

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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CONTAINS CODEWORD

April 7, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

FROM: The Situation Room

SUBJECT: Additional Information Items

Soviet Official Comments on Status Of SALT: A Soviet official, who is not presently involved in SALT matters but who has in the past worked on disarmament and was a member of one of the initial Soviet SALT teams, on Monday had an informal discussion with an American official concerning the aftermath of Secretary Vance's visit. During the discussion he delivered what appeared to be at least a semiofficial demarche. He started by saying that the Soviet side had serious problems with the American tactic of revealing radically new arms limitation proposals to the press almost simultaneously with the presentation of those proposals to the Soviet government. The Soviets preferred to maintain confidentiality, particularly in the early stages of negotiations. They were also frankly concerned that they had been put in the position, in the eyes of world opinion, of appearing negative in the face of positive American proposals. The official commented, in an unusually conciliatory fashion, that the Soviet government had perhaps expressed its negative reaction too strongly, using Foreign Minister Gromyko's press conference as an example. He said he could now state with authority, stressing the word authority, that the Soviet government was prepared to start over again in constructive fashion when contacts were resumed in May. The Soviets were also prepared to let public discussion of the differences which arose out of Vance's Moscow mission die away, and they hoped the Americans would do likewise.

The Soviets were not ruling out any and all cuts in strategic weapons ceilings, but cuts of 16 to 25 percent as suggested by Secretary Vance were not acceptable all at once. When asked what level of cuts might then be acceptable, the Soviet gave the figure of 5 to 10 percent as within the realm of possibility. The Soviet's final point, which he repeated, was that Moscow would absolutely insist on the inclusion of cruise missiles in negotiations from the outset. Neither temporary nor permanent omission of the cruise missile would be agreed to in any circumstances.

STATE & NSA reviews completed

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1. FRG-Brazilian Nuclear Agreement: Embassy Bonn reports that drafts of parallel FRG statement to President's nuclear policy statement will be sent to Washington on April 6. State Secretary Hermes said that no formal announcement would be made yet of license issuance. Embassy Brasilia believes the the German decision will be hailed as a triumph over the U.S. in Brazil and will reduce the chances of Brazilian flexibility to next to nil. (Bonn 06117 - Brasilia 2717 - State 76179)
2. South Lebanon Situation: State analysis concludes that the current situation in south Lebanon has entered a new and more risky stage. Cable provides guidance to Ambassadors Murphy and Parker and Charge Dunnigan for conversations with host government officials. (State 076882)
3. Middle East Peace Negotiations: Atherton agrees with Ambassador Murphy that Arab tensions may rise quickly after the Israeli elections and that the PNC meeting did nothing to advance the cause of peace in the area. Atherton also asks Murphy for a further expansion of his views on the possibility of direct Syrian-Israeli negotiations. (State-NODIS 077465)
4. Proposed Visit by Mrs. Carter: State instructs Embassy Brasilia to approach President Geisel and ask whether he would be prepared to accept a visit by Mrs. Carter. (State 077204 NODIS)
5. Angolan Normalization: Soares told Ambassador Carlucci yesterday that he felt the U.S. and the West should attempt to play off the various Angolan factions to our advantage. He promised to get in contact with his sources in Angola and give Carlucci a more up-to-date assessment later this week. (State-NODIS 077350)

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8. Nuclear Representation to the ROC: During an April 6 meeting with Vice Minister Chien, DCM urged a positive reply to our note and called Chien's attention to Ambassador Unger's March 28 demarche to the Premier over IAEA concerns about the ROC's nuclear research program. (State - NODIS 077658)

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