

A Dividing Sea  
The Adriatic World from the Fourth to the First Centuries BC

By

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## CURRICULUM VITAE

Keith Robert Fairbank, Jr. hails from the great states of New York and Montana. He grew up feeding cattle under the Big Sky, serving as senior class president and continuing on to Brigham Young University in Utah for his BA in Humanities and Classics (2010). Keith worked as a volunteer missionary for two years in Brazil, where he learned Portuguese (2004–2006). Keith furthered his education at Brigham Young University, earning an MA in Classics (2012). While there he developed a curriculum for accelerated first year Latin focused on competency-based learning. He matriculated at Brown University in fall 2012 in the Program in Ancient History. While at Brown, Keith published an appendix in *The Landmark Caesar*. He also co-directed a Mellon Graduate Student Workshop on colonial entanglements.



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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

SIGNATURE PAGE	iii
CURRICULUM VITAE	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
MAP OF ADRIATIC PORTS	1
INTRODUCTION	2
Connected Ecologies	4
Why the Adriatic?	8
Imaginary Adriatics	13
Conclusion	15
Chapter Descriptions	16
CHAPTER 1: DEFINING THE ADRIATIC	20
The Physical and Ecological Space	20
The Intellectual Space	38
The Historical Space	53
An Intimate Division	68
CHAPTER 2: <i>IMPORTUOSA ITALIAE LITORA</i> : MOVEMENT AND TRADERS	71
Trade Routes	77
Commodities and Markers of Trade	92
Fineware	92
Amphorae	109
Numismatics	122
Traders	127
Conclusion	132
CHAPTER 3: FROM PREDATION TO PROTECTION: FIGHTING MEN IN THE ADRIATIC WORLD	137
Adriatic Piracies	141
New Approaches	158
Application	170
CHAPTER 4: THE PEOPLE OF THE ADRIATIC: SETTLEMENT AND COLONIZATION	182

Colony or Settlement? Postcolonial Archaeology and History	186
A is for Ancona and Athens	195
Water and Land in the Adriatic Islands	210
Roman Land Use and Economic Exploitation	219
Conclusion	226
CHAPTER 5: IMPERIALISMS AND MARITIME POWER IN THE ADRIATIC WORLD	230
Imperialism and <i>imperialisms</i>	233
Syracusans	243
Athenians	249
Spartans and Epirotes (Defenders of Taras)	252
Illyrians	258
Macedonians	267
Romans	271
Conclusion	284
CONCLUSION	288
APPENDIX A: ADRIATIC COLONIES	295
BIBLIOGRAPHY	297

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 – Study of tracers in the Adriatic Sea	30
Figure 2 – Trade patterns in the Adriatic Sea	78
Figure 3 – Study of tracers in the Adriatic Sea	78
Figure 4 – Male and Female Daunian Stelae	80
Figure 5 – Sailing routes in the Adriatic after Kirigin et al.	83
Figure 6 – Surface currents in the Adriatic in Summer and Winter	84
Figure 7 – Adriatic sailing routes	86
Figure 8 – Sailing routes of the preroman period	90
Figure 9 – Distribution of Athenian red figure ceramics 6 <sup>th</sup> -5 <sup>th</sup> BC	93
Figure 10 – Route of Athenian merchants to the Po Delta	94
Figure 11 – Distribution of red figure pottery	96
Figure 12 – Athenian black (circles) and red (squares) figure pottery	97
Figure 13 – Distribution of Attic pottery in the classical period	99
Figure 14 – Sites related to black-glazed pottery	102
Figure 15 – Distribution of ESB A (white) and B (black)	104
Figure 16 – Hellenistic pottery in Liburnia	105
Figure 17 – Distribution of Hellenistic relief pottery	107
Figure 18 – Areas of amphora production 2 <sup>nd</sup> -1 <sup>st</sup> centuries BC	112
Figure 19 – Distribution of Greco-Italic amphora cargoes 4 <sup>th</sup> -2 <sup>nd</sup> centuries BC	118
Figure 20 – Distribution of Lamboglia 2 amphora cargoes	118
Figure 21 – Map of shipwrecks	120
Figure 22 – Coin hoards of mixed western Mediterranean bronzes	123
Figure 23 – Mint distribution of coins found at Issa	126
Figure 24 – Adriatic routes according to ancient geographers	134
Figure 25 – Maritime relations in the Strait of Otranto	135
Figure 26 – Plan of the colony of Potentia	199
Figure 27 – Plan of the colony of Pisaurum	200
Figure 28 – Land division on the Stari Grad and Jelsa plains	216
Figure 29 – Plan of the colony of Sena Gallica	223



## INTRODUCTION

Fernand Braudel called the Adriatic Sea “perhaps the most unified of all the regions” of the Mediterranean.<sup>1</sup> He argued this was largely due to its geography, especially the Strait of Otranto, which is so narrow as to make the Adriatic almost an inland sea. He further claimed that control of the Strait “amounted to control of the Adriatic,” especially at Corcyra (modern Corfu), which guards the entrance to the entire sea.<sup>2</sup> While Venice controlled all of Braudel’s Adriatic in the age of Philip II of Spain (16<sup>th</sup> century AD), the geography had not changed since before the age of Philip II of Macedon (4<sup>th</sup> century BC). Yet despite geographic unity of space—and a high degree of maritime connectivity through trade and migration from at least the Bronze Age—no single power claimed control over the whole Adriatic until the Roman Empire, and then only briefly. In this way the ancient Adriatic presents something of a paradox: somehow the geography of the sea simultaneously facilitated maritime connectivity and hindered political control. In other words, it was highly permeable to people and goods but impervious to state power. And, as various east-west boundaries have run straight through the Adriatic in the last two millennia, most scholars have focused on the hindering, dividing aspects of the sea at the expense of its consistent connectivity.

This study will attempt to examine the Adriatic as a geographic whole through both the maritime movements that continually connect it and the actions of powerful states trying to exploit that connectivity for political and economic control, with particular emphasis on the 4<sup>th</sup> to

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<sup>1</sup> Braudel (1972), 125.

<sup>2</sup> Braudel (1972), 125-7.

the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC. Along the way, I argue that the Adriatic remains highly fragmented—balkanized—until the very end of these four centuries, the long Hellenistic period. I explore how processes of trade, predation on trade, and colonization and settlement increasingly connect the Adriatic basin until, after the Battle of Actium in 31 BC, it is finally possible to begin envisioning the Adriatic as a controllable whole. I call this process “continentalization,” a borrowing from Gérard Chouquere’s work on Mediterranean landscapes.<sup>3</sup> At the beginning of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, the Adriatic is so fragmented as to make control of it impossible—there are simply not enough mechanisms of control to exert any kind of influence over the larger Adriatic, unlike Braudel’s Venetian Adriatic. But as networks of contact “thicken” over time, the Hellenistic Adriatic becomes increasingly entangled. Trade attracts violent predators (I call them “military entrepreneurs” rather than pirates) and powerful states which begin scrambling to control the edges of the Adriatic and so profit from and direct growing flows of commerce. These consequences of connectivity culminate in warfare, conquest, and foreign rule. At the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC, the Adriatic can finally be perceived as a single entity: a culturally fragmented, highly connected, now controllable space. The dividing sea becomes potentially unifying.

In what follows below, I explore the conceptual frameworks for this project and attempt to explain how it fits within other scholarship on the Adriatic from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC. I have chosen the loose chronological bounds of the long Hellenistic period both because I want to capture this process of “continentalization”—which I believe begins in the 4<sup>th</sup> century as Athenian influence in the Adriatic wanes and is largely concluded following Octavian’s defeat of

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<sup>3</sup> Chouquere (2002).



Antony and Cleopatra in 31 BC—and because the eras before and after it have generally received greater attention, especially in the archaeological literature.<sup>4</sup>

## I. Connected Ecologies

This exploration of connecting aspects of the Adriatic is grounded in the arguments of Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell in *The Corrupting Sea*. They contend that these many connectivities come together to create a whole history of the sea, in their case the Mediterranean. Writing of the value of trade and especially “the short hops” of cabotage to link the maritime world, they say the following about these merchants:

They united diplomats, warriors, pirates, pilgrims and traders in cargoes of all kinds, high- and low-value. They encourage us to take a synoptic view of these movements, one which has more to learn from economic anthropology than from the more restricted subject matter of classic economic history with its preoccupation with prices, markets and economic laws. The interplay of status and the movements of people are as important to this network of contacts as the sale of commodities. Gift and theft take their place beside barter, loan and purchase. Violent and irregular movements of people or materials must be included in this history as much as the tidier world of (more-or-less) legally regulated commerce.<sup>5</sup>

It is this kind of synoptic view I hope to have assembled in these chapters, placing commerce, pillaging, settlement, and violence side-by-side as indicators of connectivity and the history of the sea.

Horden and Purcell famously make the distinction between histories *in* the Mediterranean and histories *of* it, arguing that the latter are those histories focused on aspects of that space for which the Mediterranean itself provides the indispensable framework.<sup>6</sup> In their formulation, there are many histories *in* the Mediterranean organized around themes that are only tangentially dependent on the physical space, such as political, religious, or economic history. History *of* the Mediterranean must first and foremost be dependent on the geography and ecology of the region.

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<sup>4</sup> Literature review below.

<sup>5</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), 365.

<sup>6</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), 2-3.

This study of the Adriatic follows in a similar vein, seeking to be a history *of* the Adriatic rather than history *in* it. In the chapters that follow, I return repeatedly to this idea of the ecological space of the Adriatic and try to formulate each exploration within the indispensable framework of the maritime world itself.

Horden and Purcell's history *of* the Mediterranean depends on the important concept of "microecologies" and a new understanding of ecological history.<sup>7</sup> In brief, they posit that what gives the Mediterranean its Mediterraneanness is the connection via the sea of hundreds of microecologies: little pockets of weather patterns, soil types, flora and fauna, and geological features that make up the great diversity of the Mediterranean basin. They demonstrate—explicitly to the detriment of romantic views of Mediterranean unity through homogeneity—the significant differences even a few miles make between microecologies. Ultimately they argue that the relative ease of maritime transport fosters connections between microecologies scattered across large distances and allows individuals and communities to tap into the resources of these different ecological zones far more easily than over comparable distances on land. For example, in a famine or following a natural disaster, a community with access to the sea may survive through trade contacts with unaffected microecologies only a day or two away by sail but weeks overland.<sup>8</sup> This connectivity and subsequent access to diversity defines the Mediterranean basin in their eyes.

Horden and Purcell's formulation has had an enormous impact on multiple fields. Not all responses to *The Corrupting Sea* have been positive, nor has the idea of the whole Mediterranean always gone in helpful directions, with some now seeing Mediterraneans nearly everywhere.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), 53ff.

<sup>8</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), 175ff; Purcell (2003), 10.

<sup>9</sup> Harris (2005), especially Herzfeld (2005) and Horden and Purcell (2005), and Malkin (2005); cf. Wheeler (2015) for the impact outside of the Mediterranean.

Certainly there has been an increase in Mediterraneanism in the tradition of Braudel and, more generally, a sustained interest in maritime connectivity.<sup>10</sup> One of the most influential responses has been Ian Morris' call for a focus on the consequences of connectivity. He leans on the increasingly important theories of globalism:

[W]e need to take another leaf from the globalization theorists' books and think of connectedness as a process rather than a state, focusing on 'Mediterraneanization' rather than 'Mediterraneanism'. This means foregrounding change through time, different analytical scales, and tensions and conflicts. Globalization has created winners and new losers; Mediterraneanization did the same.<sup>11</sup>

This idea of change through time and the inclusion of violence in the process of connectivity links well with Horden and Purcell's notions of connectivity on the small scale of coastal trade. They argue that it is the small traders, the *caboteurs*, who connect (and Mediterraneanize) the microregions of the sea:

These vessels could be engaged in any combination of a range of possible ventures: *cabotage* (or tramping), petty piracy, the transport of travellers and pilgrims. Although individually they operated on a small scale, they were probably responsible in aggregate for many more of the movements of goods and people around the sea than was *le grand traffic maritime*.<sup>12</sup>

These maritime entrepreneurs, what Braudel called the "proletarians of the sea," provided the major means of Mediterraneanization. They are a constant focus of this study within the context of the Adriatic.

But while these small movements have a major impact in the aggregate, Morris called for "different analytical scales." One of the repeated criticisms of *The Corrupting Sea* is the near

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<sup>10</sup> E.g. Abulafia (2011) and Broodbank (2013) at the level of the Mediterranean or, for regional or specialized examples, Constantakopoulou (2007), Knapp (2008), Malkin et al. (2009), Malkin (2011), Knapp and van Dommelen (2015).

<sup>11</sup> Morris (2003), 33.

<sup>12</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), 140.

absence of states.<sup>13</sup> One of my objectives in this study is to reintroduce state-level actions to the world of connectivity. This requires navigating a difficult balance. As Peter van Dommelen recently argued, one of the problems with connectivity, especially in the guise of network theory, is the lack of agency. In systems—and this microecological formulation can become systemic—the actions of individuals and communities fade into the background.<sup>14</sup> His solution within the framework of globalization and globalism is to focus on the nodes of connectivity where humans interact with one another (and the environment) and exercise agency, rather than on the networks themselves. While I seek to do the same, I am also at pains to show how states interact with individuals and their environment through these nodes. As with Horden and Purcell’s model of ecological diversification for survival through the connection of microregions—a sort of hedging of economic, agricultural bets against disaster—I argue that the connectivity of maritime spaces, especially the Adriatic, provides increased opportunities to individuals and states in the form of a more diverse selection of trade goods, markets, and small and large states to appeal to, make claims on, or profit from. Alongside these opportunities come the negative consequences of connectivity, including predation, warfare, and conquest. These consequences, made possible by and tied inextricably to the geography and ecology of the Adriatic Sea, are a primary focus of this study.

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<sup>13</sup> E.g. Shaw (2001), 441. Horden and Purcell (2005) contains a response: The implication is perhaps that our omission is both unjustifiable and convenient: history can hardly do without such institutions, and, had we attempted to say more about them, we should have faced far greater difficulty in defending the comparability of very different epochs. We confess, naturally, to a degree of omission. The state is not in fact wholly absent from our index and is more widely present than its entry there would suggest because it is subsumed by our wider category of ‘man-agers’ of microecologies: the ‘powerful’ who direct production. But on a Braudellian yardstick our treatment is of course brief and unsystematic. Our aim was to seek precisely those structures and continuities that are camouflaged by the glitter of diversity in this most culturally complex and *mouvementée* of regions. And our reluctance to pursue in detail, for a hundred different societies, how this may be worked out is therefore the product simply of the constraints of scale and available time.

<sup>14</sup> van Dommelen (2017); Horden and Purcell (2005), 373.

Morris also argued that an effective history *of* the Mediterranean would by necessity “order a mass of local ‘histories in’.”<sup>15</sup> In other words, although many histories *in* the Mediterranean do not depend on the sea as their indispensable framework, a collection of such histories *in* can be organized into a history *of* by reframing them to depend on their geography. The last decade has seen several such efforts at the regional scale, finding a middle ground between microregions and the whole Mediterranean. For example, Christy Constantakopoulou’s *The Dance of the Islands: Insularity, Networks, the Athenian Empire and the Aegean World* tackles connections in one region of the Mediterranean on multiple scales.<sup>16</sup> Peter Thonemman zooms in on one river valley with great effect in *The Maeander Valley: A Historical Geography from Antiquity to Byzantium* and does so across a broad chronological frame and with attention to multiple wavelengths of historical time.<sup>17</sup> This study of the Adriatic fits into this broader trend of regional studies founded firmly on their ecological surroundings. These works are as much historical geography as history, what Thonemann defines as “uncovering this dialectical relationship between men and women and their environment over time.”<sup>18</sup> This study, then, is something of a historical geography of the Adriatic Sea.

## II. Why the Adriatic?

The Adriatic, perhaps more than any other subregion of the Mediterranean, suffers from the kind of division that makes it difficult to envision as a whole connected space. Beginning with Polybius’ famous formulation of the Romans crossing into the Greek world in 229 BC, the

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<sup>15</sup> Morris (2003), 33.

<sup>16</sup> Constantakopoulou (2007).

<sup>17</sup> Thonemann (2011).

<sup>18</sup> Thonemann (2011), xiii: Men and women make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please. They make it not under circumstances they have chosen themselves, but under conditions inherited from the past and imposed on them by the material world. The most fundamental of these conditions is the physical environment in which people live. Geology, botany, and climate offer possibilities, and impose limits; how people respond to those possibilities depends on a wide range of social factors, including the personalities and choices of individuals.

Adriatic has served as a firm boundary between east and west.<sup>19</sup> This split became fixed administratively in 40 BC when Octavian and Antony drew an arbitrary line through the Adriatic to divide their spheres of influence.<sup>20</sup> Similar improvised meridians through the Adriatic separated the two halves of the Roman Empire from the reign of Diocletian onward, the Roman and Byzantine Empires, Christian Europe from the Ottoman Empire, and ultimately Western Europe from the communist bloc. Into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Adriatic has divided NATO from former Soviet states and the EU from non-EU countries. Modern Croatia, which dominates the eastern Adriatic coastline, finally joined the EU in 2013; but with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Albania still on the outside of both the EU and NATO, the Adriatic remains the dividing line of the Mediterranean Sea. As Purcell put it, Octavian and Antony's division of the world has "become fossilized" in administrative thinking ever since and has thereby contributed to "many a schematic historical separatism of East and West."<sup>21</sup> With this backdrop, it is difficult to remember that the Adriatic was a highly connected space throughout ancient history, regardless of the political situation along the shoreline.

The dominant narrative of history in these first four centuries BC, that of Roman Imperialism, goes hand in hand with the historical division of the Adriatic. As Polybius set out to explain how Rome rose from Italy to conquer the entire Mediterranean world during this period, so modern historians have focused on this perspective. For most, the artificial division between east and west is so firm as to create a Hellenistic zone into which Rome must break through conquest. Take, for example, the titles of two major works on the subject: Erich Gruen's *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome* and Arthur Eckstein's *Rome Enters the Greek East*.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Polyb. 2.1, 5.105; cf. Eckstein (2008), 79-83.

<sup>20</sup> At the conference at Brundisium. App. *BC* 5.65; Zaccaria (2015), 14; Purcell (2013), 375.

<sup>21</sup> Purcell (2013), 375.

<sup>22</sup> Gruen (1984) and Eckstein (2008); noted by Čašule (2011), 23.

Both assume a firm separation between the Greek and Roman worlds. As Nicola Čašule noted in his dissertation, this division of the fields of ancient history goes back to Maurice Holleaux's strong belief that the Romans took no interest in the world on the other side of the Adriatic until well into the third century BC.<sup>23</sup>

The effects of this can be seen in the organization of the second edition of *The Cambridge Ancient History*.<sup>24</sup> The first six volumes, covering history to the end of the fourth century BC, focus almost exclusively on the Mediterranean east of the Adriatic with the exception of a few scattered chapters on Sicily, Italy in the Bronze and Iron Ages, and Carthage.<sup>25</sup> This is history of the Greek East. The editors split the seventh volume in half right at the Adriatic: 7.1 "The Hellenistic World" focuses almost entirely east of the sea while 7.2 "The Rise of Rome to 220 BC" stays west of it except for background on Pyrrhus—though the primary focus of that section is on his actions in Italy. Granted that it is very difficult to organize a history of the entire Mediterranean world without leaving something out, this schema reinforces the strength of that dichotomy of Greek history on one side and Roman history on the other. What about the history of everyone else in the Mediterranean?

Volume 8 of the *CAH*, "Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 BC," shows the further challenges of this paradigm. On one hand, Greek history seems to cease after 217 BC, the

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<sup>23</sup> Čašule (2011), 21ff where he notes the ongoing division of textbooks, for example, into Greek and Roman history despite covering similar ground.

<sup>24</sup> Čašule (2011), 23-7 makes similar observations.

<sup>25</sup> *CAH*<sup>2</sup> 3.3, *The Expansion of the Greek World 8-6<sup>th</sup> Centuries B.C.*, includes areas west of the Adriatic in a chapter on colonization and a standalone chapter on western Greeks, meaning Magna Graecia, both by A.J. Graham: "The Colonial Expansion of Greece," 83-162 and "The Western Greeks," 163-195. *CAH*<sup>2</sup> 4, *Persia, Greece, and the Western Mediterranean c. 525 to 479 B.C.* features one section entitled "The West," which means Magna Graecia (pages 623-738) and Sicily (739-790). *CAH*<sup>2</sup> 5, *The Fifth Century B.C.* covers the Sicilian expedition (A. Andrewes, "The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition," 446-463). *CAH*<sup>2</sup> 6, *The Fourth Century B.C.* has a chapter on Sicily (D.M. Lewis, "Sicily, 413-368 B.C." 120-55) and surveys of Carthage, South Italy, and Celtic Europe (G.Ch. Picard, "Carthage from the Battle at Himera to Agathocles' Invasion, 480-308 B.C." 361-80; N. Purcell, "South Italy in the Fourth Century B.C." 381-403; D.W. Harding, "Celtic Europe," 404-21).

terminus of volume 7.1. Everything thereafter, wherever it happens in the Mediterranean, must be Roman history. On the other hand, the narrative of how Rome comes to dominate the basin defines what stories are told. This focus on the Romanocentric narrative of expansion exists at the expense of many parts of the Mediterranean world, since the historian telling Rome's story shines his light only in those parts of the basin where Rome has concerns.<sup>26</sup> This leaves entire swaths of the Mediterranean—especially the Adriatic—not only out of the limelight but in the dark entirely for most of the Roman Republic. Thus when the Adriatic appears at all in the context of Roman history, it tends to be within the overarching narrative of Roman Imperialism with all its inherent problems (dealt with in chapter five).

Some historians are trying to change this firm divide by opening the loosely Hellenistic period to include parts of the Mediterranean much further west. Jonathan Prag and Jo Crawley-Quinn hosted a series of workshops at Oxford to this effect and published the excellent results in 2013.<sup>27</sup> This broadening of the Hellenistic can help to overcome some of these problems, but we must be careful not to impose the Hellenistic paradigm elsewhere, trading Roman Imperialism for the Hellenic cultural diaspora. In any case it is a steep road to climb. As Prag noted at a recent visit to Brown University, he has often driven the point home by assigning tutorial students the challenge of finding a map in a history book that shows both sides of the Adriatic at once. It is still not an easy task. The landmark *Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World*, for example, requires the reader to examine seven different maps for a complete picture of the coastline—and even then simply does not cover parts of the sea.<sup>28</sup> For most historians of these first four centuries BC, the Adriatic is not a viable unit of study itself but rather a separator of

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<sup>26</sup> The editors of *CAH*<sup>2</sup> 7.2 acknowledge this to some extent and send anyone interested in Roman engagement with other parts of the Mediterranean to “other volumes. Especially relevant are chapters 12-15 of Volume IV, but Volumes III.3, V, and VI all contain pertinent sections” (pp. xvi).

<sup>27</sup> Prag and Crawley-Quinn (2013).

<sup>28</sup> Talbert (2000), maps 19, 20, 40, 42, 44, 45, and 49.



them.<sup>29</sup> One of the major values of this project is the bridging of that artificial divide between the Greek East and Roman West by focusing on the Adriatic as a whole, telling history *of* the Adriatic rather than histories on its edges.

The most difficult challenge of this endeavor is the dearth of evidence. There may be a comparatively strong literary record for the major narratives of Roman expansion and the civil wars in Polybius, Livy, Caesar, and Appian (details in chapter one), but these are definitely Romanocentric works. One of my primary tasks is to disentangle the Adriatic from the knots of imperialism. The archaeological record presents its own challenges. The material evidence before the 4<sup>th</sup> and after the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC has received much more attention than the centuries scrutinized here (chapter one). Especially the ceramic material for these four centuries has yet to be published in most instances, let alone analyzed beyond the very local level. While great things are beginning to happen in archaeologies all around the Adriatic basin, the field is still young in many places with the result that very little analysis beyond the hyperlocal has been done. Similar problems exist with numismatic and epigraphic evidence and, to a somewhat lesser degree, site archaeology. I am certainly not an archaeologist, but rather a historian. I see my role in working with these nascent pools of evidence to be putting them in dialogue with one another. As I work through the published datasets and analyses of others, I find commonalities within the framework of the Adriatic and, as Morris challenged, marshal many histories *in* the Adriatic into a history *of* it.

I am not the only scholar thinking along these lines. Volumes published in the last two decades show an awareness of the potential for Adriatic studies. However, up to this point, they have been almost exclusively conference reports.<sup>30</sup> While these conferences bring together

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<sup>29</sup> Most work on the Adriatic as a whole focuses on prehistory, e.g. Forenbahr (2009).

<sup>30</sup> E.g. Landolfi (2000), Zaccaria (2001), Čače et al. (2006), and Marion and Tasseaux (2015).

terrific studies *in* the Adriatic, the individual studies seldom take the ecology of the sea as their indispensable framework, and the collections of studies are not organized into histories *of* the Adriatic. I do not say this to disparage these volumes for being x when I wanted them to be y. They provide invaluable studies in the Adriatic space on which I frequently draw throughout this dissertation. My point is simply that they are seldom ecologically focused and almost never on the entire Adriatic basin. The sole exception to this string of conference reports is Pierre Cabanes' multi-author history of the Adriatic in the *longue durée*.<sup>31</sup> Unfortunately, the sections on the ancient world—written by Cabanes himself—amount only to a retelling of the major narratives and ignore most of the Adriatic to focus on Illyria and Epirus, the parts Cabanes knows best. His is most definitely history *in* the sea. While the Adriatic continues to pick up steam as a field of study, this is the first monograph attempted on the whole space. I hope that as more evidence for these four centuries comes to light and receives scholarly attention, others will improve upon it.

### III. Imaginary Adriatics

It is quite clear that the Adriatic was a highly connected space throughout these first four centuries BC. The Italian and Balkan coasts were linked by trade routes crossing the sea, hopping from island to island, and hugging the coast in an uninterrupted flow of ships (chapter two). Goods from all over the Mediterranean basin make their way to Adriatic shores. Yet, within the literary tradition, the Adriatic has a distinct foreignness, an aura of danger and the unknown. Part of the task of this study is to reconcile the forbidding sea of, say, Lucan's *Bellum Civile* with the high degree of maritime traffic it routinely saw. As Čašule argues in his recent dissertation, we must stop thinking of Rome expanding to the Adriatic coast of Italy and then beginning to look across the sea. Rather, when Rome reached the Adriatic coast—as early as 295

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<sup>31</sup> Cabanes (2001).

BC at the Battle of Sentinum—the state stepped into an already existing, already thriving network of trade. When Rome joined settlements in Magna Graecia and especially the central Adriatic region, she joined trade relationships going back centuries. As I elaborate in chapters two and three, while the Roman colonies on the Adriatic coast have traditionally been seen as bulwarks against Celtic invasion from the north, they were distinctly maritime in nature and took advantage of natural ports and navigable rivers to actively participate in Adriatic trade.

For Italians and Romans living on the Adriatic from the third century BC onward, the Adriatic was a connected and familiar world. Likewise for Greek traders doing business in the Adriatic or Greek speakers living in the southern cities of Epidamnus, Apollonia, or Phoenice, for example, the Adriatic was a familiar place. Yet at Rome or Athens it seemed a far-off *monde mystérieux*.<sup>32</sup> In myth it was the place Cadmus settled in and ruled over (founding modern Budva),<sup>33</sup> and especially the route of the Argo.<sup>34</sup> This aura of otherness persisted into the fourth century at Athens. In one of Lysias speeches his client accuses Diogeiton of risking his ward's money on a merchant venture in the Adriatic Sea, the thrust of which is that the Adriatic was a high risk and high reward arena for business. Its proverbial danger also comes through in a fragmentary speech, where the merchants of the Piraeus would apparently rather risk sailing the Adriatic than do business with Aeschines.<sup>35</sup>

In the Roman imagination, the risks seem to have been weather and pirates. Livy describes Cleonymus of Sparta in 303 BC avoiding both coasts as he traveled north, with pirates to the east and harborless, unwelcoming shorelines to the west.<sup>36</sup> Perhaps most famously, Lucan describes a terrific storm in the Adriatic and the perils Caesar encountered shuffling his troops

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<sup>32</sup> Cabanes (2001), 29.

<sup>33</sup> Eur. *Bac.* 1340ff; Herod. 9.43; Beaumont (1936), 196ff.

<sup>34</sup> Apoll. Rhod. 4.284ff; schol. op. cit.; Beaumont (1936), 197; Cabanes (2001), 27ff.

<sup>35</sup> Lysias 32.25 and fr. 1.4.

<sup>36</sup> Livy 10.4.

from Brundisium to near Dyrrachium.<sup>37</sup> In Augustan poetry, Horace uses the storms of the Adriatic as an analogy for irritability and anger.<sup>38</sup> But alongside the dangers of the sea must have come increased familiarity as, following the incorporation of mainland Greece and Illyria as provinces in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC, more and more Romans crossed the Adriatic.

Despite the risks in sailing this rhetorically unknown space, evidence will show a great deal of commerce between Adriatic settlements and sites all over the Mediterranean. Whatever the rhetorical position of the Adriatic may have been, it was thoroughly connected to the flow of Mediterranean trade.

#### IV. Conclusion

The primary questions of this study are how connected the Adriatic was during the first four centuries BC, how the geography and ecology of the Adriatic basin facilitated trade and other connections while hindering state-sponsored conquest, and how individuals and communities took advantage of these conditions. The environment of the Adriatic is the consistent theme. Throughout, as I examine various histories *in* the Adriatic, I look to establish them within the framework *of* the Adriatic and create a larger, more complete picture *of* the whole sea. This frequently requires stepping outside the dominant narratives of Greek and Roman history to rescue, in effect, the histories *in* this region from discourses of expansionism. I find aid in all these endeavors in the microecological model of Horden and Purcell, which sees all the small corners of the Adriatic linked to one another in a never ending flow of trade and active economic and ecological diversification.

But I diverge from them to emphasize the consequences of all these connections. I try to show that it is through networks of commerce and contact that predation, settlement, and

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<sup>37</sup> Luc. *BC* 504ff.

<sup>38</sup> Hor. *Carm.* 1.3.14-16, 1.16.1-4, 1.33.13-6, 2.11.1-5, 2.14.13-6, 3.3.1-6, 3.9.21-4, 3.27.18-20. Cf. Prop. 1.6.1, 3.21.17-8.

conquest come to the Adriatic. As these networks thicken over time, they transform the Adriatic space from a fragmented, balkanized region into one ultimately controllable and potentially unified. Along the way, I hope to show that studying the Adriatic as a complete whole is worthwhile and provides new insights to other narratives of Hellenistic history.

## V. Chapter Descriptions

To accomplish this, I have organized the dissertation into five chapters. In chapter one, “Defining the Adriatic,” I attempt an overview of the Adriatic in three sections. First, I explore the physical and ecological space of the Adriatic, emphasizing its geography, winds, currents, and marine life. Next, I examine some of the source material for studying the Adriatic in the Hellenistic period. I discuss literary, archaeological, numismatic, and epigraphic material in turn with an emphasis on studies that address the whole Adriatic rather than its edges. Finally, I provide something of a narrative history of the Adriatic in this period, eschewing the traditional narratives of Greek and Roman history as far as possible to center the events on the Adriatic space itself. This chapter creates the spatial context for the rest of the dissertation, its “indispensible framework” as Horden and Purcell put it.

In chapter two, “*Importuosa Italiae Litora: Movement and Traders*,” I approach movement and trade. This is a broad topic and difficult to present in a limited space, not least because of the size of the sea and the state of the material evidence. The archaeology of many parts of the Adriatic is fairly young, and much of the ceramic and numismatic evidence has not been published or, if it has, has not yet been analyzed. In an attempt to cover the whole sea in this period, I divide the chapter into three sections, largely organized around maps produced by scholars trying to show patterns of movement and trade in the Adriatic. In turn I examine depictions of trade routes, trade patterns of specific commodities, and the traders themselves.

This is by no means a complete history of Adriatic movement and trade, but I believe I have constructed a good representation of the degree of Adriatic connectivity in this period.

In chapter three, “From Predation to Protection: Fighting Men in the Adriatic World,” I consider attacks on trade in the form of piracy. I quickly get away from that word, however, and focus on the model of “military entrepreneurs” favored by Thomas Gallant. The chapter is split into three parts. First, I discuss the evidence for predation in the Adriatic and review previous scholarship on pirates in the ancient world more generally. Second, I introduce Gallant’s work and theories of state-formation and the effects of “bandits” and other fighting men outside the law on the consolidation of state authority in the ancient world. Finally, I revisit predation in the Adriatic within this new framework and show how Gallant’s model can help us understand the developmental processes of the Adriatic in terms of state-formation rather than piracy. Within this formulation, developing states coexisted with and fed on the continual flow of military entrepreneurs in the Adriatic.

Within the fourth chapter, “The People of the Adriatic: Settlement and Colonization,” I examine state actions in the Adriatic in the form of the people living and populating the communities of the Adriatic. The settlement and movement of people in and through the Adriatic has left important evidence for the patterns of human communities in the zones that surround the Adriatic Sea. Developments through the fourth century suggest that the movements of people and their settlements see a deepening or thickening in the networks of contact in the Adriatic basin to the point of at which one can think of the Adriatic being “continentalized”, or the “continentalization” of the Adriatic. In other words, the once thinly-linked Adriatic becomes so closely entangled that it resembles something else entirely, almost a landmass of connections. The geo-political developments following the settlement program of Augustus at the end of the

1<sup>st</sup> century BC see the Adriatic finally conceivable as a single space under the nominal control of one power, Rome. The chapter is organized into three sections. In the first, I explore trends in the theory of settlement and colonization and how they apply to the situation in the Adriatic. This is important because Greek and Roman settlement around the Adriatic are generally studied quite separately—in a space like the Adriatic this kind of comparative study can put these separate fields side-by-side. Next, I take as a case study the settlements of Ancona and an unnamed colony of Athens and use them to explore how states project power and control in a maritime space. I then look at settlement patterns in the Croatian islands before wrapping up with a look at Roman colonization and land use along the Italian coast. Taken altogether, this chapter establishes a pattern of “thickening” networks in the Adriatic building to the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC.

The last chapter, “*Imperialisms and Maritime Power in the Adriatic World*,” is a study of the consequences of all this connectivity in the form of conquest. I argue here that the cumulative effect of strengthening trade networks over time is the attraction of violence, in other words that military entrepreneurs and armies follow the same lines of communication and traffic as trade vessels—in fact, trade paves the way. I posit that the “thickening” of these networks transforms the Adriatic in such a way—over centuries of aggression and conquest—that it is finally transformed into a single entity in the lifetime of Augustus. I begin the chapter with an examination of imperialism, especially Roman Imperialism, and introduce my concept of *imperialisms*, through which I simply dodge the overarching questions of long-term Imperialism in favor of ad hoc attempts at conquest. This allows me to put into dialogue with one another the aggressions, *imperialisms*, of many states beyond Rome, whose Imperialism traditionally dominates the narrative history of this period. In the second section, I look in turn at the

*imperialisms* of Syracuse, Epirus, Illyria, Macedon, and Rome in the Adriatic. Placing them in dialogue with one another allows us to see the process of “continentalization” in the Adriatic: for most of this period, states strive for control of fragmented parts of the sea and only strive for the whole region when it has become sufficiently developed to support such an effort, at the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC.



## CHAPTER ONE

### DEFINING THE ADRIATIC

This chapter provides the geographical and ecological context for the Adriatic as well as a sense of existing scholarship and sources. It begins with an extended essay describing the physical space of the Adriatic and how the ecologies of the Adriatic basin work together. After this exploration of the project’s environment, I turn to some of the primary sources and consider how they describe the Adriatic space and assess the problems of how we are to read this material. I also explore the material evidence available for studying the Adriatic and the sorts of things that have already been done to that end. Finally, I present a narrative of the *histoire événementielle* in the Adriatic during these four centuries, highlighting those parts of the story that illuminate in particular the sea and its ecology.

#### I. The Physical and Ecological Space

As noted in the introduction, the Adriatic Sea was to Fernand Braudel “perhaps the most unified of all the regions of the sea.”<sup>39</sup> He was writing especially of the 16<sup>th</sup> century Mediterranean and the sustained influence of Italian cities on the rest of the Adriatic, but his view of the space has heavily influenced subsequent studies of the Adriatic in all ages.<sup>40</sup> In contrast, Predrag Matvejević called it a “sea of intimacy,” by which he meant a place where culturally distinct peoples have been brought into close quarters.<sup>41</sup> As Dominique Reill put it, “The Adriatic has never been a homogenous cultural landscape. It has been intimate—one could

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<sup>39</sup> Braudel (1972), 125, cf. 19, 125-33.

<sup>40</sup> Worthington (2017a), 13.

<sup>41</sup> Matvejević and Heim, (1999), 16.

even say dangerously so—but never homogenous.”<sup>42</sup> Braudel’s homogeneity and Matvejević’s closeness both depend on the geography of the sea, namely its narrow mouth at the Strait of Otranto. The almost landlocked Adriatic presents a “special phenomenon of intense association” through its near isolation.<sup>43</sup>

The Adriatic indeed presents a challenging schizophrenia: on the one hand it unites, even if not creating Braudel’s homogeneity—“géographie, politique, économie, civilisation, religion, tout concourt à bâtir un monde adriatique homogène”—while on the other it divides the Mediterranean conveniently down the middle, although this convenience divides a uniting space.<sup>44</sup> This duality challenges and fascinates. Pierre Cabanes described it at the beginning of his *longue durée* study:

Elle a été, tour à tour, limite, frontière entre le monde connu et le monde mystérieux de l’au-delà, et passerelle entre deux rives très proches l’une de l’autre. Cette double fonction n’est, d’ailleurs, pas propre à la période antique. Elle est, au contraire, une constante dans l’histoire des pays qui la bordent: trait d’union entre la Grèce et la Grande Grèce, elle marque un temps la limite entre monde grec et monde romain; située au centre de l’Empire romain à partir d’Auguste, elle redevient frontière entre empire d’Orient et empire d’Occident, puis entre Byzance et le monde barbare, comme plus tard elle sépare l’Empire ottoman des puissances occidentales.<sup>45</sup>

Likewise Claudio Zaccaria calls the Adriatic “un luogo di scambio di merci e culture, ma anche un confine tra modelli di civiltà, frontiera tra Stati e religioni, una frattura tra Italia e Slavia, tra Occidente e Oriente.”<sup>46</sup> This juxtaposition of *scambio* and *confine* or *frattura* characterizes the sea during this period from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC. The Adriatic in this period is thus something of a mesh barrier: allowing some things to permeate it—trade, people, culture—and yet remaining impervious to state authority.

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<sup>42</sup> Reill (2012), 22.

<sup>43</sup> Reill (2012), 22.

<sup>44</sup> Braudel (1966), 122. Quoted by Reill (2012) 22 with n. 11.

<sup>45</sup> Cabanes (2001b), 25.

<sup>46</sup> Zaccaria (2015), 13. Further on this duality: Cocco, (2007a), 11-24.

The dividing line down its middle can be traced to the division of the Roman world between Octavian and Antony in 40 BC at Brundisium.<sup>47</sup> Their choice was entirely arbitrary and split the world in a line drawn through Scodra. Nicholas Purcell complained:

But they chose an explicitly arbitrary line, a meridian, to give a precise, scientific, air to a division which had earlier been loosely constructed out of maritime topography. They could hardly have done more to underline the arbitrariness of the boundaries of East-West space. The Meridian of Scodra has had a negative effect on Mediterranean historiography: it slices through the Ionian-Adriatic maritime hinterland, which has usually beaten with a single social and economic pulse, but, even worse, as a given of Roman diplomatic and administrative thinking for centuries, it has become fossilized. It is a prominent contributor to many a schematic historical separatism of East and West.<sup>48</sup>

It is my argument throughout this thesis that the arbitrariness of this dividing line indeed splits a living, pulsing whole. Because it is a connecting sea, I make the dual argument that it is both an object worthy of study in itself and that it is the ecology of the Adriatic that does the connecting—the ecology allows us to study its unitary and fragmentary aspects together within a single framework.

The physical space, its geography and ecology unite the Adriatic even if its political history—arbitrary or not—divides it. For Braudel's homogeneity and Matvejević's intimate heterogeneity, the nearly-closed isolation of the Adriatic from the rest of the Mediterranean makes it unique. The imagined dividing line down its middle notwithstanding, this maritime space depends on the Strait of Otranto for access to the rest of the Mediterranean. Reill—echoing Braudel's sentiments we saw in the introduction—asserts that this dependence on the Strait makes the sea easy to conquer and control.<sup>49</sup> But while the cities along the Strait change hands regularly in the four centuries of this study, no single power succeeds in asserting control over the whole Adriatic until the Roman Empire in the lifetime of Augustus—and then it was a

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<sup>47</sup> App. *B.C.* 5.65; Zaccaria (2015), 14.

<sup>48</sup> Purcell (2013), 375.

<sup>49</sup> Reill (2012), 22.

struggle to back up that claim. What is it about this space that facilitates maritime traffic yet resists control? Is it ultimately a connecting or dividing sea? Or as Zaccaria has it: “Adriatico: mare che unisce o mare che divide; spazio conflittuale o condiviso; e ‘l'altra sponda’ è amica o nemica?”<sup>50</sup>

In what follows I explore the physical environment of the Adriatic to set the stage for the rest of the study. I believe that by focusing on the space rather than on any entity or cultural narrative happening around it we can bypass the traditional structural divisions of histories and studies of the Adriatic to this point.

The Adriatic moves closer together every day. It is slowly shrinking, as plate tectonics move the Italian and Balkan peninsulas toward one another. It was formed by the subduction of the Adriatic microplate under the Italy and Balkan plates, the action of which has built up the Apennines and Dinarics. Simultaneously, the Adriatic microplate has overlapped with Europe to push up the southern Alps. Currently the plates of Italy and the Balkans move closer together underneath the Adriatic, slowly shrinking the sea.<sup>51</sup> These movements have shaped it into a large, almost distinct body of water within the Mediterranean basin.<sup>52</sup> It is nearly a closed inland sea. It narrows to a bare 72 km in the Strait of Otranto (so far), and its longer shorelines are seldom more than 200km apart.

In many respects, these tectonic actions bring together very different ecological areas. Off the coast of Italy, its waves seep into lagoons and spill over sandbars while, to the east, they wear out high, forbidding karst shores. The broad, marshy delta of the Po River continually silts and shrinks the northwestern edge of the sea while its southeastern reaches splash on white sand beaches. Some 1,200 islands and islets break its surface, dividing the sea into networks of

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<sup>50</sup> Zaccaria (2015), 14.

<sup>51</sup> McKinney (2007), 44-60.

<sup>52</sup> It can be called an epicontinental sea: Pinardi et al., (2006), 1262.

archipelagos on its eastern side and leaving the western sea an uninterrupted expanse of open water. But in between, the water and the patterns of life across the basin it fills unite these shores. Currents swirl through the sea driving water in clockwise and counterclockwise patterns over hundreds of kilometers, carrying debris and nutrients throughout its space. Above the surface, winds from the north and south howl over the water intermittently, joining the whole basin together in a rage of storms and creating hurricanes and waves over 6 meters in height.<sup>53</sup> This diverse and yet united marine space is the focus of this project.

This is not a study of the land masses the Adriatic happens to connect (or divide) or the inhabitable areas it adjoins, but a study of the Adriatic itself, its waters, and its interactions with human actors from the fourth to the first centuries BC. The Adriatic Sea has meant different spaces at different times.<sup>54</sup> Strabo asserts that the name Adriatic comes from Atria, the town in Venetia between the branches of the Po River.<sup>55</sup> He names the *kolpos* the Adriatic, though elsewhere he uses Adriatic for the whole sea from its northwestern bay to the Strait of Otranto.<sup>56</sup> An old view that the Adriatic originally meant the innermost part of the sea at the Po persists in reference books but has been convincingly refuted by Beaumont.<sup>57</sup> Certainly by the fourth century and Pseudo-Skylax, the Ionian Sea—interchangeable with the Adriatic—extended all the

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<sup>53</sup> Katalinić et al. (2015).

<sup>54</sup> The Adriatic appears in Greek as the *Satournios pelagos*, *Reas kolpos*, *Kronios pelagos*, *Ionios kolpos*, and *Ionios pontos* before being the *Adrias kolpos* and in Latin as the *Hadriaticus sinus*, *Hadria*, and *mare Hadrianum*. See Zaccaria (2015), 17, Coppola (2002), and Beaumont (1936). The history of its names has been investigated by Beaumont, who demonstrates a coalescence around Adriatic in the mid fourth century. Beaumont (1936), 203-4, although note that he incorrectly states that Polybius and Appian use the names of the Adriatic interchangeably: Polybius uses *Ionios* only in reference to the Strait of Otranto (*Ionios poros* as at Polyb. 2.14.4 where he distinguishes between the area south of the Strait and that north) and Appian never uses *Adrias*. Cf. Strabo 2.5.20 who uses both. By the time Polybius writes his histories, the name Adriatic has come to signify the same space it does today, from the Strait of Otranto northward to its head. McKinney (2007), 29-32.

<sup>55</sup> Strab. 5.1.8: *τὴν δ' Ἀτρίαν ἐπιφανῆ γενέσθαι πόλιν φασίν, ἀφ' ἧς καὶ τοῦνομα τῶ κόλπω γενέσθαι τῶ Ἀδρία μικρὰν μετὰθεσιν λαβόν.*

<sup>56</sup> Strab. 5.1.3.

<sup>57</sup> Beaumont (1936). The old view stems from the *RE* article on “Adrias” by Patsch (1.417-9). It is followed in, e.g. D. Strauch, “Ionios Kolpos,” in *Brill's New Pauly* (2006).

way from its inner gulf near the Po to the Strait of Otranto.<sup>58</sup> Second century AD authors Pausanias and Ptolemy wrote of the Adriatic as extending all the way to the Strait of Sicily.<sup>59</sup> For the purposes of this study, I define the Adriatic as the sea extending from the bay between the Po River and the Istrian Peninsula down to the Strait of Otranto, the *Ionios Poros*. Below that is the Ionian Sea, though its nearest islands, especially Corcyra and Cephalonia, wander in and out of the scope of this project.

Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to separate the Adriatic from the Ionian. Crossings from the Italian to the Balkan peninsulas through the Strait of Otranto occur not in one place but in a broad band, with ships from Brundisium landing as far north as Apollonia and as far south as Corcyra, for example.<sup>60</sup> Thus the northern part of the Ionian Sea bleeds into the Strait and into this study somewhat frequently. Below the Strait, the Ionian connects Magna Graecia and Sicily to Corcyra and Epirus, linking this maritime world together as much as the Adriatic. While I focus on the sea north of the Strait in this project, the Ionian plays an important role. Especially in discussions below of Syracusan influence in the Adriatic and of Epirote and Spartan military responses to events in Magna Graecia, the Ionian extends the patterns of Adriatic connectedness southward (just as some ancient authors made it one sea only).

Naturally, a study of any maritime zone as a regional and geographical space can extend far beyond the shorelines into what Boccaccio called *terre marine*, “not so much the body of water that is located in the middle of the lands, but the cluster of lands whose history has been uniquely adapted to the life of the sea.”<sup>61</sup> It is difficult, however, to know where a study of the

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<sup>58</sup> Scyl. 14-27 with notes in Shipley (2011). This text comes from the fourth century, but see pp. 6-8 on dating problems.

<sup>59</sup> Ptol. 3.1.1 and Paus. 5.25.3.

<sup>60</sup> From Brundisium to Apollonia: Strabo 6.3.5; Plin. *HN* 3.100-1; to Corcyra: Plin. *HN* 2.244; cf. Arnaud (2005), 199ff.

<sup>61</sup> Boccaccio, *Decameron* VIII 10, cited in Purcell (2005), 211 and (quotation) 232.

sea should stop. Braudel's expansive *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* extended as far north as the Netherlands. Cyprian Broodbank wrestles with this problem and settles on the kind of "fuzzy zone of transition" around the sea embraced by Horden and Purcell.<sup>62</sup> All kinds of solutions for Mediterranean studies have been found, including embracing whole climate zones within and beyond its basin, for example anywhere that olives can be cultivated.<sup>63</sup> Another approach might be to develop a concept of the Adriatic that includes its coastal landmass. For example, we might parallel Pompey the Great's authority during the pirate crisis of 67 BC: his imperium covered the entire Mediterranean and 50 miles inland, which seemed enough to manage a significant maritime crisis.<sup>64</sup> A similar approach to the Adriatic could be adopted that considers a slice of land around its circumference, but this is not a study of the lands surrounding the Adriatic Sea.

Nor does this study aim to present any sort of unified Adriatic culture in terms of a human space. While settlements and shores and river drainages certainly figure into this project, they do so only in that human actors use these nearby points as a base for influencing events in the Adriatic proper. For example, while the settlement of Ancona enters this study, it is the way the Adriatic interacts with human actors based in and traveling to or from Ancona that is of interest. In other words, Ancona just happens to be the port of call. Such inflexion points where individuals and states set up a base of power for harnessing trade or projecting military authority are especially important to this study because—as humans cannot live on the sea—they must launch into our watery world from somewhere; and those somewheres become the points of contact between human actors and the vast ecologies they try to control. With David Abulafia, then, I take as my object of study the sea itself and the land the water touches—*islands, harbors,*

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<sup>62</sup> Broodbank (1936), 57.

<sup>63</sup> Broodbank (1936), 54ff.

<sup>64</sup> Vell. 2.31.2-4; for discussion, Drogula (2015), 320ff.

coastlines—but not the hinterland.<sup>65</sup> This is a study of the Adriatic Sea and its maritime world, not its periphery.

The Adriatic Sea itself is quite large, covering an area of almost 140,000 square km, a little more than the size of the modern country of Greece.<sup>66</sup> This maritime space stretches far north, penetrating further into Europe than any other part of the Mediterranean. In total it covers almost 800 km north to south and is never wider than 250 km, usually much narrower. This long, thin sea comes to a close at the Strait of Otranto where it is now about 72 km wide, or about twice the width of the narrowest point in the English Channel. By comparison, the Aegean is about 60% larger. The Adriatic is similar in size to the Gulfs of Bothnia and California. The Adriatic is also quite shallow compared with the rest of the Mediterranean. On its southern end where the Bari Pit reaches 1,230 m, it is still shallower than the vast majority of the larger sea. Most of the Adriatic is less than 200 m deep, and most of the area north of Monte Gargano was exposed during the Last Glacial Maximum creating a large plain.<sup>67</sup> The large latitudinal range of the sea and its differences in depth contribute to the Adriatic being a warm sea.<sup>68</sup> Even under the surface, the Adriatic is a diverse space.

For all its diversity, some phenomena unite the Adriatic. Its stormy weather and dangerous seas were proverbial in antiquity. Horace especially seems fond of invoking the *ater Hadriae sinus* in his three books of *Odes* published in the year 23 BC.<sup>69</sup> He has Lydia claim he is

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<sup>65</sup> Abulafia (2013), xviii ff.

<sup>66</sup> Zonn and Kostianoy (2017), 20 ff for geographic data.

<sup>67</sup> Map 4.1 in Broodbank (2013), 110-1. For sea depths, Zonn and Kostianoy (2017), 27.

<sup>68</sup> Zonn and Kostianoy (2017), 31 ff.

<sup>69</sup> Hor. *Carm.* 3.27.18-20.



*improbo iracundior Hadria.*<sup>70</sup> Elsewhere the Auster, the Latin for the southerly wind or Sirocco, is *dux inquieti turbidus Hadriae.*<sup>71</sup> Perhaps his Adriatic is at its most lively in the second book:

Frustra cruento Marte carebimus  
fractisque rauci fluctibus Hadriae  
frustra per autumnos nocentem  
corporibus metuemus Austrum<sup>72</sup>

Certainly the harsh Adriatic held some fascination for Horace.<sup>73</sup> But as early as the fourth century BC, the Adriatic had a reputation for danger. In a fragmentary speech of Lysias, he alleges that Aeschines is in such financial straits that the maritime traders of the Piraeus would rather sail to the dangerous Adriatic than deal with him.<sup>74</sup> What made the Adriatic such a dangerous space to trade in or such an apt simile for temper?

The famous Bora, the north-easterly wind in the Adriatic, and Sirocco winds fly up and down the length of the sea during parts of the year, whipping up huge waves and toppling boats and even the occasional car.<sup>75</sup> The Sirocco is a warm wind rising from the deserts of North Africa and blowing from the southwest (Horace's Auster). It brings clouds and storms, especially in the winter when it can reach 7-9 on the Beaufort Scale (gale-force winds). It lasts for several days and can reach hurricane strength on occasion. The Bora—etymologically related to the other Boreas winds of the Mediterranean—blows from the northeast and comes down through the Alps with terrific force. It coats buildings and ships with ice and can reach hurricane force

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<sup>70</sup> Hor. *Carm.* 3.9.21-4: *quamquam sidere pulchrior / ille est, tu levior cortice et improbo / iracundior Hadria, / tecum vivere amem, tecum obeam libens.*

<sup>71</sup> Hor. *Carm.* 3.3.5.

<sup>72</sup> Hor. *Carm.* 2.14.13-16: In vain shall we avoid the bloody god of war / and the roaring breakers of the Adriatic. / In vain autumn after a long autumn shall we tremble / for our health when the south wind blows. Trans. West (1998), 97.

<sup>73</sup> Complete list of his uses of *Hadria*: Hor. *Carm.* 1.3.14-16, 1.16.1-4, 1.33.13-6, 2.11.1-5, 2.14.13-6, 3.3.1-6, 3.9.21-4, 3.27.18-20. Cf. Prop. 1.6.1, 3.21.17-8.

<sup>74</sup> Lys. fr. 1.4., cf. 32.25 where the high risk of sailing to the Adriatic is contrasted with the potential high profit.

<sup>75</sup> Zonn and Kostianoy (2017), 30-1. Cf. McKinney (2007). Overturning cars: Schroeder (2015).

quickly. It can last much longer, sometimes stretching out for weeks, pinning travelers in harbors. The Bora dominates the eastern side of the sea, usually but not exclusively in the winter. Just the same, at times summer Boras may even reach 8-9 on the Beaufort scale in some locations in the northern Adriatic. Other winds—especially the Gabrina which comes from the southwest and can quickly reach 8-11 on the Beaufort scale—blow hurricanes aloft intermittently.<sup>76</sup> The sudden and devastating sea conditions these winds bring are especially difficult in a sea that is unusually calm for most of the year. Perhaps this seeming fickleness contributed to its reputation in Horace at least. Nevertheless, largely regular wind patterns outside of these storms have led to established trade routes and sailing patterns—details in chapter two—that take full advantage of the prevailing winds and currents. But the need to be close to shelter should one of these sudden storms arise has had a significant impact on routes and on maritime habits.<sup>77</sup>

Under the surface and well away from these winds, strong currents swirl through the Adriatic. One experienced Adriatic fisherman noted he could “be at sea in winter, in absolute calm, but could not take my nets out due to currents that were strong like rivers.”<sup>78</sup> While some surface currents are highly variable, especially in the northern Adriatic, the general pattern is a great counterclockwise sweep through the whole sea.<sup>79</sup> Currents push north from the Strait of Otranto all the way to Istria along the eastern edge of the sea with tendrils (called gyres) peeling off to the west near the island of Palagruža and again near modern Zadar. The currents curve

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<sup>76</sup> Zonn and Kostianoy (2017), 31.

<sup>77</sup> Kirigin et al. (2009), 151-2 present some of the folk wisdom about the Adriatic sea gleaned by anthropologists and linguists, for example noting that a good fisherman must know the 16 winds of the Adriatic, and that one way to tell if fog brings the Bora is to toss fish into the sea for the seagulls: if they come get the fish, the Bora will not come, but if they refuse to leave the islands, then look out.

<sup>78</sup> Cited by Kirigin et al. (2009), 151. The collection of observations by traditional fishermen: Božanić (1996): 7-94.

<sup>79</sup> On variable northernmost currents: Zonn and Kostianoy (2017), 36, generally 35-7 with a chart on 36 and Kirigin et al. (2009), 146-7 with two charts on 146.

around the northernmost part of the sea and head back southward along its western edge. Deep below the surface, stronger currents circulate water in a similar pattern, bringing water from outside the Strait of Otranto north where it warms in that shallower and warmer part of the sea and moves south again. Most of the currents are fairly predictable, but the uncertainty of the winds makes their utilization potentially treacherous.

This is a map of an interesting project conducted by Pierre-Marie Poulain.<sup>80</sup> He set satellite-tracked drifters at different depths in the Adriatic and gathered data on how the currents moved them around. In addition to the subsurface currents moving water through the Adriatic, he notes as a result of the study the impact of winds on water current speed. On the whole, this diagram mimics closely the sort of movement around the Adriatic we will explore below in chapter two. These counterclockwise patterns do not inherently limit movement, but they certainly incentivize specific travel patterns.




Figure 1 - Study of tracers in the Adriatic Sea<sup>81</sup>

Branko Kirigin and his colleagues gathered two fascinating medieval examples of the unpredictable Adriatic environment for Stašo Forenbaher's important 2009 volume on trans-

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<sup>80</sup> Poulain (1999), 239.

<sup>81</sup> Poulain (1999)

Adriatic contacts in prehistory. The first dates from the 14<sup>th</sup> century. A French lord in a pilgrimage from Venice to Jerusalem spent one day traveling from Venice to Pula and then five from Pula to Corfu, a distance of almost 750 km. But on the return journey, he spent fourteen days at sea crossing from somewhere near Dubrovnik to Venice, taking almost three times as long to cross a distance of no more than 550 km.<sup>82</sup> In the other account, Pope Alexander III had to wait a month for the right wind to sail from the Gargano Peninsula to Venice in AD 1177. The route followed a gyre of the main currents across the sea at Palagruža to Zadar before continuing up the east side of the sea to take advantage of the prevailing winds. The trip took seven days at sea and seven further days of waiting for weather, including a desperate stop on tiny Palagruža waiting for a sudden Bora to die down. Reportedly the Pope was so exhausted by the ordeal of rowing to Palagruža against the wind in this sudden weather change that he ate a large meal despite Lent.<sup>83</sup> Under sail or oar, the Adriatic is an unpredictable space.

The Adriatic as a whole is not particularly rich in marine life. Like the rest of the Mediterranean, its southern half suffers from a lack of significant tides and high salinity.<sup>84</sup> But unlike the rest of the larger sea, it has a significant continental shelf (depth of up to 200m) encompassing over 70% of its total area.<sup>85</sup> The sheer extent of its shallow northern half contributes to some of the most pronounced tides in the Mediterranean as well as more abundant marine life. Indeed, some of the sea's best fisheries are in the northern Adriatic and where its shallower waters pour into its deeper neighbors to the south.<sup>86</sup> The abundance of sardines in this area especially has contributed to strong fisheries and a long tradition of exploiting the central

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<sup>82</sup> Kirigin et al. (2009), 152, for the story of Ogiera from his diary.

<sup>83</sup> Kirigin et al. (2009), 152.

<sup>84</sup> Broodbank (2013), 73.

<sup>85</sup> Zonn and Kostianoy (2017), 21.

<sup>86</sup> Blondel, (2010), esp. 80ff. Coll et al. (2007): 119-54.

Adriatic near the archipelago of Palagruža.<sup>87</sup> Larger fish and invertebrates have thrived here as well in comparison to the rest of the Mediterranean, but populations are generally lower than fisheries in other parts of the world.<sup>88</sup> An interesting comparandum from the 19<sup>th</sup> century is the work of George Faber who compiled extensive data on Adriatic fisheries and listed over 100 different species of seafood sold for market in the Adriatic.<sup>89</sup> While not abundant, marine life especially in the northern Adriatic provides rich ecosystems that interact importantly with human actors.

If winds, currents, weather patterns, and marine life unite the Adriatic, its edges and islands can seem to break it into separate (macro) ecosystems. Adriatic waves wash two very different shorelines. In general, the western Adriatic edge is long and straight, unbroken by inlets or harbors. The sea retreats eastward ahead of the Gargano Peninsula, but otherwise continues north/northwest until it blurs into the Po Delta. The one exception is Monte Conero which, though not as large as Gargano, creates shelter for reasonably favorable harbors to its north and south. The Po system is a mass of marshes and rivers and stretches Adriatic influence inland while bringing silt, nutrients, and fresh water into the sea. Other marshes to the south, especially around the Gargano Peninsula, have been reduced by draining. All along this shore, the Adriatic spills onto sandbars, gravel beaches, and lagoons.<sup>90</sup> This coast has been seen as inhospitable to

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<sup>87</sup> McKinney (2007), 119-20; Zonn and Kostianoy (2017), 38 who call the northern Adriatic “the fish-richest region in the Mediterranean.” On sardine fishing in the Adriatic, see Faber (1883), 138ff for technique in the 19<sup>th</sup> century which, according to Marzano (2013), 312, “was very simple, well within the possibilities of the ancient fishermen.”

<sup>88</sup> Lotze, Coll, and Dunne (2011): 198-222.

<sup>89</sup> Faber (1983), 141. Although, note that Marzano (2013), 107-8 knows of only three passages in ancient sources mentioning fish product processing explicitly in the Adriatic: Strabo 5.1.8 on Aquileia, Pliny *HN* 31.94 on *garum* (fish sauce) from Dalmatia, and Cassiodorus who says of Istria (*Var.* 12.22.4) “These places both feed the abundant *garismatia* and are famous for the plentiful fish.” Cf. Ephraim Lytle’s interesting uses of Faber’s work in comparative studies of Athenian fish markets, e.g. Lytle (2010) and (2012).

<sup>90</sup> Zonn and Kostianoy (2017), 24.

ships in the literary tradition. Livy calls it *importuosa Italiae litora* and Strabo ἀλίμενος.<sup>91</sup> But as we will see, such descriptions are greatly exaggerated. The Italian coast had many river ports and saw a great deal of trade, even if it pales in comparison to its opposite counterpart.

In contrast, the eastern shore is abrupt and rocky. The sea wears away high limestone formations, intruding into the karst landscape. As Michel Savignon puts it, the mountains dominate the sea like a wall, cutting the shore off from the interior and isolating port cities along the coast.<sup>92</sup> The high water levels of the Holocene transgression and the sinking of the limestone shore fed the Adriatic into what have become many bays and incisions into the coastline. The result is the world's most incised coast and over a thousand islands and islets poking up from the submerged karst formations.<sup>93</sup> In particular, long chains of islands form a protective barrier shielding much of the eastern seaboard from winds and waves. This creates island passageways, almost inland waterways, heavily sheltered from the effects of storms and providing many places to wait them out. The southeastern reaches of the sea include some lagoons and lowlands, but the towering karst ridges run nearly to the shoreline more often than not, creating a fairly barren hinterland when compared to its opposite coast.

To give a brief picture of the contrast between these two shorelines, the distance along the western edge is roughly 1,300 km whereas the eastern side stretches to 2,400 km, almost twice the distance.<sup>94</sup> If the island shorelines on the east side of the sea are included, that coast stretches over five times longer than its western counterpart.<sup>95</sup> The inlets, harbors, and bays of the eastern Adriatic—both against the mainland and the islands just off it—not only contribute to

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<sup>91</sup> Strabo 7.5.10 and Livy 10.2.

<sup>92</sup> Savignon (2001), 19.

<sup>93</sup> Zonn and Kostianoy (2017), 25.

<sup>94</sup> Zonn and Kostianoy (2017) have the Italian and Balkan shorelines as 1,249 and 2,507 km respectively. Kirigin et al. (2009) give 1,347 and 2,390 km.

<sup>95</sup> Zonn and Kostianoy (2017), 21; Kirigin et al. (2009), 137.

distance but also greatly increase the surface area of eroding limestone. Zonn and Kostianov estimate 11 kg of limestone are removed annually from only 1 linear meter of shore through a combination of water erosion and organisms.<sup>96</sup> The dissolving of so much limestone in water changes the makeup of the sea in that area and deposits large quantities of fine silt while attracting microorganisms who depend on the limestone and their predators. This creates a very different environment from that just 100 km across the water where marshes seep into the sea.

The myriad islands of the Adriatic enhance this contrast.<sup>97</sup> The vast majority hug the Croatian coast in a 400 km archipelago stretching from the Kvarner bay to modern Dubrovnik. These islands formed from limestone and feature mostly bare, karst landscapes with ridges and cliffs that retain little soil and provide almost no foothold for vegetation. The largest of them hold the most soil and therefore the most life. For example, Hvar, the fourth largest of these islands, has a large arable flatland, the Stari Grad plain.<sup>98</sup> At 1,350 hectares, this plain feeds the whole population of the otherwise almost uncultivable island.<sup>99</sup> As with many of the Adriatic islands, the rugged karst landscape has little agricultural value beyond limited grazing while the scattered terra rosa soil areas created by weathering of the karst provide decent drainage for growing vine crops.<sup>100</sup> Vineyards produced high quality wine on nearby Vis (Issa), for example.<sup>101</sup> Hvar has two excellent harbors, one at the modern town called Hvar and the other at the ancient site of Pharos. Like many of the large islands of the central Dalmatian group, it has

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<sup>96</sup> Zonn and Kostianov (2017), 26.

<sup>97</sup> Exact numbers are very difficult. The most thorough study concerns only Croatian islands (which is most of them) and delineates some 79 islands over 1 km<sup>2</sup>, 525 islets 0.1-1 km<sup>2</sup>, and 642 rocks smaller than 0.1 km<sup>2</sup>: Duplančić Leder, Ujević, and Čala (2004).

<sup>98</sup> B. Kirigin (2006), 5-6.

<sup>99</sup> Kirigin (2006), 6.

<sup>100</sup> Kirigin (2006), 6; compare Lastovo in the same island group: Della Casa et al. (2009), 113.

<sup>101</sup> Ath. 1.28d, quoting Agatharcides to say that wine from Issa was superior to all others. Excavations on the island have demonstrated a large production of amphorae for transporting wine produced there: Kirigin, Katunarić, and Šešelj (2006b).

karst springs and underwater springs that provide fresh water. Similar landscapes, if many fewer tillable acres, can be found on all the large islands in the long archipelago.<sup>102</sup>

Stretching toward the west coast of the Adriatic lie clusters of more distant islands, fewer in number and nearly uninhabitable. Most famous of these for the study of the ancient world is tiny Palagruža, an archipelago situated between modern Dubrovnik and the Gargano Peninsula. Its significance stems from its position in almost the exact center of the Adriatic.<sup>103</sup> There ships traveling north along the eastern edge could cross on winds and currents to the western edge by passing along a string of small islands including Palagruža. Likewise ships descending south along the western edge of the sea could cut across to the east. Lithic and ceramic evidence place humans on these isolated rocks over 8,000 years ago, making it one of the first examples of long-distance maritime travel in the world.<sup>104</sup> Deep below the surface, currents flowing here bring nutrients from the shallow, silting northern Adriatic into the deep holes to the south. This confluence creates some of the best fishing in the sea.<sup>105</sup> Most critically, the island is a terrific visual landmark: standing on it you can see both sides of the Adriatic on a clear day. As a marker and waypoint it allows sailors to take an entirely visually-navigated course from one side of the Adriatic to the other. But for all its importance in discussions of early trans-Adriatic contacts, Palagruža is hardly hospitable. Two pebble beaches provide access to the steep karst landscape of Velo Palagruža, the largest island of the group. There is barely enough vegetation to support a small herd of goats. Seven hectares of arable land once supported a very small community, but a lack of any source of fresh water requires living from cisterns that collect rainwater.<sup>106</sup> Even

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<sup>102</sup> A good overview in the three volumes of the Adriatic Islands Project: Gaffney et al. (1997); Stančić et al. (1999); Kirigin et al. (2006c).

<sup>103</sup> Kirigin et al. (2009).

<sup>104</sup> Forenbaher (1999).

<sup>105</sup> Forenbaher (2009a), 80.

<sup>106</sup> Forenbaher (2009a), 79-80; Kirigin et al. (2009), 138-9.



medium-sized boats cannot negotiate the small beaches. Visiting ships had to anchor in poor harbors and ferry people ashore. For small-scale fishing and—as we will see—some ritual purposes, the Palagruža archipelago was an important destination. Other small, offshore islands with similar ecologies include Sušac and the Tremiti island group.<sup>107</sup>

To return to the Adriatics of Braudel and Matvejević, this is a very diverse maritime world. On the one hand it is an intimate sea, nearly closed by the narrow Strait of Otranto and entirely crossable throughout its length. Its closeness, despite its massive size, brings its geographically diverse shores into close proximity. Yet it presents a complete whole as a geographical space. This unified diversity makes the Adriatic an excellent lab for testing the microecologies of Horden and Purcell's *The Corrupting Sea*. To reiterate, they argue that what gives the Mediterranean its Mediterranean-ness is the proximation—through the connecting power of the sea—of distant ecological zones. They identify microecologies in the Mediterranean and the joining of these microecologies through seaborne trade as an essential hedge against contingencies. To illustrate, people on the island of Hvar raise food on the Stari Grad Plain. Should a natural disaster strike Hvar, say a hurricane that destroys crops, these individuals will survive because they are connected through Adriatic trade to other places where the hurricane did not strike, say the Po Valley. They thus access the microecology of the Po region some 250 miles away, a survival strategy that would be extremely difficult to implement on land. Horden and Purcell argue that the daily repetition of this connection through the distance-shrinking force of an inland sea like the Mediterranean creates the conditions for growth that characterize Mediterranean history.

In the Adriatic, this model works especially well due to the highly diverse ecologies and the short distances between them. The rocky karst world of the eastern shore interact with fertile

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<sup>107</sup> Forenbaher (2009a), 78-9; Kirigin et al. (2006c).

river valleys across the sea, the fisheries around Palagruža, and the rich plains of Pula, all within the Adriatic. As we shall see in the next chapter, these communities also interact with microecologies represented by the merchant ships traveling dozens of common routes through and around the Adriatic, plying their wares. The riches of the Mediterranean flowed through the Strait of Otranto, and the citizens of the Adriatic world learned to take advantage.

This enclosed, whole space thus becomes unified through its diversity. It never approaches anything like political or cultural homogeneity in the first four centuries BC, but it is nevertheless a close-knit sea.<sup>108</sup> Cabanes and Zaccaria both ask whether this is a dividing or a uniting sea. The answer seems to be both. It unites the many microregions around its shores, linking people to resources they need to survive, but simultaneously seems to divide political entities effectively through these three centuries. Dominique Reill proposed that the geography of the Adriatic makes it especially susceptible to domination: “This is partly because both sides of its shores are surrounded by mountains, the Apennines in the west and the Dinaric Alps in the east, thereby making the coastal lands easily containable. Generally, eastern Adriatic ports, especially those in Dalmatia, had few easy communications with their peninsular heartland.”<sup>109</sup> While we will see that this is an over generalization, the ports of the Adriatic are, with few exceptions, fairly isolated. A maritime power controlling the major ports around the Strait of Otranto could pretty well dominate access to the Adriatic, especially if the Ionian port cities immediately south of the Strait (especially Corcyra) were also in hand. Yet the myriad islands and bays along the eastern coast provide such innumerable havens for small ships that, even were the entrance to the Adriatic dominated by an Athens or a Rome, the sea itself would still resist

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<sup>108</sup> This is an important distinction because the trend in Mediterraneanism has been to identify culturally homogenous zones and to find Mediterraneans everywhere, e.g. Herzfeld (2005) and Wheeler (2015). There is no evidence for an “Adriatic” culture at any time during our period, though attempts have been made to argue for the existence of various thalassocracies in previous eras, e.g. Batović (1987).

<sup>109</sup> Reill (2012), 252.

control. There are simply too many small harbors for any state in the ancient world to control, even if the major ports are “easily containable.” That did not stop powers like Macedon and Rome from trying, a theme that will be explored throughout the dissertation, especially in chapter five.

## II. The Intellectual Space

In this part of the chapter, I explore the primary sources and material evidence for the study, considering both how they describe the Adriatic and what work has been done thus far. This Adriatic world has been described by geographers like Strabo, who calls its western side harborless as we have seen.<sup>110</sup> For Strabo—living in Asia Minor in the late 1<sup>st</sup> century BC and early 1<sup>st</sup> century AD—the sea is fairly incidental to his larger work, the dividing line between the ports and communities he describes. His geography is organized around regions of landmasses, not bodies of water, though he views them from the sea.<sup>111</sup> Katherine Clarke argued that Strabo organized the world around Rome, with an emphasis on the subdivision of its parts into political and ethnic units.<sup>112</sup> This departs from the traditional approach to Mediterranean geographies, which were organized as a journey (periplus) along the entire Mediterranean coast, leading to what Clarke calls the “wandering linearity of the periplus tradition.”<sup>113</sup> While Strabo draws on that tradition to some extent, he departs from it in many ways, for example eschewing the usual counting of distances along the coast. Just the same, he begins his descriptions of some spaces—

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<sup>110</sup> Strab. 7.5.10.

<sup>111</sup> Clarke (1999), 208-10 for Strabo’s interest in continents. The outline of Strabo’s work in books (Clarke page 195 for a handy chart) demonstrates the division into, e.g. Iberia in book 3, Gaul and Britain in book 4, and Italy and Sicily in 5-6.

<sup>112</sup> Clarke (1999), esp. 210ff.

<sup>113</sup> Clarke (1999), 210.

especially mainland Greece—from the shore before moving inward, suggesting a perspective from the sea.<sup>114</sup>

The most important of these periplotic writings for our purposes are the ones attributed to Scylax, which include a journey around the Adriatic Sea, highlighting the people who lived on its shores. Like Strabo's geography, it is focused on the land and settlements even if viewing them from the sea. Pseudo-Scylax is organized from the sea's perspective as a sailing around the Adriatic and, while it does not pull out many details, it shows some knowledge of the whole space as early as the fourth century BC.<sup>115</sup> But this conception of the world as seen from the sea and especially of the Adriatic as a whole seems to skip over the rest of our writers.

Diodorus Siculus—who left Sicily for Egypt around 60 BC and probably settled in Rome a few years later, completing his monumental history around 30 BC—conceived of geographic space in relationship to the heavens and not bodies of water.<sup>116</sup> His universal history—the *Bibliothēke* or *Library*—set out to cover history from mythical origins to 60 BC. For Diodorus, the Adriatic and Ionian seas were certainly firmly demarcated at the Strait of Otranto, which reflects the solidification of that idea by the first century BC.<sup>117</sup> Often neglected as a historian, Diodorus was studied extensively by Kenneth Sacks in the 1980s and then largely left alone until recently.<sup>118</sup> Charles Muntz in his 2017 book spends time on geography in Diodorus' writing, but

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<sup>114</sup> Clarke (1999), 193ff for bibliography. See now Bianchetti et al. (2016).

<sup>115</sup> Shipley (2011), 4-5.

<sup>116</sup> Muntz (2017), 27ff on Diodorus' universal history and its relationship to the cosmos in the geographic tradition.

<sup>117</sup> E.g. Diod. Sic. 15.13 where he uses *Adrias* for the portion north and *Ionios poros* for the Strait itself.

<sup>118</sup> Sacks (1990); see now also Muntz (2017); Rathmann (2016).

this is otherwise an untouched topic.<sup>119</sup> There are no chapters on geography, for example, in an otherwise very wide-ranging edited volume on Diodorus published in 2018.<sup>120</sup>

Livy, born at Patavium in 59 BC, published his history of Rome from its beginnings, *Ab urbe condita*, starting in the 20s BC.<sup>121</sup> His conceptions of space are entirely Romanocentric, radiating out from the city into the rest of the Mediterranean world including the Adriatic, *Hadriaticum mare*. In other words, most consideration of geography and spatial imagination in Livy has to do with his characterization of urban Rome and the traditional stories of Roman history—*exempla*—that he sets there. This line of scholarship develops memory encoding and the spatial turn.<sup>122</sup> In general, Livy has been criticized for not incorporating geographical excurses in his writing to the degree that Polybius and others do, though a new dissertation by Virginia Clark sets out to correct that.<sup>123</sup> As for the Adriatic specifically, Livy follows Polybius (as we shall see below) in making the crossing of the Adriatic a transgression, what Clark calls “a deliberate act of aggression.”<sup>124</sup> In a speech of P. Sulpicius Galba in 200 BC arguing for war against Philip V, for example, he warns against how easily the Macedonians could invade Italy by sea by comparison with Hannibal’s invasion by land: *non quinto inde mense, quemadmodum ab Sagunto Hannibal, sed quinto die quam ab Corintho soluerit naves, in Italiam perveniet.*<sup>125</sup> And a Macedonian envoy speaking at a congress in Aetolia accuses the Romans of transgressing

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<sup>119</sup> Muntz (2017), 46ff.

<sup>120</sup> Hau, Meeus, and Sheridan (2018). With the possible exception of Bianchetti’s chapter on ethnogeography, though it is more concerned with ethnography.

<sup>121</sup> Mineo (2015), xxxi-xxxix. See the rest of that excellent volume for bibliography on Livy. The major works include Walsh (1961); Ogilvie (1965); Luce (1977); Miles (1995); Oakley (1997), (1998), (2005), and (2007); Jaeger (1997); Chaplin (2000); Levene (2010).

<sup>122</sup> E.g. Jaeger (2015), 65-77 and Jaeger (1997).

<sup>123</sup> E.g. Walsh (1961), 153-7; Horsfall (1985); Levene (2010), 126-63; Clark (2014).

<sup>124</sup> Clark (2014), 143 and 141ff. On Livy’s use of Polybius, the standard works are Nissen (1863) and Tränkle (1977); see now Briscoe (2009) and Tränkle (2009).

<sup>125</sup> Livy 31.7.7: He will arrive in Italy not in four months, as it took Hannibal from Saguntum, but in five days from the moment his ships leave Corinth. Clark (2014), 143-4.

the boundary between Italy and Sicily in their own invasions.<sup>126</sup> For Livy, as for Polybius, the sea is thus frequently a boundary which should or should not be crossed.

Julius Caesar and his generals left *Commentaries* on his wars which are rich in geographic detail due to Caesar's firm belief that a good general must know topography.<sup>127</sup> Briefly during his campaign in Gaul and then again during the civil wars Caesar moved through the Adriatic, which he defined in terms of logistical challenges.<sup>128</sup> Famously Appian—in comparing Caesar to Alexander the Great—noted that, “the Adriatic Sea yielded to Caesar, becoming navigable and quiet in mid-winter.”<sup>129</sup> Caesar's knowledge and command of geography come through in his texts, though he does not spend any words to define or consider the Adriatic per se. His extensive engagement with the sea in the civil war will be treated in chapter five.

Appian, the Alexandrine historian born at the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> century AD, treats space differently. He wrote histories of Roman wars in the early 2<sup>nd</sup> century AD.<sup>130</sup> His work has not received the same degree of scholarly attention as these others, and so ideas about geography in Appian have not been developed. This is despite the geographical excursus at the beginning of the history.<sup>131</sup> Interestingly, Appian defines the Roman Empire in terms of the sea it touches. His great tour of Roman lands is written as a tour of the Mediterranean—a circumnavigation.<sup>132</sup> He notes within it that the Romans rule the nations bordering different seas, including the Adriatic,

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<sup>126</sup> Livy 31.29; Clark (2014), 142-4.

<sup>127</sup> The outstanding new Landmark Caesar edited by Kurt Raaflaub will go a long way to rehabilitate the study of Caesar's commentaries, so often left aside as a school text. The web essays especially relevant to this project include Fairbank (2017), 214-22, Talbert (2017), de Blois (2017), and Rosenstein (2017).

<sup>128</sup> E.g. Caes. *B Gall.* 2.35.2, 7.1.1, *B Civ.* 1.25, 29.

<sup>129</sup> App. *B Civ.* 2.150.1.

<sup>130</sup> Appian has long been neglected as a historian. Major works include Gabba (1956); Goldmann (1988); Gowing (1992); Now Welch (2015). Cf. on the *Illyrike* specifically, the very thorough if not overly analytical Šašel Kos (2005).

<sup>131</sup> Merrills (2005), 64ff.

<sup>132</sup> App. *Praef.*

and defines Italy in terms of the seas it touches. This suggests a maritime conception of space and deserves further attention. As an example of Appian's view of the sea in the history of these four centuries, he describes the rise of Illyrian power in the Adriatic in terms of their ability to strike at the entire sea, viewing it at least rhetorically as a single, united space.<sup>133</sup>

The quintessential author for studying these centuries in the Adriatic is Polybius. And for him, the Adriatic was both a divider and connector. Born at the end of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC, Polybius grew up in the world of Achaean politics and military command.<sup>134</sup> His father Lycortas was an important figure in the Achaean League. Polybius was one of the 1,000 prominent Achaeans deported to Rome in the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War in 167 BC to be detained there for some 17 years. Acquainted with Scipio Aemilianus, Polybius traveled the Roman world and ultimately returned home to organize new governments in the Greek cities.

He envisioned the sea as a boundary, perhaps most famously in his triangular description of Italy. For him, the triangular peninsula (inverted) was bounded on one side by the Adriatic and on another by the Tyrrhenian Sea, with the Alps forming the northern boundary.<sup>135</sup> The majority of Polybius' mentions of the Adriatic depict it in this way, as a boundary.<sup>136</sup> He especially highlights the importance of the Adriatic as a dividing line in his scheme for understanding Roman expansionism, introducing the second book of his history by noting that the Romans

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<sup>133</sup> App. *Ill.* 7.

<sup>134</sup> Walbank (1970), 1-6. Other important volumes on Polybius: Champion (2004); McGing (2010); Baronowski (2011); Smith and Yarrow (2012). Mitsios (2013); Grieb and Koehns (2013); Moore (2016); note also a new commentary on Book One: Phillips (2016).

<sup>134</sup> Gibson and Harrison (2013); Walbank's major works: Walbank (1972); his magisterial commentary in three volumes (1957, 1967, and 1979). Erskine and Crawley Quinn (2015) includes a selection of Derow's own work on Polybius. For the trendiness of the topic, note the title of the 10th Trends in Classics Conference on Greek Historiography: "Polybius and his Legacy: Tradition, Historical Representation, Reception," held in Thessaloniki May 27-9, 2016. Note too that Polybius is due his own Landmark edition, supposedly in 2019.

<sup>135</sup> Polyb. 2.14.4ff.

<sup>136</sup> Eg. in the geographical descriptions at 2.14, 16, and 17 where the Adriatic forms a boundary or where Polybius locates things near the Adriatic as a limit: 2.19.13, 2.26.1, 3.61.11, etc.

would cross to the Greek east with an army for the first time in the First Illyrian War (229-8 BC), and concluding that part of his narrative by noting that these two spheres were now united.<sup>137</sup> He picks up this train of thought at the end of the Social War a decade later (220-17 BC), when Philip V of Macedon decides to invade Italy based on Rome's position in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Punic War. He declares that from this time forward, the entire Mediterranean becomes interwoven in its history: actions in the east affect outcomes in the west and vice versa for the first time.<sup>138</sup> This *symploke* has become an important turning point in studies of Roman history, and a convenient chronological marker for the organization of its study. Polybius puts the Adriatic on the map as the line Rome must cross to enter the Greek sphere and influence politics on the mainland and in Macedonia.

It is difficult to disentangle which of these ideas are original to Polybius and which he may have inherited in the historiographical tradition. The specific geography of the Adriatic with reference to the Illyrian Wars comes in a section where—it is usually assumed—Polybius relies primarily on Fabius Pictor for his source material.<sup>139</sup> Pictor, a Roman politician, famously wrote the first history of Rome and did so in Greek, covering a period from the origins of the city to his own time and ending around 216 BC.<sup>140</sup> The issue of Polybius' sources after this period, and therefore for the Macedonian Wars and the other events that bridge the Adriatic world, is quite difficult. He explicitly mentions Rhodian historians Antisthenes and Zeno and probably also utilized monographs on Philip V and Perseus of Macedon written by Strato and Poseidonius, for example.<sup>141</sup> Within all this, it is hard to discern what Polybius invents and adopts.<sup>142</sup> For the

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<sup>137</sup> Polyb. 2.1, 2.12.7-8.

<sup>138</sup> Polyb. 5.105; on the importance of this passage, Eckstein (2008), esp. 79-83.

<sup>139</sup> Walbank (1970), 153 for bibliography.

<sup>140</sup> Cornell (2013), 1.163ff.

<sup>141</sup> Walbank (1970), 30.

<sup>142</sup> For recent work on Polybius' sources: Marincola (2013), Champion (2013), and Wiemer (2013).



purpose of my arguments here, I assume that his conceptualization of the Adriatic world is his own. As essential a point as he makes it for his overall history, I believe the Adriatic is something he emphasized purposefully and not a vestigial trace of someone else's argument.

For Polybius, the Adriatic is both a divider and a bridge. He conceives of his history as universal and encompassing the whole known world. This sphere of connected Mediterranean space—beginning with Philip's decision in 217 BC—includes a necessary divide: if the Mediterranean is only now connected, it must have been previously divided at a specific and now bridged point. For Polybius, this point is the Adriatic Sea. It is the connecting bridge between east and west after 217 BC and must therefore be the divider before that date.

Of course, subsequent history has reinforced this line of demarcation drawn across the Adriatic. As Purcell notes, the division of the Mediterranean between Octavian and Antony in 40 BC split the Adriatic down the middle in a way that would be repeated for the division of the empire following Theodosian's death.<sup>143</sup> This division became encoded in Roman legal and geographical thinking, leaving its mark on much later periods as the Adriatic became the frontier between Christianity and Islam and between western Europe and the Soviet bloc. The arbitrariness of this line extends back to Polybius' usage as well.

In an important study, Katherine Clarke argued for Polybius' unique usage of geography within his universal history and described his deployment of geometric shapes and analogies to create a recognizable physical space for his readers. She wrote that he especially employed waterways in his descriptions: Polybius specifically mentions the study of rivers and harbors as an essential part of geography within the writing of history;<sup>144</sup> he uses with some frequency the recurring theme of Xerxes crossing into Europe as a motif for geographical transgression of

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<sup>143</sup> Purcell (2013).

<sup>144</sup> Polyb. 12.25; Clarke (1999), 79.

natural boundaries, especially rivers and, in this case, a sea;<sup>145</sup> and he continually uses waterways to define geographical space.<sup>146</sup> This is an important point. Within the historiographical context of Greek history, focusing on liquid boundaries has the specific connotations of Herodotus' Xerxes. That Polybius refers to it should elevate the literary elements of his history and encourage us to read with a grain of salt the seriousness of these divides. To put it another way, if Rome is Xerxes crossing the Hellespont, perhaps instead of imagining two separate worlds, we should think of them as being as connected as the opposite shores of the Hellespont—hardly a terrific barrier. Yet for all his use of waterways, these fluid spaces are for Polybius just the edges of his real interest: the terra firma defined by these bounding rivers and the Adriatic Sea.

Ultimately, Polybius' Adriatic geography is one of Italy and the southern Balkans—they happen to be separated by a void uncrossed with an army until 229 BC, but the void is mostly otherwise unimportant except as a callback to Herodotus. Even when maritime space enters Polybius' narrative—as when Illyrian forces attack Roman vessels near Phoenice in 230 BC<sup>147</sup>—Polybius' geographic descriptors are located relative to land and an interruption between terrestrial points. This is a Mediterranean universalism constructed on land. And the Adriatic serves mostly to separate some of that land.

Beyond these historians, epigraphic, numismatic, and archaeological evidence form the building blocks of this study. What follows is by no means exhaustive, but a useful overview of the kinds of evidence we have for studying the Adriatic world. Much of this is an exercise in bridging disciplines and field- or site-specific collections. For example, the inscriptions of Illyria and Epirus have been collected by Cabanes and Drini, and the former has published a separate

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<sup>145</sup> Clarke (1999), 99.

<sup>146</sup> Clarke (1999), 107.

<sup>147</sup> Polyb. 2.5.

volume on epigraphy in Epirus.<sup>148</sup> The Cabanes and Drini volumes include a study of a very interesting body of inscriptions at Bouthrotum which provide evidence for Latin and Italian names in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. These few studies cover, naturally, only one small part of the Adriatic Sea. Greek inscriptions in Italy have been collected, for example, in *IG XIV*, but specific studies of Magna Graecia must be consulted to ensure total coverage.<sup>149</sup> But for Latin inscription, one needs *CIL I*<sup>2</sup>, which fortunately covers most everything up to the end of our period. Other inscriptions are scattered through Degraffi and supplements. But for the most part, these major collections contain everything for the Adriatic basin. A few have been gathered into helpful collections, for example Rhodes and Osborne, which contains several of the inscriptions referred to in this study.<sup>150</sup> As with numismatics and archaeology, there are no studies of the Adriatic Sea. It mainly divides studies within the field into their appropriate categories.

The numismatic evidence for the Adriatic Sea is dominated by hoards discovered many years ago and published by Michael Crawford and his students in the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>151</sup> The standard study, also by Crawford, dates from 1979 and includes lists of all the Adriatic hoards and some notes on their contents. Since that publication, a few new items have appeared to update the list, but the majority of the content remains the same.<sup>152</sup> The main exception to this is the hoard found at Cape Ploča in the late 1990s and systematically studied since then.<sup>153</sup> These coins uncovered at a cult site to Diomedes and representative of the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC, come from all over the Mediterranean. As we will see below, Nikola Čašule uses this evidence to argue for an active Diomedes cult operating through trade in the Adriatic during these four

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<sup>148</sup> Cabanes and Drini (1995-2016). Cabanes (1976).

<sup>149</sup> E.g. Dubois (1995), Arena (1998).

<sup>150</sup> Rhodes and Osborne (2003).

<sup>151</sup> Crawford (1969) and (1979); Thompson (1973).

<sup>152</sup> Batović (2011), Bonačić Mandinić (2004), Guidarelli (2010), Ilkić et al. (2012), Mirnik (1981), and Visonà (2014).

<sup>153</sup> E.g. Čašule (2011), 244ff.

centuries. Another hoard has been recently uncovered at Rhizon by a Polish team, but it has yet to be published.

The real potential for additional information in the Adriatic (barring new hoard finds) is the study of individual coins from settlement contexts. These appear in scattered publications and are difficult to assemble together under one roof. But a team of Croatian scholars is making a good attempt to do so for at least the area of Liburnia.<sup>154</sup> The problems, as with so much material evidence in the ancient world, is the availability of publications. Many coin finds are currently hiding in Croatian language publications among preliminary site reports and notes. As this information becomes increasingly available digitally and a new generation of Croatian archaeologists starts to publish the material in French, Italian, and English, these coins will factor into larger studies of the Adriatic world. For the time being, incomplete attempts will have to do.

There is also a strong tradition of archaeological work and publication in the various parts of the Adriatic, and it is from this field that the few attempts at studying the Adriatic as a whole have arisen. Yet the majority of publications by far limit themselves to specific sites or microregions, even those that set out to provide a pan-Adriatic perspective. In what follows below, I outline some of the major projects and important publications in Adriatic history and archaeology. This is not meant to be a comprehensive review of archaeology across the sea, a herculean task far outside the scope of this thesis. Rather, I attempt to demonstrate the general nature of archaeological research in the region while zooming in on larger, Adriatic efforts.

Almost all projects tackling the larger Adriatic world begin with the work of Lorenzo Braccisi whose 1971 (1977 second edition) work *Grecità Adriatica* engages with Greek colonization in the Adriatic Sea for almost 400 pages. This major work set the questions for

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<sup>154</sup> Šašelj and Ilkić (2015), 425 note that they are close to publishing a book on all coinage found in Liburnia to the reform of Augustus.

studies that followed: how Greek was the Adriatic? How quickly did recognizable Greek *poleis* develop in the region? What Greek trade contacts flourished across that sea? On the Roman side, scholars dug for early material connections between Adriatic Italy and the Balkan peninsula and tried to pin down how Romanized various points around the sea became and how early. For example, the excavation of the Valle Trebba cemetery at Spina featuring many Attic vases opened up dialogues about the degree of Athenian connections in the Adriatic.<sup>155</sup> Scholars latched onto early evidence to prove foundation dates passed down in literary texts for the various Greek colonies in the Adriatic, as at Epidamnos where early evidence more or less coincides with the traditional foundation date of 625 BC.<sup>156</sup> The widespread contacts between Apulia and the Illyrian coast became well documented in work by D'Andria whose article in a major English publication on colonization made this work widely accessible.<sup>157</sup>

Quite naturally these projects focused on the most Greek and Roman areas of the Adriatic where the most evidence congregated: the Po Valley, Aquileia, and the eventual province of Illyria. John Wilkes' publication of *The Illyrians* in 1992 put a generation of archaeological work in that part of the sea into the hands of English speakers.<sup>158</sup> The study of Roman Illyria and Dalmatia remains an important topic, recently updated very capably by Danijel Dzino.<sup>159</sup> The Adriatic coast of Italy has not fared as well, only recently being the focus of large studies such as Vermeulen's, though individual sites have always been published.<sup>160</sup>

Importantly, Braccisi continued publishing on the Greek Adriatic long after 1971. His journal, *Hesperia*, maintained a sustained interest in the subject and regularly gave a venue to

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<sup>155</sup> Alfieri (1979); Alfieri (1994); Berti and Guzzo (1993).

<sup>156</sup> D'Andria (1990).

<sup>157</sup> D'Andria (1982): 101-16; D'Andria (1990); cf. Colonna (1974).

<sup>158</sup> Wilkes (1992). A substantial update from the famous work of Arthur Evans (1885) republished in 2007 with the help of Wilkes as Evans (2007).

<sup>159</sup> Dzino (2010).

<sup>160</sup> Vermeulen (2017).

updates to Braccesi's own work.<sup>161</sup> Two larger, thematic volumes on Greeks in the Adriatic helmed by Braccesi and Mario Luni collected archaeological work from all over the sea as part of a sustained effort toward seeing the Adriatic as a whole.<sup>162</sup> Within this journal series, Braccesi tackled larger, Adriatic issues as well, such as piracy in a volume addressing the entire sea and reaching beyond the journal's subtitle: *Studi Sulla Grecità d'Occidente* to issues encompassing the whole Adriatic basin.<sup>163</sup>

Projects encompassing the entire Adriatic have sprung up in the years since, attempting to grab hold of the Adriatic as a subject per se, some more successfully than others. Claudio Zaccaria published a conference volume on ports and maritime routes in the Adriatic that exemplifies both the benefits and the problems.<sup>164</sup> Two of the authors jump into pan-Adriatic themes with gusto: Gino Bandelli writes a history of Rome's involvement with the sea over two centuries and Michel Reddé describes military ports all over the sea in the late empire. Yet the remaining 23 chapters deal with small, microregional, or even settlement-specific issues. While the volume works and contributes a great deal to our understanding of the Roman Adriatic—and I am not trying to criticize a volume on x for not being a volume on y—this kind of project becomes a collection of archaeologies or histories *in* the Adriatic rather than a history *of* it.

To reiterate, this distinction was drawn by Horden and Purcell in their work on the Mediterranean as a whole:

[We] start from a distinction of subject matter between, on one hand, history *in* the region, contingently Mediterranean or best conceived under some other heading, and, on the other hand, history *of* it—history either of the whole Mediterranean or of an aspect of it to which the whole is an indispensable framework. Part of what happens in the Mediterranean is, *in this very particular sense*, not Mediterranean history.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> E.g. Braccesi and Rossignoli (2001); and Braccesi (2014).

<sup>162</sup> Braccesi and Luni (2002); Braccesi and Luni (2004).

<sup>163</sup> Braccesi (2004).

<sup>164</sup> Zaccaria (2001).

<sup>165</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), 2.

Certainly in this respect, Zaccario's edited volume and many of the others I will list below are histories *in* and not *of* the Adriatic.<sup>166</sup> They describe material culture that happens to be in the Adriatic and settlements and trends located along its shores but to which the Adriatic is not an *indispensable framework*. Ian Morris contended with this view in his now famous essay, "Mediterraneanization," arguing that any real history *of* must "order a mass of local 'histories in.'"<sup>167</sup> Certainly these many histories *in* the Adriatic contribute to some sort of history *of*, but I believe "order" is the operative verb here. To transform the many potted histories assembled in these volumes into a history *of* the Adriatic requires a great deal of replanting to pull them into a cohesive whole, reframed in such a way that the Adriatic is the essential piece tying them together.

Some of the most recent efforts come closer to pulling disparate pieces together into a cohesive whole. Slobodan Čače, Anamarija Kurilić, and Francis Tassaux put together an extremely useful conference volume following a roundtable in 2001 in Zadar on shipping and migration routes in the Adriatic. While the individual papers travel far from each other, they stay mostly close to the stated purpose of the volume: to overcome the traditional barriers to treating the Adriatic as a whole sea.<sup>168</sup> As Čače explains in the introduction, this effort mirrors the earlier *Chronique Adriatique* from the 1980s which pulled together researchers from all around the Adriatic basin at a time when international cooperation was frequently difficult in a space

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<sup>166</sup> This is especially clear in very specific studies perhaps unintentionally falsely advertised as pan-Adriatic, e.g. a 2000 conference volume, Landolfi (2000b), *Adriatico tra IV e III sec. a.C.*, which sounds promising until the subtitle: *vasi alto-adriatici tra Piceno, Spina e Adria*. A fascinating and useful volume to be sure, but definitely a collection of histories *in* the northern Adriatic rather than *of* the region as a whole. Cf. Cambi, Čače, and Kirigin (2002); Pietro Brogiolo and Delogu (2005).

<sup>167</sup> Morris (2003), 33.

<sup>168</sup> Čače, Kurilić, and Tassaux (2006).

dividing two very different political and scholarly worlds: western Europe and the communist bloc.<sup>169</sup>

An outlier in this effort is the *Histoire de l'Adriatique* edited by Pierre Cabanes which attempts a *longue durée* study of the sea from prehistory to the present in one volume.<sup>170</sup> Cabanes admirably assembles experts in each area and sets the stage with his own lengthy essay on the Adriatic in antiquity (to the 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD). While the book succeeds at many things—importantly at returning frequently to the Adriatic as a whole—Cabanes' own chapter leaves much of the history out, focusing exclusively on the Greek colonization of the Adriatic until the beginnings of the Roman conquest. Oddly, he dedicates space to events outside the Adriatic, such as the conquests of Alexander the Molossian and Pyrrhus, important to the history of east-west connections and Rome's contact with the Greek world, but not specific to the Adriatic. This would not be overly frustrating—and indeed I look at these events in this project briefly too—were it not for all the things Cabanes misses, especially anything happening on the Italian side of the sea or to the north. In this way his whole Adriatic exists only where the Greek colonists or Roman generals look, and nowhere else. Understandably his space is limited with such a broad timeframe to cover, but the omissions speak to a decidedly Hellenocentric, Romanocentric worldview.

Perhaps most promising alongside Čače et al.'s volume on maritime travel is a publication by the Adriaticum Mare Association, a group founded by Čače and dedicated to the creation of a thorough web-based atlas of the Adriatic and assisting research projects in the region.<sup>171</sup> The volume, though too full of histories *in* the Adriatic, attempts to pull them together with dedicated essays at the beginning (by Claudio Zaccaria) and the end (Pierre Cabanes)

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<sup>169</sup> Čače Kurilić, and Tassaux (2006), 7.

<sup>170</sup> Cabanes (2001).

<sup>171</sup> Marion and Tassaux (2015).



setting the stage for the Adriatic's place in historiography and cleaning up the scattered papers with some broad themes. But as Emilio Cocco and Everardo Minardi argue in their 2007 book on the modern problems of the Adriatic, this is a difficult space to unite.<sup>172</sup>

Overall there are terrific things happening in studies within the Adriatic and studies of the Adriatic as a whole are gaining momentum. Archaeological projects like Frank Vermeulen's ongoing work in central Adriatic Italy, the Adriatic Islands Project, excavations and surveys on islands like Palagruža, and the continual flow of publications around the major centers of the Roman empire provide new material for those trying to order all of this into histories *of* the space.<sup>173</sup> Alongside these are lots of site-specific works scattered around the basin as well as a stream of underwater discoveries and the ongoing analyses of existing datasets, explored further in chapter two. The journal *Antichità Altoadriatiche*, for example, housed at the Università di Trieste, publishes regular volumes updating work on Trieste, Aquileia, and Nauportus. A thorough grounding in the archaeology of all the Adriatic sites is outside the scope of this project, but increasing numbers and quality of publications—including underwater research—is very encouraging.<sup>174</sup>

It should be clear from this overview of recent projects that there is space among all these studies *in* the Adriatic for a study *of* it. My purpose throughout the thesis is not to assemble a definitive examination of all these disparate parts or a complete archaeology or history of the Adriatic—such a project would require a huge team and many years to complete in multiple volumes. Rather, this is an attempt at picking through the myriad studies *in* the Adriatic to ascertain something *of* the sea as a whole. This is complicated by the Hellenocentric and

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<sup>172</sup> Cocco and Minardi (2007), esp. 11-23.

<sup>173</sup> Vermeulen (2017); Gaffney et al. (1997); Kirigin et al. (2006c); Kirigin (2006); Forenbaher (2009a); Kirigin et al. (2009).

<sup>174</sup> E.g. Royal (2012); for ongoing research in the Po River region: Willis (2016).

Romanocentric nature of the evidence. But by returning frequently to the ecology of the sea, I weave these pieces together into a picture of this larger space (order them, to use Morris' word). Indeed, the way the study has been framed, the sea itself is indispensable to it: this is a study of the Adriatic Sea and not simply history happening alongside it.

### III. The Historical Space

In this final part of the chapter I give an overview of *histoire événementielle* in the Adriatic world from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC in order to set up the more specialized analyses that follow through the dissertation. This is, to my knowledge, the only such narrative beyond that of Cabanes, which, as we have said, has its own problems. This will be neither comprehensive nor heavily detailed. But as I explore these events, I hope to give a sense of the shape both of the history here in the sea and of a narrative less dependent on those accounts that usually dominate it.

At the beginning of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, the Adriatic floated ships of all sizes on its waters carrying cargoes from all over the Mediterranean and the Adriatic in familiar patterns on its surface.<sup>175</sup> They sailed and rowed up the eastern seaboard to Hvar and Vis and from there continued north, or cut across to the western side to make for the Po valley. They crisscrossed the Strait of Otranto on their way from one end of the Mediterranean to the other. They fended off, or succumbed to predators lurking on the edges of the sea and descending swiftly from the Dalmatian islands and the Italian coast to prey on vessels themselves. They passed through ports large and small, from Corcyra, Apollonia, and Epidamnus, to Pharos, Issa, Spina, Ancona, and the small communities along the river mouths of the Italian seaboard. During the sailable months, for the entire period of this study, the Adriatic saw merchants plying their wares, and

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<sup>175</sup> See detailed discussion in chapter two.

brave souls continued to sail through it in less variable periods as well, especially along the coasts.

This continued a long tradition of movement and trade going back to at least the Neolithic when humans crossed the Adriatic from near Monte Gargano via Palagruža to the Croatian islands of Vis, Korčula, and Hvar.<sup>176</sup> In the Bronze Age, Mycenaean trade passed around and across the Adriatic in patterns that continued almost uninterrupted down to the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC.<sup>177</sup> Etruscan trade dominated the northwestern Adriatic until, supposedly, Hieron of Syracuse's victory over them at Kyme in 474 BC. By at least the 6<sup>th</sup> century BC, trade flowed from the Aegean through the Adriatic to Etruria and back through the port of Spina.<sup>178</sup> In the southern Adriatic, Greek foundations at Epidamnus (by Corcyra and Corinth) and Apollonia (by Corinth) in the late 7<sup>th</sup> century BC harbored passing ships and encouraged the trade routes to grow in importance.<sup>179</sup> By the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC, Athens dominated commerce between the Po Valley and the Aegean.<sup>180</sup> After Athens and her allies lost the Peloponnesian War (404 BC), Athenian influence waned considerably in the Adriatic.<sup>181</sup> In many respects, this study begins in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC with a vacuum of power in the Adriatic following the curtailing of Athenian power at the hands of Sparta and Persia in the 5<sup>th</sup> and early 4<sup>th</sup> centuries BC.

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<sup>176</sup> Kirigin et al. (2009) and Forenbahr (1999) and (2009a).

<sup>177</sup> E.g. Braccisi (1977), 13ff and Harding (1976) for Mycenaeans; now Galaty, Tomas, and Parkinson (2014).

<sup>178</sup> Diod. Sic. 11.51. On Etruscans in the Adriatic, Sassatelli and Govi (2013). Summary of information on Spina at Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2005), 334.

<sup>179</sup> Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2005), 328-31. For an overview of Greek colonization in the Adriatic, Cabanes (2008).

<sup>180</sup> Discussion of the ceramic evidence—hundreds of Attic red and black figure vases—in chapter two below.

<sup>181</sup> In fact, it used to be argued that one of the causes for the Peloponnesian War in the first place was access to the west and the Adriatic Sea, e.g. Cornford (1907), 1-76 and Grundy (1911), but that view has been overturned by e.g. Dickins (1911) and de Ste. Croix (1972), esp. 214-20.

Nevertheless, even with Athens diminished, trade still flowed through the Adriatic Sea, now to new areas and projects as other powers struggled for a foothold in this maritime world. In the early 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, some of that traffic carried settlers and soldiers from Sicily into the central Adriatic where they established settlements on the islands of Hvar and Vis and along the coast at Lissus.<sup>182</sup> Supposedly these foundations formed part of Dionysius I's plan to overrun the Adriatic through control of the Strait of Otranto.<sup>183</sup> For many years scholars wrote of Dionysius' "Adriatic empire" and the Adriatic as a Syracusan sea in the 4<sup>th</sup> century, but there is very little evidence to support a large-scale Syracusan effort at domination in this period.<sup>184</sup>

What is clear is that port sites throughout the Adriatic become increasingly active during the fourth century. Ancona on the northern Italian coast, for example, had been inhabited and active from the Bronze Age, but began to develop into an urban center only in the 4<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> centuries BC.<sup>185</sup> Likewise nearby Hatria had been continually occupied from the 6<sup>th</sup> century BC but began to develop more extensively with the foundation of a Latin colony by Rome at the beginning of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC.<sup>186</sup> Sena Gallica follows a similar pattern, with a small village developing into an urban center in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries.<sup>187</sup> Similarly, while Issa on the island of Vis and Pharos on the island of Hvar were founded in the 4<sup>th</sup> century and grew quickly to importance, the Parians and Syracusans who settled there found others already occupying those

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<sup>182</sup> Overview at Cabanes (2001), 56ff, further discussion in chapter four.

<sup>183</sup> Diod. Sic. 15.13.

<sup>184</sup> The older view, espoused by e.g. Holleaux (1928), 825 and Caven (1990), 149-53, has been rejected by Woodhead (1970); cf. Dell (1967) and now Evans (2009), 107ff where he discusses the monuments of Dionysius' Imperialism in Syracuse.

<sup>185</sup> F. Vermeulen (2017), 93; F. Colivicchi, *La necropolis di Ancona, IV-I secolo A.C.: Una comunità italica fra ellenismo e romanizzazione* (2002) and (2008).

<sup>186</sup> Coarelli and La Regina (1984); Guidobaldi (1995).

<sup>187</sup> Lepore and Silani (2012).

spaces.<sup>188</sup> People had lived in these ports for centuries. But beginning in our period, the level of activity and growth in the Adriatic began to take off.

As is almost always the case, we know much more about the southernmost Adriatic than any other part of it. Through the 4<sup>th</sup> century the Illyrians warred with Macedon repeatedly in the mountain passes and valleys between them.<sup>189</sup> In 335 BC the young Alexander the Great invaded Illyria, but he seems never to have reached the sea. As a young man he had lived briefly in exile in Illyria, but though that region began to increase in importance for ongoing conflicts elsewhere on the Balkan Peninsula, it is not until the 3<sup>rd</sup> century that we know much about events in the Adriatic.<sup>190</sup> But it seems that the rise of Philip II, Alexander's father, had elevated the Illyrians—his dangerous neighbors—in the eyes of the Greeks to his south. In 356/5 BC, for example, the Athenians forged an alliance with Grabus, an Illyrian king far west of Macedon near Lake Skadar.<sup>191</sup> In the years following, Philip managed to extend Macedonian influence west to the coast and north to the Adriatic.<sup>192</sup> But Alexander turned eastward instead.

Alexander I of Epirus, sometimes called Alexander Molossus, turned westward. He was the great Alexander's uncle, his mother's brother, and responded to a plea from Tarentum to aid the city in ongoing conflicts in Magna Graecia.<sup>193</sup> He crossed the Adriatic with a large force and fought on its shores, taking the port city of Sipontum near Monte Gargano among many other conquests. Ultimately he waged war from 334-332 BC and died in battle. In this he followed

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<sup>188</sup> Gaffney et al (2002).

<sup>189</sup> Wilkes (1992), 117ff; Hammond and Griffith (1979), 304-9, 469ff; 504ff; Hammond and Walbank (1988), 32ff.

<sup>190</sup> Diod. Sic. 16.69; Arr. 1.5-6; Plut. *Alex.* 9.

<sup>191</sup> *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 127; *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 196; Rhodes and Osborne (2003), no. 53 pp. 254-8; cf. Hammond (1966).

<sup>192</sup> Hammond (1966), 245; in 344/3 BC he seems to be defeating the Ardiaeans on the coast and in 337 BC the Autariatae.

<sup>193</sup> Livy 8.3, 17, 24. Alessandro il Molosso (2003).

after Archidamus III, Eurypontid king of Sparta, who also died fighting for Tarentum in 338 BC, having been in Italy since 342 BC.

While to the east the other Alexander conquered the world, the Athenian assembly voted to establish a new colony in the Adriatic in 325/4 BC to protect grain shipments and secure maritime transport.<sup>194</sup> This was on the eve of conflict with Alexander and perhaps reflects a desire to have a secure source of grain and supplies from the west or simply to exploit the resources of the Adriatic. We do not know where the colony was to be or what came of it.

In the wars following Alexander's death, the Adriatic became increasingly important to Macedon and her enemies. The focus of both Athens and Macedon in the Lamian War (following the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC) was located just southeast of the Adriatic where, for example, the Battle of Echinades occurred just off the coast of Acarnania in 322 BC.<sup>195</sup> And hostilities continued there. Cassander, son of Alexander's regent Antipater and de facto ruler of most of Greece during the struggle for supremacy after Alexander's death, seized Epidamnos/Dyrrachium and Apollonia in 314 BC.<sup>196</sup> He rearranged affairs in southern Illyria on the Adriatic and probably founded a colony there in an attempt to separate those rebellious cities and the Illyrians further north.<sup>197</sup> But Glaucias, king of some Illyrians, along with forces from the Ionian island of Corcyra, took Apollonia and Epidamnos/Dyrrachium away from Macedon in 312 BC.<sup>198</sup> In 311 BC Cassander moved through northern Epirus to attack Apollonia on the Adriatic again but was surprised by the size of the resistance and lost.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> *IG* II/III<sup>3</sup> 1 1370 = *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1629; *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 305; Tod (1946-8) 200. Most accessibly published as no. 100 in Rhodes and Osborne (2003). More details in chapter four. Translation at AIO here:

<http://www.atticinscriptions.com/inscription/RO/100>.

<sup>195</sup> Bosworth (2003).

<sup>196</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.67.6.

<sup>197</sup> Hammond and Walbank (1988), 154ff.

<sup>198</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.78; Hammond and Walbank (1988), 155.

<sup>199</sup> Diod. 19.89; Hammond and Walbank (1988), 156.

Glaucias reappears in the historical record in 307 BC when he places the 12-year-old Pyrrhus on the throne of Molossia in Epirus as part of a power grab that pushed Cassander's faction out of office.<sup>200</sup> This young Pyrrhus quickly proved his mettle and by 291 BC had engaged in war with Demetrius I Poliorketes who, in 289 BC, invaded Aetolia only to be soundly defeated by Pyrrhus in turn which brought the latter great fame in Epirus.<sup>201</sup> To this point, the Hellenistic kings had engaged only with the southernmost parts of the Adriatic, primarily Epirus and only as far north as Epidamnus/Dyrrachium.

While Pyrrhus grew up—and he did so largely in exile either with Demetrius Poliorcetes on campaign or with Ptolemy I in Egypt—the Adriatic hosted another military crossing: Cleonymus, son of Cleonymus II the Agiad king of Sparta but not king himself, was summoned, as were Achimadus and Alexander I before him, to fight for Tarentum against her neighbors.<sup>202</sup> While the other commanders also floated their mighty forces across the Adriatic to the Italian coast, Cleonymus' story has even more maritime flavor. He used the seaboard to conduct raids from ships and to plunder the cities of Italy and the islands of the Ionian Sea like a pirate, seizing treasuries and carrying off women in his swift ships (more to follow in chapter three). Ultimately defeated by the Romans at Thuriae in 303/2 BC, he was forced to flee and sailed his fleet up the Adriatic to its head. Livy describes him following part of the Po system to eventually attempt a raid on Patavium, Livy's hometown. The good people of the district heroically repelled Cleonymus and force him to retreat.

Around this time (280/79 BC) an unusual migration of people around the margins of the Adriatic had significant effects on its hinterland. A massive group of Gauls moved south and east

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<sup>200</sup> Just. *Epit.* 17.3.21; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 3.3.

<sup>201</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 41.3, *Pyrrh.* 7.4-10.

<sup>202</sup> Livy 10.2; Diod. Sic. 20.104-5.

through the Adriatic region all the way to Delphi and later into Asia Minor.<sup>203</sup> Diodorus Siculus records that their king, Brennus, led a force of over 150,000 infantry into Macedon and up to Delphi but was ultimately defeated.<sup>204</sup> The drain on resources throughout the Adriatic region made by this huge mass of people must have been terrific.

Coeval with the Gallic invasion, Pyrrhus responded to a plea for help from Tarentum in Italy.<sup>205</sup> By this time Pyrrhus was one of the major players in the never-ending wars for supremacy in the Balkan peninsula. He had spent time serving both Demetrius I and Ptolemy I Soter, had married into the latter's family, and had carefully gained control of a tidy empire along the Ionian and Adriatic coasts: he controlled southern Illyria, Epirus, Ambracia, Amphilochia, Acarnania, Corcyra, and Leucas. This Pyrrhus was a powerful figure and the nephew of a previous benefactor of Tarentum, Alexander I of Molossus. Tarentum alleged that Rome had violated a longstanding treaty. Pyrrhus came to help with 25,000 foot, 3,000 horse, and 25 elephants.

Pyrrhus' costly victories against Rome at Heraclea, Ausculum, and Beneventum were too much to sustain: Pyrrhus was winning battles but losing too many men to continue fighting the war. Facing steep attrition, he went off to Sicily and became embroiled in conflicts there before returning to Italy—this is the context for the Battle of Beneventum in 275 BC—and then returned across the Adriatic.

Roman battles with Pyrrhus came just at a time when newcomers were encroaching on the Adriatic coastline. After winning the Battle of Sentinum in 295 BC (modern Sassoferrato) not too far from the coast, the Romans had finally cut their way through the central Apennines to reach the shores of the Adriatic Sea. From the perspective of the sea, this began a long pattern of

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<sup>203</sup> Nachtergaele (1979) and Sánchez (2017).

<sup>204</sup> Diod. Sic. 22.3-5. Cf. Just. *Epit.* 24.3.10-15.

<sup>205</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* See Lévêque (1957), Garouphalias (1979), Hackens (1988), and Franke (1989).



Roman participation in the activities of the Adriatic world. To this point, the majority of disruptive, exploitative interference had occurred in the southern part of the sea, where the Athenians (in 325/4 BC) and now the Macedonians were founding cities (Antipatreia, modern Berat in 311 BC) and waging war with the other inhabitants of both coasts. This meant lots of movement and perhaps increased capacity for trade, but also disruptions of the shorelines and immediate hinterland. As we have seen, even if trade was perceived as dangerous (as in Lysias), it continued uninterrupted. Battles raged along the coasts and attacks were launched from the sea, but up to the 280s BC, this was all contained in the southernmost reaches of the Adriatic near the busiest and perhaps most troublesome highway of the Strait of Otranto.

But after the distant Battle of Sentinum in 295 BC, disruptions began increasing far to the north as these interlopers enlarged settlements, built new ones, and came in greater and greater numbers.<sup>206</sup> Beginning in the 280s BC, there were the settlements of Sena Gallica, Hadria, and Castrum Novum, followed shortly thereafter by Ariminum, Firmum Picenum, and then, more to the south, Brundisium. The development or enlargement and improvement of these sites increased the flow of maritime traffic on the Adriatic along the coast of Italy as river mouths were fitted with docks and moles were built out into the sea. These new stopping points pulled ships along new routes (or in new quantities along old ones) on their way to the same old centers of Ancona and Numana and the Po. And more settlers meant increased opportunities for exploitation of the sea both for profit and violence.

At almost the same time, the coast opposite began seeing more and more traffic further and further north. The formerly sleepy kingdoms in Illyria—if we are to believe literary records, which ignore them almost entirely until the middle of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC—began to pick up

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<sup>206</sup> Details to follow in chapter four.

steam and increased importance.<sup>207</sup> In 232/1 BC, several things happened at once to speed the process along. First, the deaths of the entire royal family of Epirus and an uprising thereafter transformed the kingdom into a weak republic, so much so that Ambracia and Amphilochia—added to Epirus by Pyrrhus himself and part of the kingdom for over 50 years—fled to the Aetolian League.<sup>208</sup> This created what Arthur Eckstein has called a power vacuum in the southern Adriatic in the 230s BC.<sup>209</sup> Several forces rushed to fill it, but Illyria came out on top. This is how it happened.

In 231 BC, Demetrius II of Macedon hired the Illyrian king Agron to relieve the Acarnanians from a siege at Medion. Agron had increased the military might of Illyria considerably and was quite successful at his task. From this point the narrative gets caught up in Polybius' rhetoric of Illyrians as barbarians: greedy and given to emotional outbursts and irrational thinking.<sup>210</sup> As he picks up the story (taken up in detail in chapter three below), he describes Agron drinking himself to death on the spoils of victory and his violently greedy wife Teuta marshaling her fleet to find and seize more of the good stuff. Underneath this caricature of non-Greek leaders, we can see Illyrian power growing and the expansion of her military might into larger portions of the Adriatic. Emboldened by their success at Medion, the Illyrians push south into former strongholds of Epirus and begin successfully filling the void, much to the alarm of the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues to the southeast. In 231/0 BC, an Illyrian raid from Phoenice results in the capture and death of many Italian merchants traveling the Adriatic and these military activities in general give the Illyrians the ability to strike at the entire seaboard.<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> On the kingdoms and their kinglets, Hammond (1966), Wilkes (1992), 67ff; and now Dzino (2010), 18ff.

<sup>208</sup> Hammond and Walbank (1988), 332-3 with caution; Just. *Epit.* 28.3, cf. Polyæn. 8.52.

<sup>209</sup> Eckstein (2008), 34.

<sup>210</sup> Champion (2005), 100ff.

<sup>211</sup> Polyb. 2.2-12; App. *Ill.* 7.

From the Adriatic we can see these two powers encroaching simultaneously on this maritime space. Rome has built up an increasing presence on the Italian coast with ports and structure for merchant activity and—presumably—warships. Illyria has found herself with the ability to attack any part of the sea and with strongholds at Corcyra, Apollonia, and soon Epidamnos/Dyrrachium: their range of interference has suddenly expanded enormously. These two interlopers in the middle Adriatic soon come to blows on the sea. A Roman ambassador is killed en route to or from a meeting with Teuta and a massive Roman land and sea force crushes the Illyrian army and navy. This conflict, for the first time Polybius asserts, pulls Rome at the level of a state into political dealings in the Adriatic and beyond.<sup>212</sup>

As for the history of the Adriatic Sea, this is not the first moment of contact: the entire basin is continually connected by trade and migration. And this is hardly Rome's first military contact with the Greek world, or else who were Alexander I and Pyrrhus? Polybius says this is the first time Rome crossed with an army to that part of Europe. Looking out from the sea, Rome has had troops in the Adriatic basin for a long time—since Sentinum at least. But because military contacts accelerate in frequency from this point onward, it does seem to herald some sort of change in the long-term.

After the southern and now middle Adriatic have had their moment, the years following the First Illyrian War (229-8 BC) see these interruptions push even further north to the head of the sea itself. In the 220s, Roman forces defeated Gauls deep in the Po hinterland—and M. Claudius Marcellus won the *spolia opima* from Viridomarus in 222 BC—and then brought that fight to the Adriatic world in an attempt to consolidate authority throughout Cisalpine Gaul.

Notes in Diodorus Siculus, Eutropus, Orosius, and Zonarus reveal Roman conflicts at the head of

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<sup>212</sup> Polyb. 2.12.7 where he notes that these events resulted in an embassy with the Greek world and marked only the first of many embassies to Athens, Corinth, and the institutions of the Hellenistic world. Cf. Eckstein (2008), 32.

the Adriatic, sometimes called the First Istrian or Histrian War of 221-20 BC.<sup>213</sup> Illyrian forces were there too, attacking shipments of supplies heading to the war effort. The Romans pursued Demetrius of Pharos, the Illyrian dynast they had put in charge after he cooperated with them in the First Illyrian War, and ultimately killed him and razed Pharos (219 BC). This is called the Second Illyrian War and sometimes coincides with a second Histrian War which is really part of the same conflict.

This is because during this period we hear of Demetrius seeking alliances with the Histri and Atintani and pulling them away from relationships with Rome in a bid for power in the northernmost Adriatic.<sup>214</sup> From the sea, it certainly looks like a race up both coasts to consolidate authority over as much of the sea as possible. The subsequent development of the region under Roman rule leads to large increases in production and exports, turning this area into one of the premier wine and oil sources of the Mediterranean.

At the same time as this competition in the northern Adriatic, the southern part of the sea boiled with the Social War in Greece as Philip V tested his strength against the Aetolian League. Caught up in the conflict, Philip gazed across the Adriatic and saw opportunities. Rome was embroiled on the Adriatic coast in a long war with Hannibal and had just suffered a terrible defeat at Lake Trasimene. With Demetrius of Pharos whispering in his ear, Philip made peace with the Aetolian League (the Peace of Naupactus) in 217 BC and made immediate plans to attack Rome. For Polybius, this is a supremely important moment in the history of the world: for the first time, events happening in the west are influencing decisions being made in the east, his famous *symploke*.<sup>215</sup> Philip's plans required first establishing a foothold in Illyria, and he turned

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<sup>213</sup> Diod. Sic. 25.14. Eutrop. 3.7; Oros. 4.13.16; Zon. 8.20. See below in chapter three.

<sup>214</sup> App. *Ill.* 8.

<sup>215</sup> Polyb. 5.105. For bibliography and recent analysis, Eckstein (2008), 78ff, who goes against the trend and believes Philip V had ambitions on conquering the world.

immediately to the task. He built a fleet of 100 swift warships and sailed around the Greek peninsula, pausing at modern Kefalonias.<sup>216</sup> Afraid of confronting the Roman fleet—his ships were not built for it nor were his crews well trained—he waited until he could be sure the Romans were far away at Lilybaeum and then made his way up the coast toward Apollonia to begin his conquest of Illyria. But, as he approached Apollonia, some of his crews heard from other passing ships that Roman quinqueremes were approaching the Strait of Otranto. Philip panicked, withdrew his ships and fled to Kefalonias before discovering that there were only 10 warships to his 100. The Romans were so occupied with the war against Hannibal that they could barely spare a few boats to protect the Adriatic seaboard.

Ultimately Philip V attacked and Rome entered a second front (the First Macedonian War), fighting the Macedonians and Carthaginians simultaneously despite massive losses like Cannae. In the Adriatic the fighting clustered around Lissus and the Scodra basin which Philip—with a new fleet—occupied in 212 BC and around Aetolia and Illyris. The Aetolian League allies with Rome but ends up concluding its own peace in 206 BC. Rome comes to terms with Philip at Phoenice in Illyria in 205 BC. Movements of troops and warships clot the Strait of Otranto and the southern Adriatic coastlines, bringing to that part of the sea the consequences of connectivity.

The next 50 years see an almost uninterrupted string of conflicts drawing troops and supplies and booty back and forth across the Adriatic as these shore-dwelling Romans and Illyrians use the Adriatic to connect themselves to all kinds of objectives. The Second Macedonian War, fought from 200 to 197 BC, happened away from the Adriatic, but Pleuratus, king of Illyria, supported Rome and this strengthened political connections across the sea.<sup>217</sup> His successor, Genthius, was accused of supporting piratical raids against Rome in the 170s BC,

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<sup>216</sup> Polyb. 5.109-10.

<sup>217</sup> Polyb 18.47, 21.1; Livy 31.28, 33.34.

which ultimately led to a command against the Illyrians for L. Duronius.<sup>218</sup> The Third Macedonian War, 171-68 BC, happened on the Adriatic's shores. Genthius, the Illyrian king, was pressured from the start to switch sides and fight for Rome but refused and was ultimately defeated with his entire army at Scodra.<sup>219</sup> After the war was over, L. Anicius marched to Epirus to quell an uprising there and then Aemilius Paulus, the proconsul in charge of the command, ordered the sack of Epirus in 167 BC.<sup>220</sup> The sheer amount of precious metals was staggering. 150,000 slaves were taken to Rome, a massive forced migration and enslavement that drastically altered the region and that part of the Adriatic basin, though how much it impacted the area north of Epirus and Illyria itself is hard to tell.<sup>221</sup> It was also at this time that, as part of the effort to decapitate the leadership of the various Greek political entities, that 1000 statesmen, including Polybius, came to Rome as hostages. These gross exploitations of power flowed across the Adriatic as easily as the returning troops and significantly shifted demographics and settlement patterns around the basin.

Meanwhile, the encroaching Romans consolidated authority further with the foundation of Aquileia at the head of the sea on the river Natisone. This port town and the growing interest in northeast Italy heralded a new era for growth and especially agricultural intensification as the land here was redistributed to colonists and others. After years of conflict, M<sup>?</sup>. Acilius Glabrio defeated the Boii in 191 BC and celebrated a triumph.<sup>222</sup> Saskia Roselaar tracks the use of the Boii's land and notes that Bononia was founded on it in 189 BC, Mutina and Parma in 183 BC, Aquileia in 181 BC, and that in 173 BC there was a large distribution of plots. Aquileia was

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<sup>218</sup> Livy 40.18, 42; 41.1.

<sup>219</sup> Livy 44.30; App. *Ill.* 9.

<sup>220</sup> Livy 45.33-4. Plut. *Aem.*

<sup>221</sup> Hammond and Walbank (1988), 562-3; Gruen (1984), 423-9; Ziokowski (1986).

<sup>222</sup> Livy 36.1-2, 36.39-40. Oros. 4.20.21. Zonar. 8.18-20.

enlarged with colonists in 169.<sup>223</sup> These kinds of radical adjustments to the land altered the face of the Adriatic considerably through the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC.

Conflict continued in the Adriatic basin as, for example, uprisings in 155 BC required the consul C. Marcius Figulus to campaign in Dalmatia and besiege the city of Delminum which he burned to the ground.<sup>224</sup> In 135 BC, the Romans dispatched an army under S. Fulvius Flaccus to fight against Ardiaei who were continually attacking the Roman presence in the region. This marks the first time Narona figures into the story and is used as a Roman military base.<sup>225</sup> In 129 BC the consul C. Sempronius Tuditanus ranged far in the northern Adriatic hinterland asserting Roman dominion.<sup>226</sup> Reportedly, the consul of a later year, 119 BC, declared war against the Dalmatians for the sake of a triumph and, having wintered with them pleasantly, received it at Rome for his trouble. In 115 BC M. Aemilius Scaurus seems to have waged war in the northern Adriatic hinterland as well.<sup>227</sup>

In the second half of the second century BC, shifting population dynamics in the Italian peninsula resulted in the mass migration of thousands of settlers to the swelling agricultural districts along the Adriatic coastline.<sup>228</sup> At the same time, increased opportunities in the Po region brought farmers and soldiers north for land. Massive land resettlements such as those spearheaded by the Gracchi moved huge populations around the Italian peninsula and especially into the Adriatic hinterland.<sup>229</sup>

As the first century BC rolls around, increasing numbers of settlements appear at the head of the Adriatic, especially under the direction of Caesar who founds Pola and other colonies with

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<sup>223</sup> Roselaar (2010), 324, no 42 with bibliography.

<sup>224</sup> App. *Ill.* 11. Polybius' scathing assessment at 32.9.

<sup>225</sup> App. *Ill.* 10. Dzino (2010), 64-5.

<sup>226</sup> App. *Ill.* 10. Dzino (2010), 69-70.

<sup>227</sup> Dzino (2010), 71.

<sup>228</sup> Vermeulen (2017), explained in detail in chapter four below.

<sup>229</sup> Roselaar (2010), 251ff.

huge tracts of land for distribution.<sup>230</sup> Meanwhile the eastern coastline begins to be peppered with villas and large estates, growing up in former Illyrian strongholds and developing the countryside into rows of vineyards and facilities for processing fish and luxury items.

In the first century BC, the pace of events quickens. In 84 BC as L. Cornelius Cinna and Cn. Papirius Carbo try to prepare for the return of L. Cornelius Sulla, they plan to move troops to Liburnia from the longstanding naval base at Ancona to more easily strike at him.<sup>231</sup> Sulla himself, as all commanders heading east and returning for the wars in Asia and against Mithridates, crossed the Adriatic with his fleet. In 78 BC, C. Cosconius held a command against the Delmatae and took Salona, which had apparently been captured by the enemy. The campaign took two years, though we know little about it.<sup>232</sup> We should note that two commanders were assigned to the Adriatic during Pompey's war against the pirates in 67 BC, suggesting that there were significant maritime security issues in the region.<sup>233</sup> We should certainly pause on Caesar's command of Illyricum as a province and his limited interactions there—he had bigger fish to fry. He mentions twice in the early books of the Gallic Wars his desire to go to Illyricum and see to the province, but is thwarted from doing so. He does make it once to settle a dispute.<sup>234</sup>

During the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, the Adriatic plays an important role both as Pompey's means of escape in 49 BC and in the dangers faced by those crossing the sea to join their respective armies. During the long maneuvers at Dyrrachium, it was Pompeian access to the sea that allowed the army to find fodder for their animals and ultimately Caesar's diversion of rivers flowing past Pompey that pushed him to withdraw (discussed in more detail in chapter five). Naval actions in the Adriatic include M. Octavius' botched siege of Salona from which he

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<sup>230</sup> Santangelo (2016).

<sup>231</sup> App. *B. Civ.* 1.77-8.

<sup>232</sup> Eutr. 6.4; Orosius 5.23; Dzino (2010), 67-8.

<sup>233</sup> Plut. *Pomp.* 26-8; App. *Mithr.* 94-5; Tröster (2009).

<sup>234</sup> Caes. *BG* 2.35.2, 3.7.1, and 5.1.5-9.



had to retreat to join Pompey at Dyrrachium.<sup>235</sup> The author of the *Bellum Alexandrinum* records the excellent leadership of Vatinius in the Adriatic who, with a cobbled-together fleet, managed to route Octavius and send him packing to Africa.<sup>236</sup>

But it is in the aftermath of the civil wars that the Adriatic changes for good. Octavian campaigns there from 35-33 BC.<sup>237</sup> In the aftermath of those campaigns, the landscape shifts abruptly as growing collections of Romans along the former Illyrian and Dalmatian coasts now become formal *colonia Romana* and start to grow significantly.<sup>238</sup> As more settlements appear under the Augustan program, roads build overland links around the sea, and military actions enforce the emperor's peace, the landscape shifts considerably. We will see Histria, for example, built into an agricultural powerhouse owned largely by the imperial family, and large estates and villa economies dominate the seaboard in the transition to the 1<sup>st</sup> century AD. With the addition of a standing army and the requisite supplies to maintain a vast number of troops, the Mediterranean economy shifts considerably to accommodate this new demand. These changes affect the Adriatic directly with its close links to the *limes* and as the guardian of the Strait of Otranto, through which so many of these supplies must pass.

#### IV. An Intimate Division

Alongside these political changes and the morphing of the Adriatic landscape, a view from inside the sea shows strong continuity. Regardless of where the settlements fall or how many people pack into them, the Adriatic still floats trade through all of these centuries. Ships pass through the Straits and up and down the coasts, stopping in increasing numbers of small ports to see growing populations of settlers, but following the same patterns they have for

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<sup>235</sup> Caes. *BC* 3.11.9.

<sup>236</sup> Caes. *Bel. Alex.* 12.42ff.

<sup>237</sup> This is a complex issue with extensive bibliography, for which Dzino (2010), 101ff.

<sup>238</sup> Dzino (2010), 119ff.

centuries. One of the implications of viewing the Adriatic as a whole space rather than as the boundaries of two peninsular spaces is that we can see the continuity of contact over time regardless of geopolitics. If we buy into the idea that there was always trade linking these various shores, then it follows that the expanding Macedon reaching the Adriatic coast in the late 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC stepped into an already connected world—once one reaches a part of the Adriatic one reaches all of it. It is a whole. Likewise, when Rome reaches the sea in 295 BC and starts engaging with settlements there, the entire seaboard becomes visible and reachable through trade.

We have seen the gradual move northwards of action in the Adriatic during these four centuries, as external forces from Epirus, Rome, and Macedon played out their conflicts on Adriatic shores. As the middle Adriatic became involved, new inflexion points brought the influence of the sea to bear more firmly on hinterlands further north with the establishment of new settlements and the growth of old ones. A race to the head of the sea saw conflict spread across the northern Adriatic as especially Rome sought to establish hegemony over the Po Valley and the territory of Aquileia. By the time of the civil wars of the first century BC, the entire Adriatic can be involved in conflicts between dynasts.

It is consistently the ecology of the Adriatic Sea that makes these interactions possible. The easy communication between Apulia and the area of Epirus, for example, leads to expeditions Epirote and Spartan leaders. The island havens of Illyrian forces along the eastern shore allow them to continue harassing shipping and making conquering raids despite periodic setbacks. The winds and waves of the sea make all of this perilous and unpredictable as, for example, Caesar heroically crosses to Italy for his troops despite the growing storm. By the same token the sea unites these diverse ecologies together to great profit for all involved. While

connections bring mostly soldiers and death in the preceding narrative, they also move around the bounty of the increasingly productive agricultural lands on the Adriatic shores. They link river systems and deep hinterlands with the riches of the sea and the larger Mediterranean world.

To return to our initial formulation, this is both a sea of intimacy and a sea divided. Its closeness comes both from its geography and consistent navigability. Its division comes from its sheer size and the politics on the ground in this period. Yet, despite the separations and conflicts outlined above, I believe it is far more useful to view the Adriatic basin as a whole, geographically united space. It is a very large space, to be sure, but I believe it was consistently linked by this constant flow of movement and trade. The conflicts are, ultimately, few and far between, even if they leave the strongest impression. In between, ships plied the whole coastline and joined these individuals and communities in some sort of whole. In the chapters that follow, I explore different facets of this division and intimacy to put this theory to the test.

## Chapter Two

### *Importuosa Italiae Litora: Movement and Traders*

Now that we have seen what the Adriatic looks like, what sorts of evidence we might find there, and have some sense of what happens in and around it from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC, the next question to pose is how it was all connected and who made these connections possible? Fundamental to the idea of the connected—or not—Adriatic Sea is the movement of people and goods around its shores and across its waters. This chapter explores that connectivity with a view to the difficulties of the evidence and to unpacking what links all of these microecologies together.

The challenge of writing about movement and traders in the Adriatic is deciding which evidence to explore and how to organize it. Ultimately our evidence for people moving around this space falls into two categories: literary accounts of travel or movement, often far removed chronologically from the events they describe, and material evidence suggesting that—by some means and through an unknown number of intermediate steps—people or goods moved from point A to point B. Literary accounts of Adriatic travel for the 4<sup>th</sup>-1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC are few and far between, though later accounts (sometimes a thousand years later) have been pressed into service to outline at the very least the possibilities.<sup>239</sup> Material culture presents a thornier set of problems.

Diligent archaeological excavations, surveys, and underwater searches have uncovered a great deal of material evidence in the Adriatic. But how that material got from point A to point B

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<sup>239</sup> The most prominent example is the work of Pascal Arnaud, discussed further below. Arnaud (2005) and (2006). Cf. Kirigin et al. (2009) and Zaccaria (2015).

is not straightforward. Ceramics that seem to come from one part of the Adriatic and end up in another may do so by way of North Africa or the Aegean, or in a way incidental to major trade routes, as jettisoned packing material, ballast, recycled lids, or as secondary cargo.<sup>240</sup> Often, these datasets of archaeological evidence prove to be “of limited use.” They can “show that goods were being moved, but rarely by whom, or whether the movement represents trade or redistribution.”<sup>241</sup> Nevertheless, even without that kind of resolution, material culture still serves as an effective proxy for movement, whatever its nature.

It is not my purpose here to tease out a complex picture of the economic relationships between different sites in the Adriatic nor to pin down the character of specific transactions, either of which would be severely limited by the nature and state of the evidence. Instead, I simply aim to explore to what degree the Adriatic was connected by movement and trade both within its own basin—showing links between multiple points on its shores—and to the wider Mediterranean world. In doing this, I do not assume that clear paths from point A to point B can be demonstrated in the evidence, but rather that links can be found showing that various parts of the Adriatic participated in networks of movement and trade that joined their ecologies together and to far-flung places. I do assume, therefore, that material culture can be a useful proxy for contact and trade, but I do not presume to know the specifics of those interactions.<sup>242</sup>

These material proxies carry with them their own difficulties. As John Davies wrote of the challenges of economic history, “the greatest technical problem facing” us, and one that is

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<sup>240</sup> Tchernia (2016), 79-81; for recycling of amphorae into lids, Auriemma (2006), 175.

<sup>241</sup> Morley (2007), 580.

<sup>242</sup> On the necessities of using material evidence as a proxy for movement and trade, e.g. Bowman and Wilson (2009); Scheidel (2010) 595ff. Bonifay (2017), 328: “Despite the reticence of some historians and archaeologists, it has become more and more commonplace to use pottery as an indicator for measuring the directions, nature, and intensity of trade in classical antiquity.” For an example of handling the evidence Dietler (2007), esp. 262ff, and Wilson (2013). Cf. de Callatay (2009), 15ff. On the history of the problems, Greene (2005).

“unmanageably acute” for a study such as this, is “marrying genres of evidence.”<sup>243</sup> His explanation is very eloquent and worth quoting in full:

It needs to be explicitly stated for its full intractability to stand out as it should. Literary historians can normally confine their horizons to texts, whether transmitted via the mediaeval MSS tradition or via papyri or occasionally via inscriptions. Political historians can for the most part legitimately confine themselves to the textual evidence of literary authors and inscriptions: Will’s citations in his *Histoire politique* are eloquent testimony. Historians of religion indeed cannot so confine themselves, for sites and their surroundings, objects dedicated, representations of deities and rituals, are all essential grist to their mill. Economic historians, though, have it worst, for they need to use not only all these, but also far, far more: the locations of wrecks...the distribution of timber stands, the successful breeding of the silkworms of Kos, the behavior of courts and courtiers, the magnitude of issues from identifiable mints, the shifts of settlement pattern in this or that region, and a thousand other such topics, are all not merely relevant to any picture one wishes to draw but are essential structural components of it.<sup>244</sup>

He goes on to argue that the challenges of amassing such evidence, identifying patterns in it, and then marrying those emergent patterns together and fitting it all into some sort of successful model are incredibly daunting. It is a great deal of “personal knowledge” to acquire even for a team of scholars. But it is just this kind of work that is required to gain a larger picture of the Mediterranean rather than to produce another study *in* it. In confronting all the fields and subfields in which I am not an expert, I take comfort in the historian’s role of marrying the data and conclusions of others to overarching models that bring them to bear on the right questions.

Although I have identified this project as a sort of historical geography in the introduction, there is a great deal of parallel with the challenges of economic studies Davies discusses. These kinds of larger projects have proliferated in the last 15 years. There has been an especially heightened interest in the kinds of big data studies conducted by Walter Scheidel and his colleagues that have driven the new focus on Northian economic performance, the New

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<sup>243</sup> Davies (2001), 15-16.

<sup>244</sup> Davies (2001), 16. Compare to Bang (2008), 2-3.

Institutional Economics.<sup>245</sup> This trend toward larger datasets for the ancient world can perhaps be seen most clearly in the publications championed by the Oxford Roman Economy Project (also steeped in NIE), especially Philip Kay's *Rome's Economic Revolution* and the edited volumes, *The Roman Agricultural Economy* and *Trade, Commerce, and the State in the Roman World*.<sup>246</sup> Unfortunately, the kinds of large datasets utilized for studying the Roman Empire simply do not exist yet for the Adriatic before the Roman imperial period. One of the consistent themes of the studies used in this chapter will be the lament that they are too incomplete or too narrowly focused to be of sufficient use. But they are all we have, and so to create a larger picture of the movement of people and goods in this maritime world, we must make do.

The Adriatic was a very connected place. Many local, regional, and medium-specific studies bear this out. While the literature on the Adriatic is fairly scattered and, in some cases, almost inaccessible to scholars who do not read Croatian, the picture that emerges from careful study is one of constant movement joining the entire coastline of the Adriatic together in a network of contact and trade<sup>247</sup>. Most studies of the Adriatic cluster around two eras on opposite ends of our four centuries BC: prehistory and the height of the Roman Empire.<sup>248</sup> These are two periods for which the evidence seems to fall more easily into place. Scholars have linked, for example, lithic artifacts in modern Croatia to their geological sources near Monte Gargano in Italy, thus showing that men carried rocks from one side of the Adriatic to the other thousands of

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<sup>245</sup> E.g. Scheidel et al. (2007) and (2012). On NIE, Lo Cascio (2006) and Bang (2009).

<sup>246</sup> Kay (2014); Bowman and Wilson (2013); Wilson and Bowman (2017); cf. Bowman and Wilson (2009), (2011), and de Callatay (2009). For a turn to production instead of performance (in Northian terms), cf. Erdkamp et al. (2015).

<sup>247</sup> Braccesi (1977), Marasco (1986), Coarelli (2003), Coviello (2003), and Čašule (2012).

<sup>248</sup> Before the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC: e.g. Forenbaher (2009a), Radić (2009), Bernardini et al. (2009), D'Ercole (2015). After Augustus: e.g. Jurišić (2000), Brogiolo and Delogu (2005), articles in de Marinis et al. (2012), Bertrand and Botte (2015), Shpuza (2015). After Augustus, the Adriatic also enters the big datasets utilized by Bowman and Wilson and the Oxford Roman Economy Project.

years before our era.<sup>249</sup> And in the imperial period, the northern Adriatic became an important center of commerce linking the fertile Po River Valley, Istria, and the Limes along the Rhone to the larger Roman world.<sup>250</sup>

The period in between remains somewhat fuzzy. In the last chapter we saw the narrative of events that brought to the Adriatic communities an increased contact with the political powers of the larger Mediterranean, especially Macedon and Rome, and the consequences of that connectivity. While we must be careful not to map positivistically the data we do have onto these same events, the general growth of maritime traffic tends to follow the trends of external interference and conquest in these four centuries.

Now an important confession. I am not an archaeologist. Certainly not an expert in Lamboglia 2 amphorae or Hellenistic fine ware. I do not attempt any sort of ceramic analysis in this chapter (nor a numismatic or epigraphic one). Rather, I take it as my role to pull disparate studies *in* the Adriatic and lay them side-by-side to create a picture *of* the sea and establish, for the purposes of my larger argument, a broad image of how connected this sea was from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC. To do this I rely on the outstanding work of many specialists—cherry-picking them as necessitated by the constraints of space—published in scattered collections and periodicals. My job is to overlay these studies into a more complete picture *of* the whole Adriatic basin. My role here is akin to John Davies’ economic historian, though with more of a focus on geography and ecology.<sup>251</sup> Perhaps the better corollary is Peter Thonemann, whose work on the Maeander Valley, while concerning a smaller space, engages with many of the same kinds of

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<sup>249</sup> Forenbaher and Perhoč (2015).

<sup>250</sup> E.g. Horden and Purcell (2000), 372ff; Tchernia (2015), 86-9; Santangelo (2016).

<sup>251</sup> Davies (2001). In the same vein are the big data economic monographs like Temin (2012) and Tchernia (2015), though I do not have those datasets to work with.



evidence over a long period.<sup>252</sup> For me, it is the sea itself that provides the framework for uniting these various articles and chapters by refocusing them, in part, on the ecological framework of their study and expanding their scope to incorporate more of the sea.

The work of this chapter is to explore the degree to which the movement of people and goods connected the Adriatic in the 4<sup>th</sup>-1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC within its shores and to the outside Mediterranean world. While a comprehensive, total picture of movement and trade is not possible here, I set out to depict the patterns, at least, of Adriatic movement as much as the evidence and the state of its publication will allow.

The questions guiding this venture include, to what degree was the Adriatic connected in this period through trade? What datasets can we leverage to demonstrate that? How can this connectivity be effectively represented? And what effects do the ecologies of the Adriatic have on these connectivities? I organize my discussion around a number of maps of the Adriatic produced by scholars working on the different Adriatic datasets. Few of these works were conceived or executed as studies *of* the Adriatic. Rather, they belong to other disciplines and external perspectives such as the view from Athens, for example, or from a particular point on the Adriatic coastline, toward a specific body of evidence. I conceive of this chapter as a series of transparencies made up of these isolated maps each drawn from one angle. My job is to overlay these so that together they provide a set of perspectives on the Adriatic and combine their datasets into a larger whole. The maps I have selected come predominantly from edited volumes on larger Adriatic issues and represent individual histories *in* that space. As I attempt to overlay these maps into a larger history *of* the Adriatic, I recognize that it will not be complete, nor can it be, given the current state of research.

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<sup>252</sup> Thonemann (2011).

The consistent key to reframing these disparate studies together is the framework of Adriatic ecology. All of these trade connections exist within the ecological paradigm of the Adriatic Sea with its unique problems of winds and currents, offshore islands, and contrasting shorelines. The physical circumstances in which the individuals represented by these various proxies lived determine, as Thonemann argues, not what they will do but certainly what their prominent options are.<sup>253</sup> As trade patterns unfold, they do so in rhythm with the natural undercurrents of this maritime world.

These maps start with general overviews of the trade routes of the Adriatic painted with broad strokes from modern and ancient evidence, then shift more specifically into genres of material culture, including studies of Hellenistic pottery, amphorae, shipwrecks, and numismatics, and then conclude with a look at the traders who move all these goods around. These maps each contribute pieces to the larger picture I construct in this chapter. This is by no means a complete image of trade in the Adriatic of these centuries. But putting these studies alongside one another and engaging them in dialogue with each other creates a study *of* the Adriatic out of these scattered studies *in* it.

## I. Trade routes

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<sup>253</sup> Thonemann (2011), xii, quoted in the introduction.

Figure 3 - Trade routes in the Adriatic – Nava (1984)





Figure 2 - Study of drifters in the Adriatic Sea – Poulain (1999)

Figure 2 is a map showing a simplified picture of trade routes through the Adriatic Sea.<sup>254</sup> It shows a general counterclockwise movement of trade reaching all along the coast. How did Maria Nava, the author, decide trade flowed along those paths? There is no consensus on the general traffic pattern of the ancient Adriatic. In fact, many of the studies examined in this chapter set out to contend firmly against one view of Adriatic trade or another.<sup>255</sup> The maps I use in the chapter fall into two broad categories: those created by connecting the dots of material

<sup>254</sup> Nava (1984); my copy from Milhović (2004), 103.

<sup>255</sup> E.g. D’Ercole (2006), Vidrih Perko (2006), and Auriemma and Degrassi (2015) against the communis opinio represented by Braccesi (1977).

culture distribution and those derived from ecological data. In the first instance, scholars look for trade patterns to explain the diaspora of their evidence. Throughout this chapter we will see examples of these kinds of datasets and how movement patterns might be overlaid onto them. In the second instance, they look first to the environment to see how winds, currents, and topographies might drive maritime traffic.

Figure 3, already seen in chapter one, shows the results of a study by Poulain in which he released drifters at different depths in the Adriatic and tracked their movements over time. The general pattern of currents includes circular gyres connecting the two coasts of the Adriatic in places roughly corresponding to those on Nava's map.<sup>256</sup> Note, however, that while Nava's map shows a crossing from the Croatian to the Italian coast at about the level of Monte Gargano—one Poulain's drifters also seem to make—there is another set of crossings north of them that Nava does not include.

Nava's map comes from a study of the Daunian Stelae in Apulia and their connections to the larger Adriatic world.<sup>257</sup> The Dauni were a subset of the Iapygians and, scholars argue, flourished in Apulia from about the 10<sup>th</sup> to the 5<sup>th</sup> centuries BC.<sup>258</sup> While they are too early for this dissertation, the map and some of the details surrounding them make this slight detour worth our while. Interestingly, Strabo records that two of the primary centers of the Dauni, Siponto and Salapia, were settled by people from Dalmatia.<sup>259</sup> Based on similarities in the material culture of Dalmatia and Apulia from the 10<sup>th</sup> to the 5<sup>th</sup> centuries BC, scholars working in the area assert that the Daunians came from Illyria.<sup>260</sup>

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<sup>256</sup> Poulain (1999); cf. McKinney (2014).

<sup>257</sup> Nava (1984).

<sup>258</sup> Norman (2013)

<sup>259</sup> Strabo 6.5.238.

<sup>260</sup> Norman (2013), 15ff; cf. De Juliis (1977) and (1988), Lo Schiavo (1984), D'Ercole (2008), Pasadolos and Scardina (2011). Cf. Lombardo (2014).

The most striking thing about the Daunians is the production of stelae: beautifully carved limestone slabs decorated on all sides to appear like a person.<sup>261</sup> They have attached heads, set on top of the slabs, sometimes carved with facial features. The details of the carvings were picked out with pigments which have long since faded. The geometric designs and depictions of everything from hunting and fishing to crafts and funeral games have fascinated a small group of art historians and archaeologists. I include two stelae here from the dissertation of Camilla Norman who recently edited the entire corpus and organized them in a digital database for the first time.



Figure 4 - Daunian stelae - male on the left, female on the right - Norman (2013), 4

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<sup>261</sup> Norman (2013), 4ff.

The stelae were first published by Silvio Ferri starting in 1962 and then more systematically by Maria Luisa Neva, the provider of the map in figure 1.<sup>262</sup> They have been found in sites spread all along the Adriatic coast of Italy, as far north as Cattolica.<sup>263</sup> Because they depict women in detail and the corpus is so large, they are an invaluable source of information on Italic women in this period.<sup>264</sup>

With these stelae and the supposed Dalmatian origins of the Daunians in mind, the map from Nava's article sets out to show how Illyria and Daunia were connected to one another. The heyday of Daunia around the 7<sup>th</sup> to the 5<sup>th</sup> centuries BC is also the time when Athens has strong connections to the Po River Valley and Athenian vases show up there in great numbers.<sup>265</sup> Thus the map shows trade flowing from the Aegean, along the Dalmatian coast, and around to the Italian coast especially near Spina, where the great numbers of Athenian pots can be found, and down past Monte Gargano to Daunia. It is drawn in such a way as to link all of the relevant pieces of archaeological evidence neatly together.

It just so happens that a similar approach was followed by the biggest figure in the study of Greek contact in the Adriatic Sea, Lorenzo Braccesi. He argued in his landmark 1977 book that ships making long-haul runs from Athens to Spina and the Po Valley would sail up the Dalmatian coast most of the way before cutting across the Adriatic roughly from Iader to Monte Cerano where the settlements of Ancona and Numana lie.<sup>266</sup> This model, for Braccesi, explained the distribution pattern of Athenian pottery, as he knew it in the 1970s: the route hit all of the settlements where the pots could be found.<sup>267</sup> As we will see, the evidence continues to expand

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<sup>262</sup> Ferri (1962) and many afterward in the same journal; Nava (1979) and (1980); cf. Nava (1988).

<sup>263</sup> Braccesi (2008).

<sup>264</sup> E.g. Norman (2009), (2011), and (2016).

<sup>265</sup> E.g. D'Ercole (2006); Aurigemma (1960); Alfieri (1979).

<sup>266</sup> Braccesi (1977), 368 for the map.

<sup>267</sup> Braccesi (1977), 71ff; D'Ercole (2008) against.

as excavations, field surveys, and new studies illuminate evidence far beyond what was available to Braccesi. And this new evidence alters the map considerably.

In contrast to this connect-the-dot model of visualizing trade patterns, Branko Kirigin and his team followed ecological data ancient and modern to reconstruct travel routes that take maximum advantage of winds and currents.<sup>268</sup> In their work specifically about prehistoric crossings of the Adriatic, they drew on pilot manuals for modern sailing and the patterns of traditional vessels over the last few centuries to argue that ships moving up the Adriatic generally followed a different route than the one depicted above.<sup>269</sup> They emphasize the importance of visual navigation and the prominent (or not so visible) landmarks that guided trans-Adriatic crossings, especially near the island of Palagruža off Monte Gargano.<sup>270</sup> They note the advice of modern navigation handbooks that, sailing south to north, one should follow the eastern coast of the Adriatic until about the level of Palagruža before crossing over to the Italian side. This maximizes the advantage of the sea currents and wind patterns and puts sailing ships in a good position to take advantage of offshore winds for the trek up the Italian coast to the Po River system. Kirigin argues that this was also the pattern for ancient navigation, especially for ships carrying large cargoes (grain) from the northwestern Adriatic to the wider Mediterranean.<sup>271</sup> Here is the map Kirigin and his team put together demonstrating these long-range routes according to ecological conditions and traditional sailing habits.<sup>272</sup>

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<sup>268</sup> Kirigin et al. (2009).

<sup>269</sup> Kirigin et al. (2009).

<sup>270</sup> Cf. Horden and Purcell (2000), 124ff; Constantakopoulou (2007), 20ff.

<sup>271</sup> This assertion that this was the ancient pattern for navigation challenges the standard view of Braccesi (1977) that Adriatic crossings happened in a line from Zadar to Ancona as ships traveled up the Croatian coast and then crossed to the Italian peninsula, thus bypassing most of central Adriatic Italy on their way to the Po. As we will see in many of the datasets below, Braccesi's opinion continues to carry weight and invite dissent.

<sup>272</sup> Kirigin et al. (2009), 149.

Figure 5 - Sailing routes in the Adriatic - Kirigin et al. (2009), 149




The same counterclockwise flow of traffic follows the ecological data (he indicates winds and currents on the maps below) and pilot manuals. His map more precisely follows the transit route through the archipelago from Dubrovnik to Monte Gargano. This route for crossing the Adriatic in either direction has the distinct advantage of visual navigation. The small island group, Palagruža, can be seen from Monte Gargano on a clear day. And from Palagruža, the islands en route to modern Vis are clearly visible. This kind of sight-line navigation makes crossing the sea less of a transadriatic journey and more of an island hop. As Christy Constantakopoulou argued in her important book on the Aegean islands and the impact of insularity, visual navigation links islands like these together into a broad network of accessible places, both far away, and isolated (“their islandness”), and close enough to see.<sup>273</sup> The island

<sup>273</sup> Constantakopoulou (2007), 20ff.



chain across the Adriatic certainly invokes separation and distinct insularity for each island or island group, but it also fosters a linkage through visual connection and ease of travel. In fact, as Kirigin and others have shown, those island chains have seen human traffic across the Adriatic for thousands of years.<sup>274</sup>

Figure 6 - Surface currents in the Adriatic - Kirigin et al. (2009), 146



One of the primary sources for Kirigin’s map was a modern navigation manual (pilot), and indeed his team makes assumptions about sailing patterns in the Adriatic that depend on little changing ecologically between the Paleolithic and the present day. Interestingly, in constructing their map, they also draw on a broad chronological range of Adriatic voyages attested in literature and interviews with traditional fisherman. This includes, for example, the

<sup>274</sup> Kirigin et al. (2009), Forenbahr (1999) and (2009a).

voyage of Pope Alexander III who, in 1177 had to wait a month on the Gargano Peninsula for a fair wind to sail to Venice at the head of the Adriatic (by way of modern Zadar). Finally finding a good wind, his party set out, but within 12 hours they were in serious trouble near the tiny island of Palagruža. The struggle against the Adriatic winds was so exhausting that when they finally anchored hours later alongside the island, the Pope broke lent to enjoy a large meal. When the wind finally turned in their favor, they made a quick job of the short trip to the next island in the chain of visible land masses from Monte Gargano to modern Zadar. Despite the short distance, it took 7 days of rowing for the Pope to travel from the Gargano Peninsula to Venice.<sup>275</sup>

Importantly, this harrowing journey took place in February and March. The Adriatic has a reputation for being unsafe to travel in the winter months generally thanks to its powerful and unpredictable winter winds.<sup>276</sup> The two unpredictable storm winds, Bora and Sirocco, can come up quite suddenly and with terrific speed. The former blows through the Alps and coats the Adriatic with ice, sometimes lasting for weeks. The latter comes from North Africa and raises gale-force storms lasting for days. Both occur most often in the winter. The force and danger of these winds in combination with the Adriatic's powerful currents—one old fisherman told the linguist J. Božanić he could be sitting in calm seas and unable to pull his nets out of the water because the currents were so strong—create established sailing routes that remain the same today.<sup>277</sup> This prompts Kirigin's team to broadly call these routes and the Adriatic sailing calendar unchanged for the last few millennia.<sup>278</sup>

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<sup>275</sup> Kirigin et al. (2009), 152.


<sup>276</sup> Cf. chapter one.

<sup>277</sup> Božanić (1996), 24, 49-52; cited by Kirigin et al. (2009), 151. Cf. McKinney (2007), 65ff.

<sup>278</sup> Kirigin et al. (2009), esp. 150.

Kozličić and Bratanić have produced their own maps of Adriatic trade patterns on similar models, drawn from ecological data about winds and currents and modern sailing guides.<sup>279</sup>

Figure 7 - Adriatic sailing routes - Kozličić and Bratanić (2006), 110-1



They boldly assert with Kirigin that these are unchanged from antiquity to the present.<sup>280</sup> Note that their sailing routes hug the shore more closely and penetrate much deeper into the northern Adriatic. Rather than depict the long-haul routes Kirigin focuses on, they plot journeys around the entire Adriatic basin. And the transadriatic crossings they highlight do not conform readily to the long-distance trade in Figure 4. One of the challenges of reconciling these maps and of portraying ancient maritime trade routes in general, is that these authors are really talking about two different modes of sailing.

Part of the puzzle of assembling ancient trade is the coexistence of two different sailing habits at any given time in the ancient world. Generally, maritime trade in the ancient

<sup>279</sup> Kozličić and Bratanić (2006), 110-1.

<sup>280</sup> Kozličić and Bratanić (2006), 110-1 where they label the left map “The cardinal Adriatic navigation route of sailing ships from ancient to modern times” and the right one “The most important routes of sailing ships from ancient to modern times.” Cf. Kozličić (2012).

Mediterranean flows around the sea in two interlocking patterns. On the one hand, long-haul freighters—large ships with a heavy capacity—move bulk shipments of grain and other staples across long distances under sail, making infrequent stops for resupply and weather and following long-established trade routes.<sup>281</sup> On the other hand, small, short-range vessels hopped from settlement to settlement making ad hoc trading ventures, which is to say they picked up whatever was for sale and traded it as they could along the coasts. These small operations, called cabotage, are largely invisible to the modern historian, but formed the backbone of the ancient economy.

Horde and Purcell put it this way:

The short hops and unpredictable experiences of *cabotage* are...the basic modality for all movements of goods and peoples in the Mediterranean before the age of steam. They united diplomats, warriors, pirates, pilgrims and traders in cargoes of all kinds, high- and low-value...we must not let the glitter of high commerce devalue these routines of ordinary redistribution. It is high commerce that has done most to promote the misleading dominance in Mediterranean economic history both of the defined trade route and of labeled resources – ‘resources’, that is, in the sense of the old cartography which marked ‘wool’, ‘horses’, ‘purple dye’, ‘furs’ over large tracts of land and ‘trade routes’ designated by arrows pointing away from them. Such specialized productions and movements...belong to a very distinctive segment of the whole phenomenon of redistribution – directed trade, to which we shall return.

In fact, the glamorous manifestations of high-prestige trade should generally be regarded as outgrowths from or intensifications of the routine patterns of redistribution.<sup>282</sup>

This essential commerce does not make it into the literary record nor does it leave behind substantial archaeological remains.<sup>283</sup> For example, most of the ancient shipwrecks uncovered thus far in the Mediterranean are of the long-haul variety.<sup>284</sup> But this constant current of small

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<sup>281</sup> Kirigin et al. (2009), 144-5 for ships taking grain to Athens and the problems. Cf. Braccisi (1977), Arnaud (2005) and (2006). Certainly by the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC Athens was importing sufficient amounts of grain through the Adriatic to require a colony, provided for in 325/4 BC and mentioned in the Athenian naval lists for that year, to protect the grain barges from interference. *IG II/III*<sup>3</sup> 1 1370 = *IG II*<sup>2</sup> 1629; *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 305; Tod (1946-8) 200. Most accessibly published as no. 100 in Rhodes and Osborne (2003).

<sup>282</sup> Horde and Purcell (2000), 365-6, see also 140-1.

<sup>283</sup> Tcherna (2016), 79-81 for an example of the problems of distinguishing primary and secondary cargoes or long-distance and cabotage trade.

<sup>284</sup> Summaries at Parker (1992), Gibbins (2001), Jurišić (2000), Morley (2007), Royal (2012), Bekić and Royal (2016). Cf. Bonifay (2017), 339ff.

ships moving throughout the Mediterranean basin—Braudel’s “proletarians of the sea”—connected places and people in a never ending flow of goods and information.

The Adriatic supported both kinds of trade routes. Large shipments of grain and luxury goods moved between mainland Greece and the Po River Valley throughout the 5th and 4th centuries BC, traversing much of the Adriatic with few stops.<sup>285</sup> But perhaps the largest flow of long-range transport occurred at the Strait of Otranto, the natural crossing point for all east-west trade in the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>286</sup> Arnaud has argued that some long-range ships traveled across the Ionian Sea directly, moving from Sicily to the Greek coast rather than up to Apulia and across the Strait.<sup>287</sup> But the Strait still moved significant numbers of vessels from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC. Alongside these bulk carriers swam smaller, swifter boats with all kinds of cargo, tramping from port to port. These cabotage traders moved wherever they could fit their ships, stopping in secure port cities like Apollonia, Issa, Aquileia, and Ancona, but also pulling into river ports along the Italian coast and the small harbor towns of Dalmatia. This less visible traffic carried goods around the Adriatic almost always in sight of land, hopping from island to island or river mouth to river mouth.<sup>288</sup>

It is this visual sailing that has emerged as an important point for cross-Adriatic trade as early as the Neolithic with the evidence at Palagruža.<sup>289</sup> With small vessels in mind and especially the strong and unpredictable winds of the Adriatic described in chapter one threatening to explode at any time, it is no wonder smaller ships preferred to stay in sight of land and navigate by shore and island landmarks. The short hops between islands on the eastern seaboard and the narrow width of the Adriatic throughout made sailing this space by vision

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<sup>285</sup> E.g. Kirigin et al. (2009), D’Ercole (2006) and (2015).

<sup>286</sup> Deniaux (2005). Cf. Marasco (1986), esp. 72-81; Arnaud (2005), 199ff; Uggieri (1988).

<sup>287</sup> Arnaud (2005), 174ff

<sup>288</sup> E.g. D’Ercole (2006), 92-4. Further discussion below.

<sup>289</sup> Kirigin et al. (2009) and Forenbahr (1999) and (2009a).

especially viable and contributed to the very early beginnings—and longevity—of transadriatic movement.

This, then, is the alternate form of sailing route in the Adriatic, hugging the coast rather than crossing the sea directly. I include below a map showing the cabotage route and highlighting stops along the Italian coast of the Adriatic. It comes from Mario Luni's study on the major port centers of Ancona and Numana to either side of Monte Cerano.<sup>290</sup> Luni is particularly interested here in pre-Roman Italy, though his map names many sites prominently settled by the Romans in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. Note how many stops there are for a ship moving up or down the Italian coast between Adria or Spina and Monte Gargano. In combination with other maps and studies we will see below,<sup>291</sup> this map shows a great many Italian ports. But this goes against the conventional wisdom.

The Italian coast of the Adriatic has often been called harborless (ἀλίμενος), as by Strabo.<sup>292</sup> Livy famously described it as *importuosa Italiae litora*, from which I derive the title of the chapter.<sup>293</sup> This phrase comes as Cleonymus of Sparta flees Apulia in 303/2 BC and heads up the Adriatic with his fleet. Livy presents a stark choice between the wild, fierce people of the eastern coast or the harborless expanse of the western.<sup>294</sup> The characterization has stuck, perhaps due to the high contrast between the Italian seaboard and its eastern opposite. Compared with the western shore, the northern bay of the Adriatic and certainly its eastern coastline teem with anchorages and harbors, many of them very large and secure. While the Italian side may have enough harbors as depicted in the map, many of them are river mouths or shallow lagoons and

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<sup>290</sup> Luni (2004); cf. Vermeulen (2017) on the same region.

<sup>291</sup> especially Arnaud (2006) and D'Ercole (2006).


<sup>292</sup> Strab. 7.5.10.

<sup>293</sup> Livy 10.2.4: for the fleet of Cleonymus of Sparta.

<sup>294</sup> Livy 10.2.4: *Circumvectus inde Brundisii promunturium medioque sinu Hadriatico ventis latus, cum laeva importuosa Italiae litora, dextra Illyrii Liburnique et Histri, gentes ferae et magna ex parte latrociniis maritimis infames, terrerent, penitus ad litora Venetorum pervenit*

not well suited to larger vessels or fleets. Nevertheless, one of the themes of the studies collected here will be that the Italian coast has been falsely maligned and in reality boasted many harbors in the form of river ecologies and bays which hosted passing ships of many sizes.

Figure 8 - Sailing routes of the preroman period - Luni (2004), 13



As part of a larger project to assemble trade routes through the Adriatic, Arnaud created a table of all the Adriatic ports on the Italian coast mentioned by Strabo and Pliny the Elder.<sup>295</sup> This useful dataset provides another departure point for mapping the Adriatic. We can add to it similar (though not as precise) projects by Pierre Cabanes, Nenad Cambi, and Robert Matijašić

<sup>295</sup> Arnaud (2005) and (2006). See map at the beginning of the dissertation.

to identify ports on the eastern Adriatic seaboard.<sup>296</sup> I combine these sites together into a useful map of port cities around the Adriatic at the beginning of the dissertation. Considering these data together shows possible stopping points for cabotage shipping in a variety of periods: a dataset such as this one is necessarily diachronic—some of these sites were not built up until after the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC. As will be seen throughout the chapter, there were plenty of stops for small vessels in any part of the Adriatic. Whether they visited many of them very often or at all must be discerned from other evidence.

To conclude, it is challenging to capture all of these things on a map! There are many dynamics at play: should we follow finds of material culture to trace trade routes or natural ecological rhythms or both? Do we think there is long-range trade involved or short, hopping cabotage (or both)? And behind these larger categories lurk other shifting forces that are dependent on the season and the weather. Trade routes shift from season to season with the winds. Maps are static, but clearly the Adriatic was not.

As we chase a conceptual map of movement and trade in the Adriatic from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC, we should keep a few things in mind. We have described here and in chapter one the ecological forces driving natural currents, winds, and patterns in the Adriatic. Within the constraints of those phenomena, it seems clear that both long-haul and cabotage trade existed side-by-side in the sea. With this background, the bulk of this dissertation chapter focuses on specific sets of evidence suggesting connections around and across the Adriatic that can be further mapped onto this growing image of linkages and trade. Each additional layer further clarifies the picture of how and to what degree people and goods moved about the Adriatic. As we explore some of the underlying datasets and assumptions through this chapter, we will pay

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<sup>296</sup> Cabanes (2001), Cambi (2001), and Matijašić (2001).



especially close attention to how these proposed trade networks, sailing routes, sites, and material evidence interact with their environment.<sup>297</sup>

## II. Commodities and Markers of Trade

### II.1 Fineware

At the very beginning of our period in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, Attic red figure pottery can be found all around the Adriatic basin in funerary contexts.<sup>298</sup> Maria D’Ercole tackled the evidence of prominent ceramic forms starting in the 8<sup>th</sup> century BC with Daunian pottery, in the 6<sup>th</sup> with Attic black figure, and then in the 5<sup>th</sup> with Attic red figure wares. This map shows the distribution of red figure pottery from the 6<sup>th</sup> to the 5<sup>th</sup> centuries BC, though these ceramics bleed down into the 4<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> centuries as well.<sup>299</sup> Note how thickly distributed the wares are along the Italian coast of the Adriatic both in the central Adriatic region and in Apulia.<sup>300</sup>

This even distribution along the Italian coast—which can also be seen on D’Ercole’s excellent maps of the earlier pottery types not included here—goes toward the primary thrust of her article: despite a long tradition in the archaeological discussions of the Adriatic coasts of insisting that Greek mariners always sailed up the Croatian coast and crossed to the Italian side of the Adriatic in the northern half of the sea (from modern Zadar to Ancona), D’Ercole argues that there were many more ports on the Italian side than previously recognized and that ceramic evidence should bear out their frequent use. These ports, as we have seen above, come in the form of river mouths—especially the Biferno, Fortore, and Ofanto—and the gulfs and lagoons


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<sup>297</sup> Thonemann (2011), xiiff.

<sup>298</sup> On Athenian red figure pottery in general, Boardman (1975) and (1989). Cf. Schierup and Sabetai (2014).

<sup>299</sup> D’Ercole (2006).

<sup>300</sup> D’Ercole (2006), 100.



anciently open to the sea which have since closed off, as the Gulf of Varano, now a lake but open to the sea and used as a port into the 16<sup>th</sup> century AD.<sup>301</sup>


This bucks the established trend of, especially, Braccesi, whose 1977 book *Grecità Adriatica* opened up the field of study.<sup>302</sup> His influential map of the Athenian trade route to the northeastern Adriatic has those merchants following the eastern coastline of the Adriatic to Iader

<sup>301</sup> D'Ercole (2006), 92-4. For the hydrography of this part of Italy, Alfieri (1949), (1975), and (1981) and Luni (1995) and (1999). For these rivers as ports, see Plin. *HN* 3.103 on the Fortore, and Strab. 6.3.9 on the Ofanto (Aufidus), which had a reputation that can be seen in, e.g. Polyb. 3.110.8-9 and in Horace's *Odes*: 3.30.10, 4.9.2, 4.14.25. On the Gulf of Varano, Plin. *HN* 3.103, Strab. 6.3.11, Pompon. 2.4.66.

<sup>302</sup> Braccesi (1977) is actually the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition reflecting changes and new evidence, the 1<sup>st</sup> having been published in 1971.

(modern Zadar, Croatia) before crossing to Ancona and Numana on either side of Monte Conero and then continuing north to Spina and Adria.<sup>303</sup> The map is included below.

Figure 10 - Route of Athenian merchants to the Po Delta - Braccesi (1977), 368



As D’Ercole explains, the problem with this model is that it does not explain how so many Attic vases made it to the parts of Italy apparently skipped over entirely by Greek vessels: “Sulla base di tali premesse, i vasi greci ritrovati sulle coste medio-adriatiche, tra le Marche e gli Abruzzi, sono stati sistematicamente considerati il prodotto di una redistribuzione proveniente dall’entroterra.”<sup>304</sup> While overland transport could certainly account for some redistribution, the

<sup>303</sup> Braccesi (1977), 368 for the map, 71 ff for explanation

<sup>304</sup> D’Ercole (2006), 91 with a long footnote (10) citing examples of scholars who follow this line of thinking.

assumption that vessels did not visit the *importuosa Italiae litora* reveals the long-standing strength of that image in Livy and Strabo despite ongoing archaeological work on the riverine ports of the central and southern Italian coast.


These two lines of thinking reinforce the importance of the Adriatic ecology for understanding movement and trade in the basin. If one ignores the riverine ports of Italy and the natural currents and wind patterns of the sea, it is easy to assume travel happens along the paths Braccesi outlines. But with the river mouths taken into account and a larger picture of natural rhythms in that space through studies like Poulin's tracking broader movement trends, it is possible to see wider-reaching trade patterns including these not-so-*importuosa* stretches of the Italian coast.

D'Ercole's map of Attic red figure wares spread all over the Adriatic demonstrates a high degree of connectivity to the end of the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC, but her data falls off just as we get into our period. Maurizio Landolfi has collected information on locally made red figure wares that carry the tradition down into the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. His map, shown here, clusters around Monte Cerrano.<sup>305</sup>

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<sup>305</sup> Landolfi (2000), 119.

Figure 11 - Distribution of red figure pottery - Landolfi (2000), 119




This is naturally due to the body of evidence he draws on, focusing on Numana and Ancona and their surrounds. He does pick up a few outliers in the process, but this is by no means a comprehensive study of local red figure production. Landolfi emphasizes the role of Numana (where he knows the evidence best) and references production as far away as the Albanian coast at Epidamnos/Dyrrhachium (modern Durrës).<sup>306</sup> This map shows a very local distribution around Ancona/Numana and scattered influence elsewhere, but what it drives home for the argument of Adriatic connectedness is a profusion of styles and influences that drives local craftsmen and production long after the imports of such items from places like Athens have stopped. In other

<sup>306</sup> Cf. D'Andria (1986), Landolfi (1997), and Davis et al. (2003).

words, the flow of people and goods around the Adriatic drives tastes and markets that reach many places along the coast beyond the traditional landing zones for, say, Attic goods.

These kinds of local studies may not project a broad view of the Adriatic in themselves, but in conjunction they do paint a picture of the whole basin. For example, this map of Attic black and red figure vases at the head of the Adriatic shows distribution along the coast and inland by means of the waterways.<sup>307</sup>

Figure 12 - Athenian black (circles) and red (squares) pottery - Milhovilić (2004), 116



Drawing on Croatian publications over the last 40 years, Mihovilić points to Attic production for many of these vases into the 4<sup>th</sup> century and a transition to Adriatic workshops, especially in Apulia. Her dataset for red figure (in our period) comes from Ossero, Veglia, Kaštelina-Lopar, Nesazio (the work she knows best), Rovigno, Parenzo, S. Martino di Torre, Altino, Oderzo,

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<sup>307</sup> Mihovilić (2004), 116.

Koritnica, Stična, and Novo mesto. All of these represent sites in the northern Adriatic hinterland with published sets of Attic wares (of varying degrees of completion).<sup>308</sup>


A similar map by Katia Mannino lays out evidence for Attic ceramics at the other end of the Adriatic Sea on the Italian peninsula south of Monte Gargano.<sup>309</sup>

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<sup>308</sup> Mihovilić (2004), 120-1 for the bibliography for each site. Note that Nesazio which she emphasizes throughout the article comes from her own work, Mihovilić (1996).

<sup>309</sup> Mannino (2004), 334.

Figure 13 - Distribution of Attic pottery in the classical period - Mannino (2004), 334



Mannino sets out to show, much as D'Ercole above, that the rest of the Italian peninsula participated in exchange with Athens and the Strait of Otranto alongside the major centers in the Po Valley and off Monte Conero. While she emphasizes in her review of ceramic evidence from this area that Attic imports peak in the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC, she also notes that the same sorts of items



persist in local imitations thereafter, with this transition occurring at the end of the 5<sup>th</sup> and beginning of the 4<sup>th</sup> centuries BC.

In contrast to these two localized—albeit in large regions—studies, Filippo Giudice analyzed an odd dataset for Attic ceramics throughout the Adriatic with a view to suggesting new trade routes along the Italian coast.<sup>310</sup> The dataset comes from the catalogues of Attic painters assembled by John Davidson Beazley and published originally in German in 1925. Giudice and his team assembled data on the distribution of Attic wares from the various volumes published by Beazley.<sup>311</sup> In addition to these data points, they added information on a selection of sites around the basin. This is explicitly an attempt to be complete: “Nella presente appendice sono elencati, in ordine alfabetico, tutti i centri afferenti al mare Adriatico che hanno restituito ceramica attica figurata. È contemplato esclusivamente il materiale pubblicato e per il quale è stato possibile dare una proposta di inquadramento cronologico.”<sup>312</sup> Therein lies the rub. So little of the material has been published—though Attic red and black-figure vases fare better than anything else—and in contexts that can be dated as to represent only a small percentage of the potentially available evidence.

Nevertheless, works like Giudice’s represent a step forward in viewing the Adriatic as a whole space of interaction, even if as a receptor for Attic culture and commerce. Giudice spends a great deal of his article worrying over possible trade routes that would include the oft-maligned *importuosa Italiae litora* rather than skipping it in favor of the Zadar-Ancona crossing preferred by Braccisi and his followers. As we have seen, the question of Adriatic trade routes leaving most of the Italian coast unvisited has been settled in the decade and a half since this article was published. But Giudice was on the right track. And this kind of big data assemblage—

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<sup>310</sup> Giudice (2004).

<sup>311</sup> Beazley (1956), (1963), and (1971).

<sup>312</sup> Giudice (2004), 194ff.

increasingly popular on many fronts in the ancient world—will become more and more viable as greater numbers of finds are properly published and within acceptable chronologies.<sup>313</sup>

All of these studies of black and red-figure Attic pottery, however, only touch briefly on the beginnings of our period. It is really at the beginning of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC that the decline of these imports concludes and local production replaces that traffic. Studies of other types of ceramic evidence can fill the gap between these popular pots in the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> centuries and the large amphorae which only pick up speed at the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC.


For example, Paola Maggi and Renata Merlatti study patterns of trade at the head of the Adriatic through the spread of fine wares, especially black-glazed pottery, from the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC onward. Their map, reproduced here, shows sites they examine in their essay.<sup>314</sup>

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<sup>313</sup> On this push toward quantification and big data, e.g. Davies (2001), 15ff and Bowman and Wilson (2009).

<sup>314</sup> Maggi and Merlatti (2015), 436.

Figure 14 - Black-glazed pottery sites - Maggi and Merlatti (2015), 436



The challenge, as always, is what evidence is available. As they point out, finds of black-glazed wares in the northern Adriatic at Aquileia dominate the data at the rate of, for example, 3,114 specimens to 7 found at Trieste, 20 at Concordia, or 45 at Padova.<sup>315</sup> If one assumed that these represented real trade practice and not the state of publication of these potsherds, the results could be heavily skewed. Importantly, the large number of finds at Aquileia and their state of publication allow us to see that these specimens come from all over the Adriatic: western Italy (61.9%), Etruria (26.1%), Campania (3.8%), Sicily (1.8%), and from the central Adriatic (very few of these, only 0.3%). The vast majority were made along the west coast of Italy and reflect the high degree of connectivity along that coast where, thanks to the important port of Aquileia, we can assume the connections were in some part maritime and not simply overland.

<sup>315</sup> Maggi and Merlatti (2015), 438: as many as 48 at Sermino, 175 at Altino, and 500 at Sevegliano.


Maggi and Merlatti highlight other imports in the northern Adriatic which reflect connections outside the basin, as with Megarian ware of the Attic and Ionic-Ephesus styles (mid 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC) and Ephesian ware toward the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC. These last two styles appear to penetrate deeper into the hinterland of the northern Adriatic as communication networks develop in the Augustan period, with finds at Magdalensberg, for example. While limited to the head of the Adriatic, this kind of study fleshes out a larger picture of trade at these port sites and, importantly, emphasizes the problems of datasets and source material. Until more information is available, these kinds of studies will be consistently skewed toward the best published areas.

Maggi's previous work focused on terra sigillata, especially imports from the eastern Mediterranean.<sup>316</sup> While this evidence stretches into the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries AD, Eastern Sigillata A and B wares begin showing up in the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC at the very end of our period. This map shows their distribution in the northeastern Adriatic.

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<sup>316</sup> Maggi (2006).

Figure 15 - Distribution of ESB A (white) and B (black) - Maggi (2006), 180




This distribution suggests both strong connections to the eastern Mediterranean and trade patterns that hug the entire coastline rather than those that cut across the Adriatic at the Zadar-Ancona line to bypass the northeastern corridor. Naturally, this map reflects late evidence in a period when Roman control was being consolidated in this region and accompanied by settlements along these very coastlines.<sup>317</sup> But perhaps these patterns are reflective of earlier practice as well.

This eastern coastline of the Adriatic has received increasing amounts of archaeological attention and attempts to deal with the ceramic evidence as well. As Lucijana Šešelj and Mato Ilkić point out in their recent article, there has been no effort to study systematically the ceramic

<sup>317</sup> Dzino (2010), 80ff. Cf. Čače and Milivojević (2017).

evidence currently housed in Croatia until very recently, none of which has been published.<sup>318</sup> They do note that a preliminary report has been published for Dalmatia in the form of the ongoing Adriatic Islands Projects volumes and now the Festschrift for John Wilkes.<sup>319</sup> They point to some recent PhD projects, especially their own, as attempts to deal with this body of data. But ultimately the data for their article and the sites listed below, come from a scattering of the little that is published and available: an exhibition catalogue, preliminary excavation reports, and a few unpublished excavations. They add data from Zadar, Nadin, and Lergova gradina near Zadar.

Figure 16 - Hellenistic pottery in Liburnia - Šešelj and Ilkić (2015), 422



These sites revealed Hellenistic pottery, especially gnathia ware and relief pottery, some representing imports and the majority local imitations. Again, this is only a local study and one based on very little available evidence, but when it shares the stage with these other local studies, together they portray a diachronic picture of the Adriatic as a continuously linked space around all of its shorelines.

In the same vein as Šešelj and Ilkić, an

<sup>318</sup> Šešelj and Ilkić (2015).

<sup>319</sup> Gaffney et al. (1997), Stančić et al. (1999), Kirigin et al. (2006), and Davison et al. (2006).

international team recently studied Hellenistic pottery from three sites on the Dalmatian coast: Resnik, Cape Ploča, and the island of Issa.<sup>320</sup> By archaeometric analyses including microscopy, inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry, x-ray diffraction, scanning electron microscopy, and electron microprobe analysis, the researchers demonstrated distinct differences in the compositional materials of the samples and in the methods of their production.<sup>321</sup> Their conclusions, certainly not iron-clad but supported by their work just the same, are that the material from Resnik and Cape Ploča were produced locally. In the latter case, workshops near the cape provided the pottery which sailors left there as part of the cult of Diomedes associated with the site (more on that below).<sup>322</sup> At Issa, the material was different enough and the quality of workmanship superior to such a degree as to suggest an independent and more advanced workshop on the island. These kinds of archaeometric studies show great promise in dealing systematically with the massive quantities of data still unorganized at dig sites and in archives all around the Adriatic. But, they are limited by the narrow differences in clay types and geology around the basin: it is difficult to distinguish with a strong degree of certainty between pots made from clay on one side of the Adriatic and the other.<sup>323</sup>

By far the largest study of Hellenistic pottery in the Adriatic to date is that of Zdenko Brusić and limited to Liburnia, the northeastern Adriatic.<sup>324</sup> In a well-organized and comprehensive study of all finds from the Hellenistic period into the Roman Empire, Brusić identifies finds sites and characteristics of imported pottery as it is available in the published

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<sup>320</sup> Šegvić et al. (2012). The most important conclusion of the study is solid evidence that Hellenistic tableware was produced locally, something long denied by other Croatian scholars who insist that everything was imported from the nearby Hellenistic cities. E.g. Batović (2005) and Lisičar (1975).

<sup>321</sup> Šegvić et al. (2012), 67ff for tests.


<sup>322</sup> Kirigin and Čače (1998); Čače and Šešelj (2004); Čašule (2011).

<sup>323</sup> Carre, Monsieur, and Mattioli (2014), 419 on amphorae specifically: “we have long had difficulty extracting clear information from archaeometric analysis due to the homogeneity of Adriatic clays, which makes a determination of the origins of the amphorae very complicated.” See page 425-6 also.

<sup>324</sup> Brusić (1999)

record. Many of these are in small quantities, as the 3 graves at Dragišić (out of 26 excavated) that contained Hellenistic relief pottery or the many finds at nearby Mrdakovica.<sup>325</sup> Both, as Brusić explains, are near the river Krka which is navigable to this point and were linked by it with the sea. His map of Hellenistic relief pottery follows here.

Figure 17 - Distribution of Hellenistic relief pottery - Brusić (1999), 6



While it is not reflected well in the map, he shows this pottery scattered south of Liburnia into Dalmatia as well and on the islands of Pharos, Vis, Šćedro, and Lastovo as well as underwater sites nearby.<sup>326</sup> Indeed, Brusić references these vessels scattered all over the Adriatic along the

<sup>325</sup> Brusić (1999), 9 with bibliography.

<sup>326</sup> Brusić (1999), 10-2.



whole length of both coasts and at its head. He notes that many of these vessels would have come from a production site on Vis (Issa) and perhaps (he argues) Resnik and Iader. The latter two have been tentatively identified as production sites due to the presence of moulds found in both places.<sup>327</sup> He also studies later types in his 1999 book, including terra sigillata, relief glazed pottery, and pots from workshops in Asia Minor, Cnidos, and North Africa, though many from beyond our period.

While the data is spotty and many areas have not been published, Brusić presents a catalogue of the specimens he mentions in his study, gathering them altogether under one roof—something which may not be possible for much longer as excavations continue and more reports and catalogues appear. While nominally limited to one part of the Adriatic, Brusić's study shows the degree to which the coastlines are connected throughout the Hellenistic period as wares make their way from east to west and up and down the now Croatian shoreline.

These various studies, taken separately, show a single picture of movement and trade around the Adriatic at a specific point in time or over a small range. But taken together, they tell a broader story: at the beginning of our period in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, imports of Attic ceramics were tapering off around the Adriatic and—with demand still in place for these types—local production began to fill the void along the Apulian coast and opposite in Dalmatia. Hellenistic relief wares, gnathia ware, and other types produced in Apulia and in Dalmatian workshops made their way around the Adriatic in increasing numbers. Black-glazed ware appeared in huge quantities from the 4<sup>th</sup> century onward at every port along the coast—even if we have not found it everywhere yet. And as these fine wares continued to be produced and moved around the Adriatic, the large trade amphorae began to appear more consistently as the economic production of areas like the Po Valley, Apulia, and especially Istria picked up steam. As we are about to see,

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<sup>327</sup> Brusić (1999), 14-15.

the early Dressel forms coexisted alongside early Italic forms until the Lamboglia 2s began to dominate the Adriatic in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC. Thousands upon thousands of these shipping containers made their way around the sea and across it for a century and a half before being slowly phased out for their very similar offspring, the Dressel 6. Wine and oil—but also grains and fish products and ballast—were packed into and out of these amphorae heading from the Adriatic to the rest of the Mediterranean (or within its own shores) and back. We leave the story as the shift to Dressel 6s takes firm hold and administrative changes in the emerging Roman Empire drastically alter the political landscape of the Mediterranean world.

## II.2. Amphorae

Amphorae are one of the best proxies for movement and trade in the ancient world.<sup>328</sup> Omnipresent, these large, ovoid pottery containers carried many kinds of goods from port to port and sometimes ballast on the return journey. They can be difficult to break, which makes them ideal for secondary uses such as extended drainage systems under the soil (see below).<sup>329</sup> The various shapes and sizes of amphorae have been ordered into an accepted chronology which helps to date finds all over the Mediterranean basin; and stamps sometimes identify workshops and production centers.<sup>330</sup> Indeed, our ending point for this study, while tied to political and administrative changes throughout the Adriatic region, also coincides with the important shift to the Dressel 6 amphorae which herald the coming of the Roman Empire.<sup>331</sup>

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<sup>328</sup> Bonifay (2017), 327: Despite the reticence of some historians and archaeologists, it has become more and more commonplace to use pottery as an indicator for measuring the directions, nature, and intensity of trade in classical antiquity... Just as it is impossible to ignore literary sources, it would be unwise to do without the pottery evidence for the reason that, as John Lund reminded us in 2006 (quoting the Danish novelist Thorkild Hansen): ‘History is old and avaricious. In one hand it holds millions of nameless destinies and with the other hand, it passes us a potsherd.’ Lund (2006).

<sup>329</sup> Auriemma and Degrassi (2015) and below.

<sup>330</sup> E.g. outline of types at Loughton (2003). Cf. Peacock and Williams (1986) and Eiring and Lund (2004).

<sup>331</sup> On the amphorae in general and for bibliography, Lindhagen (2009).

The most important amphorae in the Adriatic from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC are, above all, the Greco-Italic and Lamboglia 2 types originating in the Adriatic and carrying mostly wine and oil. Greco-Italic amphorae are pear-shaped vessels with slender bases and flaring rims.<sup>332</sup> A picture on the bottom left of figure 18 gives a general idea. These Greco-Italic types appear in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC and stick around until the late 1<sup>st</sup> century BC. Similar in shape, the taller, thinner Dressel 1 amphorae (not pictured) have been subdivided into many categories based on rim, shoulder, and base shapes.<sup>333</sup> These Dressel 1 amphorae appear as early as 150 BC and as late as 10 BC.<sup>334</sup> But, as ubiquitous as they are in the western Mediterranean—numbering in the tens of millions—they do not appear in the Adriatic outside a few isolated examples.<sup>335</sup> Rather, the bag-shaped, stubby Lamboglia 2 (pictured in figure 18) is far and away the most common amphora found in the Adriatic before the 1<sup>st</sup> century AD and is generally believed to have been produced along the Adriatic coast.<sup>336</sup> These Lamboglia 2 amphorae serve as a useful proxy for movement in their heyday from the mid 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC to the late 1<sup>st</sup> century BC. In the late 1<sup>st</sup> century BC, the Lamboglia 2 gives way to the very similar Dressel 6A, the characteristic amphora of the Augustan age.<sup>337</sup>

Rita Auriemma and Valentina Degrassi recently published an excellent study drawing on finds from all over the Adriatic to demonstrate the range of movement and trade identifiable through amphorae, especially these Lamboglia 2 types.<sup>338</sup> These two maps here demonstrate the

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<sup>332</sup> Loughton (2003), 179-80; Will (1982).

<sup>333</sup> Loughton (2003), 179ff; Peacock and Williams (1986); Guichard (1997).

<sup>334</sup> Hesnard (1990), 51 for early date; Desbat (1998) and Sealey (1985), 26 for later.

<sup>335</sup> Morel (2007), 506-7.

<sup>336</sup> Jurišić (2000), 6 who claims that every second amphora found in the Adriatic is a Lamboglia 2; cf. Auriemma and Degrassi (2015), Loughton (2003), 183; Cipriano and Carre (1989), 80-2; Désy (1989), 10ff. On production, see Lindhagen (2009) who proposes that Lamboglia 2s were manufactured on the Dalmatia coast and the fierce rebuttal of Carre, Monsieur, and Pesavento Mattioli (2014).

<sup>337</sup> Jurišić (2000), 11-12; cf. Peacock and Williams (1986) and Cipriano and Carre (1989).

<sup>338</sup> Auriemma and Degrassi (2015).

range of identified production sites all around the Adriatic for seven types of amphorae utilized from the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC to the 1<sup>st</sup> century AD.<sup>339</sup> The additional types not already mentioned are the often overlooked ovoid amphorae (2<sup>nd</sup> to 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC, used for oil in western Italy), Brindisi amphorae (2<sup>nd</sup> to 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC in small numbers from Brundisium), Dressel 2/4 (extremely common wine amphora in the early empire, very late 1<sup>st</sup> century BC to 2<sup>nd</sup> century AD), and Dressel 6B (subset of Dressel 6 produced in Istria, late 1<sup>st</sup> century BC).<sup>340</sup> On the maps, note the connection in the earlier period between similar productions on the Picene coast and the Dalmatian islands opposite, two parts of the Adriatic closely linked through the trade routes explored above.

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<sup>339</sup> Auriemma and Degrassi (2015), 454, 456.

<sup>340</sup> Loughton (2003), 184ff. For ovoid: Olmer (1997), Hesnard et al. (1989); for Brindisi: Palazzo (1989), Cipriano and Carre (1989); for Dressel 2/4: Grace (1979), Tchernia (1986), 128, Jurišić (2000), 12-14; for Dressel 6B: Starac (1995) and (1997).





Figure 18 - Areas of amphora production 2nd to 1st centuries BC: phase 1 above, phase 2 below - Auriemma and Degrassi (2015), 454-6



Auriemma and Degrassi take notice at the outset of what we will see repeatedly throughout this dissertation, namely that the levels of available, published evidence vary a great deal from region to region. In this case, they identify areas with particularly rich evidence in Apulia, at the head of the Adriatic, and along the Croatian coast.<sup>341</sup> For example, they highlight a significant wreck off the coast of Vis at Velo Svitnja where some 634 amphorae—all but two identified as the Lamboglia 2 type—have been recovered and studied with stamps tying them to Apulia.<sup>342</sup> This puts the wreck between the mid 2<sup>nd</sup> and late 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC. The cargo of Apulian amphorae uncovered off the Dalmatian coast suggests trade links between those two areas in the Adriatic

The authors engage further with various other types of amphorae utilized in the Adriatic from the 2<sup>nd</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC, noting details about each one on the map with special attention to production centers. They note too amphorae coming from outside the Adriatic, as the Dressel 1 and 2/4s (few and far between),<sup>343</sup> Dressel 7-10s (Spanish amphorae from perhaps as early as late 1<sup>st</sup> BC and into 1<sup>st</sup> AD) from Baetica at Potenza,<sup>344</sup> and from Rhodes throughout the Adriatic (especially in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC).<sup>345</sup> But the meat of their presentation comes in the sites of mixed amphora types they highlight around the Adriatic basin demonstrating the strong links binding the sea together. For example, they examine the terrific amphora drainages,

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<sup>341</sup> Auriemma and Degrassi (2015), 453.

<sup>342</sup> Auriemma and Degrassi (2015), 457; Kirigin et al. (2006), 77 (no. 1509). Cf. Cambi (1989).

<sup>343</sup> Auriemma and Degrassi (2015), 465.

<sup>344</sup> Monsier and Verreyke (2007); on Dressel 7-10s, Jurišić (2000), 14-15 for the shipwreck of Paržani containing these rare amphorae.

<sup>345</sup> Auriemma and Degrassi (2015), 466-7.

especially Sevegliano, which has not been published.<sup>346</sup> Here at the head of the Adriatic, a few miles from Aquileia, a farmer has recycled amphorae and used them as a substrate layer below the soil in a particularly wet—and therefore difficult to farm—stretch of ground. The effect of the ceramic layer is to lower the water table, thus draining the soil for increased productivity.<sup>347</sup> At Sevegliano, the drained portion of the field measures some 50m<sup>2</sup> and contains over 100 amphorae. Of the 40 identified, 60% are Lamboglia 2s, 23% Lamboglia 2s transitioning to Dressel 6As, and the remaining 17% are Dressel 6As. The mix of amphorae suggests a 1<sup>st</sup> century BC context for the drainage project and a ready availability of discarded amphorae from nearby Aquileia. Other sites in the region include Sveti Teodor near Pola, where over 2,000 amphora were recovered, almost all in this transitional period between Lamboglia 2s and Dressel 6As (1<sup>st</sup> century BC).<sup>348</sup> These drainage projects present an interesting intersection between local ecological needs—wet soil not ideal for certain crops—and the detritus (we might call proxies) of trade. Thanks to thriving networks of contact around the Adriatic and with the outside world, plenty of transport vessels could be recycled to increase agricultural performance.

Another great example of these amphorae showing the trade patterns of the Adriatic comes at Torre S. Sabina just north of Brundisium. The site, which Auriemma and Degrassi have studied extensively, boasts wrecks and various finds of port activity, especially in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC, in what used to be an accessible harbor. Large amounts of Lamboglia 2 amphorae

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<sup>346</sup> Auriemma and Degrassi (2015), 468; on drainages in general, Lindhagen (2009).

<sup>347</sup> Similar procedures, though not with ceramic tiles, are used by farmers (including on my family's farm in western New York) today. Pliny the Elder describes them at *HN* 18.8.47: *umidiorem agrum fossis concidi atque siccare utilissimum est, fossas autem cretosis locis apertas relinqui, in solutiore terra saepibus firmari vel proclivibus ac supinis lateribus procumbere; quasdam obcaecari et in alias dirigi maiores patientioresque et, si sit occasio, silice vel glarea sterni, ora autem earum binis utrimque lapidibus statuminari et alio superintegi*. Cf. Cato *Agr.* 155.

<sup>348</sup> Starac (2008) and (2009). Further sites, especially in the northern Adriatic, as at Friuli, Veneto, and Emilia Romagna. On which, Auriemma and Degrassi (2015), 468-9; Pesavento Mattioli (1992); Lindhagen (2009).

from the area around Brundisium mix in these finds with Dressel 6As, ovoid oil amphorae, and vessels from Rhodes, Kos, Knidos, North Africa, and the Tyrrhenian coast.<sup>349</sup> As Auriemma and Degrassi argue, these cargoes represent the terrific quantities of trade crossing the Strait of Otranto to Brundisium and then being redistributed along the Adriatic coasts.<sup>350</sup> They posit the long Italian coast as the destination for most of this, deliberately contradicting Livy's *importuosa Italiae litora*.<sup>351</sup> Like the mixed finds at Aquileia or Ancona, the sheer quantity and diversity of amphora fragments at these sites demonstrate the degree to which the Adriatic was connected within its own waters and to the rest of the Mediterranean, from Baetican oil to Rhodian stamped vessels. All of it flowed through the Strait and into the Adriatic.

Amphorae certainly give a broad picture of movement and trade in the Adriatic, but the publication of evidence is uneven and the data has not been made available to do a complete study of all the amphorae of the Adriatic even of a single type. Further, this evidence clusters at the end of our period and picks up with the major production of large-scale agriculture, specifically wine and oil, thus privileging those parts of the Adriatic which see the capital investment necessary to create successful grape and olive plantings and processing facilities—mainly Istria. Nevertheless, finds of amphorae—in harbors or settlement context or as drainage substrate in a field—demonstrate a level of connectivity and engagement within the Adriatic and with the larger Mediterranean world.

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<sup>349</sup> Auriemma and Degrassi (2015), 469-71.

<sup>350</sup> And into the hinterland. As Verena Vidrih Perko notes, these amphorae show up deep in the karst hinterland of the northern Adriatic throughout the Istrian peninsula and along the amber route, carried up the navigable rivers even as early as the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC. As the northern Adriatic becomes increasingly developed in the imperial period—especially with significant capital investment in the great estates of Istria and viticulture—the later amphorae are easier to track through this region and along the river system to the *limes*. Vidrih Perko (2006), 210-11.

<sup>351</sup> Livy 10.4.



Closely related to ceramic proxies for movement and trade are the hundreds of shipwrecks leveraged by archaeologists and historians to demonstrate trade patterns in the ancient world.<sup>352</sup> The Adriatic certainly has its fair share across many time periods and carrying all kinds of cargoes, though frequently dominated by Lamboglia 2 and Dressel 6 amphorae. The now famous graph of Parker showing shipwrecks in the ancient Mediterranean growing steadily through the first millennium BC and peaking in the early imperial period has been disputed on various grounds.<sup>353</sup> André Tchernia has criticized the continual reproduction of that graph, asserting that it is misleading. If broken down by half centuries or adjusted for the accuracy of dated shipwrecks (as Andrew Wilson recently did), a different picture appears entirely.<sup>354</sup> Instead of an even rise to the turn of the millennium and a slow decline, the highest peak is in the early 1<sup>st</sup> century BC, after which the numbers fall off considerably and, though they rise thereafter, do not reach that same level again. Tchernia posits that this has to do with changing needs for the kinds of ships we see wrecked in the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC—mainly transportation of oil and wine—as the burgeoning empire shifts demographics and administrative control. Specifically, he argues that the conquering of Gaul and the end of the slave market on Delos heralded the end of the boom in wine and oil trade along traditional routes in Dressel 1s and Lamboglia 2s.<sup>355</sup> Whether or not that is the case, the numbers certainly peak during 2<sup>nd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC when large quantities of both commodities are leaving and entering the Adriatic Sea.

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<sup>352</sup> E.g. Parker (1992), Horden and Purcell (2000), 368ff, chapters in Robinson and Wilson (2011), Kay (2014), Bonifay (2017)

<sup>353</sup> Parker (1992), figure 3. Cf. Gibbins (2001)

<sup>354</sup> Tchernia (2016), 117. Reproduced e.g. Gibbins (2001), De Callataÿ (2005), Morley (2007), 572, and Jongman (2007).

<sup>355</sup> Tchernia (2016), 120-1.

Shipwreck data has been collected for the Adriatic by several scholars, most notably Mario Jurišić, whose 2000 publication catalogued all known Adriatic wrecks to that date.<sup>356</sup> He divides his maps up, interestingly, by amphora type so that he includes, for example, a separate map each for all wrecks with Punic, Etruscan, Chian, and Rhodian amphorae, among others. Few of these types show any presence in the Adriatic until the Dressel 1s (a single wreck) and then the Graeco-Italic types. I include here his map of the latter first and then of Lamboglia 2s, which practically obscures the sea.

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<sup>356</sup> Jurišić (2000); now also Royal (2012) and Bekić and Royal (2016).

Figure 19 - Distribution of Greco-Italic amphora cargoes 4th-2nd centuries BC - Jurišić (2000), 104





Figure 20 - Distribution of Lamboglia 2 amphora cargoes - Jurišić (2000), 105

Jurišić asserts that the Graeco-Italian amphorae were produced along the Italian seaboard and at Vis during the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries BC and dominated the central Mediterranean. Famous cargoes include some 600 at Vela Svitnja.<sup>357</sup> The transition to Lamboglia 2s in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century can be tracked in changing shapes at several wrecks. The latter form appears in some 30 shipwrecks in the Adriatic. They were produced in Apulia and transported mainly wine from the Adriatic to the rest of the Mediterranean.<sup>358</sup> The sharp division between Lamboglia 2s in the Adriatic and Dressel 1s to its west is emphasized by the exception: Jurišić knows only one shipwreck in the Adriatic that has produced any Dressel 1s, at Palagruža.<sup>359</sup> A few more have been uncovered in the years since.<sup>360</sup>

The wrecks emphasized by Jurišić cluster along the Croatian coast, the evidence he knows best. Note in his map of Lamboglia 2s that some wrecks hug the Apulian coast and then more appear off Monte Gargano. This shows once again the presence of trade along these routes of the allegedly barren Italian coast, though these also cluster around Brundisium and then Monte Conero and its harbors of Ancona and Numana.

A similar pattern of wrecks on the Italian coast has been presented by Auriemma in a study of those in the western Adriatic explicitly. Like Brusic's work above, this represents a good step toward the kind of systematic study she says has not been conducted to date.<sup>361</sup> I include her map here. The numbers relate to sites she mentions in the text.

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<sup>357</sup> Jurišić (2000), 5-6 with bibliography.


<sup>358</sup> Loughton (2003); Cipriano and Carre (1989); Lindhagen (2009); Carre, Monsieur, and Pesavento Mattioli (2014).

<sup>359</sup> Jurišić (2000), 6; Orlić and Jurišić (1989); Radić (1991).

<sup>360</sup> Auriemma and Degrassi (2015), 465; e.g. Cipriano (2003).

<sup>361</sup> Auriemma (2006)

Figure 21 - Map of shipwrecks in Auriemma (2006), 168



Note how almost no wrecks have been found along the now familiar *importuosa Italiae litora* between Monte Conero and Monte Gargano.<sup>362</sup> Wrecks 6 (Punta del Vapore off Tremiti Island) and 10 (Tre Senghe off the same) just north of Gargano both date to the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC. The latter is an especially rich archaeological discovery and contains almost a thousand amphorae of both Lamboglia 2 and Dressel 6, marking the transitional period. Many of these are still sealed,

<sup>362</sup> Livy 10.2.

and stamps allow them to be dated to the last decade of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC.<sup>363</sup> These cargoes sit along the proposed route through Palagruža for lateral crossings of the Adriatic and suggest that, even if there are no other remains between them and Monte Conero, ships passed that way.

Auriemma highlights one of the most famous Adriatic underwater sites, the Grado wreck which made the news earlier this decade when researchers proposed that lead pipes and unusual structures on the boat were a system for transporting live fish.<sup>364</sup> The wreck dates to the early 2<sup>nd</sup> century AD and well outside our period. But one of its most interesting facets applies as well to the earlier centuries as later. As Auriemma points out, the amphora on board were being reused to ship fish products and had been fitted with lids made out of pieces of other amphorae:

E' possibile quindi immaginare flussi di importazioni dal Mediterraneo orientale e occidentale che risalgono distintamente l'Adriatico e sbarcano in un grande nodo di redistribuzione (*Aquileia?*); le afore, una volta svuotate del contenuto originario, sono state 'stoccate' e quindi riempite della nuova derrata da un *salsamentarius* o *liquaminarius* dell'alto Adriatico, che ha usato quelle lesionate per farne tappi.<sup>365</sup>

Other examples of this kind of recycling on the Grado ship include glass fragments meant for recasting.

These reuses highlight another important aspect of Adriatic trade: as ships came full of cargoes or left full of them, they did not return with empty holds! Indeed, we should imagine these *grandi nodi di redistribuzione* to reflect vast quantities of commerce in both directions.<sup>366</sup>

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<sup>363</sup> Auriemma (2006), 170; Freschi (1982); Auriemma and Volpe (1998).

<sup>364</sup> Beltrame et al. (2011) with bibliography for the previous publications of the site. Note that the wreck is no longer intact as it broke apart during an attempt to raise it—the dismantled pieces have been analyzed and melded with recreated parts to create a museum exhibit at the new Museum of Underwater Archaeology in Grado.

<sup>365</sup> Auriemma (2006), 175.

<sup>366</sup> Tchernia (2016), 79ff on secondary cargo (80): They were items that were sometimes taken on board to fill up empty space amid the main load or else carried as deck cargo. Items of secondary cargo, in

Horden and Purcell speak to this in particular when they emphasize the many goods that accompany luxury commodities: we tend to find and highlight the luxury goods, especially the long-lasting ones like marble, but should not assume that they were the only cargo. To the contrary, a ship carrying marble would have also ferried other, smaller, less visible goods in the same load.<sup>367</sup>

### II.3. Numismatics

Numismatic evidence can provide a good proxy for the movement of goods and people in the Adriatic, but coinage faces the same evidentiary problems as ceramics: namely, the material has not all been published and seldom can be gathered together into one dataset. The standard study for the Adriatic was conducted in the 1970s by Michael Crawford.<sup>382</sup> He argued that the coins found on the eastern side of the Adriatic (and he largely approached the topic from that viewpoint) fall into four groups. The first group is of hoards near Aquileia and mimics the characteristics of Italian hoards from the Republican period, the implication being that this is really an extension of Italy.<sup>383</sup> The second group contains the Mazin hoard and features a broad variety of bronze pieces from all over the western Mediterranean—including many pieces from Carthage and Numidia as well as Egypt. Hoards at Gračac, Vrankamen Berg, Dolnji Unac, Kruinwa, and Kula feature similar compositions and are featured on his map 3 reproduced here.

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particular pottery, may have been traded in large numbers, using space left by the amphorae: it would have been very simple to slot boxes of pots between their feet or set them on top of the layers of amphorae filling the hold, which could not be stacked without leaving some room above them. Such cargo could be carried at very low rates...In similar conditions, however, products could be shipped for merely occasional trade.


<sup>367</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), e.g. 369ff.

<sup>382</sup> Crawford (1979).

<sup>383</sup> Crawford (1969) nos. 139, 156, 165, 231, and 316.

This set of hoards contains some coins completely out of circulation by the end of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC but each remained open until the beginning of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC. Crawford has no explanation for why, but affirms that they seem to show trade contact between Rome and the Dalmatian coast at an early date.<sup>384</sup> Presumably some of that movement came in the form of

Figure 22 - Coin hoards of mixed western Mediterranean bronzes - Crawford (1979), 4



soldiers carrying their pay through the Adriatic. As François de Callataÿ has argued, Roman Republican coins found outside of Italy frequently signal payment for troops.<sup>385</sup> Even coin issues from Greek cities, he argues, frequently exist only as payment for passing Roman troops and happen only with the interference of highly skilled Roman officials.<sup>386</sup> The greater mystery, as yet unsolved, is what the African coins were doing in the Adriatic.

Crawford's third main group of

<sup>384</sup> Crawford (1979), 3-5; (1969) nos. 142, 145-6 and Thompson et al. (1973) 644, 569, 643, 566-7. Crawford suggests in a footnote following an argument of Kurz that perhaps these bronzes came quite early to Dalmatia and were treated as money thereafter, thus escaping melting down, but labels it purely supposition.

<sup>385</sup> de Callataÿ (1997) and (2011).

<sup>386</sup> de Callataÿ (2004) and (2015)



hoards is located along the Dalmatian coast and heralds the circulation of denarii in that area beginning in the late 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC.<sup>387</sup> Here, surely, the denarii are being used to pay soldiers. His fourth group clearly reflects the major military activity of Romans in Greece and picks up also at the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century but in the southern part of the sea in Aetolia and slightly north.<sup>388</sup> The end of this fourth group begins—with the age of Sulla—the commonplace of denarii east of the Adriatic.

Crawford also identifies hoards on the Italian side of the Adriatic with reference to Syracuse, Carthage, and Pyrrhus.<sup>389</sup> Other non-Italian material in hoards found along the peninsula must represent booty, he argues, derived from Rome's wars in mainland Greece including overstrikes of coins taken early in Rome's military experience abroad. Finally, Crawford lists many examples of isolated Italian coins moving across the Adriatic from the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC onward as proxies for movement and trade.<sup>390</sup>

The sum of this 1979 essay—which still forms the backbone of numismatic studies in the Adriatic—is that Romans and Italians had contact with the opposite shore from at least the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC, and that evidence of Greek-speaking contact with the Italian shore can go back as far. This is derived entirely from the study of hoards, the most common context for coins on the Croatian coast.

Lucijana Šešelj and Mato Ilkić recently dug into single finds from settlement contexts as opposed to hoards in order to elucidate the widespread use of coinage in Liburnia specifically.<sup>391</sup> They have studied more than 1000 coins from 41 sites in Liburnia that have not yet been published. Southern Liburnia provides most of these in the densely inhabited areas near the

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<sup>387</sup> Crawford (1969), 310, 379, 396, and 446.

<sup>388</sup> Crawford (1969) nos. 121, 158; further bibliography at footnotes 7-10.

<sup>389</sup> Thompson (1973) nos. 2029, 2031, 2033, 2037, and 1972-4.

<sup>390</sup> Crawford (1979), 5-9.

<sup>391</sup> Šešelj and Ilkić (2015), 425ff.

coast. The majority of these coins come from Carthage and Numidia, then Rome, with scattered coins from Apollonia, Dyrrachiu, Issa, Heracleia, and Pharos. Of a sample of 576 coins, 18% were Roman Republican issues (104 total) with another 61% coming from North Africa (352). Most of these 567 date from the 3<sup>rd</sup> to the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC.


Interestingly of 55 coins from Magna Graecia, Salapia, Luceria, Teate, Arpi, Brundisium, and Bruttium are represented, all in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. Even Celtic and Hispanic coins make it into these finds. But the African coinage dominates, suggesting a strong trade route linking the Adriatic to the western Mediterranean. Šešelj and Ilkić point to the oddity of this within the larger context of the eastern Adriatic seaboard: the northernmost part of the coast reflects coinage from Apollonia and Dyrrachium, the central islands feature Apollonia, Dyrrachium, and Illyrian kings, and southern Dalmatia sports strong connections with areas to the southeast of the Adriatic. How is it that just north of Dalmatia in Liburnia, coinage from North Africa dominates all other types?

Šešelj and Ilkić posit that maritime trade contacts with North Africa are to blame for Numidian and Carthaginian coins appearing in this part of the Adriatic. They point to similar coinage—though not Carthaginian—in Aquileia and the head of the sea. In many of these contexts, Roman Republican coins appear alongside those from Africa, suggesting that perhaps these coins came together with Romans and their trade goods and settlements. Whatever the circumstances, clearly the Adriatic featured links to the wider Mediterranean in a maritime context. It is hard to imagine a circumstance under which Carthaginian coins came to Liburnia overland.

In addition to these broader studies, coin-specific and site-specific works add to our overall numismatic picture of the Adriatic. Giovanni Gorini, for example, studied the coinage of

Aegina and Athens in the Adriatic.<sup>392</sup> Maja Bonačić Mandinić and Paolo Visonà studied coinage on Vis in the *longue durée* from around 350 BC to AD 600.<sup>393</sup> Their study notes a great many mints represented in the rich finds on the island, depicted in this map.

Figure 23 - Mint distribution of coins found at Issa - Bonačić Mandinić and Visonà (2002), 329



Note the concentration of mints along the eastern Adriatic coast which must have engaged in sustained trade along the routes we have already identified. This map does not include Roman coins, of which there are a considerable number from the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC onward.

<sup>392</sup> Gorini (2002).

<sup>393</sup> Bonačić Mandinić and Visonà (2002).

These different kinds of numismatic studies present complementary pictures of the Adriatic over time. Studying hoards shows which areas absorb coins from which parts of the Adriatic and wider Mediterranean as does a site-specific study like that at Vis (though over a much longer chronological scale). Hoards represent snapshots, or rather brief periods of time during which they are open. In contrast, explorations of a single type or source of coinage, as with Attic coinage in the Adriatic, shows a radiating spread outward and demonstrates how single sites reach the rest of the basin. Taken together, they show some of the ways in which the Adriatic basin was linked within itself and to the wider world.

### III. Traders

Who moves these goods around the Adriatic? The material evidence studied above serves as a good proxy for movement and trade, but who was doing the trading? Horden and Purcell emphasize the anonymity of cabotage: it seldom leaves strong traces in the archaeological or literary record.<sup>394</sup> They use Braudel's phrase, the "Proletarians of the Sea" to describe this ad hoc trading along the coast. Importantly, they posit that patterns of cabotage trade can be discerned in later patterns of high commerce—the former precedes and establishes the networks for the latter.<sup>395</sup> Yet we seldom know much about the caboteurs creating and strengthening these initial webs of trade. A prominent example in the literary record is Polybius' account of the 1<sup>st</sup> Illyrian War: he notes that the Illyrians attacked Italian traders (Ἰταλικῶν ἐμπόρων) around 230 BC and that they had been doing so for a long time.<sup>396</sup> Complaints about this eventually move the Roman senate to war. Essential pieces of this episode are simply missing: who were these Italian traders?

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<sup>394</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), 142.

<sup>395</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), 366 where they call the "conspicuous movements" of high commerce "intensifications of existing universal local and small-scale redistribution systems."

<sup>396</sup> Polyb. 2.8.1-2.

Where in Italy were they based? How did they complain to the Roman senate? And why did the senate care about these particular Italians?

These questions were the focus of parts of Nicola Čašule's recent dissertation at Oxford.<sup>397</sup> He set out in part to demonstrate trade contacts between Rome and Illyria before and after the 1<sup>st</sup> Illyrian War. Much of his argument hinges on the cult of Diomedes which appears to link many sites in Italy with others scattered through the Adriatic. While this is only one example of the kind of trade network I envision developing in the Adriatic world during the Hellenistic period, it nicely demonstrates the links between people beyond goods.

Much of the discussion around the Diomedes cult has centered on Cape Ploča, an exposed point on the Dalmatian coast between Šibenik and Split. Excavations begun in 1996 revealed huge quantities of potsherds, many of them with graffiti and thought to relate to the worship of Diomedes in the Adriatic.<sup>398</sup> The original excavators found remains possibly of a sanctuary building and evidence of burning and sacrifice alongside thousands and thousands of potsherds. The earliest fragments belong to the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC and the latest to the 1<sup>st</sup> AD. Also included were various valuable items presumably used as offerings. The potsherds bear graffiti, usually the name Diomedes (over 30 times) in the dative with the personal name of the individual making the sacrifice. All told, over 130,000 potsherds have been uncovered from the small site at Cape Ploča.

These finds along the Dalmatian coast are all the more interesting considering similar discoveries on the tiny archipelago of Palagruža in the middle of the Adriatic Sea. Over 2000 pottery fragments of fine ware have been recovered there including epigraphic material

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<sup>397</sup> Čašule (2011).

<sup>398</sup> Čače and Šešelj (2004).

suggesting that it was also a cult site to Diomedes. That so much of the pottery (almost half) is fine ware strongly points to the potsherds as dedications.<sup>399</sup>

The island of Palagruža is tiny, less than 300m wide at its widest point, and devoid of fresh water or enough resources to sustain even a small population. There appears to be no good reason for visiting the little archipelago except as a waypoint on longer journeys—and then as a navigational marker only since there is no water to take on board nor much of a safe harbor for ships of any size: large vessels had to anchor and send small craft to land as revealed by several anchors uncovered nearby and the nature of the shoreline. The current argument goes that this small group of islands must be the mythical islands of Diomedes where he is supposedly buried, pushing aside the traditional identification of the Tremiti islands further north.

Čašule puts these two sites and other evidence together in his recent dissertation to argue that there existed an important network of Diomedes cult sites in the Adriatic during the 4<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> centuries BC.<sup>400</sup> As he points out, these two sites exist in critical locations for maritime traffic in the Adriatic, both at crossing points. The maps we have seen at the beginning of this chapter show the wind and current patterns crossing the Adriatic along a line roughly from the Gargano peninsula on the western side to the area around Cape Ploča to the east.

In this way the traffic at these two cult sites might be seen as sailors sacrificing for safe passage across the Adriatic or up the coastline. The Cape sits just at the junction of multiple routes around and across the Adriatic. Čašule argues,

Neighbouring harbours would have been appropriate places for seafarers, making the journey along the eastern Adriatic coastline, to put in while they gauged how favourable conditions were for their onward journey, or wait for hostile weather to subside. The site itself was also on a prominent headland, and thus represented an important navigational marker. The Palagruža archipelago, on the other hand, is located on the ‘safest, most secure, and fastest route possible’ for crossing the Adriatic sea located as it is along both

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<sup>399</sup> Most recently (and up-to-date with bibliography), Kirigin et al. (2009).

<sup>400</sup> Čašule (2011), 235ff, drawing heavily on the standard study: Kirigin and Čače (1998).

of the prevailing currents in the central Adriatic. Further, both the Italian and Adriatic coastlines are visible from Vela Palagruža: a considerable advantage for seafaring in an era whose sailors lacked sophisticated navigation technology...Sailors following a course which visited both sites may have chosen to dedicate an offering to Diomedes at either location or, indeed, both. This kind of ‘insurance’ against hostile conditions would have been particularly important for those sailing in the Adriatic.<sup>401</sup>

The implications of these finds and dedications seem straightforward enough. These were critical junctures in the sea and natural places to pray for safety.

Čašule presses the evidence harder to argue for a sustained network of trade identifiable through the proxy of this Diomedes cult. He leans on numismatic finds at Cape Ploča to identify Adriatic cities doing trade through the region: Corcyra, Ancona, Issa, and Apollonia, alongside external coins from Leucas, Argos, and Cyprus. As he notes, Ancona, Corcyra, Argos, and Cyprus all worshipped Diomedes. So did other sites in the Adriatic tied to the Diomedes myth, including eight claiming him as their founder: Brundisium, Arpi, Venusia, Canusium, Luceria, Sipontum, Adria, and Spina. This shared foundation myth and the shared worship in general of Diomedes, he argues, linked these Adriatic cities together in important ways, namely the facilitating of contacts and relationships through shared experiences. This sort of mutual mythic heritage—a language the cities of Magna Graecia spoke fluently—was a useful way to forge trade and political alliances.<sup>402</sup> Perhaps the shared Diomedes myth was already vestigial at this point, perhaps fresh. But what is important for Čašule’s argument is that strong links existed between these cities—demonstrable in numismatic and ceramic evidence—by the late 4<sup>th</sup> and early 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC.

Čašule’s primary thrust in this portion of his dissertation is that when Roman forces reached the Adriatic coast at the Battle of Sentinum in 295 BC and the state began thereafter a long and methodical process of colonization and land distribution in Adriatic Italy, the state and

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<sup>401</sup> Čašule (2011), 240-1; quotations indicate a citation from Kirigin and Čače (1998), 63.

<sup>402</sup> Dench (1995) and (2005).

the settlers in these communities stepped into an already existing network of trade. The establishment of colonies at Sena Gallica, Hadria, and Castrum Novum in the 280s BC and Ariminum, Firmum Picenum, and Brundisium over the next 50 years, created a firm foothold on the Adriatic. Čašule argues that this meant “the Romans now became exposed to the various issues which affected the other peoples for whom the Adriatic represented the main access route to the wider world, whether for trade or other purposes. These colonies also began to become increasingly integrated into the networks of trade and communication which linked the peoples on both sides of the Adriatic Sea.”<sup>403</sup> He spends many pages attempting to prove just that through numismatic and epigraphic evidence and, I think, succeeds.

In the epigraphic evidence, he demonstrates that Roman and Latin names begin appearing on the eastern side of the Adriatic in the early 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. He points to a small corpus from a theater at Buthrotum. Slave owners manumitted slaves here, including some with Roman names.<sup>404</sup> Whatever the circumstances of these Roman names appearing in Bouthrotum—whether these men immigrated and married local Greek women or represent merchants passing through the region—they strongly suggest a Roman presence from the mid 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC onward.<sup>405</sup> He points to other onomastic evidence at Epidamnus/Dyrrachium and Apollonia from the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC.<sup>406</sup> These inscriptions show people moving around beyond the commodities we use as proxies. They provide the rare exception where there are even names to put alongside transadriatic trade in the Hellenistic period.

The other important evidence for Čašule is numismatic and comes in the form of 3<sup>rd</sup> century Roman coins in hoards, especially the Mazin hoard, which includes bronze coins that

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<sup>403</sup> Čašule (2011), 234.

<sup>404</sup> Čašule (2011), 246ff; Cabanes (1974) and (2007).

<sup>405</sup> Debate on the dating of these inscriptions captured in the bibliography Čašule (2011), 248ff.

<sup>406</sup> Čašule (2011), 249-52.



must have crossed the Adriatic before the mid 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC.<sup>407</sup> Other nearby hoards from Gračac and Vrankamen also contain Roman bronze coins, as does a hoard from Krk.<sup>408</sup> While these hoards contain relatively few Roman coins, they are consistent with each other and with the coinage from Cape Ploča in that they feature large quantities of Ptolemaic, Numidian, and Carthaginian coins alongside a few Italian and Sicilian pieces.<sup>409</sup> Čašule takes this to mean that the various hoards represent the movement of coins through this network of Adriatic sites in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century. At the very least, these hoards demonstrate how much the coastlines of the Adriatic were connected to Italy and the rest of the Mediterranean even in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries BC.

### Conclusion

When placed in dialogue with one another, the scattered studies explored here reveal patterns of movement and trade in the Adriatic. From the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC, vessels sailed up the Croatian coast, crossed the Adriatic with the help of visual aids like Cape Ploča and the string of islands to Palagruža which lit the way toward the Italian peninsula. Others continued north past the cape and plied their wares among the islands and into the hinterland of the northeastern Adriatic or reached Istria and the river systems on its western side. Ships descended from the Po Valley (the destination of many large vessels) to cross from the area around Monte Gargano to Cape Ploča in return or chose instead to hug the Italian coast and take advantage of many river ports after Ancona and Numana until settling, perhaps, in the lagoon at Varano. Ships entering the Strait of Otranto could turn north up the western Adriatic too, and some did, plying wares along that coast or simply following the winds northward.

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<sup>407</sup> Crawford (1979), 5 and Borić-Brešković and Popović (2006); Crawford (1969), 142; Thompson et al. (1973), 644.

<sup>408</sup> Crawford (1969), 145, 6; Thompson et al. (1973) 569, 643; Čašule (2011), 244-5; Crawford (1979), 5 for the hoard on Krk.

<sup>409</sup> On the coinage of Cape Ploča, Bonačić Mandinić (2004) with a catalogue and photographs.

Yes, the dominant pattern of movement and trade was counterclockwise and yes, the majority of ships crossed the Adriatic from the Croatian coast to the western shore in order to maximize wind and travel speed. But the much-maligned *importuosa Italiae litora* had a surprising number of ports and could host whatever ships came that way. Critically, there does not seem to be a corner of the Adriatic basin that was not reached by these broad networks of trade.

Ecologically, this means that microregions all around the Adriatic could be connected to microregions across the Mediterranean world through commerce. Italian traders connected with communities across the Adriatic and perhaps settled there permanently. The fishmongers of North Africa traded for rich wine from Istria. And regions on either side of the sea, separated by a couple hundred kilometers, were regularly in contact. The island ecologies of the Adriatic facilitated this especially, as the thick disposition of land masses lent themselves to visual navigation and exploration. Indeed, with the winds and currents of the Adriatic converging along the navigational corridor around Palagruža, it is surprising we do not find more evidence of trade.

Pascal Arnaud produced two important maps based on the literary evidence—especially the distances and travel times recorded by geographers—for movement around the Adriatic Sea over the broad spectrum of antiquity. Here they are.<sup>410</sup>

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<sup>410</sup> Arnaud (2005), 197, 200.

Figure 24 - Adriatic routes in ancient geographers - Arnaud (2005), 200





Figure 25 - Maritime relations in the Strait of Otranto - Arnaud (2005), 200



Note how few of the routes we have seen suggested by material proxies made it into the literary record. The crossing at Palagraža is almost represented by route 93, Salone-Sipuntum, but Salone is too far to the north of Cape Ploča to make that work. The entire Italian seaboard and most of the head of the Adriatic might as well be barren, as far as the literary record is concerned. Only at the Strait of Otranto (second map) with its many crossings do we get a real sense of the level of commerce in this busy sea.

As more data becomes available, I hope sophisticated analysis of all of these categories of material evidence will follow. We need more complete studies of Attic wares and black-glazed pottery and especially of Hellenistic fine ware. We need thorough studies of the underwater evidence—we accumulate more every year. We need ongoing databases of the amphorae being uncovered all over the Adriatic basin. No one person can master all of this information and it would be a fool’s errand to try. Rather, as individual scholars and teams work

on studies *of* the Adriatic space related to their specific area of expertise—which is to say focused on the geographic bounds of the Adriatic rather than tangentially touching on it—we can gain a clear picture of these groups of evidence and ultimately put complete datasets together, overlaid on top of each other, to see just how much moved around the Adriatic.

This was a very connected space. It would be foolish in the face of all of this evidence to assert that the Romans had no contact with the eastern side of the Adriatic until late in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC, for example. The degree of connectivity along these shores strongly supports the thesis of Čašule that Rome, arriving at the Adriatic through conquest, stepped into an already connected world and seized upon those connections.<sup>411</sup> Likewise Macedon, entering from the east, dealt with Illyria not just as a landlocked neighbor to the west but as part of a connected maritime world with all of those complications. The reality of the space is that it, as a connected sea, lived and breathed with a single economic pulse through much of this period. In the next chapter we shall see how some took advantage of that connectivity for their own gain.

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<sup>411</sup> Čašule (2012), 206-7. Or Peter Derow (2003), 53 on the Roman involvement in Illyria in 229 BC: “The Adriatic was visibly in part a Roman sea.”

## Chapter Three

### From Predation to Protection: Fighting Men in the Adriatic World

Piracy in the Adriatic Sea appears in many discussions of Greek and Roman history because it figures in the outbreak of the First Illyrian War (229-228 BC), a conflict that—thanks to the Greek historian Polybius—marks the beginning of Roman expansion into the Greek-speaking world of the eastern Mediterranean.<sup>412</sup> Adriatic piracy has been largely misunderstood as ancient and modern historians have bought into a misleading binary among armed mariners: illegitimate pirate or legitimate naval force. Other scholars working on the First Illyrian War or ancient piracy more generally start from the assumption that there are pirates in the Adriatic and argue whether, for example, Illyrian expansion in one source or Illyrian piracy in another led to Roman involvement in the war, for how long and on what scale piracy was practiced by emerging states in the Adriatic before and after the 230s BC, and how successful the interventions of external powers like Syracuse, Athens, Rome and Macedon were in curbing these piracies.<sup>413</sup> I introduce to these problems the work of Thomas Gallant who, beginning in the late 1990s, began arguing for a fluid view of bandits of all kinds whom he dubbed “military entrepreneurs.”<sup>414</sup> His work drew on important trends in anthropology and history in viewing violence at the center of sovereignty and state-formation. He demonstrated that bandits and

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<sup>412</sup> E.g. Frank (1914); Holleaux (1921); Badian (1958); Badian (1968); Harris (1979); Gruen (1984); Ferrary (1988); Habicht (1989): 290-323; Kallet-Marx (1995); Eckstein (2006); Champion (2007): 255-75; Eckstein (2008); Burton (2011); Hoyos (2013).

<sup>413</sup> Ormerod (1924); Dell (1967), 344-58; Derow (1973); de Souza (1999); Šašel Kos (2002); Bandelli (2004).

<sup>414</sup> Gallant (1999).

pirates move easily between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” employment, shifting from robbers to guards and from navy crews to buccaneers. This fluidity occurs especially around the formation of states when, without a strong central government’s monopoly on violence, emerging leaders turn to private military entrepreneurs in lieu of an army or navy. As Gallant demonstrates through many comparative examples, under these circumstances the navy and the pirates are drawn from the same pool of fighting men. Thus, increasing the size of a navy without a strong enough centralized government to maintain control over violence produces more military entrepreneurs in need of work when the war ends and who will put their newfound skills to use. The labels we use as historians—pirate, privateer, corsair, navy—attempt to capture statically a dynamic “way of making a living.”<sup>415</sup>

The application of Gallant’s theory effectively eviscerates the debates around piracy in the Adriatic, posing instead a shifting world of military entrepreneurs and emerging states. External powers like Syracuse and Rome step into this world and label these men brigands, whether they are fighting on behalf of a state or for their own profit or, more likely, both. To further complicate matters, the constant conflicts in the Adriatic create a high demand for military men who, at the conclusion of a war, frequently need new employment. Without a strong centralized government, they turn to brigandage until they are hired again to do much the same thing under the veneer of legitimacy. Within this framework, the debate over whether Illyrian piracy or Illyrian expansion drew Rome into the Adriatic, for example, dissolves: both reflect the conflicts of the emerging Illyria and are perpetrated by the same pool of fighting men. Viewing the maritime world of the Adriatic as a fluid market filled with entrepreneurs looking for work transforms our understanding of “piracy” and conflict in this period.

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<sup>415</sup> Braudel (1972), 867, of pirates and corsairs.

Importantly, this emphasis on “entrepreneurs” also emphasizes the agency of actors in the Adriatic. Thousands of fighting men all over the Adriatic choose to take up this alternate form of making a living—whether once in a while or full-time—and utilize the sea to do so. The shrinking force of the sea connects these agents to a wide array of potential targets, increasing their personal opportunities. Ultimately this is about people all over the Adriatic choosing to exploit the sea to connect themselves and their communities with other people and goods representing microecologies all over the Adriatic and—through long-distance trade—the entire Mediterranean.

The physical and ecological space of the Adriatic facilitates participation in this larger maritime world. Yet no external power succeeds in controlling this sea until the Augustan period. A central question of my dissertation is what about the Adriatic makes this space so accessible for merchants, migrants, and military entrepreneurs while making it inaccessible to states? In large part it is the unique ecology of the Adriatic that makes it permeable to individuals and impassable to governments. Elsewhere in the dissertation,<sup>416</sup> I explore the winds, currents, coastlines, and traffic patterns of this sea. In sum, it is possible to travel swiftly up and down the Adriatic coasts for much of the year, departing and arriving at the Strait of Otranto which extends like a highway across the sea. It can be crossed in many places, but the Strait serves as a gateway to the rest of the Adriatic and is connected to its far corners by established traffic patterns for millennia. Within easy striking distance of this central highway are the myriad islands, inlets, and harbors of the Balkan coast, one of the most incised stretches of coastline in the world. This combination of heavy commercial traffic and a broad selection of escapes

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<sup>416</sup> Chapter one.



commonly results in high levels of predation which provides revenue to far-flung parts of the Adriatic, distributing wealth up the coast and empowering emerging states.<sup>417</sup>

The access to income in the Strait of Otranto enjoyed by towns and cities hundreds of miles up the coastline demonstrates the power of the sea to connect people with diverse resources. Nicolas Purcell and Peregrine Horden argued in their landmark book *The Corrupting Sea* that the Mediterranean is made up of micro-regions, each with its own ecology and access to a set of resources, and that these micro-regions are in turn connected to each other by the sea.<sup>418</sup> What gives the Mediterranean its characteristics, they propose, is that communities can diversify their portfolio of ecologies by connecting with other micro-regions via maritime transport. This sort of hedging of ecological bets allows the distribution of windfalls and protection against drought and famine in a way not possible in landlocked areas. Military entrepreneurs in the Adriatic supply their communities (and stopping-places along the way) with access to all the diverse ecologies represented in the holds of ships sailing the Strait.

In this chapter of the dissertation, I explore maritime attacks in the Adriatic. The orthodox view is that piracy flourished in this space for most of the period of this study from the late fourth to the late first century BC. Efforts to harness, curb, or encourage piracy led to naval encounters throughout the sea. So in this chapter I not only want to examine the events that are typically presented as examples of "piracy" but also wish to re-contextualize how we approach such actions. To undertake such a revisionist approach requires us to pose several questions and

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<sup>417</sup> An interesting comparandum can be found in the many studies of Mediterranean piracy in the modern period, e.g. Anselmi (1998a), 11: L'Adriatico, lungo, stretto, pieno di isole, penisole, insenature, golfi e, soprattutto, di importanti centri urbani lungo la sponda italic, comprava e vendeva ogni genere di merci africane (da Alessandria), asiatiche, nordiche, balcaniche, ponentine... In Adriatico fu *bellum omnium contra omnes* e i porti, le spiagge, i ridossi dovettero fortificarsi con torri, baluardi e mezzelune per respingere il nemico che a ogni buona stagione arrivava dal mare per catturare uomini da rivendere, o pore ai remi delle proprie navi, ai lavori forzati a terra e a predare ricchezze.

<sup>418</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), esp. chapter VI. Cf. Purcell (2003); Bresson (2005).

to review the regional specificity for maritime action in this time period: What is it about the Adriatic that facilitates piracy? Why does brigandage endure here through these centuries despite growing Roman authority? Why, in other words, do corsairs permeate the sea while external states cannot? How do these military entrepreneurs interact with internal Adriatic states? The questions of this chapter speak to the overarching concerns of the larger project. By asking how pirates persisted in the Adriatic, I approach the similar problem of how this sea eluded overall maritime control.

To do this, I break this chapter into three pieces. First, I walk through four sets of events traditionally described as piracy in the Adriatic and identify the problems and questions arising from using that framework. Next, I introduce the work of Thomas Gallant within its larger theoretical framework of violence, brigandage, and state building. I couple this with the micro-ecologies proposed by Horden and Purcell and explain how these tools work together. In other words, I propose to re-tool these descriptions of piracy by re-contextualizing them within the wider ecological and economic approaches to the Adriatic that the dissertation pursues. In the last section, I therefore apply to the previous four examples Gallant's anthropological model of brigandage that views increases in predation as a part of state-formation and so revises how we should perceive these "piratical" actions through the lens of the varied state-actors within the Adriatic region.

## I. Adriatic Piracies

Beginning with Henry Ormerod's influential 1924 book, *Piracy in the Ancient World*, there have been a number of articles and book-length studies of piracy, all touching on some events in the Adriatic Sea. Ormerod offers a comprehensive review of evidence for piracy in the literary sources with an emphasis on the states attempting to police these depredations as a

civilizing counterpoint to the “wild, uncivilized tribes” who participated in piracy.<sup>419</sup> The most referenced of these is Philip de Souza’s 1999 monograph, *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World*, an admirable update of Ormerod and a careful exploration of constructing enemies as “pirates” rhetorically. De Souza emphasizes ancient definitions of piracy in historiography and law with particular concern for the Cilician pirate crisis (so constructed by Cicero) in the first century BC and the Roman rewriting of that episode to highlight their projected role as protectors of the Mediterranean.<sup>420</sup> Studies after de Souza’s book have touched on piracy and the economy, states policing waterways, and problems of hegemony.<sup>421</sup>

De Souza opens his book with the problem of words like “piracy” in reference to the ancient world. For his purposes, these pejorative labels have been applied to armed robbers “by their victims and their enemies, they do not claim the label of pirate for themselves.” He studies Greek and Latin words for pirates and bandits, concluding that they are largely interchangeable and that modern usage provides a problematic translation at best.<sup>422</sup> His major contribution to the study of piracy has been demonstrating that the concept of pirates as an evil, Cicero’s enemies of all mankind, has a firmly Roman origin in the context of the first century BC and the consolidation of Roman authority throughout the Mediterranean.<sup>423</sup> De Souza has shown that this view of piracy is a construct and that ancient writers deploy such labels to smear individuals and

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<sup>419</sup> Ormerod (1924), 166; previous studies include Sestier (1880) and two works by Stein (1891) and (1894). Works on piracy after Ormerod: Dell (1967); Derow (1973); Jackson (1973); Garlan (1978); Gabbert (1986); Braund (1993); Pohl (1993). For many others not touching on the Adriatic, see bibliography in de Souza (1999).

<sup>420</sup> de Souza (1999), e.g. 131-2, 172-8.

<sup>421</sup> Crisculo (2013), 160-71 and Kruse (2013), 172-84; Tröster (2009), 19ff; Gabrielsen (2001); Wiemer (2002), but see the review by Moreno (2003); Ruah (2003); Tröster (2009); de Souza (2014).

<sup>422</sup> de Souza (1999), 2ff. See now Ferone (2008); Meissner (2012).

<sup>423</sup> Cic. *de. Off.* 3.107: *Nam pirata non est ex perduellium numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium.* Most recently, de Souza (2008). Cf. Heller-Roazen (2009).

groups and prop up claims to authority. Just the same, these conclusions have yet to influence how we talk about piracy and maritime attacks in the ancient Mediterranean.

In what follows, I narrate four examples traditionally described as piracy in the Adriatic world. In discussing these six instances, I point to problems of categorization, identify ongoing scholarly arguments, and highlight the challenges inherent in identifying these events as piratical. Having reviewed these events and their difficulties, I turn in the second part of this chapter to new approaches to “piracy” emerging in other fields of history and anthropology before returning in the last section to apply these new frameworks of understanding to these same four examples.

### *Dionysius II*

Diodorus Siculus records that sometime after 367 BC Dionysius II, tyrant of Syracuse, founded colonies in Apulia to ward off attacks that were damaging trade in the Adriatic by making the Strait of Otranto unsafe:

In Apulia he founded two cities because he wished to make safe for navigators the passage across the Ionian Strait; for the barbarians who dwelt along the coast were accustomed to put out in numerous robbing ships and render the whole shore along the Adriatic Sea unsafe for merchants.<sup>424</sup>

Ormerod takes this to mean that Illyrian raids in the Adriatic proper had spilled into the Ionian Sea.<sup>425</sup> Maurice Holleaux, linking the colonies of Dionysius I to a similar purpose, described the situation memorably:

But although Dionysius II made some show of continuing the work, the designs of the great Tyrant scarcely survived him. Abandoned by the Syracusans and receiving no help from the Greeks of Greece, the new colonies exhausted their resources in defending their independence against the barbarians, for the most part without success. The Adriatic

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<sup>424</sup> Diod. Sic. 16.5.3 κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἀπουλίαν δύο πόλεις ἔκτισε βουλόμενος ἀσφαλῆ τοῖς πλέουσι τὸν Ἰόνιον πόρον ποιῆσαι: οἱ γὰρ τὴν παραθαλάττιον οἰκοῦντες βάρβαροι ληστρίσι πολλαῖς πλέοντες ἄπλουν τοῖς ἐμπόροις παρεσκευάζον πᾶσαν τὴν περὶ τὸν Ἀδρίαν θάλατταν.

<sup>425</sup> Ormerod (1924), 168.

continued, as before, to be delivered over to the Illyrians, and piracy, like an endemic disease, continued to be its scourge.<sup>426</sup>

Harry Dell took issue with this reading, asserting that Diodorus does not refer to Illyrian pirates and must in fact mean Apulians.<sup>427</sup> He declares that towns in Apulia could have no impact on piracy originating from Illyria. He further cites the alliance in 295 BC between Agathocles, another tyrant of Syracuse, and the Apulian Iapygians and Peucetians: Agathocles would supply raiding ships and receive in return a share in the profits of their piracy.<sup>428</sup> To Dell, this indicates a long tradition of piracy emanating from Apulia and spilling into the Adriatic rather than the other way around. This was an Apulian problem with Apulian solutions. Philip de Souza follows Dell and says that the cities he established were intended as safe havens from Apulian pirates.<sup>429</sup> Thomas Figueira assumes they are Illyrians and cites passages in Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, and Cornelius Nepos that put Dionysius II and his fleet in the Adriatic, possibly protecting shipping.<sup>430</sup>

Diodorus calls these attackers barbarians who live along the coast and notes that they sail out in many robbing ships (ληστρίσι πολλαῖς), making the whole sea unsafe. But they were not necessarily pirates in the sense that they operated outside the law. Diodorus is not clear. These could have been state-sponsored naval attacks against Syracuse, part of a larger war, or something akin to privateering. Dell's example of Agathocles' pact with the Apulians may have been part of a larger conflict as well. Diodorus uses the word ληστρίς (noun) and ληστρικός (adjective) of attacks on supply convoys in war as when Evagoras used ληστρικός ships in his war against the Persians in the 380s BC or when Alexander of Pherae attacked the Cyclades with

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<sup>426</sup> Holleaux (1928), 825; Dell (1967), 345ff on Dionysius I; cf. Woodhead (1970).

<sup>427</sup> Dell (1967), 354. On Dionysius II's colonies, Muccioli (1999), 257-8.

<sup>428</sup> Diod. Sic. 21.4: πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμόρους βαρβάρους καὶ Ἰάπυγας καὶ Πευκετίους συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσατο, καὶ ναῦς ληστρικός χορηγῶν αὐτοῖς, τὰ μέρη τῶν λειῶν ἐλάμβανε.

<sup>429</sup> de Souza (1999), 51.

<sup>430</sup> T. Figueira (2008), 502 citing Diod. Sic. 16.10.2, 16.11.3, Plut. *Dion* 26.1, and Nepos *Dion* 5.4.

them in the 360s BC.<sup>431</sup> So are Dionysius II's colonies fighting illegal piracy, naval attacks by foreign states, or something in between? Are Agathocles' financed allies plundering enemy shipping or simply filling his coffers with whatever comes along? Critically, can settlements on the Apulian coast have any bearing at all on raids—whatever their legal status—launched from Illyria? Or must this all be contained within Apulia?

### *Cleonymus of Sparta*

In 303 BC, Cleonymus of Sparta was defeated by a Roman army near Thuriae and fled north with his fleet. Livy takes this opportunity to characterize the Adriatic coasts in this period:

He sailed round the promontory of Brundisium, and was carried by the winds up the Adriatic, where he had on his left the harborless shores of Italy and on his right the countries occupied by the Illyrians, the Liburnians, and the Histrians, savage tribes chiefly notorious for their acts of piracy. He dreaded the possibility of falling in with these, and consequently directed his course inland until he reached the coasts of the Veneti.<sup>432</sup>

Dell calls this is the only statement on Illyrian piracy before the events of the 230s BC and believes it is largely rhetorical.<sup>433</sup> Certainly by the time Livy was composing his history in the late first century BC the Illyrians, Liburnians, and Histrians had a reputation for maritime robberies. But in Livy, it is Cleonymus who engages in what might be called piratical behavior, raiding deep in the river system, eventually reaching Livy's native Patavium. Livy's account of the raid reads like a pirate attack: After leaving a few to guard the ships they landed, seized the villages, burnt the houses, and carried off the men and cattle as booty. Their eagerness for plunder led them too far from their ships.<sup>434</sup> Sneaking ashore, burning buildings, pillaging herds

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<sup>431</sup> Diod. Sic. 15.3.1, 15.95.1, Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.35. See de Souza (1999), 33-4.

<sup>432</sup> Livy 10.2.4: *Circumvectus inde Brundisii promunturium medioque sinu Hadriatico ventis latus, cum laeva importuosa Italiae litora, dextra Illyrii Liburnique et Histri, gentes ferae et magna ex parte atrociniis maritimis infames, terrent penitus ad litora Venetorum pervenit.*

<sup>433</sup> Dell (1967), 351-2.

<sup>434</sup> Liv. 10.2.8: *Ibi egressi praesidio levi navibus relicto vicos expugnant, inflammant tecta, hominum pecudumque praedas agunt et dulcedine praedandi longius usque a navibus procedunt.*

and men alike, all of these would describe pirates. But as a Spartan commander, Cleonymus is not labeled a pirate, even when pillaging.<sup>435</sup> Having come to Italy originally at the behest of the Tarantines, he used his army to seize and plunder Metaponto, reportedly hauling off enormous sums and hundreds of noble women.<sup>436</sup> This was in essence a large-scale raid. He then similarly took Corcyra before returning quickly to Tarentum, a reminder of how narrow the Adriatic world really was, even in 303 BC. On that return trip, he made a large-scale raid for booty and slaves: Putting in to land in the district that was defended by the barbarians, he took the city, sold its people into slavery, and plundered the countryside.<sup>437</sup> Of course, Cleonymus then camps with his force on land and engages in a battle (which he loses)—should this land action disqualify the plundering raid from being labeled “piracy”? If Scerdilaidas the Illyrian and not a Spartan prince had done the same 100 years later, would it be piracy or a military campaign?

#### *First Illyrian War*

Discussions of piracy in the Adriatic during the first millennium BC are inextricably entangled with Polybius’ account of the outbreak of the First Illyrian War for several reasons. First, Polybius narrates the only sustained example of Adriatic piracy in the extant historiography. Second, Ormerod leaned heavily on Polybius’ account as part of a lengthy section on the Adriatic.<sup>438</sup> This set the stage for later discussions, all of which typically cited Ormerod. Finally, the piratical exploits in question happen to be the catalyst for the beginning of the First Illyrian War, an event Polybius imbues with significance as the first time Roman forces

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<sup>435</sup> E.g. Oakley (2005), 54. Cf Dell (1967), 351ff; Marasco (1980) and David (1981), 119-32.

<sup>436</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.104.

<sup>437</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.105: προσσχών δὲ τῆς χώρας καθ’ ὃν τόπον ἐφύλασσον οἱ βάρβαροι, τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἐλὼν ἐξηνδραποδίσατο, τὴν δὲ χώραν ἐλεηλάτησεν.

<sup>438</sup> Ormerod (1924), 166ff. Previous studies not in English include Sestier (1880) and two works by Stein (1891) and (1894).

crossed to the East, thereby heralding the Roman conquest of the larger Mediterranean world.<sup>439</sup> This last point, especially, has drawn many eyes to these pages of Polybius and a larger debate about Roman Imperialism.<sup>440</sup> Along the way, a number of judgments have been made about the nature of Adriatic piracy before and after the war.

In brief, Polybius explains that Illyrian forces have been pushing further south in the years leading up to 230 BC.<sup>441</sup> When he introduces them, they are working as mercenaries for Demetrius II of Macedon, successfully raising the siege of Medion, a city in Acarnania to the south of Illyria. Upon receiving the wealth derived from this expedition, King Agron dies in a bout of drinking, passing the kingdom to his fiery wife, Teuta. She immediately sends vessels out to seek more plunder, instructing her subjects to treat the entire seaboard as their enemies. Illyrian forces enter Phoenice ostensibly to resupply and instead seize and ransack the city. They defeat a rescuing force from the powerful Aetolian and Achaean Leagues and only abandon Phoenice when civil strife in Illyria calls them home. While occupying Phoenice, some ships capture and kill Italian merchants, and complaints about this reach the Roman senate. After organizing her affairs back home and deeply impressed with the wealth captured from Phoenice, Teuta sends her forces out again. This time they almost take the important city of Epidamnus, begin besieging it, and successfully capture the essential port of Corcyra. Meanwhile, Roman envoys find Teuta besieging the Issa further north. They demand that she keep her forces in check. She refuses and, offended by the ambassadors, orders one of them killed. Upon his death,

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<sup>439</sup> Polyb. 2.2.1-2 (Patton's Loeb translation): It was at this period that the Romans first crossed with an army to Illyria and that part of Europe. This is a matter not to be lightly passed over, but deserving the serious attention of those who wish to gain a true view of the purpose of this work and of the formation and growth of the Roman dominion.

<sup>440</sup> See note 1.

<sup>441</sup> Events in this paragraph: Polyb. 2.2-12.



Rome commits to war and quickly overcomes all resistance, depriving Teuta of her ships and restricting her movements to north of the Lissus River.

Problematically for Roman historians, Appian provides a different account of these events.<sup>442</sup> In his much shorter version, King Agron began expanding militarily and captured parts of Epirus (Phoenice) and the cities of Corcyra, Epidamnus, and Pharus. When he threatened the rest of the Adriatic, the island of Issa asked Rome for help. Illyrian ships intercepted the Roman ambassadors and killed one, leading to the war. He notes at this juncture that Agron had died, leaving Teuta as regent. Appian's account of the war itself is much the same. Historians debate which of these versions is preferable from the point of view of Roman Imperialism: did Rome respond to Issa's pleas for help against an expansionist neighbor or to piracy and predation to safeguard shipping in the sea? Beginning with Polybius, I review these narratives with a view to shifting the dialogue away from Rome and into the Adriatic.

Of critical importance to students of Roman expansionism, Polybius' description of piracy in the Adriatic seems very straightforward:

To return to the Illyrians. For a long time previously they had been in the habit of maltreating vessels sailing from Italy, and now while they were at Phoenice, a number of them detached themselves from the fleet and robbed or killed many Italian traders, capturing and carrying off no small number of prisoners. The Romans had hitherto turned a deaf ear to the complaints made against the Illyrians, but now when a number of persons approached the Senate on the subject, they appointed two envoys, Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius, to proceed to Illyria and investigate the matter.<sup>443</sup>

The envoys were subsequently killed and war ensued. That these attacks had gone on for some time creates a problem in the Roman narrative: if this had long been an issue, why did the senate decide at this moment to intercede? Two issues arise in this passage. First, what kind of time frame does Polybius have in mind when he says "for a long time previously" (χρόνους

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<sup>442</sup> App. *Ill.* 7. On arguments for Appian's version, Derow (1973).

<sup>443</sup> Polyb. 2.8.1-3.

συνεχῶς)? Was piracy an endemic problem stretching back into the fourth century (as Ormerod believed) or a new phenomenon (as Dell argued)? Second, what was the senate's purpose in sending this delegation? Were they hoping to provoke a war, dissuade Teuta from attacking allies (Issa), or curb piracy? For some, Rome looked for any excuse for military conquest and was delayed only by wars on other fronts.<sup>444</sup> For others, Rome remained very reluctant to engage in warfare overseas and resisted committing to conquest.<sup>445</sup> Those more interested in piracy than imperialism have also latched onto the chronology. Dell argued that piracy had only really become an issue in the Adriatic within the last few years (around 230 BC).<sup>446</sup> Others have insisted on a long tradition of piracy in that sea.<sup>447</sup>

Two misunderstandings complicate readings of this episode. First, Polybius' language at the outset of book two suggests that the Romans are making a first crossing in response to this pirate problem. To be clear, he says that the Romans first crossed *with an army* at this time, not that Romans first came in contact with Illyria or the eastern shore of the Adriatic in 230 BC.<sup>448</sup> Indeed, the presence of Italian traders in the Adriatic—the merchants seized or killed by Illyrians based at Phoenice—suggests economic contact. In a recent PhD thesis at Oxford, Nikola Čašule assembled a great deal of evidence to show prolonged contact between the Italian and Balkan peninsulas in the hundred years before 230 BC.<sup>449</sup> In short, Romans had contact and were familiar with the Balkans long before they sent an embassy to Teuta.

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<sup>444</sup> E.g. Harris (1979), 195ff.

<sup>445</sup> E.g. Errington (1972), 34ff.

<sup>446</sup> Dell (1967).

<sup>447</sup> Bandelli (2004) and Šašel Kos (2002).

<sup>448</sup> Polyb. 2.2.1-2.

<sup>449</sup> Čašule (2011) and (2012).

Second, Polybius' presentation of the interview between Teuta and the Roman ambassadors complicates the distinction between piracy and expansion. The two brothers complain to her of the injustices suffered by the Romans:

Teuta, during the whole interview, listened to them in a most arrogant and overbearing manner, and when they had finished speaking, she said she would see to it that Rome suffered no public wrong from Illyria, but that, as for private wrongs, it was contrary to the custom of the Illyrian kings to hinder their subjects from winning booty from the sea. The younger of the ambassadors was very indignant at these words of hers, and spoke out with a frankness most proper indeed, but highly inopportune: "O Teuta," he said, "the Romans have an admirable custom, which is to punish publicly the doers of private wrongs and publicly come to the help of the wronged. Be sure that we will try, God willing, by might and main and right soon, to force you to mend the custom toward the Illyrians of their kings."<sup>450</sup>

Are these public wrongs or private wrongs? Teuta suggests that she has little control over the raids her forces undertake. But in Polybius' narrative, this interview comes right after Teuta had sent her subjects out with the explicit order to treat the entire seaboard as belonging to their enemies and to seize any ships they encountered on the way.<sup>451</sup> In Polybius' dramatization, she misrepresents her actions and her control over her subjects to disguise her intentions and her greed. Just before the ambassadors arrive, Polybius tells us the spoils from Phoenice—the Adriatic city from which Illyrian ships captured and killed Italians—made her twice as eager to attack Greek cities as before.<sup>452</sup> This greed, coupled with a fiery temper, induces Teuta to order the assassination of the younger ambassador who offended her. So which is it? Does Teuta have control over her raiding force and send them out to attack everyone and everything, in which case she lies to the ambassadors about her involvement? Or does the interview reveal the real power structure in Illyria and demonstrate that she cannot rein in the elites commanding these raiding parties?

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<sup>450</sup> Polyb. 2.8.9-11.

<sup>451</sup> Polyb. 2.4.8-9.

<sup>452</sup> Polyb. 2.8.4-5.

For Polybius, this set piece displays a contrast between the barbarian Teuta and the civilized Romans: Teuta encourages despicable raiding where the Romans correct such wrongs. As Craig Champion demonstrated in his important 2004 book, this fits within what he calls Polybius' "barbarian typology." Polybius depicts people he considers barbarians as fiery-tempered, greedy, short-sighted, false, and opportunistic.<sup>453</sup> It fits his paradigm of inferior "others" to have Teuta lie, demand her subjects bring her more booty, and in reality have little control over their actions. Setting aside Polybius' dramatic tendencies, should we understand the Illyrians to be pushing south in an attempt to expand their territory? Or is this simply piracy? Are the ships and sailors taking Phoenice and seizing and killing Italian merchants Illyria's navy or loosely-connected corsairs?

In the buildup to Roman involvement, some Illyrians under Agron had worked for Demetrius II as mercenaries. The booty they recovered from the siege of Medion so inspired Teuta that the Illyrians expanded further south, seizing Phoenice, almost taking Epidamnus, and ultimately controlling Corcyra. Were it not for Polybius' characterization of Teuta as a ridiculous barbarian drama queen, the whole episode might be viewed as a bid for power in the southern Adriatic and northern Ionian Seas, an effort to fill the void created by the fall of Epirus.<sup>454</sup> But how do we reconcile the mercenary navy with Illyrian expansion or piracy? Polybius relates that a relief force from the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues attempted to lift the siege of Corcyra and

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<sup>453</sup> Champion (2004), esp 111-4.

<sup>454</sup> Arthur Eckstein speaks to this view in Eckstein (2008), 34: The growth in Illyrian piracy was only one element in a sudden and dramatic shift in the configuration of power along the Illyrian coast. Agron, the Ardiaean king, had gained control over many other Illyrian tribes (Polyb. 2.2.4); meanwhile the Kingdom of Epirus, which had previously provided a bulwark against Illyrian pressure towards the south, collapsed in 233/232 BC. The new Epirote republic was weak; parts of the old kingdom broke away and became independent, including Acarnania in the south. Agron soon took advantage of his own strength and Epirote weakness.

was defeated by a combined flotilla of Illyrians and Acarnanians, suggesting that they were very competent.<sup>455</sup> This certainly appears more like a conquering navy than a rag-tag group of pirates.

In fact, Illyrian expansionism and not “piracy” features in Appian’s much later account of the war:

Agron was king of that part of Illyria which borders the Adriatic Sea, over which sea Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, and his successors held sway. Agron in turn captured a part of Epirus and also Corcyra, Epidamnus, and Pharos in succession, and established garrisons in them. When he threatened the rest of the Adriatic with his fleet, the isle of Issa implored the aid of the Romans. The latter sent ambassadors to accompany the Issii and to ascertain what offences Agron imputed to them. The Illyrian light vessels attacked the ambassadors as they sailed up, and slew Cleemporus, the envoy of Issa, and the Roman Coruncanius; the remainder escaped by flight. Thereupon the Romans invaded Illyria by land and sea.<sup>456</sup>

Here it is the Illyrian ability to attack the whole Adriatic and Ionian Seas, ἐπιπλέοντος δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον Ἴόνιον, that drew Rome into the affair.<sup>457</sup> But most historians reject Appian’s account in favor of Polybius.<sup>458</sup> Eckstein, for example, argues that Appian’s account is too pro-Roman, depicting the Romans swooping in to rescue a Hellenistic city from the barbarian Illyrians. He also notes that Issa, the focus of Appian’s account, was far to the north and ignored until late in the war: in both accounts the Romans deal first with Corcyra and Epidamnus among other cities before arriving to relieve Issa.<sup>459</sup> Of course, Polybius’ contrast between the ordered, civilized Romans and the shrieking barbarian Teuta is hardly less pro-Roman (though perhaps anti-Illyrian is better). To his second point, the threat to the Strait of Otranto presented by Illyrians controlling Corcyra and Epidamnus required immediate attention. Only with dominance

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<sup>455</sup> Polyb. 2.9.8-10.6.

<sup>456</sup> App. *Ill.* 7, Loeb translation of Horace White (1912).

<sup>457</sup> For Greek terms for the Adriatic and Ionian over time, see chapter one.

<sup>458</sup> With the important exception of Peter Derow in Derow (1973), 118-34; cf. Errington (1989), 87-8.

<sup>459</sup> Eckstein (2008), 36; App. *Ill.* 7; Polyb. 2.11.

of the strait could a military force safely make its way north to Issa following the normal flow of traffic in the Adriatic.<sup>460</sup>

To my eyes, these accounts are not incompatible. They both describe an expanding Illyria reaching further north and further south and suddenly able to strike as far as the Strait of Otranto and beyond. Confusion enters with words like “piracy” and “barbarian” that muddy the waters around these maritime attacks. What for Appian was clearly expansion seems like hot-headed greed in Polybius. Can these two accounts be reconciled? Were Illyrian actions military aggression or piracy? State-sponsored or not? And was this an endemic problem?

### *Illyrian Pirate Kings*

After the influence of Agron and Teuta, Illyrian predation continued under the direction of four men: Demetrius of Pharos, Scerdilaidas, Pleuratus, and Genthius.<sup>461</sup> Demetrius of Pharos was the Illyrian commander at Corcyra in 229-8 BC and, both Polybius and Appian report, betrayed the island to the Romans.<sup>462</sup> In return he was given a great deal of authority in the aftermath of the war, authority he abused by raiding within and without the Adriatic in violation of the peace treaty.<sup>463</sup> Appian describes Demetrius taking advantage of his position and Rome’s occupation with other conflicts to join with the Istrians in plundering the sea, τὴν θάλασσαν ἐλήζετο.<sup>464</sup> Appian uses the noun form ληστής for those carrying out the plundering. This is a word Appian uses for piracy and brigandage throughout his works, e.g. for Pompey’s war against the pirates in 67 BC.<sup>465</sup> Apparently Demetrius and the Histrians seized shipments of grain from

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<sup>460</sup> On wind and currents in the Adriatic, chapter one. On trade routes and harbors, chapter two.

<sup>461</sup> Šašel Kos (2002).

<sup>462</sup> Polyb. 2.11.

<sup>463</sup> Polyb. 2.11, 3.16; App. *Ill.* 8.

<sup>464</sup> App. *Ill.* 8.

<sup>465</sup> App. *B.C.* 2.1.1.

Sicily to the Roman battlefields of Cisalpine Gaul.<sup>466</sup> This resulted in the Histrian War of 221-220 BC. Appian notes that the Romans swiftly put down the ληστής and then marched on Demetrius, who fled (called the Second Illyrian War of 219 BC). He returned later to the Adriatic to plunder it anew until the Romans killed him. Critically, Appian records that Demetrius managed to break the Atintani, an Illyrian tribe, away from their alliance with Rome.<sup>467</sup> In combination, these do not sound like haphazard piratical raids—especially considering alliances with both the Histri and the Atintani—but rather a play for territory in the Adriatic. However much Demetrius may have misjudged the power balance in the Adriatic, it is noteworthy that Appian has him engaging in these attacks, fleeing, and then returning to engage in piracy again. Whether for foodstuffs or something more, there were gains to be had in the Adriatic that outweighed the risks.

In his own narrative of Demetrius, Polybius' emphasis is on the man's relationship with Macedon and the larger picture of Roman power expanding eastward. He describes him plundering (πορθεῖν) and subduing (καταστρέφειν) cities under Roman protection. But he makes Demetrius' primary transgression his sailing beyond the Lissus with 50 boats to sack the Cyclades (πορθεῖν) contrary to the Illyrian treaty with Rome after the First Illyrian War.<sup>468</sup> For Polybius, the Roman response (the Second Illyrian War) was really to the growing power of the Macedonian kingdom Demetrius now served.<sup>469</sup> Underneath the politics there remains a continuity of booty. Back when he introduced the Illyrian way of plundering in his exposition for the First Illyrian War, Polybius used the same verb πορθεῖν for the kind of raiding the Illyrians

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<sup>466</sup> Eutr. 3.7; Oros. 4.13.16; Diod. 25.14.1; Dell (1970); cf. Eckstein (1999); Bandelli (1981).

<sup>467</sup> App. *Ill.* 8; Burton (2011), 136.

<sup>468</sup> Polyb. 3.16.

<sup>469</sup> 3.16.4: "The Romans, in view of those proceedings and of the flourishing fortunes of the Macedonian kingdom, were anxious to secure their position in the lands lying east of Italy" (Patton's translation). Or, as Walbank has it, "Polybius motivates this war as designed to secure the rear before the clash with Carthage." Walbank (1970), 324.

habitually perpetrated on Elis and Messenia.<sup>470</sup> However much the political situation may have changed, Polybius sees Illyrian plundering in 230 and 219 BC in the same light.

The accounts of both Appian and Polybius both depict a Demetrius of Pharos marauding and expanding in the Adriatic. Leading 50 boats, he plunders (πορθεῖν) the coastline south of Lissus, seizes grain shipments, and goes even further than the traditional hunting grounds of Elis and Messenia, rounding the Peloponnese to raid the Cyclades. Appian and Polybius both preserve the Roman commander's ultimate method of squelching Demetrius' piracy: he razed Pharos to the ground.<sup>471</sup> The destruction of Pharos could be viewed as Roman revenge for Demetrius' disloyalty.<sup>472</sup> And interestingly, Appian calls Pharos "his hometown, guilty with him in crime."<sup>473</sup> Pharos must have served as Demetrius' naval base for all his piratical activities, supplying his ships and taking part in the bounty of his maritime harvest. The effective way to stop his expeditions was to destroy his base of operations. As noted elsewhere,<sup>474</sup> Pharos stood out among the Adriatic islands for its fertility, the sheer acreage of tillable ground, and its excellent harbors. Its position among the other Illyrian islands facilitated communication between them and also with the mainland.<sup>475</sup> From a strong, supply-filled base at Pharos, a fleet of ships could easily harass any shipping along the Illyrian coast and as far as the Strait of Otranto. The rare combination of fresh water, sustainable amounts of farmland, and the isolation of an island with strong, defensible harbors made Demetrius powerful indeed.

Demetrius' contemporary and successor was Scerdilaidas, a prominent Illyrian figure allied with the Aetolians, Philip V, and eventually the Romans. He first appears in Polybius

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<sup>470</sup> Polyb. 2.5.2: Ταύτας γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰς χώρας Ἰλλυριοὶ πορθοῦντες διετέλουν.

<sup>471</sup> App. *Ill.* 8; Polyb. 3.18-9.

<sup>472</sup> E.g. Hammond (1968), 11: In 219 the Romans sent the two consuls with an army which was probably as large as that of 229 B.C. to punish Demetrius and his Illyrian collaborators.

<sup>473</sup> App. *Ill.* 8: τὴν πατρίδα αὐτῷ Φάρον συναμαρτοῦσαν.

<sup>474</sup> See chapter one and Gaffney et al. (1997).

<sup>475</sup> Šašel Kos (2002), 145-6.



commanding ground troops against Epirote forces near Phoenice in 230 BC.<sup>476</sup> Ten years later, he joins Demetrius of Pharos in an extended raid south of the Adriatic. After attacking Pylos, he ends up amassing larger Illyrian forces and assisting the Aetolians in an invasion of Attica.<sup>477</sup> By 218 BC, he has become disaffected with the Aetolians. It seems they promised to divide their spoils with him and then, having captured a great deal of booty, they refused to share it.<sup>478</sup> As a result, he was eager to sever his relationship with Aetolia and agreed with Philip V to an alliance with Macedon. He would receive payment of 20 talents a year in return for ravaging the Aetolians by sea.<sup>479</sup> Philip also agreed to make Scerdilaidas ruler of Illyria, a position he seems to have held at least by 211 BC when Livy calls him such.<sup>480</sup> Scerdilaidas' final appearances in Polybius find him turning on Philip after never receiving his promised payment. He authorizes seaborne raids at Leucas, Malea, and beyond.<sup>481</sup> Then he seizes much of the overland route from Illyria to Macedon, prompting Philip to turn his attention westward, retake lost territory, and ultimately build a fleet to take Illyria by sea.<sup>482</sup> Scerdilaidas forges an alliance with Rome and dies sometime before the treaty of Phoenice in 205 BC.<sup>483</sup>

Significantly, Scerdilaidas' primary concern seems to have been money. He had a fighting force at his disposal and deployed them to seek wealth. Peter Green calls him Demetrius of Pharos' "rival in piracy", thus setting him up as another pirate king.<sup>484</sup> But the majority of his transmitted actions do not fit the traditional mold of piracy. Certainly raiding with Demetrius seems piratical. But the others—all directed by alliances with parties in the Social War—seem

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<sup>476</sup> Polyb. 2.5-6.

<sup>477</sup> Polyb. 4.16.

<sup>478</sup> Polyb. 4.16.10, 29.6-7.

<sup>479</sup> Polyb. 4.29.7.

<sup>480</sup> Liv. 26.24.9: *Pleuratus et Scerdilaidus...Illyriorum reges*.

<sup>481</sup> Polyb. 5.95.1-4.

<sup>482</sup> Polyb. 5.108-110.

<sup>483</sup> Liv. 29.12: his son Pleuratus rules without him (unlike joint rule at 26.24.9).

<sup>484</sup> Green (1990), 296.

wrapped up in politics. Šašel Kos, Hammond, Gruen, Errington, and even Ormerod naturally focus their discussions of Scerdilaidas on these shifting alliances.<sup>485</sup> But for Scerdilaidas, a dynast with a small, swift fleet and a retinue of soldiers, the dynamic world of the Adriatic created opportunities for profit as much as political maneuvering.

Pleuratus and Genthius, the last kings of the Illyrians, finish this big men exposition of Illyrian piracy. Pleuratus' brigandage was the ravaging of the Aetolian coasts within the Corinthian Gulf, following in the footsteps of his (presumed) father before him.<sup>486</sup> Šašel Kos asserts that, having being called the ideal client king of the Romans, Pleuratus' piratical "depredations were also carried out on behalf of the Romans, and certainly in agreement with them."<sup>487</sup> Genthius' raiding is better documented. Livy records that the praetor for 181 BC in Illyria, L. Duronius, complained of piracy in the Adriatic coming from Illyria and alleged that Genthius was responsible.<sup>488</sup> Piracy had apparently spread far to the north, as Duronius had received Histria as his province in addition to Apulia, explicitly to deal with pirates.<sup>489</sup> Escalating tensions near Histria led to a Histrian War in 178 BC, in which both Roman naval commanders were dispatched to fight an Illyrian fleet.<sup>490</sup> It would be easy to see Illyrian expansion through Histria in these reports similar to Demetrius' actions in the 220s BC.<sup>491</sup> The line between piracy and military expansion seems quite thin here. In any case, Genthius' loose alliance with Rome eventually broke down around maritime conflicts like these, and he entered into an agreement

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<sup>485</sup> Šašel Kos (2002), 146-51; Hammond (1968), 10ff; Gruen (1984), 371ff; Errington (1989), 91ff; Ormerod (1924), 174ff.

<sup>486</sup> In 189: Liv. 38.7.2

<sup>487</sup> Polyb. 21.11.7-8; Šašel Kos (2002), 152.

<sup>488</sup> Liv. 40.42.

<sup>489</sup> Liv. 40.18.3: *quod Tarentini Brundisinique nuntiabant maritimos agros infestos transmarinarum navium latrociniis esse*; and later that year he would be placed in charge of the *quaestio de Bacchanalibus*, Liv. 40.19.9-10.

<sup>490</sup> Liv. 41.1.3.

<sup>491</sup> App. *Ill.* 8 and above.

with Perseus on the eve of the Third Macedonian War. That conflict led to the absorption of Illyria as a Roman province.

Šašel Kos insightfully argues that all four of these men “maintained their authority mainly due to their powerful navies,” and that their authority—and large-scale Illyrian piracy—ended with the Roman decision in 167 BC to hand all of Genthius’ ships to allied cities south of the Adriatic: Corcyra, Apollonia, and Epidamnus.<sup>492</sup> She clearly states the monetary problems of maintaining any kind of fleet:

For Genthius it was certainly not easy to maintain his large fleet of 200 *lembi*...i.e. ca. 11,000 men who were both skilled soldiers and sailors, and piracy was necessarily one of the means to support them. In this respect, Genthius could not have led a different internal policy from that of Agron and Teuta, who could not prevent, but certainly also did not object to, the piratical exploits of their subjects, since they could not adequately compensate them in other ways for their support.<sup>493</sup>

Indeed, the feeding of such a huge fleet of pirates would have necessitated a great deal of raiding and conflict, perhaps more than can reasonably be supported full-time. As Šašel Kos rightly states, piracy was only one of the means of supporting this large group of fighting men.

What should we make of these four Illyrian dynasts raiding and hiring out their pillaging fleets over the 60 years from the First Illyrian War to the end of Illyrian sovereignty in 167 BC? Erich Gruen asserts that Scerdilaidas was “a piratical raider, harassing the vessels of Philip’s allies and plundering luckless merchantmen.”<sup>494</sup> For Šašel Kos all four of these dynasts represent large-scale piracy and its traditions in Illyria. Yet many of their activities appear aimed at consolidating state power. Are they Ormerod’s pirates, “wild, uncivilized tribes, who were active marauders by land and sea?”<sup>495</sup> Or state-builders?

## II. New Approaches

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<sup>492</sup> Šašel Kos (2002), 155.

<sup>493</sup> Šašel Kos (2002), 155.

<sup>494</sup> Gruen (1984), 374; cf. Dzino (2005), 51-4.

<sup>495</sup> Ormerod (1924), 166.

As we have seen, the line between pirates and navies stretches quite thin. Was Cleonymus of Sparta's maritime force depredating the Po River system in 303 BC engaged in piracy, a military campaign, or something more generic like raiding? Were the Illyrian seamen who seized Phoenice and Corcyra and besieged Epidamnus and Issa pirates or marines? The answers to these questions depend on where one stands. As Gallant put it simply, "One state's pirate was another state's privateer."<sup>496</sup> While this problem seems to be widely understood, no one writing about piracy in the ancient world has proposed a solution. Most acknowledge the difficulties of these labels and then proceed to use them anyway.<sup>497</sup> Outside of ancient history, scholars working in other fields have uncovered useful methods for addressing these inconsistencies.

The most promising work on piracy bridges history, anthropology, and political science and places brigands of all types at the center of state formation across many comparative studies while emphasizing the agency of individual pirates. In essence, several strands of scholarship on the nature and emergence of the state coalesce around violence and the state's control over its use. In these arguments, bandits, pirates, and men at arms of all sorts become essential to the wielding of authority under the chaotic economic and political conditions that generally facilitate state formation. These environments both produce military men and put them to work on both sides of the law. Ultimately, the emerging state(s)' efforts to subdue these men of violence

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<sup>496</sup> Gallant (1999), 27-8.

<sup>497</sup> E.g. Tröster (2009), 16-7, where he declares: "The very definition of certain activities as piratical, criminal, or terrorist necessarily involves an element of subjectivity and arbitrariness... The distinction between piracy and conventional naval warfare, too, can be as blurred as it is fundamental, for, in many cases, labels such as 'pirate' or 'buccaneer' are simply the terminology applied by those wishing to discredit the activities that may actually be difficult to distinguish from more respectable forms of trade and violence." Yet, after acknowledging that our Romanocentric sources paint enemies as pirates and create problems of interpretation, Tröster proposes no solution and happily uses the term "pirate" throughout his important article. Similarly Philip de Souza (1999) carefully explains the pitfalls of translation where piracy is concerned and then does the same.

consolidate authority and institutions into a centralized affair recognizable as a legitimate state, defined largely by its monopoly on the use of force. Within these frameworks for understanding violence and state formation are the keys for making sense of maritime attacks in the Adriatic as a way of making a living and as a symptom, cause, and effect of the struggle for state authority in that sea.

In this section of the chapter, I work through three strands of scholarship to bring these frameworks to bear on piracy in the Adriatic: first, violence and state-formation, then brigands and state-formation, and finally brigands and ecological space. I conclude this section by weaving these three threads together into a new understanding of maritime violence in the ancient world.

The study of the role of violence in the formation of the state begins with Weber's famous definition:

A "ruling organization" will be called "political" insofar as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded within a given *territorial* area by the threat and application of physical force on the part of the administrative staff. A compulsory political organization with continuous operations (*politischer Anstaltsbetrieb*) will be called a "state" insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.<sup>498</sup>

Weber's thesis has provoked many other, slightly dissimilar definitions which all include some monopoly of violence if the rest of the language has changed. Walter Scheidel surveyed a collection of recent definitions and concluded that they coalesce around a few ideas: "centralized institutions that impose rules, and back them up by force, over a territorially circumscribed

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<sup>498</sup> Weber (1978), 54. Walter Scheidel provides his own, slightly different translation which he asserts corrects problems in this standard English version. I cite the English most are familiar with. Scheidel's follows (Scheidel (2013), 1-2): A "ruling organization" shall be called a "*political* organization" if and insofar as its existence and the effectiveness of its order within a specifiable geographical *area* are continuously safeguarded by the application and the threat of physical coercion on the part of the administrative staff. A continuously operating compulsory political organization shall be called a "state" if and insofar as its administrative staff successfully claims the *monopoly* of *legitimate* physical coercion in the implementation of its order."

population; a distinction between the rulers and the ruled; and an element of autonomy, stability, and differentiation.”<sup>499</sup> Indeed, of ten definitions Scheidel cites spanning from 1970 to 2009, six include coercion, control, or violence.<sup>500</sup>

Janice Thomson zooms in on the two most influential definitions (after Weber) in her important 1994 book on violence outside the state.<sup>501</sup> The first is that of Charles Tilly, who argued that a state is an “organization, controlling the principal means of coercion within a given territory, which is differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory, autonomous, centralized, and formally coordinated.”<sup>502</sup> The second is that of Anthony Giddens: “The nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence.”<sup>503</sup> As Thomson notes, Tilly and Giddens abandon Weber’s “legitimacy” as this is problematic: legitimacy depends on point of view. Thomson asserts that the subtle differences in language around violence here are important. Tilly envisions a state controlling only the *principal means of coercion*, leaving open other means, and that within the state’s territory whereas Giddens sees *direct control of the means of internal and external violence*, which assumes much broader authority and is closer to Weber’s *monopoly*. Importantly, Weber’s definition requires control of the use of force only in the enforcement of the state’s order, whereas Tilly and Giddens do not restrict force in this way.

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<sup>499</sup> Scheidel (2013), 3.

<sup>500</sup> Scheidel (2013), 1-3, listed here in order they appear in his text with a keyword: Sanderson (1999), 56 “violence”; Tilly (1992), 1 “coercion”; Mann (1986), 37 “physical violence”; Haldon (1993), 32-3 “authority”; Hansen (2000), 13 “physical force, coercion”; Goldstone and Haldon (2009), 6 “Coercive power, punitively”; Morris (1991), 40-1 none; Carneiro (1970), 733 none; Cohen, R. (1978), 69 “control of force”; Claessen and Skalnik (1978), 640 none.

<sup>501</sup> Thomson (1994), 7-10.

<sup>502</sup> Tilly (1975), 638.

<sup>503</sup> Giddens (1985), 121.

Many of these definitions are focused on the modern world. Premodern states did not effectively exert a monopoly on violence either inside or outside the state.<sup>504</sup> An important new book by Douglas North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast seeks to upend these distinctions by interpreting the state as an organization made up of many organizations within which elites compete. In their formulation, the state is an organization meant to control violence by limiting access to the resources of large-scale violence and to the club of rulers more generally: “limiting the ability to form contractual organizations only to members of the coalition ties the interests of powerful elites directly to the survival of the coalition, thus ensuring their continued cooperation within the coalition.”<sup>505</sup> The overall arguments of the book is that these coalitions are the building blocks of states and that modern states do not develop until the elites in such coalitions buy into impersonal intra-elite relationships. The authors distinguish between the natural state and the open access order, the latter describing contemporary states in which access to the organizations that make up the state is not limited personally but open impersonally. To get there, they started with the question, how do we get powerful elites to stop fighting? They determined that “controlling violence depends on the structure and maintenance of relationships

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<sup>504</sup> Goldstone and Haldon (2009), esp. 4-8, from 4-5: “To begin with the notion of the state: no agreement has ever been reached on a universally accepted general definition that has any real analytic value, partly because historians and anthropologists tend to define “the state” in terms of the different questions they wish to ask. Indeed, for much of human history the state is not a relevant concept to the forms and functions of social and political organization. It is difficult to point to institutions that formally constitute “the state” until the evolution from the third millennium B.C.E. of sacred monarchical authority concentrated in the hands of an individual supported by an intellectual-religious elite. Yet thereafter, too rigid a definition merely acts as a conceptual straitjacket that ignores the fundamentally dynamic and dialectical nature of human social organization, and so, as with any definition, the notion of “the state” must remain flexible if its to generate explanations; it should function as a heuristic tool.” Scheidel (2013), 13-4; Crone (2003), esp. 35-80; Christian (2004), 274; North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), 268-70.

<sup>505</sup> North et al. (2009), 17. The primary arguments of the book focus on the transition from the natural state to the open access order, what conditions must be present for that transition to occur, and how it happens or does not happen.

among powerful individuals.”<sup>506</sup> North, Wallis, and Weingast are reorganizing the topography of states and state-formation in terms of controlling violence through organizations of elites.

The common denominator here is violence. Bandits, pirates, and other agents of violence play an integral role in the struggles among elites and the formation of states. The study of bandits properly began with Fernand Braudel who emphasized the role of brigands in the early modern Mediterranean and Eric Hobsbawm whose formulation of the “social bandit” dominated bandit studies for decades.<sup>507</sup> Hobsbawm categorized banditry as a political act of protest or rebellion. But as Gallant argued, beginning inquiries with the label “bandit” circumscribed the field to acts outside the law, a problematic definition given the dynamics of early states. Arguments in the field of bandit studies have revolved around whether banditry is a political act, as in Hobsbawm’s formulation, and under what circumstances banditry flourishes.<sup>508</sup> A new approach has shifted the field toward the effects of brigandage on the centralizing of state power and state-formation.

In an oft-cited article from 1999, Thomas Gallant argued for a new approach to bandits, beginning with the recognition that bandits often operate on both sides of the law and that restricting study to their illegal acts obfuscates their larger role.<sup>509</sup> He proposed that we instead use the term “military entrepreneur” borrowed from Koliopoulos’ work on the Greek War of National Liberation in the 19<sup>th</sup> century:

By “military entrepreneur” I refer to a category of men who take up arms and who wield violence or the threat of violence as their stock in trade. I use “military” here not in its contemporary common connotation of a national army, but in an older, more ambiguous

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<sup>506</sup> North et al. (2009), 18.

<sup>507</sup> Gallant (1999), 26; Braudel (1972) and (1947); Hobsbawm (1965), (1972), and (1981).

<sup>508</sup> Gallant (1999), 26-28. On the social bandit debate, he offers as examples Joseph (1990) in *Latin American Research Review* and rebuttals in the next issue of the same journal. See now Löwy (2000). On circumstances, Hobsbawm, (1972), Hobsbawm (1981), and challenges by O’Malley (1979a, (1979b), (1980), and (1983).

<sup>509</sup> Gallant (1999).



form referring only to the use of arms and weapons. They are entrepreneurs in the sense that they are purveyors of a commodity—violence. They may act in the employ of others or as agents in their own right. The value of the concept is that it delineates a discrete set of historical actors while not restricting inquiry to only limited aspects of their activities.<sup>510</sup>

Gallant uses this concept in a broad sweep of comparative history to illustrate the effects military entrepreneurs have on the spread of capitalism and centralized state authority. He places these military men at the center of power struggles and observes them switching fluidly from bandits to guards, pirates to navies, and robbers to tax collectors as elites in nascent states grasp around for physical force to exert their will.<sup>511</sup> He argues that these entrepreneurs speed up the spread of capitalism by both marketizing the peripheral and semi-peripheral zones they inhabit (they must sell captured goods to buy foodstuffs) and connecting their home villages to the far-flung places represented by seized booty.<sup>512</sup> Further and critically for our purposes, he connects these military men to zones of weak state authority and emerging centralized governments and highlights their roles in solidifying state power. Breaking his examples into two groups, Gallant highlights rebellions and warlordism: in the first instance, frequently military entrepreneurs provide manpower for the rebellions and then, when the war is over, turn to banditry in lieu of other employment, which leads to villainization by the state now seeking to consolidate control in the wake of rebellion; in the second, military entrepreneurs provide forces for elites competing for power and, when those conflicts are over, they have either become inlaws or outlaws depending on the victor.<sup>513</sup> Among many comparative examples of this process, he emphasizes the role of “pirates” in the Tay-san rebellion from China during the late 18<sup>th</sup> century:

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<sup>510</sup> Gallant (1999), 26. Gallant is himself a historian of modern Greece. Koliopoulos (1984).

<sup>511</sup> Gallant (1999), 31-32 he cites examples in India, Egypt, elsewhere in Africa, China, Latin America, Brazil, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, the Ottoman Empire, Greece, the Balkans, Anatolia, Spain, and Italy.

<sup>512</sup> Gallant (1999), 37-9.

<sup>513</sup> Gallant (1999), 39-45.

If the Tay-san had been victorious then they would have been transformed into inlaws, and probably would have become the fleet of the new government. Since, however, they were clients of the losers, they stood once more outside the law, except that now their numbers were far greater than before. Unable to conquer them, the Chinese Emperor did what so many other rulers before and after him had done: he bestowed legitimate authority on some of the pirates, and ordered them to eradicate those who could not be accommodated.<sup>514</sup>

This easy flip-flopping of roles among military entrepreneurs from outlaw to inlaw and brigand to enforcer demonstrates both the pitfalls of classification and the way forward. As Gallant outlines, we can more profitably see these actors as entrepreneurs than as criminals, as part of the process of state-formation and the centralization of authority than as enemies of those states.

Gallant's framework for understanding brigands/military men in weak state systems has not yet penetrated discussions of the ancient world. To the best of my knowledge, this will be the first effort to interpret any ancient "piracy" through this model. But Gallant's work has greatly influenced scholarship in other fields. The role of military entrepreneurs in state-formation has proven especially attractive and has appeared in a series of monographs, articles, book chapters, and edited volumes.<sup>515</sup> Perhaps typically, a collective effort to catalog state-formation and piracy over 3000 years of history recently featured chapters that engaged enthusiastically with Gallant's model and with theories of violence, political power, and state-formation in general, yet the only chapter on the ancient Mediterranean eschews any sort of theory. The author says simply,

In the world of Classical Antiquity, however, nation-states were not the norm, and such states as did exist lacked the extensive juridical systems and law enforcement apparatus of modern states. Therefore, with regard to Classical Antiquity, piracy should be defined at a much more basic level as any form of armed robbery involving the use of ships... The use of the term 'robbery' in this definition implies illegitimacy, but exactly where the line

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<sup>514</sup> Gallant (1999), 46. Cf. Antony (2010) and now (2014); Wheeler (2015).

<sup>515</sup> In roughly chronological order: Abraham and van Schendel (2005), esp. their introduction; Easterling (2005), 185ff; Hansen and Steputat (2006); Strazzari (2007): esp. 187-8; Schneider and Schneider (2008): esp 358-9; Kleinen and Osseweijer (2010); Ribeiro (2010); Thorup (2012), 171-2; Bridenthal (2013), esp. introduction by Bridenthal; Burgess (2014), 4ff; Lincoln (2014), e.g. 152; Wheeler (2015), Denmark (2017).

should be drawn between illegitimate piracy by outlaws and legitimate, state-sanctioned, violent plundering by military forces in warfare is not always clear.<sup>516</sup>

The concept of the variable military entrepreneur would certainly help here: there is no line between legitimate and illegitimate plundering. Both are violence perpetrated by seafaring men. The rest is simply perspective and propaganda.

In general, the study of piracy in the ancient world continues to be about economics and the role of states in suppressing piracy for economic means, a top-down approach.<sup>517</sup> This is a very important line of enquiry and not one I wish to disparage. But I believe that injecting Gallant's framework of state-formation and violence into existing discussions would solve current problems and illuminate ongoing discussions about state power and struggles for hegemony. For example, much of the ongoing debate about the nature of the Cilician pirates—rabble or state cutting into Roman maritime security?—in the Mediterranean pirate crisis of the first century BC could be put to rest on the understanding that “pirate” and “navy” are fluid and interchangeable terms and that in the political anarchy of the first century, many players made grabs for power using whatever military entrepreneurs they could find.<sup>518</sup> Crucially, scholars in other fields have recognized the role warfare plays in creating pirates: especially in zones with weak state authority and insurgent new states, grasping for power means recruiting or creating military entrepreneurs who are then out of a job when the conflict ends; more often than not, they

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<sup>516</sup> de Souza (2014), 24.

<sup>517</sup> E.g. Bresson (2016), 302ff; Crisculo (2013) and Kruse (2013); Tröster (2009), 19ff; Gabrielsen (2001). More generally, Anderson (2001); Starkey (2001); and Nadal (2001), and now Leeson (2009).

<sup>518</sup> Philip de Souza has made a career out of defining Rome's largely political construction of piracy, especially in this Cilician crisis, e.g. de Souza (1999), 97-178, the bulk of his original monograph, before that de Souza (1996), (1997), (1998), and now de Souza (2008) and (2014); cf. Ruah (2003), chapter 5; Gabrielsen (2001); Avidov (1997).

put their military skills to work doing the same things but without the aegis of a nascent or crumbling state.<sup>519</sup>

The field of pirate studies more generally is having a moment. A bibliography compiled for piracy-studies.org of academic works on post WWII piracy contains almost 600 entries up to 2015, most within the last 10 years.<sup>520</sup> Much of this has been fueled by the piracy in Somalia with a host of books and articles written on combatting piracy at sea or, importantly, state building to overcome piracy.<sup>521</sup> The current dialogue is almost exclusively focused on state-level, top down analysis. This increased interest in piracy generally has yet to trickle down into ancient history.

What has hit scholars of the ancient world is the mania for Mediterraneanism following the publication of *The Corrupting Sea* in 2000.<sup>522</sup> The importance of this work for understanding the ecologies of the Adriatic has already been explored in chapter one. For this chapter, it is the formulation of micro-ecologies and their connections through the sea that bear on piracy in the following ways. First, as Gallant argued, military entrepreneurs tend to operate out of remote, inaccessible places far from centralized authority:

An examination of the physical geography of brigandage and piracy shows that they flourished in areas where there were closely juxtaposed major trade routes and remote, inaccessible terrain like mountains or deserts...At sea, groups like the *uskoks* of Senj and the Guelayi of Morocco used the treacherous currents, narrows passes, and rugged coastlines of the Adriatic and the Straits of Gibraltar as cover for their assaults on maritime commercial traffic. In both cases, they could easily have retreated into the nearby, inaccessible terrain of the Croatian Dinaric or the Moroccan Rif

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<sup>519</sup> e.g. Gallant (1999), 41ff; Leeson (2009), 11ff.

<sup>520</sup> Stockbrugger and Bueger (2015).

<sup>521</sup> E.g. Gilmer (2014) who argues that much of the aid delivered to Somalia and many of the programs established to help build states on the ground in reality funnel cash to elites who benefit from piracy, much the same way Gallant views elite competition.

<sup>522</sup> For bibliography of reactions for and against, see chapter one. Two good summaries: Herzfeld (2005); Wheeler (2015), esp. 44.

Mountains...Military entrepreneurs like bandits and pirates provided the connecting tissue that articulated rural hinterlands to developing economic zones.<sup>523</sup>

This nests neatly with the proposal by Horden and Purcell that communities in the Mediterranean utilize the sea to connect themselves to other ecologies as a form of portfolio diversification. In this case, brigands connect far-flung places to thriving trade routes by seizing those goods and selling them in their home ports or in between, what Horden and Purcell call “a continuation of cabotage by other means.”<sup>524</sup> The comparison with cabotage is a good one, as it highlights the choice involved: military entrepreneurs have the whole sea available to them and can strike far and wide to connect microecologies many days’ sail away to their home markets. Further, like the caboteurs of the Adriatic world in the last chapter, we should assume that these military entrepreneurs were ubiquitous. We hear about them occasionally in the literary record—most instances noted in this chapter—but the reality on the ground (or on the water, rather) was a continual stream of naval raids and exploitation as thousands of individuals and dozens of communities turned to the sea for additional income by other means.

Second, the ports are crucial nodes of distribution and access for these entrepreneurs. As discussed in chapter one, the Adriatic features one of the most incised coastlines in the world, an almost impenetrable escape for raiders of all stripes, but one removed from rich maritime targets. Traveling by warship from, say, Hvar to pillage the Peloponnesian coast would require a journey of over 400 miles as the crow flies and far more along the coastline. This distance would necessitate multiple stops to resupply, preferably in ports with readily available fresh water and markets for trade. Natural harbors occur along the route at reasonable rowing intervals, as between Epidamnus, Apollonia, and the Lissus River.<sup>525</sup> For these port cities, raiding parties

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<sup>523</sup> Gallant (1999), 37

<sup>524</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), 158.

<sup>525</sup> Intervals of about 50 miles. Morrison, Coates, and Rankov (2000), 94-104.

make for good business as they stop to sell their booty. The role of ports in profiting from, encouraging, and suppressing piracy has received a great deal of attention and will be taken up more thoroughly in the next chapter of this project. For the immediate discussion, it is important to recognize that ecological constrictions channeled sea traffic through certain ports which both regularized trade (making it easier, more predictable prey) and provided essential access to markets for military entrepreneurs to ply their wares.<sup>526</sup> In this way ports connected micro-ecologies as distant as the pirates' home villages, ports-of-origin of merchant ships, and the sites of production of seized goods. This level of diversification helped everyone involved in brigandage to hedge their bets against bad weather or ill fortune.

As an example of how all of this comes together, Gallant settles aptly on the Uskoks of Senj on the Adriatic Sea.<sup>527</sup> In the sixteenth century AD (and for a long time thereafter), military entrepreneurs called Uskoks and preserved and lionized in local legend lived at the nexus of three great powers: the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Viennese empires in modern Croatia. Nominally employed as border guards by Habsburg Austria, the Uskoks raided far and wide through the Adriatic, taking advantage of the liminal zone they inhabited and the weakened limits of control in the remote and inaccessible Dinaric Alps. Ultimately it was the reining in the Uskoks and the assertion of Habsburg authority in their region of Croatia that solidified state power there. These military entrepreneurs challenged state authority, operated under its auspices, and ultimately brought about its cementing. In this way they participated in state-formation while operating fluidly around whatever legitimacy might be constructed on such a frontier. It is important to

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<sup>526</sup> For example, excellent chapters in Kleinen and Osseweijer (2010). Cf. Hastings (2009) who argues against the *communis opinio* that weak states rather than failed states are ideal for piracy because pirates need the infrastructure present in a weak state to effectively move their loot. He especially highlights a nexus in Southeast Asia where failed, weak, rich, and poor countries collide so that pirates have access to hideouts, rich targets, and sufficient infrastructure to sell goods with insufficient policing.

<sup>527</sup> Gallant (1999), 50; Bracewell (1992) and (2001).

remember that, however the Habsburgs, Ottomans, and Viennese might have categorized the Uskoks at any given time, to their victims they simply perpetrated violence, whether on behalf of a state or their own private gain, it did not matter.

All of this maps well onto the Adriatic of the third, second, and first centuries BC. As we have seen (chapter one), this was a zone of constant struggle, especially in the southern Adriatic as Epirus, Acarnania, the leagues, and Macedon competed for power. Syracuse and Rome had significant interests in the Adriatic as well, and the shifting political mosaic created ideal circumstances for military entrepreneurs to flourish: many conflicts and so high demand for their skills, an ecological landscape with remote hideouts reasonably close to rich targets and higher-functioning states, and proximity to the wealth represented by major trade routes, especially that through the Strait of Otranto. Under these conditions, no wonder military men thrived in this sea! As external powers like Rome and Macedon tried and failed to project control over parts of the Adriatic, the resulting conflicts heightened the problem by creating more entrepreneurs. Unlike the Tay-san rebellion cited above, no Chinese Emperor succeeded in exerting control of violence (its principal means or all of it, monopoly or no) in the Adriatic. Some, like Pompey and Augustus, claimed to have rid the sea of pirates, but in reality these were temporary shifts pushing entrepreneurs from one line of work into another. In the last section of the chapter, I push maritime attacks—traditionally called piracy—in the Adriatic of the first three centuries BC through this framework and demonstrate its usefulness for studying “piracy,” brigandage, and emerging states in the ancient world.

### III. Application

#### *Dionysius II*

Diodorus Siculus' accounts of Dionysius II founding colonies in Apulia to safeguard the sea against barbarians in their robbing ships and Agathocles financing Iapygian and Peucetian raiding ships are both best understood within the framework of military entrepreneurs operating in systems of weak states and strong men.<sup>528</sup> In the connected world of the Adriatic where warships can cross the Strait of Otranto in less than a day and fleets in Italy can threaten Apollonia, Apulian colonies can absolutely have an impact on raids launched from Illyria.<sup>529</sup> In the chaotic world of the 360s BC, Dionysius II grasps for authority in the seascape around him, establishing strong harbors at two sites from which he can launch raids or counterattacks in the Strait and beyond into the Adriatic. He has military entrepreneurs at his disposal—perhaps some of them were raiding against his merchants moments ago—and puts them to work doing violence from the seas. Whether it is to protect barges crossing the Strait or harass the merchants of others, the line between the forces represented by these two colonies and the Syracusan navy is nearly transparent. Thus Diodorus, Plutarch, and Nepos all report Dionysius II with his fleet in the Adriatic or on the Italian coast. Safeguarding, harassing, or campaigning, these are the same men in very similar violent roles. Crucially, all of this occurs as Dionysius II struggles to assert authority following the death of his father in 367 BC—Dionysius II is reportedly in Italy with the fleet when Dion returns from mainland Greece to oust the unpopular tyrant.<sup>530</sup> With weak authority and in conflict with Dion, it is no wonder the tyrant is worrying about military entrepreneurs (hiring or fighting) and trying to secure control of violence around him. These are the circumstances in which fighting men flourish.

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<sup>528</sup> Diod. Sic. 16.5.3, 21.4.

<sup>529</sup> E.g. the Sicilian expedition Thuc. 6.34.5, 6.44.2 or Philip V fleeing Apollonia at word that Roman naval forces were at Rhegium preparing to cross the Strait of Otranto, Polyb. 5.110.

<sup>530</sup> Diod. Sic. 16.10.2, 16.11.3, Plut. *Dion* 26.1, and Nepos *Dion* 5.4. Westlake (1994), 698ff.



Indeed, Dell sees some 50 years of piracy on the Apulian coast in these two examples, suggesting a perpetual problem.<sup>531</sup> Conflicts like the power struggles in Sicily during that period (a quick succession of rulers following Dion's murder: Callipus, Hipparinus, Nysaeus, Dionysius II again, Timoleon, and ultimately Agathocles) generate countless military men as each elite reaching for power raises a fighting force. If they win, their military entrepreneurs become—at least temporarily—what Gallant calls “inlaws,” legitimate wielders of violence. If they lose, or once their leader is deposed, these inlaws are outlaws again and looking for work.<sup>532</sup> In a highly mobile place like the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, these men can—as Dell suggests—stick around in Apulia and ply their trade in the lucrative Strait of Otranto or move to more remote locations within reasonable striking distance of rich targets and potential employers. The chaos of this period and the connectedness of these spaces make it impossible to say whether these are Apulians or Illyrians: they are simply men of violence looking for work. In the case of Agathocles financing Apulian raiders, these are military entrepreneurs paid by an elite trying to consolidate control and gain revenue. Whether they attack neutral or enemy shipping or opposing navies or raiders, Agathocles' effort is the same: control of violence in his sphere of influence.

These accounts of Diodorus Siculus reflect the state-building happening in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas in the fourth century BC and the role that military entrepreneurs play in that process. Dionysius II establishes new bases of power in an attempt to project authority over violence in these two seas. As he is deposed and other would-be tyrants squabble over Syracuse, each draws on the growing pool of military entrepreneurs flowing through the Strait of Otranto to attempt control. Viewing these events as part of this process of state-formation drawing on a

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<sup>531</sup> Dell (1967), 354.

<sup>532</sup> Gallant (1999), 46.

fluid pool of military men rather than as a fight against a foreign, unrelated menace of “piracy” sheds new light on maritime power in this region.

### *Cleonymus of Sparta*

When Cleonymus of Sparta raids Patavium in 303 BC, he employs a fleet of military entrepreneurs no different from the Illyrians, Liburnians, and Histrians Livy points to as maritime robbers in this passage of his history.<sup>533</sup> In fact, this raid is similar to many others, like the regular Illyrian raids on Elis and Messenia.<sup>534</sup> This is the only mention of Cleonymus in Livy – he does not record the Spartan’s involvement with the Tarantines, only that he seized Thuriae.<sup>535</sup> If he had shared the rest of the story, at least the version in Diodorus Siculus, Cleonymus’ involvement in Italy would have closely mirrored the Illyrian actions of 230/229 BC: both were paid to intervene in a war on behalf of a city (the Illyrians Medion, Cleonymus Taras), both entered a city as friends and then seized goods and people (the Illyrians Phoenice, Cleonymus Metapontum), and then both besieged, captured, and garrisoned Corcyra.<sup>536</sup> The Illyrians used Corcyra as a forward base to attack Epidamnus, but Roman forces engaged them before they could expand further afield in the First Illyrian War.<sup>537</sup> Seventy years earlier, Cleonymus used Corcyra to launch a raid on the Italian coast (in a place defended by the barbarians, as Diodorus has it).<sup>538</sup> Any measure of Cleonymus’ activities would make him as much a pirate as the Illyrians. Livy does not call the Illyrians, Liburnians, and Histrians pirates. He calls them *gentes ferae* who are *infames latrociniis maritimis*. Cleonymus, by contrast, is

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<sup>533</sup> Livy 10.2.

<sup>534</sup> Polyb. 2.5.1.

<sup>535</sup> Livy 10.2.1.

<sup>536</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.104; Polyb. 2.5, 2.9.9-10.9.

<sup>537</sup> Polyb. 2.10.9-11.10.

<sup>538</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.105.1: τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἐλῶν ἐξηνδραποδίσατο, τὴν δὲ χώραν ἐλεηλάτησεν.

simply a leader (*dux*).<sup>539</sup> Viewed through Gallant's framework, Cleonymus leads a flotilla of military entrepreneurs who have just lost a battle and been pushed from their plundering of southern Italy. When the winds blow them northward in the Adriatic, they do what men of violence do best. This is a good example of what happens when nascent rulers or strong men are defeated: their assembled force of entrepreneurs needs work elsewhere and new targets. In this instance, they land in Patavium. While Livy does not tell us what happens next, it is safe to assume that after being driven from the Po River system by Livy's suspiciously courageous countrymen, they found new victims. This is also a good example of the agency of piracy in the Adriatic: Cleonymus had the entire sea available to him. Granted, his was a larger force than was typical, but still he could sail the entire length of the sea and back in search of plunder.

#### *First Illyrian War*

The events leading to the First Illyrian War should be considered in light of the vacuum in the Hellenistic world formed by the fall of Epirus just to the south of Agron's kingdom.

Eckstein puts it this way:

The growth in Illyrian piracy was only one element in a sudden and dramatic shift in the configuration of power along the Illyrian coast. Agron, the Ardiaean king, had gained control over many other Illyrian tribes (Polyb. 2.2.4); meanwhile the Kingdom of Epirus, which had previously provided a bulwark against Illyrian pressure towards the south, collapsed in 233/232 BC. The new Epirote republic was weak; parts of the old kingdom broke away and became independent, including Acarnania in the south. Agron soon took advantage of his own strength and Epirote weakness.<sup>540</sup>

The growth in piracy is a symptom of the shifts in power along this coast. Precisely these chaotic conditions—the collapse of one power and several competing states trying to fill the resultant space—create the ideal milieu for military entrepreneurs to flourish. And we see these men fighting in a variety of circumstances. When Polybius introduces the Illyrians, they are fighting

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<sup>539</sup> Livy 10.2.1: *Eodem anno classis Graecorum Cleonymo duce Lacedaemonio ad Italiae litora adpulsa Thurias urbem in Sallentinis cepit.*

<sup>540</sup> Eckstein (2008), 34.

at the behest of Demetrius II, their neighbor over the mountains. He has paid them to lift the siege of an ally, Medion, as part of his ongoing struggle with the Achaean League. Here we have an elite relying on entrepreneurs for military strength. The Illyrians attack from the sea in swift ships, succeed in raising the siege, and return home with *lemboi* full of booty.<sup>541</sup> The wealth from this attack inspires Queen Teuta to send out anyone who has a boat in pursuit of more. It is the flow of booty back to Teuta that motivates the attacks and the loss of revenue among Italian traders that pulls the Roman senate into the conflict.<sup>542</sup> Thus Agron and Teuta draw on the same pool of entrepreneurs to assert their own claims to control in the Adriatic space. Critically it is the same flotilla of independent naval squadrons—she famously tells the Roman envoys she cannot and would not control her people nor keep them from their traditional raiding<sup>543</sup>—that features in Illyria’s wars against Rome and on behalf of the Achaeans and ultimately Philip V and Perseus. In fact, Polybius describes in book five how Philip became fed up with these Illyrian military entrepreneurs and raised his own fleet to put them down in 217/16 BC.<sup>544</sup> He constructed *lemboi*, the fast ships the Illyrians use, and set out to conquer Illyria. Thus we see the Macedonians, having depended on Illyrian military entrepreneurs in their struggles for power and so creating more and more of them through demand, now trying to conquer them and assert control of violence in their arena as well. Here are the same boats and the same men, but circumstances engage them in work for one elite or state or another. To the rower or the marine, he pursues his living, unaware of the label Polybius or Appian or modern historians will use.

Are the Illyrians under Agron and Teuta engaged in military expansion or piracy? Yes.

They amount to the same thing. The artificial distinction between legitimate and illegitimate

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<sup>541</sup> Polyb. 2.3.

<sup>542</sup> Polyb. 2.4.6-9.

<sup>543</sup> Polyb. 2.8.8.

<sup>544</sup> Polyb. 5.110; on Philip’s purposes, Kleu (2015), chapter 3.

maritime attacks depends entirely on perspective. It appears Illyrian forces attacked from the sea in increasing numbers and further-flung places. This naturally flows from the greater level of chaos in the region surrounding Epirus in the 230s BC. Decreased maritime security resulted in increasing numbers of military entrepreneurs as states grasped about for security forces. These men-at-arms required work, and when no particular elite paid—and especially when he did—they plundered the sea around them. In the 230s and beyond, military entrepreneurs from Illyria plied their trade for Macedonian kings, Agron, Teuta, the leagues, and even Rome. It was all violence. Attempts to define the legitimacy of those attacks simply identify the perspective from which each historian writes.

Within this framework, we can follow both Polybius and Appian. They narrate the same events, namely the increase of maritime attacks in the Adriatic following the collapse of Epirus. Polybius focuses on the seizure of Phoenice and the wealth flowing from this line of work to elites in Illyria, demonizing them as a part of his larger project to project the cultural superiority of Hellenism (from which such rabble as the Illyrians and Aetolians were firmly excluded).<sup>545</sup> He notes how these attacks impacted shipping in the sea, ultimately drawing Rome into the conflict. Appian tells the very same story. More and more military entrepreneurs appear in the Adriatic in this chaotic period, and some of them are employed in the siege of Issa. Others threaten the whole sea with their plundering. In this chaos, some turn to Rome for aid.

Critically, Polybius and Appian's accounts of Illyrian military entrepreneurs revolve around state-formation in the Adriatic. These are elites grasping about for the means to control violence in their spheres of influence and to expand those spheres into the power vacuum created by the fall of Epirus. Agron and Teuta, later Illyrian kings, the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues, Macedon, and Rome all bring violent men to bear on the eastern Adriatic coast in an effort to

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<sup>545</sup> Champion (2004).

control the use of force for their benefit. As Gallant demonstrates, this competition both increases the number of military men available and makes it more difficult to assert control for that very reason: there are now gobs of fighting men looking for a way to make a living right where these nascent states want to control violence. Interestingly, Polybius records that one of the consuls, L. Postumius Albinus, stayed in Illyria after the war with 40 ships and enrolled a legion from Illyria to guard the region.<sup>546</sup> Having just defeated fighting men in Illyria, Rome now employs thousands of them against the rest. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that violence continued. In the absence of a state strong enough to mount a standing navy in the long term or convince some of the military entrepreneurs to eradicate the rest, violence and predation will continue and state authority will remain weak for a long time to come.

### *Illyrian Pirate Kings*

The Illyrian dynasts who followed Agron and Teuta—Demetrius of Pharos, Scerdilaidas, Pleuratus, and Genthius—inherited the violent and chaotic circumstances of the late third and early second centuries BC with its thousands of military entrepreneurs looking for work. Polybius and Appian present Demetrius utilizing such men to make claims to authority in the Adriatic by making bids for power in Istria and among the Atintani and by seizing cities under Roman protection.<sup>547</sup> These same men also plunder the Adriatic and seize Roman grain ships carrying supplies to the legions in Gaul. It is natural that Demetrius' fighting men should shift fluidly between campaigns and raids—they are doing the same work under different names. It is natural too that the Roman consuls should put Demetrius in charge of Illyrian affairs after 229 BC: he was simply a man commanding military entrepreneurs, and they could do the same work for Teuta or Rome as long as it paid. This is another good example of an external power seeking

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<sup>546</sup> Polyb. 2.12.1-2.

<sup>547</sup> Polyb. 3.16; App. *Ill.* 8.

to shore up claims to authority over violence by employing one set of fighting men to ward off or eradicate their peers. That demand for control fosters increased centralized authority and state-building in the Adriatic.

The mercurial quality of these Illyrian military entrepreneurs follows under the other monarchs. Scerdilaidas puts them to work doing violence for Agron, the Aetolians, Philip V, and Rome.<sup>548</sup> Pleuratus and Genthius likewise find employment for their military men, on behalf of Rome and, ultimately, Perseus.<sup>549</sup> As Šašel Kos argues, these dynasts ruled through their navies. She asserts that they permitted their fleets to plunder as a way to compensate them beyond their mercenary work.<sup>550</sup> I think it pushes the evidence too far—leaning especially on Polybius’ fanciful account of Teuta—to suggest any sort of policy toward plundering.<sup>551</sup> It is more helpful to view all of these Illyrian actions as the same thing: violence on the sea. Whether working for Philip V or plundering “independently,” these fighting men put their skills to work, and it made no difference to their victims who financed or approved the voyage.

It is important to note that these Illyrian military entrepreneurs contributed a great deal to state-formation in the Adriatic. The violence they practiced in and from that sea challenged the authority of struggling states: Epirus, Macedon, the leagues, and Rome. Each in turn was pushed to try and assert greater control over the region to the south of Illyria and thus solidify state authority in this part of the Mediterranean. Within the quarrels between these states, Illyrian entrepreneurs frequently found employment, and the demand for more men created ever more entrepreneurs who needed work when the fighting was done. Efforts to quash this fighting

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<sup>548</sup> Polyb. 4.16, 29.6-7, 5.95; Livy 29.12.

<sup>549</sup> Livy 38.7.2.

<sup>550</sup> Šašel Kos (2002), 155.

<sup>551</sup> Polyb. 2.8. Of this passage Gruen says this (1984), 365: The dramatic interchange given by Polybius rests on no first-hand information, is polluted by anti-feminine invective, and cannot be used to support any reconstruction. Cf. Champion (2004), 112-3 on Polybius’ depiction of Teuta within his broader view of barbarians and women in particular.

force—like Philip’s aborted attempt in 217/6 BC to conquer the Illyrian seaboard or ultimately the Third Macedonian War—strengthened centralized power and created stronger states in and around the Adriatic.

#### IV. Conclusion

Piracy in the Adriatic should be viewed through the framework of Thomas Gallant’s military entrepreneurs and their impact on state-formation. With this paradigm in mind, maritime attacks fit into the larger context of the waning of Epirus and the struggle for power in the vacuum that followed. Conflicts between elites and emerging states require fighting men, and the chaotic milieu of these centuries in the Adriatic required thousands of them. When each struggle ended, these military entrepreneurs were either inlaws or outlaws. They performed the same work either way, plying their trade up and down the coasts of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. The resulting attempts by emerging states to put an end to these uncontrolled uses of violence within their perceived territories both produced more military entrepreneurs and attempted to solidify centralized authority structures in the Adriatic. This is state-formation. It is the exertion of control over violence that makes sovereignty and states. As Gallant put it simply, “bandits helped make states, and states made bandits.”<sup>552</sup> Rather than attempt to discern between legitimate and illegitimate actions in ancient texts like Polybius, Appian, and Livy, it is far more useful to view all of these fighting men as fluid characters shifting between roles in a mercurial world of emerging and competing states.

The Adriatic Sea is well suited to precisely the kind of brigandage and state-formation around which Gallant built his thesis. A number of important elements come together within appropriate distances for swift, Illyrian *lembi*: the rich, essential trade route across the Strait of Otranto laden with ships from all over the Mediterranean; weak states and city-states with

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<sup>552</sup> Gallant (1999), 25.



markets available for stolen goods and few qualms about trading in them; and remote terrain inaccessible to pursuers in the highly-incised coast of Illyria and the Dinaric Mountains beyond. This combination of wealthy targets, the means to dispose of booty, and a place to escape make a haven for these countless military entrepreneurs out of a job when their faction loses a power struggle in the southern part of the sea. This is a connected space.

The Strait especially connects a great deal of the Mediterranean to far-flung portions of the Adriatic as smaller trade vessels and victorious *lembi* carry goods north either by trade or what Horden and Purcell call “cabotage by other means.”<sup>553</sup> In this way the micro-regions of the Adriatic are connected to products and microclimates around the Adriatic and the whole Mediterranean through the raids and captures of products throughout that sea. Entrepreneurs dependent on the support of their harbors and villages—as Demetrius was of Pharos—share the wealth of this other way of making a living and link their small spaces to a much wider world.

While the focus of most pirate scholarship is on the state-level efforts to curb raiding attacks, Gallant’s framework helps emphasize the bottom-up view of maritime commerce and conflict. As unstable conditions and frequent wars in the Adriatic produced thousands of potential pirates (state level), they also created ideal conditions for individuals to flourish through “cabotage by other means.” Unnamed, unknown tens of thousands took advantage of these opportunities and moved all over the Adriatic in short, local bursts and long-distance raids. Almost all escape any kind of notice in the literary record. But these entrepreneurs moved goods and people around the sea just the same, connecting their communities to far-flung parts of the Mediterranean through captured goods. This kind of invisible movement formed the backbone of what would become high-commerce trade later. It also invited the participation of states, which

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<sup>553</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), 158.

sought to control these entrepreneurs or at least curb their activities. We turn to those efforts in the next chapter.

## Chapter Four

### The People of the Adriatic: Settlement and Colonization

Within the Adriatic world, we have seen a contradiction between the high degree of connectivity manifested in networks of movement and trade and the high level of fragmentation among state entities around the sea. This trade seems to have increased over time as the networks of connections in the Adriatic “thickened” from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC (chapter two). In the last chapter (three), we saw individuals in the Adriatic seize on the opportunities presented by that trade to make a living by predation. These “military entrepreneurs” followed the networks of trade and represent some of the consequences of connectivity. In this next chapter, I explore how states utilized settlements to exploit and foster trade.

A colonial approach to the period from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC can see something of a “scramble for the Adriatic” as a number of powers establish settlements on its edges. This phrase, borrowed from the “scramble for Africa,” comes to the Adriatic via work on competing Italian, Slavic, and Austrian claims to the whole Adriatic in the buildup to WWI.<sup>554</sup> In the long Hellenistic period, a series of powerful states stretch their influence into the Adriatic by means of settlements: Syracuse, Athens, and Rome. Their colonial foundations pave the way for interactions in the sea with long-time settlements allegedly founded by Greek poleis centuries earlier.<sup>555</sup> But longstanding communities already flourishing on the edges of the Adriatic also participate in this increase in growth. Despite the largely colonial narrative of Adriatic

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<sup>554</sup> Klabjan (2011).

<sup>555</sup> Useful overview at Cabanes (2008).

settlements, preRoman and preGreek settlements and settlers form the backbone of networks of trade in the Adriatic world, and they need to be seen within a wider picture of the people inhabiting the region that looks beyond the colonial movements to settlement in general.

In brief, the traditional narrative asserts that Epidamnus (later Dyrrhachium) and Apollonia in the southern Adriatic were founded by settlers from Corcyra and Corinth at the end of the 7<sup>th</sup> century BC, followed by foundations at Oricum (by the Abantes), Salpia (Rhodes), Korkyra Melaina (Cnidians), Ravenna (Thessaly), Adria (unknown).<sup>556</sup> These older settlements, concentrated in the southern Adriatic—except for Adria—flourished as trade networks thickened in the 6<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> centuries BC, especially between Spina (probably not a Greek colony) and the Aegean.<sup>557</sup> As Athens waned in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, so did some trade in the Adriatic, and several powers stepped forward to fill the void. Colonies established by Dionysius I of Syracuse in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC controlled parts of the Adriatic at Issa, Lissus, Pharos, and probably Ancona and Adria as well.<sup>558</sup> Then in turn Roman foundations began to appear in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC, culminating in the settlement of tens of thousands of Italians around the Adriatic over two centuries, especially at the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC.<sup>559</sup> Appendix A contains a list of settlements in the Adriatic with known or estimated foundation dates and some references to primary and secondary sources.

These increasing numbers of colonies greatly thickened the networks of contact and interaction in the Adriatic as more and more nodes joined the network. These growing numbers of settlements also put more individuals into these trade networks which required and

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<sup>556</sup> For references, Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2004); cf. Cabanes (2008), and earlier work by Braccisi (1977).

<sup>557</sup> Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2004).

<sup>558</sup> Diod. Sic. 15.13-14; Ps.-Skymnos 413-4; Strabo 5.4.2; discussion in Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2004) and notes below.

<sup>559</sup> Generally Dzino (2010), 119ff and below.

encouraged the movement of more and more goods. This thickening of networks has been compared to the difference between scattered, loosely joined islands and a solid landmass by Gérard Chouquere.<sup>560</sup> In his work, he considers thin networks to be like webs of islands. As the network grows thicker, it is as though land appears between them (his emphasis):

On appelle **îles** les régions—par exemple d’un graphe, ici d’une carte—qui sont isolées du monde extérieur. En revanche, dès qu’existe un réseau s’étendant à toute une région, qui permet un niveau suffisant de relations entre les îles, on parle de **continent**. “Îles” et “continent” ont ici valeur de notions métaphoriques pour qualifier le niveau de connexion d’un réseau, et n’ont pas leur sens géographique physique habituel (mais l’image rejoindrait la notion dès lors qu’on imaginerait, par exemple, la progressive réunion des îles d’un archipel entre elles par abaissement du niveau de la mer).<sup>561</sup>

Chouquere develops this idea of islands and continents into “continentalization,” or the process by which these scattered islands become sufficiently entangled as to be treated as a whole. Giulio Mellinato uses the term differently, arguing that the Adriatic before WWI underwent “continentalization” as competing groups projected views of the sea as a single, solid space rather than as a fluid maritime zone and disputed control of it as though it were terra firma.<sup>562</sup> In the Adriatic of the 4<sup>th</sup> to 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC, I imagine networks of exchange growing thicker over time, shifting from loosely linked groups of settlements (Chouquere’s islands) to a dense mass of connections. I call this process “continentalization.” At the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC, the Adriatic becomes sufficiently continentalized as to be viewed as a single political unit—though that discussion follows in chapter five.

In this chapter, I explore these Adriatic settlements and the process by which they follow trade. Just as the military entrepreneurs of chapter three preyed on networks of exchange, so states exploit them by establishing settlements. These colonies provide zones of control, where a state can claim sovereign power—that is, a monopoly on violence—and back up that claim

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<sup>560</sup> Chouquere (2000), esp. 134-6; cf. Chouquere (2002), esp. 44-5.

<sup>561</sup> Chouquere (2000), 134.

<sup>562</sup> Mellinato (2015).

through force.<sup>563</sup> As we will see, the nature of maritime space is such that these are small zones of state power around secure harbors. But within these circles of influence, the state can claim a percentage of trade and secure their own moving goods. These impositions by the state represent the consequences of connectivity. It is important to note here that these state-sponsored settlements appear where there are already established networks of exchange. These longstanding networks represent communities participating in Adriatic networks well before the arrival of Rome or the later Greek colonies. And we should not imagine these indigenous settlers as always being displaced by external settlements either. The major thrust of this chapter is that one facilitates the other: trade and the networks of trade established by merchants and military entrepreneurs already living and exploiting in the Adriatic create the ideal conditions for further settlements, this time imposed by state powers. In other words, trade attracts state power, limited as it may be.

This is essentially a comparative study of settlement in the Adriatic with a view to these specific questions about maritime power and the growing, thickening networks of the Adriatic from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC, built as they are on the existing networks established long before these states interfere.. Part of the value of this chapter is putting alongside one another settlements normally kept separate within the disciplines of Greek/Hellenistic and Roman history. The constraints of space have kept the chapter to only a few of the many settlements that could be chosen. I have tried to highlight some areas that have received less scholarly attention and have avoided, for example, Corcyra, Aquileia, Spina, and Brundisium for the opposite reason.<sup>564</sup>

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<sup>563</sup> See discussion of state power and definitions in chapter three; summary at Scheidel (2013).

<sup>564</sup> There is, for example, an entire journal dedicated to the archaeology and study of Aquileia and its immediate hinterland: *Antichità Altoadriatiche* published in Trieste.

I begin the chapter with a discussion of the theory around colonization, settlement, and post-colonialism. I then turn to a series of case studies highlighting different efforts to project power over the Adriatic by means of these towns and cities. Finally I conclude with some observations about these power relationships, the limitations of maritime power, and the thickening, continentalizing networks of the Adriatic. Ultimately I suggest that states can project some degree of control over both trade and predation from the safety of a harbor, but that this influence is limited by the constraints of space and technology.

### I. Colony or Settlement? Postcolonial Archaeology and History

In an important, large-scale study of Greek colonization helmed by Gocha Tsetskhladze ten years ago, Pierre Cabanes laid out the evidence for Greek settlement in the Adriatic Sea.<sup>565</sup> He cited a broad variety of ancient sources to establish the foundation date, mother city, and founder of each colony where possible. For example, he cited Plutarch's *Quaestiones Graecae* to show that Corcyra was originally colonized by Eretrians from Euboea in the eighth century BC.<sup>566</sup> He notes that modern scholars reject this on archaeological grounds: no Eretrian evidence has been unearthed on Corcyra to date.<sup>567</sup> To counter this, he inserts the opinion of Irad Malkin that there may yet be Eretrian evidence on Corcyra that simply has not been excavated yet.<sup>568</sup> To complicate matters further, Strabo recorded that when the Corinthians arrived to colonize Corcyra and evicted the alleged Eretrians, they found Liburni there from the Illyrian coast.<sup>569</sup> Cabanes also digs into a scholiast on Apollonius of Rhodes to suggest that Euboeans occupied a position on the mainland opposite the island of Corcyra (a *peiraia*) and that—via a passage of

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<sup>565</sup> Cabanes (2008).

<sup>566</sup> Plut. *Quaest. Graec.* 11.293; Cabanes (2008), 163-4.

<sup>567</sup> He cites two examples, Will (1955), 330 n.6 and the tellingly titled Morgan and Arafat (1995), "In the Footsteps of Aeneas: Excavations at Butrint, Albania, 1991-1992."

<sup>568</sup> Malkin (1994).

<sup>569</sup> Strabo 6.2.4.

Stephannus of Byzantium—these Euboeans had regular contact with fellow Euboeans at nearby Amantia (founded by the Abantes).<sup>570</sup> This amalgamation of written evidence seeking corroboration from ethnically identifiable archaeological finds characterizes a previous *modus operandi* within archaic and classical Greek history. The last 20 years has seen significant departures from these methods and new focuses that bring with them their own problems.

Cabanes' evidence for Euboeans in Coreyra rests on written evidence hundreds of years removed from the 8th century BC it purports to describe: Strabo wrote during the life of Augustus, Plutarch in the late 2nd and early 3rd centuries AD, scholiasts on Apollonius probably contemporarily with Plutarch, and Stephannus of Byzantium in the 4th or 5th century AD. The traditional hunt through surviving ancient writing for widely-scattered evidence and the presentation of that evidence without literary context has become increasingly frowned upon.<sup>571</sup> Perhaps more importantly, the study of colonization has moved on from trying to pin pots to peoples to prove passages in the historiography. It is now generally understood that the situation on the ground differed widely from colonization narratives which were employed by communities throughout the Mediterranean after centuries of continuous occupation to assert political and military relationships with new allies regardless of kinship or ethnic connections.<sup>572</sup> This shift leaves behind previous studies that dominated scholarship on the archaic period of Greek history (roughly 1200-480 BC) and sought to unravel the longstanding relationships

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<sup>570</sup> *Schol.* on Apollonius of Rhodes 4.1175; Stephannus of Byzantium s.v. "Amantai".

<sup>571</sup> Jonathan Hall does an excellent job demonstrating the problems with this approach in the first pages of his textbook of Archaic Greek history using the Lelantine War as an example: Hall (2014), 1-8.

<sup>572</sup> Robin Osborne demonstrates this well in his competing textbook of the same period using foundation stories of Cyrene: Osborne (2009), 8-17. First edition published in 1999. Excellent discussion of this process in central Italy and Magna Graecia in Dench (1995), esp. 32ff.



between colonies, mother cities (metropoleis), and kinship ties as preserved in scattered literary records.<sup>573</sup>

The new study of colonization has been wrapped up in firm trends of post-colonialism, beginning with an important book published by Ian Morris in 1994. In it, he sought to push the study of Greek archaeology in new, more anthropological directions, partly by applying the language and ideas of the growing post-colonial movement to the ancient Mediterranean.<sup>574</sup> Peter van Dommelen, Robin Osborne, and others broadened the application of this terminology and new approach in the field.<sup>575</sup> As this movement picked up speed, it emphasized the interactions between different groups at settlement sites rather than privileging Greek over non-Greek or barbarian culture. Instead of a narrative about the spread of Greek culture throughout the Mediterranean, the study of “settlement” rather than “colonization” has become an exploration of how individuals exercised agency to create and project identities through material culture.<sup>576</sup> And by necessity, these conversations have come to rely heavily on archaeological evidence. In fact, the study of settlement in the archaic and classical periods is now almost exclusively an archaeological endeavor, rooted in the interpretation of sites and surveys to show interactions between different ethnic and identity groups and the creation of hybridity among these groups in a cultural middle ground.<sup>577</sup> This middle ground, famously demonstrated in the Great Lakes region of North America in the 17<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> centuries by Richard White, has blurred into

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<sup>573</sup> Perhaps most famously, Graham (1964) which was reprinted in multiple editions through the 1990s. Boardman (1964) was also almost continuously in print for over 30 years. The original major work was Dunbabin, (1948). These trends continue in, e.g. Descoedres (1990); Tsetskhladze and De Angelis (1994); and Tsetskhladze (2006) and (2008).

<sup>574</sup> Morris (1994), especially his chapter, “Archaeologies of Greece.”

<sup>575</sup> E.g. Osborne (1998); Osborne and Alcock (2007); van Dommelen (1997), (2002), (2011), and (2012).

<sup>576</sup> Morris (1998).

<sup>577</sup> E.g. Gosden (2004); Malkin (2002); Jiménez (2011).

“entanglement” and “hybridity” as this new way of talking about settlement interactions continues to mature.<sup>578</sup>

Somewhat in competition, networks and network theory emerged in the early 2000s as a way to approach the spreading settlement of the ancient Mediterranean, beginning largely with the work of Irad Malkin.<sup>579</sup> Founded in the tenets of modern Social Network Analysis (SNA), Malkin’s approach highlighted the interconnectivity of scattered Greek settlements and their interdependence on one another.<sup>580</sup> This approach to ancient history even beyond colonization has gained steam and resulted in network analyses as large as the vast Mediterranean economy and as small as family group relationships.<sup>581</sup> As van Dommelen has noted, the challenge with a network approach to settlements is the focus on systems rather than people: the value of network theory is in analyzing the *network* rather than those participating in it. For van Dommelen and others who value the human agency of history, network theory falls short as a heuristic tool.<sup>582</sup>

But the networking of settlements has continued to rise in importance thanks to a focus away from network theory in particular and on the more general *connectivity* characteristic of the Mediterranean basin. Specifically, Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell’s *The Corrupting Sea* has changed the landscape of ancient history with an emphasis on connected microecologies.<sup>583</sup> This new Mediterraneanism, built on the Braudelian foundations of the old one, revolves around

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<sup>578</sup> White (1991). Dietler (2010).

<sup>579</sup> Malkin (2003) and (2011).

<sup>580</sup> For a history of the theoretical approach, Terrell (2013), esp. 19ff.

<sup>581</sup> E.g. chapters in Malkin, Constantakopoulou, and Panagopoulou (2009); Fenn and Römer-Strehl (2013); Blake (2013).

<sup>582</sup> van Dommelen (2017), 620.

<sup>583</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), chapter 6 for microecologies, restated succinctly at Purcell (2003), 10. Horden and Purcell began with the work of Fernand Braudel, especially *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1972). Direct responses to Horden and Purcell include Harris (2005) and Concannon and Mazurek (2016). Many works have embraced Horden and Purcell’s ideas and expanded on them, e.g. Abulafia (2011); Broodbank (2013); and O’Connell and Dursteler (2016).

the increased opportunities provided to individuals and communities through the networks available via the sea. I have drawn on this connectivity extensively thus far in the dissertation. For the purposes of this discussion of colonization and settlement, it is worth noting that the points of connectivity where the sea meets the individuals benefiting from it happen to be the settlements traditionally studied under the label “colonization,” the nodes of Malkin’s network.

Another approach that has come rather late to the party is the *new coastal history* advocated by historians studying coastlines as far apart as Scotland and Southeast Asia.<sup>584</sup> In a series of books, articles, and conferences, these scholars have advocated for studying coasts as distinct from the landmasses they happen to join. They suggest that coastal settlements have more in common with each other—even separated by hundreds or thousands of miles—than with inland sites. This new theory originates in the highly-incised coasts of Scotland but could reasonably be applied to coastal situations in the ancient Mediterranean much the way Malkin’s network theory has been: the coastal sites are connected to each other with far stronger links than to those inland. As we shall see in studying coastal settlements and their relationships with their hinterlands in both the Italian and Balkan peninsulas, this may not be a good fit for the Adriatic.

One approach to reconciling these various approaches to settlement is the increasingly important field of globalization. A string of books and articles on the subject have appeared in recent years trying to steer globalization studies to the connected world of the ancient Mediterranean.<sup>585</sup> These ideas of increased internationalism and the consequences of contact map well onto the problems of colonization and settlement in the archaic and classical periods: they recognize the individual and community effects of networks. Van Dommelen recently argued for

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<sup>584</sup> Worthington (2017). They draw especially on the work of Michael Pearson, Isaac Land, and John Gillis: Pearson (2006), 353-73; Land (2007), 731-43; Gillis (2012); Gillis (2015); Gillis and Torma (2015).

<sup>585</sup> E.g. Hodos (2010), 81-106; Jennings (2011); Geller (2014); Hodos (2017).

examining the impact of changing settlement patterns at the level of the node.<sup>586</sup> Globalization studies demonstrate how living in and near the nodes of power and economic networks creates opportunities and challenges at the individual level.

In many respects, these ideas go back to a now famous 2003 article by Ian Morris called “Mediterraneanization” in which he unpacked the connectivity and network trends in recent scholarship and asked the question, “What does it mean?”<sup>587</sup> Morris leaned on globalization theory and proposed this approach alongside three others:

[W]e need to take another leaf from the globalization theorists’ books and think of connectedness as a process rather than a state, focusing on ‘Mediterraneanization’ rather than ‘Mediterraneanism’. This means foregrounding change through time, different analytical scales, and tensions and conflicts. Globalization has created winners and new losers; Mediterraneanization did the same.<sup>588</sup>

Indeed, the spread of colonists, migrants, and everyone else moving through the Mediterranean created winners and losers, positive and negative impacts on struggling communities. The increased mobility of the Mediterranean world certainly brought Horden and Purcell’s increased economic and ecological opportunities for survival, but with those came increased opportunities for theft, piracy (or entrepreneurship), and conquest. As increasing numbers of people inhabited the Mediterranean basin, Plato’s frogs around a pond, it turns out not all of them were friendly.<sup>589</sup>

After the earliest colonies in the Adriatic, e.g. Epidamnus, Apollonia, Spina, and Ancona,<sup>590</sup> the process of settlement takes on a different character in the long Hellenistic period which further complicates the traditional narrative of colonization. By the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, Hellenistic kings were establishing colonies and shifting populations on a grand scale and in

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<sup>586</sup> van Dommelen (2017), 621-3.

<sup>587</sup> Morris (2003), 30-55.

<sup>588</sup> Morris (2003), 33, his point #2.

<sup>589</sup> Pl. *Phd.* 109b.

<sup>590</sup> See entries in Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2004).

very deliberate fashion.<sup>591</sup> Unlike the nebulous migrations and settlements of the archaic period, which scholars increasingly see as led not by states but by individuals and small groups of entrepreneurs, the Hellenistic period features state-led colonization. We will see this in the Adriatic with the settlements by Syracuse and Athens and, in a different way, Rome.

Spreading eventually all over the Adriatic, Roman settlements operate much more like those of the Hellenistic kings, as state-led enterprises imposing external settlers on a new or recently conquered site. Roman settlements along the Adriatic began at the outset of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC and continued through the life of Augustus with huge population swings as voluntary and forced migration shifted hundreds of thousands of people around the Adriatic Sea. Because it stands in a distinct historical tradition, the historiography of Roman colonialism has not focused on whether or not the state was involved or what ethnic ties colonies retained to the metropolis as in older studies of Greek colonization.<sup>592</sup> In fact, Roman colonization has not attracted nearly as much scholarly attention as its Greek counterpart.<sup>593</sup> What debates there have been have centered on how individual colonies or groups of settlements played into a Roman strategy for control of the Italian peninsula.<sup>594</sup> It is only quite recently that control of or even participation in trade on the Adriatic Sea has entered into this dialogue.<sup>595</sup>

Put another way, discourses of colonization in the Greek and Roman worlds have remained almost entirely separate. Movement in recent years toward a vocabulary of “settlement” has leveled the playing field somewhat, but these are still very separate fields. Just as the Adriatic in general is divided into Greek—in our period Hellenistic—and Roman history,

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<sup>591</sup> E.g. Cohen, G.M. (1978); Billows (1995).

<sup>592</sup> On larger Italian concerns with ethnic ties to Greek metropoleis, see Dench (1995).

<sup>593</sup> For many years the major works on the subject were all by Edward Togo Salmon: Salmon (1936), (1955), and his monograph, Salmon (1969), *Roman Colonization under the Republic*. Now there are a few more major publications: Moatti (1993); Broadhead (2007); Stek and Pelgrom (2014); Bertrand (2015).

<sup>594</sup> Esp. Salmon (1969).

<sup>595</sup> Esp. in the work of Derow (2003) and Čašule (2011) and (2012).

so the study of settlement falls along the same lines.<sup>596</sup> Archaeologists working on settlements in the two peninsulas have the potential to bridge this gap, but a curious theoretical barrier firmly separates the two disciplines.<sup>597</sup>

Until quite recently, settlement archaeology in the Italian peninsula and really the whole Mediterranean past a certain date invoked the term “Romanization” which referred to the gradual adoption at each site of Roman societal norms expressed in the available evidence: visual material culture.<sup>598</sup> Within this framework archaeologists at sites in Adriatic Italy, England, or North Africa could speak to the degree of Romanization based on the kinds of ceramics employed, goods consumed, and especially monumental structures present.<sup>599</sup> The spread of Roman visual forms around the Mediterranean world served as a handy index and fruitful ground for comparative studies across long distances. But, as with studies of Greek colonization and the spread of Greek culture in the archaic and classical periods, the terminology and approach of Romanization left non-Romans—a loaded term—in the lurch. A number of landmark studies—especially Greg Woolf’s *Becoming Roman: the Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul* in the late 1990s and Michael Dietler’s *Archaeologies of Colonialism: Consumption, Entanglement, and Violence in Ancient Mediterranean France* in 2010—have demonstrated thoroughly the problems and pitfalls of making colonial encounters one-sided.<sup>600</sup> Just as in Greek history and

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<sup>596</sup> For example, we have Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2004) for Greek settlements in the Adriatic and Braccisi (1977) and Cabanes (2008) on colonies specifically. On Roman settlements, we have to go to entirely different works, e.g. Salmon (1969) and Keppie (1983) on the Italian coast, Brunt (1987) in general, and Alföldy (1962) and (1965) on the eastern side. There is no study of Adriatic settlement per se, but the Adriatic features into other, culturally or geographically separated studies.

<sup>597</sup> One exception is the volume Bradley and Wilson (2006) which seeks to compare Greek and Roman colonization, though its component chapters stay largely separate.

<sup>598</sup> E.g. Brown (1980) and Zanker (2000). The traditional view saw colonies as miniature Romes bringing the blessings of civilization to non-Roman peoples. This has been deconstructed many times, e.g. Keay and Terrenato (2001) or Revell (2009).

<sup>599</sup> MacMullen (2000). For nuanced approaches, e.g. Millett (1990), Mattingly (1997), and Hingley (2005).

<sup>600</sup> Woolf (1998); Dietler (2010).

archaeology, the conversation has become about hybridity and created identities expressed through the evidence we have: material culture.<sup>601</sup>

Despite this shift in terminology and focus, many archaeologists working on Roman colonial sites—especially sites on the Italian peninsula—have kept many of the same frameworks and simply shifted vocabulary slightly to “urbanization” rather than “Romanization.”<sup>602</sup> Simply put, the focus is still on how, when, and to what degree select communities display what we expect a Roman(ized) site to look like, namely specific civic structures; but now, this transformation from non-Roman to Roman site falls under the rubric of non-urban and urban. The “new” theory of urbanization has at least shifted the dialogue away from Rome-centric, colonial narratives to include more regularly interactions with other settlers even if it is explicit in most studies that Rome drives this urbanization financially and culturally, which is simply the reality of Roman Italy. Adriatic Italy provides the rare exception in Ancona which, as we shall see, became far more urban independently of Roman sites and debatably in response to economic pressures through Adriatic trade networks as much as overland Roman ones.<sup>603</sup>

Within this broader framework of Mediterranean settlement and the terminologically and theoretically shifting landscapes of post-colonialism, networks, and globalization, I focus on by what means and how successfully states employ settlements to exert control over maritime traffic. I propose throughout this chapter that maritime control is functionally limited to the nodes of globalizing networks: external states exert control at nodes and can there harvest some portion of trade in the form of taxes or exert protection over trade vessels within and near the node, but military and political power are not easily transmitted through the network outside that

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<sup>601</sup> Dietler (2010).

<sup>602</sup> Good introduction to urbanization and colonization: Attema (2004); cf. de Marinis et al. (2012).

<sup>603</sup> Vermeulen (2017), 93-5 and Colivicchi (2008).

specific node. Access to military and political power may come through the network and be a serious consequence of globalization—a topic for chapter five—but control never extends beyond the nodes themselves.

As I explore specific sets of settlements in the rest of the chapter, I return continually to this question of control and how state actors harvest trade and provide security through these settlement sites. If, as our literary sources tell us, many of these colonies were established to protect or facilitate trade, what does that look like on the ground or on the sea? How does this “scramble for the Adriatic” play out? What does control over the sea require? How is it extended? And what happens as the number of Adriatic settlements increases, thickening the network across this connected sea?

## II. A is for Ancona and Athens

I begin my exploration of this topic with the comparison of two roughly contemporary settlements, one well-known and excavated and one perhaps never realized. The first is Ancona, located along the Adriatic coast of the Italian peninsula, just north of Monte Conero.<sup>604</sup> This limestone promontory juts out into the sea creating natural harbors to the north and south which both attracted settlements from at least the Bronze Age.<sup>605</sup> As we have seen (chapters one and two), the Italian coastline has traditionally been described as harborless and featureless, which makes these rare protected bays all the more important to maritime traffic.<sup>606</sup> Ancona has long been viewed as an essentially Greek colony founded by Syracusans in the early 4<sup>th</sup> century BC and then refounded and integrated into the growing Roman Republic and Empire.<sup>607</sup> Importantly, Rome used Ancona as a forward operating base for ongoing conflicts at the head of the Adriatic

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<sup>604</sup> Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2004) and Cabanes (2008).

<sup>605</sup> See below, e.g. Lollini (1956).

<sup>606</sup> Strabo 7.5.10 and Livy 10.2.

<sup>607</sup> Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2004) no. 76 (pp. 327-8).



in Histria and against maritime attacks allegedly perpetrated by Illyrians in the 170s BC.<sup>608</sup> The second settlement in this pair is an unnamed, unknown colony proposed and probably founded in 325/4 BC by Athens at an unknowable location.<sup>609</sup> This little information comes from the Athenian naval list inscription from 325/4 BC which details ships assigned to the colonial expedition and, critically, the purpose for the colony: to safeguard Athenian grain shipments from ongoing predation in the Adriatic sea.<sup>610</sup> Powers external to the Adriatic employed both of these settlement sites to exert control over trade by safeguarding movement, offering safe harbor and markets to passing ships, and combating the “military entrepreneurs” exploiting maritime commerce.

Ancona, so Strabo tells us, was founded by Greeks who fled the tyranny of Dionysius I in Syracuse.<sup>611</sup> This would put the foundation in the early 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, and historians and archaeologists have expended a great deal of energy trying to prove the foundation of the site in that period.<sup>612</sup> But ongoing excavations have shown that Ancona was occupied from the Bronze Age forward and that, therefore, any “foundation” by Syracusans or others made use of an existing site and interacted with another population.<sup>613</sup> Scholars now focus on those interactions between the indigenous settlement and “the processes of Hellenism and Romanisation from the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC onwards.”<sup>614</sup> Those processes include both trade contacts, as demonstrated through the proxy of the grave goods catalogued by Colivicchi and others, and the political and

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<sup>608</sup> See below; Livy 40.18, 42; 41.1.

<sup>609</sup> Overview at Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2004), 326.

<sup>610</sup> Details of the inscription follow below. Cf. Oliver (2007), 44-5.

<sup>611</sup> Strabo 5.4.2.

<sup>612</sup> E.g. Alfieri (1938); Sebastini (1996). Cf. Woodhead (1970) for the classic view that Ancona was actually founded by Dionysius I.

<sup>613</sup> E.g. Lollini (1956); Braccesi (1977), 220ff; Luni (1995), 193ff.

<sup>614</sup> van Limbergen and Vermeulen (2017), 165. Colivicchi (2002) and (2008). Work in Ancona continues to be published: Pignocchi and Häggglund (1998); Salvini and Palermo (2014); Sebastiani (2014).

military uses of Ancona at the hands of Rome from the 3<sup>rd</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC.<sup>615</sup> This is an important point. That Ancona was already occupied and participating in trade changes the narrative of “colonization” by these Syracusan Greeks. Whatever their expansion of the existing settlement looked like, it capitalized on existing trade networks. Ancona’s participation in Adriatic trade made it an attractive place to settle and made it economically visible to the Syracusans fleeing Dionysius I in Strabo’s account. Settlement follows trade.

Vermeulen argues that Ancona probably received the status of *civitas foederata* from Rome during the 3<sup>rd</sup> century in light of its importance during Hannibal’s devastation of Adriatic Italy in the Second Punic War (218-201 BC).<sup>616</sup> In any case, Ancona became the essential forward base in the early 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC for ongoing operations against encroaching naval threats. Livy records that the two Roman naval commanders in 178 BC assigned to fleets raised against the Illyrians were to take Ancona as a *cardo*, a hinge or critical turning point. From there, L. Cornelius would command the coastline all the way to Tarentum and C. Furius to Aquileia.<sup>617</sup> The value of Ancona as a central position on the coast speaks both to the connectedness of the larger Adriatic and the importance of strong harbors. Especially in this area without large harbors (though I argue here and in chapter two that there are more harbors than Livy or Strabo allows), Ancona is an essential port and naval base.

In fact, the idea seems to be that from Ancona, the Romans could control most of the Adriatic seaboard in 178 BC. Livy notes in the previous book that L. Dronius, a praetor for 181 BC, complained of piratical raids against Italy coming from Illyria. Dronius had Istria and Apulia both as his province, suggesting that the problem spread the whole length of the

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<sup>615</sup> Esp. in the 170s BC: Livy 40.18, 42; 41.1.

<sup>616</sup> van Limbergen and Vermeulen (2017), 165.

<sup>617</sup> Livy 41.1: *aduersus Illyriorum classem creati duumviri nauales erant, qui tuendae uiginti nauibus maris superi orae Anconam uelut cardinem haberent; inde L. Cornelius dextra litora usque ad Tarentum, C. Furius laeua usque ad Aquileiam tueretur.*

Adriatic.<sup>618</sup> The launch of the Istrian War in 178 BC suggests growing Roman confidence in control of the seaboard, especially with Ancona as the lynchpin. Indeed, it was just a few years earlier in 184 BC that the colonies of Pisaurum (Pesaro) and Potentia (near Porto Recanati) were founded directly on the coast and relatively near Ancona.<sup>619</sup> Both were situated at the mouths of rivers (see images), providing a landing point for maritime traffic and especially military forces.<sup>620</sup> Pisaurum and Potentia were unusually large colonial foundations, a departure from Roman practice to this point, and followed shortly by an inland support colony at Auximum (Osimo) quite close (less than 20 km) from Ancona.<sup>621</sup> Altogether, this set of settlements suggests an effort at control of the coast and support for the base at Ancona.

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<sup>618</sup> Livy 40.18.3, 40.42.

<sup>619</sup> Livy 41.27.10-13.

<sup>620</sup> See figures below.

<sup>621</sup> Vermeulen (2017), 77ff.




Figure 26 - Plan of the colony of Potentia - Vermeulen (2017), 81





have been created out of whole cloth.<sup>622</sup> In 174 BC, shortly after the Istrian War, the censors Q. Fulvius Flaccus and A. Postumius invested in the infrastructure of these still new colonies, but exactly how is not clear. The relevant passage of Livy is fraught with textual difficulties. Of the possibilities, Vermeulen argues for a circuit wall at Auximum and Potentia and a temple of Jupiter at Pisaurum.<sup>623</sup> The building of fortifications suggests the ongoing importance of these sites to Rome's ambitions in the region. Perhaps more tellingly, a network of roads emerged to link these sites both to each other and through the Appenines to the Tyrrhenian Sea and Rome.<sup>624</sup>

As Vermeulen puts it:

As rapid movement was needed between the stable military nuclei on the coast and Rome, we can imagine that roads were built and extended shortly after the foundation of the colonies, even if the existing pathways and routes of indigenous populations had already been used for a while. There is undoubtedly a strong relationship between the development of this road system and colony foundations, the ratification of *foedera* and the early incorporation of the subjected peoples.<sup>625</sup>

The network that emerged linked developing sites and facilitated movement in ways that provided access to and control of the sea. We can imagine a web of roads growing on the coast to connect new settlements to maritime settlements like Ancona, Auximum, and Potentia which were already plugged into the broader network of Adriatic trade. These coastal sites, in other words, participated in existing networks in the sea. As the pattern of settlement and development in their hinterland became denser over time, increasing numbers of people and goods flowed into these Adriatic networks of exchange.

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<sup>622</sup> Pisaurum: Dall'Aglio and Di Cocco (2004). Auximum: Gentili (1955). Potentia: work done by Vermeulen and his team, e.g. Vermeulen (2011), further bibliography at van Limbergen and Vermeulen (2017), 183ff esp. n286. There is some evidence of a pre-Roman settlement there (perhaps Picene), but not much is known about it as of yet: Percossi Serenelli (2012).

<sup>623</sup> van Limbergen and Vermeulen (2017), 169, 181, 183-4 where they have their passages of Livy confused. All three should cite 41.27.

<sup>624</sup> On the road network generally, Laurence (1999).

<sup>625</sup> Vermeulen (2017), 71.

The placement of more and more settlements on the coast was also essential to maritime security. We saw in the last chapter that Illyrian raiders—according to Polybius—were able to devastate the western coast of the Peloponnese for topographic reasons:

The expedition began by making a descent on Elis and Messenia, lands which the Illyrians had always been in the habit of pillaging, because, owing to the extent of their seaboard and owing to the principal cities being in the interior, help against their raids was distant and slow in arriving; so that they could always overrun and plunder those countries unmolested.<sup>626</sup>

As Polybius implies, it is very difficult to protect a seaboard from raids as there is so much territory to cover.<sup>627</sup> Even a relatively featureless seaboard like the Italian Adriatic coast covers a great deal of surface area when the response speed is, at best, fewer than eight knots.<sup>628</sup> Two Roman fleets sent out in 178 BC to protect the seaboard from their base in Ancona had quite the challenge, but the building of secondary bases and centers of strength like those at Pisaurum and Potentia could make that task significantly more feasible. As the population of this agricultural area increased, having fortified town centers within easy striking distance of settlers and ports meant that responses to attacks could be swift. And providing secure landing points for military and trade vessels—the river mouths at Pisaurum and Potentia—ensured that the protective fleets could stop here often.<sup>629</sup> Interior roads played their part too as troops could move much more quickly between towns and cities if necessary, even all the way from Rome. Although the Italian coast was vast, here, unlike in Elis and Messenia, the principal cities would not be in the interior but nearby and so could respond more swiftly to maritime attacks.

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<sup>626</sup> Polyb. 2.5.1-2.

<sup>627</sup> As M. Calpurnius Bibulus discovered when trying to prevent Caesar crossing the Adriatic in 48 BC: *Caes. B. Civ.* 3.5-7, 26.

<sup>628</sup> Morrison, Coates, and Rankov (2000).

<sup>629</sup> On river ports on the Italian coast, D'Ercole (2006) and further notes in chapter two.

The other of this pair of settlements is the much less understood and nameless colony supposedly sent out in 325/4 BC by Athens.<sup>630</sup> The settlement is known from the Athenian naval lists of that year, an annual document published by the curators of the dockyards (*epimeletai*). This body was made up of ten men chosen annually, one from each tribe, to have supervision of the naval ships and their accouterments.<sup>631</sup> This is not a group about which a great deal is known beyond the surviving inscriptions. Borimir Jordan noted in 1975 that the majority of the individuals known to serve as curators came from the coastal trittyes within each tribe and that therefore seamen were more likely to stand for this office.<sup>632</sup> Beyond ad hoc maintenance dictated to the curators by the Athenian assembly, these ten officers published a list every four years of all ships and equipment belonging to Athens.<sup>633</sup> The physical stone, a marble stele, was discovered in the Piraeus (harbor of Athens) and now resides in the Athenian Epigraphical Museum. The stone is broken in places and inscribed in five total columns of which four are on the front and one on the right edge.

What remains of the text reveals the massive task of this ten-man committee to manage some 360 triremes, 50 quadriremes, and assorted triaconters plus the oars, masts, poles, sails, riggings, ropes, anchors, and all the other gear to outfit them. Only a small number of these ship hulls were manned at a time in this period, but the city's property still needed a close eye. The financial burden for repairing and outfitting the ships was passed to trierarchs selected by lot from the wealthiest citizens at Athens, and so the curators of the dockyards had to wrangle these men into fulfilling those often expensive obligations too.<sup>634</sup> As Rhodes and Osborne note:

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<sup>630</sup> *IG* II/III<sup>3</sup> 1 1370 = *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1629; *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 305; Tod (1946-8) 200. Most accessibly published as no. 100 in Rhodes and Osborne (2003).

<sup>631</sup> Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 522-3.

<sup>632</sup> Jordan (1975), 31.

<sup>633</sup> Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 522.

<sup>634</sup> On the evolving office of the trierarch, Gabrielsen (1994), 182ff.



A significant proportion of the naval lists is made up of records of moneys and fines owed by trierarchs and by various officials for ships and equipment which they have damaged or absconded with: initiating legal action to oblige debtors to pay up was the responsibility of the curators, but unlike other public debtors, defaulting trierarchs seem only to have been fined and never to have been imprisoned or to have lost their civic rights.<sup>635</sup>

Needless to say this was an involved and litigious business. The naval lists provide a fascinating window into the world of Athenian public finance both in the realms of liturgies and military resources. And their regular publication means that we can track the size of the Athenian navy and the numbers of ships in use periodically through a good chunk of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC.<sup>636</sup>

What sets this particular naval inventory apart from the others is the provision to execute a decision of the assembly to found a colony in the Adriatic under the direction of one Miltiades. The inscription picks up (after damaged portions of the stone) with a list of ships assigned to Miltiades for the expedition, including horse transports, triremes, triaconters, and quadriremes.<sup>637</sup> The inscription includes the decree of Cephisophon of Cholargus (lines 165-271) which directed that the ships be handed over to Miltiades in order to expedite the foundation of the colony (the decree for which is not quoted). The colony is not named nor is there any certainty that it was actually founded. Lorenzo Braccesi argued that the colony was indeed settled based on the use of the term *epoikoi* (colonist) in the inscription.<sup>638</sup> Others have argued that the “colony” was really the refoundation of an existing emporion.<sup>639</sup> Whether the decree was fulfilled or not, this inscription reveals a great deal about the motivations for (re)founding settlements in the Adriatic.

The decree portion of the inscription includes the following purpose for the settlement in the Adriatic (as printed in Rhodes and Osborne):

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<sup>635</sup> Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 523, cf. Gabrielsen (1994), 205-6; Pritchard (2012) for calculations of trierarchs' costs and the history of that question.

<sup>636</sup> Gabrielsen (1994).

<sup>637</sup> On ancient warships, de Souza (2013) with bibliography.

<sup>638</sup> Braccesi (1977), 296-300.

<sup>639</sup> E.g. Fantasia (1972).

In order that the people may for all future 217  
time have their own commerce and trans-  
port in grain, and that the establishment  
of their own naval station (*naustathmos*)  
may result in a guard against the Tyrrhe-  
nians, and Miltiades the founder and the  
settlers may be able to use their own fleet,  
and those Greeks and barbarians who sail  
the sea and themselves sailing into the  
Athenians' naval station will have their  
ships and all else secure, knowing that...  
(*lacuna*)<sup>640</sup>

The explicit concern here is safeguard shipping, specifically grain, against Tyrrhenians. As we saw in the last chapter, “Tyrrhenian”—some argue—is a catch-all ethnic for Adriatic pirates.<sup>641</sup> Regardless of whether these were Etruscan, Illyrian, or Italic pirates, the movement of grain through the Adriatic was very important to Athens. Athens had long been diversifying the grain supply and seeking Sicilian grain specifically.<sup>642</sup> But grain for Athens could have come from the fertile Po Valley through Spina or central Adriatic Italy near Ancona just as easily as from Sicily. In any case, grain seems to be the critical motivator: the decree specifies that trierarchs can have their fines for various offences reduced if they or those close to them have given grain to Athens in the recent crisis of 328/7 BC.<sup>643</sup>

The inscription also highlights the importance of a secure “naval station” (*naustathmos*) for safe shipment. As emphasized with the harbor off Monte Conero and Ancona above, safe harbors are essential for secure maritime operations. But the sense of these lines is not safety from the Bora or other weather events but those Tyrrhenians and others attacking merchants—the decree even explicitly mentions other Greeks and non-Greeks using the harbor to escape

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<sup>640</sup> Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 517-9 with facing Greek.

<sup>641</sup> de Souza (1999), 51.

<sup>642</sup> Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 525; cf. Garnsey (1988), 153; on the food shortages of the late 4<sup>th</sup> century, cf. Oliver (2001), 137-40 and (2007), 41ff.

<sup>643</sup> lines 859ff; Oliver (2007), 41-3.

predation (lines 28-31). The passage also indicates that the base would house warships which could strike from its harbor against others in the vicinity. This dual purpose security—a safe haven for grain ships and a launching point for counterattacks—demonstrates the limited means available to Athens to secure shipping in a faraway place.

Triremes, quadriremes, and other ancient warships did not provide sleeping quarters for rowers. Even with multiple rowers per oar and the potential to be under sail part of the time, these ships needed regular stops for meals, to take on water (for which there was little space for storage and much need) and certainly to spend the night.<sup>644</sup> While these warships were easy to pull ashore for such stops, they became quite vulnerable once beached as the Athenians learned to their great detriment at Aegospotami in 405 BC: having camped on the beach rather than in a harbor, almost the entire Athenian fleet of 180 ships was captured on shore, a huge blow that accelerated Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War.<sup>645</sup> Unfriendly ports might refuse entry to a passing fleet for fear of attack—as the Illyrians attacked Phoenice and Epidamnus in 230 and 229 BC<sup>646</sup>—or provide only the basic necessities and refuse to trade. A good example of the problem is the Sicilian expedition of the Athenian fleet starting in 415 BC: the large naval force crossed the Strait of Otranto only to be refused entry to port after port, being allowed water and anchorage only at most (Tarentum and Locri withheld even these) for a considerable distance. Ultimately Rhegium provided a market to acquire supplies, water, a place to beach the warships, and a campsite.<sup>647</sup> There emerges something of a hierarchy of hospitality from this: a very hostile

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<sup>644</sup> For collected evidence: Morrison, Coates, and Rankov (2000), 94-104. Cf. the growing body of scholarship on overseas routes that did not require stops on long-distance ships, e.g. Arnaud (2005).

<sup>645</sup> Competing accounts in Diodorus Siculus 13.106 and Xenophon *Hell.* 2.2. Important scholarship on the battle includes Ehrhardt (1982) and Kagan (1987), 386-94.

<sup>646</sup> Polyb. 2.5, 9, discussion in chapter three.

<sup>647</sup> Thuc. 6.44. Note at 6.42 that the commanders of the expedition divided the force into three chunks so as to increase the likelihood that settlements would provide water and anchorage, the size of the expedition being perhaps too intimidating for most.

or very worried city might forbid even basic necessities to passing naval forces; allowing water and anchorage (required for retrieving the water) were the bare minimum but forced rowers to sleep very uncomfortably on their ships; the next step, trade through a market, provided an opportunity for profit and kept the sailors outside the city (recall the guards at Epidamnus who separated the port market from the town proper);<sup>648</sup> finally, providing a campsite increased exposure for both the city and the fleet. Of course, the Athenian expedition of 415 BC or the triremes of this decree in 325/4 BC could beach along any shore to eat and search for water, but that did not always end well. Xenophon describes Iphicrates' voyage to Corcyra in 372 BC in which he had to take extraordinary precautions to safely stop on enemy shores including posting men on the tops of the masts of the beached ships to keep lookout and racing to and from shore to avoid capture, motivating his men with prizes and penalties for the winners and losers.<sup>649</sup> For merchants and especially marines, safe beaches and harbors were essential for successful maritime operations.

To return to the decree, establishing a naval base would certainly help safeguard grain shipments through the Adriatic, but depending on the location—again, we have no idea where this colony was to be—this small fleet could have a great deal of seaboard to cover. Certainly a small force could convoy with grain barges to provide protection from point to point and guide the large, slow ships to safety within the naval station. As implied by the decree, the short range of rowed warships and the needs of their crews means that Athens could only exert limited control over the situation through such a colony. The need to do whatever was possible seems to have been acute. The decree within this inscription provides prizes for the first trierarchs to get

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<sup>648</sup> Polyb. 2.9.

<sup>649</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.27-30. Cf. Morrison et al. (2000), 97-9.

their ships ready and severe penalties for anyone hindering the process.<sup>650</sup> Finally, the decree ends with the reminder that it has been passed “for the defense of the country.”<sup>651</sup> In other words, securing the grain supply was important enough to expend these resources.

As Rhodes and Osborne note in their analysis of the inscription, its approach to colonization is surprising and anachronistic. The language used hearkens back to the glory days of the Athenian empire: the settlers are called *epoikoi* and the founder an *oikistes*, terms from the 5<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>652</sup> It is also interesting to compare (as Rhodes and Osborne do) this pirate colony to one from that same period at the beginning of the Athenian Empire. At the outset of Athens’ rise to power in the early days following the second Persian invasion, Athens used the excuse of suppressing piracy to take over the island of Scyros, sell the inhabitants into slavery, and resettle it with Athenian citizens.<sup>653</sup> Scyros was at this time (470s BC) one of several important waypoints for the grain shipments arriving in Athens from the Black Sea (the others being Lemnos and Imbros). It is unfortunate that nothing else of this later 4<sup>th</sup> century colonization project survives. It hints at the relationship between Athens and the west on the eve of poor relations with Alexander the Great and Athenian efforts to break away from his influence (the Harpalus affair and the Exiles Decree). The Miltiades heading up the effort must be related to the famous Miltiades of the Battle of Marathon and indeed eventually married his daughter to Demetrius Poliorcetes. It is not inconceivable that Athens, flexing her imperialistic muscles again in the 320s and about to depart from Alexander, would likewise take drastic action to secure a grain supply to the west, far out of reach of Macedon and safeguarded by citizens manning Athenian warships from a safe harbor.

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<sup>650</sup> Lines 190-203 for the carrots, 233-41 for the sticks.

<sup>651</sup> Lines 270-1: Ταῦτα δ’ εἶναι ἅπαντα εἰς φυλακὴν τῆς χώρας.

<sup>652</sup> Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 525-7.

<sup>653</sup> Thuc. 1.98.2; Diod. 11.69.2; Ephor. fr. 191; Plut. *Cim.* 8.3-7; Plut. *Thes.* 36.1.

I present these two Adriatic foundations, Ancona and the Athenian colony, together because they are both functionally similar and civically different. The foundation methods diverge significantly: at Athens the assembly voted to establish this colony and then passed the job on to one of a myriad of citizen boards which then leveraged legal power and potential fines to force said citizens into action; an *oikistes* (founder) led the expedition with state naval forces and supplies.<sup>654</sup> In contrast, Ancona was conscripted into service by the Roman consul who directed other military officers to make it a base.<sup>655</sup> Probably Ancona already had formal status as an ally of Rome, but this was certainly an imposition just the same. The other colonies founded almost immediately nearby were assigned to a board of three men, Q. Fabius Labeo, M. Fulvius Flaccus, and Q. Fulvius Nobilior.<sup>656</sup> As we will see below, this involved the hugely invasive procedure of dividing up and assigning the landscape and plotting the layout of a new town center with large proportions. My point is that these are very different procedures.<sup>657</sup> Yet the effect was the same.

In all these instances, settlers moved from one place to another to begin a new life. In some cases, they also displaced or interacted with the previous occupants of these already thriving settlements. The state hoped to utilize these new locations and the labor of the settlers to exert control over passing maritime traffic. They did this through stationing warships with secure harbors nearby and, in the case of Pisaurum and Potentia, establishing yet further bases to extend the potential range of the protected area. The settlements followed trade and were established in places ideal for exploiting and safeguarding it and sometimes already participating in these networks. For Athens, securing grain meant safeguarding grain ships and providing safe havens

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<sup>654</sup> Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 521ff.

<sup>655</sup> Livy 40.18, 42; 41.1.

<sup>656</sup> Livy 39.44.

<sup>657</sup> See below. Chouquere and Favory (1991) and Roselaar (2010), 64ff.

for them to spend the night. For Rome, protecting shipping against Illyrian attacks meant doing much the same thing as well as having a secure forward base for launching their own counterattacks. For both, imposing another node in the network of exchange yielded profit for the state and thickened the network. For everyone involved, the limited naval technology employable in the first millennium BC meant that there was only so much seaboard that could be covered at any given time.<sup>658</sup> Try as they might, neither Rome nor Athens could control the Adriatic Sea nor even—successfully—a long stretch of its coastline. What could be controlled was one port or, as Rome discovered, an expanding number of ports. These nodes could be controlled and regulated. And taking over these waypoints along the networks of trade and predation is really what colonization in this period is all about.

### III. Water and Land in the Adriatic Islands

The modern Croatian islands in the Adriatic have become the focus of a great deal of archaeological activity in recent years and especially of publications for the first time in English, making the role these essential ports played in the Adriatic accessible to a broader audience.<sup>659</sup> Some of these islands were settled by colonists from mainland Greece as early as the 6<sup>th</sup> century BC.<sup>660</sup> By the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, there begins to be substantial evidence for constant trade and contact between these settlements and the wider Adriatic and Mediterranean worlds. For the purposes of this chapter I will focus on settlements on three of these islands: Korçyra Melaina, Pharos on modern Hvar and Issa on Vis.<sup>661</sup> All held strategically and economically important harbors and saw efforts by external powers to exert control by seizing and refounding them.

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<sup>658</sup> Discussion in chapter five on control of long stretches of seaboard through concentric foundations.

<sup>659</sup> E.g. the volumes of the Adriatic Islands Project: Gaffney et al. (1997), Stančič et al. (1999), and Kirigin et al. (2006). Cf. Kirigin (2006), Jurišić (2000), and international works in Italian and French like Marion and Tassaux (2015).

<sup>660</sup> E.g. Korçyra Melaina, Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2004), 333.

<sup>661</sup> In general, Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2004), 331-4.

Korkyra Melaina (modern Korčula) presents an interesting example of settlement from within the Adriatic. A decree dated variously from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the late 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC records a colonizing effort by Issa.<sup>662</sup> There was already a settlement on the island established by the Cnidians, according to Strabo and others.<sup>663</sup> It is now generally assumed that the previous colony had died out and that the Issaians were reestablishing an old Greek settlement on the island.<sup>664</sup> The decree mentions Pyllos and Dazos, though it is not entirely clear who they are. Some argue that they were Illyrian kings allowing the establishment of the colony, others that they were Issaians chosen as its founders.<sup>665</sup>

The particular interest of this settlement lies in the list of names given on the decree. While scholars argue over the specifics, it is clear that the settlers did not come exclusively from Issa. They are listed in three Dorian tribes. Fraser in particular has argued persuasively that many came from Syracuse, a Dorian foundation.<sup>666</sup> Others, like Woodhead, argue that these were Illyrian colonists.<sup>667</sup> Whichever schema one accepts, it is clear that this was a larger venture than an Issaian colony. Settlers from other parts of the Adriatic—I am inclined to believe Fraser on the participation of Syracusans—joined this settlement together. This is disruptive to the idea of state-sponsored colonization. Whereas the Athenian settlement discussed above is a clear example of a top-down settlement pattern, the “colonies” of Dionysius I and II are more complicated—how far can we trust Diodorus Siculus’ account? This decree suggests that, at Korčula at least, such efforts could extend far beyond a single state entity. This is also significant because the colony is ascribed to a neighboring island rather than an external power. If Syracuse

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<sup>662</sup> *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 141, *SEG* 17 312, 19 435, 40 511, 43 348. Lombardo (1993).

<sup>663</sup> Strabo 7.5.5, Skymn. 421, Pliny *NH* 3.152.

<sup>664</sup> E.g. Cabanes (2008), 174, Graham (1964), 43. Some, e.g. Braccesi (1977), 104-6, prefer that both colonies existed simultaneously.

<sup>665</sup> Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2004), 333.

<sup>666</sup> Fraser (1993).

<sup>667</sup> Woodhead (1970), 508ff.



was involved, it does not appear to have been on the state level. Perhaps Issa—having been founded by Syracuse—still had strong connections to the Ionian region and drew on settlers from that area. But the decree as we have it does not suggest any Syracusan administrative involvement. For allegedly explicit Syracusan settlement projects, we turn to Hvar and Vis.

Hvar is the fourth largest of the Adriatic islands and the longest at some 68 km but only 10.8 wide at the widest. It is separated only by 6 km from the mainland.<sup>668</sup> The island is quite large, some 300 km<sup>2</sup>, and separated into sections by a rocky spine of mountains that makes land travel difficult from one end of the island to the other. Two principal harbors make the island essential to maritime travel in the area: on the northern shore, the harbor at Stari Grad features a deep bay facing to the west, and on the southern coast, the harbor at the modern town of Hvar formed by the Pakleni islands.<sup>669</sup> These harbors in and of themselves do not make Hvar exceptional among Adriatic islands, though the one at Stari Grad is one of the best and most secure in the whole sea. What makes the island a necessary stopping point for maritime traffic is access to abundant food and, critically, fresh water.

Hvar was the focus of the first volume of the Adriatic Islands Project, an international publishing effort aimed at making emerging archaeological data about the Croatian islands available to a wider audience.<sup>670</sup> The volumes catalogue all known archaeological sites on each island addressed through the series and make recommendations for their preservation and upkeep, but interpretation of settlement trends or engagement with scholarship on the history of the islands is outside the scope of that project (though they do an excellent job on the history of modern archaeology on each island). However, one of the principal participants, Branko Kirigin, took it on himself to publish the site of Pharos in a more detailed and analytical manner, drawing

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<sup>668</sup> Gaffney et al. (1997), 5.

<sup>669</sup> Gaffney et al. (1997), 5-6.

<sup>670</sup> Gaffney et al. (1997).

on the outstanding and valuable cataloguing and bibliography building done by the earlier team and his own experience working on Hvar since the 1980s.<sup>671</sup> Kirigin's discussion of Pharos is wide-ranging and includes large sections dedicated to the island of Paros—from which the Greek settlers of Hvar supposedly came—and its history and culture, coinage minted and found on Hvar, and religious culture on the island, for example.

A point to which Kirigin repeatedly returns is the unique quality of Hvar's arable land. Unlike any other Adriatic island, Hvar has a large quantity of rich, fertile land in the Stari Grad plain. This allows the island to be largely self-sustaining. The island also features consistent sources of fresh water near the harbors and supposedly in antiquity—though no longer visible—a river.<sup>672</sup> While many of the Adriatic islands have karst springs, developing a settlement around a secure natural harbor like the one on Hvar would provide a very attractive stopping point for any and all traffic going up the eastern Adriatic coast. As we have seen, passing ships frequently stopped to take on water and trade, and the possibilities for fostering and profiting from such activities in a location like Hvar were numerous.

The combination of fresh water and very secure anchorage—from both weather and predation—made the Stari Grad harbor on Hvar some of the most desirable real estate in the Adriatic Sea.<sup>673</sup> Diodorus Siculus relates the interest of the Parians and Dionysius I of Syracuse in establishing a settlement on the island in the early 4<sup>th</sup> century BC:

While these events were taking place, in Sicily Dionysius, the tyrant of the Syracusans, resolved to plant cities on the Adriatic Sea. His idea in doing this was to get control of the Ionian Strait, in order that there he might make the route to Epirus safe and have his own cities which could give haven to ships. For it was his intent to descend unexpectedly with great armaments upon the regions about Epirus and to sack the temple at Delphi, which was filled with great wealth... While these events were taking place, the Parians, in

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<sup>671</sup> Kirigin (2006).

<sup>672</sup> Kirigin (2006), 6; Steph. Byz. s.v. "Pharos" = Ephorus *FGrHist* 70 fr. 89.

<sup>673</sup> It remained very desirable for many years: in the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries it became the seat of a bishopric and a key staging post for the later Venetian naval empire, Gaffney et al. (1997), 7-8.

accordance with an oracle, sent out a colony to the Adriatic, founding it on the island of Pharos, as it is called, with the co-operation of the tyrant Dionysius... This year the Parians, who had settled Pharos, allowed the previous barbarian inhabitants to remain unharmed in an exceedingly well fortified place, while they themselves founded a city by the sea and built a wall about it.<sup>674</sup>

He continues explaining that the other inhabitants of the island later mounted an attack against Pharos with the help of Illyrians from the nearby mainland and that Pharos only repelled the attack with the aid of ships from Issa, another Adriatic city founded by Dionysius.<sup>675</sup>

The implications of this pericope for settlement by external powers and the specific value of Pharos and Hvar are several. First, the island has strategic importance for Dionysius who views it—or so we can infer—both as a good launching point for attacks on Epirus and the surrounding region and also as a site of control for the Strait of Otranto, or at least part of that larger project. Of course, Hvar is quite removed from both Epirus and the Strait, at a distance of some 300 km as the crow flies from the northernmost parts of Epirus and another 50 km to the strait proper. Why in the context of creating a strong position against Epirus should Dionysius support a colonial foundation all the way up the sea at Hvar? Or at nearby Issa as he already had done?<sup>676</sup> The two sites controlled traffic into the northern Adriatic one of the main routes (as we have seen in chapter two) from mainland Greece the Po Valley and the northern Adriatic generally. By holding Hvar, Dionysius could profit from trade flowing into the rest of the

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<sup>674</sup> Diod. Sic. 15.13.1, 4, 14.1

<sup>675</sup> There is a textual problem here and debate whether it should be Lissus or Issus that provided aid. Stylianou (1998), 193-197. Scholars have argued both sides, e.g. Kuntić-Makvić (1995) for an emendation to Issa against, e.g. Čače (1993), Kirigin (1996), and Vanotti (2001) who prefer Lissus. It has long been assumed that Syracuse founded Issus (stated by Pseudo-Scymnus in Timaeus (*FGrH* 3b 566 fr. 77), which makes the emendation a possibility. Despite the ongoing discussion, most now prefer the solution of Stroheker, who proposed in 1958—long before some of the dissenting articles cited here—that Diodorus refers to Lissus but that Issa (from which help comes to Pharos, see below) was founded by Dionysius as a naval base at around the same time: Stroheker (1958), 122ff, cf. Nikolanci (1970), Woodhead (1970), and now Cambi (2002), 49 note 13. Examples of this general acceptance: Caven (1990), 149-50; Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2004), 331-2; Cabanes (2008), 176ff.

<sup>676</sup> Pseudo-Scymnus in Timaeus *FGrH* 3b 566 fr. 77.

Adriatic. Further, from Hvar he could easily strike further south at the settlements forming stepping stones for rowed warships into the southern Adriatic and the Strait: Epidaurus, Epidamnus, Apollonia, Oricum, and Corcyra. As we have seen, these are precisely the steps the Illyrians would take in 230 BC to seize control of the Strait and, in reverse order, Rome would take to repel them.<sup>677</sup> To make inroads in this maritime world, Hvar would be an excellent place to start.

Second, Diodorus says Dionysius wanted his own cities (πόλεις ἰδία) for safety on the route to Epirus both for his own ships and for others. Despite his alliance with the Illyrians and agreements to supply them with arms and troops, he wants his own cities on the ground. Of course, Pharos and Hvar are hardly on any reasonable route from Syracuse to Epirus, so Diodorus may be confused here. It would make more sense for Dionysius to be after a secure route *from* Epirus to the northern Adriatic and back after his ships had crossed the Strait. Having his own cities would provide guaranteed safe anchorage for all his merchant ships and any other vessels trading with Syracuse; a platform from which to launch attacks on Epirus or counterattacks against others preying on his shipping; and the opportunity to profit from providing for passing ships. Hvar provides all of these possibilities and a strong position for all ships traveling north into the Adriatic and back.

Third, this settlement did not happen in a vacuum. There were already settlers on the island—and archaeological evidence suggests Greek settlers there before this foundation as well—who were connected to the Illyrian mainland.<sup>678</sup> If Diodorus' narration is to be trusted, it seems there was at least a friendly agreement between these two populations initially. Kirigin proposes persuasively that the earlier population lived in the higher country on the Stari Grad

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<sup>677</sup> Polyb. 2.2-12 and discussion in chapter three.

<sup>678</sup> Gaffney et al. (2002).

plain.<sup>679</sup> Because of the difficult terrain of the island, they may not even have been aware of the other settlers for some time after the development of this new settlement at the harbor. In any case, the eventual conflict between them resulted in the takeover of the fertile plain by the Pharians and its incorporation into the agricultural plan of Pharos.

Long-term studies of aerial and satellite photographs of the island have revealed the agricultural divisions beginning in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC in the Stari Grad plain (image below).<sup>680</sup> This represents a significant disruption of the landscape and a reassignment of ecological resources to the new settlement at Pharos. This reliable source of food must have created a significantly independent population on the island and further increased the value of Pharos as a stopping point for passing ships.




Figure 28 - Land division on the Stari Grad and Jelsa plains - Kirigin (2006), 86

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<sup>679</sup> Kirigin (2006), 65ff.

<sup>680</sup> Cambi (2002) and especially Slapšak (2002) who proposes a 4<sup>th</sup> century date for the land divisions contrary to the traditional view that they date from the Roman period in, e.g. Bradford (1957) and Chevallier (1961).

We saw in the last chapter that Pharos became a key naval base in the late 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC for Demetrius of Pharos.<sup>681</sup> He used the secure harbor and food and water supply to launch successive attacks on Roman shipping in cooperation with Issa and populations on the mainland, ultimately resulting in the destruction of Pharos as a punishment for being guilty with Demetrius in his crimes against Rome.<sup>682</sup> Afterward, the site was clearly not abandoned entirely but did diminish in importance in the historical record, and archaeological finds from after this period become much scarcer.<sup>683</sup> The use and abuse of Hvar form another example of the negative consequences of connectedness.

Another of these islands along the east shore of the Adriatic, Vis was reportedly settled by Syracusans also under Dionysius' leadership.<sup>684</sup> The island is also quite large—over 90 km<sup>2</sup> and the largest of its island group—and contains tracts of arable land sufficient to support a small population, placing it with Hvar in the very small minority among Adriatic islands.<sup>685</sup> Vis also boasts a terrific harbor precisely where the settlement of Issa arose near some of the only reliable freshwater springs on the island.<sup>686</sup> This combination of arable land, a secure harbor, and freshwater springs marked Vis as an essential stopping point on the trade route through the Adriatic, especially for ships headed west to Italy.<sup>687</sup> As the writers of the Adriatic Islands Project put it, “The island therefore possesses a strategic openness. This is clearly reflected in the early colonial interests of the Greeks in Vis and the later role of the island as a base for the gradual promotion of Roman power within the region. During these periods, and whenever the

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<sup>681</sup> App. *Ill.* 8; Polyb. 4.16.

<sup>682</sup> Appian calls Pharos “his hometown, guilty with him in crime. App. *Ill.* 8: τὴν πατρίδα αὐτῷ Φάρον συναμαρτοῦσαν.

<sup>683</sup> Kirigin (2006), 151ff.

<sup>684</sup> Diod. Sic. 15.13.1-5.

<sup>685</sup> Kirigin et al. (2006c), 5-6.

<sup>686</sup> Kirigin et al. (2006c), 6.

<sup>687</sup> See discussion of trade routes in chapter two.

Adriatic sea has held a strategic importance, Vis was always ‘a player.’”<sup>688</sup> Indeed, Vis was such “a player” through the 20<sup>th</sup> century that images and maps of it were classified information until quite recently due to ongoing military activity on the island.<sup>689</sup>

Navigationally, Vis is one of the sight-line islands that ancient sailors could follow from the eastern to the western coast of the Adriatic. Its position made it an ideal stopping place for ships headed to Italy from Corcyra or outside the Adriatic and a necessary port of call for rowed vessels headed in that direction.<sup>690</sup> It was surely with its strategic position in mind that the Illyrians besieged the island in 230 BC in the buildup to the First Illyrian War.<sup>691</sup> Later in the war against Genthius in the 170s BC, Issa proved a valuable ally to Rome for the same reasons.<sup>692</sup>

In both Vis (Issa) and Hvar (Pharos), we see an external power attempting to exert control over maritime traffic through possession of an essential harbor. In both cases the winning combination of an excellent harbor, sufficient arable land, and reliable water supplies mean that all the necessities of passing ships could be met. Dionysius I of Syracuse wanted control over those sites explicitly in Diodorus Siculus’ account as a way to control movement in the Adriatic and as launching points against Epirus to the south. We have noted above that control in such a situation is really limited to the node or the harbor—it is very difficult to control the open sea or a long stretch of coastline very far outside the port city itself. These two island settlements provide an instructive example: when the new settlement at Pharos faced attack, Issa was close enough to respond with a naval force and help Pharos fend off the Illyrian forces from the mainland. Port nodes placed close enough together form some overlap and better “coverage” for maritime security.

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<sup>688</sup> Kirigin et al. (2006c), 3.

<sup>689</sup> Kirigin et al. (2006c), 5.

<sup>690</sup> See discussion in chapter two.

<sup>691</sup> App. *Ill.* 7; Polyb. 2.8; discussion in chapter three.

<sup>692</sup> Livy 42.26, 48.

#### IV. Roman Land Use and Economic Exploitation

Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the Marche or central Adriatic region of Italy. What have long been studied as “dots on maps” in the expansion of the Roman presence in Italy, the colonies and smaller settlements emerging on the peninsula during the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries BC used to be seen as bulwarks against potential Gallic invasions. In what is still the only monograph on Roman colonization under the Republic, Edward Togo Salmon emphasized repeatedly the strategic value of the Roman colonies in northeastern Italy in the face of Gallic invasions.<sup>693</sup> Certainly Rome expended a great deal of energy fighting Gauls in the Po Valley and beyond, but that was neither the only challenge Rome faced in the region nor the principle purpose in founding such settlements.

Peter Derow argued late in life that the Roman foundations on the Adriatic coast in the early 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC represent a sustained effort to control not the passage into Gaul but the Adriatic Sea itself.<sup>694</sup> This idea was picked up by his student Nikola Čašule who, in his recent Oxford dissertation, argued that Rome had designs on the Adriatic from the early 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC.<sup>695</sup> This is not to say that Rome intended to conquer the Adriatic nor is it to weigh in on the rather fruitless debate about Roman imperialism.<sup>696</sup> Instead, it merely suggests that Rome participated in the wide network of the Adriatic earlier than the first sustained attempts to conquer it by military force. As Čašule argued, upon arriving in the Adriatic region of Italy, Rome stepped into an already thriving network of trade and contacts throughout that maritime basin. Of particular interest to him were networked cities linked by the cult of Diomedes.<sup>697</sup>

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<sup>693</sup> Salmon (1967), e.g. 63.

<sup>694</sup> Derow (2003), 51-4.

<sup>695</sup> Čašule (2011).

<sup>696</sup> For which see discussion in chapter five.

<sup>697</sup> Čašule (2012), 205-29; cf. Čašule (2011).



Archaeological work in the late 1990s identified two new cult sites of Diomedes in the Adriatic which Čašule leverages to describe a trans-Adriatic religious network strongly affiliated with other sites on the Italian peninsula already associated with the Romans. The first of these is Palagruža, the tiny island in the center of the Adriatic and subject of a great deal of interest around the questions of early seafaring in the Mediterranean.<sup>698</sup> Palagruža has no source of fresh water beyond periodically collected rainfall and so is not a reliable stopping point on any voyages. Yet, its position along major, visually connected trade routes makes it potentially a navigational point, and finds show visits to the island over many centuries. The excavations under Slobodan Čače and Branko Kirigin found thousands of Greek fine ware fragments, many with inscriptions linking the site to Diomedes.<sup>699</sup> This is especially important in light of the second set of evidence discovered at Cape Ploča on the Croatian mainland starting in 1996.<sup>700</sup> The pottery fragments unearthed there were so thick in places along off this exposed headland that there was more pottery than dirt in the excavated trenches. Inscriptions on the pottery as at Palagruža tie the site firmly to Diomedes.<sup>701</sup>

As we have already seen in chapter two, ecological patterns in the Adriatic sent maritime trade straight into Cape Ploča where, jutting out into the sea, it presided over the junction of the two big currents and the meeting of sailing routes. Sitting prominently on the coast, the Cape was an important visual marker for sailors navigating in the Adriatic. Likewise Palagruža sat directly on a major crossing of the sea and could be visible from both coasts, making it a fine guide.

Čašule argues that the cult of Diomedes was organized around seafaring and the making of

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<sup>698</sup> E.g. Forenbaher (2009a); Kirigin et al., (2009).

<sup>699</sup> Kirigin and Čače (1998); Kirigin (2003); Kirigin, Katunarić, and Skelac (2004); Kirigin, Katunarić, and Miše (2005); Kirigin et al. (2006); Kirigin, Katunarić, and Miše (2006a); Kirigin et al. (2009); Kirigin and Miše (2010).

<sup>700</sup> Kirigin and Čače (1998); Bilić-Dujmušić (2002); Bilić-Dujmušić (2004); Bonačić Mandinić (2004); Kirigin et al. (2004); Čašule (2011), 237ff.

<sup>701</sup> Čašule (2011), 238; Bilić-Dujmušić (2004): 134-6.

offerings to ensure safe passage.<sup>702</sup> Sailors stuck at Cape Ploča waiting for weather to clear or preparing for the crossing to the west shoreline made dedications on the promontory. The coins found on the Cape identify a number of sites potentially involved in this network, including Corcyra, Issa, Apollonia, and places further afield such as Argos and Cyprus. There are also a number of Roman republican coins.<sup>703</sup> From here Čašule stretches his argument to suggest that sites on the Italian peninsula linked to the worship of Diomedes or claiming him as a mythical founder were also participants in the network linking Cape Ploča, Palagruža, and the broader Adriatic world. This is a tenuous argument, in my opinion, but one of the underlying principles merits much more consideration, namely the existing trade contacts on the Adriatic coast into which Rome stepped over the course of the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries BC.

Čašule's ultimate point in his dissertation and in putting forward evidence for the widespread worship of Diomedes is to show that Romans participated in the Adriatic world far before the beginnings of their eastern conquest. He titles the driving chapter on the subject after a statement of his mentor Peter Derow (my emphasis):

After the battle of Sentinum in 295 Roman dominion in Italy was extended across the peninsula to the Adriatic. This was quickly confirmed by the foundation of colonies on the coast in the 280s: Sena Gallica, Hadria and Castrum Novum. They were the beginning of a process that continued with the foundations of Ariminum (268), Firmum Picenum (264), and, finally, Brundisium (244). These were citizen and Latin colonies, and it was above all the sea that connected them to the wider world. It is against this backdrop of fifty years of Roman presence along the Adriatic coast that the events of the 230s must be seen and understood: by then Adriatic affairs were altogether relevant to Rome's dominion in Italy...The Adriatic was visibly *in part a Roman sea*.<sup>704</sup>

That the Adriatic was *in part a Roman sea* depends on these settlements and Roman access to and use of the sea. Derow in making this pronouncement and Čašule in following him both buck

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<sup>702</sup> Čašule (2011), 233ff and (2012).

<sup>703</sup> Čašule (2011), 241; Bonačić Mandinić (2004): 151-7.

<sup>704</sup> Derow (2003), 52-3.

decades of scholarship asserting that the colonies Derow lists here were established as bulwarks against Gallic encroachment from the north, a landlocked problem.<sup>705</sup>

These settlements turned seaward rather than landward and reflected Roman engagement with the Adriatic starting early in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. We have seen in chapter two the evidence for robust trade in the Adriatic during that period. That these Roman sites were involved in that trade and harbored its ships in their river ports seems beyond doubt. Settlements both follow and attract trade, and the growing of coastal sites and subsequent networks following these 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC colonies helped to thicken the network of exchange across the Adriatic Sea.

To return to the Marche and central Italy, the ongoing settlement and development of the region during this period and especially in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC led to overwhelming change in the landscape and, critically, increased maritime trade. We have seen sites along riverbanks fortified to provide havens for merchant ships and launching points for counterattacks at Pisaurum and Potentia. The excavations and analysis carried out by Giuseppe Lepore and his team at Sena Gallica confirm that this pattern goes back to the early 3<sup>rd</sup> century: the settlement was established at a site of maritime traffic where a river mouth and canal could provide safe dockage for merchants and warships (see image below).<sup>706</sup> Castrum Novum, one of the least excavated of these sites, was also founded on a river.<sup>707</sup> Ariminum began as a settlement on a the terrace of the River Marecchia near its mouth sometime in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC and slowly developed into a substantial urban center beginning in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century.<sup>708</sup> The majority of these sites have direct

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<sup>705</sup> Foremost Salmon (1969), 63.

<sup>706</sup> G. Lepore, S. Antolini, F. Galazzi, “Novità epigrafiche da Senigallia,” *Picus* 25 (2015): 273-95, esp. 290ff for the port function of the ancient city. Cf. Lepore et al. (2012); Lepore et al. (2014); further bibliography Vermeulen (2017), 65ff and van Limbergen and Vermeulen (2017), 186-7.

<sup>707</sup> In general, Vermeulen (2017), 171.

<sup>708</sup> Lenzi (2006), esp. article by J. Ortalli (2006).

access to the sea in the form of navigable rivers and canals. Not only were they linked by roads but, as Derow had it, they were linked foremost by the sea.




Figure 29 - Plan of the colony of Sena Gallica - Vermeulen (2017), 64

Frank Vermeulen has the advantage of working in the Marche region for many years. Having carried out many surveys and really dug into the history of this region, he authoritatively describes the huge impact the arrival of Roman settlers had on this area, beginning as a trickle and swelling quickly to a torrent. He pinpoints the 232 BC *lex de agro Gallico et Piceno viritim*

*dividundo* by C. Flaminius as one moment of influx and the opening of the Via Flaminia in 220 BC as another.<sup>709</sup> Newcomers poured into central Adriatic Italy from all over the peninsula as the land was divided among them in the process of virgane distribution.<sup>710</sup> Whole landscapes were divided up and apportioned to settlers to the detriment of recently-conquered populations. Saskia Roselaar has argued that the Romans distributed the land gained from conquest with a view to both enriching themselves and maintaining the peace, a dual purpose that required careful balance.<sup>711</sup> This radical transformation of the landscape included road networks linking the sites to Rome and each other, significantly disrupting existing market systems and creating new ones while dispossessing thousands.<sup>712</sup> Polybius spoke to the incredible impact of the distribution of land by Flaminius in 232 BC in particular, claiming that the war between Rome and the Gauls in 225 BC was precipitated by the land distribution: “For what prompted many of the Gauls...to take action was the conviction that now the Romans no longer made war on them for the sake of supremacy and sovereignty, but with a view to their total expulsion and extermination.”<sup>713</sup> Even the physical impact on the landscape was so significant as to still be visible today in the form of centuriation.

Nowhere is this transformation more dramatically apparent than in the northernmost part of the Adriatic near Pula. As has been carefully studied from photographs and now satellite

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<sup>709</sup> Vermeulen (2017), 70-1.

<sup>710</sup> On the different kinds of land distribution, Roselaar (2010), 52ff.

<sup>711</sup> Roselaar (2010), 51: In this way the treatment of *ager publicus* was a tool in the suppression of defeated peoples. If an enemy was considered dangerous, the Romans took care to make sure that they had a firm grip on the land by privatizing much of it, and by isolating any remaining autonomous groups from others. If the enemy was considered less dangerous, relatively more *ager publicus* remained undistributed. Of course, when an enemy had been treated leniently, it was more difficult to distribute all *ager publicus*, since the defeated population still needed a place to live. The way the Roman state dealt with its public land was therefore motivated not only by the gains it would bring the Romans, but also by the necessity of keeping the allies in check without antagonizing them unnecessarily.

<sup>712</sup> On the road system in this area, Luni and Uttoveggio (2002); Dall’Aglia (2004); Biocco (2008).

<sup>713</sup> Polyb. 2.21.8-9.

images, a huge area of centuriation can be discerned radiating out from Pula and the nearby site of Parentium.<sup>714</sup> The scale of the land reorganization is indicative not only of the fertile quality of the land at on Istria but also of the excellence of the available harbors.<sup>715</sup>

In many respects the area around Pula is much like centuriated land all over the Roman Empire.<sup>716</sup> But Pula provides an interesting case study for our purposes because of the personalities involved in its foundation and the later history of the area. Julius Caesar seems to have been directly involved in the establishment of the colony and its land distribution as part of an overall plan for agricultural exploitation and economic investment in the area.<sup>717</sup> As a result of his involvement and the truly spectacular quality of the agricultural ecology, the space around Pula became dominated by members of the imperial household and their close associates in the decades after Caesar's death.<sup>718</sup> More perhaps than in any other part of the larger Italian peninsula (and whether Istria should be considered part of Roman Italy is another can of worms entirely), the area around Pula was inhabited by the wealthy and received significant agricultural investments.

Frederico Santangelo recently gathered all of the evidence for Caesar's involvement and sifted through the tendentious writing about the size and orientation of the centuriation grids around Pula to argue for deliberate economic investment.<sup>719</sup> As he explains, Pula is not a significant strategic site for control of the Adriatic Sea. There are many good harbors on the Istrian peninsula to either side of it, for example. The choice to settle this area and distribute the

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<sup>714</sup> Santangelo (2016); Bradford (1957); Chevalier (1961); Marchiori (2010).

<sup>715</sup> Santangelo (2016), 113, 121: It is not just exceptionally fertile, with abundance, in the central and southern sectors, of highly productive *terra rossa*, a reddish sticky clay that enables a remarkable range of cultivations, especially vineyards and olive trees, sustaining a thriving long-distance trade circuit...

<sup>716</sup> Chouquere and Favory (1991).

<sup>717</sup> Santangelo (2016), 113ff.

<sup>718</sup> Maiuro (2012).

<sup>719</sup> Santangelo (2016).

land not to veterans—though there is evidence for some of that—but to wealthy Romans from Caesar’s own circle, speaks to agricultural and economic investment and exploitation on a new level at Rome.<sup>720</sup> This kind of development in the region shortly produced large numbers of agricultural exports which were funneled through Pula and shipped all over the Adriatic. Not only were the soil and climate perfect for the production of wine and olive oil, but the coastline was thickly dotted with salt and fish operations as well as the production of purple dyes.<sup>721</sup> This forever changed the ecology and economy of the peninsula and its relationship with the rest of the sea. The kind of heavy-handed terraforming Caesar performed here is indicative of the power individuals and states have to manipulate the landscape and harness the power of the sea. Caesar’s investment paid dividends for wealthy Romans for decades afterward.

## V. Conclusion

At the end of the long Hellenistic period, a new wave of settlements followed on the civil wars of the 40s and 30s BC. Julius Caesar granted municipal privileges to existing settlements along the eastern Adriatic coast including probably Iader, Narona, and Epidaurum.<sup>722</sup> As we have seen, he had already founded Pola on the coast of Istria during the 50s BC.<sup>723</sup> But it was the settlement program of his heir Octavian that really transformed the Adriatic in the long term. In the period after Actium, he established (or elevated to the status of) colonies at Iader, Salona, Narona, Senia, and Epidaurum in the eastern Adriatic and perhaps many others in Italy, including at least Ancona.<sup>724</sup> The evidence for these colonies is problematic: and involves reconciling a list of Augustan colonies given by Pliny the Elder with epigraphic and other data,

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<sup>720</sup> Santangelo (2016), 117, 119, 121; epitaph of a veteran near Parentium: *CIL* V 397; Keppie, (1983).

<sup>721</sup> Marchiori (2010), 36-8; Carre, Kovačić, and Tasseaux (2011); Matijašić (1993); Marzano (2013); Macheboeuf et al. (2013).

<sup>722</sup> Alföldy (1965), 78, 135, 139; cf. Brunt (1987), 597-8.

<sup>723</sup> Santangelo (2016).

<sup>724</sup> Alföldy (1965), 78, 102-5, 135, 143; Brunt (1987), 597-8; Dzino (2010), 119-21.

despite the fact that Pliny is inconsistent in his application of Roman terminology for the legal statuses of settlements.<sup>725</sup>

However many settlements may in the end be attributed to Augustan distributions following Actium in 31 BC, it is clear that this was a period of significant change for the Adriatic. Danijel Dzino summed it up like this:

This was a significant period for building activity in the eastern Adriatic, when new urbanistic forms were implemented over the existing templates of indigenous cities in the eastern Adriatic. It is interesting that early Augustan colonists were not military veterans, as in Gaul or Spain, but civilians....Some colonies such as Iader were probably of an agrarian nature...This wave of colonisation hastened the process of Italian settlement, which had already begun in the second-first century BC, when Italian traders started to settle there. Epigraphy also reveals that the settlement of the colonists on the eastern Adriatic coast corresponded with their places of origin across the Adriatic. Thus the majority of the settlers in Liburnia were of North Italian origin; central Italians settled in central Dalmatia, especially in Salona; and settlers from southern Italy settled in the south.”<sup>726</sup>

That Italian settlers seem to have moved laterally across the Adriatic speaks to the strength of ties between eastern and western shores. As Dzino has it, this effort of “settlement and establishment of colonies in the Augustan era was part of a much wider process” of strengthening Roman ties in the Adriatic.<sup>727</sup>

Overall, I envision the process of settlement in the Adriatic as a gradual “thickening” of networks of contact as more and more nodes (settlements) join the web tying the Adriatic basin together and linking it to the outside world. In the wake of the Peloponnesian War, as Athenian influences decrease in the Adriatic, Dionysius I and Syracuse grab up excellent settlement sites in something of a “scramble for the Adriatic.” This scramble continues through the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC as Roman colonies appear along the Adriatic coast and begin both harvesting maritime trade and pouring into it the increasing production of the Italian peninsula. As Adriatic Italy becomes

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<sup>725</sup> Brunt (1987), 608-9; Čače (2002) on Pliny’s unreliability. The list is found at Pliny *HN* 3.123.

<sup>726</sup> Dzino (2010), 121.

<sup>727</sup> Dzino (2010), 124.



more and more developed, the agricultural produce of the countryside flows through the sea and further thickens those networks of exchange. By the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC and the settlement programs of Caesar and Augustus, network density reaches a tipping point, what Chouquere would call “continentalization,” and the Adriatic becomes so thoroughly linked as to behave like a landmass. It is at this point, as we will see in the next chapter, that the dividing sea becomes a potentially unifying one under Roman rule.

But rule and control, as we have seen in this chapter, are complicated by maritime space. The argument I have made here is that while states exert a great many resources to control these networks and predation, they have a limited scope for doing so outside of the harbors they hold and influence. States manage to promote and safeguard trade at harbor sites because the nature of ancient shipping and especially of ancient warships required frequent stops for rest and water. Providing a secure site with reliable water and food resources greatly facilitated movement around the sea. Controlling such a site gave an external power like Syracuse or Rome a significant foothold within that network. But functionally, that foothold only extended briefly outside the harbor itself. Thus it is important to remember that these thickening networks of contact are still made up of little zones of control linked with one another. Increasing numbers of them may eventually overlap (as we will see in the next chapter), but for the most part they remain separate spheres of influence linked by trade routes on uncontrolled seas.

Importantly, all of these settlements are fueled by settlers. These programs of settlement across the Adriatic represent the movement of hundreds of thousands of people over these four centuries. These top-down, state-level settlements facilitated large-scale migrations especially in Adriatic Italy where road systems and rich landscapes brought tens of thousands of Italians and Romans across the Central Apennines. But it is important to remember that, as Čačule argued,

these settlements did not appear in a vacuum. They plugged into existing networks of trade established by others long before Greek or Roman colonists arrived in those parts of the Adriatic. We should also assume that, beyond the literarily noted colonies established in the Adriatic, dozens of other settlements appeared along its shores to facilitate or exploit trade and natural resources. These were outside the influence of “states”, per se, and do not make it into the literary record. Even for those that do, the top-down imposition of settlements following existing trade patterns serves to confirm the bottom-up effects of movement and trade: there are people living here and thriving, so it must be a good place to settle; let’s settle there too. As these settlements follow on bottom-up networks of contact and exchange, the Adriatic becomes a more connected place. People do the connecting. And as there are more of them, in closer contact with one another, violence ensues. And as networks become more and more valuable, external powers are willing to exert increasing effort to control them, as we will see in the next chapter.

## Chapter Five

### *Imperialisms* and Maritime Power in the Adriatic World

A central problem of this dissertation is the juxtaposition of the connecting and dividing forces of the Adriatic Sea from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC. Even though this maritime world remains highly fragmented politically through this period, we have seen it become increasingly entangled on the level of economic and human geographies. In chapter two, we observed networks of contact through trade growing thicker over time as increasing numbers of people and goods flowed through the Adriatic. In chapter three, we saw military entrepreneurs arise in larger numbers to exploit that trade through force. In chapter four, we explored two approaches to the movement and settlement of people in the region. On the one hand we watched state powers stake out claims to the edges of the sea through settlement in a scramble for the Adriatic that facilitated exploitations of trade while also increasing security against maritime attacks. And on the other hand, we saw how these settlements built on existing networks of trade and movement of people that were already thriving before these external powers arrived. Growing numbers of settlements over this period further thickened the web of connectivities in the Adriatic, building on the movement and trade of others. In this last chapter, I explore how the powers of state and non-state actors developed in the Adriatic. The diverse powers that at one time or other in this period exercised power in the Adriatic can be described as extending one of the various *imperialisms*—violent, military aggressions by one state aimed at control over another (expanded below)—that we see extended into the Adriatic. Ultimately, while several powers compete for

control of various parts of the fragmented Adriatic—*imperialisms* IN the Sea—it is only at the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC that we begin to conceive of the Adriatic as a politically unifiable unit and therefore envision *imperialisms* OF the Adriatic.

As in chapter four, I utilize here the useful model of Gérard Chouquere, who distinguishes between the “island” and “continent” stages of networks.<sup>728</sup> In brief, he compares thin networks to sparse islands connected over long distances. As more islands are added, the network thickens until it becomes almost a solid continent. He compares this process to the progressive meeting of islands in an archipelago as the sea level drops and exposes the land bridges between them. He calls this “continentalization.” While Chouquere works on networks across agricultural landscapes, the concept applies well here. In the Adriatic, networks of movement and trade are thin to begin with, like a network of linked islands (and in the Adriatic, some of the links happen to be between actual islands). From the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC, the networks thicken until they become so dense as to resemble a continent. The consummation of this process occurs following Octavian’s victory at Actium in 31 BC when, for the first time, it becomes possible to envision the fragmented Adriatic as whole under the control of one state, in this case Rome.<sup>729</sup> Up until that point, state efforts of conquest *in* the Adriatic are aimed at specific settlements or microecologies within the scattered, “island” network of the 4<sup>th</sup> through the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC. Now, with Octavian in command of the entire basin, we can speak of control *of* the whole sea.<sup>730</sup> Octavian projects control through the many articulation points around the sea—the nodes discussed in chapters three and four—that allow land-based power to be extended into the maritime sphere. By the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC there are now so many of

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<sup>728</sup> Chouquere (2000), esp. 134-6; cf. Chouquere (2002), esp. 44-5.

<sup>729</sup> Discussion at the end of the chapter.

<sup>730</sup> On the *in/of* distinction, see the introduction above and Horden and Purcell (2000), 2-3.

these extending into the maritime networks—and they are being utilized by so many people—that the density of connections reaches this tipping point of “continentalization”.

Viewing *imperialisms* in the Adriatic through this framework—as disjointed aggressions aimed at control of specific microregions within the sea—requires sidestepping the traditional approach, focusing as it does almost exclusively on Roman expansion and eventual conquest of the territories east of the Adriatic. Indeed, most studies of warfare and conquest during these critical centuries look only on the long narrative of Roman expansion from the viewpoint of Imperialism, more precisely the deliberate, systematic takeover of foreign states with the intent of long-term rule by Rome.<sup>731</sup> Instead of this largely Romano-centric narrative, I here compare the aggressions of multiple actors in the Adriatic in this period, including non-state actors. As will be explained more fully below, this has the dual advantages of both allowing me to put the narratives of these states and others into dialogue with one another and also of removing from the equation the need to show how these frequently isolated *imperialisms* fit into a larger, deliberate pattern of Imperialism. In turn I examine the *imperialisms* of Syracuse, Athens, Epirus, Illyria, Macedon, and finally Rome. The scope of the study is not determined by the culture or ideology of any of these states but rather by the geographical boundaries of the Adriatic. It is especially an exploration of how various agents utilized the ecological space of the Adriatic to project power and authority, in other words how they linked their influence to different zones within the sea. For this reason, as we will see, it is also an examination of exploitation in this maritime space.

These exploitations bring the consequences of connectivity to the Adriatic, first to scattered, targeted areas and then—through the process of continentalization—to the whole

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<sup>731</sup> For definitions of Imperialism and specifically of the history of Roman imperialism, Hoyos (2013), Edwell (2013), Goldstone and Haldon (2009), and Hopkins (2009).

sea.<sup>732</sup> As I have argued in each chapter, the growing connections in the Adriatic from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC bring with them increasing contact with powers inside and outside the sea. It is through these thickening networks of movement and trade that actors within and without the Adriatic find opportunities for exploitation. This connectivity has fostered trade contacts (chapter two), attacks on settlements and trade vessels (chapter three), and state-level efforts at control through settlement and population transfer (chapter four). Now *imperialisms* bring conquest, war, and foreign rule to the Adriatic. The same links that facilitate moving amphorae across and around the sea now move warships and troops. As Morris argued, these connections create winners and losers.<sup>733</sup> As the Adriatic becomes increasingly connected through this period, they create more winners and more losers until the dividing sea becomes a unifying sea under Roman rule.

### I. Imperialism and *imperialisms*

But first it is necessary to explore the terms Imperialism and *imperialisms* used in the opening paragraphs. Military aggression and conquest in the ancient Mediterranean have frequently been studied through the lens of Imperialism, especially in the case of Rome's swift expansion during the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries BC.<sup>734</sup> But the study of formal Imperialism depends on specific definitions that do not readily apply to events in the ancient Mediterranean. Michael Doyle's definition has become somewhat standard: "a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural dependence.

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<sup>732</sup> On the consequences of connectivity, Morris (2003).

<sup>733</sup> Morris (2003), 33.

<sup>734</sup> In general, Morris and Scheidel (2009) and Hoyos (2013). The most famous example is Harris (1979). On the history of the problem, Eckstein (2008), 42ff

Imperialism is simply the process of establishing or maintaining an empire.”<sup>735</sup> Behind this formulation and others lurks a degree of deliberateness in the establishment of empire. Robert Werner required Imperialism to be “an expansionist mode of action, prompted by various causes, not directed to a precise end, resting on the conscious and programmatic disposition of a state, or interested parties authorised or recognized by it, with the aim of establishing and stabilizing an *imperium* or *Reich* and of directly, in practice, ruling conquered groups, peoples, and territories together with their institutions, with a tendency to world-rule in optimal conditions.”<sup>736</sup> This element of intention is essential to the understanding of Imperialism but problematic when applied to the ancient world. Scholars working on the theory of empire, power, and control also emphasize the foreign relationship between the conqueror and conquered, asserting it is an essential aspect of Imperialism proper.<sup>737</sup> As Ian Morris recently argued, this eliminates what is usually called the Athenian Empire (5<sup>th</sup> and early 4<sup>th</sup> centuries BC) from the list of Imperialistic states: Athens gained control over poleis very similar to Athens and all identifying as Ionian—hardly a case of foreign rule.<sup>738</sup> Further, Imperialism frequently happens over great distances, and that geographical separation enhances the foreignness of the conquerors. In Morris’ eyes, this means that Athens cannot rule over an empire since the conquests of the so-called Delian League (470s-460s BC) were so close to Athens.<sup>739</sup> He argues that we should instead view

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<sup>735</sup> Doyle (1986), 45. See discussion in Morris (2009), 129ff and Hoyos (2013), 2ff. On the history of the term Imperialism, which emerged in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in the context of Napoleon’s empire, Koebner and Schmidt (1964); cf. Flach (1976), Baumgart (1982).

<sup>736</sup> Werner (1972), 523, translated by Hoyos (2009), 3-4.

<sup>737</sup> As, for example, Doyle (1986), 30

<sup>738</sup> Morris (2009), 132-4: “I am suggesting, like many comparativists in the past twenty years, that we think of empires as a type of state, characterized by a strong sense of foreignness between rulers and ruled. I believe that calling the Athenians’ fifth-century *archê* an empire is a mistake because the sense of foreignness was, by the standards of the other ancient empires described in this volume, very weak.”

<sup>739</sup> Morris (2009), 99, where he says the Athenian “empire” (which he will argue should be viewed as a large state and not an empire at all) “was barely big enough to make a respectable Assyrian or Roman province, let alone a Persian satrapy... The other empires discussed in this book dwarfed the Athenian in

Athens as a growing state and her empire building simply as state-formation: Athens became a bigger state not the ruler of a foreign, overseas empire.

Morris' arguments highlight the problems of definition that trouble other studies of Imperialism in the ancient world. Many of the aggressors we typically label as empire-builders were expanding their influence into neighboring and culturally very similar states.<sup>740</sup> Historians frequently make a distinction, for example, between the Roman conquest of Italy (expansion) and the acquisition of an "overseas" empire.<sup>741</sup> Even in instances when foreignness and distance seem to apply—Rome conquering Carthage or Persia, or Rome attempting to conquer the Greek cities—it is difficult to prove that these wars were part of a sustained, deliberate effort to build an empire with the evidence we have at hand. Separated by thousands of years from the events and depending on historiographers who were themselves almost always centuries distant from them as well, how are we to judge if these states displayed the degree of deliberateness and long-term planning that would qualify their aggressions as aimed at the domination of an empire?<sup>742</sup>

It is precisely this debate—how can we be sure of an aggressive state's intentions—that has dominated discussion of Roman Imperialism for more than a century. As Martin Stone put it succinctly: "It is necessary to distinguish the phenomenon of imperialism from the mere

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almost every sense and lasted much longer. Athens was a quirky empire—so quirky, I suggest in this chapter, that we would do better not to think of it as an empire at all."

<sup>740</sup> As Athens, Morris (2009) or Rome in Italy.

<sup>741</sup> E.g. Errington (1972) who, like Mommsen and many a textbook makes a firm division between expansion in Italy and the marker of the First Punic War—the first foray into the wider world and, critically, a beginning of governance (outside Italy) rather than the system of treaties and agreements used to work with cities and leagues in the peninsula: Mommsen (1984) 2.165ff, cf. Prag (2009); as textbook examples, Scullard (1961), Ward, Heichelheim, and Yeo (2013). Cornell (1995), xiv on the chronological markers of his history: "The terminal date of 264 BC has been chosen not only as a convenient stopping point, but as a symbolic moment; for in that year the Romans embarked on their first major overseas adventure, when they sent an army to Sicily to confront the Carthaginians. The start of the first Romano-Carthaginian war marked the beginning of the end for Carthage, and ultimately for all the other major powers of the Mediterranean basin. For Rome, it equally clearly signaled the end of the beginning." On the problems of this chronology, Flower (2010).

<sup>742</sup> Morris (2009) for an example of how this can be applied.



expansion of the Roman city-state.”<sup>743</sup> I focus here on Roman Imperialism, specifically the Roman conquest of the Greek peninsula (229-167 BC), because it has attracted by far the most interest. The debate is a complex one and has generated a great deal of bibliography. In brief, some argue that Rome aggressively sought to conquer the Mediterranean (deliberate Imperialism over time),<sup>744</sup> and others that the state only acted defensively or altruistically, what has been called conquest by invitation (no evidence for deliberate Imperialism).<sup>745</sup> This second position is the older one, first argued by Theodor Mommsen.<sup>746</sup> Tenney Frank, Maurice Holleaux, and others bolstered this view in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, positing that Rome only intervened in the affairs of other sovereign states either by invitation or to protect the interests of the weak and never with the intent to govern.<sup>747</sup> Quite by accident—and goodwill—Rome ended up governing the entire Mediterranean when other states proved unable to do so effectively.

William Harris firmly countered these arguments with his 1979 book, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 BC*, in which he depicted a Roman political and social system that created elites entirely dependent on war and conquest for status and prestige.<sup>748</sup> This systemic requirement, he insisted, meant that the elites who governed Roman foreign policy continually sought out new battlefields where they could harvest this precious commodity of military glory. In this way, Rome systematically conquered the entire Mediterranean basin

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<sup>743</sup> Stone (2013), 23.

<sup>744</sup> Especially Harris (1979).

<sup>745</sup> Champion (2007) and see below.

<sup>746</sup> Mommsen (1903), e.g. 696-701.

<sup>747</sup> Frank (1914), Holleaux (1935). A good summary of the view from Errington (1972), 3: “Rome’s rise to world power was one of the most important accidents in European history. It was not a deliberately engineered process; Rome’s empire was not created by any initial desire to rule or to exploit others. Rather it evolved through a continual process of responding to threats, real or imagined, to Rome’s ever-widening sphere of interests. Expansion proceeded by a series of steps which aimed to achieve, first and foremost, merely the security of Rome.”

<sup>748</sup> Harris (1979).

through a series of aggressive atrocities.<sup>749</sup> Romans were definitely the bad guys. In the decades since the book's publication, the primary objections to Harris' argument have been his portrayal of Roman aggression as largely one-sided and his assumption that Rome was exceptionally belligerent among Mediterranean states.<sup>750</sup> To the first point, Erich Gruen explored the interstate conflicts of the Hellenistic world and the degree to which the Greek states invited Rome's participation, thus refocusing the debate on what was happening in the Greek peninsula rather than solely on Rome's external push for power.<sup>751</sup> The result is that Rome escapes some of the blame for the atrocities of Imperialism—with the agency of the Hellenistic states restored to the equation—and looks more like the good guys (or at least less like the bad). To the second point, Arthur Eckstein has championed the application of the realist school of International Relations Theory to these same conflicts, thereby understanding all of the sovereign states in the Mediterranean as participating in an anarchic type of interstate relations within which each must act rationally and with great aggression against its neighbors.<sup>752</sup> In this way he argues that Rome was not exceptionally bellicose but rather won out through greater resources.<sup>753</sup> He also shifts away from the idea of Imperialism by situating Roman Imperialism within the rules of political realism that all states must follow: Rome was not exceptionally imperialistic but doing what any

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<sup>749</sup> Esp. Harris (1979), 9-40.

<sup>750</sup> E.g. Eckstein (2006), 182ff. Eckstein here gathers (page 184) a few examples of the impact of this thesis, including Raaflaub (1991) and (1996) and Cornell (1995) who (page 365-7) compares Roman Imperialism to a criminal gang: "The Roman system has been compared to a criminal operation which compensates its victims by enrolling them in the gang and inviting them to share the proceeds of future robberies. This brutal analogy brings us back to the point about the Roman state's need to make war. Any self-respecting criminal gang would soon break up if its boss decided to abandon crime and 'go legitimate'."

<sup>751</sup> Gruen (1984); Eckstein's useful judgment (2008), 5: Erich Gruen has attempted to restore the balance in analysis by emphasizing the powerful independent role which, he argues, the rival policies, expansive ambitions, mutual conflicts, and outright aggressions of the Greek states themselves played in the complex events that led to the rise of Roman power in the East, emphasizing as well the influence which Greek interstate practices had upon Roman approaches to the region. But Gruen's attempt to bring the Greek's back in as a crucial factor in events has often been bypassed."

<sup>752</sup> Eckstein (2006), (2008), and now Burton (2011).

<sup>753</sup> Eckstein (2006), 182ff.

state would. Romans are neither good nor bad but the same as everyone else. Other historians have piled onto the debate, combing through the same evidence and adding nuances to each position. We are effectively at an impasse.<sup>754</sup> This is not to say that I believe all of these scholars are wrong. To the contrary, I believe each brings essential elements to the debate. However, I wish to ask different questions.

To my mind, we have reached this deadlock by two intertwined paths. First, without any reliable evidence laying out the Roman senate's foreign policy plan—if there was such a thing—for most of a century of major expansionism from 229 BC to 146 BC, we are left to look at the results of military actions and the aftermath of conquest to then make judgments about Rome's intent.<sup>755</sup> That is simply the nature of the evidence. We do have the writings of Polybius who lived through many of the events and knew some of the officials involved, but his *Histories* are wrapped up in their own agenda and must be read carefully.<sup>756</sup> The other historians we rely on came centuries afterward.<sup>757</sup> This is something like reading a news report about an important basketball tournament that happened 50 years ago and was written by a reporter who sat in the stands for only some of the games and vaguely knew one of the coaches. We, based on the outcomes, stats, and a brief summary of each contest, must try to discern not only the winning coach's strategy for each game but the way his team practiced, how they played in the regular

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<sup>754</sup> These ideas of an impasse and of boiling down each position essentially to Rome as the good guys, bad guys, or equally culpable with everyone else (and therefore not at all) come from John Ma's paper at the 2016 SCS seminar "Rethinking Roman Imperialism in the Middle and Late Republic (c. 327-49 BCE)." Others piling onto the debate: e.g. Errington (1972), Ferrary (1988), Habicht (1989), Kallet-Marx (1995), Champion (2007), and now Waterfield (2014).

<sup>755</sup> See Eckstein (2008), 42ff for an example of the complexities. Recently more attention has focused on how much latitude Roman field commanders had to make such foreign policy decisions, e.g. Eckstein (1987) and Drogula (2015). For an interesting take on the influence of the voting body on such decisions, Tan (2017), 93ff.

<sup>756</sup> Further in chapter one. Eckstein (2006) is essentially a work about Polybius. Cf. Champion (2004) and especially Baranowski (2011).

<sup>757</sup> Diodorus Siculus and Livy in the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC especially, as well as Appian in the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> AD.

season, and how their overall strategy fit into the long-term vision of their school's athletic director.

The second path to deadlock is that many of the existing frameworks of analysis assume Roman foreign policy was consistent across this 50 years and, really, for the entire history of the Roman Republic.<sup>758</sup> Every study written to date about Roman Imperialism—to my knowledge—takes as its starting point a single, overarching framework that then must be used to interpret and frequently justify every event on the path of Roman expansion.<sup>759</sup> While this produces many important insights, it is something like reading the news report about the basketball tournament and assuming that the winning team not only ran the same offense and defense in every game but the same exact play on every possession. These various monolithic models for Roman Imperialism require the Romans to make consistent decisions in spite of a complex and changing political environment and over a long period of time (with an ever-changing cast of characters making foreign policy decisions).<sup>760</sup> This follows common veins of international relations scholarship. Especially in the case of Rome, this is made more challenging by the degree of autonomy given to the individual Romans who largely made up and enacted foreign policy unaided.<sup>761</sup> While it is helpful analytically to limit the winning basketball team to one play, it is an oversimplification to assume that Rome—or Athens or Macedon or any other state—had the same motivation and intent for every aggression from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC. Rather, I prefer to emphasize the agency of those involved in orchestrating these aggressions, seeing them as ad hoc decisions rather than as part of an overarching program that can be justified or vilified

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<sup>758</sup> This is part of a general problem in the periodization of the pre-Augustan Roman republic, for which see Flower (2010), who recommends redividing those centuries into Roman *republics*.

<sup>759</sup> Some more forcefully than others. Harris (1979) fits every war into his model as does Eckstein (2008). John Ma called for an ad hoc approach in his 2016 SCS paper.

<sup>760</sup> On the foreign policy decisions, Eckstein (1987) and Tan (2017), esp. 93ff.

<sup>761</sup> Previous note and Drogula (2017).

as a whole. In this way the Roman state, rather than being set on an unchanging (and more easily evaluated) course, begins to appear as a living, breathing, changing institution, a set of what Harriet Flower called *Roman Republics*.<sup>762</sup>

To return from the example of Rome to the rest of the Adriatic and Mediterranean world, I do not believe it is feasible to apply this particular standard (or definition) of Imperialism proper to any state in ancient history as we do not have enough information to make a careful judgment about the deliberate, long-term effort to acquire and govern an empire required by standard definitions of Imperialism.<sup>763</sup> This is especially true for Rome, as we begin to have a sufficiently clear resolution in our evidence for making such judgments only when Rome already has an empire to rule (in the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC). The years when Rome gained control over these foreign states remain fuzzy by comparison. Stone makes a useful distinction between Roman expansion—an historical fact—and Imperialism, which is up for debate.<sup>764</sup>

Another approach is to shift the focus from Imperialism to *imperialisms*, in other words the plural neatly avoiding the monolithic nature of previous studies.<sup>765</sup> By *imperialisms* I mean aggressive acts (frequently military) aimed at establishing control over a sovereign state.<sup>766</sup> It is important to allow that states in the ancient world can be quite small, even on the level of the polis. By “establishing control” I mean claiming and backing up a claim to a monopoly on the

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<sup>762</sup> Flower (2010).

<sup>763</sup> Morris (2009), 128ff; Hodos (2013), 2-4.

<sup>764</sup> Stone (2013), 23.

<sup>765</sup> Others using the plural: Rose (2003) and Janković and Mihajlović (2018).

<sup>766</sup> On what makes a state, definitions in chapter three, esp. Weber (1978): “A ‘ruling organization’ will be called ‘political’ insofar as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded within a given *territorial* area by the threat and application of physical force on the part of the administrative staff. A compulsory political organization with continuous operations (*politischer Anstaltsbetrieb*) will be called a “state” insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.” Cf. Scheidel (2013) and Mann (1986).

use of violence (usually military force) in a specific region.<sup>767</sup> It is also important to allow that states in the ancient world were not in general as successful at enforcing their monopolies on violence as in later periods<sup>768</sup>. Whereas Imperialism by definition requires a sustained, long-term effort, states perpetrate *imperialisms* on an ad hoc basis. I study individual *imperialisms* separately as isolated events responding to specific circumstances rather than as stepping stones on the way to a larger objective. In part, this restores agency to the actors of *imperialisms* rather than subordinating their decisions to an overall foreign policy. It may be that some *imperialisms* strung together look like Imperialism, but I am deliberately avoiding asking that question.

There are two primary advantages to exploring *imperialisms* over Imperialism. First, ridding myself of the burden of proof for the latter allows me to sidestep entirely the big debate over Rome's motivations for the wars that brought about her control over other states in the Mediterranean. Second, examining isolated events allows me to introduce aggressions perpetrated by other states who do not end up controlling the entire Mediterranean basin, like Syracuse, Epirus, Illyria, and Macedon. Rather than focus on the one overarching narrative, I put these various *imperialisms* in dialogue with one another and compare methods and results. I thereby avoid the question why did x attack y—and who can say?—and shift the debate to more fertile ground.

Exploring *imperialisms* within the geographic space of the Adriatic Sea further disrupts the traditional paradigm for understanding Greek and Roman history from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC. The standard approach has been to view the Greek and Roman worlds as separate, divided down the middle at the Adriatic Sea.<sup>769</sup> The aggressions perpetrated by states in these

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<sup>767</sup> On the element of force, Scheidel (2013), 1-3.

<sup>768</sup> For example, Martin van Creveld claimed that there are no real “states” until 1300 AD: Creveld (1999). Cf. Scheidel (2013), North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), 268-70, and Christian (2004), 274.

<sup>769</sup> Chapter one – Purcell (2013), Čašule (2011), Prag and Crawley-Quinn (2013).

four centuries have frequently been couched in terms of transgressing that dividing Adriatic line. Thus, for example, Gruen titled his book on the subject *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, asserting from the dustjacket that these are separate spheres and Rome must cross the sea to penetrate the Hellenistic world proper.<sup>770</sup> Even Eckstein, who argues both that Rome participated in an inter-state anarchy across the Adriatic and also had no interest in crossing it herself, keeps these worlds very separate in his book, *Rome Enters the Greek East*.<sup>771</sup> Had Philip V's plans to invade Italy come to fruition in the 210s BC, perhaps we would be writing *The Italian World and the Coming of Macedon* or *Macedon Enters the Roman West* instead. Organizing this study geographically rather than according to national or ethnic boundaries allows us to put these various *imperialisms* side by side rather than focusing only on the team that won out in the end.

Being focused geographically also means that this is also a study of exploitation and the interactions of these *imperialisms* with Adriatic ecologies. In the maritime world, the possibilities for conquest presented by the geography and resources of the Adriatic seem to have had a continual influence on human decisions. As we have seen, there were only so many secure harbors in some parts of the Adriatic. Wind patterns and currents suggested sailing routes that stayed within sight of land along both coasts. We will see that these factors weighed heavily in the calculations of generals and kings directing troops and founding new settlements in the Adriatic world.

This new, hopefully more productive ground nourishes a new set of questions aimed at specific *imperialisms* instead of monolithic Imperialism: by what means did state x attempt to gain or project control over state y? How successful were they? What kind of power or control

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<sup>770</sup> Gruen (1984).

<sup>771</sup> Eckstein (2008), see below.

were they able to effect in the Adriatic? How did they exploit the specific ecologies of the Adriatic Sea to this purpose? How does this map onto other *imperialisms* in the same space? What other, non-state actors complicated this process? What patterns emerge by studying these *imperialisms* together?

Crucially, asking questions about *imperialisms* allows us to emphasize the fragmented nature of the Adriatic from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC. Competition between states claiming power in the Adriatic and the challenges of its ecologies keep the political seascape disjointed until the very end of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC. Thus we will see *imperialisms* operating through the Adriatic but not on or of the whole sea until after Octavian's victory at Actium in 31 BC. Until that point, it remains a dividing sea. Only with the continentalization of connectivity in the Adriatic does it become a unifying sea.

In what follows I examine the *imperialisms* perpetrated in the Adriatic in roughly chronological order. Beginning with Syracuse in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, I look in turn at aggressions from Athens (4<sup>th</sup> century BC), Sparta and Epirus (4<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> centuries BC), Illyria (3<sup>rd</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries BC), Macedon (3<sup>rd</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries BC), and Rome (3<sup>rd</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC). While these events are organized more or less by state, presenting them together in this way allows for comparative analysis, with which I conclude the chapter.

## II. Syracusans

Dionysius I carried out two major *imperialisms* as reported in the text of Diodorus Siculus.<sup>772</sup> The first, which we have already examined briefly in the last chapter, was the establishment of settlements in the Adriatic by military force around 385 BC. Diodorus reports that he did this specifically in order to gain control of the Ionian Strait and so pave the way to

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<sup>772</sup> On Dionysius I and Syracuse generally: Stroheker (1958), Sanders (1987), Caven (1990), Evans (2009), and now De Angelis (2016). On imperialism in particular, Langer (1997), esp. 131ff.



warfare in Epirus.<sup>773</sup> His explicitly stated purpose is to get control of (ιδιοποιεῖσθαι) the Strait of Otranto and thus facilitate attacks on Epirus. Diodorus even claims he intended to sack Delphi, though many assume this is a mistake for Dodona.<sup>774</sup> Accordingly, Dionysius established strongholds at Lissus, Issa, and Pharos (in partnership with the Parians).<sup>775</sup>

Diodorus next notes that the colony at Pharos was contested by nearby Illyrians who, in a force of 10,000, attacked the new settlement.<sup>776</sup> The governor of Lissus, he writes, brought triremes and reinforcements to bear and saved the day with a thorough naval victory.<sup>777</sup> This seems geographically unlikely, as Lissus is far removed from Pharos. The traditional solution has been to emend the text here to Issus (Issa, now Vis), which is within easy striking distance.<sup>778</sup> So here are Syracusan fighting men establishing military bases in the Adriatic and enforcing their claim to them by violence. Meeting resistance on Hvar (Pharos)—a challenge to their projection of power and the subsequent monopoly on violence—they respond with force and crush their

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<sup>773</sup> Diod. Sic. 15.13.1: τοῦτο δὲ ἔπραττε διανοούμενος τὸν Ἰόνιον καλούμενον πόρον ιδιοποιεῖσθαι, ἵνα τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἥπειρον πλοῦν ἀσφαλῆ κατασκευάσῃ καὶ πόλεις ἔχῃ ἰδίας εἰς τὸ δύνασθαι ναυσὶ καθορμισθῆναι. ἔσπευδε γὰρ ἄφνω μεγάλας δυνάμεις ἐπιπλεῦσαι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἥπειρον τόποις καὶ συλῆσαι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς τέμενος, γέμον πολλῶν χρημάτων.

<sup>774</sup> E.g. Caven (1990), 149.

<sup>775</sup> Diod. Sic. reports Lissus, though it may be a manuscript error for Issus, Stylianou (1998), 193-197. Scholars have argued both sides, e.g. Kuntić-Makvić (1995) for an emendation to Issa against, e.g. Čače (1993), Kirigin (1996), and Vanotti (2001) who prefer Lissus. It has long been assumed that Syracuse founded Issus (stated by Pseudo-Scymnus in Timaeus (*FGrH* 3b 566 F 77), which makes the emendation a possibility. Despite the ongoing discussion, most now prefer the solution of Stroheker, who proposed in 1958—long before some of the dissenting articles cited here—that Diodorus refers to Lissus but that Issa (from which help comes to Pharos, see below) was founded by Dionysius as a naval base at around the same time: Stroheker (1958), 122ff, cf. Nikolanci (1970), Woodhead (1970), and now Cambi (2002), 49 note 13. Examples of this general acceptance: Caven (1990), 149-50; Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2004), 331-2; Cabanes (2008), 176ff. On the colonization program of Dionysius I in the Adriatic: Cambi (2002), Ceka (2002), D’Andria (2002), and Lombardo (2002).

<sup>776</sup> I happily use the ethnic “Illyrians” throughout this chapter despite the reality of different groups in what would become Illyria. Others, especially Wilkes (1992) and Dzino (2010) pick apart Roman and Greek sources trying to pin down who exactly lived where. For the purposes of the dissertation I am happy with the umbrella term “Illyrian” given the difficulties of the ethnographies in our sources.

<sup>777</sup> Diod. Sic. 15.14.1-2.

<sup>778</sup> So Stroheker (1958), 123-4 and, for communis opinio, e.g. Cabanes (2008), 177: “It could not have been from Lissus, as suggested by Diodorus (15.14.2) that Dionysius came in aid of the colonists from Paros who wanted to settle in Pharos; the island of Issa could have been used as a base for a Syracusan squadron which intervened when the Parians were threatened by the Illyrians in Pharos.”

opponents. This is unfortunately all we know of the incident and of Syracuse's involvement with the islands. On the face of Diodorus' report, it seems this was a successful attempt at establishing at least a few centers of control and then protecting those claims of state power.

The second incident follows on the first in Diodorus' description of Dionysius I's aims. Having secured forward operating bases in the Adriatic, he proceeds to intervene in Epirus by supplying troops and arms to an Illyrian force with the aim of putting Alcetas on the throne of Molossia (at the time the ruling seat of Epirus).<sup>779</sup> It seems the plan succeeded, as Alcetas is king of the Molossians by 373 BC.<sup>780</sup> Here, then, is a clear case of military intervention (albeit reportedly indirect) to interfere in the affairs of another sovereign state, Molossia and by extension Epirus. The initial objective, to put Alcetas on the throne, seems to have succeeded, though the aftermath has not been preserved. Interestingly, Alcetas happened to be at Dionysius' court and provided the impetus for these *imperialisms*. Here is an example of the networks of contact at work in the Adriatic: an individual from Epirus has made his way to Syracuse and, by exerting influence with Dionysius, has brought people and arms and goods to various parts of the sea in an effort to get back.

These two events reported by Diodorus Siculus have led historians to envision an Adriatic empire of Dionysius I, some of them “avvalorando fino alle sue estreme conseguenze la tesi di un suo impero coloniale in Adriatico, e venendo di conseguenza a giustificare come siracusana qualsiasi traccia di greicità in questo mare.”<sup>781</sup> This is perhaps most clearly reflected in John Bury's article for the first edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History*:

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<sup>779</sup> Diod. Sic. 15.13.2-3.

<sup>780</sup> [Dem.] 49.22 where he visits Timotheus. Nep. *Timoth.* 2 makes Timotheus responsible for bringing the Epirotes into the Athenian alliance. Xenophon has Alcetas participating with Jason of Pherae at Xen. *Hel.* 6.1.7 and 6.2.10. Cf. Hammond (1967), 523-4.

<sup>781</sup> Braccesi (1977), 186. His footnote 5 on pages 186-7 lists those who support “la tesi di un impero coloniale.”

He seems to have formed a conception of a Northern Empire for which the Adriatic sea was in some ways what the Pontic sea was for the Athenian Empire. It was bordered by barbarous inhabitants and touched large rivers and unexplored lands. It was the ambition of Dionysius to make his influence supreme in the Adriatic and make it a source of revenue by collecting dues from all the ships sailing the Gulf.<sup>782</sup>

While many have pushed back against pulling so much from the sparse text of Diodorus, the general idea still persists.<sup>783</sup> The most accessible general work on Dionysius I is the English language biography by Bruce Caven. Despite decades of softening of the Adriatic Empire idea, his analysis from 1990 runs thus:

That Dionysius entered the Adriatic in order (as Diodorus suggests) to secure military bases from which to make a descent upon Epirus and sack the great international religious centre of Delphi, we need not believe for a moment: the charge derives from the fourth-century stereotyped portrait of The Tyrant as one who cared nothing for the rights of men or gods... His purpose, I believe, was to build up a maritime empire in the Adriatic to counterbalance that of Carthage in the western Mediterranean—an empire that would provide him with silver, tin, timber, horses and mercenaries: Celts imported from the country of the Senones, to match Carthage's Iberians and Ligurians.<sup>784</sup>

Certainly Dionysius I's Syracuse was one of the great powers of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, but there is little evidence to support such grand intentions. If Caven is right, and the purpose of founding these colonies and creating allies in Epirus and Illyria was to control the Strait of Otranto, this would be Imperialism supported by a long-term intent to build an empire.

But as the evidence stands, the military conflict with the Illyrians and alliance with other Illyrians against Epirus fit well into the model of *imperialisms*. Rather than trying to establish a picture of overall foreign policy, it is safer to say that Dionysius I set out to establish individual footholds in the Adriatic from which to project control: a monopoly on the use of violence

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<sup>782</sup> Bury (1926), 129. These sentiments are completely absent from the new *CAH*<sup>2</sup> version of Sicilian history where David Lewis (1994), 147-8 delicately writes, "We are told that Dionysius resolved to found cities in the Adriatic Sea, with the intention of controlling the *Ionios poros*, which ought to mean the crossing. The alleged intention was to invade Epirus and rob the temple of Delphi; the second half of that can at any rate be discounted... On the present evidence, we can hardly speculate on his motives, and a substantial historical phenomenon may have been lost."

<sup>783</sup> Woodhead (1970), 504ff for early disagreements including, of course, Stroheker (1958), esp. 120-7.

<sup>784</sup> Caven (1990), 149-50.

(which he backs up with the help of ships from Issa). He seems to have succeeded in his settlements, at least temporarily, and in his attempt to put an ally on the throne of the Molossians. Both efforts are focused on specific regions of the Adriatic with the aim of strengthening network ties to those areas (and thus facilitating trade and, potentially, further conquest in Epirus). Whatever his grander ambitions may have been or how these *imperialisms* may fit into bigger patterns, these two aggressions demonstrate the challenges of operating in the Adriatic Sea in the selection of sites for settlements and the ability of allies at Issa to respond to problems in Pharos.

Diodorus Siculus suggests that Dionysius I wants to control the Strait of Otranto. As we have seen, the Strait is 72 km wide, a large distance to police effectively. But as we have also seen, routes north from the Strait into the Adriatic stopped at Lissus, Issa, and Pharos to rest and resupply. While Dionysius I may not have seized the *Ionios poros* himself, he could well have effectively projected control over trade passing through those essential port stops along the major routes. Add to this Strabo's note that Ancona on the Italian coast—a major trade center and on one popular sailing route to and from the wealthy Po Valley—was settled around 387 BC by Syracusan refugees and Theopompus' claim that Adria—on the Po—was resettled by Dionysius I himself, and it is possible the tyrant controlled the flows of a great deal of wealth in the Adriatic basin.<sup>785</sup> With the ability to project a monopoly on violence in the immediate vicinity of these port cities—and the swift response from Issa to danger at Pharos certainly provides an example—Syracuse could maintain control over trade and reap a profit from that economic enterprise as well as a favorable position for pushing further into the Adriatic. Without more evidence it is difficult to say how successful this endeavor was. But it is clear that Syracuse and

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<sup>785</sup> On Ancona, Strabo 5.4.2; cf. Woodhead (1970), 511-2; Braccisi (1977), 220-2; Cabanes (2008), 174-5; on Adria, Theopomp. fr. 128; cf. Wilkes and Fischer-Hansen (2004), 326.

Dionysius I successfully exploited some Adriatic ecologies by taking advantage of natural harbors and traffic patterns in the sea. Each site, as we have seen in the last chapter, benefited from

To this might be added the efforts of two more Syracusan tyrants, to harvest shipping in the Strait of Otranto, Dionysius II (after 367 BC) and Agathocles (in 295 BC). We have already reviewed the evidence in chapter three. In brief, Dionysius II establishes settlements in Apulia to launch attacks against alleged pirates.<sup>786</sup> A few generations later, Agathocles bankrolls pirates along the Apulian coast.<sup>787</sup> I have argued above that both of these efforts represent military entrepreneurs—not pirates—in a good position to plunder shipping in the Strait. Within our context of *imperialisms*, we should imagine both Dionysius II and Agathocles using violent means to project and enforce power in the Strait and along the Apulian coast. In the context of piracy, Dell argues that Dionysius II's efforts (ca. 367 BC) must have failed because there are still problems in 295 BC when Agathocles makes his pact with the military entrepreneurs in Apulia.<sup>788</sup> But perhaps the latter's moves in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century simply indicate Syracuse reinforcing its claims to power and employing whatever entrepreneurs were handy to exert the required military force.

These isolated *imperialisms* are best read as individual efforts to claim power over routes and pathways through the Adriatic, those important inflection points in the tangled network of movement and trade, rather than as a sustained effort of Imperialism. *Pace* Caven and others who wish to see in the evidence Dionysius I's grand designs at an empire matching Carthage or

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<sup>786</sup> Diod. Sic. 16.5.3: In Apulia he founded two cities because he wished to make safe for navigators the passage across the Ionian Strait; for the barbarians who dwelt along the coast were accustomed to put out in numerous robbing ships and render the whole shore along the Adriatic Sea unsafe for merchants. Cf. Holleaux (1928), 825; Dell (1967), 345ff; Muccioli (1999), 257-8).

<sup>787</sup> Diod. Sic. 21.4. Cf. de Souza (1999), 33-4.

<sup>788</sup> Dell (1967), 354.

Athens, there is too little in the text to justify imagining a Syracusan empire in the Adriatic. Individual *imperialisms*, by contrast, allow us to see the effectiveness of Dionysius I's actions and those of his successors. By seizing the ecological challenges of the Adriatic—especially the need for secure harbors and safe water stops to escape the sudden weather shifts of the sea—these tyrants successfully exploited the maritime space through their claims to control and the backing up of those claims.

### III. Athenians

The Athenian naval lists for 325/4 BC preserve the vestiges of Attic *imperialisms* in the Adriatic on the eve of conflict with Alexander the Great.<sup>789</sup> The nature of the inscription and information on the naval lists in general have been given in chapter four. In brief, the text refers to the foundation of an unnamed colony in the Adriatic and preserves a decree for the organization of an expedition by Miltiades to establish it. The colonizing mission included transports for a military force as well as triremes, triaconters, and quadriremes.<sup>790</sup> And, critically, the purpose for the colony was to use its ships and troops to protect the grain supply against attacks.<sup>791</sup> This seems to be a clear attempt at establishing a zone of control in the Adriatic Sea.

The food situation for Athens leading up to 325/4 BC had been fairly dire. A series of grain crises in the 330s and 320s B led to innovative responses on the part of the polis.<sup>792</sup> These included the devising of programs to buy grain and an intensification in honorific decrees

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<sup>789</sup> *IG* II/III<sup>3</sup> 1 1370 = *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1629; *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 305; Tod (1946-8); Rhodes and Osborne (2003).

<sup>790</sup> Lines 167ff.

<sup>791</sup> Lines 217ff (translation Rhodes and Osborne): In order that the people may for all future time have their own commerce and transport in grain, and that the establishment of their own naval station (*naustathmos*) may result in a guard against the Tyrrhenians, and Miltiades the founder and the settlers may be able to use their own fleet, and those Greeks and barbarians who sail the sea and themselves sailing into the Athenians' naval station will have their ships and all else secure...

<sup>792</sup> Garnsey (1988), esp. 150-64; Oliver (2007), 41ff.

awarding honors to those who supplied grain to the polis for free or at reduced prices.<sup>793</sup> In addition, the Athenians began looking further afield for secure sources of grain. Importantly, this included quests westward across the Strait of Otranto to Sicily.<sup>794</sup> With Athenian naval power severely curtailed under the shadow of Macedon after Chaeronea (338 BC), the polis' options in the Aegean were limited. Graham Oliver put it this way:

The western Mediterranean is one region that the Athenians wished to develop and it had the advantage of being more detached from the principal spheres of the Macedonian Empire. The change in emphasis in the award *and inscribing* of honours for explicit aid in the movement of grain fits into this context of developing the diverse sources of grain. Nevertheless, the Athenians had more options now than for much of the late fourth and third centuries. They continued to possess not only a potentially powerful fleet but also their harbor installations at the Piraeus that permitted them to launch ambitious ventures such as the expedition of Miltiades in the Adriatic.<sup>795</sup>

Indeed, with limited ability to expand eastward, applying what force they had westward made a great deal of sense.

In this context it is important to note the explicitly military nature of the proposed colony. Warships accompanied the colonists to establish a naval station (*naustathmos*), and provision was made to utilize the fleet aggressively.<sup>796</sup> The inscription also provides for a safe haven for passing ships both Greek and not, suggesting a larger intention of fostering trade. As noted in chapter four, having a secure harbor and a small naval force meant that Athens could claim a monopoly on violence and back up that claim within a reasonable radius of the new port. As grain ships passed by, the triremes, triaconters, and quadriremes sent with the settlers could provide escort. From the naval base, they could also strike or respond to strikes within a half day

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<sup>793</sup> On the amount of grain coming into the Adriatic, Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 486ff no. 96 with commentary. On grain purchasing, Oliver (2007), 213ff; on honorific decrees, Lambert (2002) and Oliver (2007), 228ff; cf. Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 478ff no. 95.

<sup>794</sup> E.g. Dem. 32.4 and 56.9. Cf. Oliver (2007), 247-8.

<sup>795</sup> Oliver (2007), 44-5.

<sup>796</sup> lines 219-23.

or so of rowing.<sup>797</sup> The force of warships effectively created a small circle of Athenian influence somewhere in the Adriatic.

It is interesting to note, as Rhodes and Osborne do, that this settlement was sent in 325/4 BC both in the wake of grain crises and also on the eve of conflict with Alexander.<sup>798</sup> This is the period of time building up to the Harpalus affair and the exiles decree which would embroil Athens in conflict with the Macedonians.<sup>799</sup> Looking out from Athens in 325/4 BC, it would appear that those conflicts would likely be restricted to the Aegean where Macedonian power was strongest. It was good strategy to establish a secure source of grain to the west, largely outside of Macedon's reach.

This is a clear example of *imperialisms* at work from a power outside the Adriatic. Athens, as Oliver points out, still had a significant navy, even if not to the standard of the fifth or even early fourth century BC. While that navy was not sufficient to challenge Macedonian forces in the Aegean and secure grain from the Black Sea via the traditional route—and, incidentally, Athens established another settlement in the 470s BC ostensibly to fight pirates along that route as well at Scyros, an interesting corollary to this unnamed colony—it certainly could support a new settlement in the Adriatic to safeguard trade far away from the Macedonian military.<sup>800</sup> Unfortunately, we do not know whether the unnamed Athenian settlement of 325/4 BC was successful or even if it came about.<sup>801</sup> It is therefore impossible to assess its efficacy. Nevertheless, this isolated incident maps well onto the efforts of the Syracusans explored above to establish a zone of control in critical shipping lanes. As we will see, other powers approach Adriatic *imperialisms* along similar lines.

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<sup>797</sup> Discussion in chapters two and three; Morrison, Coates, and Rankov (2000).

<sup>798</sup> Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 526, citing Cargill (1995), 33.

<sup>799</sup> Rhodes (2010), 382ff.

<sup>800</sup> On Scyros, Thuc. 1.98.2; Diod. 11.69.2; Ephor. fr. 191; Plut. *Cim.* 8.3-7; Plut. *Thes.* 36.1.

<sup>801</sup> Braccesi (1977), 296-300.



#### IV. Spartans and Epirotes (defenders of Taras)

In the 4<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> centuries BC, three generals crossed the Adriatic from the Greek peninsula to Italy to answer a call for help. Taras, or Tarentum, sought aid repeatedly and received it in the form of military intervention. It is important to note that these crossings stretch the Adriatic southward, as do many in this chapter. The Strait of Otranto becomes something of a fuzzy zone of transition in this way. While I focus throughout on the Adriatic proper, it is essential to keep Corcyra in mind as the launching point for many connections between the Balkan and Italian peninsulas.

These *imperialisms* reflect a willingness for major players in the Adriatic world to intervene in one another's affairs. As Eckstein has argued, this reveals the intensely competitive nature of what he calls the anarchic state of the ancient Mediterranean: to refuse a call for aid like the ones Tarentum sent out would be to signal to one's allies and enemies alike that the task was too difficult, suggesting weakness or a lack of resources.<sup>802</sup> This was common practice:

One characteristic of the interstate environment apparent in this chapter is the tendency in the West for weaker states to call upon strong states to protect them in local quarrels and conflicts. This tendency was a prominent phenomenon in the eastern Mediterranean as well. Herodotus, the earliest surviving Greek historian, describes it in language that remained a constant for centuries (4.159.4 and 6.108.1): weaker states “put themselves into the hands” of the stronger for the sake of protection. And Thucydides, discussing fifth-century Greece, pointed to the danger such conduct by the secondary states posed: by involving the stronger states in local conflicts, it created clashes of interest between the larger powers themselves. But the tendency of weaker states to seek protection from the strong—called “empire by invitation” by the political scientist Geir Lundestad—is natural in an environment that provides little means of protection but power: either one's own power, or else the power of the powerful.<sup>803</sup>

In the instances outlined below, Eckstein's explanation lays out two points especially important for this dissertation: first, that Tarentum and could call on Epirus and Sparta demonstrates the high degree of connectivity and communication across the Strait of Otranto even in the 4<sup>th</sup> and

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<sup>802</sup> Eckstein (2006), 141ff on Capua appealing to Rome, as an example.

<sup>803</sup> Eckstein (2006), 119, citing Lundestad (1986), 263-77 and (1990), chapter 1.

3<sup>rd</sup> centuries BC; rather than existing in separate worlds, it seems that cities and states around the Adriatic were in contact with one another. Second, Rome becomes entangled in these same networks as early as the late 4<sup>th</sup> century BC in conflict with Alexander I, an example of great powers entering into confrontation through the acceptance of such pleas for aid.

The first instance we know of was in 343 BC when the Spartan king Archidamus III traveled to Italy to fight for Taras.<sup>804</sup> Diodorus Siculus records simply that the Spartans assembled men and ships, appointed Archidamus, and sent them to Italy where the king lost his life fighting bravely.<sup>805</sup> Strabo mentions his name and nothing more. Pausanias is chiefly interested in Archidamus because he is the only Spartan king who died without burial and happened to be honored with a statue at Olympia.<sup>806</sup> Whatever the circumstances, it seems the Spartans were willing to expend great capital to project power across the Adriatic in Magna Graecia, even if on a temporary basis.

The second of these *imperialisms* came about when Taras secured aid from the newly powerful kingdom of Epirus in the form of King Alexander I of the Molossians, the brother of Olympias (mother of Alexander the Great) in 334/3 BC.<sup>807</sup> Epirus in the southeastern Adriatic had never been a terribly powerful state until Philip II, king of Macedon, began using it as a bulwark against the Illyrians in the 350s BC.<sup>808</sup> Philip put Alexander on the throne in 342 BC and added to his kingdom Ambracia and the important poleis of Pandosia, Bucheta, and

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<sup>804</sup> Diod. Sic. 16.62.4-63.1; Strabo 6.3.4 C 280; Paus. 3.10.5, 6.4.9; further bibliography and discussion at Čašule (2011), 63-4, esp. Urso (1998) and Nafissi (2003).

<sup>805</sup> Diod. Sic. 16.62.4-63.1

<sup>806</sup> Paus. 3.10.5, 6.4.9 for the statue.

<sup>807</sup> Čašule (2011), 64ff; on the expedition's beginnings: Livy 8.17, 24; Just. *Epit.* 12.2; Strabo 6.3.4 C 280. Cf. Lomas (1993) and Cabanes (2001b), 64ff.

<sup>808</sup> Just. *Epit.* 7.6.10.

Elatea.<sup>809</sup> These territorial expansions made Epirus all the more powerful, while the familial connections of Alexander I to Philip II and Alexander the Great enhanced the state's prestige.<sup>810</sup>

When Alexander I first crossed the Adriatic with his force, he appears to have concentrated his efforts in Apulia along the sea. Justin notes that he concluded a peace there before moving further inland and south.<sup>811</sup> We do not know much about his campaigns beyond that he seems to have been fairly successful at first. Controversy arises between the two main sources, Livy and Justin, over the matter of a treaty ultimately concluded between Alexander I and Rome, who had not fought in the conflicts. Justin records a *foedus* and *amicitia* whereas Livy claims just a peace (*pacem cum romanis fecit*).<sup>812</sup> We have very few details. Perhaps, as Eckstein suggests, Alexander I “sought to create his own empire in southern Italy as the defender of the Greeks against the Italic peoples.”<sup>813</sup> Whatever the arrangement, this represents a significant moment for Roman relations with the larger Mediterranean world and the meeting of two potential powers.

A generation later, Tarentum appealed to Sparta again for aid. The commander who answered was Cleonymus, of Cleomenes II, Agiad King of Sparta. Not in line for the throne, perhaps Cleonymus relished the opportunity to shine. In any case, around 303 BC he recruited 5,000 mercenaries in Sparta and another 5,000 in Tarentum and, if we believe Diodorus, 20,000 foot and 2,000 horse from the area around Tarentum.<sup>814</sup> Having formed his army, he intimidated and battled his way into Metapontum and then fleeced the city for 600 talents of silver and 200 maidens. From there he sailed to attack Corcyra, took the city, demanded huge sums of money,

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<sup>809</sup> Dem. 7.32. Alexander I then married his niece, Cleopatra: Diod. Sic. 16.91.4, Just. *Epit.* 9.6.1;

<sup>810</sup> Hammond (1967), 557.

<sup>811</sup> Čašule (2011), 70; Just. *Epit.* 12.2; Frisone (2003); Mele (2003); Oakley (1998), 664-74.

<sup>812</sup> Čašule (2011), 71ff; Just. *Epit.* 12.2.12: *cum Metapontinis et poediculis et Romanis foedus amicitiamque fecit*. On the peace, Braccisi (1974), Gruen (1984), 61; Oakley (1998), 591.

<sup>813</sup> Eckstein (2006), 153.

<sup>814</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.104.

and set himself up as a force to be reckoned with, ready to participate in the affairs of the Hellenistic kingdoms.<sup>815</sup> Diodorus claims that both Demetrius I Poliorketes and Cassander (both self-styled kings) sent delegations to ally with Cleonymus, that he refused both, and that he responded brashly to news of rebellion in Italy: he returned and attacked from the sea and took prisoners but was surprised by night, lost part of his fleet in a sudden storm, and withdrew to Corcyra.<sup>816</sup> That would be all we know about Cleonymus' time in the Adriatic except for Livy's record—discussed in chapter three—that he ventured north and attacked Patavium.<sup>817</sup>

Diodorus' story of Cleonymus raises several important points. First, with a good fleet, this general was able to swiftly deal with both sides of the Strait of Otranto, reinforcing yet again how close-knit the Adriatic world appears to have been even at the close of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. Second, the power balance in the Adriatic was in such flux that a second son of the Agiad line—uncle to the next king—could become a major power player armed only with some mercenaries and swift ships. He was hardly a state actor at this point, certainly not representing Sparta in any kind of official capacity. He was instead setting himself up as an outside player. Holding Corcyra made Cleonymus powerful. Once he had taken control of the harbor, he immediately fielded delegations from the two biggest players in the western Hellenistic world. The entrance to the Adriatic must have been valuable to them both. So valuable that they engaged diplomatically with essentially a renegade warlord. As I have argued above, Cleonymus acts as a military entrepreneur, taking action outside the official state system and influencing international relations nonetheless. This is largely due to the importance of Corcyra as a port. In fact, after he

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<sup>815</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.104.4: ὑπερθέμενος δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ταύτην τὴν στρατείαν ἔπλευσεν εἰς Κόρκυραν καὶ κρατήσας τῆς πόλεως χρημάτων τε πλῆθος εἰσεπράξατο καὶ φρουρὰν ἐγκατέστησε, διανοούμενος ὀρμητηρίῳ τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ χρῆσασθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πράγμασιν ἐφεδρεῦειν.

<sup>816</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.105.

<sup>817</sup> Livy 10.2.

was rebuffed, Cassander besieged Corcyra almost immediately but failed to take it.<sup>818</sup> The island ultimately fell to Agathocles, then tyrant of Syracuse, who gave it to his daughter's new husband, Pyrrhus (see below).<sup>819</sup> Finally, the Adriatic ecologies dominate these stories. One of the famous Adriatic storms destroys part of Cleonymus' fleet. Further, the crossing to Corcyra facilitates his plans and brings him unwanted attention (from Agathocles). The intimate Adriatic can be too close for comfort.

Here, then, are at least four *imperialisms* perpetrated by Cleonymus of Sparta. First, he raised an army and attacked Metapontum on the Italian peninsula, abusing his invitation from Tarentum. Next he seized Corcyra with the intent of using it as a base (διανοούμενος ὀρμητηρίῳ τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ χρῆσασθαι) and becoming a power player in the Hellenistic world. After that, he returned to Italy and plundered some cities, even selling people into slavery. Finally, he fled to Pavatium and attempted to seize it too before returning to the Greek mainland. In our surviving sources, only one of these—the capture and garrisoning of Corcyra—smacks of long-term intent. Diodorus states that Cleonymus wants to use the base to τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πράγμασιν ἐφεδρεύειν. Even so, all of these *imperialisms* are decidedly opportunistic. Presented with the chance to raise an army and take it to Sicily, Cleonymus does not hesitate. Once he has his force, he pulls no punches, seizing the important port town of Corcyra and then plundering Italy. This kind of predation was probably far more common than our sources maintain. Ultimately Cleonymus fades into the background, but not before projecting brief power in the Adriatic and enforcing that power by violence.

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<sup>818</sup> Diod. Sic. 21.2.1-3. Hammond and Walbank (1988), 207: The area where Cassander was active during the last months of his life was Corcyra... In 298 or 297 Cassander sailed round the Peloponnese to attack Corcyra. His purpose is not clear; but his actions suggest an interest in the Adriatic coast which, had events turned out differently, might have been further developed.

<sup>819</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 9.2; Diod. Sic. 21.4, 22.8.2. Hammond and Walbank (1988), 213.

A generation later, Tarentum appealed again across the Adriatic, this time to Pyrrhus, King of the Molossians, in 280 BC. Unfortunately, the story of Pyrrhus falls in the missing books of Livy and Diodorus Siculus and outside the scope of Polybius. We are largely dependent on Plutarch's *Life of Pyrrhus*.<sup>820</sup> From what we can piece together, Pyrrhus spent much of his young life in exile. He was the son of the deposed Molossian king Aicides, grandson of the Alcetas whom Dionysius I put on the throne.<sup>821</sup> The Illyrian king Glaucias put Pyrrhus on the throne in 306 BC and he ruled briefly before Cassander pushed him out in 302 BC in one of Macedon's many bids to secure Epirus and Illyria both. Pyrrhus served in the army of his sister Deidameia's husband, Demetrius I Poliorketes. He also lived for a time with the Ptolemies as a hostage and there married Antigone, daughter of Berenice I (wife of Ptolemy I and mother of Arsinoe II and Ptolemy II Philadelphus). Pyrrhus returned to Epirus in 297 BC after Cassander's death and ruled there successfully. He expanded Epirus by acquiring Corcyra, Ambracia, Acarnania, Amphilochia, Tymphaea, and Parauaea. By 287 BC he had been proclaimed king of Macedonia, which was a short-lived aspiration: by 284 BC he had returned to Epirus and set out to capture Illyria. He seems to have gained Apollonia before accepting the call for help from Tarentum.

Pyrrhus went to the Italian peninsula loaded for bear. His fighting force reportedly included (in addition to an advance guard of 3,000 infantry sent with Cineas) 20 elephants, 3,000 horse, 20,000 foot, 2,000 archers, and 500 slingers.<sup>822</sup> Apparently the entire expedition was caught in a sudden storm while trying to cross the Adriatic and many were shipwrecked including Pyrrhus, though he made his way to shore safely in the end. That Plutarch would

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<sup>820</sup> In addition to scattered bits of Just. *Epit.* 16-18 and 23-25 and Appian.

<sup>821</sup> For what follows, Franke (1989), 458ff. Cf. Čašule (2011), 130ff and Rosenstein (2012), 36ff.

<sup>822</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 15.1

include this story in his life reinforces the reputation the Adriatic had in antiquity for violent and sudden storms.<sup>823</sup>

In brief, Pyrrhus engaged with Roman forces in southern Italy for over a year in 280-279 BC, dealing costly defeats to Rome—costly to his own force whereas Rome had a deep bench of recruits—until sailing to Sicily and engaging in conflicts there. Eventually he returned to Italy in 275 BC and lost to the Romans spectacularly at the Battle of Beneventum in 275 BC. One of the battles of 279 BC, the Battle of Ausculum, happened just along the Adriatic in Apulia.<sup>824</sup> While slightly inland, the battle happened along the river Aufidus which was navigable for quite some distance from its mouth and the large port at Salapia which has long since silted up.<sup>825</sup> While the battle narratives describe a bridge and the difficult crossing of the Aufidus, this was certainly a maritime context and close to the sea. After the Battle of Beneventum in 275 BC, Pyrrhus cut his losses and returned to Epirus. He briefly seized the Macedonian throne again in 274 BC and ultimately died a few years later in Argos.<sup>826</sup>

In each of these *imperialisms* from 343 BC and Archidamus III to Pyrrhus' arrival in Italy in 280 BC, these aggressions were made possible by the network of contacts across the Adriatic between Taras and both Sparta and Epirus. This is a clear case of connectivity having severe consequences. While Taras and the surrounding countryside may have benefited from trade crossing the Strait of Otranto, triremes, troops, and even elephants followed closely behind.

## V. Illyrians

Illyrian kings and navies fade in and out of focus in Adriatic history from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC as they become important to the larger narratives of Polybius and Diodorus

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<sup>823</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 15.2-5.

<sup>824</sup> Dion. Hal. 20.1.1-3.7; Livy. *Per.* 13; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 21.5-10. Cf. Cic. *Fin.* 11.61 and *Tusc.* 1.39 who is mostly interested in the *devotio* of P. Decius Mus.

<sup>825</sup> Strabo 6.3.9; Arnaud (2005), 195.

<sup>826</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 34.

Siculus.<sup>827</sup> As early as 385 BC, Illyrians aided Dionysius I of Syracuse in putting Alcetas on the throne of the Molossians.<sup>828</sup> Diodorus reports that the Illyrians were already at war with Epirus when Dionysius I intervened: τῶν δ' Ἰλλυριῶν ἐχόντων πόλεμον. The genitive absolute does not identify their opponent in the war, but in context it appears to have been Epirus. The Illyrians raided the countryside until they drew enough of an opposing force together for a battle. After trouncing the Molossians and killing reportedly 15,000 of their troops, they installed Alcetas as king.<sup>829</sup> While Diodorus does not say so explicitly, this seems to have been more than a casual affair carried out at Dionysius I's request. The Illyrian victory prompted a harsh backlash from Sparta, the aftermath of which is unclear.<sup>830</sup> Alcetas must have remained on the throne despite the Spartan attack, as he appears as king in later events.<sup>831</sup>

Under the Syracuse heading above, I discussed Dionysius I's role in this conflict. But it seems that the Illyrians had an existing war with the Molossians that made the agreement possible in the first place. While it is not clear in the text whether they were raiding south or attempting to establish control of some part of Epirus, the strong Spartan reaction perhaps suggests the former. In any case, it is noteworthy that the Illyrians intervened so forcefully in Molossian affairs, whatever their intentions may have been.

Illyrian dynasts come into repeated conflict with Macedonian kings during the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, not least of which Philip II.<sup>832</sup> But as these wars happened far inland, I will not review them

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<sup>827</sup> On the difficult question of who these authors meant by "Illyrians" at any given point in these four centuries, Wilkes (1992) and Dzino (2010).

<sup>828</sup> Diod. Sic. 15.13.2-3 and notes above.

<sup>829</sup> Diod. Sic. 15.13.3: πολλήν δὲ δύναμιν ἀθροίσαντες ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὴν Ἥπειρον καὶ κατήγον τὸν Ἀλκέταν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν Μολοττῶν βασιλείαν. οὐδενὸς δ' αὐτοῖς προσέχοντος, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπόρθησαν τὴν χώραν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν Μολοττῶν ἀντιταπτομένων ἐγένετο μάχη καρτερά, καθ' ἣν νικήσαντες οἱ Ἰλλυριοὶ κατέκοψαν τῶν Μολοττῶν πλείους τῶν μυρίων πεντακισχιλίων.

<sup>830</sup> Diod. Sic. 15.13.3.

<sup>831</sup> [Dem.] 49.22; Nep. *Timoth.* 2; Xen. *Hel.* 6.1.7 and 6.2.10. Cf. Hammond (1967), 523-4.

<sup>832</sup> Wilkes (1992), 117ff.



here. Skipping ahead a few decades, an Illyrian king Glaucias seized the chaos of the years following Alexander's death to reach further south. In 313 BC, in violation of a treaty with Cassander, Glaucias besieged Apollonia.<sup>833</sup> We know very little about the siege, beyond that the passing Spartan Acrotatus, son of King Cleomenes II and brother of the Cleonymus who would invade Italy around 303/2 BC, convinced Glaucias to abandon the siege and make a truce with the Apollonians. It appears on the surface that Glaucias was trying to expand his influence south into Epirus by seizing the next city on the coast. He certainly interfered again when, in 307 BC, he put young Pyrrhus forcefully on the throne of Molossia.<sup>834</sup> That is the last we hear of Glaucias, beyond that Pyrrhus visited his court in 303/2 BC.<sup>835</sup>

Pompeius Trogus preserves in the prologue to his histories (now in Justin's Latin translation) that Pyrrhus' son Alexander had to repel a major Illyrian invasion by King Mytilius.<sup>836</sup> We know of his stratagem thanks to Frontinus.<sup>837</sup> Whatever the circumstances, it seems Illyrian dynasts continued to attempt expanding south through aggressive *imperialisms*. The overall impression of the Illyrians in the late 4<sup>th</sup> and early 3<sup>rd</sup> centuries BC is of growing power. As John Wilkes put it, "More than a century of warfare with Macedonia and Epirus had brought the Adriatic Illyrians between Epirus and the river Neretva into direct and lasting conflict with the Greek world... There is a general impression from the historical sources that this was a period of growth in the Illyrian population. Attacks by them came frequently and in great strength."<sup>838</sup> These isolated *imperialisms* cited above may be part of that larger trend. But clearer evidence only becomes available toward the end of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC.

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<sup>833</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.70.7; Hammond and Wilkes (1988), 155.

<sup>834</sup> Just. *Epit.* 17.3.21; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 3.3.

<sup>835</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4.

<sup>836</sup> Just. *Epit.* prol. 25; Hammond (1967), 588ff; Wilkes (1992), 146.

<sup>837</sup> Front. 2.5.10.

<sup>838</sup> Wilkes (1992), 125-6.

The Illyrians really come into focus in Adriatic history in the 230s BC with the collapse of Epirus.<sup>839</sup> After the deaths of most of the ruling family in 233 BC, a revolution transformed Epirus into a far weaker state.<sup>840</sup> Agron, king of part of Illyria, seized on favorable circumstances to greatly increase his territory in the years following. He must already have commanded a sizeable military force, as the King of Macedon, Demetrius II, hired him to help in the war against Aetolia, specifically to relieve the siege of Medion in Acarnania to the south of Epirus.<sup>841</sup> That fighting was going on in 231 BC in this region speaks to the instability following the revolution in Epirus itself. The Illyrians under Agron made the trip in their swift attack vessels, the *lemboi*, and successfully repelled the Aetolian force on behalf of Demetrius II. In the aftermath, they seized a great deal of booty and returned to Illyria under sail. This was not the first time Illyrians ventured south and inflicted losses on Aetolian, Macedonian, or Epiran forces.<sup>842</sup> But, according to Polybius, this particular mercenary venture had a lasting impact due to the wealth carried off from Medion:

King Agron, when the flotilla returned and his officers gave him an account of the battle, was so overjoyed at the thought of having beaten the Aetolians, then the proudest of peoples, that he took to carousals and other convivial excesses, from which he fell into a pleurisy that ended fatally in a few days. he was succeeded on the throne by his wife Teuta, who left the details of administration to friends on whom she relied. As, with a woman's natural shortness of view, she could see nothing but the recent success and had no eyes for what was going on elsewhere, she in the first place authorized privateers to pillage any ships they met, and next she collected a fleet and a force of troops as large as the former one and sent it out, ordering the commanders to treat the entire seaboard as belonging to their enemies.<sup>843</sup>

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<sup>839</sup> Eckstein (2008), 34.

<sup>840</sup> Hammond (1967), 588ff; cf. Hammond and Walbank (1988), 332ff.

<sup>841</sup> Polyb. 2.3.

<sup>842</sup> Polyb. 2.5.1 and 2.8.1: For a long time previously (κατὰ τοὺς ἀνωτέρω μὲν χρόνους) they had been in the habit of maltreating vessels sailing from Italy.

<sup>843</sup> Polyb. 2.4.

We have already discussed Polybius' characterization of Agron and Teuta as quintessentially non-Greek dynasts.<sup>844</sup> It is interesting that here he seems to downplay as much as possible Illyrian *imperialisms* in favor of casting Teuta as brash and unrestrained.

As we have said in chapter three, these events in 232 and 231 BC have become indelibly linked to Polybius' narrative of Roman Imperialism, specifically the beginnings of expansion over the Adriatic.<sup>845</sup> For this reason we are peering through two layers of obfuscation to find *imperialisms* rather than Imperialism: first, Polybius portrays his Illyrians as decidedly un-imperialistic raiders of opportunity—drunk, undisciplined pirates—and within that context he attributes no motive to any of their actions beyond greed;<sup>846</sup> second, in his story the Romans are the agents who act and ultimately conquer the Greek world—in other words the Illyrians cannot be up to much because they are only secondary characters in the plot.<sup>847</sup> So Polybius presents Agron and Teuta setting the stage for the real action through their undisguised, unrestrained lust for plunder.

At the risk of oversimplifying Polybius' narrative, he describes events more or less as follows (more detail above in chapter three):<sup>848</sup> after Agron's indulgent death, Teuta orders raids further afield to find more booty. Her ragtag band of pirate ships manages through deception and luck to seize such strongholds as Phoenice, Epidamnus, and Apollonia, the three major stopping points on the route north from Corcyra to Illyria. They then also take Corcyra. There seems to be

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<sup>844</sup> Champion (2004); cf. Gruen (1984), 365 who says Polybius' account "is polluted by anti-feminine invective, and cannot be used to support any reconstruction."

<sup>845</sup> Time is spent discussing them in detail in e.g. Harris (1979), 195-7; Gruen (1984), 359-73; Eckstein (2008), 30ff.

<sup>846</sup> E.g. Polyb. 2.8.4: "Teuta, on the return of the flotilla from Epirus, was so struck with admiration by the quantity and beauty of the spoils they brought back (Phoenice being then the wealthiest city there), that she was twice as eager as before to molest the Greeks."

<sup>847</sup> The plot, recall, is to demonstrate how the Romans conquered the entire Mediterranean and, in the 1<sup>st</sup> Illyrian War specifically, to show how this conflict related to the overall project of expansion: Polyb. 1.1.5-6, 2.2.1-2, 2.12.7-8.

<sup>848</sup> Polyb. 2.1-12.

no purpose for these actions other than to plunder further and further afield. Their escalated raiding shocks the Greek world, especially when they stoop to selling captives into slavery.<sup>849</sup> Unfortunately, they kill too many Italian merchants and Rome becomes directly involved. When Teuta turns out to be wildly unpredictable and unable to restrain her own subjects, the Romans intervene forcefully and put an end to this constant predation.<sup>850</sup>

Underneath these thick layers of narrative lie clear efforts of Illyrian *imperialisms*. It appears that, following the collapse of Epirus, Agron and Teuta were in a good position to stake out claims to power further afield. They took the opportunity of partnership with Demetrius II as an opportunity to flex their muscles to the south and, having met success, followed up with attempts at conquest. Teuta launched attacks on all of the large, well-defended cities of the Adriatic seaboard between her own strongholds and the crucial island and city of Corcyra. She successfully repelled counter-attacks from the Aetolians and Achaeans who were also trying to grab up influence in the area, not merely flailing about in response to this barbaric, Illyrian menace. As Gruen put it, “The Illyrians were transforming themselves from disreputable buccaneers to respectable imperialists.”<sup>851</sup> We may not buy into the “disreputable buccaneers” part (see chapter three), but agree that these should be viewed as steps toward conquest. Teuta further seized Corcyra, thus successfully choking off naval access to the Adriatic from mainland Greece, becoming effectively the first Hellenistic monarch to hold the entire coastline by force

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<sup>849</sup> Polyb. 2.6.8: “They had caused the Greek inhabitants of the coast no little consternation and alarm; for, seeing the most strongly situated and powerful town in Epirus thus suddenly taken and devastated, they all began to be anxious *not, as in former times, for their agricultural produce, but for the safety of themselves and their cities.*” Compare with 2.8.2, where the Illyrians capture and carry off Italian merchants. This escalation has been described by Gruen as sending “shock-waves” through Greece, (1984), 363. Clearly something had changed.

<sup>850</sup> This exaggerated characterization by Polybius is echoed in Holleaux who called the Illyrians “barbarians,” spreading piracy “like an endemic disease,” and an “evil” habitually “infesting the Ionian Sea,” (1928), 824-5.

<sup>851</sup> Gruen (1984), 364.

(Cassander had done it through alliance).<sup>852</sup> This put Teuta and Illyria in an extremely powerful position. As Appian put it, the Illyrians threatened the entire Adriatic Sea.<sup>853</sup> Another way of phrasing it might be to say that, from these centers of strength, Teuta was able to project violence throughout the Adriatic and fend off competing claims to control. The critical port cities, once secured, formed effective bases of operation. It may be easiest to visualize these cities as projecting circles of influence (about a half day's rowing in a *lembos*), close enough together from Corcyra northward as to overlap. This made Teuta powerful indeed.

I will treat Rome's response, called the 1<sup>st</sup> Illyrian War, below under the heading of Rome. In brief, the Romans took away these conquests and restricted Illyrian forces to their earlier strongholds north of Scodra.

In the years following 229 BC and the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> Illyrian War, powerful Illyrian dynasts make further efforts to project power in the Adriatic.<sup>854</sup> Demetrius of Pharos became an ally of Rome during the events of 230-229 BC when he betrayed the island of Corcyra to them.<sup>855</sup> In return for his treachery, he received great influence in the newly restricted Illyria and repaid the favor by harassing Roman shipping and seeking to seize territory in the northern Adriatic.<sup>856</sup> While the sources conflict and the chronology is confused in Polybius and Appian, it seems Demetrius made his own alliance with two powerful Adriatic tribes against the Romans, the Atintani and the Histri. This coincided with a Roman effort in the 220s BC to establish control at the head of the Adriatic (details below). Demetrius disrupted this by attacking Roman shipping and, after being reprimanded and losing his fleet, turning to Philip V of Macedon for aid. Demetrius pushed Philip to attack Rome, something I take up in the next section.

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<sup>852</sup> Hammond and Walbank (1988), 154-5; Diod. Sic. 19.36.5, 67.6; Polyæn. 4.11.4.

<sup>853</sup> App. *Ill.* 7.

<sup>854</sup> Šašel Kos (2002).

<sup>855</sup> Polyb. 2.11.

<sup>856</sup> Eutr. 3.7; Oros. 4.13.16; Diod. 25.14.1; Dell (1970); cf. Eckstein (1999); Bandelli (1981).

The next general and probably king, Scerdilaidas, allied himself with a series of actors in the larger Adriatic world including the Aetolians, Philip, and eventually the Romans.<sup>857</sup> While we do not have record of his actions against Rome or others beyond fighting for hire as a mercenary, he participated in the conflicts of the Social War and First Macedonian War on several sides, presumably with a view to increasing Illyrian standing and influence.<sup>858</sup> A series of other dynasts did the same, hiring out their military forces and appearing in the lists of allies present at the conflicts between Macedon and Rome in the early 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC.<sup>859</sup>

The last king of Illyria, Genthius, broke the mold of his predecessors by allying with Perseus, King of Macedon, against the Romans. He had already been accused in 181 BC of mounting attacks against the Italian seaboard, and though it seems on the surface that Illyrians were merely raiding Italian shipping, there may be more going on.<sup>860</sup> Assigned to fight against these Illyrian marauders, the Roman nauarchs established a forward naval base at Ancona and from there launched maritime attacks and support actions for ongoing warfare in Histria in 178 BC.<sup>861</sup> It may be that this is an extension of the struggle between Illyria and Rome for Histria itself and overall influence at the head of the Adriatic. I have suggested in chapter two that the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC saw a kind of race up the coasts of the Adriatic with Romans on the west coast and Illyrians on the east trying to consolidate influence and project economic control as quickly as possible. Perhaps in 171 BC we can see Genthius trying to stake a claim to the Histrian peninsula and back it up with his swift ships. Unfortunately, the Romans win out and maintain a naval presence in that part of the Adriatic for years to come.

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<sup>857</sup> Polyb. 2.5-6, 4.16, 29.6-7.

<sup>858</sup> Livy 26.24.9; Šašel Kos (2002).

<sup>859</sup> Šašel Kos (2002), 146-51; Hammond (1968), 10ff; Gruen (1984), 371ff; Errington (1989), 91ff; Ormerod (1924), 174ff.

<sup>860</sup> Livy 40.18-19, 42.

<sup>861</sup> Livy 41.1.

Genthius sided with Perseus of Macedon in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Macedonian War and lost an extended naval war with Roman triremes in the Adriatic Sea and a brief ground campaign on its shores.<sup>862</sup> True to his characterization of other Illyrian monarchs, Polybius lambasts Genthius as a drunkard.<sup>863</sup> The end result of his reign was the destruction of Illyrian military power and the apparent elimination of political autonomy as well.

Overall, the challenge for interpreting Illyrian *imperialisms* is that they serve as a backdrop to other stories in both our sources and the secondary literature treating these episodes. Taken together rather than as stage dressing, they present a series of projections of power and attempts at expansion. Repeatedly the Illyrian kings looked to the south for control over the coastal cities and the increased zones of power they could bring. Exposure to those cities through trade relationships and the raids of Illyrian military entrepreneurs paved the way for further conquest. That they never managed to hold onto the coastal cities for long should not deter us from seeing these efforts as clear examples of *imperialisms*. Illyrian forces seized and controlled large tracts of the Adriatic, especially in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC and this state—whatever its nature—was a power to be reckoned with, even if only briefly.

Beyond the state-level actions of the Illyrians, we should read non-state actors in the form of military entrepreneurs (chapter three) flourishing in the Adriatic. We have seen that Illyrian raiders had great success in the early 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC, though I have argued that this leads to state-level expansion as much as non-state action. But in the aftermath of the 1<sup>st</sup> Illyrian War, all the raiding force of Teuta was out of a job. And in subsequent conflicts with Rome and between Roman and Macedonian and Epiran forces, increasing numbers of sailors and troops were raised, defeated, and put out of work. These military entrepreneurs, largely invisible in our written

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<sup>862</sup> Livy 44.30; App. *Ill.* 9; Burton (2017), 161-2.

<sup>863</sup> Polyb. 29.13.

sources, were an important factor in the instability of the Adriatic region. They seized on opportunities to ply their trade in conflicts and to make a living by other means in the lulls of peace in between. As we will see, the threat of such non-state actors frequently leads to direct military intervention and so has an important impact on the *imperialisms* of others.

## VI. Macedonians

The story of Macedonian *imperialisms* is wrapped up in the rise of Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the internecine warfare after Alexander's death in 323 BC.<sup>864</sup> In the mid 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, Philip fought a series of wars with the Illyrians and others on the edges of Macedonian territory, expanding even into Illyria, but all overland and away from the Adriatic coast.<sup>865</sup> Alexander too, shoring up his allies in the west and striving to keep Illyria in line, fought an inland campaign in the 330s BC before embarking on his conquest of Asia.<sup>866</sup> Specifically Adriatic *imperialisms* really come to the fore after Alexander's death with the westward gaze of Cassander.

Cassander was the son of Antipater, regent of Macedon under Alexander the Great. Antipater died in 319 BC and passed over his son, naming Polyperchon (a general of Alexander the Great) regent instead.<sup>867</sup> Cassander organized allies and attacked Polyperchon, driving him out of Macedonia and proclaiming himself regent in his place.<sup>868</sup> In 317 BC, while Cassander fought to depose Polyperchon, he made an alliance with the army of Epirus that lasted for several years.<sup>869</sup> But he faced a problem around 315 BC as he tried to consolidate his authority over

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<sup>864</sup> There are a number of works on Macedonian Imperialism specifically, e.g. Ellis (1976), Billows (1995), and Worthington (2014).

<sup>865</sup> Ellis (1976), Worthington (2014), 25ff.

<sup>866</sup> Worthington (2014), 121ff; Hammond and Walbank (1988), 32ff.

<sup>867</sup> For an overview of the history, Will (1984), 23ff or, more completely, (1966), 19-84, esp. 48-51; Hammond and Walbank (1988), 136ff.

<sup>868</sup> For an overview of the history, Will (1984), 23ff or, more completely, (1966), 19-84, esp. 48-51.

<sup>869</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.36.5.



Macedonian territory: the Illyrians to the north of Epirus had begun interfering in events in the southernmost Adriatic and threatened to undo his alliances there.<sup>870</sup> Cassander moved to the Adriatic coast and conducted campaigns to restore his authority in the region. He captured Apollonia and garrisoned Epidamnus/Dyrrachium.<sup>871</sup> Events further away demanded Cassander's attention in 315/4 BC and, in his absence, the Illyrians rushed to the coastal cities and freed them from Epirote garrisons.<sup>872</sup> Despite failed efforts to reclaim that territory through the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, Cassander still looked west in the first years of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century.<sup>873</sup> He seemed determined take and hold Corcyra, for example, trying several times to maintain a foothold there and thereby a pathway into the Adriatic.<sup>874</sup> Ultimately, Cassander's westward ambitions failed and with them further Macedonian efforts at holding the Adriatic coast. The parade of Macedonian kings after Cassander seem to have left that part of the Balkan peninsula well enough alone, though that image of affairs may simply be a reflection of the poor state of our sources.

Indeed, rather than attempt to conquer the Illyrians or seize the Epirote cities on the Adriatic coast, subsequent Macedonian kings seem to have hired Illyrian kings as mercenaries and navies. At any rate, Demetrius II had hired Agron in the 230s BC as discussed above.<sup>875</sup> Philip V and Perseus would likewise rely on Illyrian forces in conflicts of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC.

Philip V was the first king since Cassander to attempt to take and hold the Adriatic coast. According to Polybius and Livy, it was Demetrius of Pharos—who had fled to Philip to escape Roman punishment during the 2<sup>nd</sup> Illyrian War—who suggested to him that he conquer the

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<sup>870</sup> Hammond and Walbank (1988), 154-5; Diod. Sic. 19.36.5, 67.6; Polyæn. 4.11.4.

<sup>871</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.67.6; Polyæn. 4.11.4.

<sup>872</sup> Hammond and Walbank (1988), 155.

<sup>873</sup> Failed attack in 312 BC: Diod. Sic. 19.89.

<sup>874</sup> Hammond and Walbank (1988), 207; Diod. Sic. 20.105.

<sup>875</sup> Polyb. 2.3; Šašel Kos (2002) on the various employments of the Illyrian dynasts.

Adriatic cities.<sup>876</sup> Here Demetrius' contacts with Italy spread to Macedon in a good example of the thickening of Adriatic networks and the consequences that process can bring. Philip saw this as a necessary step toward a loftier goal, namely the invasion of Italy in coordination with Hannibal of Carthage and, ultimately, world domination.<sup>877</sup> In 217 BC, embroiled in a war with the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues, Philip received news of the Battle of Lake Trasimene and the massive defeat handed to Rome. With Demetrius' encouragement, he seized on this as an opportunity to take advantage of Roman weakness. Planning to invade Italy, he attacked the cities on the Illyrian coast.<sup>878</sup> A first attempt in 217 BC involved building a fleet of 100 *lemboi* and sailing to Apollonia. However, when Philip's fleet was nearing the city some of his commanders heard that Roman warships were just across the Strait of Otranto and headed their way. According to Polybius, Philip panicked and withdrew, abandoning his designs and fleeing to the safety of Cephallania.<sup>879</sup> In 215 BC he formed a treaty with Hannibal to attack Italy from across the Adriatic and followed this with another expedition against Apollonia and Oricum in which he was defeated by the Romans.<sup>880</sup> Finally in 212 BC, Philip succeeded in capturing Lissus and its important harbor.<sup>881</sup> But while he had a firm base of operations in the Adriatic, the Romans controlled Coreyra and the cities south of Lissus, taking the teeth out of Philip's accomplishment.<sup>882</sup> After a prolonged war, fighting between Macedonians and Romans in Illyris and the region immediately south ultimately concluded in a peace treaty made at Phoenice in 205

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<sup>876</sup> Polyb. 5.101.6-10, 8: "Demetrius seized on this opportunity to advise him to get the Aetolian war off his shoulders as soon as possible, and to devote himself to the matters of Illyria and a subsequent expedition to Italy."

<sup>877</sup> Polyb. 5.101.10, 102.1, 104.7, 108.5; 15.24.6; Eckstein (2008), 78ff; cf. Walbank (2002).

<sup>878</sup> Hammond and Walbank (1988), 391ff.

<sup>879</sup> Polyb. 5.109-10 were Polybius lambasts Philip's whole expedition.

<sup>880</sup> On the treaty: Polyb. 7.9.1-17; on the fighting, App. *Mac.* 1.2; Zon. 9.4; Plut. *Arat.* 51.1; Livy 24.40.

<sup>881</sup> Polyb. 8.13; Hammond and Walbank (1988), 398-9, 409-10; Kleu (2017).

<sup>882</sup> Hammond and Walbank (1988), 401 where it is called "a wasting asset"; cf. 403.

BC.<sup>883</sup> Philip V's further aggressions were directed further east as the theater of conflict between Rome and Macedon shifted to the Greek mainland and then the Aegean and Asia Minor.

The Macedonian kings were quite active in the Adriatic from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. Perseus also continued his father's fight against Rome in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC, but I leave that narrative aside for the discussion of Roman *imperialisms* below.<sup>884</sup> While the Macedonians seem to show sustained interest in control of the Illyrian coast and northern Epirus, it would be a mistake to ascribe to kings from Cassander to Philip V a continual foreign policy or a single reason for attacking the Illyrians. By considering these events as *imperialisms*, we can compare their approaches to power and control without imposing on them an overarching purpose. What emerges from such a comparison is the importance of the port cities of Illyria and Epirus. To claim any sort of space in the Adriatic and effectively back up that claim required access to the coastline and, on the eastern side, the cities of Apollonia, Epidamnus/Dyrrachium, and Phoenice. For the Macedonians, unless they were willing to cross the mountains as Philip V did in the late 3<sup>rd</sup> century, they must also gain control of Corcyra or the maritime entrance to the Adriatic will be lost. Macedonian kings maintained vast zones of control in the Greek mainland for many decades after the death of Alexander. But to claim power in the Adriatic required coastal cities that escaped all but Cassander (briefly) and Philip V. As the latter learned, a fleet was also necessary to maintain that claim to control in the dynamic environment of the late 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC. With a strong fleet and mastery of the coastal cities, Philip could have controlled the Adriatic from Phoenice to Histria.

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<sup>883</sup> Livy 29.12; Gruen (1984), 381; Errington (1989), 104-5; Eckstein (2008), 112ff.

<sup>884</sup> On Perseus and Rome, Burton (2017).

## VII. Romans

Traditionally the First Illyrian War has been seen as the beginning of Roman Imperialism eastward—thanks to Polybius’ characterization of the events—and has been situated within the general paradigms of Imperialism already outlined above.<sup>885</sup> For example, Momsen, Frank, and Holleaux saw Roman involvement in Illyria as reluctantly necessary to protect innocent economic interests and protect the weak state of Issa from attack.<sup>886</sup> They point both to Polybius’ report that Illyrians attacked Italian merchants and killed many and sold others into slavery and to Appian’s claim that Issa, besieged by Agron, turned to Rome for help.<sup>887</sup> In both instances, Rome intervened for the benefit of others. In contrast, Harris asserted that Romans had long been looking east and would take about any excuse to open a new region for earning triumphs.<sup>888</sup> In other words, Illyrian attacks on shipping were hardly a necessary motivator. For Gruen, they were certainly enough. In his assessment, the war was a small affair with little effort expended and no hope of long-term involvement in Illyria.<sup>889</sup> For Eckstein, the war came as a natural response to the power vacuum in northwestern Greece after the downfall of Epirus. To his view, Rome responded as any other state would, and in fact as the Aetolian and Achaean leagues did themselves.<sup>890</sup> Other views of the war are slight nuances of these general models. Within them, one can see the outlines of the larger debate of Roman Imperialism: Rome acted defensively and were really the good guys (Holleaux etc.); Rome was violently, unstopably aggressive and the bad guys (Harris); Rome responded to pressures and especially invitations in the Hellenistic world and brought aid—more or less good guys (Gruen); and Rome interacted with other states

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<sup>885</sup> Overview Eckstein (2008), 29ff; e.g. Harris (1979), 195-7; Gruen (1984), 359ff.

<sup>886</sup> Mommsen (1903); Frank (1914), 116ff, Holleaux (1921) and (1928).

<sup>887</sup> Polyb. 2.8.1-3; App. *Ill.* 7.

<sup>888</sup> Harris (1979), esp. 195-7.

<sup>889</sup> Gruen (1984), 367-8.

<sup>890</sup> Eckstein (2008), 30ff.

in a system of checks and balances with each seeking to maximize its area of control—in other words acting as all other states just more successfully (Eckstein).

It is this last school of thought, recently bolstered by Philip Burton (a student of Eckstein), that brings an important new insight to the larger discussion of Adriatic imperialism.<sup>891</sup> Eckstein insists that Rome responded to events in Illyria and Epirus in the same manner as closer powers on the Greek mainland:

That Rome, far from seeking any excuse for war, was reacting to disturbing developments on the Adriatic coast opposite Italy is shown by the *Greek* response to this situation, which was the same as the Roman response: an unprecedented military intervention in the region, including joint operations on land and sea by the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues. These two large Greek federal states were bitter rivals, and even when allied (as in the 230s) did not usually operate together militarily. The Greek response to the Ardiaean crisis of 231-229 was thus an exceptionally unified and energetic use of military force. Roman conduct regarding the Ardiaei should therefore not be seen as unique but rather as part of a broader and quite natural systemic response to the increasing success of Illyrian violence—which was, in turn, the result both of the energy of King Agron and (importantly) the collapse of Epirus.<sup>892</sup>

This is an extremely important point to the larger picture of Roman expansion in the Adriatic world and of that region's connectivity in general. Eckstein seems to suggest that Rome by 230 BC is plugged into the world of Hellenistic geopolitics to a sufficient level as to naturally respond to pressures across the Adriatic. This is a significant departure from previous students of Roman Imperialism who emphasize Rome's disconnectedness from events in Greece as early as the 230s BC.

Oddly, Eckstein insists both that Rome participated in a transadriatic, interstate anarchy to such a degree that responding to Illyrian expansion was very natural and also that Rome was very disconnected from the Greek world and had little interest in what happened there.<sup>893</sup> This

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<sup>891</sup> Burton (2011).

<sup>892</sup> Eckstein (2008), 37.

<sup>893</sup> Eckstein (2008), 37: "Indeed, one should underline that despite the embassy of Apollonia to Rome in the 260s (of which much has sometimes been made (above), the Apolloniaties did not appeal to Rome

seeming contradiction remains unresolved through his impressive study. This sort of imperialist schizophrenia results from trying to square the underlying mechanics of realism within international relations theory and Eckstein's commitment to reading Roman disinterest in the Greek world following the analysis of Holleaux.<sup>894</sup> To my mind it is difficult to present significant evidence for Roman participation in an interstate anarchy without showing sufficient contacts to bring Rome within the Hellenistic sphere. The former requires the latter.

That Rome had contact with the Hellenistic world earlier and with greater consequences has been the argument of Čašule, a student of Peter Derow.<sup>895</sup> As we saw in the last chapter, Derow claimed that the series of colonies Rome founded on the Adriatic coast of Italy from the 280s BC through the middle of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC represent a sustained effort of engagement with the Adriatic world.<sup>896</sup> Čašule set out to prove that engagement and argued persuasively that, upon reaching the already settled Adriatic shore, Rome entered into an existing, thriving network of Adriatic trade and therefore into contact with the entire Adriatic basin. He concludes:

On a general level, the Roman eastern intervention in the First Illyrian War no longer appears sudden or surprising. It is not possible to maintain that the war took place in a region about which the Romans were largely ignorant and with which they had few ties. Since the foundation of Roman and Latin colonies on the eastern Italian seaboard in the early third century, Romans had been present at sites around the Adriatic basin, and had steadily become integrated into the intricate network of relationships which characterized that sea.<sup>897</sup>

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when seriously threatened in 229, but – apparently still operating in a purely Greek political world – appealed instead to the Aetolians and the Achaeans for military help (Polyb. 2.9.8). The conduct of Apollonia thus appears to demonstrate both how insubstantial were those earliest contacts between Rome and the states east of the Adriatic, and how widespread outside the Roman context was the phenomenon of weaker states appealing to the strong.” Compare with 53 where he says, “Roman indifference to these strategically important places needs to be underlined. The Senate *could* have [imposed its will on the Adriatic], but it did not.”

<sup>894</sup> Eckstein (2008), 6-7.

<sup>895</sup> Čašule (2011) and (2012).

<sup>896</sup> Derow (2003).

<sup>897</sup> Čašule (2012), 226-7.

While these new connectivities were not military nor formally political, there is strong evidence—considered in chapters two and four—that the Adriatic beat with a single economic pulse during the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC.<sup>898</sup>

With this connected Adriatic in mind, it is easy to adopt Eckstein's theory that Rome participated in a system of international relations with the Hellenistic states that shared the Adriatic in common. It does not follow, however, that Rome had little knowledge of or interest in the other parts of that maritime world. To the contrary, it seems the Romans had longstanding interests in the Adriatic basin. To restrict their concerns to one shore or the other is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of maritime space.

Critical to all discussion of the First Illyrian War is its aftermath, in which the Romans established some sort of relationship with the port cities along the coast of Illyria and Epirus from Corcyra to Issa and then, in the record as we have it, interacted with them very little for a decade.<sup>899</sup> An old interpretation of Polybius and Appian was that Rome created a sort of protectorate along the coast and thereby a buffer zone between Macedon (inland from Illyria) and the Adriatic Sea.<sup>900</sup> Ernst Badian argued strongly against this and proposes instead a very loose, informal friendship between the cities and Rome on the model of the patron/client relationship among Roman elites.<sup>901</sup> This model has since been largely replaced—as far as these Adriatic cities are concerned—with the view that Rome imposed firm dominion on these cities and treated them as essentially subjugated.<sup>902</sup> The sparse nature of the sources makes any of these outcomes possible, which means that all have been passionately defended in turn.

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<sup>898</sup> Purcell (2013).

<sup>899</sup> Summary at Eckstein (2008), 42ff.

<sup>900</sup> Holleaux (1928), 836; Walbank (1940), 19.

<sup>901</sup> Badian (1964), 1-33.

<sup>902</sup> Ferrary (1988), 24-33; Hammond (1968), 7-9. See also Derow (1991) on the treaty between Pharos and Rome, but the dating is insecure and the context confusing: Eckstein (2008), 45-50.

Given the fluidity of the evidence for Roman intentions in the Adriatic and for decisions afterward regarding government (or not) of the Greek cities, it seems fruitless to stake out yet another position on whether this qualifies as Imperialism. The First Illyrian War certainly qualifies under the rubric of *imperialisms*. Rather than ask why Roman forces got involved, it is perhaps more useful to ask how they attempted to project power in the Adriatic Sea, how successful they were, and how this stacks up against other *imperialisms* in the same space.

Polybius reports that during the war itself in 229 BC, Roman consuls took Corcyra first, or rather Demetrius of Pharos gave it up to them while they were en route.<sup>903</sup> From there, they moved steadily north by sailing along the shoreline, relieving sieges and expelling Illyrian garrisons at Phoenice, Apollonia, Epidamnus/Dyrrachium, and Issa. Having pushed the Illyrians back to Rhizon, they agreed to terms that forbade Teuta's forces from sailing south of Lissus.<sup>904</sup> Furthermore, they left a garrison of locally-raised troops in Apollonia for at least that winter to watch over the area with the aid of 40 ships under Lucius Postumius, one of the consuls.<sup>905</sup> That the Romans felt a force at Apollonia could supervise the whole region speaks to both the centrality of the city and the ease of transportation up and down the coast. Note that the Romans sail first for Corcyra at the outbreak of the war, highlighting its importance as the real crossing point for most traffic across the Strait of Otranto. Note too the limited number of cities. Polybius mentions some tribes inland and other scholars have expended a great deal of energy trying to pin down who exactly lived where, but despite the jumble of Illyrian ethnography, access to the sea and the Adriatic world was really funneled through this small number of ports. Control of these few cities gave the wielder power over a huge expanse of coastline and a rich shipping lane. As we have seen, most (though not all) traffic from the Strait into the Adriatic flowed by

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<sup>903</sup> Polyb. 2.11.3-5.

<sup>904</sup> Polyb. 2.11-12.

<sup>905</sup> Polyb. 11.12



way of these cities, continuing north to Istria or crossing westward from Issa to the Italian coast near Monte Conero. And, of course, control of Corcyra meant the ability to easily strike at or regulate traffic crossing the Strait. The Roman consuls established their own forces in each of these spaces and removed them from Illyrian control. Whatever the actual level of sway Rome held in the region after 229 BC, there was at the very least a degree of friendship between the Romans and these cities. Even if not subjugation, that friendship would guarantee access to each of these important ports for passing Roman ships and facilitate trade flowing around the Adriatic to the benefit of everyone participating in this larger economic ecosystem.

My view of the First Illyrian War within the framework of *imperialisms*, then, is one of establishing access. The Romans sought to project influence in the Adriatic through access to these essential port cities and thus free up trade through the Strait and along both coasts. Whether that effort involved a “sphere of influence,”<sup>906</sup> a “protectorate,”<sup>907</sup> loose friendships,<sup>908</sup> or de facto subjugation,<sup>909</sup> it is safe to say that Rome had an interest in utilizing these harbors. This broad interest in access to the Adriatic coasts reappears in other *imperialisms* in the rest of the 3<sup>rd</sup> and early 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries BC. We have confused notices, for example, that the Romans engage in warfare around the Po River Valley and in Histria around 222-221 BC, apparently in an attempt to extend their power further north along the coast. As we have seen, this brings them into direct conflict with the Illyrian dynast Demetrius of Pharos who, having made alliances in Illyria and Histria, has begun attacking Roman supply ships and making his own bid for control in the northern part of the sea. When Demetrius continues to threaten Roman access to the Adriatic ports on the eastern side of the sea as well, they embark on the short Second Illyrian War and

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<sup>906</sup> Errington (1972), 40; Eckstein (2008), 54ff.

<sup>907</sup> Holleaux (1928), 836; Walbank (1940), 19; Eckstein (2008), 43ff.

<sup>908</sup> Badian (1964); Gruen (1984), 367-8.

<sup>909</sup> Ferrary (1988), 24-33; Hammond (1968); Petzold (1971); Derow (1991).

wipe out his navy, destroying Pharos in the process.<sup>910</sup> By eliminating this encroaching threat and the base from which Demetrius operated, the Romans once again secured access to the Adriatic coast and, crucially, to the crossing at the Strait of Otranto. Polybius notes in the buildup to the war that Demetrius had taken Scerdilaidas and a large force of ships on a long raid along the Peloponnese and into the Cyclades, clearly demonstrating their ability to strike at the Strait.<sup>911</sup> For Polybius, this is the impetus behind Rome's engagement in the war, namely to eliminate the threat Demetrius represented to their free movement and trade in the Adriatic.<sup>912</sup> He couches this in terms of the pending war with Carthage, noting that the Romans do not want Demetrius loose in the east and potentially tied to Macedon while they must deal with threats from Gaul and Carthage. Naturally this last point has drawn a great deal of discussion on Polybius' hindsight and Roman purposes for pursuing the war in Illyria. Underneath this thick varnish of motives lurks the issue of access: whatever the Romans knew or suspected about Macedon or Carthage, they seem to have wanted to maintain access to the port cities of the Adriatic.

When the First Macedonian War really got underway, it was fought in part over Illyria where Philip V had ensconced himself in Oricum and was besieging Apollonia. The Roman commander M. Valerius Laevinus sailed from Brundisium to capture Oricum, Livy tells us, because either Oricum or Apollonia would be a great forward base from which to attack Italy.<sup>913</sup> Laevinus thereafter based his fleet in Oricum in an effort to prevent Philip from any maritime power in the Adriatic. Philip, unable to reach the Adriatic by sea with the Roman fleet

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<sup>910</sup> App. *Ill.* 8 calls it guilty with him in crime: τὴν πατρίδα αὐτῷ Φάρον συναμαρτοῦσαν.

<sup>911</sup> Polyb. 4.16.

<sup>912</sup> Polyb. 3.16.

<sup>913</sup> Livy 24.40, Polyb. 8.1.6; Eckstein (2008), 85ff.

controlling the eastern shore, came overland from Macedonia and seized Lissus on the coast.<sup>914</sup>

While a maritime conflict continued in the Adriatic, Rome arranged a treaty with the Aetolian League to begin a war in mainland Greece. Eckstein argues that this was meant to serve as a distraction for Philip, citing Livy: *Philippum quoque satis implicatum bello finitimo ratus ne Italiam Poenosque et pacta cum Hannibale posset respicere, Corcyram ipse se recepit.*<sup>915</sup>

Ultimately the Romans were unable to remove Philip from Lissus and won and lost Apollonia and Oricum. These coastal cities once again keenly felt the consequences of connectedness. Their key position in the maritime routes of the Adriatic brought them into each of these conflicts in turn. At the Peace of Phoenice in 205, conducted just on the edges of the Adriatic world, the Romans maintained their relationship with most of the coastal cities, ceding only Lissus and its access to Macedonia overland to Philip V.

The next Roman offensive in the Adriatic began in 200 BC with an attack on Macedonia by way of Illyria.<sup>916</sup> The consuls, intending to go overland across the mountains, first established a bridgehead in Epirus and took the Macedonian stronghold of Antipatreia in 200 BC. In conjunction with their land attack, naval forces took up Corcyra as a base and blockaded Epirus, ensuring that no Macedonian forces could harass the Romans from the rear. Once again, the importance of Corcyra and the coast of Epirus for maintaining control over or even access to the Adriatic comes to the fore.

In the 170s BC, a different set of crucial cities comes into focus as Roman naval commanders set up shop in Ancona. As discussed in chapter four, L. Cornelius and C. Furius established a naval base at Ancona for an ongoing conflict around Histria.<sup>917</sup> This old Adriatic

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<sup>914</sup> Polyb. 8.13.

<sup>915</sup> Livy 26.24.

<sup>916</sup> Livy 31.27-8; Hammond and Walbank (1988), 420-1.

<sup>917</sup> Livy 40.18-19, 42; 41.1.

port made an excellent launching point. The Illyrian king Genthius had been accused of sponsoring pirate attacks in Histria and along the Adriatic seaboard. The two Roman commanders split responsibility for the Italian coast to either side of Ancona and utilized the harbor there to launch attacks against the Illyrians and responses to attacks on Italian shipping. Just as in the southern Adriatic, the ecologies of specific port sites—Ancona had the most secure harbor for a great distance along the middle Adriatic coast—made them essential starting points for any military operations in the Adriatic Sea.

At the end of the 170s BC, Roman forces moved to Illyria and attacked Genthius directly, as he had allied with Perseus (Philip V's heir) against Rome in what would be the Third Macedonian War.<sup>918</sup> In the fourth year of the war, 168 BC, a major Roman offensive under the direction of the praetor L. Anicius led to the complete loss of Genthius' army and his surrender at Scodra. The Roman treatment of Illyria was much harsher than in previous conflicts and garrisons were installed in the Illyrian cities, though they were later withdrawn under the proclamation of freedom for the Greeks in 167 BC.<sup>919</sup> In the aftermath of the war, Q. Maximus and Scipio Nasica ravaged the territory of the Illyrians who had aided Genthius and Perseus against the Romans.<sup>920</sup>

The horrific depopulating and razing of Epirus in 167 BC has already been discussed in chapter four. This had an indelible effect on the human geography of the Adriatic, shifting 150,000 people away from its shores. This kind of massive population transfer was an extreme form of *imperialisms* to project control over Epirus and remake it in Rome's interest. In fact, the Romans reorganized all of the Balkan peninsula to their liking, dividing it into regions and

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<sup>918</sup> Livy 44.30; App. *Ill.* 9; Polyb. 29.13; Burton (2017), 161-2; Hammond and Walbank (1988), 506ff.

<sup>919</sup> Livy 45.18; Diod. Sic. 31.8; Hammond and Walbank (1988), 562-3; Burton (2017), 175-7.

<sup>920</sup> Livy 45.40-1; Plut. *Aem.* 34 and 37; Diod. Sic. 31.

segregating former allies in order to prevent coalitions of opposition.<sup>921</sup> This alteration of the political landscape nominally left free, autonomous states without Roman interference (though created and ordered according to Roman desires). This kind of extreme intervention and state-formation demonstrate a new way of projecting control and influence in the Adriatic basin.

Around the rest of the sea, Rome continued to assert control and back it up. After the Histrian War of 221-20 BC, Roman commanders continued conquering lands at the head of the Adriatic for decades. M'. Acilius Glabrio defeated the Boii in 191 BC, and the colonies of Bononia, Mutina, Parma, and Aquileia were founded on it over the next 10 years.<sup>922</sup> Rebellions in Dalmatia required Rome to back up claims to power in 155 BC in Dalmatia and in 135 BC against the Illyrians.<sup>923</sup> Other commands in 129, 119, and 115 BC suggest—though details are sparse—ongoing Roman efforts to shore up control of the northern Adriatic coastline and its hinterland against encroaching Gauls.<sup>924</sup>

In the 1st century BC, a few scattered commands show ongoing engagement with the Adriatic world, especially in the north.<sup>925</sup> But it is with the civil wars of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC that the Adriatic comes to the fore again as commanders cross back and forth between the Italian and Greek peninsulas. For example, in 84 BC L. Cornelius Sulla prepared to return to Italy from the 1<sup>st</sup> Mithridatic War. His enemies in Italy, L. Cornelius Cinna and Cn. Papirius Carbo wanted to

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<sup>921</sup> Hammond and Walbank (1988), 566: The aim of the Senate in partitioning Macedonia was to prevent any resurgence of power. With that end in view each republic was isolated from its fellows. The lines of division were cleverly drawn; for the great rivers... were effective barriers, difficult to cross; and the passes leading from one republic to another were few, and some of them were to come under control for the movement of Roman armies along what came to be known as the Via Egnatia.

<sup>922</sup> Livy 36.1-2, 39-40; Oros. 4.20.21; Zonar. 8.18-20; Roselaar (2010), 324 no 42.

<sup>923</sup> C. Marcius Figulus in Dalmatia App. *Ill.* 11 and Polyb. 32.9; S. Fulvius Flaccus against the Ardiaei App. *Ill.* 10; cf. Dzino 2010, 64-5.

<sup>924</sup> App. *Ill.* 10; Dzino (2010), 69-71.

<sup>925</sup> C. Cosconius in 78 BC, App. *B. Civ.* 1.77-8; two commanders in the pirate war of 67 BC, Plut. *Pomp.* 26-8, App. *Mithr.* 94-5; Tröster (2009).

stop his crossing and so established a naval base—where else?—at Ancona.<sup>926</sup> Julius Caesar, before the civil war broke out in 49 BC, held Illyricum as his province and made the trek there once to administer justice.<sup>927</sup>

During the civil war between Caesar and Pompey in 49 BC, the latter established himself in Brundisium while some of his forces crossed to Epidamnus/Dyrrachium.<sup>928</sup> Caesar records in his *Commentaries* on the war, that he thought Pompey might be staying in Brundisium to thus control the entire Adriatic between it and the southernmost cities on the Greek side: *neque certum inverniri poterat, obtinendine Brundisii causa ibi remanisset, quo facilius omne Hadriaticum mare ex ultimis Italiae partibus regionibusque Graeciae in potestate haberet atque ex ultraque parte bellum administrate posset, an opeia navium ibi restitisset.*<sup>929</sup> Hoping to prevent Pompey leaving, Caesar invested Brundisium, but Pompey sailed across to Epidamnus/Dyrrachium.<sup>930</sup>

That winter, 49-48 BC, Caesar notes that Pompey inhabited all the coastal towns of Epirus and Illyria in order to prevent him from crossing from Brundisium: *Hiemare Dyrrachii, Apolloniae omnibusque oppidis maritimis constituerat, ut mare transire Caesarem prohiberet, eiusque rei causa omni ora maritime classem disposuerat.*<sup>931</sup> Both commanders understood the fundamental necessity of those coastal cities for access to and control of the Strait of Otranto.

When he finally crossed in 48 BC, Caesar had to sneak ashore wherever he could. His own ships

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<sup>926</sup> App. *B. Civ.* 1.77-8.

<sup>927</sup> Caes. *B. Gall.* 2.35.2, 3.7.1, and 5.1.5-9. On Caesar, see now Raaflaub (2017a) and (2017b) with extensive notes.

<sup>928</sup> Caes. *B. Civ.* 1.24-5; App. *B. Civ.* 39; Plut. *Caes.* 35, *Pomp.* 62. While there are many important works on Caesar and the civil wars, the volumes of T. Rice Holmes have not been replaced (1911) and (1923). Gelzer (1968) and Meier (1982) provide excellent biographies, but Goldsworthy (2006) is the most accessible and entertaining. See also on Pompey, van Ooteghem (1955), Gelzer (1959), Leach (1978), and Seager (2002).

<sup>929</sup> Caes. *B. Civ.* 1.25.3.

<sup>930</sup> Caes. *B. Civ.* 1.27-8.

<sup>931</sup> Caes. *B. Civ.* 3.2; App. *B. Civ.* 53-4; Plut. *Caes.* 37, *Pomp.* 65.

were captured and burnt by a Pompeian naval commander who then reinforced a blockade from Salona to Oricum to prevent Caesar crossing.<sup>932</sup> When Pompey, who was in Macedonia, heard that Caesar had landed, he rushed to Apollonia to prevent him grabbing up the coastal communities, *ne Caesar orae maritimae civitates occuparet*.<sup>933</sup> But Caesar's speed allowed him to take Oricum and Apollonia which led to the complete surrender of Epirus.<sup>934</sup>

The two armies came to blows near Epidamnus/Dyrrachium, where they formed opposite encampments around the Apsus River.<sup>935</sup> From his camp, Caesar was able to spread troops along the entire coast near Oricum which kept Bibulus, commander of Pompey's fleet, from landing his ships. This prevented them gathering wood, taking on water, or dropping anchor, which caused severe hardship. They had to import water from Corcyra to maintain their blockade against Caesar's ships crossing from Brundisium. These details are worth noting because they speak to the extreme difficulty of blockading the Strait of Otranto. Bibulus had to string a large fleet along a vast expanse of shoreline to do it effectively, and this strained his resources enormously. Further, these points emphasize the necessity of friendly ports. Caesar was able to cause a great deal of discomfort and harassment to Bibulus' fleet by preventing them landing—without a series of friendly ports, a blockade or any kind of control of the Strait would be impossible. After a long wait, Caesar's ships find a favorable wind—the winds determine so much movement in this sea—and sneak through Bibulus' ships to a small harbor north of Lissus. It is noteworthy both that the wind made such a difference and that this otherwise unknown harbor—it has not appeared in any of our narratives so far—could host the fleet. Indeed, the

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<sup>932</sup> *Caes. B. Civ.* 3.6-8.

<sup>933</sup> *Caes. B. Civ.* 3.11.2.

<sup>934</sup> *Caes. B. Civ.* 3.11.3-12.4.

<sup>935</sup> *Caes. B. Civ.* 3.13ff. *App. B. Civ.* 60ff; *Plut. Caes.* 39-41.

eastern seaboard of the Adriatic was full of such places, even if the more secure harbors commanded so much attention.

The war quickly moves away from the Adriatic, though not before Sextus Pompey destroys Caesar's warships at Oricum and almost starves the latter's army while engaged in ever more intricate siege works near Epidamnus/Dyrrachium.<sup>936</sup> The legates of Caesar and Pompey play out the Adriatic conflict further when, in 47 BC, P. Vatinius faced off against M. Octavius. The Caesarian commander in the Adriatic had been A. Gabinius, but he was cut off by the harsh winter storms and cut not get supplies to his post at Salona and died of disease contracted through starvation and exposure.<sup>937</sup> Octavius, Pompey's legate, was shoring up control of the Adriatic coast when Vatinius, stationed at Brundisium and weakened by illness, heard of the danger. Innovatively, Vatinius put ramming beaks on small, swift ships—perhaps *lemboi*?—and defeated Octavius in a battle of Tauris.<sup>938</sup> Thereafter the Pompeians abandoned the Adriatic entirely.

In the aftermath of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, Octavian consolidated his power over Antony through a series of campaigns in the Adriatic and its hinterland in 35-33 BC.<sup>939</sup> A prolonged campaign against the continuously problematic Dalmatians and Illyrians allowed him to prove his military prowess (after his struggles at Philippi) and to contrast his industriousness with Antony's laziness. As Danijel Dzino put it, "The troubles in Illyricum suited the interests of Octavian perfectly at that particular moment...it was a unique opportunity for Octavian to improve his image and keep his legions under arms while reacting to the regional

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<sup>936</sup> Caes. *B. Civ.* 3.39-40 for the attack, 42.3 Caesar cut off from food supplies by Sextus Pompey's fleet, and 43ff for the various circumvallations and maneuvers.

<sup>937</sup> *B. Alex* 43.

<sup>938</sup> *B. Alex* 44-7.

<sup>939</sup> *App. Ill.* 16-28; Dio. 49.34-38. Complex issue with lots of bibliography: Dzino (2010), 101ff.



crisis.”<sup>940</sup> Following Octavian’s successes, a civil war broke out between him and Antony which culminated in a naval battle of sorts at Actium, south of Corcyra on the Acarnanian coast in 31 BC.

With Octavian’s success at Actium, he controlled the entire Adriatic Sea. It had been divided between him and Antony at an artificial line through Scodra in 40 BC in a meeting at Brundisium.<sup>941</sup> Between the consolidation of Roman authority in the hinterland of Dalmatia in 35-33 BC and the melding of authority over the eastern and western halves of the Roman dominion, Octavian could effectively claim power over the whole Adriatic basin. It is at this point that I end the dissertation precisely because the nature of the Adriatic space has changed so thoroughly as to permit political unification. That is not to say that the space was homogenous or culturally unified, but simply to assert that it might finally be controlled by a single state.

## VIII. Conclusion

In describing habitual Illyrian attacks along the coast of the Peloponnese, Polybius notes that “the Illyrians had always been in the habit of pillaging [Elis and Messenia], because, owing to the extent of their seaboard and owing to the principal cities being in the interior, help against their raids was distant and slow in arriving, so that they could always overrun and plunder those countries unmolested.”<sup>942</sup> His point seems to be that, without a garrisoned coastal city nearby, the shoreline was easy pickings. The Adriatic *imperialisms* examined here in these chapters have demonstrated the importance of seizing and holding the harbors of the Adriatic in order to effectively project control over the maritime world.

If the Strait of Otranto is the gateway to the Adriatic, then Corcyra and Oricum are its keys. Repeatedly we have seen actors grab one of these ports in order to project control over the

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<sup>940</sup> Dzino (2010), 106.

<sup>941</sup> App. *B. Civ.* 5.65; Zaccaria (2015), 14 and Purcell (2013), 375.

<sup>942</sup> Polyb. 2.5.1-2.

entrance to the Adriatic. Brundisium is the corollary on the Italian side. By holding these cities, a power with enough of a navy in hand, can project a decent amount of control over the Strait and communication between the Adriatic and the larger Mediterranean. As we just saw, someone with enough ships could even prevent an Adriatic crossing, as Bibulus in 48 BC. But Caesar managed to get through. These southern cities are consistently a high priority for any power striving for dominance in this region.

Moving up the Adriatic coasts, Apollonia, Epidamnus/Dyrrachium, Pharos, and Issa command considerable attention. We have seen Syracusans, Illyrians, Macedonians, and Romans fighting over control of these ports because of their position on the major trade routes into the Adriatic. We saw in chapter two that there are multiple routes through the Adriatic basin, but this is one of the most frequently utilized. A state with a stranglehold on these harbors could command all the wealth flowing through them and be in a position—as the Illyrians were in 230 BC—to project violence over much of the Adriatic Sea. Studying these events side-by-side also reveals the limits of maritime power in the Adriatic. While the cities of the Illyrian coast are close enough together as to create concentric circles of power when controlled by the same state, the rest of the sea is not so fortunate (or unfortunate). Further up the Adriatic coast, harbors become more distant. When engaging with Istria, for example, the Romans rely on Ancona which is over 130 km from the Istrian coast.

Throughout these discussions, a subtle thread of Adriatic ecologies has picked out patterns in these *imperialisms*. It was the unpredictable winds of the Adriatic that wrecked part of Cleonymus of Sparta's fleet in 303/2 BC, just as winds crashed some of Bibulus' ships 250 years later. Storms pinned A. Gabinius in the Adriatic without food in 47 BC just as storms pinned Pyrrhus in 280 BC. Thus Appian says, after his death, that even the Adriatic yielded to Caesar

who crossed it in winter despite great personal danger.<sup>943</sup> The storms and winds are as much characters in these *imperialisms* as the commanders and soldiers.

The longer thread of this chapter has been the slow development of connections and communications in the Adriatic to the point that the entire space could be ruled by one polity, in this case Rome. This process, what I have called “continentalization,” occurs as the networks of exchange in the Adriatic thicken over time. As trade, exploitation of that trade, and the planting of settlements create more nodes on the networks and push more traffic through them, this maritime space becomes less and less open and instead transforms into something increasingly continental. In the aftermath of Actium, Octavian could claim control of the whole Adriatic, something inconceivable a century earlier. This possibility of unified control comes as a consequence of connectivity: links across this sea between its many microecologies pull in the power players of the Mediterranean and turn the Adriatic into a battleground of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC.

Eckstein, in attempting to show that the Romans wanted nothing to do with the larger Adriatic world in the aftermath of the 1<sup>st</sup> Illyrian War, promotes the idea that they leave the interior alone. He names tribes and peoples in the hinterland of the coastal cities that—by the silence of Polybius—were left out of the arrangements after the war.<sup>944</sup> This, he asserts, shows that the Romans had no real interest in Illyria. But in the larger comparative context of Adriatic *imperialisms*, we have seen that everyone cares about the very cities Rome establishes relationships with in 229 BC—it is above all the coastal cities that matter to projecting power in the Adriatic. I have argued above that what Rome really wanted was access, the ability to send ships (military or mercantile) into the Adriatic via the essential port cities along the coast of

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<sup>943</sup> App. B. Civ. 54.

<sup>944</sup> Eckstein (2008), e.g. 52-3

Epirus and beyond, and that it was for this reason that the Romans freed them from Illyrian rule. I would argue further that access more than anything else drove the majority of these *imperialisms*. Syracuse, Athens, Illyria, Macedon, and Rome all wanted access to the Adriatic world. They jockeyed for it by multiple methods and ultimately by might and main in naval combat. It was precisely that access that pulled more and more contact into the Adriatic, that thickened the networks of commerce in this space, and ultimately made it worth fighting over.

## Conclusion

In a 2014 European Union brochure entitled “For a Prosperous and Integrated Adriatic and Ionian Region,” members of the Adriatic Ionian Council (AIC) lay out their goals for integrating the fragmented sea and its hinterland.<sup>945</sup> They note the connecting power of the sea: “In relation to mobility, the sea basin provides a natural waterway penetrating deep into the EU. There is thus a great potential for improved land-sea connectivity and intermodal transportation.”<sup>946</sup> They recognize the difficulties of the project: “Improving connectivity within the Region and between the Region and the rest of the EU needs a coordinated approach.” They identify ongoing projects that include improving ports, sharing information through new communication networks, and improving accessibility to islands and underutilized harbors.<sup>947</sup> The long and the short of current EU policy is to create a unified Adriatic region both by knocking down any barriers to connectivity and exchange between the eight nations that claim territory along the Adriatic coast, and by actively strengthening networks of contact and exchange among them.

This kind of regionalism—the construction of a region out of fragmented parts—has been called “continentalization.”<sup>948</sup> In the Adriatic specifically, Giulio Mellinato identified this process in the period around World War I when states with a stake in parts of the Adriatic began

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<sup>945</sup> For a Prosperous (2014). Compare other work for the committee, e.g. Kovacevic and Pagella (2015).

<sup>946</sup> For a Prosperous (2014), 2.

<sup>947</sup> For a Prosperous (2014), 6-7.

<sup>948</sup> Chouquere (2000).

claiming the sea as a whole and strategizing to project power over it as a complete unit.<sup>949</sup> Similarly, Borut Klabjan pointed to national discourses around World War I as Italian, Slavic, and Austrian groups began projecting national identity onto the Adriatic Sea and competing for historical claims to its waters.<sup>950</sup> The need for “continentalization” in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries reflects the balkanization of the Adriatic region up to this point. Fernand Braudel may have claimed that the Adriatic was the most unified of any region in the Mediterranean in the period of its Venetian rule, but such eras of unification are rare in its history.<sup>951</sup>

From the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC, the Adriatic remained very fragmented politically. Yet despite the disconnectedness of the states bordering it, the sea reflected a high degree of connectivity through networks of movement and trade. This juxtaposition of sovereign division and economic linkage complicates the history of the Adriatic basin during these centuries. I have argued here that connectivities in the sea increase over these centuries and that the networks connecting the Adriatic grow denser over time. This process of thickening culminates in the “continentalization” of the Adriatic at the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC when the entire region can reasonably be said to be under the political control of a single state, Rome.

My conceptualization of connectivities owes a great deal to Horden and Purcell’s formulation in *The Corrupting Sea*. They brilliantly demonstrate the high degree of contact between the many microecologies of the Adriatic, importantly going beyond the major trade routes to emphasize the “proletarian” coastal trade—“the basic modality for all movements of goods and peoples”—that made the Mediterranean Sea a united whole: thousands of fragmented ecologies sewn together by constant human interaction.<sup>952</sup> But Horden and Purcell are not

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<sup>949</sup> Mellinato (2015).

<sup>950</sup> Klabjan (2011).

<sup>951</sup> Braudel (1972), 125, cf. 19, 125-33.

<sup>952</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), 140-1 on cabotage as basic modality.

interested in the historical consequences of this linkage, seeking instead ecological “structures and continuities that are camouflaged by the glitter of diversity in this most culturally complex and *mouvementée* of regions.”<sup>953</sup> By “diversity” they mean here the many forms of the state, something they have been accused of leaving out of their work almost entirely.<sup>954</sup> As Oliver pointed out, they leave “considerable scope for historical, social, and economic analysis that was not, and is not, on the authors’ agenda. Their sequel, *Liquid Continents*, promises some ecological narration, but the authors believe that a political and economic narrative analyzing the Mediterranean already exists.”<sup>955</sup> We do not yet know what that ecological narration will look like. For now, I believe this study in the long Hellenistic of the Adriatic Sea provides a possible way forward.

Ian Morris called for a focus on the consequences of connectivity along the lines of globalization theory. As he put it, this process of Mediterraneanization (which we might compare to continentalization in the Adriatic) “created winners and new losers.”<sup>956</sup> He said that we can only see this change take place if we “think of connectedness as a process rather than a state, focusing on ‘Mediterraneanization’ rather than ‘Mediterraneanism.’ This means foregrounding change through time, different analytical scales, and tensions and conflicts.”<sup>957</sup> I have tried to do just that in this study of the Adriatic. By following the growth of connections—the thickening of networks rather than connectivity as a state of being—I have shown how the consequences of connectivity follow contact. Horden and Purcell hint at this when they insist that the ubiquitous movement of cabotage must go beyond trade to gift, theft, and “violent and irregular movements of people or materials... as much as the tidier world of (more-or-less) legally regulated

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<sup>953</sup> Horden and Purcell (2005), 358.

<sup>954</sup> E.g. Shaw (2001)

<sup>955</sup> Oliver (2011), 346. Horden and Purcell (2005), 374 cite Abulafia (2003) as such a narrative.

<sup>956</sup> Morris (2003), 33.

<sup>957</sup> Morris (2003), 33.

commerce.”<sup>958</sup> But by stopping short of historical analysis, they miss the opportunity to demonstrate how these constant connections pave the way for conquests.

I have suggested in this dissertation that the growing levels of connectivity in the Adriatic from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC make possible the exploitations of that space perpetrated by actors both within and without the Adriatic basin. Military entrepreneurs (formerly “pirates”) follow trade and make a living violently exploiting its movement. States seeking to profit from trade swoop into the Adriatic to establish zones of control (settlements) which facilitate both harvesting trade for themselves and securing movement against entrepreneurial attacks. As the networks of movement and trade thicken over time, the stakes become higher and states expend more and more effort to stake out and defend claims in the Adriatic Sea. This culminates in war, conquest, and foreign rule. These consequences of connectivity flow through networks of movement and trade as easily as cargoes of wine or oil. This overall picture of historical processes and connectivities in the Adriatic provides one possibility for moving beyond Horden and Purcell’s model to place states and state power back into the Mediterranean landscape.

Within the Adriatic specifically, I have explored the juxtaposition between its relatively high degree of economic and human connectivity and its persistent fragmentation on the level of state power. The Adriatic has been “a sea of intimacy” and a unified space.<sup>959</sup> For Dominique Reill it presents “a special phenomenon of intense association” in its geography, yet we have seen how fragmented it remains.<sup>960</sup> For Claudio Zaccaria, it is both “un luogo di scambio di merci e culture” and “un confine tra modelli di civiltà, frontiera tra Stati e religioni, una frattura tra Italia e Slavia, tra Occidente e Oriente.”<sup>961</sup> Certainly the Adriatic has provided the dividing

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<sup>958</sup> Horden and Purcell (2000), 365.

<sup>959</sup> Matvejević and Heim, (1999), 16; Braudel (1972), 125, cf. 19, 125-33.

<sup>960</sup> Reill (2012), 22.

<sup>961</sup> Zaccaria (2015), 13; cf. Cocco (2007a), 11-24.



line between many large administrative and cultural blocs: the eastern and western halves of the Roman Empire, the Ottoman and Christian worlds, and western Europe and the Soviet bloc. As Purcell, argued, the artificial division of power between Octavian and Antony in 40 BC through the Adriatic ultimately became “fossilized” in administrative thinking and divided a region “which has usually beaten with a single social and economic pulse.”<sup>962</sup> As I have argued here, the political fragmentation of the Adriatic from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC disguises a continual flow of trade and a gradual thickening of contacts throughout the Adriatic basin.

Is the Adriatic a dividing or a connecting sea? Both. It divides the fragmented political world of the Adriatic basin through the whole Hellenistic period while simultaneously connecting it through commerce. Only at the end of this period when the Adriatic has become sufficiently “continentalized” through trade, settlement, and conquest can we envision it as potentially a single unit of political control, though that is seldom the reality on the ground. Yet we can observe it as a single network of movement and trade long before that. The Adriatic both unites and divides.

At the beginning of the project I noted Horace’s engagement with the Adriatic in his *Odes* published in 23 BC. He repeatedly invokes the wildness and unpredictability of the Adriatic.<sup>963</sup> In the second book, he tells his friend Quincius not to worry about invasions from the eastern Mediterranean, since the Adriatic stands in the way, a barrier against Rome’s enemies.<sup>964</sup> This wild space, the *ater Hadriae sinus* provides a forbidding boundary to Italy.<sup>965</sup> Famously, in the third *Ode* of the first book, one of the most important in the collection, he begs for the safety

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<sup>962</sup> Purcell (2013), 375.

<sup>963</sup> Hor. *Carm.* 1.3.14-16, 1.16.1-4, 1.33.13-6, 2.11.1-5, 2.14.13-6, 3.3.1-6, 3.9.21-4, 3.27.18-20. Cf. Prop. 1.6.1, 3.21.17-8.

<sup>964</sup> Hor. *Carm.* 2.11.1-5: *Quid bellicosus Cantaber et Scythes, / Hirpine Quincti, cogitet Hadria / divisus obiecto, remittas / quaerere, nec trepides in usum / poscentis aevi pauca.*

<sup>965</sup> Hor. *Carm.* 3.27.18-20.

of Virgil as he crosses the Strait of Otranto to Greece. These lines are set in the context of the dangerous Adriatic and the fraught separation of east and west:

Illi robur et aes triplex  
circa pectus erat, qui fragilem truci  
commisit pelage ratem  
primus, nec timuit praecipitem Africum  
decertantem Aquilonibus  
nec tristis Hyadas nec rabiem Noti,  
quo non arbiter hadriae  
maior, tollere seu ponere vult freta.<sup>966</sup>

Notus, it seems, is the supreme arbiter of the Adriatic in the poetic imaginary of 23 BC, whatever the state of Roman control in the basin by that time.

I return to Horace both to emphasize the overarching importance of Adriatic ecologies and their impact on the historical narratives I have tried to construct here and also to draw in a 19<sup>th</sup> century parallel. In the buildup to World War I, as the various powers around the Adriatic began putting forward competing cultural claims for the sea (what Klabjan calls the scramble for the Adriatic), a Slovenian poet named Simon Jenko published a poem entitled “Adrijansko Morje,” or “Adriatic Sea.”<sup>967</sup> In the poem—which was eventually set to music and sung for many years—he claims that the Adriatic was a Slavic sea and remained so even after the land around had been conquered by foreign foes. He puts the primacy of the Slavic claim forward as proof of their ownership of the Adriatic, a sort of precedence. As Klabjan argues, this is part of an ongoing dialogue in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century debating who can claim the Adriatic Sea.

Interestingly, Jenko asks in the poem whose oak-wrapped ship was first to sail the Adriatic.<sup>968</sup>

This surely references Horace *Odes* 1.3 and the oak-hearted man who first sailed the sea. It may

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<sup>966</sup> Hor. *Carm.* 9-16. Translation of West (1995): Oak and triple bronze / were round the breast of the man who first committed / a fragile ship to the truculent sea. / He was not afraid of the swooping sou'wester / battling it out with the winds of the north, / nor the weeping Hyades, nor the madness of the south wind, / the supreme judge of the Adriatic / whether his will is to raise or lay the seas.

<sup>967</sup> Klabjan (2011), 19-20; Jenko (1865), 68.

<sup>968</sup> Jenko (1865), 68 lines 2-4.

also refer to the first ship ever in the Greek tradition, the Argo, which was famously fitted with oak from Dodona.<sup>969</sup> In the fourth book of Apollonius of Rhodē's version of the Argo story, he describes the Argonauts traveling the Danube from the Black Sea to the Adriatic and making their way along its eastern coastline.<sup>970</sup> Jenko's oak ship in the Adriatic pulls up the ancient connectivity and foreboding of the sea and lends his claim weighty heritage.

Literarily, the Adriatic was not a united space in antiquity—certainly not in the long Hellenistic period—but a divided and dividing sea. It has also remained a firm barrier in our conceptualization of histories of the Greek and Roman worlds from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries BC, and even between fields of study. I hope to have shown that, despite the fragmented geopolitics of the Adriatic basin, a high degree of connectivity linked the sea in this period, and that studying the Adriatic as a unit rather than as the periphery of the Italian or Balkan peninsulas can provide new insights to historical as well as ecological narratives. As we continue to explore the connectivities and Mediterraneanism of the middle sea, I hope to have shown one way we can also look to the consequences of those connectivities. Ultimately the Adriatic became a uniting as well as a dividing sea, and that process should caution us against excluding historical and economic analysis from our narratives of connected antiquity.

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<sup>969</sup> Argo as the first ship, Catull. 64.1-15, Eur. *Med.* 1.1 schol; for the oak, Apollod. *Bibl.* 1.9.16; Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 519ff.

<sup>970</sup> Cabanes (2008), 158-9.

## Appendix A Adriatic Colonies

This list of colonies represents all of the explicitly named colonies founded in the Adriatic Sea up to the end of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BC. There may well be other sites in the Adriatic basin that were colonial foundations, but these are the ones explicitly named so. Most of these sites eventually became Roman towns, and some were refounded as Roman colonies. I include here the earliest foundation date for each as it is available.

The list of Greek colonies comes from Cabanes (2008), building on Braccesi (1977). The Roman colonies are more difficult and scattered. Salmon (1969) lists many without references. Wilkes (1992) lists many Roman settlements in Illyria. The best composite lists of Republican colonies outside of Italy are in Brunt (1987) and Vittinghoff (1951), with Alföldy (1962) in Dalmatia. Within Italy, we have studies by Mommsen (1883) and Keppie (1983). One specialized problem is Pliny the Elder's unreliable use of the word *colonia* and his list of them in Book 3 of the *Naturalis Historiae*, on which see Čače (2001).

<b>Name</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Founded By</b>	<b>Reference</b>
Epidamnus/Dyrrhachium	627 BC	Corinth and Corcyra	Thuc. 1.24-6, Strabo 8.3.32
Apollonia	600 BC (ca)	Corinth and Corcyra	Thuc. 1.26 Steph. Byz. S.v. Amantai, GCA 163-5
Oricum	6th BC	Abantes	Vitr 1.4.12, GCA 173-4
Salpia	6th BC	Rhodes	Strabo 7.5.5, Pliny HN 3.152
Korkyra Melaina	6th BC	Cnidians	Strabo 5.1.7
Ravenna	6th BC	Thessaly	Strabo 5.1.7
Spina	6th BC	(Greek)	Theopomp. Fr. 128
Adria	6th BC	Dionysius I	Strabo 5.4.2
Ancona	4th BC	Dionysius I	Pliny NH 3.111
Numana	4th BC	Dionysius I	Diod. Sic. 15.13
Lissus	4th BC	Dionysius I	Ps.-Skymnos 413-4, Diod. Sic. 15.13
Issa	4th BC	Dionysius I	Diod. Sic. 15.13-4
Pharos	4th BC	Paros and	

Dionysius I			
Tragurium	3rd BC	Issa	Strabo 7.5.5
Sena Gallica	280 BC	Rome	Polyb. 2.19.13; Livy <i>Epit.</i> 11.
Hadria	280 BC	Rome	Livy <i>Epit.</i> 11
Castrum Novum	280 BC	Rome	Livy <i>Epit.</i> 11
Ariminum	268 BC	Rome	Vell. Pat. 1.14
Firmum Picenum	264 BC	Rome	Vell. Pat. 1.14
Brundisium	244 BC	Rome	Vell. Pat. 1.14; Livy <i>Epit.</i> 19
Sipontum	194 BC	Rome	Livy 34.45, 39.22
Pisaurum	184 BC	Rome	Vell. Pat. 1.15; Livy 39.44
Potentia	184 BC	Rome	Vell. Pat. 1.15; Livy 39.44
Aquileia	181 BC	Rome	Vell. Pat. 1.15; Livy 40.34, 43.17

#### Settlements by Caesar or Augustus

Asculum	1st BC	Rome	Pliny NH 3.13.18
Epidaurum	1st BC	Rome	Pliny NH 3.144
Fanum Fortunae	1st BC	Rome	Vitr. <i>Arch.</i> 5.1.6
Iader	1st BC	Rome	Pliny NH 3.140
Narona	1st BC	Rome	Pliny NH 3.142
Parentium	1st BC	Rome	CIL 5.335
Pola	1st BC	Rome	Pliny NH 3.129
Salonae	1st BC	Rome	Pliny NH 3.141
Senia	1st BC	Rome	Tac. <i>Hist.</i> 4.45
Tergeste	1st BC	Rome	Pliny NH 3.127

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