

TELEGRAM

INCOMING

BRASILIA

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ACTION
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INFO
FILE

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Control:

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Recd:

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SUBJECT

Distribution:

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0171
INFO RUESUA/AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO 0683
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0021
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0402
STATE GRNC
BT
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 37033

LIMDIS

DISTO

SUBJ: 22ND UNGA

1. SYG OF BRAZILIAN FONOFF, CORREA DA COSTA, ACCOMPANIED BY AMB TO US LEITAO DA CUNHA CALLED ON ASST SECY SISCO SEPT 13 FOR DISCUSSION FORTHCOMING 22ND UNGA. SISCO EXPRESSED VIEW GA WOULD BE DOMINATED BY THREE SUBJECTS: MIDDLE EAST, VIET-NAM, AND NPT.

2. MIDDLE EAST. SISCO NOTED US AND USSR TOWARD END ESSGA HAD AGREED ON WORDING FOR RES WHICH SOVS TRIED OUT ON ARABS, WHO REJECTED IT. HE EXPLAINED WE HAD HAD NO CONFIRMATION FROM SOVS THAT THEY STILL STOOD ON THIS LANGUAGE AND SIGNS IN FACT OTHER WAY. IN MEANTIME KHARTOUM CONF NED ENDORSED POLITICAL, RATHER THAN MILITARY SOLUTION, WHICH WE CONSIDERED FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT. DISCOURAGING FACT WAS CONF HAD TAKEN STAND AGAINST PEACE TREATY, AGAINST DIRECT NEGOTIATION AND DID NOT RENOUNCE BELLIGERENCY. AS LONG AS THIS CONTINUED BE ARAB POSITION WE FOUND IT HARD SEE WHERE GA COULD MAKE PRACTICAL PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT. CONSENSUS FOR APPOINTMENT OF MEDIATOR MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, BUT EVEN HERE ARABS WANTED MANDATE TO INCLUDE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS FIRST POINT. SISCO ALSO REVIEWED TITO PROPOSALS AND US POSITION ON THEM, POINTING OUT THEY AVOIDED CARDINAL POINT OF LINK BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL AND RENUNCIATION OF STATE OF BELLIGERENCY AND ACCEPTANCE OF STATE OF PEACE.

3. SISCO THOUGHT THERE HAD BEEN SOME HARDENING IN ISRAELI

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POSITION, AND NOTED ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO PONDER HOW ITS ^{Recd:} MILLION PEOPLE COULD LIVE IN SECURITY SURROUNDED BY 100 MILLION ARABS. ISRAELI POSITION WAS CLEAR AND FIRM. IT DID NOT WANT PEACE IMPOSED FROM OUTSIDE BUT ONE TO WHICH BOTH SIDES COMMITTED. NASSER ACTION CLOSING TIRAN HAD UNDERCUT US, WHICH HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN OBTAINING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN 1957 ON BASIS CERTAIN COMMITMENTS. ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT SIMILAR DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS NOW, AND OUR INFLUENCE LIMITED AS RESULT 1957 EXPERIENCE. WE THOUGHT WE COULD EXERCISE INFLUENCE, HOWEVER, IN FAVOR OF A STABLE AND DURABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT BASED ON COMMITMENTS BY BOTH SIDES.

4. SISCO SUGGESTED USSR WOULD PROBABLY CONTINUE EFFORTS AT GA TO GET WITHDRAWAL RESOLUTION AT CHEAPEST PRICE AND TO LOOSEN LINK BETWEEN END TO BELLIGERENCY AND WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES. WE AND OTHERS LIKE BRAZIL, WHICH HAD BEEN ONE OF STRONGEST PROPONENTS AT ESSGA OF POSITION FAVORED BY US, WOULD BE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE AT 22ND GA. IT IMPORTANT WE STAND TOGETHER FIRMLY AND SOLIDLY.

5. SYG SAID THIS APPRAISAL AND US VIEWS ON TITO PROPOSALS COINCIDED VERY MUCH WITH THOSE OF GOB, WHICH WOULD CONTINUE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH US ON THIS PROBLEM. REFERRING TO BRAZIL'S PRE-JUNE 5 SUGGESTION FOR POLITICAL CONFERENCE ON ME, SYG SAID GOB HAD SHELVED THIS IDEA SINCE BELIEVED IT COULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL UNLESS PARTIES THEMSELVES CAME TO SOME SORT OF AGREEMENT. IN REPLY HIS INQUIRY WHETHER WE KNEW ANYTHING OF ISRAELI PLANS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SISCO SAID WE HAD NO INFO ALTHOUGH HAD SOME INDICATION ISRAEL MIGHT COME TO GA WITH REFUGEE PROPOSAL.

6. VIET-NAM. SISCO REVIEWED RECENT CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH NUMBER SC MEMBERS, INCLUDING BRAZIL, TO EXPLORE FEASIBILITY OF UN ACTION ON VIET-NAM. HE SAID ONE FACTOR HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE US SENTIMENT FAVORING EFFORT IN UN BUT WE HAD ALSO WONDERED WHETHER SC ACTION MIGHT HELP SOVS EXERCISE INFLUENCE WITH HANOI. ON WHOLE, CONSULTATIONS INDICATED RATHER SUBSTANTIAL RESERVATIONS ON PART ALLIES. SOME DOUBTED SUFFICIENT VOTES AVAILABLE TO INSCRIBE ITEM, IN LIGHT FRENCH, SOVIET, AND HANOI OPPOSITION IN UN INVOLVEMENT, AND SOME FEARED MIGHT BE MOVE SSR RES CALLING FOR END TO BOMBING, WHICH WOULD PLACE US FRIENDS IN VERY AWKWARD

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POSITION. WE WERE REVIEWING SITUATION AND HAD TAKEN NO FINAL DECISION BUT SISCO CONSIDERED IT PROBLEMATICAL WE WOULD GO AHEAD.

7. NPT. WITH NPT TEXT TABLED AT ENDC IN GENEVA, SISCO THOUGHT TWO POSSIBILITIES EXISTED. ENDC MIGHT REACH AGREEMENT ON COMPLETE TREATY IN NEXT FEW WEEKS, IN WHICH CASE TREATY WOULD PROBABLY GO TO GA FOR ENDORSEMENT. IF NO MEETING OF MINDS IN GENEVA, TREATY WOULD PROBABLY TO TO GA WITH BLAND ARTICLE III (SAFEGUARDS), THERE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL DEBATE, AND MATTER WOULD PROBABLY BE REMANDED TO ENDC. HE REALIZED BRAZIL HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH DRAFT NPT AND ASKED SYG OUTLINE PROBLEM.

8. SYG SAID GOB IN FULL AGREEMENT ON PURPOSE OF TREATY, AS EVIDENCED BY ITS EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF MEXICO TREATY AND ITS ADHERENCE TO THAT TREATY. HE NOTED MEXICO TREATY PROSCRIBED NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT PROVIDED FOR "PEACEFUL NUCLEARIZATION" ON REGIONAL BASIS. GENEVA TEXT, HOWEVER, ASKED NON-NUCLEAR STATES TO RENOUNCE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES FOR PEACEFUL AS WELL AS MILITARY PURPOSES, WHICH WERE CONSIDERED NOT DIFFERENTIABLE. BRAZIL CONSIDERED SUCH RENUNCIATION HANDICAP TO DEVELOPMENT PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. POTENTIAL OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS NOT YET KNOWN AND STATES BEING ASKED RENOUNCE SOMETHING THAT MIGHT BE IMPORTANT FOR FUTURE ADVANCEMENT. GOB FAVORED EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS IN PLACE SUCH RENUNCIATION. ITS POSITION, HE SAID, WAS AS SET FORTH HIS ENDC SPEECH. BRAZIL HAD NO PLANS TO PRODUCE EXPLOSIVES BUT CONSIDERED THIS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

9. SISCO NOTED AUG 31 ENDC SPEECH BY BRAZILIAN REP HAD DEALT NOT ONLY WITH QUESTION OF PEACEFUL EXPLOSIONS BUT HAD BEEN FRONTAL, POINT-BY-POINT ATTACK ON NPT AND SAID IT HAD CAUSED US CONSIDERABLE CONCERN. SYG SAID SPEECH HAD NOT BEEN "PREVIOUSLY CLEARED WITH US" AND HE HAD RESERVATIONS CONCERNING IT. HE ASSURED SISCO HIS EARLIER ENDC SPEECH STILL CONSTITUTED DEFINITIVE BRAZILIAN POLICY STATEMENT.

10. IN REPLY SISCO QUERY, SYG SAID HE THOUGHT WHAT HAPPENED IN ENDC WOULD DEPEND LARGELY ON FLEXIBILITY OF TWO SUPER POWERS. IF THEY STUCK TO PRESENT NPT TEXT, HE SAW LITTLE CHANCE FOR CONSENSUS AND ANTICIPATED "QUESTIONABLE" GA DEBATE WHICH HE CLEARLY THOUGHT WOULD SERVE LITTLE OR NO USEFUL PURPOSE.

11. SYG THOUGHT IT WOULD INCREASE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEMS AND HELP BUILD SOLIDARITY IF ASST SECY COULD VISIT RIO AND OTHER LA CAPITALS FOR DISCUSSION UN MATTERS. SISCO SAID HE WOULD TRY MAKE SUCH TRIP IN POST-GA PERIOD.

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