

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


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May 5, 1977

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PRM-10

MEMORANDUM FOR: WILLIAM LUERS
Department of State/ARA

FROM: SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON 

1. Enclosed are the comments which the NSC staff has prepared on the PRM/NSC-10 preliminary report on Latin America.

2. It is our view, as it was the prevailing opinion at the Working Group discussion May 4th, that the report requires substantial additional work to make it comparable to the other analyses which have been prepared in this exercise.

→ cc: Mr. Robert Pastor
Mr. Luigi Einaudi

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COMMENTS ON PRM-10 WESTERN HEMISPHERE
TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT

This draft is a summary without a report. It does little more than translate the Task Force Terms of Reference into complete sentences. What is needed is a major fleshing out of its main themes with substantive data and analyses, and more differentiation of conclusions with respect to specific countries and regions.

There are a number of general issues that should receive attention:

1. More extended consideration should be given to the bilateral relations of major Latin American countries with the United States and other external powers. Latin American countries presumably included in this analysis would be Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, and Argentina. To what extent does a "see-saw" phenomenon operate, with improvements in U. S. relations with one country impairing our relations with another? What impact will movement toward normalization of U. S. - Cuban relations have on Cuban-Soviet relations?
2. More detailed information is needed on Soviet activities in Latin America, especially trade, arms sales, and covert operations. How does Cuba fit into Soviet strategy for Latin America? What about intelligence reports on Cuban activity in Jamaica, Guyana, and Central America?
3. As the U. S. role declines, how have European countries and Japan moved in to fill the gap?
4. What about some generalizations about future developments in major Latin American regions -- the Caribbean, North Coast, Brazil, Andean countries and Southern Cone -- that might produce security problems in some way?
5. Do U. S. arms transfer and nuclear proliferation policies have implications for the U. S. -Soviet balance in the region?

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6. What about the Latin American role in South Atlantic and Southern African contingencies, involving either threats against oil coming northward or Soviet intervention in Southern Africa? What are Latin American countries' military capabilities to help us in responding to such threats? Would they help us?

7. What are the implications of likely change in the status of the Panama Canal for the U. S. security position?

Following are a few specific comments/questions on the draft:

1. Soviet initiatives toward Peru and commercial activities elsewhere are alluded to (p. 2) but not analyzed.

2. The goal of strengthening "the regime of peaceful relations that has traditionally existed among the states of the region" is mentioned on p. 3. Is there any likelihood of inter-state conflict in the region (after all, there have been a few wars in Latin America in this century)? If so, how might either of the superpowers be involved, if at all?

3. The draft notes Cuban initiatives toward Guyana and Jamaica (p. 4). The potential for instability or conflict flowing from this should be analyzed more extensively.

4. P. 6 mentions prospective Soviet attempts to increase their influence. Where will they focus their efforts? Where are they likely to achieve most success?

5. Why do we view Brazil's role as stabilizing, if most Latin states would view it with alarm (both statements on p. 9)? Wouldn't alarm imply some sort of reaction?

6. An option mentioned on p. 9 -- "a mix of strengthened military relationships" -- underlines the need to deal with the issue of arms sales, especially vis-a-vis Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil, as well as the advisability of reducing/maintaining/increasing the U. S. training of Latin military officers.

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