they encountered white-*mestizo* notions of the ideal bureaucrat, which I have discussed in the previous chapter, that

naturalize its traditional white-*mestizo* occupants while discounting the new guard's worth as state agents. But, how do indigenous new entrants, in the context of decolonization, navigate the old guard's constructed boundary between modern bureaucracy and indigeneity? I show that members of the new diplomatic guard *contest* the old guard's racialized notion of the ideal bureaucrat that organized these spaces. Rather than conforming to the old guard's notion of the ideal bureaucracy, they seek to delegitimize their criteria and unsettle white normativity.

The rest of this chapter is organized in five sections. The first section discusses personnel changes in *Cancillería* and the ethnoracial and social composition of the new diplomatic guard. Second, I discuss the new guard's criteria of worth that underlie their competing notion of the ideal diplomat. The analysis identifies the components of the new guard's ideal bureaucrat, highlighting the imprint of activist, personal, and professional trajectories linked to the indigenous peasant population and/or movement. In the third section, I briefly discuss Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca's life and trajectory, highlighting the radical break that his appointment represented in relation to the historic and recent monopoly of the post by white-*mestizos*. Next, I describe how the new guard respond to and discount the old guard's criteria of worth, drawing on changing narratives of race and modernity to discredit their claims. Lastly, in the fifth section, I discuss the new leadership's program to institutionalize and codify the emerging notion of the ideal bureaucrat and a new *esprit de corps* around decolonization.

## **A New Guard for a Decolonized Foreign Ministry**

In *Cancillería*, decolonization brought a gradual and visible change in the composition of the ministry. Indigenous people and their non-indigenous allies, all linked to the indigenous peasant movement and its MAS-IPSP party, came to occupy authority positions previously reserved for upper-class and upwardly mobile urban white-*mestizos*.

This ethnoracial recomposition was an explicit objective of the new leadership. For the leadership, transforming *Cancillería* did not entail the exclusion of non-indigenous Bolivians from spaces of power but rather the construction of a representative apparatus that would mirror the country's diversity, interpreted as a new source of national strength in the decolonization discourse. It also entailed the development of a new diplomatic profile and ethos. For the official architects of decolonization, this project thus required a new type of expert diplomat guided by indigenous experiences and worldviews, as I have discussed in previous chapters. Hence, the new administration sought to incorporate social movement organizations into the bureaucracy.

For example, in March 2006, the administration extended an invitation to social movement organizations, particularly indigenous peasant federations, to put forward their best cadres to be considered for ambassadorial appointments and to fill other high-level offices within *Cancillería* and the state bureaucracy. On the occasion, Choquehuanca highlighted that human capital was one of the greatest strengths of the MAS government and its allied movement organizations. Opposition parties qualified this action as an “authoritarian coup” and a “forceful invasion of state offices [by social sectors]” (La Razón 2006c). This constituted

one front on which the new guard disrupted the normativity of whiteness that they encountered in career diplomats' dominant notions of the ideal bureaucrat.

Documentary evidence helps historically contextualizing the Ministry's changing composition. I used publicly available personnel lists to classify employees as indigenous or non-indigenous based on surnames. In fact, Morales often pointed to the absence of surnames, such as Quispe or Mamani, in state personnel lists to highlight the exclusion of indigenous Bolivians from the bureaucracy. In the 2013 fiscal year, 23 percent of the personnel in the Central Service (CS) and close to 15 percent of personnel in the Foreign Service (FS) were indigenous. In particular, roughly 40 indigenous men and women occupied positions at the diplomatic and executive levels, over 15 percent of posts at those levels. At the administrative level, they represented 31 percent of the CS and 20 percent of the FS.

However, it is important to point out that the surname criterion underestimates the number of *Cancillería* entrants who may nonetheless identify or be perceived as indigenous. On the one hand, historically, indigenous-origin families Hispanicized their surnames to escape stigmatization. On the other, the surname criterion is also based on a narrow definition of indigeneity based on ancestry and does not capture other phenotypical and cultural markers of indigeneity in the country. While an imperfect measure of indigeneity, no better measures of race/ethnicity among state personnel are available at this moment.

During fieldwork, I found that, although indigenous Bolivians certainly do not constitute a majority in *Cancillería*, their numbers are likely higher than what the surname criterion indicates, whether categorizing employees on the basis of self-identification or ascription. This finding is consistent with a recent survey of public servants across three other state agencies

that documents a diverse new generation of civil servants with more self-identified indigenous members and women than in 2001 (Soruco et al. 2014).

By contrast, informal conversations and documentary research in *Cancillería* indicate that in the 1990s, the number of indigenous Bolivians in *Cancillería* was likely in the single digits. Given the old guard's emphasis on the incorporation of academy graduates into the ministry's ranks, I also reviewed the lists of graduates since the 1970s and used the surname criterion to classify them. This analysis revealed that before 2004, three out of 160 graduates had indigenous last names. The same analysis applied just to the graduating class of 2014 indicates that 7 out of 32 graduates had indigenous last names.

Another significant change has been the displacement of pre-2006 academy graduates from *Cancillería*'s ranks. In 1999, *Cancillería* reported that 70 percent and 45 percent of diplomatic and executive personnel in the Central Service and Foreign Service, respectively, were academy graduates.<sup>43</sup> In 2004, the ministry reported that career diplomats filled 90 percent of diplomatic non-Ambassadorial posts in the CS and FS combined. Although the senior old guard strived to have leadership- and executive-level positions filled with career diplomats, appointments have historically been the governing party or coalition's prerogative rather than exclusively reserved for career diplomats.

Comparing the list of academy graduates with the personnel list for 2013, I find that academy graduates now account for roughly 15 percent of diplomatic and executive personnel

---

<sup>43</sup> Declaration before the Foreign Policy Committee of the Chamber of Deputies of the Republic of Bolivia. "Política Exterior Boliviana: Desafíos en el Nuevo Milenio" Comisión de Política Internacional y Culto, H. Cámara de Diputados, La Paz, Bolivia. Armando Loayza Mariaca "Desafíos Institucionales de la Política Exterior Boliviana" pp.45-55

in each of its systems, with only one of them holding an executive-level position. This estimate is more precise than that of indigenous entrants as it entailed a direct comparison of the list of academy graduates with the personnel lists. Yet, the contrast is accentuated in the context of a growing ministry staff, with new entrants filling newly created positions.

Importantly, new entrants are not a homogenous group. They are partly public employees from formerly excluded ethnoracial populations hired after 2005. Time of entrance and ethnoracial self-identification are not sufficient or rigid membership criteria. Like Salman (2009) notes of the emerging political elite, the diplomatic new guard is composed of three sectors: progressive middle-class white-*mestizos*, upwardly mobile urban indigenous people, and participants of the indigenous and peasant movement. They share a “political affinity to an anti-elite administration” (p.99). As I explain later, they also share a common vision of bureaucratic worth.

In *Cancillería*, members of the new guard occupy positions at all levels of the organization. Under Choquehuanca, for the most part, new guard diplomats at the leadership, executive, and diplomatic levels did not have formal diplomatic training in diplomacy and/or international relations when they were appointed or hired. With few exceptions, however, new-guard leaders, executives, and diplomats hold university degrees, including advanced ones. The key difference is that they come from other disciplines, including law, the social sciences, and even engineering. For example, the leadership in 2014 was composed of an engineer, a lawyer, and a sociologist, all of whom held advanced degrees. At the time, all 13 director-generals in the CS held at least a university degree in business administration, engineering, law, or a social science. Contrary to widespread characterizations of the new guard

as lacking formal education, during my time working in the ministry, I did not meet any mid- and upper-level employee who had not attended university.

At the diplomatic levels, those positions below Ambassador and General Director, hiring takes place through three avenues: invitation, the academy, and competitive open calls. Invitation, a provision included in the 1993 Law of the Foreign Relations Service, is the most common form of recruitment into the ministry today. Invitees are, as the label suggests, invited by the leadership and executives to join the ranks of *Cancillería* on a permanent position or contract-based positions, which are dependent on the yearly reallocation of funds. Getting an *ítem*, as permanent positions are known, is often a matter of luck and timing. Some entrants spending years in contract-based positions before being assigned an *ítem*. Invitees in *Cancillería* are recruited through professional and activist networks, whereby an invitee happened to have previously worked alongside a member of the leadership or the executive in another job or social organization. For the most part, as I show later in this chapter, invitees share an affinity for the decolonization project, but are not necessarily party militants.

Hiring also takes place through the academy and other educational institutions. *Cancillería's* internship program plays a role in this process, connecting aspiring diplomats with the various directorates of the ministry. These unpaid internships give academy students and students from other educational entities an opportunity to prove themselves along various criteria. Though the academy's role within *Cancillería* is still ambiguous, i.e. there is no clear path of incorporation of graduates into the ministry, the Ministry's 2015 Public Accountability report indicates that 60 percent of post-2006 graduates have joined the ranks of the ministry (RREE 2015).. Often aspiring diplomats remain unpaid interns for several months before a

contract-based position or an *item* becomes available. Finally, hiring also takes place through competitive open hiring, though it is perhaps the least common practice.

Minister David Choquehuanca and his cabinet approached the renewal of personnel gradually. Two days after his oath, Choquehuanca announced that his priority was to learn about the workings of the ministry in order to make informed decisions concerning policy and personnel (La Razón 2006b). This gradual approach meant that that no massive firings took place upon Morales's arrival to power. Rather, Choquehuanca initially kept and included members of the old guard in leadership, executive, and mid-level diplomatic positions. An old guard diplomat who lived through the process described this gradual approach as a ploy to learn from "the experts" before beginning the "to de-institutionalize *Cancillería*."

This gradual approach was evident in the new leadership's first wave of intra-ministerial appointments. For example, Choquehuanca appointed Mauricio Dorfler, a junior old guard career diplomat, as his first Viceminister of Foreign Relations. Dorfler, who had a bachelor's degree in international relations and a PhD in political science, had joined the diplomatic career in the early 1990s and moved up the ranks to executive positions within ten years. Mauricio Dorfler took his oath alongside María Luisa Ramos, an agricultural engineer with extensive experience working with indigenous peasant organizations, appointed to Viceminister of Foreign Trade and Integration. Standing firmly in the Foreign Ministry's *Salón de Honores* (Honors Hall), Mauricio Dorfler – who wore a dark suit, white shirt and a tie – held his hand close to his lips, using his index and thumb to make the sign of the cross. María Luisa Ramos, who wore a dark skirt and jacket, stood next to him with her right hand to her heart and

her left arm raised to her side making a fist. The contrast highlighted the meeting of two logics of diplomatic service.

In 2007, Dorfler was appointed Consul General to Rio de Janeiro, and months later, Bolivia's ambassador to Brazil. He left the Bolivian Foreign Ministry in 2009 due to "personal motives," according to his public statements, though his departure was most likely due to differences with the governing party. Instead, Ramos stayed in her role until 2009, when she was appointed Ambassador to Russia, replacing the career diplomat Sergio Hugo Sánchez, who had held the post since 2008. As of this research, Ramos still held her ambassadorial position. She was also one of the most respected members of the new guard, clearly fitting the new guard's emergent conception of the ideal bureaucrat.

### **The New Guard's Notion of the Ideal Bureaucrat**

This section examines the criteria by which members of the new guard distinguish the worthy and the unworthy bureaucrat, drawing the boundary between themselves and members of the old guard. Whereas members of the old guard emphasize their diplomatic credentials and dispositions in assessing their worth as state agents, notions of commitment figure prominently in how members of the new guard understand their worth. Furthermore, this section shows that the new guard draws on the narratives of indigeneity and modernity of the decolonization discourse in the construction of a new notion of the ideal bureaucrat, which redraws the ethnoracial boundaries of the bureaucracy.

Despite their heterogeneous backgrounds and trajectories, the new guard attaches great importance to political and social commitment as the defining trait of bureaucratic worth.

Isabel, for example, is a lawyer and new-guard diplomat in her early 40s. She arrived as an invitee early on during the Morales administration. She self-identifies as indigenous and regularly speaks, in addition to Spanish, an indigenous language. She combines Western and indigenous garments on a daily basis at work. Like her parents, Isabel was raised in the countryside and one of Bolivia's main cities. As she explains, despite widespread racism, she and her parents managed to become college-educated professionals.

Evident in Isabel's narrated trajectory is her political and social commitment. She notes, "I have been fortunate to have had parents who were union leaders, and were critical of the social, political, economic situation of Bolivia. That motivated me and politically educated me." She is forthright about her commitment to this process of social and political change.

Marina, a new-guard diplomat with an advanced degree in law, also shares this 'commitment.' In her mid-30s, Marina self describes as "a committed person. Committed with this process, but also committed to my life and the lives of people who I would like to help." Marina also arrived as an invitee and claims she never aspired to be a diplomat. Her background, however, differs from Isabel's. While her grandparents were indigenous people, she does not self-identify indigenous. Through informal conversations, I have learned that many co-workers perceive her indigenous ancestry. The daughter of working-class parents with little formal education, she claims belonging to the urban "humble" segment, a term that echoes the racialized class structure of Bolivia and the in-between place of those who historically sought to escape stigmatization as indians by shedding their ethnoracial identities.

Jaime is also a new-guard diplomat. In his early 40s, he represents the progressive middle-class white-*mestizo* members of the new guard. His family background is solidly white-

*mestizo*. Yet, he prefers to view himself as a *cholo*, who lives and embodies a hybrid culture heavily influenced by indigenous traditions. Like Carolina and the others, he is also an invitee. In our interview, Jaime described the “very strong division between career diplomats versus those of us who are invitees, political.” He also never had an interest in pursuing a diplomatic career having pursued advanced degrees in the social sciences. Besides employment at a public university, he had never worked in the state bureaucracy before. He self-describes as a carrier of a “committed vision, linked to the process of change, [...] aligned with the Minister’s ideological perspective.”

New entrants claim commitment specifically to decolonization as a state project. When talking about decolonization, the new guard openly aligns itself with a project of decolonization that is framed explicitly in ethnoracial terms. Carolina, for example, explains decolonization as:

[A] a return to our [indigenous] origins. It is to understand the country like we really are, intercultural, multicultural, plurinational, that we are all part of this country, that there mustn't be exclusion, that there mustn't be elites, that we are all one country. [...] The indigenous people, the peasants, we were always ignored. They left us aside.

Similarly, Jaime explains that his commitment is to a vision of decolonization “having to do with ethnicity.” He explains, “What are you decolonizing from? From a colonial past and that colonial past has to do with a white-mestizo Western imaginary. And how are you going to counter that imaginary? With values from an ethnic worldview, a communitarian world.” Like Carolina and Jaime, the new guard’s vision rejects a homogenizing white-*mestizo* culture and advocates the transformation of the ethnoracial order. They do not perceive their project as a partisan agenda. Rather, for them, decolonization is itself a national project.

Commitment to decolonization is today the central formal criteria of merit among new guard diplomats, much like a degree in international relations was for the old guard. That is,

among new entrants, commitment emerges as the new criterion by which they draw the line between the worthy and the unworthy. Commitment is also narrated as a motivating force in their decision to become diplomats. This embracing of a discourse that both articulates a critique of the state's exclusionary past and valorizes indigeneity is part of a new repertoire by which new entrants judge their worth and that of others.

As I discuss later in the chapter, the centrality of social and political commitment to decolonization has also shaped ministry reforms to the Diplomatic Academy, which now seeks to train a new type of decolonized diplomat. By declaring their commitment, the new guard challenges the criteria by which the old guard purportedly defined the modern 'ideal bureaucrat,' namely their commitment to the institution rather than a political project.

Members of the new guard mobilize a notion of the decolonized ideal bureaucrat that also includes other criteria deriving from the notion of commitment. For example, new diplomats emphasize interculturality and inclusiveness, embracing the revalorization of indigenous peoples and cultures in the state.

In this sense, commitment also entails a willingness to undergo a deep process of personal transformation, whereby colonial schemas of thought, such as racism and discrimination, are shed. Carolina explains, "Decolonization is about decolonizing our minds, beginning with not bullying or mocking someone who does not speak correctly, [...] discriminating an indigenous person when instead we can all be part of something together. [...] To decolonize your mind, to open it, to understand the other." Marina understands decolonization similarly, as "breaking mental structures [...] to rescue what we once were, strengthen it today and project a new country, a new being, a new person." Thus, the new

bureaucratic guard links the macro-political project of decolonization to an individual-level change regarding the ethnoracial organization of interactions and thought.

In contrast to the careerism of the old guard, indigenous new entrants articulate commitment with what they describe as sacrifice. They assert and reassert a willingness to sacrifice their own career interests for the construction of a new Bolivia. This claimed selflessness is partly signaled through the remark that they never aspired to become diplomats. They have put aside their own professional aspirations to contribute to the greater good. For example, Marina points out that her ultimate goal is to return to working directly with rural communities. Similarly, Martín, a new-guard diplomat in his early 30s, aspires to return to his indigenous community to take on local leadership roles.

Even Minister David Choquehuanca has noted that his life goal is to be a weaver of new ways of thinking and to become an indigenous spiritual leader (La Razón 2006a). Unlike his predecessors, including career diplomats like Javier Murillo and Armand Loaiza, Choquehuanca describes having little to no particular desire to be Foreign Minister. What might have been a prestigious accomplishment for an old guard diplomat was a sacrifice in Choquehuanca's narrative, a temporary hiatus from his true vocation. In fact, in 2017, following eleven years of service, David Choquehuanca stepped down from his ministerial position, returning to his previous role as a grassroots organizer. His replacement was former Director of State Protocol and Ceremonial, Fernando Huanacuni, an Aymara lawyer and scholar of indigenous ancestral knowledges.

While those who aspire to enter *Cancillería* and current members of the Central and Foreign Services might claim it, commitment claims require substantiation. The worthy

(decolonized) ideal bureaucrat must have or demonstrate organic links to the indigenous peasant population and/or the indigenous peasant movement. As Choquehuanca has noted in various public speeches, the new Bolivian diplomat must know Bolivia and in particular the “deep Bolivia” that is rural, poor, and indigenous (Stefanoni 2006).

New-guard diplomats substantiate their commitment claims with shared professional and activist trajectories that link them to the indigenous movement. Specifically, they often point to linkages to indigenous communities and activism in their trajectories. For example, Isabel started actively working with her indigenous community’s authorities nearly twenty years ago to organize politically and mobilize against poor socioeconomic conditions. Marina also highlights links, though less direct than Isabel’s, to indigenous rural communities. She was a consultant on agricultural issues and participatory governance in rural municipal governments. Jaime too worked with NGOs doing political organizing and consulting work alongside peasant unions. Through project collaborations with indigenous organizations, Carolina, an urban Aymara new-guard diplomat, had met Isabel before arriving to *Cancillería*.

Like most members of the new guard, invitees Carolina, Isabel and Jaime did not have formal diplomatic training. As a graduate of the new Diplomatic Academy, Martín is an exception in terms of prior training. Yet, Martín too had a trajectory of youth movement militancy in his hometown.

For the most part, new guard diplomats cultivated connections with the current *Cancillería* leadership and executives through joint work with indigenous movement organizations. These networks form the base from which invitees to the ministry are often drawn. Organicity is thus the primary corroboration of commitment. At some high-level ranks,

claims to commitment must often be accompanied with endorsements from indigenous and peasant organizations, called *Avalos*. In today's Bolivia, these trajectories and networks are thus a valuable credential, a new form of organizational capital.

Commitment is not equal to party militancy and cannot be corroborated merely by shifting partisan allegiances. In my research, I found that new-guard diplomats are predominantly not card-carrying MAS militants. For example, Jaime, who considers himself “part of the social movements that have brought along this change,” notes, “I am not a MAS militant.” He adds, “I don’t come from a national left, let’s say. Rather I come from an indigenous left.” Commitment lies with a political project linked to the indigenous movement rather than the party itself, though certainly party militancy is not a hindrance. This is consistent with recent survey findings (Soruco et al. 2014). For example, in the Ministry of Education, the only central-level agency surveyed, nearly 78 percent of employees did not identify as MAS militants, although about half of them identified as sympathizers. In *Cancillería*, affirmation of party militancy is more prevalent among those at the leadership and executive levels, consistent also with recent survey results.

The importance of prior linkages to the indigenous movement as opposed to party militancy in commitment claims is further substantiated by anecdotes regarding old-guard diplomats who unsuccessfully tried to claim commitment. For example, a new-guard diplomat told me the following anecdote:

But, I insist, [old-guard diplomats] were very good at camouflaging themselves because they had always done so. [...] There was a lady— she was so funny! A lady who was the living image of all that [diplomatic model]. She was like a caricature of it [chuckles]. And the lady [...] in order to avoid being kicked out [...] founded a MAS local office in her neighborhood [chuckles], ok? And she would call you *compañero*! [chuckles] How funny this was! [chuckles] Of course, they did that. These were strategies.

In his view, her attempt to demonstrate her commitment, to become a *compañera*, through local party organizing was an insincere strategy. She had no prior connections to the indigenous movement or the MAS party, as she had spent her life not only as a career diplomat, but also living in the upper-middle class white-*mestizo* area of La Paz. The legitimacy of a claim to commitment, thus, rests on a demonstrable trajectory of participation in or collaboration with the indigenous movement and/or indigenous populations. Commitment thus cannot always be successfully claimed.

In addition, to demonstrate their commitment, new guard diplomats emphasize their proactiveness, which they view in terms of struggle and contestation. They view themselves as proponents rather than passive administrators. In their view, unlike in the past, their driving political commitment leads them to take proactive policy stances in international relations, and to advance the indigenous struggle. In their self-understandings, if their diplomacy is conflictual, this is only because international diplomacy has been unjust, and the old guard just went with it. Members of the new guard often illustrate their proactiveness through a catalogue of foreign policy accomplishments previously believed impossible, such as Bolivia's diplomatic efforts and stances regarding the decriminalization of coca leaf.<sup>44</sup> Yet, proactiveness is also performed in everyday organizational life through displays of rupture with the status

---

<sup>44</sup> In 2011, Bolivia withdrew from the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, which outlawed the indigenous practice of *akhulliku*, or the practice and ritual of coca leaf chewing. Prior to this unprecedented move, Bolivian diplomats had introduced a proposal to have Article 49 on coca leaf chewing suppressed, which encountered the opposition of several countries, including the United States. Since 2009, the practice is constitutionally protected in the country. Old guard foreign policy experts at the time had predicted that the strategy would fail and have dire consequences for the country and its foreign relations. Yet, in 2013, Bolivia managed to re-adhere to the Convention, this time with reservations on coca leaf use and cultivation matters.

quo, as when new-guard diplomats make unconventional proposals and work long hours and weekends to toward fulfilling such objectives.

Members of the new guard also emphasize and to varying extents practice horizontality in their daily interactions. They, for example, have shed the use of formal address and titles for the preferred terms *compañero/compañera* and brother/sister. While the bureaucracy continues to have hierarchies of command, members of the new guard present themselves as challenging those norms through rejection of rank and educational titles. Elias, an indigenous bureaucrat in his 40s, narrates his resistance to adopt educational degree prefixes, like *licenciado*, which recognizes a person's college degree.

He is *licenciado*, that. Many told me, 'you can't say out loud, Andrea, Andrea. She has a bachelor's degree. You have to tell her *Licenciada* Andrea.' That's it. So, at the same time, they will dominate me in there... ((chuckles)) Decolon- ((chuckles)) I call no one *licenciado*. Just *hermano* I tell them, how are you? The Viceminister, 'how are you viceminister hermano?' To the minister, I've never called him *licenciado*. I've never called him that. How are you *hermano* minister... Like that. You have to be sincere.

Similarly, Ana notes:

Please engineer, please doctor, or *licenciado*, I mean, that mentality is there, that practice is everywhere. In the countryside even worse because there was a time of subjugation that scared the very Aymara, the very indigenous person and subjugated him and brought those behaviors from the middle ages. Even in my own work, in my office, my own workmates still do that of *licenciado*, doctor, but there is no horizontality... there is still discrimination, in my view, from the top down.

Both Elias and Ana articulate the use of prefixes with discrimination, domination or subjugation, particularly toward rural indigenous people. Elias opts for the term *hermano*, or brother, which in the current bureaucratic context indexes its users as indigenous, but also subverts ethnoracial and class distinctions through references to the family. Diana clarifies this as follows, "[Our] mother earth... is the one that feeds us. We live in her. She is like our mother and because of that, I call you my brother, ok?"

In addition to *hermano/a*, *Compañero/a* is used in daily organizational interactions to distinguish the politically committed and the non-committed, the worthy and the unworthy. In doing so, new guard diplomats also reject the perceived hierarchical interactions that characterized the old guard, and their use of addresses like Ambassador, His Excellency, or Doctor, among others. Thus, members of the new guard stress equality of treatment through the rejection of hierarchy as desirable traits of public servants.

Ultimately, then, members of the new guard mobilize new criteria of worth and thus merit, through which they contest the boundary between bureaucracy and indigeneity. In this sense formal training is not understood to be the key or primary determinant of worthiness, but part of a whole set of criteria within which social movement logics figure prominently.

### ***An Unprecedented Foreign Minister as Architect***

Members of the new guard generally point to the Foreign Minister as the key articulator of the decolonization committed vision. Marina, for example, explains,

Our minister, what he has tried to do is, since he is indigenous, he brings much of his indigeneity to *Cancillería* and [...] that has had an impact in everything we do. [...] All these changes are done mostly by the minister [...] because they are a way to join East and West [...] always trying to find the equilibrium between East and West.

This sentiment is echoed by Jaime, who explains, “I believe that Choquehuanca is the one that best expresses this process [of decolonization] by far.” The construction of a new bureaucratic imaginary whereby the first indigenous Foreign Minister stands as its architect represents a radical symbolic break with the past, which legitimizes and facilitates new assumptions and expectations that shape the trajectories of new state agents.

President Morales's appointment of David Choquehuanca Céspedes to Foreign Minister marked a radical break with the modal habitus around which *Cancillería* is constituted. His background and trajectory contrast significantly with the almost exclusively white and urban elite profile of its predecessors. Instead, Choquehuanca's background and trajectory more closely resemble that of pioneer indigenous bureaucrats, except that pioneers were admitted only into highly restricted spaces of the state dealing with "indigenous issues."

Born in 1961 in the Aymara community of Cota Cota Baja in Omasuyo Province, La Paz, Choquehuanca is the first indigenous man in Bolivia's history to hold this post. He grew up exclusively speaking Aymara until the age of 7, when he enrolled in the local public school and began to learn Spanish (Ticona Alejo 2011). Three years later, Choquehuanca moved to the nearby town of Huarina, where he completed his primary and secondary education (Cancillería de Bolivia n.d.). At the time, in the post-revolutionary context of indigenist *mestizaje*, Bolivian public education was primarily concerned with assimilating the population into white-*mestizo* Hispanicized culture (Canessa 2005). Displays of indigeneity, through clothing or language, were discouraged and punished, including through physical punishment.<sup>45</sup>

At the start of the 1980s, Choquehuanca left Huarina for La Paz to pursue higher education because institutions of higher education were exclusively concentrated in the country's large urban centers. Like in other Latin American countries, public higher education primarily served the urban upper and upwardly mobile middle classes. In La Paz, Choquehuanca enrolled in the philosophy program at Simón Bolívar Higher Teacher Training College.

---

<sup>45</sup> Most older (>40 years of age) indigenous bureaucrats I interviewed who grew up speaking an indigenous language recalled being pinched, hit, or insulted by teachers for speaking an indigenous language in elementary school, and feeling ashamed of their culture and backgrounds.

As his official biography in *Cancillería's* website recounts, “the change from country to city life was traumatizing. He saw there was a lot of discrimination and exclusion, though he had no choice than to put up with and resist that adversity” (Cancillería de Bolivia n.d.). Motivated by the social injustice he saw, Choquehuanca quit his studies to become actively involved in social and political organizing for the indigenous movement, particularly the national peasant union federation (CSUTCB), created by a generation of indianista Katarista indigenous leaders emerging in the 1970s. Morales and Choquehuanca met at a meeting of a young peasants association in La Paz in 1984 (Quiroz 2015).

At CSUTCB during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Choquehuanca participated in the organization of the *500 años*, or 500 years campaign, which the indigenous peasant movement organized to counter the official commemoration of the beginning of the Spanish conquest of the Americas, “which helped him recover his self-esteem as a person and as part of indigenous peoples” (Cancillería de Bolivia n.d.). While at CSUTCB, he also participated in the creation of the Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (IPSP), which would later become the MAS-IPSP party (Quiroz 2015). He notes, “during those meetings [for the *500 años*] we decided to build a political movement. We said, ‘we have resisted so far and after 500 years we can’t keep resisting because they have to respect us.’ And in Bolivia we created a commission, anchored in CSUTCB, and we got to work.”

In 1998, he joined NINA, an indigenous-led political and social educational and training program created and financed by a consortium of national NGOs in 1989. NINA’s objective was to facilitate indigenous people’s participation in political decision-making. As the NINA national coordinator, Choquehuanca met and learned alongside leaders of the indigenous

movement, making this a decisive experience in his consolidation as one of the most important indigenous leaders and intellectuals of the country.

Choquehuanaca often describes himself and is described as a self-taught intellectual. He views himself primarily as “an organizer, a weaver, for political training, to generate a new type of thought, a different behavior” (Quiroz 2015). Yet, he does not lack formal educational credentials. In 1985, as a result of his work in the indigenous movement, he won a scholarship to study at the Niceto Pérez School for the Training of Cadres in Havana, Cuba. In 1990, he completed a post-graduate degree in History and Anthropology at the public national flagship university, San Andrés Major University. Moreover, in 2002, Choquehuanca completed a second postgraduate degree in Indigenous Peoples’ Rights at Cordillera University.

The appointment of David Choquehuanca to Foreign Minister in 2006 was a symbolically powerful move on the part of Morales and the MAS party. His appointment, however, derived not only from his movement trajectory and party militancy but also from his extensive experience in what the Morales administration would later call Peoples Diplomacy and incorporate as a guiding principle of decolonization in *Cancillería*. Prior to becoming Foreign Minister, Choquehuanca had served as an advisor in Congress to elected indigenous leaders and participated in various national and international meetings with social and indigenous movements.

By his own account, involvement in transnational movements and initiatives, linking indigenous peoples, labor unions, and left-wing parties, gave Choquehuanca a global perspective (Cancillería de Bolivia n.d.; Quiroz 2015). Choquehuanca recalls in an interview with the press (Quiroz 2015):

In one of those trips [coordinated through NINA] we traveled together between 1997 and 1998 to Libya; we went through Malta, on a boat, because they had a sanction, an air blockade. Their Foreign Minister met us. Evo Morales was already a representative [in Congress]; they were following his trajectory abroad and I don't know why. We talked informally and he said to Evo: 'You're going to become President. You have to already begin organizing what your government is going to be like.' And the host added, 'You have to know who your Foreign Minister is going to be already,' and the President answered, 'I already have one.' 'And who is it going to be?' he answered. 'It's him,' Evo said and pointed at me.

I used to organize trips to the social forums for the [indigenous peasant] leaders. That's what I did. On January 23 of 2006, I already had my tickets to go to the Social Forum of the Americas in Caracas. 'Who could it be? Who could it be?' he would tell me because they had already proposed that I run for senator and I would say, 'pass.' So, he would ask me, 'look for someone.' I did not imagine I would be Foreign Minister. I did not even want to. I had to travel on the 23<sup>rd</sup>. On the very last day he proposed it to me and I accepted. [...] We took over with a historic responsibility. We're living through a historic moment. I feel good.

Minister Choquehuanca's ethnoracial origin, professional trajectory, and organizing vocation were new to *Cancillería*. So was his unabashed indigenous identity and displays of his indigenous culture through language, clothing, and rituals. Choquehuanca followed President Morales's lead wearing a custom-designed black suit, adorned with Andean weavings, a collarless white shirt, and no tie. Many adherents to the decolonization project portray ties as a colonial vestige. More frequently, he wears a black leather jacket over an understated sweater, dark jeans, and dress shoes. At his oath ceremony, Choquehuanca made the government officials, foreign diplomats, and *Cancillería* functionaries raise their hands with their palms facing out and shout "*Jallalla*," a Quechua and Aymara word denoting joy, hope, and well-being.

In many of his addresses, David Choquehuanca often speaks Aymara and Quechua and deploys Aymara concepts. For example, at the 2014 public accountability meeting, held at *Cancillería's* elegant Tiwanaku Hall and attended by public servants, foreign diplomats, civil society, and the press, the Minister greeted the audience, "*Jallalla*, brothers and sisters." Some in the audience reciprocated shouting out, "*Jallalla*."

**Figure 6.1.** Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca (right) and his successor, Fernando Huanacuni (left), participate in an Andean indigenous ceremony led by two *amautas* at *Cancillería*'s Tiwanaku Hall (formerly known as Honors Hall) on the occasion of the leadership transfer.



Source: Abya Yala Televisión, January 24<sup>th</sup>, 2017.

Tiwanaku Hall is a heavily ornamented and imposing space, featuring tall white and golden columns, blue arches, nineteenth century framed mirrors, a vaulted ceiling with a glass production of the Bolivian coat of arms, and more. Until 1934, the entire historic building, including the hall, belonged to the Club La Paz, a social club for the *paceño* urban elites. In that same space, speaking Aymara, the Minister then asked how many in the audience spoke Aymara. A few in the audience raised their hands or spoke back in the same language. He then began to list other languages, pausing for a response, assuming everyone had understood what he had asked. “Quechua? Guaraní? Chiquitano? English? *Quimsani* [Thirteen]. Spanish?

Everyone! Ok, let's speak in Spanish then." His concession to speak in Spanish brought out some chuckles from the audience, but the performance was symbolically effective in turning, even for a minute, the assumption of Spanish as the only language of state.

**Figure 6.2.** Audience at the yearly accountability meeting of the Ministry of Foreign Relations held in *Cancillería's* Tiwanaku Hall on February 14<sup>th</sup>, 2014.



Source: Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2014.

Throughout the speech, moreover, the Minister used Aymara concepts, translating and explaining their meaning to the audience:

*Tumpa*, the mandatory control that has to exist between all of us, between the *taxpacha*, not only between the *taqini*. When we say *taqini*, we speak only of people, and when we say *taxpacha*, we speak of everything that exists. So, when we establish this type of dialogue, not only does it have to be of the interest of human beings but of everything that exists in our *Pachamama*.

Choquehuanca not only spoke of Bolivia's foreign policies on various matters, including indigenous peoples rights, the environment, and trade, among others. He also spoke of the need to recognize and recover indigenous identities and the racist colonial history that sought to erase them.

In Choquehuanca's *Cancillería*, similar statements and performances have abounded since 2006. This diverges significantly from the experience of the few indigenous men and women who managed to secure high-level posts in the bureaucracy before 2006. As I discussed in Chapter 4, pioneer indigenous bureaucrats, much like successful black bureaucrats and politicians in the U.S. (Lamont and Fleming 2005) and the U.K. (Puwar 2004), navigated white normativity by downplaying their marked racial status. In turn, Choquehuanca remain unwavering in his efforts to use his body to contest these spaces and to articulate Bolivia's diplomacy to indigenous and popular culture (Ticona Alejo 2011). This does not mean, however, that Choquehuanca has not faced the same racism pioneer indigenous bureaucrats faced. His actions and statements, as I noted in the previous chapter, caused much controversy among the old political elite and evoked dozens of explicitly racist expressions and mockery.

### **The Unworthy Old Guard and their Racist Bureaucracy**

This section examines the discursive strategies through which the new guard discredits the old guard's conception of the ideal bureaucrat on the basis of commitment. Amidst the unsettled taken-for-granted of diplomatic practice in Bolivia today, the new guard thus mobilizes and seeks to institutionalize a competing notion of the ideal bureaucrat embedded in the decolonization discourse, and its rearticulated meanings of indigeneity and modernity, to assert

their own worthiness. This competing notion builds on shared activist, personal, and professional experiences and trajectories that link most new guard diplomats to the indigenous peasant population and movement. Indigenous new entrants and their allies do not only mobilize a competing notion of worth. They also draw on new symbolic resources, made available by the decolonization discourse, to directly contest the old guard's notion of the ideal bureaucrat and discredit its claims to governing the diplomatic field, as I show in Table 6.1.

**Table 6.1.** The new guard's 'ideal bureaucrat' criteria.

| <b>"DECOLONIZED" BUREAUCRAT</b> |                  |
|---------------------------------|------------------|
| <b>Worthy</b>                   | <b>Unworthy</b>  |
| Committed                       | Status           |
| Intercultural                   | Monocultural     |
| Inclusive                       | Racist           |
| Organic                         | Elite            |
| Sacrifice                       | Selfish          |
| Proponent                       | Administrator    |
| Horizontal                      | Hierarchical     |
| Merit                           | Race             |
| <b>Bureaucracy/Indigeneity</b>  | <b>Whiteness</b> |

Members of the new guard mobilize symbolic representations of white-*mestizo* old-guard bureaucrats as self-interested, discriminatory, and un-representative. They also understand the old set of bureaucratic criteria as built on racism and individualism, the maladies of modernity. For example, whereas indigenous new entrants and their allies highlight their political commitment as the key motivating factor behind their entrance to the state, they portray old-guard diplomats as self-interested. In particular, in the new guard's representations of career diplomats, old guard careers are primarily driven by the search for status.

Thus, members of the old guard are viewed as overly concerned with credentials, ranks, and appearance over true political commitment. Marina, for example, notes how when she

arrived to the ministry, “We were surprised by their level of formal training and they always talked about their credentials and training. It was very important to them. Even the matter of dress was very important to them. [...] A diplomat, in addition to being a good negotiator, must have a good appearance, and that in itself gave a good impression.” Similarly, Jaime critically describes diplomacy as having to do “with how much of a hypocrite you are in carrying a relationship, how well dressed you are, and what your surname is.”

Jaime’s and Marina’s accounts mark a key difference between committed diplomats and career diplomats. As Marina puts it, “Obviously, we, the new arrivals, didn’t know those rules, we didn’t know the importance of appearance. But, even then, we would not have dressed that formal.” They were not concerned with adhering to them. Instead, their words convey a sense of irony in the notion that these criteria secured worthiness. Their accounts mark a sharp line between the new guard and career diplomats in that it represents new entrants as unconcerned with adhering to these norms.

Most importantly, new guard diplomats articulate a decolonization critique of the exclusionary ethnoracial history of the Foreign Ministry, challenging the purported race-neutrality of the Weberian ideal bureaucrat notion that the old guard mobilizes. They discredit the old guard’s diplomatic criteria of worth by highlighting their ethnoracial entanglements. They often describe the historical construction of the ministry as a white elite exclusionary space, which today they have disrupted. For example, Aymara sociologist Esteban Ticona Alejo, the Former Director of the Diplomatic Academy (2006-2011), notes that the old guards’ constant questioning and scrutiny of Choquehuanca’s abilities and qualifications reveals an underlying racist logic. He explains, “For us the matter is simple, it is so painful for the ‘lords

and masters' that a Choquehuanca is Foreign Minister and not a MacLean, or some other surname of the *q'ara* or Creole elite, as they were accustomed to" (Ticona Alejo 2011:135).

In these accounts, indigenous new entrants and their allies challenge the apolitical meritocracy of members of the old guard, instead representing their purported meritocratic careers as careers based on race. For example, Carolina describes it as, "created by families that were always there in *Cancillería*. Families with a lot of power. Children of families with a lot of power." For Jaime, *Cancillería* was created and inhabited by "aristocratic families." He expands, *Cancillería* has always been a spoil of war, even more so the Foreign Service. [...] But what prevailed? Basically, families, ok? Surnames. That was respected even if you were from different political parties. There was that aspect of class, that distinction. You can check [...] how families have stayed and their children are still there.

In describing the ministry as a space monopolized by white upper-class families, they emphasize its racially exclusionary history.

Furthermore, they identify racist representations of indigenous peoples as intellectually inferior as the basis of such closure. This is best exemplified in the following quote by Inés:

Come on! A Choquehuanca is Foreign Minister. [...] But before, it was not like that. The surnames that the colonials had... they could be [in authority positions], even in the universities. If you were Indian, you were badly seen. 'Look at that! Could that Indian really be a doctor?' if you were studying medicine, a person from a dark race, but they saw you like that. They were always seen as if they were not capable. That only [whites] could be there. It was more than anything reserved for people from a white [pause] class, race. [...]. But today, that's no longer the case.

Inés, a self-identified indigenous woman in her 40s, points to *Cancillería*'s main leader, an indigenous man with an indigenous surname, to illustrate a break with a bureaucratic model in which racialized notions of merit organized access and trajectories.

For the new guard, old-guard diplomats are defenders of a racist regime that buttressed the whiteness of bureaucratic space. Hence, Inés contrasts today's *Cancillería*, whose leader is an indigenous man, with the pre-2006 diplomatic space to highlight the distinction between a

more inclusive present and an old-guard bureaucratic model that discounts the worth of indigenous professionals and reserves access to white-*mestizos*. Descriptions of the past, like that of Inés, problematize the erased naturalization of bureaucratic authority in white-*mestizo* bodies, positing that the old guard's purported meritocratic trajectories were in fact afforded to them by their whiteness.

In the committed ideal bureaucrat notion, self-interest and racist entanglements preclude the commitment that makes bureaucrats worthy. On the one hand, in new guard accounts, they preclude a sense of duty for country. As Marina, notes,

We went to [international] organizations where they told us, for example, that even though we had voice and vote, 'Bolivia never spoke up.' [...] 'You always submitted to what others said.' [...] I have a friend who told me, 'they [old guard diplomats] were not in the meeting. They went shopping and at night they would come and vote.' Instead, we listened and confronted what the rest said. [...] Even now they complain that we speak too much.

In this account, old-guard diplomats used international negotiations as shopping trips, putting their personal interests ahead of those of the country. By contrast, the committed new-guard diplomats put duty before pleasure and use these spaces to advance the social and political project they are committed to.

On the other hand, old-guard self-interest and racist entanglements preclude solidarity for the sake of the country. As Jaime notes,

Many [career diplomats] quit [...] because they were carriers, even unknowingly I think, of seigniorial logics, ok? Of course, their dream was to be an ambassador like their fathers, or be posted abroad, ok? even those who came from humble families. They bought into this tale of being a diplomat. [chuckles] The status!

In diplomatic practice, he further notes, "if your head is overtaken by the idea that getting a foreign post, becoming a consul, and basically being a small king is the greatest thing you can aspire to in life, you don't have the sense of country that we are betting for."

For the new guard, the old guard's seigniorial logics trump commitment because their priorities are prestige and status. Hence, in the new guard's representation of the old guard, their search for status, elite positions, and racist entanglements and logics make them unworthy bureaucrats. Members of the new diplomatic guard, in fact, narrate feeling a strong rejection from career diplomats. For example, Marina notes,

You could feel, not so much work-wise, but at the personal level, a hatred, a deep hatred from people in the diplomatic career towards us. They wouldn't give you information, equipment, or the conditions to work. [...] There were still people that resisted. [...] They hated us because we had not done the diplomatic career.

This sentiment is echoed by Carolina, who tells me that upon her arrival,

I began to feel that thing of being a graduate [of the academy] or not, and the hierarchies. That's why when you talk about decolonization of the public servants, it is not a process that is yet totally embraced by people. There are still few that do that, but it's still there. It's like they see you there to serve them not to help them, to build together, [...] recognizing equality.

As their words reveal, Marina and Carolina feel that the old guard's commitment to the status the diplomatic career grants stymied the possibility of working as equals. What is more, their lack of commitment, as Marina observes, echoing the experiences of many other new-guard diplomats, turns into active sabotage of the new guard's efforts.

In informal conversations, several new guard diplomats claimed that many members of the old guard attempted to actively thwart initiatives of the new government, misplacing documents, withholding information, and misinforming the new guard on how certain processes worked, among other purported actions. Esteban Ticona Alejo, in turn, has written that during his time in *Cancillería*, members of the old guard were outraged by the idea that an "indian" could lead the ministry (Ticona Alejo 2011).

In these new guard accounts, then, the old bureaucrat model and its practices fall beyond the kind of bureaucracy that today's political context demand. This redrawing of the

worthy-unworthy boundary also redraws the dominant boundary between indigeneity and bureaucracy.

### **Institutionalizing the Decolonized Ideal Bureaucrat**

Much like the senior old guard over the last three decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the new guard leadership has sought to institutionalize its competing notion of the ideal bureaucrat and to build a new career diplomatic body with a strong *esprit de corps*. This is, however, an institution-building project that is based on a different ideological foundation, namely that of decolonization. Ministry reforms directed at this objective came on two fronts beyond changes to the ethnoracial, gender, and social composition of the ministry. First, the new guard engaged in what Wingfield and Alston (2014) call “ideological work,” codifying new organizational practices and culture wherein whiteness was no longer taken for granted, primarily through the Diplomatic Academy. Second, the incoming administration promoted a new Foreign Service Law that would set new guidelines for the diplomatic career and for Bolivian foreign policy stances and objectives on the basis of Living Well and Peoples Diplomacy.

Regarding the first front, in their work, Wingfield and Alston (2014) use the concept of “ideological work” to refer to a type of racial task carried out by members of ethnoracial minorities in predominantly white organizations that help establish and maintain an organizational culture wherein whiteness is normative. Such tasks, for example, include helping advance an organizational image of colorblindness and meritocracy that effectively erases its racialized exclusion and structure. Here, instead, I show that in the context of a hegemonic state decolonization discourse and control of the bureaucracy by the formerly excluded, the

latter are able to fill key organizational posts where central organizational processes and practices are determined. Through the deployment of rhetoric and organizational resources, the formerly excluded are thus able to challenge the normativity of whiteness and redraw the boundary between the bureaucracy and, in this case, indigeneity.

Although the position of the academy within the ministry has been unclear in recent years, it is evident that the leadership understood the academy as necessary to its long-term objectives. Thus, rather than closing the academy, the new leadership renamed the old Rafael Bustillo Diplomatic Academy through which the old guard had controlled access to the Ministry since the 1980s. The new Plurinational Diplomatic Academy became an important site for and actor in the development and codification of a new diplomatic practice.

Before 2006, the Academy had been under the direction of career diplomats with academic credentials in international relations, such as Jorge Gumucio, Juan Ignacio Siles, and Armando Loaiza, among others. Minister Choquehuanca's choice for Director of the Diplomatic Academy was the renowned Aymara sociologist and anthropologist Esteban Ticona Alejo, appointed in 2007. Ticona, who majored in Sociology at the San Andrés Major University and graduated with honors in 1986, had a Masters' degree in Anthropology from the Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO) in Ecuador and a PhD in cultural studies from Simón Bolívar Andean University in Ecuador. He has authored and co-authored dozens of academic books and articles on indigenous political organizing and thought. Having taught at various national and international universities, Ticona had ample experience developing and running educational programs, but had no educational credentials in international relations or diplomacy specifically.

Ticona ran the academy between 2007 and 2011 with the primary objective of developing of a new ‘decolonized’ educational curriculum and a ‘democratized’ recruitment system for the academy and *Cancillería*. In an interview with *Casa de las Américas* in 2013, Ticona noted,

Heading the Diplomatic Academy of my country, I asked myself everyday how this colonial state works and how we could transform it, because that’s the paradox. We have a very advanced constitution that speaks of the Plurinational State but in many tangible ways the colonial state is still present because it is not a process that was done on a clean slate. For me there are many challenges related to how to change those elements. [...] We have to realize that the diplomatic field is very elitist in which a close-minded mentality predominates. I was the first director of the Diplomatic Academy who did not come from the diplomatic world. I remember that when the Foreign Minister [Choquehuanca], who was the first indigenous Foreign Minister, all of them were asking themselves how he was going to be able to carry out his duties, it’s going to be shameful, they said, and they said the same thing about the president. I remember that Vargas Llosa even called President Morales a brute indian and all those point of views were inside the country and of course it was a huge task to change minds. In that sense I think we’ve made much progress but obviously there’s still a lot to do because the main task is to decolonize. (Gómez Triana and Gutiérrez Torres 2013)

Ticona viewed working on the “symbolic front” as essential to the construction of an intercultural public administration model that would replace the extant “colonial and paternalist” model (Viceministerio de Descentralización 2007). By the symbolic, Ticona means clothing, architecture, protocols, forms of communication, languages, and knowledge (Viceministerio de Descentralización 2007). This understanding of Bolivian public administration and diplomacy informed Ticona’s work in the Ministry.

In this context and under Ticona’s leadership, the Diplomatic Academy collaborated with the new Director General of Ceremonial and Protocol Fernando Huanacuni, an Aymara lawyer and scholar of indigenous ancestral knowledge, in codifying a new protocol for Peoples Diplomacy based on Andean indigenous ceremonies, primarily Aymara and Quechua. In 2007 and 2008, the Plurinational Diplomatic Academy organized a series of workshops named “Learning New Protocols,” that *Cancillería* functionaries, academy students, and scholars of

indigenous practices attended (Cancillería de Bolivia 2009a). The workshops led to the publication of two ministry books on the new protocols: “The *Akhulli*: Coca in Peoples Diplomacy” (2009a) and “The *Apthapi*: The Indigenous Banquet in Peoples Diplomacy” (2009b). *Cancillería* also produced an instructional DVD on other elements of indigenous protocol. The main contributors were members of the Andean Oral History Workshop, which Ticona had co-founded with other indigenous scholars.

The development of new forms of protocol often, though not always, used in *Cancillería* events intended to mirror the broader transformation of the Bolivian state under decolonization. Consider this excerpt from the prologue of the second publication:

In this change juncture that the Bolivian state lives, changes are also taking place in its traditions, behaviors and practices, one of which is, without a doubt, foreign diplomacy, which through new ways and styles promotes the emergence of a new form of relating, protocoling the diplomatic practice of indigenous peoples as part of ‘peoples’ diplomacy.’ As such, the diplomacy and protocolled ceremonies of indigenous peoples are now understood within the categories and logics of an inclusive and open thought in order to understand and share new ways and traditions, without discrimination. (Cancillería de Bolivia 2009b:5).

New forms of protocol also articulated a critique of Western diplomatic practice, understood as individualist and hierarchical, and proposed an alternative form of diplomatic human relations.

Hence, the same publication adds:

This publication’s intention is for the *apthapi* to be considered part of the official state protocol and of society because of its deep social and conciliatory sense, which fosters equity and respect between participants. The *apthapi* is a communal practice where everyone shares with each other without restrictions or established hierarchies, getting closer to *suma jakaña* or *suma qamaña* (living well). (Cancillería de Bolivia 2009b:7)

Thus, the codification of “indigenous diplomatic protocols” became a vehicle to revalorize indigenous epistemology and practices vis-à-vis the state. It was also a new resource that the leadership envisioned gradually becoming part of the diplomatic toolkit of the new guard and of their nationalized diplomacy project.

As director of the academy, Ticona also oversaw important changes to the educational curriculum and the implementation of new educational programs. Early on, he incorporated courses, such as “Theories of Decolonization” and “Culture, Power, and Interculturality,” as a requirement in the curricular structure of the academy’s Master’s degree in Foreign Relations and Diplomacy and required modified course content to expand the definition of Bolivian history and culture. Ticona also developed a postgraduate certification in Cultural Diplomacy, whose objective was “to recover our own identity and culture and use it to build new forms of relating with other countries” (Peña Aguilar 2015). The academy also organized talks and workshops on new topics, including decolonization and indigenous practices.

The implementation of an indigenous language requirement in the curriculum, offering three levels Quechua and Aymara, was similarly innovative. The courses were also offered to *Cancillería* employees, who since 2009 are constitutionally mandated to speak at least two official Bolivian languages.<sup>46</sup> In 2012, a group of eight *Cancillería* employees became the first in the entire executive branch to complete the Aymara certification, with another group having already completed two levels of Quechua. There is now a group of diplomats certified by the institution to read, write and speak Aymara.

When Ticona left his post in 2011, Choquehuanca replaced him with Carla Espósito Guevara, another sociologist. Espósito held bachelor’s and a master’s degrees in sociology from the San Simón Major University in Cochabamba and Cordillera University in La Paz, respectively. In the early 2000s, before joining *Cancillería*, Espósito worked as a social

---

<sup>46</sup> The new Bolivian Constitution, enacted in 2009, recognizes Spanish, Quechua, Aymara, Guaraní, and 33 other indigenous languages as official languages of the state.

researcher at the NGO UNITAS, conducting research on political participation and empowerment with mining cooperatives. During this time, she met David Choquehuanca, as UNITAS was the main sponsor of the NINA project, which he coordinated. Later, Espósito joined Cordillera University as a researcher in the Observatory on Racism. In 2009, she joined the Bolivian Foreign Service in the high rank of Minister Counselor in Bolivia's Permanent Mission to the United Nations.

Like her predecessor, Espósito did not have formal credentials on international relations and/or diplomacy before leading the academy, but her experience at the United Nations shaped her vision for the future of the training curriculum. As she explained,

[The new diplomat] must have two components. He must have technical expertise, because before the desire was purely for technical expertise, but we aim for both a political and technical profile. That diplomacy is apolitical is a huge lie. It's not true. It's very political. Diplomacy is the most political thing that exists, so [the new diplomat] must have that trait, a political edification linked to the political project of the government as well as technical traits, a good technical training that will allow him to defend himself in international forums, or in bilateral meetings, during negotiations, etc. (Interview with the author in 2014)

She advanced the idea of a balance between political and technical development in the new diplomatic curriculum. The central topics of Living Well, Peoples Diplomacy, and Decolonization still figure prominently in the curriculum. But the curriculum also emphasizes negotiation techniques, international law, and diplomatic law. She has also overseen the creation of the Peoples' Diplomacy for Life Research Center within the academy and launch of an international analysis journal named "Rupture."

Another initiative that Ticona took and Espósito continued was to transform the ethnoracial and social composition of the student body in order to break with the "elitism" of *Cancillería* and the academy. As Espósito notes in our interview, "we want the foreign service to mirror the social reality of the country." In this vein, the ministry has implemented the

Diplomatic Academy Democratization Program with the goal of, as its name indicates, democratizing access to the Diplomatic Academy.

To achieve a diverse student body, recruitment to the academy was widely publicized across Bolivia's nine departments. The program also shed the requirement that applicants should have a university degree relating to international relations, making applicants with any university degree eligible. Other criteria for admissions into the program were also changed, such as the foreign language requirement. Beginning with Ticona, indigenous languages became a valued asset, responding to Choquehuanca's public statements that diplomats would be required to speak at least one indigenous language. Martín, an indigenous new guard diplomat who accessed the ministry after completing the Master's degree in the Plurinational Diplomatic Academy, believes these changes made his entrance possible.

A press release from *Cancillería* (RREE 2015) on the occasion of the 2015 Diplomatic Academy graduation ceremony explains:

In the graduation ceremony of the new diplomats, [Minister Choquehuanca] highlighted that the new diplomatic professionals must have new values: humility, fellowship, solidarity and to not be selfish. Choquehuanca also highlighted that the new professional diplomats must balance a technical profile with a politico-ideological one, and that 'before diplomats had only a handful of last names, it was an exclusionary system, so it is one of the goals of our government to take back the diplomatic academy on behalf of Bolivians.' [...] The Diplomatic Academy graduated 28 new masters who concluded their studies on Diplomacy and International Relations, in the framework of Peoples Diplomacy for Life, a new state vision and action in its relations with governments, states, international organizations and social organizations worldwide. [...] The new Bolivian diplomatic profile no longer consists of an elite functionary disconnected from national reality, passive and with a tendency to support the political positions of the powerful nations. Since 2006, the Plurinational Diplomatic Academy seeks to train diplomats committed with national reality and the process of change that the country is undergoing [...].

In the vision of the new guard leadership, the future diplomats will mirror Bolivian society, advance a new committed vision, speak indigenous languages, and have a combination of technical abilities with political edification.

The second front through which the incoming administration has sought to codify and institutionalize their emerging notion of the ideal bureaucrat is through the development, proposal, and enactment of a new Law of the Foreign Relations Service. In December 2013, Evo Morales Ayma signed Law 456, effectively replacing the law the senior old guard had advocated for in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Effectively, the law re-establishes the diplomatic career system, a mandate that *Cancillería* leadership will gradually implement. Two initial steps toward its implementation took place in 2014. First, the Ministry's Legal Direction began conducting educational workshops about the new law for all employees of the Central and Foreign Services. Second, the diplomatic academy has expanded and strengthened its training program for current *Cancillería* personnel. In 2014, *Cancillería* employees could enroll in one of three executive master's programs, which would enable those not belonging to the diplomatic career to 'regularize' their status in the ministry once the law goes into full effect.

In addition to the re-establishment of the diplomatic career, Law 465 also incorporates in its text the values and principles the Morales administration and the new diplomatic guard leadership have advanced. Article 2 codifies twelve principles: rights, living well, pluriculturality, peoples' diplomacy for life, the rights of indigenous peoples and nations, the knowledge and practices of indigenous peoples and nations, the right to peace, security with food sovereignty, claim to sea access, integration and borders, trade based on solidarity and complementarity, and interculturality. In addition, the new law recognizes "social commitment" as a new criterion of merit in the incorporation of personnel into the diplomatic career. Moreover, in Article 54, the new law notes, "The career of the Ministry of Foreign Relations represents the work trajectory of the public servants of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, due to merit based on

experience, expertise, social commitment, skills and abilities.” In this sense, the new guard has adopted a similar strategy to that of the senior old guard in the 1980s and 1990s through which it hopes to durably alter the character of Bolivian Diplomacy and the diplomatic corps.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has examined how members of formerly excluded ethnoracial populations and their allies in *Cancillería* negotiate the ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy in the context of the Bolivian state project of state decolonization. I have shown that indigenous new entrants and their allies mobilize a competing notion of the ideal bureaucrat that valorizes their experiences and trajectories. I also show that new entrants draw on the decolonization critique to *contest* the racialized assumptions and expectations that organized this space, seeking to position themselves as the rightful occupants of *Cancillería*. Whereas members of the old guard emphasize their diplomatic credentials and dispositions, notions of social and political commitment figure prominently in how members of the new guard understand and describe their worth. Commitment is a theme that cuts across a heterogeneous new guard composed of rural indigenous segments of the population, urban indigenous segments, and progressive white-*mestizo* allies. As I showed in the analysis, new-guard notions of diplomatic worth map onto trajectories of work and activism with indigenous organizations, despite new entrants’ heterogeneous backgrounds and ethnoracial identities.

The decolonization discourse provided a rough map for the construction of a new public servant, but the new guard appropriated it and invested it with new meaning and their own experiences on the ground. Moreover, in mobilizing these criteria to discredit old-guard

diplomats, members of the new guard portray the old guard as carriers of the negative aspects of modernity, such as self-interest and racism, which preclude commitment.

The new and old guards' differing notion of the ideal bureaucrat are embedded in competing narratives of race and modernity that underlie two distinct projects: an elite modernizing-state project and a subaltern decolonizing-state project. Their ideological strength and backing by the state can constrain or expand the symbolic and material resources available to formerly excluded ethnoracial populations in renegotiating organizational ethnoracial boundaries.

In post-2006 Bolivia, the state decolonization project as an oppositional racial project of new state elites expanded the symbolic boundary strategies and resources of formerly excluded ethnoracial populations and their allies. The electoral success of an indigenous party enabled proponents of the state decolonization project to put the symbolic and material power of the state behind an oppositional racial project. In the *Cancillería* case, Choquehuanca furthermore placed decolonization supporters in key positions of organizational ideological production and pushed for the incorporation of indigenous people and knowledges. Decolonization also provided competing narratives of race and modernity that new entrants could appropriate in boundary work. Combined, these factors enabled formerly excluded ethnoracial populations and their allies to dispute the ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy, not least through the codification of a new notion of the ideal bureaucrat.

## CHAPTER 7

### Conclusion

Talking with Félix Cárdenas, the current Viceminister of Decolonization, he once said that this social relation between whites and indians, in a priori terms, consists in that a child who is born in a well-to-do white family's cradle starts opening his eyes and see his mom wearing makeup, all done-up, well dressed, and he also sees another woman that takes care of him whose hair is not styled, who is not done-up, not wearing makeup, and whom receives orders from his mother. So, since childhood, he gets used to ruling and that the other, in this case the indian, has to obey. Culturally, this is how they are raised. In a poor family's cradle, in this case indigenous or Aymara, let's say, when the child is born, he grows up with that trauma that he has been born to obey not to rule. I think this has been very strong during the hacienda because during that time everyone, parents, grandparents, children, young, old, ok? could order indians around, treat them however they wanted. So, they had to obey all the time. My parents always told me, they remembered, that you had to call the [patron's child] *niñito* (little boy), and you had to greet them kneeling, things like that. So, I think this has been constructed already from the very cradle. Obviously, when you reach a [state] post, that person who you can always order around is now in a higher position than you, for them it must have been a shock. They can't believe it, ok? and so many times they prefer to ignore you. [...] These are social constructions that a little bit shock you. I think these relations, like what happened to Mauricio Mamani and others, are a product of this situation, that whites don't value you.

Pablo, indigenous public servant, interview with the author, 2014

The good thing, for example, before, my dad told me that [in the past] you would enter government institutions and you would have to lower your hat. So, you had to enter state offices lowering your hat and nearly kneeling down, reverentially greet people, like that, but that part has also changed. [Indigenous] people come in as if they were in their own house. So, there is no longer fear, ok? They approach you and talk to you and ask you, without fear. But before, there was fear.

Inés, indigenous public servant, interview with the author, 2014

### Introduction

This dissertation has delved into the altered moment in which members of formerly excluded ethnoracial populations “take up ‘privileged’ positions which have not been reserved for them” (Puwar 2004:1) to examine how the state bureaucracy is racially constituted not only in terms of the policies it carries out but also internally, as practice and structure. It set out to answer two related questions. First, how does race shape the experiences of members of formerly

excluded ethnoracial populations within the state bureaucracy? The answer reveals the particular racialization of state bureaucratic spaces and dominant notions of the ideal bureaucrat, namely the formal and informal criteria that define who is recognized as a worthy actor in the bureaucratic field, in Bolivia. Second, how do new and old bureaucrats understand and navigate the white-*mestizo* state bureaucracy under decolonization? The answer sheds light on boundary work within the bureaucracy and the macropolitical dynamics that shape such boundary dynamics.

The Bolivian state decolonization project and the renegotiation of the ethnoracial boundaries of the state bureaucracy that it has unleashed are contested and ongoing processes. While indigenous movements had variously problematized indigenous exclusion, agents of the state historically confined their demands only to limited areas of the apparatus, such as indigenous and peasant affairs agencies and local governments and jurisdictions. As the above quotes and this study reveal, the hegemonic rise of a state-sanctioned oppositional racial project has notably altered not only indigenous access to the state bureaucracy but also how members of formerly excluded indigenous populations experience and navigate the ethnoracial boundaries of the central state bureaucracy. It has also altered how the old guard experiences what once was their social paradise, a bureaucratic space through which suited them and through which they naturally and seamlessly moved. This is because alongside ethnoracial recomposition, decolonization has politicized bureaucratic practice and its ethnoracial foundations and logics, previously insulated from racial politics under the veil of universality. In this context, decolonization has made indigenous inclusion and revalorization transversal to the state apparatus.

In my account, I have shown that dominant notions of the ideal bureaucrat are deeply intertwined with race, embedded in narratives of race and modernity that devalue the worth of indigenous entrants as state agents. They are constituted by and constitute exclusionary relations of power based on race, linking meaning and structure. However, in the context of state decolonization in Bolivia, new entrants *contest* dominant notions of the ideal bureaucrat in the everyday organizational life of the state, attempting to redefine the dominant criteria of bureaucratic worth and as such redraw the ethnoracial boundaries of the state. In light of scholarly accounts that emphasize minorities' conformity and complicity with the normativity of whiteness in elite spaces, I offer a cultural analytic framework that helps explain what made contestation possible in the post-2006 Bolivian bureaucracy.

The changing and contested bureaucratic landscape has blurred the boundary between statecraft and indigeneity, constructed over centuries of white monopoly of the bureaucracy. Yet, the durability of the project is not guaranteed as the sediment of history and competing racial projects weighs heavy on this political and cultural transformation. In the Bolivian *Cancillería* the enactment of the new Foreign Relations Service Statute, Law 465, in December 2013, represents an important step toward safeguarding the continuity of the government's vision for a decolonized foreign policy and body of diplomats. A similar statute is still missing for the broader field of public administration, formally regimented still by public administration and civil service laws from the 1990s. Much like in the past, implementation of the new law will be a slow process that will depend on the continuity of its advocates within the ministry. The government's efforts to codify and institutionalize decolonization within *Cancillería* and to

gradually expand its institutional autonomy are indicative of the level of politicization of state institutions themselves rather than only of the policies they carry out.

This project also speaks to additional questions. First, this study inserts itself in an emerging literature around the relationship between race and states. An exploration of the situated politics around ethnoracial exclusion in the state bureaucracy and racialized notions of the ideal bureaucrat provides insights into an underexamined and undertheorized dimension of the racial state, namely bureaucratic practice. Second, this study also problematizes the notion of the representative bureaucracy, particularly the link between passive and active representation, and the issue of race and democracy.

In the next section, I provide a brief synthesis of this dissertation's findings. I then discuss the implications of this study for a theory of the racial state. The third section addresses how this study contributes to our understanding of race work in organizations in order to shed light on the conditions under which different types of boundary work strategies and resources become available. The final section explores this study's broader relevance, thinking about its implications for scholarly and practitioner interest on representative bureaucracies and their democratic promise.

### **Synthesis of Findings**

The racialized bureaucratic notions of worth that underpin the racial state and its bureaucracy are the product of ongoing and sociohistorically situated macro- and micro-level ethnoracial projects. State-sanctioned racialized notions of the ideal bureaucrat are durable and naturalized but also political and unstable and, hence, sites of ethnoracial conflict. The possibility of

*contestation* of the racial state bureaucracy necessitated, on the one hand, a decolonization discourse that provided a rough map for the construction of a new public servant and new symbolic resources for boundary work. On the other, it required the presence of decolonization proponents in key positions of organizational ideological production and the availability of organizational resources to support decolonization-related reforms and initiatives.

For most of Bolivia's republican history, the central state bureaucracy has been the prerogative of white-*mestizo* elites. The patterns of political exclusion and incorporation of the ethnoracially mixed and indigenous populations variously changed over the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but a dominant ideology that casted indigeneity as backward and unfit for statecraft persisted in explicit and implicit forms alongside white-*mestizo* control of the central bureaucracy. In defining racial others as unfit for statecraft, *criollos* and *mestizos* defined themselves as the natural holders of state power and imposed bureaucratic notions of worth based on their own racialized class trajectories.

By contrast, in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the state sanctioning of an oppositional ethnoracial project enabled the production of alternative official narratives of race and modernity that blurred the symbolic boundary between indigeneity and statecraft produced and reproduced for over a century. Control of the central state bureaucracy since 2006 enabled MAS-IPSP leaders and intellectuals to produce and mobilize alternative official interpretations of the misfortunes of Bolivian development. They understood it necessary for the success of their project to decenter the Hispanicizing monocultural state logic that the former elite had advanced. They viewed its success as contingent on the emergence of new state discourses, practices, and structures.

The official decolonization discourse offers a rearticulation of the relationship between race and modernity in the country's past and future. Rather than simply inverting the white/other binary, decolonization proponents launched an attack on the precepts that they understood sustained the country's racial hierarchy and white-*mestizo* monopoly of the bureaucracy. First, the state decolonization discourse contested the 'indian problem' trope that has, explicitly or implicitly, informed twentieth century ruling elites, positing instead that a neocolonial order in which white-*mestizo* elites are invested constitutes the root cause of Bolivia's underdevelopment. Second, it rejects the ethnoracially homogenizing state of the previous century in favor of an inherently heterogeneous 'plurinational state' as the necessary basis for development. Lastly, the architects of state decolonization reclaimed and revalorized the role of indigeneity in the modernizing project, placing it at its center. Hence, indigeneity becomes the moral guiding compass of modern bureaucratic practice.

This represents a significantly altered moment relative to the context in which pioneer indigenous bureaucrats, like former-Minister Mauricio Mamani and former-Vice Minister Paulino Guarachi, accessed the state in the 1980s and 1990s. Comparing the experience of pioneer indigenous bureaucrats and indigenous new entrants under decolonization in Bolivia, I contend that distinctive state-sanctioned ethnoracial projects differently shape the symbolic boundary strategies through which bureaucrats renegotiate racialized notions of the ideal bureaucrat by differentially making available or unavailable various symbolic and material state resources. In other words, they establish a horizon of possibilities within which situated actors attempt to "produce, extend, subvert, or directly challenge that system of racial patterning" (Omi and Winant 2015:125).

Pioneer indigenous bureaucrats were highly strategic actors who, despite the odds, managed to access high levels of the state bureaucracy through alliances with white-*mestizo* parties. Pioneer experiences unfolded in the context of (1) white-*mestizo* control of the central state bureaucracy, (2) state-sanctioned discourses that articulated modernity and indigeneity as antithetical, whether under the veil of national *mestizaje* or multiculturalism, and (3) minimal indigenous participation in the state bureaucracy, particularly its upper echelons. White-*mestizo* state elites granted them access in efforts to garner indigenous support or appease indigenous mobilization and only within restricted policy realms, such as the Ministry of Peasant and Indigenous Affairs.

While indigenous pioneers' professional trajectories and strategic alliances afforded them rare appointments, their presence was often held suspect and their abilities *a priori* discounted. In order to prove themselves legitimate occupants of the state bureaucracy, they had to variously shed or downplayed their indigeneity and emphasize their professional competence. They navigated race in the bureaucracy by *conforming* to and *upholding* the racialized notions of bureaucratic suitability that at the same time sustained the power and authority of white-*mestizo* bureaucrats. Even then, they found themselves repeatedly pleading with gatekeepers to see beyond their stigmatized identities. Their state trajectories, moreover, were short-lived and precarious.

These pioneers confronted and navigated dominant narratives of race and modernity that naturalized state power in white-*mestizo* bodies and devalued their worth. In fact, their experiences within the state bureaucracy confirm that as indigenous men and women they did not fit racialized dominant notions of the ideal bureaucrat. Their experiences resemble those of

ethnoracial minorities in predominantly white organizations in the United States and the United Kingdom documented by Wingfield and Alston (2014) and Puwar (2001, 2004), respectively, as well as those of the successful black elites in the United States that Lamont and Fleming's (2005) report on.

In the United States, for example, the experiences of ethnoracial minorities in work organizations unfold in what Omi and Winant (1994) describe as a hegemonic racial project consisting of "the retreat of social policy from any practical commitment to racial justice, and the relentless reproduction and divulgation of this theme at the level of everyday life – where whites are now 'fed up' with the 'special treatment' received by non-whites, etc." (p.75). While different, the hegemonic racial projects under which the experiences of pioneer indigenous bureaucrats in Bolivia and workplace ethnoracial minorities in the United States take place share an underlying ideology that rejects the recognition of race-specific demands. Their ideological strength and backing by the state constrains the symbolic and material resources of formerly excluded ethnoracial populations in renegotiating organizational ethnoracial boundaries.

However, under different conditions, members of formerly excluded ethnoracial populations can *contest* rather than conform and uphold dominant notions of the ideal bureaucrat that sustain the normativity of whiteness in state bureaucracies. New-guard entrance to and experiences within the central state bureaucracy have unfolded in a different context marked by (1) indigenous control of the central state bureaucracy, and a (2) state-sanctioned state decolonization discourse that rearticulates the meaning of indigeneity vis-à-vis the state bureaucracy. The electoral success of the indigenous movement enabled it to put the

symbolic and material power of the state behind decolonization. Decolonization, in turn, advanced oppositional narratives of race and modernity that questioned the naturalization of state power in white-*mestizo* bodies and its legitimizing ideologies. The new state leadership and their legitimizing discourses, moreover, politicized areas of the state bureaucracy previously insulated from ethnoracial politics, such as the Ministry of Foreign Relations.

Today, indigenous people, clothing, languages, and practices are commonplace in the state bureaucracy and *Cancillería*. Yet, the ethnoracial transformation of *Cancillería* personnel and practices did not unfold *tabula rasa*. The new guard encountered a Foreign Ministry still largely in control of white-*mestizo* career diplomats, whose notions of the ideal diplomat were threatened by their entrance. Senior and junior members of the old guard, who had accessed *Cancillería* before and after 1980, respectively, shared into a common vision of diplomacy as a hyperspecialized profession. In the Bolivian context, career diplomats, thus, conceive themselves and their organization as the embodiment of Weber's rational modern bureaucracy. To them, new entrants are not worthy state agents. They perceive the change of guard as a setback in their modernizing project.

My analysis, however, reveals that the old guard's purportedly race-neutral Weberian understanding of the ideal bureaucrat map onto the cultural status markers of white-*mestizo* upper-middle class Bolivians. The Weberian ideal bureaucrat erases the history of ethnoracial exclusion and white-*mestizo* monopoly in which it emerged and carries the racialized class imprint of its advocates. Moreover, in defending the criteria of worth on which they see themselves as the legitimate occupants of *Cancillería*, old guard diplomats draw on racist ideologies that construe indigeneity as backward and incompatible with modern state

bureaucracy, thus discounting the worth of indigenous prospects and worldviews. This is similar to what minorities in other periods in Bolivia and in other national contexts experienced. Operating here is a dominant discourse of cultural difference in manners and education, backwardness and civilization, that defines not only racial categories in Bolivia, but also the worthy and unworthy in bureaucracy.

This study shows that, unlike in the case of pioneer indigenous bureaucrats, the new guard seeks to institutionalize a new notion of the ideal bureaucrat. Amidst the unsettled taken-for-granted of diplomatic practice in Bolivia today, indigenous new entrants and their allies mobilize a competing notion of the ideal bureaucrat that valorizes their experiences and trajectories linked to the indigenous peasant movement. They transpose indigenous movement notions of social and political commitment onto the bureaucratic field. Commitment thus figures prominently in how members of the new guard understand and describe their worth.

Most importantly, indigenous new entrants and their allies not only mobilize a competing notion of the ideal bureaucrat they also draw on the decolonization discourse and the new symbolic resources it made available to *contest* the racialized assumptions and expectations that organized this space. They portray members of the old guard as carriers of negative aspects of modernity: self-interest and racism, which preclude commitment. In doing so, the new guard positions itself as the rightful occupants of *Cancillería*. The new and old guards' notions of the ideal bureaucrat are deeply intertwined with competing narratives of race and modernity that underlie two distinct projects: an elite modernizing-state project and a subaltern decolonizing-state project.

At the macro-level, theory and research on the racial state shows that states are “targets and operators of intersecting racial projects” (Omi and Winant 2015:147). The interplay between the state and racially-oriented actors, exclusionary or egalitarian, seeking to rearticulate the dominant racial ideology and redistribute state resources along ethnoracial lines variously structure the state, including, I claim, dominant assumptions about the ideal bureaucrat. Thus, the ideal bureaucrat is also the site of struggle over the ethnoracial boundaries of the bureaucracy.

### **Toward a Theory of the Racial State**

This work responds to calls to examine the constitutive role of race in the state and, particularly, to advance a theory of the racial state (e.g. Goldberg 2002; James and Redding 2005; Omi and Winant 1994). The analysis presented here sheds light on a key constitutive dimension of the racial state so far underdeveloped in existing work: the racialization of bureaucratic notions of worth, which authorize or de-authorize particular kind of actors to govern bureaucratic practice. Synthesizing racial formation theory, insights from the literature race in organizations, and the cultural boundaries conceptual toolkit, this dissertation offers a multilevel analytic framework that helps us understand the relationship between race and the state, particularly how race shapes the ongoing construction of state bureaucracy and its politics.

In line with a growing body of critical literature on race in organizations, my account shows that race is integral to state organizations. This is different from how Omi and Winant (1994) theorize the racial state. For example, Omi and Winant conceive states as “composed of

*institutions*, the *policies* they carry out, the *conditions and rules* which support and justify them, and the *social relations* in which they are embedded” (Omi and Winant 1994:83). At each of these points, the state is racially-inflected: institutions are racially oriented, policies codify racial politics and have racial effects, and institutional configurations set the rule of the games for racial politics, all within particular sociohistorical contexts. Thus, for them the state is the primary site of ethnoracial conflict, whose object are those externally-oriented policies and practices.

Instead, my account is closer to Goldberg’s (2002) theorization of the racial state, which he sees as historically conceived through racial thought. His historical analysis of the mutually constitutive development of modern political and racial thought reveal the conceptual and material racial foundations of modern states. The master concept of race, entangled with class, gender, and sexuality, was central to how the modern state came to be imagined and defined. My study on the Bolivian decolonization process within *Cancillería* complements and advances Goldberg’s theory of the racial state by directing our attention the racialized notions of the ideal bureaucrat that underpin the bureaucratic racial order.

Dominant notions of the ideal bureaucrat emerge out of and naturalize exclusionary relations of power based on race. Dominant (racialized) notions of the ideal bureaucrat differentially shape and reproduce the work situations of white bureaucrats and members of marginalized ethnoracial populations. That is, race differentially organizes access, trajectories, and authority within state bureaucracies. The racial order within state bureaucracies entails “systemic disparities between participants in power and control over goals, resources, and outcomes; workplace decisions such as how to organize work; opportunities for promotion and

interesting work; security in employment and benefits; pay and other monetary rewards; respect; and pleasures in work and work relations” (Acker 2006:443).

This account shows that criteria of bureaucratic worth are racially structured and racially structuring feature of the racial state. On the one hand, they are racially structured because, across different periods and places, the ideal bureaucrat was conceived and defined through racial thought. Such criteria are based on and embedded in dominant narratives of race and modernity that (1) conceptually link race and state-making projects, (2) couple whiteness and state power, and (3) write racial others out of statecraft. Moreover, emerging out of histories of white monopolization of state symbolic and material resources, criteria of bureaucratic worth carry the racialized class imprint of the upper class white men that have historically governed the bureaucratic field.

On the other hand, they are racially structuring because their daily enactment organizes bureaucratic access, trajectories, and authority along ethnoracial lines. Certainly, various categories get enacted on a daily basis in organizations that structure various forms of inequality. Yet, the historicized link between race and power should give us pause to reduce ethnoracial boundaries to other categories or dismiss racial boundary work as an attempt to racialize a previously non-racial situation. At the same time, any given notion of the ideal bureaucrat is not a *fait accompli*. Oppositional ethnoracial projects variously develop and mobilize competing definitions of the ideal bureaucrat in their efforts to (re)define the meaning of race and (re)distribute symbolic and material state resources along ethnoracial lines.

This is not to say that, in this sense, the state bureaucracy does not have racial effects. The state bureaucracy and its personnel are one of the most concrete materializations of the

state that citizens encounter in daily life. The ethnoracial composition of the state bureaucracy and the racialization of the bureaucratic hierarchy produce particular representations of the state and shape how people imagine it. Moreover, ethnoracial inequalities in bureaucratic authority (re)produce inequalities in state power, while inequalities in bureaucratic employment trajectories (re)produce broader socioeconomic and status inequalities.

Moreover,

Instead, my point here is to highlight that the state is not only racial in effects. In examining the everyday dynamics of racialization of the state bureaucracy, I posit that the bureaucracy is racial in their definition as white spaces and practices (cf. Bracey II 2015) and their exclusion of racialized bodies, knowledges, and practices from the state as an organization. For Weber, the principle of *sine ira ac studio*, ‘without anger or bias,’ was the defining trait of the modern rational bureaucracy. In their modernizing (homogenizing) impetus, Bolivian Western-oriented white-*mestizo* state elites have throughout the twentieth century sought to build a nation-state worthy of the respect and recognition of Europe and the United States. The construction of a rational central bureaucracy has been a high priority, but also a testing project. Yet, as a symbol of modernity, rational ‘Weberian’ bureaucracy in neocolonial Bolivia is embroidered in a discursive fabric that portrays indigeneity as the antithesis of modernity and, thus, bureaucracy.

Work theorizing the racial state is also fundamentally interested concerned with its transformation. The intersection of these three literatures – racial formation, race in organizations, and cultural boundaries— invites us to consider how macro-level and micro-level racial projects shape dominant notions of the ideal bureaucrat. Omi and Winant’s (1994) insight

that the interplay between various racial projects has shaped the state highlights that both racial formations and state formations are unstable, even if durable. As racially-oriented actors target it, seeking to rearticulate the dominant racial ideology and redistribute state resources, dominant notions of the ideal bureaucrat and their underpinning ideologies too shift. These shifts are often rearticulations of racial exclusion but also, though less common, egalitarian moves. Yet, racial formation studies seldom link multiple levels of analysis or explicitly focus on the everyday (Saperstein et al. 2013).

Bringing in insights from organizational and boundary studies offers a focus on the ideal bureaucrat as a key site of negotiation of the relationship between race and state not only at the macro- but also at the micro-level. First, I have argued that the state is racially structured also through ethnoracial boundary work taking place in everyday life within state bureaucracies. Ethnoracial actors not only negotiate the ethnoracial order and state power in the most visible spaces of the state, such as legislatures, but also within the ordinary and less visible areas of the state apparatus. I have shown this by tracing how bureaucrats on the ground navigate and negotiate racialized criteria of worth and the ethnoracial boundaries of bureaucratic practice. Second, I have posited that the ability of racially oriented actors to turn their racial projects into a state-sanctioned project shapes everyday boundary dynamics on the ground by expanding the symbolic resources available for boundary work.

Dominant race-blind ideologies of state bureaucracy foreclose the possibility of articulating effective race-based claims or critiques. Under such conditions, bureaucrats on the ground often navigate racism by conforming to and upholding the ideal bureaucrat and downplaying their ethnoracial identities. Their work situations and trajectories thus heavily

depend on complicity with the normativity of whiteness, on conforming to it as well as sustaining it (Puwar 2004; Wingfield and Alston 2014), which in turn invites complicit acceptance of its inherent meanings and hierarchies.

My findings, however, also depart from existing accounts of how the formerly excluded navigate race in organizations, which point primarily to reproduction and attribute boundary dynamics to demographic change (see Vallas 2003). Previous accounts echo Bourdieu's (1998b) claim that the dominated always contribute to their own domination. I show, instead, that complicity with the normativity of whiteness is certainly pervasive but also contingent. In rare occasions, like the one I document here, the politicization of race and state bureaucracy at the macro-level enables individuals on the ground to reclaim and assert their ethnoracial identities as well as to contest the racialization of bureaucratic notions of worth. Through its everyday workings, the bureaucracy and its members (re)produce and on occasions (trans)form the racial character of the state.

In post-2006 Bolivia, the presence of indigenous men and women has increased significantly. But, as I have also noted, for the most the Foreign Ministry, is not "predominantly" indigenous. How are we, then, to explain that indigenous new entrants in Bolivia are able to contest ethnoracial boundaries? This study suggests that the ability of new entrants to discursively *contest* dominant notions of the ideal bureaucrat depended on two key factors. First, contestation has been dependent on a recent control of the Executive Branch, i.e. the central state bureaucracy, by the formerly excluded indigenous population. In other words, it depended on the presence of social movement with access to national political power. As a

result, changes in the ethnoracial composition of national bureaucratic ranks have occurred in key spaces of state ideological and institutional production and decision-making.

Second, control of the central bureaucracy enabled the codification of a decolonization discourse, which allowed it become a state-backed narrative of race and modernity. The boundary dynamics opened up by these changes draw on new symbolic resources made available by these changing and sanctioned narratives of race and modernity. Thus, the presence of ethnoracial minorities alone is not a sufficient determinant of boundary dynamics. It is not primarily a matter of demography, but of political transformations that enable new actors to claim or assert their worth in the participation of the governance of bureaucratic practice.

As this study demonstrates, bringing the concept of the ideal bureaucrat into a theory of the racial state reveals the importance of devoting greater attention to the state bureaucracy and to the cultural dynamics at play in projects to ethnoracially reform or transform it. The boundary work carried out by defenders and challengers, loosely defined, to redefine the 'ideal state bureaucrat' norm becomes a central dimension of the (re)production and (trans)formation of the racial state and its racialized bureaucracy. This study also expands the range of cases on which we can build an understanding of racial dynamics in state organizations in order to shed light on the conditions under which different types of boundary work strategies and resources become available.

## **Project's Relevance and Looking Ahead**

This dissertation also has important implications for the study of race and representative bureaucracies. The findings problematize important assumptions about the relationship between race and bureaucracy that underpin scholarly and practitioner interest in representative bureaucracies and their democratic promise. As I noted in the introduction, scholarly and practitioner interest in representative bureaucracies has revolved around two issues: passive representation and active representation. Here, I discuss each of this in light of this study's findings.

First, much like earlier literature on race in organizations, representative bureaucracy studies have focused on the determinants of the ethnoracial composition of state bureaucracies. That is, they have been concerned with understanding and documenting passive representation, or the extent to which state bureaucracies mirror the broader society in terms of race. Yet, their focus on the various structural-, organizational-, and individual-level causes of organizational ethnoracial composition and inequality do not tell us much about the cultural processes that shape the work situations of marginalized ethnoracial populations within the state. This despite the fact that the ethnoracial composition of the state bureaucracy is “[...] the product of quite deliberate choices by political elites attempting to create and entrench state authority” (Enloe 1978:343).

As the contrast between the past and present in Bolivia indicate, the construction of representative bureaucracies, whether through affirmative action hiring policies, quotas, or even party patronage, require strong commitment from state agents because ethnoracial

exclusions and recomposition are ultimately about relations of power. They entail political struggles rather than demographic or market processes.

Second, in shifting their attention to active representation, scholarly and practitioner work on representative bureaucracies has posed the question of whether passive representation does result in participation in decision-making and/or fairer policy outcomes. This study finds that dominant notions of the ideal bureaucrat complicate the link between passive and active representation.

The MAS-IPSP administration and its decolonization agenda constituted a strong commitment to increase the active representation of indigenous people in the state bureaucracy as well as to address ethnoracial inequality in the country. For example, Minister David Choquehuanca's explicit mission was to develop a new foreign policy informed by the thought and culture of the indigenous population and reorient Bolivia's bilateral and multilateral priorities according to this new vision. In this sense, Bolivia has played visible roles in climate change negotiations, negotiations concerning indigenous rights, in the decriminalization of coca leaf, the creation of fair trade agreements, and other international policy matters directly affecting the indigenous population.

Yet, as I have noted, these transformations did not take place on a clean slate. The MAS leadership, indigenous new entrants to the bureaucracy, and even their white-*mestizo* allies found a bureaucratic field in which their presence and their policy proposals were *a priori* questioned the basis of dominant racist ideologies. The findings here concerning the racialization of bureaucratic notions of worth indicate that bureaucracies are not apolitical, spaces of pluralist politics or instruments readily available to whatever group is in power.

Rather, state agents committed to particular ethnoracial project encounter state bureaucracies that by design privilege “white-based institutional logics and cultural practices, signifiers and metrics that mask white power and normalize whiteness” (Bracey II 2015:561).

Thus, the proposal to develop a new ethos of public service in Bolivia was crucial to the advancement of new non-traditional policy proposals. The effort entailed revaluing the indigenous experiences and worldviews that informed these policies and their rationales. These findings indicate that the link between passive representation and active representation rest not only on a strong commitment to address ethnoracial inequalities on the part of bureaucrats, whether themselves indigenous or not, but also a commitment to new cultural logics in the state bureaucracy.

As ethnoracial movements around the world demand inclusion into state bureaucracies and states respond to these demands, it is in the notion of the ideal bureaucrat – that is the normative assumptions and expectations that organize bureaucratic spaces and practice – where we might locate and begin to understand how race shapes state bureaucratic spaces and practices. Research in other contexts might consequently examine particular sociohistorical constructions of the ideal bureaucrat and how new entrants navigate them, expanding the range of cases on which to understand how different political conditions afford or foreclose different strategies for change in the bureaucracy.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acker, Joan. 1990. "Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations." *Gender and Society* 4(2):139–58.
- Acker, Joan. 2006. "Inequality Regimes Gender, Class, and Race in Organizations." *Gender & Society* 20(4):441–64.
- Albó, Xavier. 2007. "Alcaldes y Munícipes Indígenas En Bolivia, 2002." Pp. 89–118 in *Movimientos Indígenas y Gobiernos Locales en América Latina*, edited by W. Assies and H. Gundermann Kroll. San Pedro de Atacama, Chile: Instituto de Investigaciones Arqueológicas y Museo, IIAM.
- Albó, Xavier. 1994. "And from Kataristas to MNRistas? The Surprising and Bold Alliance between Aymaras and Neoliberals in Bolivia." Pp. 55–82 in *Indigenous peoples and democracy in Latin America*, edited by D. L. Van Cott. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Albó, Xavier. 2002a. "Bolivia: From Indian and Campesino Leaders to Councillors and Parliamentary Deputies." Pp. 74–102 in *Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity and Democracy*, edited by R. Sieder. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Albó, Xavier. 2002b. *Pueblos Indios En La Política*. La Paz: Plural Editores/CIPCA.

Albó, Xavier and Mauricio Mamani. n.d. *Esposos, Suegros y Padrinos Entre Los Aymaras*. La Paz, Bolivia.

Albó, Xavier and Victor Tacuri Quispe. 2004. *Quiénes son Indígenas en los Gobiernos Municipales*. La Paz: Plural Editores/CIPCA.

Alcoff, Linda Martín. 2006. "Latinos, Asian Americans, and the Black-White Binary." Pp. 247–63 in *Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Amenta, Edwin. 2005. "State-Centered and Political Institutional Theory: Retrospect and Prospect." Pp. 96–114 in *A Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization*, edited by T. Janoski, R. R. Alford, A. Hicks, and M. Schwartz. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. 2nd ed. London: Verso.

Anon. 2014. "Quién Es Quién: Tomasa Yarhui Jacomé." *El Diario*, July 24. Retrieved May 26, 2017 ([http://www.eldiario.net/noticias/2014/2014\\_07/nt140724/politica.php?n=69&-tomasa-yarhui-jacome](http://www.eldiario.net/noticias/2014/2014_07/nt140724/politica.php?n=69&-tomasa-yarhui-jacome)).

Anon. 2002. "Tomasa, Ministra Indígena (Bolivia)." *BBC Mundo*, March 8. Retrieved May 24, 2017 ([http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/specials/newsid\\_1860000/1860523.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/specials/newsid_1860000/1860523.stm)).

Ariñez, Rubén. 2014. "Tomasa Yarhui: Los Verdaderos Indígenas No Están En El Poder." *La Razón*, July 13. Retrieved May 24, 2017 (<http://la->

razon.com/index.php?\_url=/suplementos/animal\_politico/Tomasa-Yarhui-verdaderos-indigenas-poder\_0\_2087191316.html).

Arkonada, Katu. 2010. "Entrevista Con Simón Yampara, Dirigente Aymara: Debate Del Buen Vivir, Una Solución a La Crisis de Civilización Moderna." *Rebelión*, April 7. Retrieved May 26, 2017 (<http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=103616>).

Artaraz, Kepa. 2012. *Bolivia: Refounding the Nation*. London: Pluto Press.

Baiocchi, Gianpaolo and Brian T. Connor. 2008. "The Ethnos in the Polis: Political Ethnography as a Mode of Inquiry." *Sociology Compass* 2(1):139–155.

Barragán, Rossana. 2011. "The Census and the Making of a Social 'Order' in Nineteenth-Century Bolivia." Pp. 113–33 in *Histories of Race and Racism: The Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times to the Present*, edited by L. Gotkowitz. Durham: Duke University Press.

Bautista S., Rafael. 2012. *Anexo 1: Marco Histórico*. La Paz, Bolivia: Secretaría Técnica del Comité Nacional Contra el Racismo y Toda Forma de Discriminación.

Bernstein, Anya and Elizabeth Mertz. 2011. "Introduction Bureaucracy: Ethnography of the State in Everyday Life." *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 34(1):6–10.

Bird, Karen. 2014. "Ethnic Quotas and Ethnic Representation Worldwide." *International Political Science Review* 35(1):12–26.

Blaser, Mario. 2007. "Bolivia: Los Desafíos Interpretativos de La Coincidencia de Una Doble Crisis Hegemónica." Pp. 11–21 in *Reinventando la Nación en Bolivia: Movimientos*

- Sociales, Estado y Poscolonialidad*, edited by K. Monasterios, P. Stefanoni, and H. D. Alto. La Paz, Bolivia: Plural Editores.
- Bonilla, Heraclio. 1997. "Estructura y Articulación Política de Las Comunidades Indígenas de Los Andes Centrales Con Sus Estados Nacionales." Pp. 93–108 in *La Reindianización de América, Siglo XIX*, edited by L. Reina. Mexico, D.F.: Siglo XXI Editors; CIESAS.
- Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 1997. "Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation." *American Sociological Review* 62(3):465.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1981. "Men and Machines." Pp. 304–17 in *Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro-Sociologies*, edited by K. D. Knorr-Cetina and A. V. Cicourel. Boston: Routledge.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 2000. *Pascalian Meditations*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1998a. *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1994. "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field." *Sociological Theory* 12(1):1–18.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1989. "Social Space and Symbolic Power." *Sociological Theory* 7(1):14–25.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1998b. *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bracey II, Glenn E. 2015. "Toward a Critical Race Theory of State." *Critical Sociology* 41(3):553–72.

Bradbury, Mark and J. Edward Kellough. 2011. "Representative Bureaucracy: Assessing the Evidence on Active Representation." *The American Review of Public Administration* 41(2):157–67.

Bradbury, Mark and J. Edward Kellough. 2008. "Representative Bureaucracy: Exploring the Potential for Active Representation in Local Government." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 18(4):697–714.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2009. "Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism." *Annual Review of Sociology* 35(1):21–42.

Buechler, Hans C. 2016. "'Interconnected Positionalities': Foreigners and Foreign Experience in the Lives of Aymara Intellectuals." Pp. 89–110 in *Ethnographic Collaborations in Latin America: The Effects of Globalization*, edited by J. C. Nash and H. C. Buechler. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Burawoy, Michael. 2000. "Introduction: Reaching for the Global." Pp. 1–40 in *Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and Imaginations in a Postmodern World*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Burawoy, Michael. 1998. "The Extended Case Method." *Sociological Theory* 16(1):4–33.
- Bustillos Zamorano, Iván. 2014. "Simón Yampara Huarachi: A Superar El Ch'aki Colonial." *La Razón*, November 30. Retrieved May 23, 2017 ([http://la-razon.com/index.php?url=/suplementos/animal\\_politico/Simon-Yampara-Huarachi-superar-colonial\\_0\\_2171182876.html](http://la-razon.com/index.php?url=/suplementos/animal_politico/Simon-Yampara-Huarachi-superar-colonial_0_2171182876.html)).
- Cajías de la Vega, Beatriz, ed. 2011. *Participación Política Indígena y Políticas Públicas Para Pueblos Indígenas En América Latina*. La Paz, Bolivia: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
- Cancillería de Bolivia. 2009a. *El Akhulli: La Coca En La Diplomacia de Los Pueblos*. La Paz, Bolivia: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores; Academia Diplomática Plurinacional.
- Cancillería de Bolivia. 2009b. *El Apthapi: El 'Banquete Indígena En La Diplomacia de Los Pueblos*. La Paz, Bolivia: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores; Academia Diplomática Plurinacional.
- Cancillería de Bolivia. n.d. "Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores: David Choquehuanca Céspedes." Retrieved February 20, 2015 (<http://www.cancilleria.bo/node/312>).
- Canessa, Andrew, ed. 2005. *Natives Making Nation: Gender, Indigeneity, and the State in the Andes*. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.
- Cárdenas, Víctor Hugo. 2011. "Participación Política Indígena y Políticas Públicas Para Pueblos Indígenas En Bolivia." Pp. 17–64 in *Participación Política Indígena y Políticas Públicas para Pueblos Indígenas en América Latina*, edited by B. Cajías de la Vega. La Paz, Bolivia: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Cazenave, Noel A. 2011. *The Urban Racial State: Managing Race Relations in American Cities*.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Chávez, Patricia. 2012. *¿De La Colorida Minoría a Una Mayoría Gris?: Presencia Indígena En El Legislativo*. La Paz, Bolivia: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung : Editorial Gente Común.

Choque Canqui, Roberto. 2010. "Proceso de Descolonización." Pp. 37–61 in *Descolonización en Bolivia: Cuatro Ejes para Comprender el Cambio*, edited by G. Gosálvez and J. Dublon. La Paz, Bolivia: Vicepresidencia del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.

Ciudadanía and LAPOP. 2012. *Cultura Política de La Democracia En Bolivia, 2012: Hacia La Igualdad de Oportunidades*. Cochabamba, Bolivia.

Comité Nacional Contra el Racismo y Toda Forma de Discriminación. 2012a. "Anexo 2: Marco Normativo Internacional y Nacional Contra El Racismo y La Discriminación." in *Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia Contra el Racismo y Toda Forma de Discriminación*. La Paz, Bolivia: Ministerio de Culturas del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.

Comité Nacional Contra el Racismo y Toda Forma de Discriminación. 2012b. "Anexo 2: Marco Normativo Internacional y Nacional Contra El Racismo y La Discriminación." in *Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia Contra el Racismo y Toda Forma de Discriminación*. La Paz, Bolivia: Ministerio de Culturas del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.

CPE. 1826. "Constitución Política de La República de Bolivia."

CPE. 1878. "Constitución Política de La República de Bolivia."

- Demelas, Marie-Danielle. 1981. "Darwinismo a La Criolla: El Darwinismo Social En Bolivia, 1880-1910." *Historia Boliviana* 1(2):55–82.
- Dunkerley, James. 2003. *Rebelión en las venas*. 2nd ed. La Paz, Bolivia: Plural Editores.
- Echalar, Agustín. 2006. "Temiendo Al Próximo San Juan." *La Razón*, January 29, A-4.
- Enloe, Cynthia H. 1978. "Ethnicity, Bureaucracy and State-Building in Africa and Latin America\*." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1(3):336–51.
- Epstein, Cynthia Fuchs. 1992. "Tinkerbells and Pinups: The Construction and Reconstruction of Gender and Boundaries at Work." Pp. 232–56 in *Cultivating Differences: Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of Inequality*, edited by M. Lamont and M. Fournier. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- Ernst, Tanja and Stefan Schmalz. 2012. "¿Hacia Una Doble Descolonización? Bolivia a Cinco Años de Gobierno de Evo Morales." Pp. 7–30 in *El primer gobierno de Evo Morales: Un balance retrospectivo*, edited by T. Ernst and S. Schmalz. La Paz, Bolivia: Plural Editores.
- Evans, Ivan Thomas. 1997. *Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. 1985. *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Farthing, Linda C. and Benjamin H. Kohl. 2014. *Evo's Bolivia: Continuity and Change*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Go, Julian. 2016. *Postcolonial Thought and Social Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goldberg, David Theo. 1997. *Racial Subjects: Writing on Race in America*. New York: Routledge.

Goldberg, David Theo. 2002. *The Racial State*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Goldberg, David Theo and Susan Searls Giroux. 2014a. *Sites of Race: Conversations with Susan Searls Giroux*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Goldberg, David Theo and Susan Searls Giroux. 2014b. *Sites of Race: Conversations with Susan Searls Giroux*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gómez Triana, Jaime and Susel Gutiérrez Torres. 2013. "La Principal Tarea Es Descolonizar: Entrevista a Esteban Ticona Alejo." *La Ventana, Portal Informativo de La Casa de Las Américas*, January 28. Retrieved April 15, 2015  
(<http://laventana.casa.cult.cu/noticias/2013/01/28/la-principal-tarea-es-descolonizar/>).

Gosálvez, Gonzalo and Jorge Dulong, eds. 2010. *Descolonización En Bolivia: Cuatro Ejes Para Comprender El Cambio*. La Paz, Bolivia: Vicepresidencia del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia y Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia Multipartidaria.

Gotkowitz, Laura. 2007. *A Revolution for Our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 1880-1952*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Gotkowitz, Laura. 2011. "Introduction: Racism of the Present and the Past in Latin America." Pp. 1–56 in *Histories of Race and Racism: The Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times to the Present*, edited by L. Gotkowitz. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

- Grissom, Jason A. and Lael R. Keiser. 2011. "A Supervisor Like Me: Race, Representation, and the Satisfaction and Turnover Decisions of Public Sector Employees." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 30(3):557–80.
- Gumucio Granier, Jorge and Gustavo Aliaga Palma. 2005. *La Cancillería de La República*. La Paz, Bolivia: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto.
- Hall, Gillette and Harry Anthony Patrinos, eds. 2006. *Indigenous Peoples, Poverty, and Human Development in Latin America*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hall, Stuart. 1992. "The West and the Rest." Pp. 185–227 in *Formations of Modernity*, edited by S. Hall and B. Gieben. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hatch, John K. 1981. *Nuestros Conocimientos: Prácticas Agropecuarias Tradicionales En Bolivia*. Alexandria, VA: Ministerio de Agricultura y Asuntos Campesinos; Agencia Internacional del Desarrollo; Rural Development Services.
- Hennink, Monique M. 2007. *International Focus Group Research: A Handbook for the Health and Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hong, Sounman. 2017. "Black in Blue: Racial Profiling and Representative Bureaucracy in Policing Revisited." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*.
- Htun, Mala. 2015a. *Inclusion without Representation in Latin America: Gender Quotas and Ethnic Reservations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Htun, Mala. 2015b. *Inclusion without Representation in Latin America: Gender Quotas and Ethnic Reservations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hughes, Melanie M. 2011. "Intersectionality, Quotas, and Minority Women's Political Representation Worldwide." *American Political Science Review* 105(03):604–20.
- Irurozqui, Marta. 2001. "'Desvío Al Paraíso': Citizenship and Social Darwinism in Bolivia, 1880-1920." Pp. 205–28 in *Reception of Darwinism in the Iberian World: Spain, Spanish America and Brazil*, edited by T. F. Glick, M. A. Puig-Samper, and R. Ruiz. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Irurozqui, Marta. 1994. *La Armonía De Las Desigualdades: Elites Y Conflictos De Poder En Bolivia, 1880-1920*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas.
- Irurozqui, Marta. 2012. "Tributo y Armas En Bolivia. Comunidades Indígenas y Estrategias de Visibilización Ciudadana, Siglo XIX." *Mundo Agrario* 13(25).
- James, David R. and Kent Redding. 2005. "Theories of Race and State." Pp. 187–98 in *A Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization*, edited by T. Janoski, R. Alford, A. Hicks, and M. Schwartz. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Jenkins, Richard. 1994. "Rethinking Ethnicity: Identity, Categorization and Power." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17(2):197–223.

- Johnson, Brian B. 2010. "Decolonization and Its Paradoxes: The (Re)Envisioning of Health Policy in Bolivia." *Latin American Perspectives* 37(3):139–59.
- Jung, Moon-Kie and Yaejoon Kwon. 2013. "Theorizing the US Racial State: Sociology Since Racial Formation: Theorizing the US Racial State." *Sociology Compass* 7(11):927–40.
- Kelly, Erin L., Samantha K. Ammons, Kelly Chermack, and Phyllis Moen. 2010. "Gendered Challenge, Gendered Response Confronting the Ideal Worker Norm in a White-Collar Organization." *Gender & Society* 24(3):281–303.
- Kempff Suárez, Manfredo. 2006a. "Deslumbramiento y Preocupación." *La Razón*, January 28, A-6.
- Kempff Suárez, Manfredo. 2006b. "¿El Turno de La Cancillería?" *La Razón*, February 4, A-6.
- Kempff Suárez, Manfredo. 2006c. "¡Jallalla Ullucu!" *La Razón*, March 28, A-4.
- Kempff Suárez, Manfredo. 2006d. "Recuerdo de Los Colegas Muertos." *La Razón*, April 1, A6.
- Klein, Herbert S. 2011. *A Concise History of Bolivia*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Klein, Herbert S. 1992. *Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kohl, Benjamin. 2010. "Bolivia under Morales: A Work in Progress." *Latin American Perspectives* 37(3):107–22.

Kohl, Benjamin and Rosalind Bresnahan. 2010. "Introduction Bolivia under Morales: National Agenda, Regional Challenges, and the Struggle for Hegemony." *Latin American Perspectives* 37(4):5–20.

Kristov, Samuel. 1974. *Representative Bureaucracy*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

La Razón. 2006a. "El Canciller Es 'indianista Puro' y Tiene El Sueño de Ser Un Yatiri." *La Razón*, March 26, A12.

La Razón. 2006b. "El Canciller Espera Renuncias Para Comenzar Los Cambios." A-14.

La Razón. 2006c. "El Gobierno Apela a Los Sectores Para El Llenado de Cargos." March 18, A14.

La Razón. 2006d. "Las Postergaciones En El Servicio Exterior." *La Razón*, May 20, Edición impresa.

La Razón. 2006e. "Las Relaciones Con El Mundo." January 26, A-5.

La Razón. 2006f. "¿Qué Tipo de Diplomacia Requiere Bolivia?" *La Razón*, July 15, Edición impresa.

Lamont, Michèle. 1992. *Money, Morals and Manners: The Culture of the French and the American Upper-Middle Class*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

- Lamont, Michèle. 2002. *The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lamont, Michèle and Crystal Marie Fleming. 2005. "Competence and Religion in the Cultural Repertoire of the African American Elite." *Du Bois Review* 2(1):29–43.
- Lamont, Michèle and Virág Molnár. 2002. "The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences." *Annual Review of Sociology* 28(1):167–95.
- Larson, Brooke. 2005. "Redeemed Indians, Barbarized Cholos: Crafting Neocolonial Modernity in Liberal Bolivia, 1900-1910." Pp. 230–52 in *Political Cultures in the Andes 1750-1950*, edited by N. Jacobsen and C. Aljovín de Losada. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Larson, Brooke. 2004. *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Lentin, Ronit. 2007. "Ireland: Racial State and Crisis Racism." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30(4):610–27.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1980. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Llorens, Jared J., Jeffrey B. Wenger, and J. Edward Kellough. 2007. "Choosing Public Sector Employment: The Impact of Wages on the Representation of Women and Minorities in State Bureaucracies." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 18(3):397–413.

Loayza Bueno, Rafael. 2010. *Halajtayata: Racismo y Etnicidad En Bolivia*. 3rd ed. La Paz, Bolivia: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Loveman, Mara. 2014. *National Colors: Racial Classification and the State in Latin America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Loveman, Mara and Jeronimo O. Muniz. 2007. "How Puerto Rico Became White: Boundary Dynamics and Intercensus Racial Reclassification." *American Sociological Review* 72(6):915–39.

Lusane, Clarence. 2006. *Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice: Foreign Policy, Race, and the New American Century*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

Madrid, Raúl. 2005. "Indigenous Parties and Democracy in Latin America." *Latin American Politics and Society* 47(4):161–179.

Madrid, Raúl. 2008. "The Rise of Ethnopoliticism in Latin America." *World Politics* 60(3):475–508.

Magubane, Zine. 2016. "American Sociology's Racial Ontology: Remembering Slavery, Deconstructing Modernity, and Charting the Future of Global Historical Sociology." *Cultural Sociology* 10(3):369–84.

Maldonado, Marta Maria. 2009. "'It Is Their Nature to Do Menial Labour': The Racialization of 'Latino/a Workers' by Agricultural Employers." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32(6):1017–36.

- Malloy, James M. and Eduardo Gamarra. 1987. "The Transition to Democracy in Bolivia." Pp. 93–119 in *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America, Pitt Latin American series*, edited by J. M. Malloy and M. A. Seligson. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Mandepora, Marcia. 2011. "Bolivia's Indigenous Universities." *ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America*.
- Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes.'" *Journal of Politics* 61(3):628–57.
- Maravić, Patrick von, B. Guy Peters, and Eckhard Schröter, eds. 2013. *Representative Bureaucracy in Action: Country Profiles from the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
- Marx, Anthony W. 1998. *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- MAS-IPSP. 2014. "Bolivia, Juntos Vamos a Vivir Bien: Programa de Gobierno 2015-2020."
- MAS-IPSP. 2009. "Bolivia, País Líder: Programa de Gobierno 2010-2015."
- MAS-IPSP. 2005. "Por Una Bolivia Digna, Soberana y Productiva Para Vivir Bien: Programa de Gobierno."
- Maxwell, Joseph A. 2005. *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Mesa, José de, Teresa Gisbert, and Carlos D. Mesa Gisbert. 2003. *Historia de Bolivia*. Editorial Gisbert.

Ministerio de Autonomías. 2014. *Agenda Patriótica 2025: ¿Quién Hace Qué?* La Paz, Bolivia: Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.

Minnesota Population Center. 2017. *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.5*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

Monasterios, Karin, Pablo Stefanoni, and Hervé Do Alto, eds. 2007. *Reinventando la Nación en Bolivia: Movimientos Sociales, Estado y Poscolonialidad*. La Paz, Bolivia: Plural editores.

Mora, G. Cristina. 2014. *Making Hispanics: How Activists, Bureaucrats, and Media Constructed a New American*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Morales Ayma, Evo. 2006a. "Discurso de Investidura Del Presidente de Bolivia Evo Morales Ayma."

Morales Ayma, Evo. 2010. "Discurso de Investidura Del Presidente de Bolivia Evo Morales Ayma."

Morales Ayma, Evo. 2015a. "Discurso de Investidura Del Presidente de Bolivia Evo Morales Ayma."

Morales Ayma, Evo. 2015b. "Palabras Del Presidente de Bolivia, Evo Morales Ayma."

Morales Ayma, Evo. 2006b. "Palabras Del Presidente Electo de Bolivia, Evo Morales Ayma."

- Moreno, Erika. 2003. "Subnational Determinants of National Multipartyism in Latin America." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 28(2):179–201.
- Morgan, David L. 1996. "Focus Groups." *Annual Review of Sociology* 22:129–52.
- Nicholson-Crotty, Jill, Jason A. Grissom, and Sean Nicholson-Crotty. 2011. "Bureaucratic Representation, Distributional Equity, and Democratic Values in the Administration of Public Programs." *The Journal of Politics* 73(2):582–96.
- Nkomo, Stella M. 1992. "The Emperor Has No Clothes: Rewriting 'Race in Organizations.'" *The Academy of Management Review* 17(3):487.
- Nobles, Melissa. 2000. *Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics*. 1st ed. Pal: Stanford University Press.
- Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. 2015. *Racial Formation in the United States*. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge.
- Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. 1994. *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.
- Oporto Ordoñez, Luis. 2010. "Roberto Choque Canqui: Historiador Aymara." *Fuentes, Revista de La Biblioteca y Archivo Histórico de La Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional*, 52–55.
- Ostria, Marcelo. 2006. "Una Política Exterior Incoherente y Errática." *La Razón*, August 5, Edición impresa.

- Oszlak, Oscar. 2005. "State Bureaucracy: Politics and Policies." Pp. 482–505 in *The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil societies, and Globalization*, edited by T. Janoski, R. Alford, A. Hicks, and M. Schwartz. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Pachucki, Mark A., Sabrina Pendergrass, and Michèle Lamont. 2007. "Boundary Processes: Recent Theoretical Developments and New Contributions." *Poetics* 35(6):331–51.
- Paschel, Tianna S. 2016a. *Becoming Black Political Subjects: Movements and Ethno-Racial Rights in Colombia and Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Paschel, Tianna S. 2016b. *Becoming Black Political Subjects: Movements and Ethno-Racial Rights in Colombia and Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Paxton, John. 1983. *The Statesman's Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the Year 1983-1984*. London: Macmillan.
- PDBA. n.d. "Bolivia: Elecciones Presidenciales de 2005." *Political Database of the Americas*. Retrieved November 22, 2011 (<http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Bolivia/pres05.html>).
- PDES. 2015. *Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social 2016-2020 En El Marco Del Desarrollo Integral Para Vivir Bien*. La Paz, Bolivia: Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.
- Peña Aguilar, Amalia. 2015. "'Diplomacia Pop', Diplomacia de Paz." *La Razón*, May 5, En línea.
- Phillips, Anne. 2003. *The Politics of Presence: The Political Representation of Gender, Ethnicity, and Race*. Reprinted. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Pierce, Jennifer L. 2012. *Racing for Innocence: Whiteness, Gender, and the Backlash against Affirmative Action*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- PND. 2007. *Bolivia Digna, Soberana, Productiva y Democrática Para Vivir Bien: Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2006-2011*. La Paz, Bolivia: Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia.
- Postero, Nancy. 2006. *Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia*. 1st ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Postero, Nancy. 2017. *The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational Bolivia*. University of California Press.
- Prudencio Lizón, Ramiro. 2016. "Armando Loaiza." *La Razón*, January 27. Retrieved June 29, 2017 ([http://www.la-razon.com/opinion/columnistas/Armando-Loaiza\\_0\\_2425557430.html](http://www.la-razon.com/opinion/columnistas/Armando-Loaiza_0_2425557430.html)).
- Puwar, Nirmal. 2004. *Space Invaders: Race, Gender and Bodies Out of Place*. Oxford: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Puwar, Nirmal. 2001. "The Racialised Somatic Norm and the Senior Civil Service." *Sociology* 35(3):651–70.
- Quijano, Aníbal. 2000. "Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America." *International Sociology* 15(2):215–32.
- Quiroz, Mauricio. 2015. "David Choquehuanca: El Tejedor Que Hilvanó El 'Proceso de Cambio.'" *La Razón*, January 22. Retrieved January 25, 2015 ([http://la-](http://la-razon.com)

razon.com/especial\_mandato\_historico/David-Choquehuanca-tejedor-hilvano-proceso\_0\_2203579706.html).

Reitman, Meredith. 2006. "Uncovering the White Place: Whitewashing at Work." *Social & Cultural Geography* 7(2):267–82.

Reskin, Barbara F., Debra B. McBrier, and Julie A. Kmec. 1999. "The Determinants and Consequences of Workplace Sex and Race Composition." *Annual Review of Sociology* 25:335–61.

Riccucci, Norma M. 2009. "The Pursuit of Social Equity in the Federal Government: A Road Less Traveled?" *Public Administration Review* 69(3):373–82.

Rice, Roberta and Donna Lee Van Cott. 2006. "The Emergence and Performance of Indigenous Peoples' Parties in South America: A Subnational Statistical Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies* 39:709–32.

Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia. 1987a. "*Oppressed but Not Defeated*": *Peasant Struggles among the Aymara and Qhechwa in Bolivia, 1900-1980*. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia. 1987b. "*Oppressed but Not Defeated*": *Peasant Struggles among the Aymara and Qhechwa in Bolivia, 1900-1980*. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

- Rocha Sánchez, Deyvid. 2014. "Los Últimos Días de Un Líder Campesino y Exministro." *La Patria*, June 15.
- Rojas, Christian. 2016. "¿Quién Era Armando Loaiza? La Familia Lo Recuerda." *Oxígeno Digital*, January 19. Retrieved June 15, 2017 (<http://oxigeno.bo:81/pol%C3%ADtica/14203>).
- Roper, J. Montgomery, Thomas Perreault, and Patrick C. Wilson. 2003. "Introduction." *Latin American Perspectives* 30(1):5–22.
- RREE. 2015. "Canciller Choquehuanca: 'Los Nuevos Diplomáticos Deben Construir La Hermandad Continental y Mundial.'" *Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, February 24. Retrieved January 25, 2017 (<http://www.cancilleria.gob.bo/webmre/node/902>).
- RREE. 2014. *La Revolución Política y Cultural y Su Política Exterior: Memoria 2006-2013*. La Paz, Bolivia: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.
- Saavedra Weise, Agustin. 2003. "Un Digno Embajador Ante Uruguay y ALADI." March 1. Retrieved August 20, 2015 (<http://agustinsaavedraweise.com/art-2003/>).
- Sabatini, Christopher. 2003. "Decentralization and Political Parties." *Journal of Democracy* 14:138–50.
- Salman, Ton. 2009. "Searching for Status: New Elites in the New Bolivia." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 86:97–105.

- Saperstein, Aliya, Andrew M. Penner, and Ryan Light. 2013. "Racial Formation in Perspective: Connecting Individuals, Institutions, and Power Relations." *Annual Review of Sociology* 39(1):359–78.
- Schatz, Edward, ed. 2009. *Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Schavelzon, Salvador. 2012. *El Nacimiento Del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia: Etnografía de Una Asamblea Constituyente*. La Paz, Bolivia: Plural Editores.
- Shakow, Miriam. 2014. *Along the Bolivian Highway: Social Mobility and Political Culture in a New Middle Class*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Sharma, Aradhana and Akhil Gupta. 2006. "Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the State in an Age of Globalization." Pp. 1–42 in *The Anthropology of The State: A Reader*, edited by A. Sharma and A. Gupta. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Sieder, Rachel. 2002a. "Introduction." Pp. 1–23 in *Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity, and Democracy*, *Institute of Latin American Studies series*, edited by R. Sieder. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sieder, Rachel, ed. 2002b. *Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity, and Democracy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Skocpol, Theda. 1985. "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research."

Pp. 3–37 in *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T.

Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Ryan A. 2002. "Race, Gender, and Authority in the Workplace: Theory and Research."

*Annual Review of Sociology* 28:509–42.

Soruco, Ximena, Daniela Franco, and Mariela Durán. 2014. *Composición Social Del Estado*

*Plurinacional: Hacia La Descolonización de La Burocracia*. La Paz, Bolivia: Centro de

Investigaciones Sociales, Vicepresidencia del Estado.

Stefanoni, Pablo. 2006. "Entrevista Con David Choquehuanca: 'Soy Indígena, No Indigenista.'"

*Página 12*, February 15, En línea. Retrieved

(<https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elmundo/4-63124-2006-02-15.html>).

Stefanoni, Pablo. 2011. "Five Years of Evo." *ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America*, 2–4.

Steinmetz, George. 1999. "Introduction: Culture and the State." Pp. 1–49 in *State/Culture:*

*State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*, edited by G. Steinmetz. Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press.

Tellería Escobar, Loreta. 2016. *Multiculturalismo y Educación Superior En El Ejercito de Bolivia*

*(2006-2016): El Colegio Militar*. La Paz, Bolivia: Escuela Militar de Ingeniería.

The World Bank. 2000a. *Bolivia: From Patronage to a Professional State, Volume I*. Washington,

DC: The World Bank.

The World Bank. 2000b. *Bolivia: From Patronage to a Professional State, Volume II.*

Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Theobald, Nick A. and Donald P. Haider-Markel. 2008. "Race, Bureaucracy, and Symbolic Representation: Interactions between Citizens and Police." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 19(2):409–26.

Ticona Alejo, Esteban. 2011. "El 'Racismo Intelectual' En El Pachakuti. Algunas Connotaciones Simbólicas Del Ascenso de Evo Morales a La Presidencia de Bolivia." Pp. 113–42 in *Bolivia en el inicio del Pachakuti: La larga lucha anticolonial de los pueblos aimara y quechua, Pensamiento crítico*, edited by Es. Ticona Alejo. Madrid: Ediciones Akal.

Ticona Alejo, Esteban. 2000. *Organización y Liderazgo Aymara: La Experiencia Indígena En La Política Boliviana, 1979-1996*. La Paz, Bolivia: Universidad de la Cordillera.

Ticona Alejo, Esteban. 2010. *Saberes, Conocimientos y Prácticas Anticoloniales Del Pueblo Aymara-Quechua En Bolivia*. La Paz, Bolivia: Plural Editores.

Tilly, Charles. 1999. *Durable Inequality*. 1st ed. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Tórrez Rubín de Celis, Yuri, Daniela Carrasco, and Gloria Cámara. 2010. *El Indio En La Prensa: Representación Racial de La Prensa Boliviana Con Respecto a Los Levantamientos Indígenas/Campesinos (1899-2003)*. Cochabamba, Bolivia: Centro Cuarto Intermedio.

Trigo Gandarillas, Carlos. 2006. "La Diplomacia Directa Del Presidente." *La Razón*, March 28, Edición impresa.

- Tummala, Krishna K. 2015. *Politics of Preference: India, United States, and South Africa*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
- Vallas, Steven P. 2003. "Rediscovering the Color Line within Work Organizations The `Knitting of Racial Groups' Revisited." *Work and Occupations* 30(4):379–400.
- Vallas, Steven P. and Emily Cummins. 2014. "Relational Models of Organizational Inequalities: Emerging Approaches and Conceptual Dilemmas." *American Behavioral Scientist* 58(2):228–55.
- Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2002. "Constitutional Reform in the Andes: Redefining Indigenous-State Relations." Pp. 45–73 in *Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity and Democracy*, edited by R. Sieder. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2005. *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2010. "Indigenous Peoples' Politics in Latin America." *Annual Review of Political Science* 13(1):385–405.
- Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2003. "Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America." *Latin American Politics and Society* 45(2):1–39.
- Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2008. *Radical Democracy in the Andes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Vargas Aguirre, Oscar Patricio and Juan Carlo Montecinos Luque. 2004. *Trayectoria de La Diplomacia Boliviana: Época de La Renovación, 1952-2004*. La Paz, Bolivia: Editorial “Campo Iris” s.r.l.
- Viceministerio de Descentralización. 2007. *Memoria: Taller de Gestión Pública Indígena e Intercultural*. La Paz, Bolivia: Ministerio de la Presidencia.
- Viceministerio de Descolonización. 2014. *El Futuro Es Indio*. La Paz, Bolivia: Ministerio de Culturas y Turismo del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.
- Von Vacano, Diego A. 2014. *The Color of Citizenship: Race, Modernity and Latin American/Hispanic Political Thought*. Oxford University Press.
- Wade, Peter. 2010. *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America*. 2nd ed. London: Pluto Press.
- Watkins-Hayes, Celeste. 2009. *The New Welfare Bureaucrats: Entanglements of Race, Class, and Policy Reform*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Weber, Max. 1967. *Ancient Judaism*. New York: The Free Press.
- Weber, Max. 1958. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Oxford University Press.
- Weeden, Lisa. 2009. “Ethnography as Interpretive Enterprise.” Pp. 75–94 in *Political ethnography: what immersion contributes to the study of power*, edited by E. Schatz. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Williams, Melissa S. 2000. *Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wimmer, Andreas. 2002. *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wimmer, Andreas. 2008. "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 113(4):970–1022.

Winant, Howard. 2001. *The World Is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy Since World War II*. New York: Basic Books.

Wingfield, Adia Harvey and Renée Skeete Alston. 2014. "Maintaining Hierarchies in Predominantly White Organizations: A Theory of Racial Tasks." *American Behavioral Scientist* 58(2):274–87.

Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zegada, María Teresa and Jorge Komadina. 2014. *El Espejo de La Sociedad: Poder y Representación En Bolivia*. La Paz, Bolivia: Plural Editores.

Zolberg, Aristide R. 2008. *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.