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Francisco Carlos Palomanes Martinho

Introduction: The Lusophone World at War, 1914-1918 and Beyond

Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses¹

On March 9, 1916, Germany declared war in Portugal. In response, Lisbon sent a fighting force, the *Corpo Expedicionário Português* [CEP], to France, where it held a portion of the Western Front until April 9, 1918. In addition, a number of smaller expeditions were dispatched to secure Mozambique and, if possible, participate in the conquest of German East Africa. Both theatres of war were a source of frustration for the Portuguese, and participation in the conflict fell far short of the hopes deposited in it by its defenders. As interventionist politicians slowly lost control over the country's destiny after the war's end, the conflict faded from the public's awareness, its memory kept alive essentially among those who had direct experience with combat. For decades, Portugal's participation in World War I was generally ignored, or reduced to a historical cul-de-sac, a pointless, if expensive, military episode. However, our understanding of the conflict's impact on Portugal and its importance in the subsequent course of the country's history has increased immeasurably over the past twenty years. The centenary commemorations for both the Republic, in 2010, and the Great War itself, starting in 2014, have naturally contributed to this process.

In March of 2016, on the hundredth anniversary of Portugal's intervention in the conflict, a colloquium was held at Brown University as an attempt to insert Portugal's war experience into a wider, but intimately related, context: that of the Lusophone world. The intention of the colloquium's organizers was twofold. They set out, on the one hand, to acknowledge and showcase the rich diversity inherent in the Portuguese war experience (both in the European metropolis and in the African and Asian colonies) and in its Brazilian counterpart. On the other, the organizers intended to challenge participants to think of the First World War in a new way: not only as the preserve of governments, generals and statesmen, or even of strictly defined nation-states, but rather of linguistic communities and cultures that crossed oceans and were, in some cases, present on all

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continents. This aspect of the workshop's rationale rested on the possibility that there might well have existed affinities beyond loyalty to country, class, or even to empire (multi-national or colonial)² that determined how people around the globe experienced the First World War. In other words, it was the organizers' intention to establish whether global linguistic communities, tied together by a multitude of bonds of varying strengths, developed a common response to the experience of a world at war in the age of total conflict.

The Lusophone World, 1914-1918

There were, during World War I, only two such communities, whose membership spanned an incredible diversity of race, class, and creed: the English and the Portuguese-speaking worlds. This is because there were, in 1914, no French, Italian, or German equivalents of Brazil, a fully independent country speaking the same language as the former motherland. Significantly, the Spanish-speaking world, which contained many such entities, remained neutral in the conflict. By 1914, the Lusophone world could be divided into three parts, which to a certain extent overlapped. The first consisted of Portugal, its adjacent islands (Madeira and Azores), and its colonial possessions, be they the distant remnants of the expansion of the 15th and 16th (Goa, Macau, Timor), be they Angola and Mozambique, greatly expanded in response to the 'Scramble for Africa'. The second part was Brazil, independent since the 1820s. The third and final part consisted of the Portuguese diaspora, the greater part of which lived in Brazil, most of the rest living in the United States. It was thus a combination of European metropolis, far-flung colonial empire, New World Republic, and substantial immigrant communities, at different levels of integration in their host countries. It was the intention of the workshop organizers that all these components should be covered in the event's proceedings.

Improvements in communications meant that by 1914 news travelled quickly, if imperfectly, between all of the relevant territories, and there was considerable emotional attachment displayed by each part to the wellbeing of the whole. But while the notion of the community of interests known as the 'English-speaking peoples', made popular, of course, by Winston Churchill, is regarded as a given, a real factor in world affairs worthy of study, there is greater reluctance in acknowledging the Lusophone world in this manner – not least within its constituent parts. Still, there has long been, among the Portuguese, more

² See Gerwarth, Robert and Manela, Erez (2014), Introduction.

to their conception of Portugal's place in the world than just the metropolis and the colonies. Portugal's emigrant communities in the Americas, first and foremost in Brazil, played an important part in this conception, but so too, crucially, did Brazil itself, with its wealth, resources, and enormous potential.

World War I, it seemed to the organizers of the workshop, provided a moment of rare unity of outlook and purpose within this Lusophone world. All of its constituent parts were eventually at war with the Central Powers. Portuguese communities all over Brazil, and, in the United States, from Hawaii to Massachusetts, self-mobilized to support their embattled homeland any way they could. In Honolulu, a Portuguese School, created in July 1917, headed by a Lisbon-appointed teacher, served as a focal point.³ The Portuguese in Brazil responded to the German declaration of war against Portugal by – their press proclaimed – burying commercial rivalries and the more recent political enmities engendered by the overthrow of the monarchy in 1910. A *Grande Comissão Pró-Pátria* was organized, taking it upon itself to gather the funds necessary to look after and educate Portuguese children orphaned by the war. It later raised funds to look after Portuguese POWs in Germany. Portuguese-owned publications were enthusiastically pro-war and disseminated highly patriotic accounts of Portugal's ongoing participation in the fighting; the extent to which the Portuguese Embassy in Rio de Janeiro and the dense consular network around the country contributed to or shaped this mobilization remains to be seen. Brazilian national and local newspapers dedicated many columns to events in Portugal, especially at the time of the German declaration of war, and then celebrated when the two countries were finally united in the common purpose of waging war. This is not to say that Brazil entered the war because Portugal was already involved in it. Nevertheless, a greater concern for Portugal's fate was noticeable in Brazilian discourses regarding the conflict, be it at the level of intellectual elites or at the level of popular politics, than in any other country.

The importance of this transatlantic link was proclaimed in the pages of *Atlântida*, a Luso-Brazilian journal created in late 1915, which ran until 1920 and which originally had two directors, both journalists with artistic pretensions: Portugal-based João de Barros and Brazil-based João do Rio, or, to give him his real name, Paulo Barreto. *Atlântida* was the cornerstone of a considerable Portuguese propaganda offensive mounted with the wider Brazilian public as its target – one that has gone unnoticed in the general historiography of

³ 'Solene Inauguração da Escola Portuguesa', in *O Luso*, 14 July 1917.

the conflict.⁴ *Atlântida* may have been aimed at a narrow elite,⁵ but many of those who contributed to the review on the Brazilian side were also involved in the *Liga Brasileira pelos Aliados*, a mass organization designed to spread pro-Allied propaganda in Brazil. Livia Claro Pires writes, of the links between *Atlântida* and the League,

Both defended the opposition between the Germanic and Latin civilizations, the predatory character of the first in relation to the second, and the demonization of Germany. They were against German immigration to Brazil, seeing it as a threat to its nationality [...] Afrânio Peixoto and Carlos Coelho regularly published their poems and writings; Vitor Vianna wrote an article about the importance of the preservation of Portuguese language and culture in Brazil for the preservation of the nationality, mentioning the resistance of German, Italian and Polish immigrants to the assimilation process; when Olavo Bilac visited Lisbon, he was the subject of a banquet offered by *Atlântida* because he was an important partner in the cause defended by the review (Pires, 2011: 13-14).

And what was this cause? It was made clear in its very first number:

It seems as if we have reached a unique moment in world history, when there will take place the definitive union, for common action, of the human groups which are bound by affinities and relations, which only when united and joined can produce their maximum strength and splendor! The small efforts, the small desires, the small ambitions of each nationality that might one day compose a great ethnic or social collectivity will be fused in a great desire, a great ambition, a formidable effort – for the greater merit and usefulness of global civilization.

The time has thus come for the people who together possess strong communities of sentiment, racial affinities, similarities of temperament and mental structures to understand each other, to study each other, to move

⁴ See, for example, Rinke (2016).

⁵ This review carried – until the Sidónio Pais coup, which seems to have upset its publication schedule – the inscription ‘Sob o alto patrocínio de S.Exas os Ministros das Relações Exteriores do Brasil e dos Estrangeiros e Fomento de Portugal’. What this translated into in practice is not immediately clear.

closer together. Within the vast Latin family, Brazil and Portugal are, more than any other countries, fraternal and similar.⁶

Over the following years, *Atlântida* disseminated literature produced on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as a number of political and economic texts. One regular feature was the insistence – common in the Portuguese press at this time – on the creation of a regular shipping line between Portugal and Brazil, possible now that German competition had disappeared from the oceans and that a not inconsiderable part of Germany's merchant navy was in Portuguese (and later also in Brazilian) hands. João do Rio, one of a handful of journalists picked out for his influence by Olivier Compagnon in his innovative (but incomplete) study of South America and the war (Compagnon, 2013, 74), also wrote regularly for the Rio newspaper *O País*, one of the main Rio de Janeiro newspapers. *O País* mixed Brazilian reports about Portugal with Portuguese-written accounts of combat (and its personnel overlapped, to an extent, with that of *Atlântida*). For a time, as 1917 came to a close, its Portuguese page, established in 1916, was transformed into a full-blown 'Suplemento Português', readers being informed that they were purchasing two newspapers for the price of one. There was here an unequivocal desire to interest Rio de Janeiro's population in the Portuguese war effort, the course of which naturally dominated the supplement's pages. After all, in November the CEP had finally received its own sector of the Western Front, its two divisions fighting side-by-side and its command publishing a regular communiqué. *O País*'s reaction to the April 1917 diplomatic crisis between Brazil and Germany shows it to be an interventionist newspaper, eager to see the Brazilian government take a much firmer stance against Germany than just breaking off diplomatic relations.⁷ However, other routes were explored to bring the two countries closer together. A Chair of Brazilian Studies was created at the University of Lisbon (Miguel Calmon being appointed by the Brazilian Academy of Letters to fill it) and the new relationship between Portugal and Brazil was to have been sealed by the Special Embassy sent to Brazil to salute

⁶ Parece que chegámos a um instante único na história da Terra, em que se vão unir definitivamente, para uma ação de conjunto, os grupos humanos que têm entre si afinidades e relações, que só unidas e amalgamadas poderão produzir o máximo da sua força e do seu esplendor! Os pequenos esforços, os pequenos desejos, as pequenas ambições de cada uma das nacionalidades que talvez venha a compor uma futura e maior coletividade étnica ou social, fundir-se-ão num grande desejo, numa grande ambição, num esforço formidável – para maior brilho e utilidade da civilização do globo.

É, pois, esta a ocasião de se compreenderem mutuamente, de se estudarem, de se aproximarem uns dos outros, os povos que entre si possuem fortes comunidades de sentimento, afinidades de raça, semelhança de temperamento e de estrutura psíquica. Dentro da vasta família latina – o Brasil e Portugal são, mais do que nenhuns outros países, fraternais e semelhantes.⁷ *Atlântida*, Year 1 n.1, November 1915.

⁷ See, for example, *O País* (Rio de Janeiro), 10-11 April 1917.

its entry into the conflict. Led by Justice Minister Alexandre Braga, it was set to arrive in December and included a number of writers as well as an army and a navy officer (although it was not as high-powered as it might have been – more sonorous names such as Guerra Junqueiro appear to have bowed out.)⁸ Its impact was much diminished by the fact that, while crossing the Atlantic, the government of which Braga was a member was overthrown by Sidónio Pais. Still, the party was greeted by the highest figures in Brazilian official life, starting with the President of the Republic. Its members spoke at a number of engagements and, largely thanks to Braga, the Embassy became involved in a political spat with members of the Portuguese community in Brazil after denouncing Sidónio Pais's actions.

Some Notes of Caution

The workshop organizers wanted therefore not only to reflect on the impact that World War I had on the various constituent parts of the Lusophone world – in the Americas, in Europe, in Africa and in Asia – but also to explore the possibility that the conflict made possible a moment of reflection within that same Lusophone world, on the basis of ideas common to all within it, about the ties that bound it together. Was there any expression of a desire that, in a future generally understood to be radically different, but whose terms were not yet discernible, those ties might be strengthened, and even substantially transformed? At one extreme were the writers who, in the pages of *Atlântida*, argued for the creation of a Lusitanian Confederation, bringing together Portugal, its colonies, and Brazil (an idea that would remain alive in Portugal, under various guises, until well into the 1960s) (Gonçalves, 2003); but everywhere there were signs of delight when each element of the Lusophone world displayed vitality in defense of its rights, and challenged those who showed contempt for the whole, be they German settlers in Brazil or American lawmakers and journalists. There was, of course, much confusion, empty posturing, and completely unrealistic dreaming influenced by past glories; but there was also something more than this – a sense of optimism now that history had once again handed the Portuguese and their descendants a chance to demonstrate their worth.

⁸ The 'Embassy' was composed of Alexandre Braga, José Bessa, Fausto Guedes, Augusto Gil, Marcelino Mesquita, Lieutenant Colonel Figueiredo Campos and Captain Judice Bicker. According to *A Capital* (Lisboa), 17 October 1917, 'Teófilo Braga, Henrique Lopes de Mendonça, Rector of the University of Lisbon, Júlio Dantas, José Augusto Prestes, Júlio Martins, João de Barros, Ramada Curto e Marcelino Mesquita refused to take part in this mission, alleging ill health and other motives.'

There are, of course, obstacles in the way of carrying out this investigation, even as a collective enterprise. At a historiographical level there is relatively little literature on which to build. Published research on Portugal's participation in the war dwarves its Brazilian counterpart,⁹ and even the links between these two states, as well as comparative examinations of their respective leaderships' political and cultural influences, have generally been neglected. One important exception is Isabel Corrêa da Silva's excellent *Espeelho Fraterno*, a very thorough account of the different nature and outlook of the Portuguese and Brazilian republican currents, whose coverage unfortunately ends in 1914, just as this workshop's theme begins (Silva, 2013). Research into the experience of Portuguese colonies during the war is also still in its early stages, notably once Angola and Mozambique is set aside; and the same holds true for Portuguese emigrant communities outside Brazil.¹⁰

A more significant obstacle is the fact that the two sovereign states of the Lusophone world, Portugal and Brazil, adopted very different postures in relation to World War I and arrived at their common belligerence via very different paths. Sentiment and even enthusiasm for the war as a transformative moment for all ran headlong into the understanding of Brazil's national interest held by its political leadership; a balancing act built out of a number of domestic considerations, starting with the uneasy equilibrium among the country's leading states and their respective elites. Moreover, as Lucia Lippi Oliveira makes clear in her contribution to this volume, not only did the war tarnish Europe's overall reputation, it also reawakened a profound debate on Brazilian identity which was frequently critical of all things Portuguese. Pro-Portugal propagandists did not have an unimpeded field of action before them, far from it, and there was no guarantee that Brazilian nationalism would perforce result in a desire for closer collaboration with the old colonial power. We must also keep in mind the very different nature and scale of the Portuguese and Brazilian war efforts.

Portugal, a country of six million people, sent some 100,000 men to the battlefields of Europe and Africa. Many of these soldiers and officers were well known in the fields of politics, art, journalism, and academia, but the force itself remained a small sample of the nation as a whole. Even counting the war workers provided to the French armaments

⁹ An initial exploration of Portuguese-Brazilian wartime relations was attempted in Carvalho and Martins (2011). Brief summaries of Brazil's experience of the war can be found in Streeter (2010) and Schulze (2015), as well as in Pires, Pinto, Duarte, Reis, and Rollo (2015). Leal (ND) explores aspects of the wartime attempts to reformulate the relationship between Portugal and Brazil.

¹⁰ In respect to this matter, see Gomes (1994-1995), 44-59, in which the press of the California Portuguese community's wartime stance is examined.

industry, Portugal's was by no means a society fully mobilized for war. Fewer than 8,000 men died at the front, the majority in Mozambique, where conditions were hard and disease was rife. As Ana Paula Pires suggests at the close of her contribution, consensus about the need to defend the colonies existed only among the political elites. Among those called on to fight in Africa, there were very grave doubts about the need for their presence in the colonies, doubts that grew as the chaos that would engulf them made itself clear. Mortal casualties were much lower on the Western Front (where they were overwhelmingly suffered during the battle of La Lys, on 9 April 1918). The number of wounded was greater on the Western Front – some 5,000 – while the number of those invalided there was also considerable: 7,000. The number of prisoners – again, taken mostly on 9 April – was remarkably high: 6,678. In Mozambique, some 4,800 men died and 1,593 were wounded or incapacitated by illness; in Angola, the number was 810 and 583 respectively. Sílvia Correia, in her article, calls our attention to the plight of disabled veterans in Portugal, noting how even achieving the title of 'disabled' and its corresponding supports could involve a frustrating bureaucratic battle.

Rather than mobilizing the colonial empire to help in the European struggle against Germany, the European metropolis was mobilized to fight Germans – and rebellious African populations – in the colonial empire (Meneses, 2014). This was a sure sign that Portugal was, alone among colonizers, a poor nation, with only the most limited of abilities to determine the course of events throughout the enormous tracts of African land for which it was responsible. This limited ability to exercise its will over the colonies through anything other than violence (and this only in rather inefficiently and at great cost) naturally constitutes a difficulty which a study of the Lusophone world in wartime must address; it should not be confused with the boundaries of the Portuguese colonial empire. Ironically, those areas with the greatest number of non-metropolitan-born Portuguese speakers – Cape Verde and Goa – were by no means the most important in economic terms. Cape Verde was also highly unusual in that, while an African colonial territory, it was also a source of emigrants to the United States. Nevertheless, as the articles in this volume by Pedro Aires Oliveira and Luís Cunha make clear, there was no such thing as a blanket rejection of Portuguese colonialism, be it by Chinese nationalists (beginning with Sun Yat-Sen himself, who had close contacts with Macau) or by an educated African elite who, in the colonies or in Lisbon, chose to work with the Republican authorities, attempting to make them live up to the regime's rhetoric and principles when it came to racial issues. This

African elite should be considered as part of the Lusophone world for the purposes of this study, and its members were clearly enthused by the possibilities opened up by the conflict.

The Brazilian government's approach to the war was very different, even if there were, on the surface, a number of similarities. Like Portugal, Brazil was a relatively recent republic facing internal difficulties, was led by a Francophile political elite whose members instinctively favored the Allies, and was a latecomer to the war. However, Brazil's intervention, largely devoid of the ideological drive which characterized Portugal's participation in the conflict (despite the best efforts of the aforementioned intellectuals), was closer, in its timing and rationale, to that of the United States of America. This was the case for four reasons. Firstly, participation in the European conflict represented a major break with Brazil's diplomatic tradition. Secondly, it was a step made highly problematic by the presence in the country of numerous and sizable European immigrant communities. Italians and Portuguese on the one hand, and Germans on the other, formed well organized and influential 'colonies'.¹¹ These immigrants naturally pulled Brazil in different directions during a war fought between their homelands, threatening the internal unity of their adopted country. Thirdly, while the cultural elites were dominated by francophile sentiment, the military and many involved in economic life were seduced by Germany. The Brazilian armed forces were pushing for an overhaul based on the German model. Lastly, the Brazilian government was greatly concerned with restoring the level of foreign exports, notably coffee, the basis of the São Paulo economy. As Oliver Compagnon makes clear, Brazil's economy, dominated by the production and export of coffee, was very vulnerable to the war's effects, especially since much of that export trade was in German hands (Hamburg was second only to New York as an importer of Brazilian coffee) and therefore subject to a British blockade (Compagnon, 2013, 131). Becoming an ally was one way of overcoming this situation.

Recently elected President Venceslau Brás (1914-1918) attempted to use the war as a way of rallying the population of this disparate and multi-ethnic state around the idea of a common national interest in a dangerous world, but Brazil's multi-ethnic dimension was a problem that could not be easily overcome. The German community, comparatively well-off and certainly well organized, had its own institutions and was characterized by a desire to preserve its distinctive culture. Its refusal to integrate had already raised apprehension

¹¹ Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a considerable body literature dealing with the German community in Brazil at this time both as a stand-alone subject and as part of a comparison with Germans in the United States. A useful guide can be found in Schulze, Frederik: *German Immigrants (Brazil)*, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2014-10-08.

about its ultimate intentions among other Brazilians, leading to some talk of a ‘German Threat’ in the years before the war. Now this matter rose to the fore again, as Brazilian-Germans mobilized to send aid to their beleaguered home country. The Brazilian intervention debate was not nearly as intense or as consequential, as Portugal’s,¹² but still, as young men from the various immigrant communities were called up for military service in their European home countries, tempers flared. Suspicion grew that this German community and its supporters in high places (the Foreign Minister was, after all, Lauro Müller, son of German immigrants who had settled in the state of Santa Catarina) might use the war as an excuse for a political adventure.

This declaration of war brought with it a number of challenges. What was to be done? Should Brazil participate in the fighting? How would communal relations improve? A *Lei de Guerra* was published in November and imposed restrictions on banks and other businesses with German connections. German-language newspapers were closed down, as were German-language schools and speaking societies. As for the war, a number of military missions were sent to the United States and France to investigate possibilities for military participation – but the state of the army was very poor indeed. The Navy was another matter. The *Divisão Naval em Operações de Guerra* was made up of two cruisers and four destroyers which were refitted and assigned mine-clearing duties off West Africa in May 1918. They were then ordered to the Mediterranean, but arrived in Gibraltar just in time to hear the news of the war’s end. Preparations were also under way to send a number of volunteers to serve as pilots in a number of Entente countries. More importantly, a large medical mission – 100 doctors accompanied by nurses – established a 300-bed hospital in Paris.¹³

Compared to Portugal, then, Brazil moved very slowly in the face of the First World War. It was more cautious even than the United States of America, holding out for six months longer than Washington before it finally declared war on Germany. When it finally did so, its government resisted local calls for a more active contribution to the fighting. Participation in the ground war in France was not seen as essential in order to

¹² A sketch is provided in Pires, 2011: 2-6.

¹³ At the Paris Peace Conference, Brazil was initially represented by former minister Epiácio Pessoa, an international lawyer with knowledge of European affairs and a senator from the state of Paraíba. In Paris the main concerns of the Brazilians were practical – payment for coffee stocked in the ports of the Central Powers in 1914 confiscated after the Brazilian declaration of war – and the fate of the German merchant ships. Pessoa cultivated Wilson, and his efforts were rewarded with the awarding of a non-permanent seat in the League of Nation’s first Executive Council. Surprisingly, Pessoa’s role in the Conference was cut short when he was elected President of Brazil, following the death of the incumbent. Remaining in Europe, he undertook a series of visits to European heads of State. See Streeter, 2010.

project a new and more progressive image of the country, as had been the case in Portugal, where the leadership proclaimed that belligerence without a commitment to the Western Front was demeaning. There is much to explore in this regard, including the official diplomatic contacts between the two countries – was Lisbon twisting Rio's arm in any way?¹⁴ What must also be explored is the impact of Portugal's military failures and the Sidónio Pais coup, in December 1917, on both the official and semi-official propaganda networks run from Lisbon, and on local self-mobilization efforts. Pais's attempt to refocus attention on domestic issues through his 'New Republic', which Francisco Martinho examines in this volume, confused Lusophone opinion outside Portugal, which expected a total dedication to the war effort matching their own commitment now that the whole was finally united in a common effort. Four months later the Battle of La Lys took place. The resulting destruction of the CEP as a fighting force and the silence that subsequently engulfed Portugal's war effort had a confusing and disheartening effect as it became clear that just as the Allies finally achieved the longed-for ascendancy over German forces, Portuguese troops were nowhere near the battlefield.

Conclusion

Ultimately, then, the Brazilian and Portuguese governments approached the First World War in very different ways. Nevertheless, it seems at the very least possible to study Brazil – beyond just the Portuguese immigrant community – alongside the rest of the Lusophone world when it comes to the experience of the First World War. In no other country on earth was there as much interest – as measured in newspaper column inches – in the Portuguese experience of the war. Brazilian intellectual interventionists not only used the Portuguese case to argue for their country's involvement in the conflict, they even called for a new understanding between the two countries, united by history and a common language. Moreover, no other country was as immediately targeted, in propaganda terms, by Portuguese intellectuals and governments, as Brazil. The key is to establish precisely the means through and the extent to which events in Portugal and the Portuguese rhetoric regarding the conflict affected Brazilian public opinion – and the actual influence which

¹⁴ Existing studies seem to privilege Brazil's relations with the 'Great Powers'. See, for example, Francisco Luiz Teixeira Vinhosa, *O Brasil e a Primeira Guerra Mundial: A Diplomacia Brasileira e as Grandes Potências* (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 1990), and Clodoaldo Bueno, *Política Externa da Primeira República: Os Anos de Apogeu (de 1902 a 1918)* (Rio de Janeiro: Mauad, 2003).

propagandists of both nationalities, as well as Portuguese politicians and diplomats, had on Brazilian decision-makers.

João de Barros, in the very first issue of *Atlântida*, wrote, “[...] Not even in literary terms do Portuguese intellectuals know Brazil well! But in reality, the fervent love which Brazilian writers feel for our literature does not imply merely a literary preference, nor could it mean just that: it is a higher manifestation of a general trend of affection, no doubt badly requited.”¹⁵ This was, no doubt, an exaggeration, and it applies only to one, albeit important, aspect of the interchange of ideas within the Portuguese world. Even so, there is still much for historians to discover about World War I and the Lusophone world, thereby enriching our understanding of the global dimensions of the conflict. The Brown workshop was intended as a first step in this direction; others will hopefully follow.

¹⁵ “[...] nem literariamente os intelectuais portugueses conhecem bem o Brasil! E no entanto, o amor fervoroso que os escritores brasileiros têm pela nossa literatura, não significa somente uma preferência literária, e nem podia significá-lo: é uma manifestação superior duma tendência geral de afetividade, sem dúvida mal reconhecida”. João de Barros, “Atlântida”, in *Atlântida: Mensário Artístico, Literário e Social para Portugal e Brasil*, n. 1, Novembro de 1915. *Atlântida* can be used as gateway into Brazilian culture and politics, noting public figures and artists who viewed improved relations with Portugal as desirable. Among these one can cite are Coelho Netto, Senator Antônio Francisco Azeredo (politically close to Ruy Barbosa), Victor Viana (with links to *O Paiz*); and former President Rodrigues Alves (who would be re-elected to the position at the close of 1918).

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World War I and the Arts: The “Geração de *Orpheu*” and the Emergence of a Cosmopolitan Avant-Garde

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Abstract

The outbreak of First World War had a significant impact on the circulation of people, objects, and ideas. During the summer of 1914, Portuguese writers and painters, forced to leave in Paris and return to their native land, brought with them first-hand experience of the avant-garde practices that had dominated the Parisian scene in the decade prior to the war. In the years that followed, many new, inventive, and exciting publications were launched, and Lisbon would host exhibits of painting, dance, and futurist-inspired events that shook the foundations of Portuguese literature and art.

Keywords

Fernando Pessoa; *Orpheu*; futurism; modernism; war

Resumo

A eclosão da Primeira Guerra Mundial teve um impacto significativo na circulação de pessoas, objetos e ideias. No verão de 1914, vários escritores e pintores portugueses viram-se forçados a deixar Paris e regressar à Pátria, levando consigo experiências de primeira mão das práticas vanguardistas que dominavam o meio parisiense na década anterior à Guerra. Nos anos que se seguiram, lançaram-se muitas novas publicações inovadoras e Lisboa serviu de palco para exposições de pintura, espetáculos de dança e *happenings* futuristas que abalaram os alicerces da literatura e arte portuguesa.

Palavras-chave

Fernando Pessoa; *Orpheu*; futurismo; modernismo; guerra

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Some twenty years after the end of the First World War, Gertrude Stein looked back at the event and commented that the composition of the war was akin to the composition of a cubist painting:

Really the composition of this war ... was not the composition of all previous wars, the composition was not a composition in which there was one man in the center surrounded by a lot of other men but a composition that had neither a beginning nor an end, a composition of which one corner was as important as another corner, in fact the composition of cubism (Kern, 1983: 288).

This observation appears at the start of the final chapter of Stephen Kern's 1983 book *The Culture of Time and Space 1888-1918*. As he sets about explaining the ways in which the war "embodied most of the transformations of time and space of the pre-war period," Kern notes that during the war, consciousness was "riveted in an eternal present," in a "spatial extension of the present that included a multiplicity of distant events" (Kern, 1983: 294). Continuing his discussion of the war, which "released powerful and dislocating forces that broke up the old dividers and forged new unities" (Kern, 1983: 307), the author cites a series of concrete examples, such as cubism's direct influence on the invention and development of camouflage (Kern, 1983: 302) and the idea that structural changes in the art of war like the "defense in depth" were analogous to the shift in painting from a single vanishing point perspective to the multiple perspectives of cubism (Kern, 1983: 305).

In a sign of the new perceptions of time and space that would shape the battlefield experience, the Portuguese modernist poet Mário de Sá-Carneiro described the "curious atmosphere of Paris" in a letter that he sent to his friend, Fernando Pessoa, on 1 August 1914. At a moment when war seemed unavoidable, Sá-Carneiro remarked on a new kind of unity that reminded him of intersectionism, one of the experimental literary techniques that he and Pessoa recently had been busy theorizing and practicing:

In short, some kind of fluid undulates in the atmosphere, besides the air – sincerely, that is my impression. And I am reminded – now via literature – that in fact the psychic force of everyone thinking the same thing – of so many minds with the same profound preoccupation, in the same way, with the same inflections – could, should presumably create in the surrounding

atmosphere some type of subtlety... This would make an interesting chronicle... a chronicle, in fact, stained by intersectionism.²

Three weeks later, after having sent several more letters to Pessoa describing his beloved city as “astonished, frightened and deserted”³, Sá-Carneiro would announce to Pessoa that he was leaving France for Barcelona, where he planned to wait out the war.

Sá-Carneiro’s letters to Pessoa are often cited as valuable documents that trace the development of aesthetic ideas and practices – of paulismo (swampism) and interseccionismo (intersectionism) – that informed the two poets’ works at this time.⁴ Like cubism, these Portuguese-born literary experiments were creative responses to “broad cultural pressures that bore down on all sorts of traditional forms and necessitated new compositions and new perspectives” (Kern, 1983: 312). Additionally, Sá-Carneiro’s letters record key information about the activities that he and other young Portuguese artists participated in during their years in Paris prior to the war. The correspondence from August and September 1914, in particular, provides a window onto a moment in the early part of the twentieth century, when centripetal flows, drawing exiles and émigrés to Paris, quite suddenly became centrifugal (Lewis, 2011: 6).

On 1 September 1914, Sá-Carneiro wrote Pessoa from Barcelona registering his surprise at encountering Antoni Gaudí’s Temple of the Sacred Family, which he exclaimed was “A swampist cathedral. Yes! Pure swampism – even almost cubist.”⁵ Like many artists before and after him, Sá-Carneiro was astonished by the Catalan architect’s skill at translating late symbolism’s seemingly most ephemeral qualities into palpably concrete materials. Several days later, Sá-Carneiro was able to acquire a postcard image of Gaudí’s cathedral, which he sent to his friend back in Portugal.

² “Emfim, qualquer fluido ondea na atmosfera além do ar — tenho, em sinceridade, essa impressão. E lembro-me — agora por literatura — que em verdade a força psíquica de toda a gente pensando na mesma coisa — de tanto cérebro com a mesma preocupação profunda, de igual sentido, de iguais inflexões — poderia, deveria presumivelmente criar na atmosfera envolvente qualquer coisa de subtil... Isto seria uma crónica interessante a desenvolver... uma crónica, sabido, lavada de interseccionismo.” Sá-Carneiro, 2015: 253.

³ “atônito, apavorado e deserto.” Sá-Carneiro, 2015: 255.

⁴ The term “paulismo” takes its name from the two-part poem titled “Impressões do Crepúsculo” (Twilight impressions) that Pessoa published in *A Rensascença, Revista de Crítica, Literatura, Arte* in February of 1914. The first word of the second poem was “Pauis” (Swamps). The first of several aesthetic movements theorized by Pessoa during the period of 1913-1915, paulismo was a short-lived experiment that drew upon dark, murky images that were often of an aquatic nature.

⁵ “Uma Catedral Paúllica. Sim! Pleno paúlismo—quase cubismo até.”



Figure 1: Postcard from Mário de Sá-Carneiro to Fernando Pessoa
 Barcelona, September 6, 1914
 (Sá - Carneiro, 2015: 279)

From Barcelona, he would then travel to Madrid and finally on to Lisbon, where he would arrive on 9 September.⁶

Mário de Sá-Carneiro was not alone, of course, in following this route out of France in the late summer of 1914. Ironically, in fact, the aging poet Guerra Junqueiro (1850-1923) was on the same train that brought the author of *A Confissão de Lúcio* to Gaudí's cathedral. Named Plenipotentiary Minister to Switzerland in 1911, Guerra Junqueiro's service to the Republic came to an end with start of the war, and his chance encounter with Sá-Carneiro gave the younger man an unexpected opportunity to amuse his interlocutor, Pessoa, with an anecdote about the provincialism of a member of the literary generation of 1870.⁷ Moreover, at around the same time, twenty-six year old Amadeo de Souza Cardoso was making his way back home to Amarante. Both Eduardo Viana (thirty-three years old) and Santa-Rita Pintor (twenty-five years old) would also make a similar return trip to Portugal. While the Portuguese proto-modernists formed a somewhat dispersed group in Paris, they would come together much more closely in Lisbon in the months that followed.

⁶ In all, Sá-Carneiro was in Barcelona from August 29 to September 7.

⁷ See letter of September 5.

The most important Portuguese literary movement of twentieth century – the *Geração de Orpheu* – emerged from this concatenation of actors and events. Like other European avant-garde artists, the poets and painters who participated in the launch of the modernist journal in March 1915 had begun experiments that challenged traditional perspectives and broke up unitary notions of time and space in the years prior to the war. However, it was during the war years, when they came together in Portugal, that their art matured and developed into a true movement dedicated to shocking the republican bourgeoisie, renewing the bases of representation, and creating “the Portuguese fatherland of the twentieth century”⁸ that José de Almada Negreiros would later demand (Negreiros, 1993: 42). Between 1915 and 1918, some of the most significant poems and narratives of Portuguese modernism were produced or published, some of the most striking paintings were exhibited, and other public events that challenged prevailing aesthetic norms were staged. In many respects, the explosion of creativity that characterized the *Orpheu* generation’s production during the years of the First World War may be interpreted as a response to, and even a reflection of, the socio-political instability of the war years in Portugal.

As I will show in the final part of this essay, several of the leading modernists used their art to register oblique images of the conflict during and after the war. However, the impact of this event on their world must be measured first in terms of the opportunities afforded to them by the accelerated movement of people and ideas that occurred at this time. Pessoa, Sá-Carneiro, Almada, and many others openly expressed an intent to challenge the tastes and practices of their day, regularly producing irreverent works and choreographing scandalous events that were explicitly critical of the republican government and of the cultural establishment that supported it.⁹ As the prevailing stance amongst these latter parties was strongly in favor of Portugal’s entrance into the war on the side of the allies, the *Orpheu* generation would accordingly reject their arguments, often by remaining silent on the topic or by adopting ambiguous positions that celebrated the *idea* of the war as means of forcing change upon the Portuguese nation.

⁸ “a pátria portuguesa do século XX.”

⁹ As Ricardo Vasconcelos has noted, World War I fueled the appearance of *Orpheu* ‘por algo tão simples quanto o facto de Sá-Carneiro se ver forçado à vida em Lisboa, e procurar reproduzir aí algum espírito da *blague* parisiense’ (due to something as simple as the fact that, finding himself forced to return to Lisbon, Sá-Carneiro sought to reproduce there the spirit of the Parisian *blague*). Vasconcelos (in press), np.

Orpheu and *Atlântida* – Two Luso-Brazilian Initiatives

News about the war occupied the pages of daily and weekly newspapers and magazines in Portugal during 1915, as debates raged over whether the nation should enter the conflict. That same year, two transatlantic literary publications, founded as joint initiatives between Portuguese and Brazilian writers, made their debut. *Atlântida*, which counted João de Barros (Portugal) and João do Rio (Brazil) as its directors, would enjoy a five-year run, beginning in November 1915. *Orpheu*, on the other hand, saw only two issues come to press in March and June of 1915 (a third, projected, issue of the review never came to press). Published monthly, *Atlântida* sought to combat nativist stances on both sides of the Atlantic, responding to anti-Portuguese positions that were common in Brazil and to Portuguese intellectuals who saw Brazilian literary advances as a threat or an affront (*vexame*) to their literary tradition (Martuscelli, 2015: 90). During 1915 and early 1916, this explicitly pro-republican publication would lobby actively in favor of Portugal's entrance in the war on the side of the Allies. *Orpheu*, on the other hand, was conceived as an apolitical project that presented itself as an "exile of artistic temperaments."¹⁰ For the most part, "exile" can be understood here as advocating for position in favor of "art for art's sake" (*arte pela arte*). While several of *Orpheu*'s contributors were openly against the republic in their daily lives, in their art they withheld their opinions regarding current debates about Portuguese intervention in the conflict.¹¹

Many articles published in *Atlântida* clearly map out responses to the authors' immediate context, thereby making that publication a useful source for understanding the debates of the day. Critics today, however, are in agreement that *Orpheu* was the more significant publication. Arnaldo Saraiva has observed that *Atlântida* "was almost completely closed to modernity."¹² As one of the final expressions of a vitalist neo-romantic aesthetic that originated around the turn of the century, its pages were filled with works that adhered

¹⁰ "um exílio de temperamentos de arte." *Orpheu* 1, 1915, 11.

¹¹ In an overview of the events of 1915, José Barreto describes two public incidents that tarnished *Orpheu*'s reputation among supporters of the republic. In the first instance, Fernando Pessoa, writing in the name of Álvaro de Campos, sent a letter to the director of *A Capital* in the aftermath of Afonso Costa's disastrous fall from a streetcar. A paragraph of the letter, attributing the accident to Divine Providence, was published under the headline "Antipático futurismo—Os poetas de *Orpheu* não passam, afinal, de criaturas de maus sentimentos" ("Antipathetic futurism—The poets of *Orpheu* are nothing more than poorly behaved creatures"). This letter was then linked to a public intervention by Raul Leal that had taken place shortly before the accident. That poet had publicly distributed an insulting anti-republican manifesto in which he identified himself a collaborator of *Orpheu*. According to Barreto, these incidents, which may have hindered the continuation of the review, were eventually neutralized by other members of the group. Sá-Carneiro, in particular, was pressed to defend the idea that *Orpheu* was only interested in art and did not assume a collective position of any sort, either in politics or in art. Barreto, 2015: 75-78.

¹² "se fechava quase por completa à modernidade." Saraiva, 1986: 139.

to standards that were conservative in form, in addition to invoking conventional or frivolous themes, often patriotically exalted Portuguese intervention in the war as a means of reviving the nation's glorious past.¹³ The aging ultra-romantic poet Guerra Junqueiro leant an authoritative air to this review, which counted among its contributors some of most powerful cultural brokers of the day. If we recall the encounter between Mário de Sá-Carneiro and Guerra Junqueiro in Perpignan, France, in late August 1914, it is not difficult to imagine that young writers and artists associated with *Orpheu* would hold *Atlântida* in great contempt. Sá-Carneiro used the opportunity provided by that meeting to belittle this prominent member of the government who was also a staid representative of the literary establishment, joking to Pessoa about his stinginess and noting the poor quality of his spoken French. In addition to Guerra Junqueiro, one of *Atlântida's* most tireless collaborators was Júlio Dantas. He published a sonnet in its inaugural issue (as did Olavo Bilac [1865-1918]). Dantas, who enjoyed great popularity and wielded a good deal of political power, would become the target of José de Almada Negreiros's scathing "Manifesto Anti-Dantas" the following year.

Although the two published issues of *Orpheu* had appeared in the months prior to the launch of *Atlântida*, there is next to no notice of the activities of the modernist group on its pages.¹⁴ This silence may be interpreted, in part, as following Dantas's admonishment that the best way to neutralize the effects of the modernist avant-garde was to ignore their works altogether (Trindade, 2014: 218). The immediate hostility to the project that was launched with the publication of *Orpheu* opened Dantas to ridicule, however, and when his play titled *Soror Mariana* opened in the autumn of 1915, Almada responded with his "Manifesto Anti-Dantas," where he proclaimed that "Dantas was born to prove that not everyone who writes knows how to write!"¹⁵ Still, the first number of *Orpheu* was not as radical as promoters and detractors would purport. In addition to containing a number of post-symbolist compositions that would not have been much out of place on the pages of *Atlântida*, *Orpheu*, like its aesthetic adversary, also emerged from an attempt to forge a transatlantic partnership.

The poet Luís de Montalvor returned to Portugal from Brazil just as Sá-Carneiro and his friends were forced to leave Paris. While working in Rio as a secretary in the Portuguese embassy, Montalvor, together with the Brazilian poet Ronald de Carvalho, had

¹³ Pereira, 2015: 106-108. For a description and analysis of *saudosista* and neo-romantic poets that take up the war as a theme, see Braga, 2016.

¹⁴ There is a reference by V. F. (Victor Falcão) in n. 14 (15 December 1916) to works by Almada Negreiros and José Pacheco that were exhibited in the *Galeria das Artes*.

¹⁵ "O Dantas nasceu para provar que nem todos os que escrevem sabem escrever!" Negreiros, 1993: 20.

conceived a new literary review that would bring together poets from both Portugal and Brazil; he gave this review the name *Orpheu*. Thus, the inaugural number of the publication that would rock the foundations of Portuguese literature identified Carvalho and Montalvor as the editorial directors and the title page of that issue promoted *Orpheu* as a transatlantic enterprise. There is no indication, however, that *Orpheu* was ever distributed in Rio de Janeiro, and the three numbers of the review (two published, one projected) included works by only two Brazilian poets (Carvalho and Eduardo Guimaraens). With the publication of the second number, in June 1915, the designation “Portugal – Brazil” had disappeared from the magazine’s opening page, as had the names of Montalvor and Carvalho. The directors of *Orpheu 2* were now identified as Fernando Pessoa and Mário de Sá-Carneiro, both of whom had undoubtedly constituted a driving force behind the content of the previous issue as well.

With the exception of the magazine’s closing text – “Ode Triunfal” (“Triumphal Ode”), signed by Pessoa’s heteronym, Álvaro de Campos – most of the contributions to the inaugural issue of *Orpheu* were not as scandalous as Pessoa and Sá-Carneiro would later assert. They exhibited a late symbolist aesthetic that favored highly interiorized evocations of experience, constructed with elaborate correspondences and synesthesias. Such was the case with the series of twelve poems by Sá-Carneiro dated 1913-15, and with Pessoa’s ‘own’ contribution to the issue: a “Static Drama” titled *O Marinheiro* (*The Mariner*), dated October 1913. The long closing poem bearing the signature of Álvaro de Campos goes a step further still, however, for it abandons a post-symbolist fascination with the subjective world of dream imagery and exhibits a new complex objectivity that *O Marinheiro* had lacked. Although “Ode Triunfal” is not identified as belonging to any specific literary current, its style and content were clearly inspired by the futurist example.

The influence of avant-garde techniques would be much more in evidence in the second number of *Orpheu*. In an apparent challenge to critics who had considered the review’s collaborators as possibly insane, that issue opened with the collaboration of a poet (Ângelo de Lima) who had been long confined to a state mental institution. Curiously, Lima’s contribution was the only text in both numbers of *Orpheu* to include the word “war.” It is likely, nonetheless, that the term was not meant, in any concrete way, to reference the poet’s or the readers’ immediate socio-political context (Dix, 2015: 27). Immediately after Lima’s sonnets, Sá-Carneiro published two poems dedicated to an associate from his time in Paris, the artist Santa-Rita Pintor. The second of these poems, “Manucure,” takes up some vanguard techniques that he had experimented with earlier that

display an attempt to effect a rupture in form, syntax, and subject matter, as the incorporation of varied typefaces, verbal montages, and onomatopoeias demonstrate. These techniques appear somewhat forced, however. By contrast, Álvaro de Campos's magisterial "Ode Marítima" ("Maritime Ode"), which occupies thirty-six pages of *Orpheu* 2 and is also dedicated to Santa-Rita Pintor, employs a similar method of montage to surprising effect. Aside from the work of Campos, Pessoa's 'own' contribution to this issue was a series of six "intersectionist" poems titled "Slanting Rain." Additionally, the second issue of the journal, unlike the inaugural number, which had no illustrations or other visual content, included reproductions of four collages by Santa-Rita Pintor.

Due to financial problems, the third issue of *Orpheu* was never published, although attempts were made to revive the project in 1916 and 1917. From Pessoa's correspondence of those years, we do know that Pessoa and Sá-Carneiro intended to continue the practice of including visual material related to the group's literary experiments. After the example of Santa Rita's four "definitivos trabalhos futuristas" (four definitive works) that appeared in *Orpheu* 2, it would be Amadeo de Souza Cardoso's turn to collaborate. While we cannot be certain exactly which of his paintings were selected, it is quite possible that they included recent examples of his work that had been completed after his return to Portugal.¹⁶ Sousa Cardoso would have to wait another year to see reproductions of his work published. In 1916, he would bring out a small album titled "12 Reproductions," and in the following year, two of his paintings would appear on the pages of *Portugal Futurista*. That publication, which effectively signals the end of the "heroic" years of Portuguese modernism, came out in November 1917, more than a year after Portugal's entry into the war and less than one month prior to the coup led by Sidónio Pais that put an end to Afonso Costa's government. *Portugal Futurista* was noticeably different from *Orpheu* in several respects. It included collaborations by French and Italian futurist poets and painters and much of its content was both more shocking and ostensibly more political. In order to explain the rapid expansion and the aesthetic radicalization of the modernist project in Portugal, it will be necessary to turn our attention, once again, to the comings and goings of various avant-garde artists and to other public events precipitated by the outbreak of the war.

¹⁶ Recent information uncovered in the papers of Almada Negreiros has led Marta Soares to speculate that the paintings intended for inclusion were *Arabesco Dinâmico...*, *Parto da Viola...*, *Oceano Vermelho Azul Cabeça...* and *Par Ímpar 121*. Soares, 2015: 105.

Collaboration and Confrontation: Amadeo de Souza Cardoso, Robert and Sonia Delaunay, and the Suppression of *Portugal Futurista*

In the summer of 1914, Amadeo de Sousa Cardoso and his lover, Lucie Pecetto, were on holiday in Barcelona when they learned of the outbreak of the war. Deciding to return to Portugal, they married shortly after arriving at the painter's family home in September of that year. During the decade that Amadeo had spent in Paris, he made regular visits to his family's properties in northern Portugal, spending months at the *quinta* in Manhufe, where he was born, or in Espinho, where the family would spend their summers. During one of these visits, in 1910, Amadeo's father built him a studio in Manhufe, and it was there that he began a period of intense work in late 1914. The paintings that date from the war period are considered his most original works (Leal, 1999: 21). In them, Amadeo began to incorporate more expressionistic, figurative elements, moving away from the experiments with cubism and pure abstraction that characterized his Parisian compositions. Additionally, once back in Portugal, Amadeo would develop an iconography of his home country that is both popular and erudite (Freitas, 2006: 51). Personal symbols and popular images, such as windmills, weirs or dams (açudes), water mills (azenhas), earthenware bowls (alguidares), and pitchers (cântaros) appear in the art that he produced at this time. Moreover, a special quality of light is captured in these works, a light that recalls the intensity of the sun of his native land.



Figure 2: Amadeo de Sousa Cardoso, *Study for "Expositions Mouvantes – Corporation Nouvelle" 1915* (Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Centro de Arte Moderna, 77DP343).



Figure 3: Amadeo de Sousa Cardoso, *Canção Popular – A Russa e o Figaro*, c. 1916
(Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Centro de Arte Moderna, 77P18)

During this period of intense activity, Amadeo and Lucy would also act as hosts for painters Robert and Sonia Delaunay, who set up residence in Vila do Conde in the spring of 1915. On their trip to northern Portugal, the couple, well known as the originators of Orphism, passed through Lisbon, where they met with Almada Negreiros, Eduardo Viana, and José Pacheco (I have found no indication that they met Pessoa, but that is certainly a possibility). While in the capital, they undoubtedly saw the first number of *Orphen*, which had come out in March of that year. A project would be born from this meeting with the main figures associated with *Orphen*, and the group formed what came to be called the *Corporation Nouvelle*, which had the goal of organizing art exhibitions and producing original albums. The Delaunays named their home in Vila do Conde the Villa Simultanée, and they welcomed Eduardo Viana and the North American painter Sam Halpert into their midst. This space became a nucleus of activity and inspiration for the group of young Portuguese artists that formed around them.

The *Corporation Nouvelle*'s plans for organizing “moving exhibits” (“expositions mouvantes”) in Barcelona, Stockholm, and Oslo would not come to fruition. Nonetheless, Amadeo did produce several studies promoting this initiative and, during the period of 1915-16, the project stimulated a lively exchange of letters between the Delaunays, Amadeo, Viana, Pacheco, and Almada¹⁷ Almada, moreover, was so enthusiastic about this friendship that he announced a number of works that ostensibly involved Sonia's

¹⁷ See Ferreira, 1981.

collaboration. As the front matter from Almada's 1917 novella *A Engomadeira* attests, he and Sonia began collaborating on a series of "10 Poemas Portugueses." Additionally, Almada included his plans to develop a ballet (*Ballet Veronèse et Bleu*) that would be dedicated to Sonia.




Figure 4: José de Almada Negreiros, Front matter *A Engomadeira* (1917).

The Delaunays' stay in the Minho region was very productive for both. The quality of light they encountered on Portugal's northern coast impressed them greatly, as did the local culture's vibrant folk elements. Years later, Sonia would recall that "[t]he light there wasn't violent but it intensified all the colors. There were multi-colored or bright white houses ... I remember the peasants in their popular attire, the fabrics, the ceramics that had an ancient beauty and exceptional purity, the crowds at the fairs and the bulls with massive horns. // We had the impression that we were living in a land of dreams."¹⁸ Robert, at that time, returned to figurativism, mixing images of the people and the products of the land filtered through his emblematic chromatic disks in a series of still lifes and in the painting *La Grande Portugaise* (1916). Sonia, in particular, was fascinated by the popular culture she

¹⁸ "Lá a luz não era violenta mas exaltava todas as cores. Havia casas multicolores ou dum branco esplendoroso, duma linha sempre sóbria. Lembro os camponeses e os seus fatos populares, os tecidos, as cerâmicas duma beleza antiga, duma pureza excepcional, as multidões nas festas e os bois de grandes cornos. // Tínhamos a impressão de viver num país de sonho." Santos, 2000: 8.

encountered in the markets, capturing the colors and movement of those spaces in works like *Marché au Minho* (1916).



Figure 5: Sonia Delaunay, *Marché au Minho*, 1915
[[https:// www.wikiart.org/en/sonia-delaunay/market-at-minho](https://www.wikiart.org/en/sonia-delaunay/market-at-minho)]

Additionally, Russian-born Sonia took advantage of the villa's garden space to paint, and she began work outdoors on a series of very large canvases. In the spring of 1916, this apparently simple act would contribute to charges against her for spying. Portugal had just entered the war on England's side and German submarines had begun to appear regularly along the nation's northern coast. Some in the area believed that Sonia's paintings contained bizarre 'signs' that communicated hidden messages to the enemy (Santos, 2000: 9). The confusion was eventually cleared up, but only after Robert spent time in Vigo, prohibited from returning to Portugal. While the reasons for this detention remain obscure, the charges against the Delaunays were very real. Besides the possibility that the large canvases displayed in their garden were perceived as signals to the enemy, others have noted that Robert continued his correspondence with artists and galleries he had collaborated with in Germany, even after that country's declaration of war against Portugal, and that Vila do Conde also counted a small shipyard at the time that had a contract with the French government (Belém; Ramalho, 2009: 153). This conjunction of events illustrates, most importantly, that worries born of the tensions surrounding Portugal's entrance in the war extended to all corners of society. As Amadeo noted in a letter to Sonia, dated 28 August 1916, politics was a dangerous business: "J'aime vraiment

votre art, c'est dommage que vous fassiez tant de politique.” (Ferreira, 1981: 186). Upon Robert's release, the couple subsequently moved to Valença do Minho; by early 1917, they had decided to leave Portugal definitively.

While the Delaunays' stay in Portugal was cut short, in part, for political reasons, their influence on the artists associated with *Orpheu* would continue through the end of 1917, when *Portugal Futurista* saw the light of day. That review included unpublished works by the noted poets Appolinaire and Blaise Cendrars that had been provided to the editors by Sonia Delaunay. In addition to Saint-Point's *Futurist Manifesto of Lust* and the *Manifesto of Futurist Painters*, also in the original French, a Portuguese translation of Marinetti's manifesto “O Music-Hall” also appeared on its pages (several of these texts had been presented to the public previously, on April 24, 1917, when Almada staged his “Conferência Futurista”). *Portugal Futurista* was immediately seized by the police upon its publication, although the reasons for its suppression are unclear. It is possible that alleged obscenities contained in Almada's novella *Saltimbancos* or the virulent language of Álvaro de Campos's *Ultimatum* may have precipitated that response. Fernando Pessoa, in an unpublished preface that he drafted for an English translation of Campos's *Ultimatum*, observed that “no such publication could be printed while the War lasted.” In this text, Pessoa recognizes the political context and the role it might have played in *Portugal Futurista*'s apprehension, noting that the journal was suppressed by “the Democratic ministry which was thrown out of power by Sidonio Pais.” He concedes, moreover, that “it is difficult to imagine how any ministry at all, when the country was at war, could allow the publication of the ULTIMATUM, which, original and magnificent as it is, and although not pro-German (being anti-everything, Allied and German), contains scathing insults on the Allies, as also on Portugal and Brazil, the very countries where PF was destined to be read” (Pessoa, 2009: 275).

Published at almost the same time as the coup that would put Sidónio Pais in power, it is not surprising that the authorities perceived this review as a possible threat to the public order. As Luís Trindade observes, the *Ultimatum* attributed to Campos, like Almada's *Ultimatum Futurista para as Gerações Portuguesas do Século XX*, which followed it on the pages of *Portugal Futurista*, had a clear political reference. Both were systematically organized in the form of a doctrine, and the objective of both was to “think about taking advantage of the energies liberated by the War.” (Trindade, 2014: 216)¹⁹. At a moment when public opinion against the war was at its height, the titles of these texts, which recall

¹⁹ “pensar como aproveitar as energias libertadas pela Guerra.”

the British Ultimatum of 1890, would likely have resonated with the pro-German faction in the capital and with other elements that were opposed to the *União Sagrada* government led by Afonso Costa. The suppression of *Portugal Futurista* can be understood, therefore, as an example of the Costa government's increasingly repressive measures in the months leading up to the Sidonist coup.

Conclusion: Echoes of the War in Modernist Works

The rise of a cosmopolitan avant-garde in Portugal coincided almost precisely with the period of the First World War. Nonetheless, it is difficult (and risky) to characterize the work of this generation as constituting some sort of 'voice' of the time. On the contrary, Pessoa, Sá-Carneiro, and others of their generation largely made every effort to avoid referencing the world of politics in their work. The war years brought people together, nonetheless, and facilitated the explosion of creativity that characterized the *Geração de Orpheu*. The occasions afforded by the friendships and collaborations that occurred in Portugal during these years had a significant impact on the development of a modernist culture. Moreover, by 1917, or thereabouts, the powerful and disturbing forces that had provoked transformations in the apprehension of time and space registered in the modernists' literary and visual production had been proven on the battlefield, where soldiers experienced an intensified sense of the present and "time seemed to burn brightly ..., riveting consciousness in an eternal present" (Kern, 1983: 293). Certain attitudes and techniques that were considered subversive in 1914-15 were slowly becoming more familiar and less threatening. While still not part of the cultural mainstream, a number of avant-garde practices and techniques had begun to generate enthusiasm among certain elements of the elite. This is evidenced by the welcome accorded to Serge Diaghilev's *Ballets Russes* when it came to Lisbon in December 1917. In preparation for the troupe's arrival, Almada, José Pacheco, and Ruy Coelho penned a manifesto in support of it that was included in the opening pages of *Portugal Futurista*, while other more conventional publications such as *Ilustração Portuguesa*, *República*, *A Capital*, and *Lucta* also reported on its performances (Tércio 2010: 114-122).

Examples of specific instances in which the new avant-garde modes of production addressed the war are sparse, at best, however. In October of 1914, Sá-Carneiro published a chronicle in *A Restauração* titled "Paris e a Guerra" that developed several of the impressions he had communicated to Pessoa in his letter of August 1 of that year. In a

somewhat more conventional description of the conflict that appeared on the pages of *Ilustração Portuguesa* in late 1915, he would recall the Battle of the Marne. It is unlikely, however, that the author actually had visited the site.²⁰ Almada, following Marinetti's lead, made a series of combative pronouncements in his *Ultimatum Futurista* about war as a creative act that "does away with all feelings of *saudade* in regard to the dead praising instead the living and honoring them with luck."²¹ He incorporates no concrete mention of the actual conflict, nonetheless. Likewise, certain elements of Álvaro de Campos's *Ultimatum* may be construed as responses to the current political situation, but that text's complexity precludes us from understanding it as a solely political tract. The best contemporary example of a modernist text that situates its content in a wartime context is Almada's experimental novella *A Engomadeira*. Published in late 1917, soon after *Portugal Futurista*, this short fictional work is prefaced by a letter from the author to José Pacheco, explaining that he had completed the text in 1915.

Certain plot elements of this novella reveal that its author was lying (or mistaken) when he asserted that he had changed nothing since 1915. The war appears in the backdrop of this experimental "Novela Vulgar Lisboaeta," the opening chapters of which may well have been written prior to March 1916. In Chapter III, the narrator captures cheers of "Viva a Gália!" solicited by the declaration of war; a few pages later, mention is made of a rally in support of the allied nations (Chapter V). By the novella's mid-point, however, the narrator incorporates a reference to newspaper accounts of the battle of Verdun and, in a subsequent chapter, a comment on the movement of Portuguese troops is ironically interspersed with the scene of an adulterous seduction (Negreiros, 1989: 69; 75). Throughout the text, the narrator's foil is a certain Sr. Barbosa, a symbol of bourgeois mediocrity who is an active member of the *comissões de vigilância*. Ardently supportive of the Allied forces, Sr. Barbosa on occasion defends his companion against accusations that he is a *germanófilo*.²²

Whether Almada himself, or any of his companions, was a vocal *germanófilo* is more difficult to assess. None of the writers and artists that comprised the *Geração de Orpheu*

²⁰ See Vasconcelos (in press) for details. In the same essay, the author defends the hypothesis that Sá-Carneiro's sonnet "O Fantasma" (1916) makes explicit use of a wartime imaginary.

²¹ "acaba com todo o sentimento da saudade para com os mortos fazendo em troca o elogio dos vivos e condecorando-lhes a Sorte." Negreiros, 1993: 39.

²² A character similar to Senhor Barbosa also appears in Almada's long and vituperative poem "A Cena do Ódio" that was dated May 14, 1915. This poem was set to appear in the ill-fated third number of *Orpheu*. During the war years, efforts were made to revive the project and, by the summer of 1917, it appears that a good portion of its contents, including Almada's poem, had been typeset. It is possible that the turbulent political situation of that time contributed to its failure.

actually went to the front or witnessed combat. We should remember, as well, that reactions to the war would take time to percolate in art and literature; it was in the years after the peace that cultural production would reflect back on that time. In this respect, we cannot overlook the fact that by 1918, several of the key figures of Portuguese modernism had disappeared: Sá-Carneiro committed suicide in April of 1916; two years later, also in April, Santa-Rita Pintor died of complications of tuberculosis and syphilis; also that same year (October 25, 1918), the Spanish flu claimed the life of Amadeo de Souza-Cardoso. In the chaotic years that followed the end of the First World War, Almada and Pessoa would continue to produce literature and art, striving to keep the memory and dream of *Orpheu* alive in the public imagination. Each, however, would follow new paths of artistic discovery and when they looked back at that time, their memories rarely, if ever, included direct references to the war.

A curious exception to this generalized tendency to elide references to the event that had a profound impact on Portuguese politics in the early twentieth century can be found, however, in a poem that Fernando Pessoa published in the 1920s. Ten years after Portugal's entry to the war, in 1926, the poem titled "O Menino da Sua Mãe" ("Mother's Boy") appeared in the literary review *Contemporânea* (Series III, n. 1). This short ballad that describes a young soldier fallen on the battlefield would become one of the poet's best-known works. Several critics have posited that it was probably written a decade earlier (Lind, 1972: 19; Monteiro, 2015: 51), at a time during which the author penned several other poems, in English, French, and Portuguese, that addressed the topic of war in more general terms. These latter poems (or fragments of poems) were discovered in Pessoa's *espólio* after his death, as were other brief notes regarding British writers against the war.²³ They confirm that during the war years, the creator of the heteronyms had explored the possibility of using poetry to address contemporary events. Like so much of the poet's work, these texts did not see the light of day until many years after they were written.

"O Menino da Sua Mãe," (His Mother's Child) on the other hand, was published three times during Pessoa's lifetime (Monteiro, 2015: 62). After its initial appearance on the

²³ According to Lind, Pessoa wrote eight poems that have content related to the war. Of these, only two were published in the poet's lifetime ("O Menino da Sua Mãe" and "Tomámos a Vila Depois de um Intenso Bombardeamento," which also appeared in *O Notícias Ilustrado*). Two other, unpublished poems were attributed to Ricardo Reis ("Ouví contar outrora, quando a Pérsia..." and "Prefiro rosas, meu amor, à pátria..."), one poem was attributed to Álvaro de Campos ("Ode Marcial"), and two, written in English, were not attributed to any particular heteronym. Lind's final example comes from Caeiro's "Poemas Inconjuntos." I am grateful to Patricio Ferrari for providing me with information about the notes found in Pessoa's *espólio* and for calling my attention to another poem referencing the war that Pessoa had drafted in French. Pessoa, 2014: 258.

pages of *Contemporânea*, this short poem would be reprinted in *O Notícias Ilustrado* on November 11, 1928. Two years later, it was also included in *Cancioneiro — I Salão dos Independentes*. While it is all but impossible to ascertain exactly when this poem was written or what it meant to its author, it is worth noting that in *O Notícias Ilustrado*, it was explicitly linked to the tenth anniversary of the Armistice of Compiègne. Thus it became a small element of wider efforts in Portugal to instrumentalize the memory of a war that, as Gertrude Stein reminds us, was unlike previous wars. The memory communicated in the poem is one of loss and senseless death, of an innocent victim whose sacrifice comes to symbolize the uselessness of war (Lind, 1972: 20). In a seemingly unimportant corner of the conflict, forgotten on an unnamed battlefield and left there to rot, the fate of Pessoa's "menino da sua mãe" is unknown to his mother and the old nurse who had carried him about. In the final stanza, an ironic parenthetical observation astutely equates their personal loss with one of the main causes of the Great War:

"Far off, at home, there is prayer:
Return him soon — safe, sound.
(Webs that the Empire weaves!)
He lies dead and rots,
This mother's boy."²⁴

Not surprisingly, the poet's aside has continued to resonate for subsequent generations of readers.

²⁴ "Lá longe em casa, há a prece: / Que volte cedo, e bem! / (Malhas que o Império tecel) / Jaz morto e apodrece, / O menino da sua mãe." Trans. Monteiro, 2015: 53.

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Illustrations

- Figure 1: Postcard from Mário de Sá-Carneiro to Fernando Pessoa, Barcelona, September 6, 1914 (Sá-Carneiro: 2015, 279).
- Figure 2: Amadeo de Sousa Cardoso, *Study for “Expositions Mouvantes, Corportation Nouvelle,”* 1915 (Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Centro de Arte Moderna, 77DP343).
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The Mutilated Face of World War I in Portugal

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Abstract

The disabled veterans of World War I take the paradoxical form of the mutilated hero. Portugal's barely consensual participation in the European front of World War I turned disabled veterans into an inconvenient symbol to be neglected in the politically unstable post-war period. From the delay in official recognition to the slow collective mobilization, the disabled prove hard to analyze, whether because of the lack of sources or the difficulty in positioning them in a post-war era eager to celebrate and then quickly forget the vestiges of mutilated victory. This paper seeks to characterize the appearance of these men in public space and their consecration as victims of the state's decision to go to war.

Keywords

World War I; disabled veterans; post-traumatic stress.

Resumo

Os inválidos da I Guerra Mundial instalam-se na paradoxal forma do herói mutilado. A pouco consensual participação de Portugal na frente europeia da I Guerra Mundial fez dos inválidos um rastro incomodo a negligenciar num pós-guerra instável politicamente. Do atraso do reconhecimento oficial à lenta mobilização coletiva, os inválidos apresentam-se como um objeto de difícil de análise, seja pela precariedade das fontes, seja pelo difícil enquadramento num pós-guerra ávido de comemorar e esquecer vestígios de uma vitória mutilada. Procuramos demonstrar, assim, a emergência destes homens no espaço público e a sua consagração enquanto vítimas da decisão de estado.

Palavras-chave

I Guerra Mundial; inválidos; stress pós-traumático.

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Introduction²

What place does the WWI disabled veteran occupy³? Where do these men find themselves and where would they like to go? Disability puts a person in a state of permanent war. If the *serrano* was granted the ability to return to a national and familial home, the disabled veteran had, as compensation for the war, the difficult return to a place lacking the inextinguishable marks of the war experience.

The official count of disabled veterans is strongly susceptible to doubt. How can it be that of more than 100 thousand soldiers, only 1,759 individuals are officially recognized as disabled by war? How can it be that of the approximately 7,000 wounded, only 1,759 retained a recognized disability in a war in which mental or degenerative illnesses, such as tuberculosis, were not immediately visible and diagnosable?⁴

Portugal mobilized about 100,000 men during the war, and, according to the *Livro de Estatística do CEP*, about 1,759 of them were given disability leave.⁵ However, this number becomes hard to accept given the condition of the health services of the Corpo Expedicionário Português (CEP) (it is the European front that provides more information), in which the registers of internment, treatment, and medical leaves are insufficient. The specificity and novelty of the war, too, gave rise to the inability to identify illnesses, principally mental illness, often diagnosed as physical or as *cobardia* (cowardice) or *herança genética* (hereditary). The more frequently recurring illnesses resulting primarily from combat situations were, in descending order, pulmonary, dermatological and venereal, with mental illness appearing only in the ninth place and categorized as mental exhaustion (asthenia), alienation, and epilepsy.⁶

In Isabel Pestana Marques's substantial work on the CEP's experience in the Flanders trenches, we see the conditions of health services at the campaign, the conditions that would create a definitive constraint on the nosological picture that would affect the

² This text is part of chapter III of Silvia Correia's doctoral dissertation, *Políticas da memória da I Guerra Mundial em Portugal 1918-1933: entre a experiência e o mito* (FCSH/Universidade Nova de Lisboa), presented in 2011 and published as a book in 2015. That dissertation was written with the support of the *Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia* (SFRH/BD/23735/2005). For a political understanding of the disabled and past combatants, see Correia (2012: 531-551). I thank Vinicius Liebel for the dialogues and contributions.

³ On disablement in World War I, see the pioneering works of Bourke (1996), Cohen (2001) and Reznick (2004). For more information on disablement, see Carden-Coyne (2015).

⁴ Cf. AHM, FO, 006, I, 52, Caixa 906, n.º 5 – *Carta da Direcção do Grémio dos Inválidos de Guerra ao Presidente do Ministério*, November 16, 1933.

⁵ Cf. AHM, 1.ª Divisão, 3.ª Secção, Caixa 1401 – *Serviços de Estatística e Estado Civil do CEP*, Livro de Estatística do CEP.

⁶ Cf. AHM, 1.ª Divisão, 35.ª Secção, Caixa 1412 – *Causas de morte no CEP*, May 20, 1919; Marques (2002: 132-136; 380).

men in wartime and inevitably extend into the post-war period. Marques notes that the number of patients exceeded the number of those wounded and that there is a reduced number of mental illness diagnoses. She emphasizes the predominance of diagnoses of common clinical illnesses, deviating from the allies' health services' diagnoses, which identified a number of illnesses that are decidedly associated with trench warfare, such as trench fever, gas gangrene, and dysentery. These are illnesses that require prolonged treatment, for which the poor CEP health services were not sufficient⁷.

Aside from the soldiers' difficult and prolonged repatriation process, the situation was aggravated by the political disinterest in dealing with the mutilated face of war. Most disabled soldiers opted to return home, but the problems inherent to a state of armed conflict and to the specific aspects of trench war persisted, if not increased. In spite of the general demobilization, those mutilated by war remained in the public space demanding reparations. For Antoine Prost, "the demobilized soldiers want to turn a new page, those mutilated by war present a kind of invoice to the State."⁸ For these men, and especially for the victims of war stress, the past refuses to pass, in that "in the traumatic memories the past defines and determines the present actions and thinking of the rememberer, whereas in normal remembering the need of the present determine what is called up associationally from the past" (Leed, 2000: 87). This article seeks, in the face of the manifold limitations on the scope of sources, to account for the universe of past mutilated and/or disabled combat soldiers. Given Portugal's controversial intervention in World War I, the war's end during the time of Sidónio Pais, and the need to quickly forget the experience, justify that the disabled – who were the mutilated face of the war – turned out to be an experience that should be forgotten. The aim, therefore, is to make a social and political history of disability in World War I in Portugal.⁹ To do this, the major difficulties that the disabled faced after the war must be addressed: the difficulty of legal framework; the inadequate process of identification and subsidy; the slowness and bureaucratization of official recognition procedures; and the impracticability of hospital treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration. Let us examine, then, this flux of difficulties and devote our attention to the legal apparatus.

⁷ Cf. Marques, 2002: 127-136.

⁸ Cf. Prost, 2004: 1088.

⁹ This is in regards to understanding, not only how this group constitutes itself as a social identity and force, but also to looking at the political place claimed and given to the war disabled.

Legal Framework: Between Identification and Subversion

In Portugal, the formal understanding of “disabled” would undergo a lengthy process of narrowing the concept’s meaning. As a matter of fact, there were numerous terms used to denominate these men who did not fit into the formula of a mere former combat soldier; for example, disabled, mutilated, tubercular, and gassed. It was only in 1924 that a decree was published in which the disabled and mutilated would be subject to the same norm. As such, “individuals considered ‘mutilated by war’ are those who suffered anatomical loss, injury to or loss of any organ or any of its functions, as a result of wounds received or accidents suffered while fulfilling service in the campaign; individuals considered ‘disabled by war’ are those incapacitated due to a wound or illness acquired or worsened while performing this same service, and during the time spent in enemy territory as prisoner of war.”¹⁰ By this definition, “disabled” is understood to be a broad term that encompasses all of the categories in question.

The most significant legal formulations, with regard to the disabled soldiers of the Great War, were: Law No. 1:170, May 1921, constituting the first major legal benchmark for invalids; Decree No. 10:099, 1924, reaffirming the former, but with the important specification that the mutilated and disabled were legally concentrated in a single term, the *inválido de guerra* (disabled by war); and finally, Law No. 14:044, 1927, revised in 1929, establishing a comprehensive code of evaluation and assistance.

It should be noted that before these large scale publications in October 1918, pension allocations for a period of five years had already been approved by Sidónio Pais, providing a possible appeal for those to whom, after a year,¹¹ were still not granted benefits, and providing as well the right to use a badge “indicating disability acquired in the campaign, and at the same time recognition and protection for those wearing it.”¹² It is important to note that the law was passed immediately after war-disabled’ refusal to participate in the October 5th parade.¹³ Later, a law published in March 1921 guaranteed

¹⁰ Decreto n.º 10:099 (art. 2.º) – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 210, September 17, 1924.

¹¹ Decreto n.º 4:868 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 217, October 5, 1918. The Ministry of War granted a complementary pension to every soldier mutilated and disabled by the War. This determination was extended to all the Navy personnel; the *Junta* would request a naval physician when a Navy military was to be examined (Cf. Decreto n.º 4:868 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 223, 12 de Outubro de 1918).

¹² Decreto n.º 4:923 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 236, October 30, 1918.

¹³ Cf. “Como se comemoram duas datas. O 5 d’ Outubro e o 5 de Dezembro”, *A capital*, March 19, 1919: 1.

access to public services for all those mutilated in the Great War or equivalent services on the mainland or sea.¹⁴

The first major legal project concerning the disabled, Law No. 1:170, 1921,¹⁵ is the result of work by the *Comissão de Estudo das Condições de Reforma e Pensões Temporárias e Assistência a fornecer aos Mutilados da Guerra* (CEAMG) (Committee for the Study of Reform Conditions and Temporary Pensions and Assistance for the Mutilated at War), appointed by the Ministry of War on 21 October 1919¹⁶. Having among its members some of the most important public figures who fought for the cause of the disabled, such as António Aurélio da Costa Ferreira, Tovar de Lemos, and José Pontes, it sought to “review the legislation concerning those disabled at war, in order to establish the conditions of their retirement and temporary pensions, the assistance to be provided them, and, as such, proceed to examine their re-inspection”¹⁷. The report on the work was peremptory, and “should be put into action in the shortest possible time, as warranted by the situation in which those most gravely disabled find themselves, especially the soldiers, who, discharged from the institutions where they were being treated, cannot meet their more imperative needs with the grossly insufficient pensions they receive.” By institutions, it meant the Instituto de Reeducação dos Mutilados da Guerra de Arroios (Institute for the Reeducation of the War Disabled from Arroios), the only one truly created for this purpose, and one which will be expanded upon further. However, the law would only be published in 1921,¹⁸ being subject to multiple adaptations,¹⁹ including the insertion of soldiers disabled by pulmonary tuberculosis.²⁰ In September 1924, decree No. 10:099 was finally released. This decree would bring together the mutilated and disabled under a single designation – “disabled by war”.²¹ The publication of the decree did not prevent a debate both in government chambers and in the public square, which claimed a constant need for

¹⁴ Lei n.º 1:128 – *Diário de Governo*, I Série, n.º 57, March 18, 1921; Lei n.º 993 (*Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 134, June 28, 1920).

¹⁵ Cf. *Ordens do Exército*, 2.ª Série, n.º 23, October 21, 1919.

¹⁶ Cf. AHM, 1.ª Divisão, 35.ª Secção, Caixa 442 – Comissão encarregada de legislação sobre os inválidos do Serviço Militar, Lisboa, March 20, 1920 – Carta ao Chefe da Repartição de Gabinete da Secretaria da Guerra e Anexos (Relatório e Proposta de lei).

¹⁷ AHM, 1.ª Divisão, 35.ª Secção, Caixa 442 – Actas das Sessões da Comissão de Estudo das Condições de Reforma e Pensões Temporárias e Assistência a fornecer aos Mutilados da Guerra, nomeada pela OE N.º 23 (2ª Série), October 21, 1919, Acta n.º 1, November 7, 1919: 1-2.

¹⁸ Cf. Lei n.º 1:170 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 105, May 21, 1921.

¹⁹ The various formulations are stated at: Lei n.º 1:333 (*Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 175, August 26, 1922); Lei n.º 1:400 (*Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 32, February 8, 1923); na Lei n.º 1:464 (*Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 178, August 18, 1923); e na Lei n.º 1:467 (*Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 178, August 18, 1923).

²⁰ Cf. *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, August 21, 1922: 8-9; March 20, 1925: 20.

²¹ Cf. Decreto n.º 10:099 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 210, September 17, 1924.

revisions,²² either of Law n. 1:858²³ or of decree 13:375,²⁴ which again required a reinspection by a special committee of all military personnel considered mutilated or disabled. The Code of the Disabled in its most complete form would be only published in August of 1927 and republished in 1929 with slight changes.²⁵ An extensive document would deal with regulating the identification, evaluation, benefits, pensions for families, and the war disabled apparatus.

Many were critical of the regulations published in the years after the war. In the first issue of *O Mutilado da Guerra*, in January 1925, a complaint is made about Laws 1:170 and 10:099. Despite the text of the 1921 law was considered apt, it was criticized the unequal promotion positions for those who registered their injuries in combat and not in campaign, that is, “a soldier with a 20/100 disability (the minimum), missing a finger, was promoted by two ranks for having registered the suffering he acquired in combat; [...] While another soldier with a more significant disability, i.e. 100/100 (the maximum) receives the same rank, as his injuries are registered while ‘campaigning’ and not ‘in combat’.” As for Law n.10:099, the disapproval it faced was due to the fact that it assigned a disability pension to those injured on the front, and not those suffering from illness resulting from war and whose symptoms would appear only later, “[t]hat is: the soldiers who arrived at the trenches and had the supreme good fortune of being injured lightly and taken out of the hardships of war should be seen and treated with care! The others who had the misfortune of not being wounded slightly, and so had to continue to fight for their country, slowly depleting their body, returning to Portugal tubercular, gassed, and suffering from other grave illnesses, exhibiting misery and pain, these then do not require the aid, nor the care of their fellow countrymen?!”²⁶

Beyond these laws, the disabled had to undergo extremely bureaucratic and dehumanizing evaluation procedures. Above all, the work of the Fifth Office of the Ministry of War, upon which the evaluation committees depended, was problematic. In the

²² On 20 March 1925, congressman António Correia proposed the “revision of all the proceedings referring to those mutilated and disabled by war who are benefited by *Lei* n.º 10:099,” given the need to conduct a full revaluation of the number of disabled (*Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, March 20, 1925: 25.). He also proposed the inclusion of people “with tuberculosis acquired in campaign during the Great War who were declared as such by the appropriate health board” (*Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, March 20, 1925: 20-21.)

²³ *Lei* n.º 1:858 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 73, April 7, 1926.

²⁴ Decreto n.º 13:375 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 66, March 30, 1927.

²⁵ Decreto n.º 14:044 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 167, August 5, 1927. This was reprinted with minor changes in Decreto 16:443 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 138, June 6, 1929. Later, some inclusions would be made by the decretos n.º 17:335 (*Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 211, September 10, 1929), which put into effect the *Código de Concessão de Pensões*, and n.º 20:251 (*Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 197, August 25, 1931), among others.

²⁶ *O Mutilado da Guerra*, n.º 1, January 14, 1925: 1-3.

Chamber of the Senate, Procopio de Freitas, rapporteur of the 1924 law, drew attention to the generalizations and abuses committed by the evaluation committees, in that they cling to an interpretation of the law that produces erroneous opinions and that the Minister cannot change. 'These are opinions based on incomplete clinical records of the campaign, "because everyone who was familiar with the way in which our intervention in the war was carried out, knows that many services were not properly administered, and, according to information provided by competent individuals, I know that clinical records left much to be desired, it being natural that they are sometimes flawed, and there is no reason for these failures to now harm the stakeholders."'²⁷

The Republic, from its beginning, reconciled poorly with the mutilated face of war. The road to earning disability status was burdensome indeed. Since the publication of the first relevant law, the Law of 1921, the disabled were required to present a campaign document and proof of accident for the right to legal protection, which was made difficult given the conditions of health services on the war front. After being evaluated, if the identification and grant were denied, the soldier would have to wait for one year, without earning an income, in order to be able to appeal using the services of a lawyer and a doctor of belonging to the same evaluation committee.²⁸ However, even if he were to obtain a disability pension, its continuity was not guaranteed, since after the first standard, others would be published at the mercy of changes in national policy.

Legislation and support emerged late and slowly, through disorganized and poorly defined regulation. The situation was aggravated by the absence of an autonomous official body able to dedicate itself to these issues away from the fluctuations of national politics. Generally speaking, it can be claimed "that the mutilated and crippled need: treatment and equipment; the pension they are entitled to; an immediate job compatible with their physical state and abilities."²⁹ Above all, it is intended to give a voice to the disabled when decisions are being made about them,³⁰ since "everything has been done without even one disabled soldier being heard, without having their claims, attested to by the rigor of fact, taken into consideration."³¹

²⁷ Procópio de Freitas, *Diário do Senado*, June 12, 1925: 5.

²⁸ I was not able to study the health boards' exam proceedings because I do not know their whereabouts.

²⁹ *O Mutilado*, n.º 11, January 30, 1921: 3.

³⁰ *O Mutilado*, n.º 11, January 30, 1921: 1.

³¹ Cf. "As reclamações dos mutilados da guerra", *O Século*, December 5, 1919: 1.

Treatment and Rehabilitation: The Arroios War Disabled Veteran Rehabilitation Institute (IRMGA)

One of the most important initiatives with regard to the war disabled veterans, is the creation of the Instituto de Reeducação do Mutilados de Guerra de Arroios (IRMGA) (The Arroios War Disable Veteran Rehabilitation Institute) on 11 April 1917 by the relief committee for mobilized soldiers of the Cruzada das Mulheres Portuguesas (CMP)³² (Portuguese Women's Crusade). The IRMGA was organized and directed by captain Alfredo Tovar de Lemos. Once created, it came to dialogue with work done at the Instituto Médico Pedagógico de Santa Isabel, made available to the Ministry of War by its director, António Aurélio da Costa Ferreira, beginning on 22 November 22 1916. The Institute of Arroios was responsible for pedagogical services and Santa Isabel for functional rehabilitation work.³³

With regulation approved in October 1917,³⁴ the Institute was organized into three sections: research and professional orientation; motor skills rehabilitation; and professional retraining in order to allow the mutilated or disabled to resume their prior profession, or one compatible with their injuries, for which there were a variety of workshops and primary school classes (83% of the men were illiterate). If prosthetics were needed, they were fitted at the Institute itself. As they underwent rehabilitation, the disabled received a salary that went as high as 20 cents a day, the same amount given for participation in the military campaign. The Institute's revenue came from CMP funds, hospitalized patient pensions, grants, donations, inheritances, and benefactor bequests, among other resources.³⁵

The IRMGA concretized, in Portugal, the European model of treatment, rehabilitation, and social integration of disabled veterans. Fulfilling this task, however, was limited by multiple alterations in its administration as well as in its statutes under national policy. Tovar de Lemos confessed that "the Rehabilitation of Disabled Veterans initiative could not escape suspicion of politics, and the work had to be stopped after we went through some tough times because of [...] ignorance of the Institute's purpose, an aloofness toward the subject, etc., in short, ill wishes" (Lemos, 1919: 9). In the years 1917 and 1918,

³² The *Cruzada das Mulheres Portuguesas* (CMP) took its first steps in March, 1916. Its statutes were published in *Diário do Governo* in July 13, 1916 (Cruzada das Mulheres Portuguesas [*Estatutos*, 1917: 16]).

³³ Cf. Casa Pia de Lisboa (1917).

³⁴ Cf. Portaria n.º 1:113 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 175, October 11, 1917.

³⁵ Cf. Lemos (1919).

the institute's custody and operation were at the center of some public discussion, suffering significant regulatory changes.³⁶ Indeed, on 8 January 1918, hospital institutes run by CMP were placed under the authority of the Ministry of War,³⁷ returning to the hands of the CMP only in March 1920³⁸ and running for merely one more year.

Confronted with the Ministry of War's publication of Order No. 103 in 1921,³⁹ which suspended the activities of the Arroyos Institute as a center for treatment and rehabilitation of disabled war veterans, the reactions were immediate. On a front page, the April 26 edition of the *Diário de Lisboa* opens with the title "The Mutilated," in which dismay is clearly expressed. The question is evident: "How can one comprehend that the government, through the Ministry of War, could so brutally resolve the matter of the mutilated, practically discarding them as if they were parasites enjoying chewing up public money? Why hasn't the Parliament taken a moment to pause its sad fights in order to approve the project that, for better or worse, takes care of the material situation of those mutilated?" It could be said it is because "the work toward benefiting the wounded, aside from its early stages, when it was supported by the hearts and donations of Portuguese women, was not born under a lucky star. The official intervention suffocated it, paralyzed its development. We could be the product of generous ideas and sentiments, a perfect collaboration of sympathy and selfless efforts for this has become a surly and unpleasant thing, formalistic and regulatory, against which the scant devotions still fighting to conserve a drop of tenderness could do nothing."⁴⁰

In addition to this list of criticisms is the following, by the general Gomes da Costa: "I understand that the country's obligation is to find a place for these men. That these soldiers should not have to be dependent on anyone, or worse: on the dire condition of begging. For the sake of the honor of this country and army, the matter should have been resolved long ago! [...] They say the government will place some disabled veterans in Instituto Runa. Do you know what Instituto Runa is? It is a convent for the old ... as if men in the prime of life could be cloistered or kidnapped!"⁴¹

³⁶ By way of the *Decreto n.º 3:751* in January, the Ministry of War determined that the *Instituto Médico-Pedagógico da Casa Pia de Lisboa* should start working as *Instituto dos Mutilados de Guerra* (*Diário do Governo*, Iª Série, n.º 12, January 15, 1918); the *Portaria n.º 1:398*, 11 June 1918 approves the statute of the *Instituto Militar de Reeducação dos Mutilados de Guerra*.

³⁷ *Decreto n.º 3:742* – *Diário do Governo*, Iª Série, n.º 6, January 8, 1918.

³⁸ Cf. *Lei n.º 959* – *Diário do Governo*, Iª Série, n.º 59, March 23, 1920.

³⁹ The *Ordem* 103 would most likely have been published by April 1921, as stated by the press and the legal statute of May (*Lei n.º 1:160*), though no source that could prove this was found.

⁴⁰ "Os Mutilados", *Diário de Lisboa*, April 26, 1921: 1.

⁴¹ "O nosso inquérito: Palavras do Sr. General Gomes da Costa", *Diário de Lisboa*, April 28, 1921: 1.

To calm things down, and possibly as a response to these complaints, in May of 1921 the *Diário do Governo* announced a cost of living assistance award for disabled veterans, singling out those who had been discharged from the Arroios Institute or its counterparts, before or after the arbitration of the definitive disability pension.⁴²

During a visit by the evaluation committee to the Institute in 1921, the final verdict was given: the institute failed in its mission. Although the sources we have are merely reports of the activity of the same Institute and press, the Institute's action can be determined to have been positive. Perhaps its political dissent was frowned upon by some governments. As a matter of fact, the disabled in its custody will have been those most quickly identified, treated, and reintegrated. Maybe, the Institute incapacity lay beyond its control, since much is due to the reticence of the disabled veterans to continue being "on duty", far from their families and the possibility of changing their lives, being guaranteed a job as compensation for their disabilities (some abandoned the revalidation process in order to get jobs).

Grouping and Mobilization: The Public Face of Disability

From parliamentary discussion to legislative regulation, the disabled were at the center of the main debates around veterans in the years immediately following the war. Many veterans returned to their lands and families, dispersing them with the possibility of a strong political movement of contestation.⁴³ However, those who had been to the poor treatment and rehabilitation centers reinforced the many public calls for attention, presenting an "invoice" to the Portuguese State and outlining a collective locus for claims.

In 1925, the formation of the Portuguese League of Disabled War Veterans was announced in *O Mutilado da Guerra – Órgão da Liga Portuguesa dos Mutilados da Guerra* (The Disabled of War – Journal of the Portuguese League of Disabled War Veterans), the first and only known issue.⁴⁴ It is only in January of 1926 that the disabled war veterans' first public and collective act takes place: the realization of the First Congress of the Mutilated and Disabled War Veterans with the presence of the Minister of Agriculture and representatives of the Ministry of the Navy and War.⁴⁵ At this meeting, major issues concerning the disabled are discussed. On the one hand, this exposes the discrepancy

⁴² Cf. Lei n.º 1:160 – *Diário do Governo*, Iª Série, n.º 91, May 2, 1918.

⁴³ For a political understanding of the disabled and veterans, see Correia (2012: 531-551).

⁴⁴ *O Mutilado da Guerra*, n.º 1, January 14, 1925.

⁴⁵ "Mutilados e Inválidos de Guerra", *A Guerra*, July 1, 1926, ano 1, n.º 7: 12.

between the number of disabled veterans recognized by the government, about 1,535, and those spoken of by Congress, about 1,800.⁴⁶ On the other hand, it lays the foundations of an organization that should be “made up of retired military personnel protected by Statute No. 1:170, Decree No. 10:099 or any other piece of legislation that especially regarded those mutilated and disabled by war, an association to be called the *Associação dos Inválidos e Mutilados de Guerra Portugueses* (Association of the Portuguese Disabled and Mutilated by war).”⁴⁷

Despite these transactions, it is only at the end of the First Republic that the collective reaction of the disabled becomes more visible and, subsequently, official, upon the statute publication of the *União dos Inválidos de Guerra* (Disabled Veterans Union), in 1933.⁴⁸ The legal formalization of associations for disabled veterans occurs essentially after this year, due to the centralized nature of the new political reality, which will alter entirely the way in which World War I, the combatants, and the disabled will be framed in the ideological and social scene of the *Estado Novo*.⁴⁹

Correspondence from 1933 between the management of the *Grémio dos Inválidos de Guerra* (Disabled War Veterans Guild) and the Ministry of the Interior⁵⁰ sums up the list of complaints recurrent among the disabled veterans. This contestation should be highlighted, given the determination that there should be further revision to regulate the already highly regulated situation of the disabled veterans, carrying out a survey of health and economic conditions.⁵¹ The disillusionment and fatigue were evident after “a situation was considered final; a situation obtained through very rich documentation and careful screening by a

⁴⁶ Cf. “I Congresso dos mutilados inválidos de guerra”, *A Guerra*, ano 1, n.º 2, February 1, 1926: 13-19.

⁴⁷ “Mutilados e Inválidos de Guerra”, *A Guerra*, July 1, 1926, Ano n.º 1, n.º 7: 4.

⁴⁸ Although veterans’ collective visibility is something mostly from Estado Novo, the larger discussion about disabled indentification, support laws, and pensions is from the First Republic.

⁴⁹ The already mentioned associations are formalized in 1933: the *Grémio dos Inválidos de Guerra* is authorized to use a small flag with the national color at public acts (Portaria n.º 7:613 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 144, June 29, 1933); and statutes of the *União dos Inválidos de Guerra* are published (*Diário do Governo*, II Série, n.º 291, December 14, 1933). It is believed that they were already acting before that, but no confirming source could be found.

⁵⁰ Cf. AHM, FO, 006, L, 52, Caixa 906, n.º 5 – Carta da Direcção do Grémio dos Inválidos de Guerra ao Presidente do Ministério, November 16, 1933.

⁵¹ Cf. Decreto n.º 21:990 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 294, December 16, 1932: “Considering that it is public knowledge that the disabled veterans are in good physical condition for the activities that they perform, their official designation as ‘disabled’ is not in accordance with reality. [...] I deem it right to decree as law the following: Article 1. In each military command, at the *Governo Militar de Lisboa*, the *Comandos Militares da Madeira e dos Açores*, and at the colonial governments, committees will be permanently appointed; they will be charged with conducting an investigation into the situation of all the disabled veterans residing in their areas, regardless of their rank; for that, they can request of any administrative authority or public office the information they deem necessary.”

series of boards, in a manner not expected by the law of any of the countries participating in the Great War.”⁵²

This, then, is an extremely controversial and undefined universe in which there is a raging struggle to find a place in the postwar context, where the speed of a new era sought to annihilate the remnants of war and, even more so, its “mutilated” face.

The Limits of the Norm and the Heterogeneous Identity

The time-consuming and limited normative conception of “disabled” in the Portuguese post-war period led to an ambiguity, reflected in this research, about what is actually meant by “disabled.” George L. Mosse identifies the disabled as “those who were thought to menace society’s defined as ‘outsiders’, on the margins of established society, was in direct opposition to the ideal manhood, the foil to which such ‘outsiders’ represented in mind and body. Such men were nervous, ill-proportioned, and, above all, constantly in motion” (Mosse, 2000: 102).

Within the heterogeneous universe of what is enshrined as *disabled*, those mutilated were the first to be recognized by the norm, as the disabled would only earn the designation of disability when above 50% of incapacity, including also those who had been gassed but not the tubercular, since the requirement was a limitation of movement, which was verifiable only in the terminal stage of the disease. The situation worsens, in fact, when the mutilation is not visible, as is the case for those gassed, tuberculous, or suffering from post-traumatic stress. In short, there was a universe of differences that unequivocally hindered the disabled veterans’ consecration under the law, as well as in the public space and as a collective identity. I will consider here this multiplicity in the heterogeneity of its manifestations. Let us examine, within the limits of the investigation, the cases of those disabled by tuberculosis and post-traumatic stress.

Susan Sontag, in an analysis of the use of disease as a political metaphor, presents tuberculosis as “disintegration, febrilization, dematerialization; is it a disease of liquids – the body turning to phlegm and mucus and sputum and, finally, blood – and of air, of the need for better air” (Sontag, 1978: 13). Marked by a long and slow attrition, the tubercular patient is relegated, much like those who are “mad” or victims of shell shock, to the social margin, to a kind of exile. For Sontag, in madness and in tuberculosis “there is

⁵² AHM, FO, 006, L, 52, Caixa 906, n.º 5 – Carta da Direcção do Grémio dos Inválidos de Guerra ao Presidente do Ministério, November 16, 1933.

confinement. Sufferers are sent to a 'sanatorium' (the common word for a clinic for tuberculars and the most common euphemism for an insane asylum)" (Sontag, 1978: 35-36). Relegated to the margin, the consumptive soldier and the victim of post-traumatic stress disorder take time to be recognized politically and socially.

Beginning on 20 October 1917, services by *Assistência a Militares Tuberculosos* (Assistance for the Tubercular Soldier) become subordinate to the Ministry of War, with the creation of the *Comissão de Assistência aos Militares Tuberculosos* (Assistance Commission for Tuberculosis Military),⁵³ responsible for

studying and proposing the necessary measures for mitigating the precarious situation of the military personnel who have contracted tuberculosis or aggravated their injuries due to the constant fatigue they were subjected to during military service, whether in France, overseas or in the metropolis, many of whom, due to insufficient documentation or other reasons unknown to those affected, were not considered to have the legal conditions for granting the retirement pension (Article 6.).

This commission was also responsible for treating and hospitalizing in appropriate institutions; propose monthly pensions; acquire funds; propose the research and technical developments to support the fight against the disease; among other responsibilities.⁵⁴ In the Commission regulation, the limits of identification were evident for the victims of tuberculosis – for a long time, they would not be acknowledged as disabled by war. The situation changes when, under the 1924 law, for the first time, the tuberculous are integrated into the status of disabled: all those who, in addition to physical injury, are carriers of disease acquired or aggravated in the campaign⁵⁵. Nevertheless, this definition was profoundly limited by the lack of proof of injury required by the evaluation committees, and by the fact that visible injury occurs only in the final stage of the disease. Invisibility collided with the limits of medicine. In a letter from the Director of the Disabled Veterans Guild to the President of the Ministry, the situation was described: "there are disabled soldiers, in greater numbers those who have proven to have contracted tuberculosis in campaign, who did not receive a single cent from the State, since they, poor and ignorant as they are, did not apply in time for

⁵³ Decreto n.º 14:957 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 21, January 25, 1928.

⁵⁴ Portaria n.º 2:299 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 113, June 1, 1920. Published again in June 30, 1920 (*Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 136).

⁵⁵ Cf. Decreto n.º 10:099 – *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 210, September 17, 1924.

the pension to which they are entitled. Many have died; some are waiting for their turn to receive the scant aid allowed by the dwindling resources of the Ministry of War's Committee for the Assistance for the Tubercular Soldier.⁵⁶

Another form of invisibility is that of the soldier who is a victim of mental illness. Becoming better understood after World War I,⁵⁷ war neurosis, as coined by Freud, is also known by several names, such as shell-shock, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and war fatigue, among others. This disorder is, according to Eric Leed, a “historical illnesses in the sense that they are rooted in particular contexts, times and places: the trenches across northern France between December 1915 and March 1918” (Leed, 2000: 1). Difficult to identify by virtue of its invisibility, in some cases, it leaves the victim held in the grip of the past; “the neuroses of war transcend the context of their generation, continuing through some kind of inertia to frame the perceptions, judgments and behaviour of those who suffer from the past” (Leed, 2000: 1). Post-traumatic stress disorder results in a victim's inability, after being subjected to an extreme traumatic situation anomalous to his or her normal life (for example, war) to report this experience using existing narrative formulas. It is a present absence of narrative, since the past trauma becomes unnarratable, preventing progress (Quintais, 2000). In Portugal, little has been said about the illness in the context of the Great War, with most studies of this kind focusing on the colonial war.

Dealing with PTSD means to face the limits of the historical sources, whether in the archives or in the press. Those that exist are in large part from the period after 1931 or the campaign period, as preciously noted. In 1917, at the opening of the Instituto Médico Pedagógico de Santa Isabel to disabled veterans, its director emphasized the importance of having the “psychically disabled” be “carefully selected at a neuro-psychiatric center and from there distributed to hospitals, asylums, their homes or special wards. For many, being put in ordinary psychiatric services could be detrimental, influencing both their spirit and the public's spirit.”⁵⁸ There is, too, correspondence between the *Liga dos Combatentes da Grande Guerra* (League of Combatants of the Great War), family or local military units, and the *Direção Geral de Assistência* (General Directorate of Aid) used in the referral of former combatants to hospital units compatible with the illness usually dubbed “schizophrenic psychosis” or “depressive mentalpsycho-neurosis alienation.” Despite the fact that placement of these men in public psychiatric units was not conducive to recovery because

⁵⁶ AHM, FO, 006, L 52, Caixa 906, n.º 5 – Carta da Direção do Grémio dos Inválidos de Guerra ao Presidente do Ministério, November 16, 1933.

⁵⁷ Cf. Peter Barham (2004); Mosse (2000: 101-108); Lerner (2003); Leese (2002) e Leed (1979).

⁵⁸ Casa Pia de Lisboa (1917: 45).

the disease involves moments of lucidity, there was no initiative to create a psychiatric unit restricted to the military and designed to treat these cases. The soldiers were hospitalized in common psychiatric units such as at the Hospital S. João de Deus (Barcelos), Hospital de Alienados do Conde de Ferreira (Misericórdia do Porto), Hospital Miguel Bombarda (Lisbon), and the Casa de Saúde do Telhal (Mem Martins), where most of the alienated soldiers were gathered, in order for there to better control and specially monitored aid.⁵⁹ In 1936, the report of the League of Combatants of the Great War provided the first account of the “alienated” 28 men, and in 1937 the number almost doubled, at 58 identified cases.⁶⁰ This considerable increase in the space of a year could be interpreted as conscientiousness when dealing with these individuals who, until that date, would not be classified in any legal framework identifying the disabled. Ultimately, this presented a mutilated face of war that could not be displayed in the national celebrations of the war effort, contrary to what would take place with soldiers who had suffered more visible, physical injuries.

Final remarks

The research done on the disabled war veterans in Portugal, in their multiplicity of identities, has shown itself to be limited.⁶¹ The intention was to tackle the public universe occupied by the disabled veterans through revision of the legislation, analysis of the relevant institution, and survey of the scarce and belated unionizing movement. In the words of Aurélio da Costa Ferreira, one of the greatest activists for the cause of the disabled veterans in Portugal, the situation presents itself as heterogeneous:

As a rule, our mutilated soldiers can belong to one of two groups: 1) those who excessively want to return to their land to live as freely as possible with their pensions; 2) those who excessively want to settle into the urban environment to live off of their pension and wages, employed in public service jobs. The former hardly subject themselves to educational systems,

⁵⁹ Cf. AHM, FO, 006, I, 45, Caixa 896, n.º 7-8 – Reforma da Lei n.º 1:170 (1937-1966); ANTT, MI, Secretaria-Geral, Livros 37, 38, 39 (19128-1929): these refer to several hospitalization requests for mentally disabled soldiers.

⁶⁰ Cf. LCGG, *Relatório da Gerência de 1936* (1937), mapa n.º 12; LCGG, *Relatório da Gerência de 1937* (1938), mapa n.º 10.

⁶¹ Considering the limited number of sources about treatment, evaluation, integration, and pensions, my conclusions are restricted to those the limits. In a certain way my conclusions are guided by the available sources, such as published legislations (and some archival sources about those publications), parliamentary debates, press and secondary sources. Hence, some specificities such as distinguishing treatment and support for African versus European troops are impossible to deeply check.

and I believe that, whenever they are willing, they should be employed in the state or county rural and industrial services, close to their hometown. The latter, on the other hand, can be subjected to educational systems; more than accept it, they ask for it (as with those who anxiously sought a career as a postal worker). Nowadays, in retrospect, it seems that the issue can be stated as follows: the pension should be raised, and access should be facilitated to public positions for those who wish for them, and are able, giving them preference always.⁶²

Finally, where should we situate the disabled veteran? What is the public and political space occupied by this figure in Portugal? Contrary to France, where associations for the disabled were first formed, establishing a group consciousness, such was not the case in Portugal. The rise of a unionizing movement, visible beginning in the 1930s, shows how late it was before the disabled veteran recognized to himself the right to a public voice.

Within the framework of the postwar period and of a conflict that demands to be forgotten, the disabled seek to resignify their position from beggars of state charity to an appreciation of their sacrifice, their disability a positive attribute, gained in the service of the homeland. More than monetary compensations, their wish was for moral recognition. They longed for the “bounty of the heroic sacrifices given in honor of the glorious combat, so that Portugal could take pride in keeping its honorable place among the allied nations.”⁶³

The display of injury as a positive value derives from the necessary overcoming of individual and collective trauma. Joy Damousi understands that the “[d]isabled men had to find another language of self and identity, one which would expose but downplay the extent of their wounds and afflictions. They found this language in their plea that their difference be seen as positive rather than a disadvantage, and in their claim to a heroic citizenship where their disabilities would be honored.”⁶⁴ This is how the first issue of the newspaper *O Mutilado* presented the disabled:

They don't have academic degrees, nor honorific ones. They don't have more than an average education, and some don't have even that. They have neither wealth nor political influence. They have only a few badges to adorn

⁶² Casa Pia de Lisboa (1917: 89-90), de Aurélio da Costa Ferreira, “Serviços Pedagógicos”, *A capital*, August 18, 1920.

⁶³ “I Congresso dos mutilados inválidos de guerra”, *A Guerra*, ano 1, n.º 2, February 1, 1926: 13-19.

⁶⁴ Damousi (1999: 85-102).

the chest of the loyal Portuguese they are. Badges! War crosses! Some awards recognizing their bravery, discipline, military pride, sacrifices, heroism! That is what we have. Is it little? Yes, it is little. We notice that in comparison [...] It is little. It is almost nothing but it will be enough to make us hear our voice of the sacrificed who call out for justice. It is not alms that we ask for, not alms. It is necessary. This is what we have come to demand of the conviction conceded to us. That is our program.⁶⁵

Would this group movement be responsible for the formulation of a particular image of the war, differing from the dead, those immortal and consensual heroes? Men who return are not immune to changes, seeking to shape a new identity which integrates their injuries, transforming loss and anger in political activity, claiming their place in the center of the construction of public memory of the conflict. A “paradoxical position” deeply shook the world of the disabled veteran, to the extent that “his body, which in wartime had been heralded as the icon of nationhood and manhood, exalting Victorian values of heroism, chivalry and glory, was now considered an anachronism, belonging to a premodern world. [...] The injured and the limbless became invisible in the masculine rhetoric of heroism and sacrifice.”⁶⁶

The process of recollection seeks, as such, to consolidate the myth of war experience,⁶⁷ as a nation regenerated by the sacrifice of the dead. While the war is described as a glorious sacrifice, those disabled by it do not enjoy the same role as protagonist: over the years, the memory of the trauma is annihilated in the name of concordant and homogenizing commemorative processes. According to Modris Eksteins, “to lose the recognition of their specific contribution from public commemoration would mean they would endure another loss: that of relinquishing *their* special place in the memory of war, at a time when others are trying to forget, repress or rewrite war” (Eksteins, 1989: 254-256).

In a universe of celebrations of the war experience, it becomes desirable to consecrate for a sacrifice the anonymous dead to which the state may assign the desirable qualities of a model citizen. There is a dissociation between the reality of the disabled veteran, who seeks support, work and livelihood, and the image of a commemorative process in which such a man could cause damage by the display of his injuries and his longings. While these symbolized the sacrificed nation for some, for others they

⁶⁵ *O Mutilado*, n.º 1, July 30, 1920:1.

⁶⁶ Cf. Damousi (1999: 89).

⁶⁷ Cf. Mosse (1990:7).

represented the excesses of an era best forgotten. After all, for these men the war was a memory ever present in their body and mind. The disability is a mark that persists, an indelible legacy.

The legacy of the Mutilated
When the war was over,
one of the boldest highlanders
of the small village,
the one who, upon leaving, most animated
the broken spirit of the boys,
barely containing the cascading blood in each vein;
when the war was over and he could, then, even though tired
smile again, the sun of our land,
I will go to them, minus one arm
one "War Cross" added
What a day, Lord... What a day
of joy, this day of arriving...
-- As if in a procession
the people, coming to meet him, filled the road.
And he found himself surrounded by highlanders,
looked-at with awe, with wonder,
until the months became years,
and ours became oblivion ...
Rural worker,
left arm gone, once used
- was now a useless part of the pair
The poor mutilated fellow! ...
And to add yet more torment,
- As if the suffering were slight
Forced inaction brought upon him
Always a dogged and violent cough
to shake it all - like a wind of death, the passage of a typhoon!⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Silva Tavares, "A herança do mutilado," *A Guerra*, Ano 1, n.º 3, March 1, 1926: 1.

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World War One and Authoritarian Thought in the Lusophone World

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Abstract

The goal of this article is to analyze the impacts of Portugal's participation in the First World War, especially emphasizing the construction of an authoritarian, conservative, and anti-republican culture policy. It also tries to understand the polarization process of the Portuguese Army between the conflict and the coup d'etat on 28 May, 1926.

Keywords

First World War; Portuguese Army; Rights

Resumo

O presente artigo tem por objetivo analisar os impactos da participação de Portugal na Primeira Guerra Mundial enfatizando, sobretudo, a construção de uma cultura política autoritária, conservadora e antirrepublicana. Procura também entender o processo de politização das Forças Armadas portuguesas entre o conflito e o Golpe de Estado de 28 de maio de 1926.

Palavras-chave

Primeira Grande Guerra; Exército Português, Direitas

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Introduction

Who was it that killed him? [...]

It was those who glorified the memory of the assassins of King D. Carlos and Prince Luiz Filipe, who went on pilgrimages to their graves with flowers and speeches, recommending their criminal examples to schoolchildren; it was those who herded those same children through the streets of Lisbon bearing banners with cynical emblems; it was those who taught you, the legendary people of Lisbon, to make bombs and who made every honest and obedient worker a member of a secret society, a cowardly institution by virtue of its methods, its irresponsibility and its impunity [...].²

The above text was published in a small, unsigned, and undated book, which, as its content makes clear, was written between the death of the dictator Sidónio Pais³ and the coup d'état of 28 May 1926. It demonstrates how important the construction of the ephemeral dictator's memory was for Portugal and the Portuguese.⁴ Sidónio Pais's example is not unique. After the Spanish Civil War, for example, there occurred an inflation of death-related commemorations through the perpetuation of mourning and its associated rites. The cult of the 'fallen' reached its apogee in the construction of the political myth of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, founder of the Falange. His funeral was celebrated in Burgos Cathedral, in November 1938. By then, his name had already been engraved on its outer wall, an action repeated in all of Spain's churches as they fell into Nationalist hands;

² 'Quem foi que o matou? [...]. Foram aqueles que glorificaram a memória dos assassinos do rei D. Carlos e do príncipe D. Luiz Filipe, que iam em romaria às suas sepulturas com flores e discursos apontar o seu criminoso exemplo às creanças das escolas; foram os que conduziram pelas ruas de Lisboa essas creanças exibindo pendões com distintos cynicos; foram os que te ensinaram, legendário povo de Lisboa, a fabricar bombas e que de cada trabalhador honesto e ordeiro fizeram um membro duma sociedade secreta, instituição cobarde pelos processos, pela irresponsabilidade e impunidade [...]' *Dr. Sidónio Paes*. Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal. S/R, 1918.

³ A Major in the Artillery and Professor of Integral and Differential Calculus at the University of Coimbra, Sidónio Pais (1872-1918) was always an opponent of liberalism and parliamentary democracy in Portugal. Responsible for the 1917 coup d'état, he governed Portugal as a military dictator for a year until, in December 1918, a Freemason shot him dead at Rossio train station. See Samara, 2010: 371-395.

⁴ On 28 May 1926 a coup d'état put an end to the First Portuguese Republic (1910-1926) and unveiled a military dictatorship which, beginning in 1928, underwent a transition to a corporativist civilian dictatorship under the command of the then Minister of Finance, António Oliveira Salazar. The *Estado Novo* (New State) itself came into being only in 1932 with the introduction of a new Constitution. On the timeline of the Portuguese dictatorship, see Cruz, 1988: 38-47.

to his name were added those of the respective locality's sons fallen in combat for the Nationalist cause (Calero, 2010, 257-282).

Portugal and the War: The Stymied Intervention

In Portugal, on the other hand, participation in the Great War of 1914-1918 had been so frustrating that it resulted more in embarrassment than in enthusiasm. The republican government was incapable of imposing its commemorative plans, with the result that some of the monuments intended to strengthen the collective memory of Portugal's involvement were only concluded in the 1930s or even the 1940s (Correia, 2009, 361; Correia, 2015). On the eve of the military dictatorship, the magazine *Ordem Nova* [New Order], founded by young activists from *Integralismo Lusitano*, complained of the absence of any state policy towards disabled veterans (Alvares, 1926: 195-197).

The reasons for these constraints lie in the symbiotic relationship between victory and defeat which resulted from Portugal's participation in the Great War. It is true that it was on the victorious side; but its participation as an effective force was so disastrous that one is unable to speak of it in terms of a triumph. One veteran summarized Portugal's fate in the following terms: "having joined the ranks of the victors, our attitude was that of the vanquished."⁵ Such sentiment results from the fact that Portugal was disappointed by the failure to obtain greater bargaining power in the field of international relations. Moreover, while belligerence had as an objective the quelling of internal disputes through nationalist resurgence, the result was the precise opposite: it contributed decisively to the deepening of the Republic's crisis. It seems, in fact, that demobilization and disinterest in the war were a constant from the moment war was declared until its conclusion. As the newspaper *A Monarchia* put it after the declaration of war,

Germany had just declared war on us, and the Portuguese received the terrible news without the straining of a sinew, without a nerve shuddering, without its soul soaring trembling with febrile emotion. Not a day went by without the Admiralty, or Mr. Leotte do Rego, or whoever it is that runs today's Navy, publishing official statements in the newspapers informing us that careful watch was being kept on the harbor at Lisbon, and later at Leixões and Setúbal, no ship being now able to arrive once the sun has set

⁵ Mardel Ferreira, 'Vitória Mutilada'. *A Guerra*, May 1926, cited in Meneses, 2006: 129.

– proof positive that there is the expectation that in those parts some aggressive move by the enemy is expected. And everyone shrugged their shoulders, bound together by irresponsibility and lack of sense.⁶

As the crisis deepened and the Republic's hesitations came to the fore, anti-liberal political forces begin to close ranks, achieving that unity which proved decisive for the success of the 28 May coup.

The discrediting of the Portuguese presence in the war had begun even before Portugal had effectively entered the conflict. It was as old as the offer to fight alongside Great Britain. Thus, in January 1916, *A Monarchia* gave great prominence to an article which, in a mocking tone, pointed out, "According to *The Times*, the Portuguese government, led by the present President of the Republic, *proposed, offered*, to send a Portuguese expeditionary corps to the British government."⁷ On the same page, it welcomed the war, which, in the opinion of its writers, was confirming the superiority of monarchies over republics. One could now discern

*the unquestionable triumph of the Monarchies. Whoever wins, William II or George V. But real monarchies, which have taken up once more the pure doctrinal current, which the Great Revolution had cut, and whose legal statutes will be underscored by King and cannon like. In other words, kings anointed by divine right will replace the liberal kings and the short-term heads of state.*⁸

⁶ 'A Alemanha acabára de nos declárar guerra, e o povo portuguez recebia a noticia terrivel sem o estremecimento de um musculo, sem uma cristação de nervos sem que a alma vibrasse de emoção febril. Não houve um só dia da semana finda que a Majoria ou o sr. Leotte do Rego ou lá quem dirige as coisas de Marinha, não fornecesse notas officiosas aos jornaes informando da cuidadosa vigilancia da barra do Tejo, e apoz da de Leixões e Sado, onde navio algum já pode entrar depois do sol posto, - prova de que por alli se espera alguma tentativa de agressão por parte do inimigo. E toda a gente encolheu os hombros na mesma inconsciencia e incensatez'. 'Que faz o Governo?' in *A Monarchia*. N. 13, 10 March 1916, 3. Jaime Daniel Leotte do Rego (1867-1923), mentioned in the text, reached the rank of Rear Admiral in the Portuguese Navy. He served in Mozambique and in São Tomé, of which he was Governor. A Freemason, he was one of the main proponents of Portugal's participation in the war. <http://ihc.fcsh.unl.pt/pt/recursos/biografias/item/4355-rego-jaime-daniel-leotte-do-1867-1923> Site consulted on 7 March 2016.

⁷ 'Segundo o "Times" o governo portuguez de 1914, presidido pelo actual sr. Presidente da Republica, propôz, ofereceu, ao governo inglez a ida de um corpo expedicionário portuguez para a guerra.' *A Monarchia*, 25 January 1916, 2.

⁸ 'o triumpho inadiavel das Monarchias. Vença lá quem vencer, Guilherme II ou Jorge V. Mas Monarchias a valer, retomada a corrente pura da doutrina, que a Grande Revolução cortára, e cujos estatutos foraes serão firmados pelo Rei e pelo Canhão. Quer dizer: *reis ungidos de direito divino substituirão os reis liberaes e os chefes de Estado a curto-prazo*.' 1916: Anno de pezadelo e de libertação,' in *A Monarchia*, 25 January 1916: 3.

However, this praise for the war did not imply agreement with the Portuguese interventionist project. The following month, the same newspaper questioned Portugal's capacity to wage war and the reasons which brought it into the conflict. The first problem was the good relations hitherto enjoyed with Germany: "It seems a done deal that the government will oblige Portugal to participate in the European conflict, which is none of its business [...] In the Ministry of War the mobilization of an army to go and fight is being prepared, side by side with the British, against a nation that has never attacked us."⁹ Amid much irony and criticism of the republican regime, notably of Afonso Costa, the newspaper doubted that a "general sense of indignation" could be generated.¹⁰ At the same time, *A Monarchia* noted the weakness of the Portuguese Army, which resulted from political strife within its ranks.¹¹

General Pimenta de Castro, Prime Minister between January and May 1915, had also refused the option for war. He argued first of all that Britain had unilaterally declared war on Germany, which excused Portugal from any duty towards its ally. Pimenta de Castro added that the army was not ready for such an enterprise: "To join the war in Europe today is not the same as fighting the natives in our possessions. And Portugal lacks the means and the indispensable preparations to succeed in a war with other civilized countries."¹² The article in question attacked Portugal's subservience in front of Britain and wondered about the British Empire's real strength:

Servile to the most abject of extremes [...] It seems as if England is pleased with all the unrest in Portugal, so that the Portuguese might not become citizens and she not lose this fiefdom [...] the great, the superb, the majestic British Empire, running majestically to shake the hand of, to embrace, this vile scum, might it not be in fact a decadent Empire?¹³

⁹ 'Parece que é ponto assente o governo obrigar Portugal a participar no conflicto europeu, para onde não é chamado [...] no ministerio da guerra se prepara a mobilização de um exercito para ir combater, ao lado dos inglezes, e contra uma nação que jamais nos hostilisou.' Sempre vamos à guerra? *A Monarchia*, 11 February 1916: 2.

¹⁰ 'sentimento geral de indignação.' Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² 'Ir hoje, para a guerra europeia, não é o mesmo que ir combater o gentio nas nossas possessões. E Portugal está desprovido dos elementos e dos preparos indispensaveis para se afoitar numa guerra com paizes civilizados. Uma pagina de história. O que diz o General Pimenta de Castro.' Ibid: 5-6.

¹³ 'Servis até á extrema abjecção [...] Parece que a Inglaterra se compraz com o desassocego em Portugal, para que os portuguezes não venham a fazer-se cidadãos, e ella a perder este feudo [...] O grande, o soberbo, o magestoso imperio brittanico, correndo majestosamente a apertar a mão, e abraçar essa vil canalha, acaso não será um imperio em decadencia?' Ibid:6.

The declaration of war dates back to March 1916. After a struggle between ‘interventionists’ and ‘anti-interventionists,’ the scales weighed in favor of the former when the British government asked Lisbon to seize German merchant ships which had taken refuge in Portuguese waters. Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses has written recently on tensions within the republican camp. He demonstrates that even among the main republican parties there was no consensus regarding Portugal’s participation in the conflict (Meneses, 2009, 267-276).

Consensus may well have emerged solely in relation to the absolute need to defend the country’s overseas possessions. In the face of the constant negotiations between Britain and Germany about the division of colonial space, in 1914 the Portuguese Government had dispatched troops to Africa, namely Angola and Mozambique. As Aniceto Afonso explains, “[...] although the idea of intervening in the European theatre did not generate unanimous support among republicans, no one questioned the mobilization of expeditions to Africa.”¹⁴ Many republicans, whether military or civilians, urged the need for military intervention based on the overriding need to protect these overseas possessions (Meneses, 2006, 125-126). In fact, republicans and anti-republicans alike showed that this was the sole issue capable of uniting the Portuguese.¹⁵

Uncertainty regarding the advantages of participating in the war and the well-known unpreparedness of the CEP (*Corpo Expedicionário Português*) led to a deepening of the internal crisis, constant desertions from the Army in Portugal and, in the end, Sidónio Pais’s military coup on 8 December 1917. The year-long dictatorship that followed was responsible for a slowing down of the Portuguese military effort – or, as General Ferreira Martins, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the CEP put it, its “winding down.”¹⁶

Most likely this decision to reduce the Portuguese presence at the front resulted above all from political considerations. Sidónio Pais’s priority was the nature of the regime, creating space in which civilian forces might remain active, even in wartime. The phenomenon now referred to as *Sidonismo* had as its fundamental goal the establishment of a political regime. It possessed all the elements needed to build it: a popular and charismatic leader; the reorganization of political forces, including the formation of a new party, the

¹⁴ ‘embora a ideia intervencionista no teatro europeu não tivesse apoio unânime entre os republicanos, ninguém pôs em causa a mobilização de contingentes para a África.’ Afonso, 2009: 290.

¹⁵ Thus, while after the fall of the *Estado Novo* (New State) the incoming republican political culture identified the commitment to colonialism as a hallmark of the supporters of the deposed regime, the fact remains that during the First Republic the overseas territories were viewed as a patrimony which was an integral part of the country’s national and political identity. See Monteiro; Pinto, 2005: 51-65.

¹⁶ ‘amenização.’ Martins, 1934: 333.

Partido Nacional Republicano; a rewriting of the electoral decrees, granting suffrage to the illiterate; and, finally, doctrinaire elements with which to revise the Constitution, bringing in, for example, the parliamentary representation of professional associations. This was a project for the establishment of a presidentialist and proto-corporativist regime (Ferreira, 1992: 70-71). In this way, and despite the formation of a new political party, the *Sidonista* project marked, in the eyes of its supporters, a rupture with politicians and their parties. The idea of a corporative model was thus reconciled with the negation of conflict and private interests as represented in the traditional parties. As one commentator put it, “[Sidónio Pais] was contemptuous of politicians because his great intelligence and his generous heart told him that politics was the deadly evil that had invaded the nation’s organism.”¹⁷ What was needed, then, was to recover the true national soul.

The war was thus fought half-heartedly. Although he made an effort to please the victorious regimes alongside which Portugal had fought, Sidónio Pais was viewed as a traitor by the defenders of armed intervention in the conflict. The somewhat embarrassed welcome given to the first returning veterans demonstrated the regime’s difficulty in dealing with this inheritance. Having risen to the presidency in the wake of a coup against the Republic’s leading figures, notably Afonso Costa and António José de Almeida, the dictator could not enthusiastically support a war effort begun before his brief consulate (Meneses, 2006: 111). So far as the mobilization of civil society is concerned, three distinct groupings that supported the dictatorship can be identified: first, those who were content with the declaration of a state of emergency; second, those who defended the creation of a new regime; and, finally, the monarchists, intent on restoration. Sidónio Pais hesitated between the first two alternatives, constantly rejecting the monarchist solution (Meneses, 2006: 72). In any case, a new regime, the *República Nova*, began to take shape. Of 77 senatorial seats, 28 were attributed to representatives of professional associations, including both employers or employees; doctors, lawyers and engineers; civil servants; and faculty members at universities, artistic academies, or high schools. The remaining 49 seats were attributed to the common electorate, nine of which were reserved for political minorities. In addition, the widening of the electoral body brought the number of registered voters to 900,000, increased from the 300,000 or so at the beginning of the Republic.¹⁸

¹⁷ ‘Elle despresou os politicos porque a sua grande intelligencia e o seu generoso coração lhe diziam que a politica era o mal de morte que tinha invadido o organismo da nação.’ *Dr. Sidónio Paes*. Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal. S/R, 1918.

¹⁸ *Ibid*; see also Ramos, 2009: 589.

Still, and despite the announced political reforms, there remained the feeling that *Sidonismo* would only last for as long as the war did. The *República Nova* was never more than a project without a constitutional solution. In a country that had entered the conflict in March 1916 and dispatched its first contingent to the Western Front only the following year, the coup was simply a way of marking time. A little over a month after the armistice, Sidónio Pais was assassinated at Rossio train station, in Lisbon. With this event, there began the tension between the reality of his regime and its memory, as propagated by his followers. The simple fact is that, from a strictly political point of view, the dictatorship was always an incomplete regime. There were elections but no new constitution; there were councils, but these did not deliberate. As a result, this incomplete nature, related to the fact that the enthusiasm initially generated by corporate representation had gradually cooled off, led the government to rapidly lose its credentials. The strikes that occurred throughout 1918 also led to the mounting erosion of the Sidónio Pais dictatorship (Cabral, 2007: 87). Consequently, the regime was faced once again with the choice between Monarchy or Republic, eight years after the latter's triumph (Ferreira, 1992, 73). But there was a twist: 1914-1918 were the years in which the political and ideological tendencies of a fascist or proto-fascist character began to gain traction (Cabral, 2007: 75).

The mounting crisis and the political and military turmoil of October/November 1918 led many authors, such as the republican Raul Rego and the historian José Medeiros Ferreira, to see signs of the early demise of *Sidonismo* in those months.¹⁹ However, my point is the precise opposite: the dictator's tragic death was crucial for the strengthening and the continuity of *Sidonismo* until the fall of the republican regime in 1926. Sidónio Pais was an officer and Portugal was at war for practically the whole of his tenure. Nevertheless, it was precisely the Armistice and his death which brought about a significant increase in chaotic military interventions, carried out by independent factions devoid of any institutional sense (Ferreira, 1992: 74-75). While the armed forces broke down into various factions, fragmenting and undertaking isolated and unrelated coups, civilians were busy organizing themselves. Examples of the military division can be found in the counter-revolutionary *Monarquia do Norte*, which began in the city of Porto on 19 February, three days after the pro-republican rising led by the Santarém regiment. Despite these fragmented and more or less fragile actions, it should be noted that the *Sidonista* coup and the war had politicized the Portuguese armed forces to such an extent that military intervention in politics became a constant feature of the second phase of the Republic's existence (Ferreira, 1992: 80):

¹⁹ Rego, 1978: 56; see also Ferreira, 1992: 75.

“While the question of Portugal’s participation in the war was of extreme importance to the parties and other political forces, it was absolutely decisive for the evolution of the armed forces and their growing role in the country’s political life.”²⁰

Sidónio Pais – The Reference Point for Mobilization

Corporative dictatorship, victorious under António de Oliveira Salazar, was one alternative to the increasingly worn out Republic. The repeated crises faced by Portuguese liberal republicanism questioned its ability to implement a political project on a larger scale. Against this background, various opposition groups came together to confront the existing system of liberal representation and present Portuguese society with a new alternative. In most cases, this opposition was carried out under a markedly anti-liberal profile, although there was as of yet no unanimity on some important points, such as the nature of the new regime to be built. Sidónio Pais’s tenure as President of the Republic, although brief, allowed for the creation of a set of reference points which, to a great extent, served to steer this anti-liberal militancy. Fragile though this guidance was, it was still much clearer than it had been before the *sidonista* dictatorship (Leal, 1994: 97).

In February 1918, the Integralist newspaper *A Monarquia: Diário Integralista da Tarde* set out the reasons why Integralists were now supporting Sidónio Pais: “It is with the Fatherland’s remaining soul that Mr Sidónio Pais finds himself collaborating, through one of History’s mysterious laws, in the preliminary labors of Portugal’s true restoration.”²¹ As monarchists, Integralist activists divined the possibility of a restoration in a Portugal left rudderless by liberalism and democracy. At the very least, their support allowed them the space in which to make their case for monarchy.²² Little by little, however, they came to understand, with a modicum of realism and of respect, the path set out by the dictator: “Mr Sidónio Pais, a republican, will not bring back the Monarchy, because his dignity prevents him from betraying his convictions.”²³ As a result, they defined their stance as one of “critical support” for the new regime, refusing to accept any significant position of

²⁰ ‘Se a questão da participação de Portugal na guerra foi de extrema importância para os partidos e outras forças políticas, ela foi absolutamente decisiva no que respeita à evolução das forças armadas e ao seu crescente papel na vida política do país.’ Cabral, 2007: 80.

²¹ ‘É com a alma remanescente da Pátria que o Sr. Sidónio Paes se encontra colaborando, por uma lei misteriosa da história, nos trabalhos preliminares da verdadeira restauração de Portugal.’ ‘O Senhor Sidónio Paes,’ *A Monarquia: Diário Integralista da Tarde*, n. 271, 16 February 1918.

²² Braga, Luís de Almeida. ‘Sem equívocos,’ *A Monarquia. Diário Integralista da Tarde*, n. 316, 9 March 1918.

²³ ‘O sr. Sidónio Paes, republicano, não fará a Monarquia, porque a sua dignidade o impede de trair as suas convicções.’ Raposo, Hipólito, ‘Os Modos de Sentir e Pensar a Geração Nova,’ *A Monarquia. Diário Integralista da Tarde*, n. 271, 16 February 1918.

responsibility: “Monarchists can support the government, can even serve it in political posts, but can hardly serve as ministers while they are monarchists and the Republic remains a Republic.”²⁴ Opposed to the holding of elections,²⁵ they nevertheless participated in them when they occurred: “One does not fight evil by turning one’s back on it; to the contrary, one must confront it in order to undo it.”²⁶ In any case, the adopted electoral system, which incorporated corporativist representation, was welcomed by the Integralists: “[...] the principle of technical representation, one of the fairest and most victorious aspirations to political truth, was welcomed for the principles that underpin it already and which can be used against electioneering politicians [...]”²⁷

The dictator’s death did not bring the young Republic the dreamed-of stability. Rather, the contrary happened; the crisis deepened. In this respect, it is worthwhile analyzing the perspective of anti-republican unity established by *Sidonismo*. To a large extent, it established itself against the will of the dictator. Sidónio Pais, like so many men of his time, drank from the waters of positivism and scientism and was close to the ‘advanced ideas’ of the Republic and Freemasonry, going as far as to display sympathy for the radical and socializing perspective of French republicans; Émile Zola at their head (Silva, 2003: 55). At the same time, the fact that he had served the Republic’s government in Berlin as Ambassador to Imperial Germany did not make him pro-German, as much of the literature he generated seeks to establish (Cabral, 2007: 75-95). In correspondence dated May 1914 and addressed to his friend and former Minister of Industry and Commerce in the first years of the Republic, Manuel de Brito Camacho, Sidónio called for the strengthening of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Among the reasons for this was the protection of Portugal’s colonies. It is true that he attempted to prevent both the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Germany and Portugal’s intervention in the war. However, it was not Germanophilia which drove him, but rather fears for the future of the Republic should it involve itself in a conflict outside Africa (Silva, 2003: 66). His profile was thus very

²⁴ ‘Os monárquicos podem apoiar o governo, podem mesmo servi-lo em cargos que sejam políticos, mas dificilmente serão ministros enquanto forem monárquicos e a republica fôr republica.’ Monsaraz, Conde de. ‘Ressentimentos,’ *A Monarquia. Diário Integralista da Tarde*. N. 354, 15 May 1918.

²⁵ Amaral, João do, ‘O Integralismo no Parlamento,’ *A Monarquia. Diário Integralista da Tarde*, n. 278, 17 January 1918.

²⁶ ‘Não é voltando as costas para um mal que ele se combate, é pelo contrário indo ao seu encontro que se pode obter sua correcção.’ Cordeiro, Xavier, ‘Os Modos de Sentir e Pensar da Geração Nova,’ *A Monarquia. Diário Integralista da Tarde*, n. 347, 18 April 1918.

²⁷ ‘o princípio de representação técnica, uma das aspirações a verdade política mais justa e mais vitoriosa foi bem acolhido pelas bases que se dela aproveitam já hoje e apenas vieram combater os políticos eleicoeiros [...]’ Raposo, Hipólito, ‘As Classes no Senado,’ *A Monarquia. Diário Integralista da Tarde*, n. 361, 8 May 1918.

different from the religious and mythical character which some of his followers attempted to impose on him – a character fused with the very history of the country itself:

Great People, rich deposit of the Nation's noblest traditions, magnanimous people who with your arms built this Fatherland [...] Your History is made of Apostles of an Ideal. That is why you acclaimed him as an envoy from Heaven, who had come not just to drive out a criminal government and a criminal president, and an unworthy parliament, moneylenders at the Temple of the Fatherland, but also to restore peace to your conscience, order and tranquility to your home, bread and comfort to your sons, and exalt in foreign eyes this beloved Fatherland, as unhappy as it is loved.

On the altar of the Fatherland, in the sacred pantheon of those great Portuguese, which either genius or sanctity immortalized, you have just placed, amid flowers and tears, in a sweet corner, the great President – for he was as brave and heroic as Nun'Álvares, as idealistic and fearless in the discovery of new horizons and serene in the realization of a great dream as the Prince of Sagres [Henry the Navigator], as Vasco da Gama, as the Corte-Reais.²⁸

In this sense, it is worth reinforcing the idea that *Sidonismo* was a victorious ideology. The actual opinions and values of the dead dictator counted for little. Despite its difficulties in consolidating itself as a regime, it preserved its ability to bring together all the forces opposed to the Republic. Sidónio's death, thus, gave life to *sidonismo*.

The Integralists, who, as we have seen, had positioned themselves as 'critical supporters' of Sidónio, began to see the murdered dictator as a destiny-assigned reference point for Portugal. Nevertheless, they continued to point to Sidónio's insistence on a republic as his great weakness: "He who Freemasonry pushed off his chimera-like pedestal

²⁸ 'Grande Povo, rico depositario das mais nobres tradições da Nação, povo magnanimo que fizeste com teu braço esta Pátria... [...]. E é de Apostolos do Ideal que a tua historia é feita. Por isso o aclamaste, como a um enviado do Céu, que viera não só a expulsar um governo e um presidente criminosos, e um parlamento indigno, vendilhões do Templo da Pátria, mas a trazer a paz á tua consciência, a ordem e a tranquilidade ao teu lar, o pão e o conforto aos teus filhos, a engrandecer aos olhos estrangeiros esta querida Pátria, quanto mais infeliz tanto mais estremecida.

No altar da Pátria, no pantheon sagrado dos grandes Portugueses, que o génio ou a santidade immortalizou, tu acabas de collocar, por entre flores e lagrimas num cantinho bem carinhoso o grande Presidente – porque elle foi corajoso e heroico como Nun'Álvares, idealista, temerario na descoberta de novos horizontes e sereno na realização dum grande sonho, como o Infante de Sagres, como Vasco da Gama ou como Côrtes Reaes [...]' *Dr. Sidónio Paes*. Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal. S/R, 1918.

was the victim of the regime which he tried to save. Sidónio Pais never understood that he was an instrument in the hands of destiny and that he could not have done as he wished.”²⁹ Despite this difference, even these most autonomous of supporters, so wary of a formal engagement with *Sidonismo*, did not stop evoking the dictator.

Ideological currents, political parties, and civic associations of a conservative and authoritarian nature allowed for convergence within various segments of opposition to the Republic. Among the former, although divided into republican and monarchist factions, unification occurred around a nationalist, anti-liberal and authoritarian project. Among the political parties, one can cite the *Partido Republicano Conservador* and the *Partido Nacional Republicano Presidencialista*. As far as civic associations are concerned, *Ação Nacionalista – Centro do Nacionalismo Lusitano*, *Ação Nacional* and *Cruzada Nacional Nun’Álvares Pereira* all deserve a mention. This was a space disputed by republicans and monarchists alike, which allowed for a widening of the anti-republican field.

The growth of anti-liberal groups did not mean, however, that there was unity among them. In its very first edition, the Magazine *Ordem Nova* pointed towards the fragmentation of the various political currents, even on the right. Curiously, it was those who were most independent within the various rightist tendencies who denounced their lack of unity:

One day we open *A Época* and we read Mr Alfredo Pimenta calling the *Diário de Lisboa* “our esteemed colleague,” just when Mr Raul Proença, in a most honorable attitude, must deal with the anger of the mainstream press for a noble gesture in the face of a proposal to play an acting part in a farce of the ‘court of honor’ variety. Then it is the Saviors of *Cruzada Nun’Álvares* who behave like epileptics at the Nationalist Congress, losing all prestige in the eyes of the country, every day warier and more disappointed with elixirs... In today’s Portugal, leaving aside some small groups, there is no homogenous party, no united current. Where one finds four men with identical points of view (or an identical lack of points of view, which is also common), one will find also a tendency for that group to split into two

²⁹ ‘Aquele que a Maçonaria fez tombar para sempre do seu pedestal de quimera foi uma vítima do regimen que pretendeu dar visibilidade. Sidónio Pais não chegou a compreender que era um instrumento nas mãos do Destino e que jamais poderia guiar ao seu gosto.’ Correia, Félix, ‘O Símbolo’, *A Monarquia. Diário Integralista da Tarde*, n. 515, 8 January 1919.

groups of two. Soon one will have to include a heading, in the laws that govern associations and the rules of collectives, entitled “On the Split.”³⁰

As a result, the presumed unity of the right was the result of a victorious coup rather than of a unified program of action. Of course, the postwar setting strengthened a Pan-European sentiment of opposition to the liberal system. Portugal was not, as a result, an isolated case. It is not for nothing that Eric Hobsbawm labelled these years the “Fall of Liberalism” (Hobsbawm, 1995: 113-143). Other events, foremost among them the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, must therefore be seen as elements to consider in the European – and world – crisis of the 1910s and 1920s. In the Portuguese case, wherein a comparison can be established with the case of Primo de Rivera in Spain, the memory of Sidónio Pais as a fallen hero strengthened not only anti-liberalism but also the prospect of an intervention by the Armed Forces (Leal, 1994: 161). In this way, civic associations and political parties opened the way for military action and the resulting overthrow of the republican regime.

Conclusion

The First World War played a key role in the fall of the First Republic and the subsequent rise of the *Estado Novo*. Alongside the military question that was opened up by the notorious failure of the Portuguese army’s participation in the fighting in Flanders, there stood the coup d’état carried out by Sidónio Pais. The two episodes, participation in the conflict and the dictatorship, contributed decisively towards the politicization of the armed forces, which took up the moralizing discourse of order against the anarchy of ‘politicians.’ The many *pronunciamentos* which occurred between Sidónio Pais’ murder and the victorious coup of 28 May 1926 prove this. Nevertheless, civic forces also reorganized

³⁰ ‘Um dia abrimos “A Epoca” e vemos o sr. Alfredo Pimenta a chamar *nosso prezado colega* ou coisa assim ao “Diário de Lisboa”, justamente quando o sr. Raul Proença numa atitude honrosíssima, arrosta com as iras da grande imprensa e tem um nobre gesto perante a proposta que lhe faziam para tomar parte como actor numa fantochada género “pendencia de honra”. Depois são os Salvadores da Patria da Cruzada Nun’Alvares que nos aparecem epiléticos no Congresso Nacionalista, desprestigiando-se perante o País, cada vês mais desenganado e desiludido dos elixires... Não há hoje em Portugal, tirando um ou outro grupo pequeno, um partido homogêneo, uma corrente unida. Onde há quatro homens com pontos de vista idênticos, (ou com idêntica ausência de pontos de vista, o que também é vulgar), há também a tendência para se scindir esse agrupamento em dois grupos de dois. Dentro em pouco será preciso incluir nas leis sobre associação e nos estatutos das colectividades um titulo denominado: “Da Scisão”...’ ‘Signos Tristes,’ *Ordem Nova*, Year 1, Vol. 1, 1925: 36. The text makes a reference to Raul Proença (1884-1941), republican and democrat. See Reis, António. *Raul Proença, biografia de um intelectual político republicano*, Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional – Casa da Moeda, 2003.

themselves – if slowly – along anti-liberal lines. The various conservative blueprints – republican or monarchist – provided proof of the growing isolation of republican Jacobinism. The latter's ability to sustain the regime in the name of a long-term project was ebbing away. Not all who opposed the republicans, of course, were *Sidonistas*. Many had even opposed the dictator, but his tragic death and the return to power of a bankrupt regime suited all of the opponents. It became both a point of reference and a focus of reverence. All that was missing was the unity that 1926 would bring: unity of the Army and civic forces *against* the Republic. The path to take could be decided after the regime's overthrow. As in war, the death of Sidónio Pais was transformed into a source of commemoration. There is no need here to consider the degree of sincerity or opportunism of those who evoked the first of Coimbra's dictators. What mattered for Portugal was their efficiency – about which there can be no question.

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World War One and Brazilian Cultural Life

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Abstract

Addressing the repercussions of the First World War on Brazilian cultural life, this article highlights the conflictual relationship between Brazil and Portugal during the Brazilian First Republic. Rio de Janeiro's urban reform, which aimed at transforming the capital into a 'tropical Paris' (proof of the country's modernization and its accession to the *belle époque*), was seen to represent liberation from the colonial past. However, the War shattered these illusions and overthrew the trust hitherto placed in the values of European civilization, now considered decadent. New diagnoses and therapies began to guide nationalist political movements. Old struggles were brought up to date and the Portuguese legacy was once more reevaluated.

Keywords

First Republic; Anti-Lusitanian Nationalism; Pereira Passos Reform; *Carioca Belle Époque*; Reinvention of Brazil.

Resumo

Ao abordar as repercussões da Primeira Guerra na vida cultural brasileira o artigo destaca a conflituosa relação entre Brasil e Portugal durante a Primeira República. A libertação do passado colonial vai ser representada pela reforma urbana do Rio que pretende transformar a capital em uma "Paris tropical" – prova da modernização e do ingresso do país na *belle époque*. A Guerra destrói tais ilusões e derruba a confiança nos valores da civilização europeia considerada então como decadente. Novos diagnósticos e novas terapias passam a guiar movimentos políticos de cunho nacionalistas. Antigos combates são reatualizados e a herança portuguesa vai ser novamente reavaliada.

Palavras-chave

Primeira República; nacionalismo antilusitano; reforma Pereira Passos; *belle époque* carioca; reinvenção do Brasil.

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Cultural relations between Brazil and the other countries of South America have long been marked by a process of construction of identities and otherness that alternate over time. The evaluation made by monarchist historians of Latin America, for example, emphasized the difficulties faced by the South American Republics and the benefits derived from Brazilian independence having been achieved with the continuity provided by its monarchist regime. One can cite as an example Eduardo Prado and his book, *A Ilusão Americana*, written in 1893. For this author, Spanish America, when its independence movements adopted the North American model throughout the nineteenth century, had turned its back on its own traditions. While the United States was accused by Prado of having an aggressive, tyrannical, arrogant, and opportunistic foreign policy, the Republics of Spanish America were identified with militarism and authoritarianism. For Prado, it was the imperial regime in Brazil that warded off authoritarianism by then suffocating the other countries of South America.

The end of the nineteenth and the start of the twentieth centuries witnessed an enormous wave of European immigrants who came to 'build America.' The United States was the principal destination although Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil also received large numbers of migrants. From Europe arrived not only immigrants but also ideas that proclaimed the superiority of pure over mixed races and of whites over blacks. Some segments of Brazil's intellectual class, influenced by these doctrines, began to ascribe greater importance to the biological, or racial, component of social relations. Brazil began to be regarded as a backward and even sick society, since it was largely made up of 'inferior' races and a miscegenated population, both identified as obstacles to progress and social harmony. As a result, the great wave of mostly European immigration was welcomed not only because it resolved the problem of replacing slave labor but also because it made possible the 'whitening' of Brazil, by altering the composition of the miscegenated population.

Relations with Portugal

Relations between Portugal, the creator, and Brazil, the creation, were always turbulent. At the start of the twentieth century, many Brazilian intellectuals viewed the two countries' common past as valuable, since it made possible the affirmation of their country's European origins. For others, however, the common past should not be emphasized, since it was imperative to overcome the experience of having once been a Portuguese colony. They believed affirming a national identity and rejecting the identification with Portugal was necessary. In other words, while for Brazil highlighting the

differences was necessary, for Portugal, emphasis was placed on a permanence and continuity that extended to the Portuguese colonies in Africa, as well, preserving them from conflict.

In Rio de Janeiro, then the federal capital, Paulo Barreto (who pen name was João do Rio) was one of the Brazilian intellectuals who set great store by the Luso-Brazilian tradition. However, the role played by the Portuguese in the city's press fed into the strong anti-Portuguese sentiment characteristic of Rio de Janeiro. In the 1910s and 1920s, *cariocas* poked fun at their Portuguese ancestors while *paulistas* exalted the *bandeirantes*, a unique combination of Renaissance-era Portuguese and indigenous Americans (Lessa, 2002).

1908 saw the inauguration of the Centennial Commemorative Exhibition of the Opening of the Ports² in Rio de Janeiro. The Opening of the Ports was presented as Brazil's certificate of economic independence, which had come about before the political independence attained later, in 1822. These commemorations should have been attended by King Carlos I, but his assassination in February 1908 put an end to the visit and, two years later, to the Portuguese monarchy itself.

The Exhibition demonstrated what Brazil had achieved over the course of one hundred years and what it hoped to achieve in the future to come. For three months, the state pavilions and the four sections – agriculture, livestock, industry, and liberal arts – exhibited their successes. Moreover, the Exhibition, as was typical of the age, was the site of sporting and festive activities such as a roller-coasters, shooting ranges, skating, hot-air-balloon rides, and fireworks. Visitors could also purchase the Exhibition's postcards, making the event better known across Brazil and throughout the world through their correspondence with family and friends. Reviews such as *O Malho* and *Careta* provided a rich report of the Exhibition.

The staging of the Exhibition was meant to consecrate, so to speak, a deep movement of modernization, wherein progress and civilization were symbolized by the modernization of cities. Urban reform, improvements, and embellishment were presented as alternatives to the chaos and backwardness of colonial-era cities.

The Modernization of the Capital

As the twentieth century began, new comparisons began to be made between Brazil, now a Republic, and other comparable regimes of Latin America. The progress and

² Exposição Comemorativa do Centenário da Abertura dos Portos.

wealth of Argentina both seduced and threatened Brazilians at a time when Buenos Aires began to be considered the continent's most European city. In 1900, President Campos Sales visited Argentina, accompanied by a delegation composed of ministers, politicians, and journalists. Among them was journalist and poet Olavo Bilac who, upon his return, could not hide his admiration for the "new Argentine capital"³ and began to campaign for reforms to Rio de Janeiro (Freire, 2003). In the first decade of the twentieth century, and with the strong backing of the city's press, which acted as a cheerleader for this "civilizational project,"⁴ the capital underwent a modernization process that helped to build the image of a country aligned with the imaginary of a civilized Europe. In Rio de Janeiro, this project entailed urban reforms aimed at transforming the city into a 'tropical Paris.'

Rio de Janeiro's urban reform, carried out under the stewardship of prefect Pereira Passos, was implemented over the space of three years and submitted the insalubrious colonial city to a standard of modernization that had as its ultimate point of reference Haussman's transformation of Paris. It was deemed necessary to overcome the lack of hygiene noted by health experts, putting an end to the habits which favored the transmission of diseases, and action was indeed taken. In 1903, the Port Works Building Commission,⁵ led by an engineer, Paulo de Frontin, was created; it was charged with organizing projects as well as negotiating compulsory purchases, sales, and exchanges of property. Another commission, charged with fiscal and administrative matters, included in its ranks various illustrious names, among them another engineer, Francisco Bicalho, who had earlier, in 1897, cooperated with Aarão Reis in the building commission charged with creating a new capital for Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte.

The capital's reform included the construction of a quayside avenue (Rodrigues Alves), linking Mauá Square with another avenue running alongside the Mangue Canal (Francisco Bicalho). The opening of Avenida Central, two kilometers long, was made possible by the demolition of some 700 buildings and the relocation of the population – street traders, shopkeepers, and artisans – who lived in tenements. In 1910, various buildings of a monumental or eclectic nature appeared on Avenida Central, among them the Academy of Fine Arts,⁶ the National Library, the Supreme Federal Court, and the Municipal Theatre. The opening of the Beira-Mar and Mem de Sá Avenues was also a

³ 'nova capital platina.'

⁴ 'projeto civilizatório'.

⁵ 'Comissão Construtora das Obras do Porto'.

⁶ 'Escola Nacional de Belas Artes'.

response to problems of public health. In addition, it facilitated the movement of goods and persons and created new urban social spaces (Bechimol, 2003).

The modernization of the city was carried out in accordance with a French pattern, giving rise to what is known as the *carioca belle époque*. Avenida Central began to function as the shop-window for progress, making possible the expression of an elite culture where fashion and décor were given prominence. This Francophile transformation of the capital can be traced through its illustrated reviews, department stores, theatres, cafés, and salons, where an upwardly mobile population learned new codes of conduct and displayed its optimism regarding what the future held in store (Needel, 1993). In this way, the project for the city's improvement, which had as its most prominent achievement the Avenida Central, synthesized the effort to rectify outdated customs and ushered the capital into the *belle époque*, as it was referred to by the magazines of the time. Pre-war cosmopolitanism permitted, as well, advances in the field of journalism, which allowed intellectuals, for the first time, to flourish independently of the State subsidies – one case in point being Olavo Bilac. *Kosmos* and *Revista da Semana* were the main organs for the dissemination of the new type of desired society; in other words, the project for the Europeanization of the Republic's capital. "Rio is becoming civilized,"⁷ an oft-repeated phrase at the time, embodied the effort to reform the city center, bringing light to the alleys, destroying tenements, controlling epidemics, and driving the poor away from the capital's central space.

This project of civility implemented by its elites lent the capital French airs, as has already been mentioned, leading to a rift with the society that existed not only in the surrounding hills but also in many of the city center's streets, deemed much closer to those of an 'oriental city.' Rio was thus divided between a worldly cosmopolitanism and ancient patterns of behavior that did not disappear, and that have not disappeared still, from many urban areas.

The Impact of War

The First World War, as is well known, brought about a reorganization of the modern world. It unleashed social tensions that resulted in the Russian Revolution of 1917. The war also marked the end of North American isolationism and brought about the collapse of backward empires – Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. The Ottoman Empire, which aligned itself with the Central Powers, would lose, in the post-war

⁷ 'O Rio civiliza-se'.

settlements, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon to France and the United Kingdom; it would give way to the modern Turkish Republic, recognized by the Allies in 1923.

Military clashes and the terrible conditions endured by soldiers in the trenches provoked the death of some eight million combatants; there were also some 20 million wounded. Thanks to the war, the idea of international fraternity gave way to patriotic sentiment, love for one's motherland and for one's people. Declarations of war were received by the various peoples with demonstrations of support for their respective nations. The conflict also brought about changes to social and even familial relations. Women, for example, assumed positions in the labor market hitherto reserved for men and would also find themselves close to the battle lines through activities such as nursing.

Brazil only entered the conflict in its final stages as a result of attacks by German submarines against its merchant vessels. These resulted in protests on the streets of the capital in 1917 against the sinking of these ships and in favor of a declaration of war. The war on the other side of the Atlantic began to receive greater press coverage, with newspapers disseminating arguments both for and against intervention. One of the Brazilian government's initiatives, beyond the patrolling of the South Atlantic, was the dispatch of a medical mission whose members were badly affected by the 1918 Spanish Flu epidemic, contracted while stopping over on the African coast. Although limited, Brazil's involvement in the conflict allowed it to be represented at the Paris Peace Conference and to see its complaints addressed. Of these, the most significant was financial compensation for all the coffee delivered to Germany before the war's outbreak but consumed during the conflict, as well as the confirmation of the ownership of seized German merchant vessels. In this way, Brazil joined the League of Nations, created by the Versailles Treaty.

Brazilian Intellectuals and the Conflict

The First World War's outbreak in 1914, bringing into conflict France and Germany, two of the main paradigms of progress and civilization, was a shock to the optimistic universe of *belle époque* Rio de Janeiro. The war would soon divide Brazilian intellectuals among those who defended pan-German conceptions and those who upheld their Francophile beliefs – a current that, it should be noted, had long-standing traditions in Brazilian culture (Carelli, 1994).

A period marked by trust in the achievement of mankind and in the liberal ideas dominant from 1870 to 1914 had come to an end. During the war and in the postwar years, space was created for other ideas, which questioned the way in which progress, or what was

viewed as progress, was measured. So-called avant-garde movements proliferated, as did the manifestos which sought to alter established standards in the various fields of art and culture.

Europe had been, from 1870 to 1914, Brazil's most important point of reference, but the country was also conscious of its own greatness in terms of territorial dimension, natural resources, and variety of populations. This made it imperative to think differently from many European countries, including Portugal, the old metropole. A new nation could only be built if Brazil's singularities, its potential, and also the obstacles it faced were recognized. If hitherto the climactic and racial characteristics of Brazil and its people had been understood as hurdles to the country's progress, reformists and nationalists of the period explained that this was because the elites saw themselves and the country as a whole through the prism of a European mentality. However, it was precisely this mentality that began to change as a result of the war, since it was increasingly thought that Brazilians could not and should not retain their subservience to decadent European values. It was imperative to struggle against the vice of imitation, the simple desire to copy, in order to create a more modern and more Brazilian Brazil.

In order to break with the mentality encapsulated in the term "mimicry,"⁸ attention had to be redirected to Brazil's own roots. The motto of the times was "rethink Brazil."⁹ Intellectuals gave themselves the task of finding the country's true culture wherever it may lie, whether in a historical past or even in times immemorial. Thanks to this spirit of reinvention, the Brazilian people themselves began to be seen as the starting point of the nationality; the 'popular' gained pride of place as the original source of Brazilian cultural authenticity.

In this same context, a great effort was made to study national problems, which gave rise to many different diagnoses and the prescription of therapies capable of bringing progress to the country. Each of these was produced and defended by groups who stood out in the intellectual panorama of the 1910s and 1920s. Writers, poets, journalists, doctors, and engineers were summoned to a crusade whose ultimate goal was the creation of a new nation. Alberto Torres, Oliveira Vianna, and Monteiro Lobate were some of the most prominent intellectuals who, beginning in the mid 1910s, began to denounce, each in his own way, the existence of an archaic Brazil; backward and led by an incompetent political class.

One common diagnostic was that of a lack of patriotism. This assessment could be found, for example, in the interventions of the already mentioned poet and journalist

⁸ 'mimetismo'.

⁹ 'Repensar o Brasil'.

Olavo Bilac, who campaigned for the introduction of obligatory military service. This measure was also defended by the Liga de Defesa Nacional, from 1916 onwards. In 1918, the Pro-Health League¹⁰ was founded to campaign for the carrying out of essential health initiatives, designed to root out disease. Among its members were counted famous doctors such as Afrânio Peixoto, Belisário Pena, and Artur Neiva (Lima, 1999).

Other intellectuals saw in the cosmopolitanism of the cities the source of the desire to mimic European standards. From this perspective, the culture of the coastal cities was seen as degraded, or corrupted, by foreign influences. Their counterpoint was the interior (*sertão*) and its inhabitant, the *sertanejo*; these were considered the true representatives of the nationality. There thus began a movement of rediscovery of Brazil's regions and their folklore, which went hand-in-hand with the growing nationalist movement and had in Catulo da Paixão Cearense one of its best known names.

A New Wave of Anti-Lusitanian Nationalism

After the First World War, new light was shed on the question of the construction of Brazilian national identity. New models of national identity came into being and began to compete with each other.

In Rio de Janeiro, the nationalism of Álvaro Bomilcar and the Nativist Propaganda¹¹ movement led to a rebirth of republican Jacobinism, now expressed as “anti-lusitanianism.”¹² In 1920, Bomilcar published *A Política no Brasil ou o Nacionalismo Radical* in which he asserted that one of Brazil's gravest problems was that it was a product of Portuguese colonialism. This was so, firstly, because of slavery; the Portuguese had devastated Asia and Africa, not just Brazil, turning the activity of seizing free men only to sell them as slaves into a legal branch of commerce (Oliveira, 1990). Secondly, according to this author, the Lusitanian influence could also be felt in the intolerance and hostility still manifested against those Brazilians who had the misfortune of descending from Africans or the dispossessed indigenous populations. As proof of his theories, Álvaro Bomilcar pointed to the progress experienced in Brazil's southernmost states, precisely those in which Portugal's influence was not as strong.

Bomilcar also railed against those intellectuals who could not, in the name of an ancestral linguistic inheritance, move on from philology and the debate surrounding a

¹⁰ Liga Pró-Saneamento.

¹¹ ‘Propaganda Nativista’

¹² ‘antilusitanismo’.

spelling reform. Brazilians had inherited a language – considered by Alexandre Herculano to be the tomb of thought – which then isolated Brazilians from global intellectual exchanges. According to this author, Brazil's language was Brazilian, with its own syntax, prosody, style, and vocabulary, all different from Portuguese. Álvaro Bomilcar chose Portugal as the target of his attacks, following in the footsteps of a current that included Manuel Bonfim, and which refused to accept the Portuguese inheritance as beneficial to Brazil (Botelho, 2002).

This being the case the case, the debate over the ills, the shortcomings, and the problems of the Brazilian nation was reenergized in the years surrounding the First World War, with Portuguese colonialism once again denounced as responsible for the country's backwardness (Oliveira, 2006; Ramos, Serpa, and Paulo, 2001). Nevertheless, at this precise moment the Francophile Olavo Bilac emerged as one of the authors who reaffirmed the positive aspects of the inheritance of the Portuguese world. While Bilac's first trip to Europe, in 1890, was dominated by literary interests, his 1914 and 1916 trips saw primacy being given to his role as a nationalist ideologue. He was one of the mainstays of the nationalist cause, defending the integrity of language shared by Portugal and Brazil. During the First World War, Bilac placed himself at the forefront of the struggle for the defense of primary and practical education, as well as obligatory military service. Bilac, the "prince of the poets,"¹³ became the "worker of the nation,"¹⁴ involving himself in a number of civic campaigns for the above ends as well as the creation of the Liga de Defesa Nacional (Dimas, 2006).

It should be noted, however, that Manuel Bonfim, anti-lusitanian, and Olavo Bilac, supporter of the Portuguese world, joined forces to write a most interesting children's book. *Através do Brasil* combines fiction and history and presents an "educational journey"¹⁵ in which the main characters mature as they travel across the country. The book functions as a type of civic catechism capable of nurturing a new national sentiment among all those who are being educated at school.

Manuel Bonfim and Olavo Bilac both defended education as the way to triumph over backwardness. They were preoccupied, and busied themselves, with the moral reform of society; the construction of the nation and the production of standard-bearers for the project of modernization. By presenting their work in this manner, they eventually defined a social identity for Brazilian intellectuals (Botelho, 2002).

¹³ 'príncipe dos poetas'.

¹⁴ 'operário da nação'.

¹⁵ 'jornada educativa'.

In other words, from 1910 onwards there began a great debate about the country's future, and against this background the Portuguese legacy was reevaluated once more. The Great War put an end to the blind cult of Europe and generated a sense of disappointment. As such, it allowed for the rereading of the former colony's history and the organization of political movements of a nationalist nature. As Compagnon puts it, the image of a European civilization crumbled (Compagnon, 2014). If at its start the war was often presented as a clash between French civilization and German barbarism, over time this was replaced by another interpretation – that of the collapse of European civilization in its totality. The models which had hitherto guided Latin Americans in general, and Brazilians in particular, in their search for modernity, lost their validity; radical optimism regarding the progress of humanity and boundless faith regarding the civilizing virtues of the Old World were abruptly interrupted thanks to the violence of the battlefields.

The war amounted to the eruption of the tragedy of a civilization and marked the definitive end of the nineteenth and the start of the twentieth centuries. The “collapse of a civilization” and “dark times” were expressions frequently employed during this period. At the war's end, and with its wounds still raw, the world then had to face the Spanish Flu epidemic, which claimed nineteen million lives. It was as if one tragedy overshadowed the other (Brito, 1997).

It should be noted, finally, that many of the nationalist movements which marked the political and cultural realms of the interwar period had only an ephemeral existence. Others, busy with the (re)discovery of Brazilian roots, played a significant role in the 1920s. It is also important to recall the rebirth of colonial architecture that put a premium on traditional Luso-Brazilian inspiration. This trend, which in both Brazil and Spanish America was known as neo-colonial, was known as *casa Portuguesa* in Portugal itself.

The apogee of neo-colonial architecture, which had as its greatest exponent the doctor and historian José Mariano Filho (1881-1946), came in 1922 during the Brazil Centennial International Exhibition,¹⁶ which contained many pavilions built in the neo-colonial style (Pinheiro, 2011). 1922 also witnessed the staging of a Modern Art Week in São Paulo.¹⁷ And this was the decade in which the rediscovery of colonial cities took place, notably those of Minas Gerais, visited by *paulista* modernists in 1924.

All of these developments can be considered, from a wider perspective, as the unfolding of the First World War in Brazil.

¹⁶ Exposição Internacional do Centenário da Independência

¹⁷ 'Semana de Arte Moderna'.

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The First World War in Portuguese East Africa: Civilian and Military Encounters in the Indian Ocean

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Abstract

The Great War witnessed the most important military operation carried out by Portuguese troops outside the country's borders during the first half of the twentieth Century. Portugal was the only country involved in the conflict which, between 1914 and 1916, was able to preserve a position of undeclared neutrality in Europe and, simultaneously, wage war against Germany in Africa. The defense of the Portuguese colonial empire's integrity has often been signaled by historians as one of the factors which justified the declaration of war against Germany in March 1916 and Portugal's participation in the European theatre of operations alongside its ally, Great Britain, from early 1917 onwards. This article seeks to analyze the way in which the Great War was considered by the colonies, especially Mozambique, by discussing the Portuguese military intervention and the way it was understood and witnessed by civilian and military figures alike.

Keywords

East Africa; World War One; Mozambique; Empire; Mobilization.

Resumo

A Grande Guerra foi a maior operação militar no exterior em que participaram tropas portuguesas durante a primeira metade do século XX. Portugal foi o único país envolvido no conflito que, entre 1914 e 1916, conseguiu manter uma posição de neutralidade não declarada na Europa e travar, simultaneamente, uma guerra em África contra a Alemanha. A defesa da integridade do império colonial português, tem sido apontada pela historiografia como um dos factores apresentados para justificar a declaração de guerra à Alemanha, em Março de 1916, e a participação portuguesa no teatro de guerra europeu, ao lado da aliada Grã-Bretanha, no início de 1917. Este artigo procura analisar o modo como a Grande Guerra foi encarada pelas colónias, nomeadamente, por Moçambique, discutindo a intervenção militar portuguesa e a forma como esta foi entendida e acompanhada por civis e militares.

Palavras Chave

África Oriental; Primeira Guerra Mundial; Moçambique; Império; Mobilização

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
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‘The European, civilized and educated, must nevertheless copy the loyalty and character displayed by coloured soldiers. This truth cannot be denied, however difficult it may be for many puritans to swallow’.²

Crossroads

East Africa’s strategic importance grew from the late nineteenth century onwards. The British Ultimatum of 1890 – by which London demanded the removal of the military forces commanded by Major Serpa Pinto from the territory that links Mozambique to Angola – was an example of the global reach of European imperialism during the late 1800s; it would eventually force Portugal into having to fight to preserve its place in the political geography of both Europe and Africa. When analyzing the Republic’s mobilization for the war in Africa, it should be kept in mind that the generation in power when the conflict began in Europe, in the summer of 1914, had already experienced the ultimatum and had subsequently publicly criticized the policy of acquiescence to British interests undertaken by King D. Carlos, considering it nothing short of a national humiliation. According to republican propaganda, the idea of the indispensability of a single and indivisible empire, whose defense must be assured at all costs, rested, from the start, on a much wider and complex question: that of ensuring that the change in political regime at home resulted in a revitalization of the empire. In a recent work, Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses asserts that it was “the sight of others fighting over Africa [...] which had finally awoken [...] Portugal from its colonial lethargy” (Meneses, 2014: 333-334).

² ‘O europeu, civilizado e culto, ainda tem de ir copiar as atitudes leais e os rasgos de caracter do soldado de cor. Embora isso lhe pese, não pode negar esta verdade, dura de mais para que muitos puritanos a possam engolir em seco.’ Simões, 1933: 143-144.



Map 1: The Partition of Africa 1885-1914

East Africa's strategic importance for the British Empire resided in the fact that it controlled the safety of the Suez Canal and therefore the shortest route to India and the Far East. As World War I began, East Africa was a mosaic of European colonies and protectorates. To the north, there were French Somaliland, the British Protectorate of Somaliland, and Italian Somaliland. The British East Africa Protectorate and the British Protectorate of Uganda were at the center, and to the south were German East Africa (Tanganyika) and Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique). Two states remained as independent entities, Abyssinia and the Sultanate of Zanzibar. The whole region had been crisscrossed by Portuguese sailors and merchants for over 400 years.



Map 2: German East Africa c. 1914.

Immigration from western India into East Africa was sizable and encouraged informally by Indian employers and British agents. The German and British railways, inland shipping, postal and telegraph corporations, banking and government administrative developments brought hundreds of Goanese men to East Africa where, by 1911, their wives and families had begun to join them in the city coast, notably in Zanzibar, Mombasa, Tanga, and Dar-es-Salaam. Indian emigration to East Africa was incentivized and even encouraged, informally, by both the Indians and the British (Hawley, 2008). During the Anglo-Boer War, the British commander, Lord Roberts, had requested permission from the Portuguese government for his forces to cross Mozambique in order to facilitate an attack on the Transvaal from the north. Many Boers, as a result of this conflict, eventually settled in Mozambique, where they remained even after peace was restored.

When Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian imperial throne, was murdered in Sarajevo, little more than 10,500 Portuguese whites lived in Mozambique.

The overall population of the colony hovered around the 2.8 million mark.³ The district of Mozambique was home to 296 whites, 312 Asians, and 4,634 blacks.⁴ The greatest concentration of the white population was to be found in the city of Lourenço Marques, with its wealthiest members residing in the Ponta Vermelha and Polana neighborhoods, close to the shore. Tram and train lines linked them to the city center.⁵

A census published two years earlier noted the presence of a little over a thousand foreigners living in Lourenço Marques (Costa, 1934: 39). A German consulate had been opened in 1889 and throughout the 1890s diplomatic representations were established on the island of Mozambique and in Beira, Chinde, and Quelimane. In 1907, a cultural center was inaugurated in Lourenço Marques, whose objective was to “foment social relations between German residents in Lourenço Marques and to promote the use of the German language and the preservation of the national spirit” (Carvalho, 2015: 39). The presence of British and South African citizens was also significant, notably in the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques.

Mozambique. Foreign Population 1912

	Lourenço Marques	Beira	Chinde
British	668	268	31
Germans	106	45	24
Chinese	300	-	-
Italians	80	47	-
Greeks	149	123	-

Source: *A Manual of Portuguese East Africa* (1920). London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. 88.

Colonial authorities were worried about both the number of white Portuguese living in the territory, which they considered insufficient, and their lack of capital, which limited their ability to invest in the development of Mozambique. Nine tenths of the total capital invested in Lourenço Marques was British, with only three tenths of one percent originating in Portugal. As a result, the war's outbreak had a very powerful impact on the European population living in Africa. Men of military age were incorporated into the units stationed in the continent or sent to fight on the Western Front. This situation resulted in

³ *A Manual of Portuguese East Africa* (1920), 86.

⁴ National Archives of the United Kingdom [NAUK], WO 106/587, Notes on Mozambique District, Portuguese East Africa, 10-11.

⁵ *Anuário de Lourenço Marques* (1914). Lourenço Marques: A.W. Bayly & C. Editores.

an exodus of Europeans and, therefore, a very significant drop in the number of civil servants and clerks in commercial houses. From a religious point of view, the war would determine the end of the hegemony exercised by Christian missions: once peace was restored, the work of German missionaries would be carried out by Africans.

The actual demarcation of the borders continued to be part of the agenda. The Bernardino Machado government assigned 94,000 escudos in the fiscal year 1914-1915 for this for this purpose across the colonies. The precise limits of Mozambique's northern border were not well known, in great measure because of the disputes between Portugal and Germany over the Quionga Triangle, now in German hands. Despite possessing a vast colonial empire, the Portuguese, on the eve of war, were not familiar with Africa and the Africans. African soils and mines were still, for the most part, unexplored, and native languages remain unstudied. Most colonial ministers did not really generate policy; they were content to supervise, from Lisbon, territories they never visited. Contemporary literature and the circulation of books provide a snapshot of this ignorance: "[...] Africa did not read Africa!"⁶ Even at the start of the 1930s, the best-selling books on Mozambique remained the reports drawn up by António Enes and Mouzinho de Albuquerque at the close of the nineteenth century.

Not a single Minister of the Colonies had visited any overseas territory between 1911 and 1914. World War I contributed to overcoming this lack of knowledge, bringing about a deepening of the political, social, and cultural relations between metropolitan Portugal and colonial realities (Pires and Rollo, 2015). Europeans and Africans learned about one another through their military exchanges, in relationships of marked inequality, but always through complex processes with far-reaching consequences. The Great War was one of those moments.

The Final Scramble

The growing rivalry between European powers as they extended their colonial empires, especially in Africa, caused tensions between British, French, and Germans, but these pressures were not strong enough to justify the outbreak of a European War. Ironically, in 1914, Africa ended up being the trigger that transformed, in the early days of

⁶ '...África não lia África!'. Costa, 1934: 3.

August, a local war into a World War. This argument gains credence if we keep in mind that the first British shots in the First World War were fired in Togoland, not in Europe.

Although it was never declared on the African continent, the Great War had its beginning in East Africa, with the British attack on the port of Dar-es-Salaan on 8 August 1914. Great Britain tried to reach an agreement that might preserve the neutrality of the African continent in the face of war in Europe, but without success (Killingray, 1998: 92). The general expectation was that the terms of the 1885 Treaty of Berlin relating to the neutrality of the Congo basin would prevent the spreading of the war to West and Central Africa (Samson, 2006: 33). As the summer of 1914 began, there were no tensions between British and German settlers, and both empires' military garrisons were very small, numbering, respectively, 2,400 officers and Askaris and 216 officers and 2,540 Askaris. As for Mozambique, the decree that determined its military organization had been published in November 1901 and the military presence was limited to a cavalry squadron and a few poorly drilled indigenous companies. It was known, however, that other European forces had modern artillery at their disposal; airplanes and long-range radio communications.

Although the start of the conflict in Europe created a climate of tension and suspicion among the German and British residents of Mozambique, the spread of the war to the African continent was neither questioned nor debated (Pires and Fogarty, 2014). Not much thought was given to the nature or the consequences of this development, despite some newspaper articles allowing already for a glimpse of the consequences the conflict would have on the continent's geography.⁷ The South African Union's autonomy from the British Crown was growing daily. This represented a mounting danger and threat to regional stability and Portuguese interests, with Mozambique being the most affected (Arrifes, 2004). South Africa's concerns were dual in nature. On the one hand, the Union believed that Germans were using Mozambique to engage in the smuggling of goods to their own colonies; on the other, it longed to take possession of the Portuguese colony once the war was over.

The spread of the war to Africa was not, however, a prospect which pleased Germany. William II's strategy rested on achieving swift military victory in Europe which might in turn open up the possibility of establishing a geostrategic region – *Mittelafrika* – stretching from Cameroon to East Africa. The main objective of this strategy was to put an end to the old British dream of establishing a corridor linking Cape Town to Cairo. In Togoland, Major Von Doering, a military commander who also served as governor of this

⁷ 'A Guerra e Nós', *O Africano*, 16 September 1914.

German colony, tried, as early as 5 August, to reach an understanding with his British neighbors in the Gold Coast and the French in Dahomey which might allow his territory to remain neutral, “[...] so as not to give Africans the spectacle of whites waging war on whites.”⁸ Von Doering’s initiative was interpreted as a ploy to ensure the continued functioning of the wireless station at Kamina. The following day, the Gold Coast’s military commander, F. C. Bryant, issued Von Doering an ultimatum regarding the surrender of the Togoland garrison. The governor of German East Africa, Heinrich Schnee, had a similar view to Von Doering and favored the preservation of neutrality when, in the first days of August, two British ships shelled his capital, Dar-es-Salaam. His intentions clashed with the aggressive stance of Paul Lettow-Vorbeck, commander of the *Schutztruppe*, who from the start argued for retaliation against the British action. In a gesture of clear disobedience to Schnee, Lettow-Vorbeck, at the head of an army composed of 260 Germans and 2,500 Askaris, invaded British East Africa, heading for Uganda. On 5 August 1914, the troops of this British Protectorate attacked German forward posts near Lake Victoria. In South Africa, Prime Minister Louis Botha and Minister of Defense Jan Smuts quickly affirmed their support for the British government. Both men understood that in order to preserve its naval supremacy, the United Kingdom had to control both the means of communications and Germany’s principal ports in Africa.

After the British declaration of war on Germany, on 4 August 1914, one of London’s main priorities was to harness the strategic potential of German interests and colonies, scattered across the world. This led to particularly strong action in Latin America and Africa, which consisted of capturing harbor installations and submarine cables. This was one of the objectives recorded in a memorandum, written by British consul Erroll Macdonell, on the subject of a British takeover of German economic affairs in Portuguese Africa, especially Mozambique (Pires and Fogarty, 2014). Shortly after the outbreak of war in Europe, the Foreign Office stated that it was no longer possible to afford protection to Portugal’s land borders on the African continent. The dispatch of military expeditions to Africa, notably Mozambique, acquires great importance when we add to the equation the already alluded to growing threat represented by South Africa (Arrifes, 2004). Portugal’s minister in London, Teixeira Gomes, stated that the sending of troops to Africa was the sole means at his country’s disposal “[...] to make ourselves respected [...] by our

⁸ “[...] para não dar aos africanos o espectáculo de brancos fazerem a guerra a brancos”. Crowder, 2010: 324.

neighbors.”⁹ Lourenço Marques had long been seen as a desirable point of access to the sea by Transvaal.



Map 3: Mozambique on the eve of the First World War. The map locates the capital, Lorenzo Marques, and the territories held by the Nyassa Company.

Britain’s minister in Lisbon, Lancelot Carnegie, requested of the Portuguese government that it allow the passage of troops through Chinde, in Mozambique, on their way to Nyassaland, today’s Malawi.¹⁰ Reacting to this request, Teixeira Gomes insinuated to Eyre Crowe, of the Foreign Office, that Portugal still aspired to recover Quionga, a small territory on the border with German East Africa that had been seized by a German naval force on 16 June 1894, without, however “[...] showing that it was our intention to ask for compensation for the favor granted.”¹¹

⁹ “[...] de impor no futuro algum respeito aos [...] vizinhos”. Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, Arquivo de Cultura Portuguesa Contemporânea, Manuel Teixeira Gomes private papers, Esp.46., Box 14, Manuel Teixeira Gomes to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 4 September 1916.

¹⁰ *Portugal na Primeira Guerra Mundial (1914-1918). As Negociações Diplomáticas Até à Declaração de Guerra*, Vol. 1 (1997), From the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the British Minister at Lisbon, 14 August 1914, 32.

¹¹ “[...] mostrar ser intenção nossa pedir compensação pelo favor dispensado”. *Portugal na Primeira Guerra Mundial (1914-1918). As Negociações Diplomáticas Até à Declaração de Guerra*, Vol. 1 (1997), From the Portuguese Minister at London to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 August 1914, 34.

Going to War

On 21 August 1914, Prime Minister Bernardino Machado decreed the organization and sending of two mixed groups (composed of mountain artillery, cavalry, infantry, and machine guns), one each to Angola and Mozambique.¹² In the decree's preamble, the government recognized the need to "[...] in the current circumstances, garrison properly some points on the southern border of Angola and the northern border of Mozambique." All told, 1,525 men were sent to Angola and 1,477 to Mozambique. At the time, the Portuguese army had a little over 31,000 men.

One must underscore the importance and significance of this measure, placing it in a wider context that takes into consideration the ambiguous position in which Portugal found itself since the outbreak of hostilities. It could not, as a result of a British request, declare either its neutrality or its belligerency. As a result, the expeditions were organized by the Ministry of the Colonies and not the Ministry of War. The measures adopted by Portugal, with British approval, were presented as merely preventive and aimed at colonial defense; they did not result in a declaration of war by Germany or its allies. In a round-robin letter sent to his colleagues in government and the Portuguese ministers in London and Madrid, the minister of Foreign Affairs, Freire de Andrade, showed himself opposed to Portugal's intervention on the Western Front, mentioned the difficulties that might arise should Portugal's stance result in an insult to Germany, and denounced what he considered to be the use of a "[...] language which is sometimes offensive and even insulting to Germans and Germany's leaders by part of the press [...] especially since it might be construed that the government approves of it, consenting to it without the least reproach."¹³

On 23 August 1914, the German Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs tried, using the services of the United States ambassador in Berlin, to ensure the neutrality of Cameroon, French Equatorial Africa, German East Africa, Uganda, Nyassaland, and parts of Rhodesia. However, the proposal was eventually rejected by both the British and the French (O'Neill, 2013).

Under the cloak of an undeclared neutrality, Mozambique soon became a buffer zone between British and German territory, a crossing point for essential goods

¹² *Ordem do Exército*, n.º 19, First Series, 21 August 1914.

¹³ '[...] linguagem por vezes ofensiva e até insultuosa de parte da imprensa contra os alemães e os dirigentes da Alemanha (...) sobretudo porque se pode pensar que o Governo com eles seja cúmplice ou os consinta sem qualquer reparo'. *Portugal na Primeira Guerra Mundial (1914-1918). As Negociações Diplomáticas Até à Declaração de Guerra*, Volume I (1997), 26.

(contraband) and foodstuffs, and a privileged platform for the acquisition of intelligence (through espionage) vital for both British and Germans throughout the war. Alfredo Lisboa de Lima, the then Minister for the Colonies, charged the governor of Niassa with controlling the Rovuma border and placed all German ships at anchor in the colony under the strictest of supervisions (Carvalho, 2015: 39). Great Britain wanted Portugal to remain neutral, without announcing its intention; behind the British government's stance lay an understanding of the strategic importance of Portugal's Atlantic and African ports, which might yet be used by the Royal Navy, as well as the possibility of requesting the passage of British troops through Portuguese colonial territories. Through their legation in Lisbon, the British had already ordered the garrisoning, with indigenous forces, of the territories held by the old Niassa Company. Carnegie had alerted the Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, of the transport by the Empresa Nacional de Navegação of "[...] correspondence for enemy subjects resident both in Portuguese East Africa and in the neighboring German colony [...]." Carnegie also expressed the wish to the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Augusto Soares, that "[...] mails from and to Portuguese East Africa carried by the Company's ships would be able to reach their destination passing through the hands of the Censorship Authorities at Cape Town."¹⁴

The first incident between Portugal and Germany in Africa occurred on 24 August at Maziúá, on the Rovuma river, when the commander of a border post was shot dead upon leaving his room, surprised by a night-time raid by German forces operating out of neighboring German East Africa.¹⁵ The Lisbon press closest to the Portuguese Republican Party quickly proclaimed the need to dispatch Portuguese troops to Africa:

It is natural that our alliance [with Britain] should, after an exchange of views between the governments of the two countries, serve to guarantee the integrity of the Portuguese possessions. But hoping to secure that guarantee while keeping our arms folded, without an efficient demonstration that we are capable, for our part, of making every possible effort to defend what is ours, is to place the country in a humiliating and depressing condition

¹⁴ NAUK, FO 371/2598, Lancelot Carnegie to Edward Grey, 7 February 1917.

¹⁵ *Palavras Claras. Razões da Intervenção Militar de Portugal na Guerra Europeia. Relatório publicado no Diário do Governo n.º 9, 1.ª série de 17 de Janeiro de 1917* (1917). Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 19.

before the great English nation, a condition for which there is but one word: protectorate.¹⁶

Command of the Mozambique-bound troops was handed to Massano de Amorim, who would be subordinate to the General Government of the Province. The troops, loaded onto the British steamer *Durham Castle*, left Lisbon without great enthusiasm on 11 September 1914, reaching Lourenço Marques on 16 October, during the rainy season.¹⁷

The colony's military garrison was small and badly prepared; most of its members had not frequented any military establishment. To this was added the faulty military training received by the recently sent forces, as well as the deficient constitution of the men who made them up, and who, for the most part, proved unable to withstand the rigors of the tropical climate. Many men even arrived ill in Africa, having failed to withstand the terrible hygiene conditions which characterized the journey. The local press noted the disorganized nature and delays of the disembarkation process: "This ill-fated expedition surpassed everything we had seen until now [...] the journey, which should have lasted 23 days, lasted 35 [...] the troops, it should be noted, leave much to be desired when it comes to discipline, bearing and cleanliness [...]."¹⁸ Towards the end of the war, the South African commander-in-chief of the allied forces, Van Deventer, would be highly critical of the performance of the Portuguese troops, stating that they were "[...] totally unreliable, and a source of grave danger to their Allies. The personnel, both European and African, is of the poorest possible quality."¹⁹

The British ships that transported the expeditionary forces to Africa went as far as to drop their respective loads into the sea, close to the beach, before departing, since they could not wait for a disembarkation which had not been properly prepared. Alberto Simões, in his memoirs, described the episode in detail:

¹⁶ 'É natural que a nossa aliança, sobretudo, depois de algumas afirmações trocadas entre os governos dos dois países sirva, de facto, para garantir a integridade das possessões portuguesas. Mas querer alcançar essa garantia de braços cruzados, sem se mostrar de um modo efectivo que somos capazes, por nossa parte, de empregar todos os possíveis esforços para defendermos aquilo que possuímos, é colocar o País numa situação humilhante e deprimente em face da grande nação inglesa que só há uma palavra para a traduzir: - protectorado'. 'A Partida das Expedições Militares', in *A Capital*, 17 August 1914.

¹⁷ 'Pró-Pátria. A Expedição Portuguesa', in *O Africano*, 15 October 1914.

¹⁸ 'O que se tem passado com a malfadada expedição ultrapassou tudo quanto até aqui se tinha visto [...] A expedição que devia gastar 23 dias gastou 35 [...] depois de muito passeadas as tropas que, seja dito de passagem, deixam muito a desejar a respeito de correcção, porte e estado de asseio [...]'. Regras, João das, 'A Expedição', in *O Africano*, 24 October 1914.

¹⁹ NAUK, WO 158/474, General Van Deventer to "Troopers", 24 June 1918.

The ship lay at anchor at the center of the bay, static, an apocalyptic colossus, out of all proportion [...] enormous blacks, naked but for a piece of cloth tied around their kidneys, entered the water, their teeth shining from open mouths, to carry men on their backs. There was some hesitation among the white troops who arrived only to be received in such grotesque fashion; but the bravest among them climbed on to the back of the blacks, while carrying their own gear, and then clung desperately to the hair of the blacks, who whined like pursued rats but who ferried them to dry land. There were no personal disasters nor forced baths. One, two, three long hours this *mardi gras* procession went on, to great laughter and some scares, of little consequence [...] The unloading of the Mozambique expedition, be it at the new base in Mocimboa da Praia, be it in the old bases of Porto Amélia and Palma, was carried out in this rudimentary fashion.²⁰

Accounts such as these are common in the memoirs of officers who fought in Africa after the conflict's end. Some of the publications designed to inform delegations during the Peace Conference noted the unflattering way in which Portugal looked upon its native populations: "[...] The [...] Portuguese seldom know much of the natives, neither studying their ethnology scientifically nor regarding their customs sympathetically, and rarely taking pains to learn their language."²¹ Van Deventer went as far as to say that the natives of East Africa hated the Portuguese "to such an extent that we can get no help from them, when we act in conjunction with the Portuguese troops. When acting alone, removed from the Portuguese sphere of influence, the natives help us freely."²²

On 5 November 1914, in an article published in *República*, António José de Almeida, leader of the Evolutionist Republican Party, justified the mobilization of Portuguese troops for the African continent, stating,

²⁰ 'O barco ficou ao largo, no centro da baía, esbezerrado, como bizarma apocalíptica, descomunal. [...] foi nesta altura que começaram a avançar pela água dentro pretalhões nus com um pedaço de pano sujo enrolado nos rins, de dentuça a luzir e bocarra aberta, para passarem os homens às costas. Houve uma indecisão na tropa branca que chegava e era recebida tão grotescamente; mas os mais animosos montaram ao dorso dos pretalhões, com a tringalhada às costas, agarrados desesperadamente à carapinha dos pretos que guinchavam como ratazanas perseguidas, mas que os iam colocar em terra enxuta. Não houve desastres pessoais nem banhos forçados. Uma, duas ou três horas bem puxadas durou esta cavalgada de entrudo, que provocou grande risota e alguns sustos sem consequências [...]. A descarga dos transportes da expedição a Moçambique, tanto na nova base de Mocimboa da Praia, como nas anteriores bases de Porto Amélia e de Palma, foi feita por este rudimentar processo.' Simões, 1933: 27.

²¹ *A Manual of Portuguese East Africa* (1920): 129.

²² NAUK, WO 158/474, General Van Deventer to "Troopers", 24 June 1918.

They are going to Africa for a single purpose: to defend the land left to us by our elders. They go to fight so that this land, ossuary of our martyrs and tomb of our heroes, is kept under our flag. They are not going to destroy, wipe out, or conquer foreign territory; they are going to defend their own soil. They do not want to subjugate anyone; they seek only to fight so that we are not ourselves subjugated. They do not covet what belongs to others; they wish only to keep for the Portuguese what belongs to them, since they inherited it legitimately from those who conquered it with the strength of their arms and the blood of their bodies.²³

For his part Unionist leader Brito Camacho, who had shown himself opposed to Portugal's participation in the fighting in Europe, explained the differences between military campaigns in the two continents in the following manner: "Should we fight in Africa? There we would make payments in *Banco de Portugal* bills, in *Banco Ultramarino* bills, and Jewish financiers would not have the profit margin they aspire to. The same would not occur should we fight in France; there we would have to make payments in gold, and since the State does not possess it, we would have to borrow" (Camacho, 1934: 170). Despite this apparent consensus, there emerge doubts from the pages of newspapers like *O Africano*, a daily published in Lourenço Marques and founded by Mozambican João dos Santos Albasini, as to the necessity of sending troops to the colony: "Since we have not yet understood the undoubtedly powerful reasons which led the government to send both to Angola and to this province the military expeditions, somebody thought of sending us a clipping from a Lisbon newspaper [...]." ²⁴ These doubts and uncertainties could still be found in this press by year's end: "Six or eight thousand armed and equipped men came to the colonies, and to what end? To defend our colonial sovereignty, isn't that what we are told? Well, where exactly is that defense? The troops which months ago came to this

²³ 'Eles vão a África para um efeito único: defender a terra que nos legaram os nossos maiores. Vão combater para que permaneça sob a nossa bandeira a terra que é o ossuário dos nossos mártires e túmulo dos nossos heróis. Eles não vão talar, arrasar, conquistar o solo alheio; vão defender a própria terra. Eles não querem avassalar ninguém; querem apenas bater-se para que ninguém nos avassale. Eles não se sentem animados pela cobiça do que é dos outros; desejam apenas guardar para os portugueses aquilo que é deles, porque legitimamente o herdaram de quem o conquistou com a força dos seus braços e o sangue do seu corpo.' ALMEIDA, António José de, 'Boa Sorte!' in *República*, 5 November 1914. See also, by António José de Almeida, 'Em Plena Carnificina', *República*, 7 November 1914.

²⁴ 'Porque também ainda não chegamos a compreender as razões poderosas decerto que levaram o governo a mandar para esta província e para a de Angola as expedições militares, alguém se lembrou de nos enviar um recorte de um jornal de Lisboa [...]'. 'Para a Guerra. As Expedições Portuguesas', in *O Africano*, 4 November 1914, 2.

province are still to be found, according to our information, in Porto Amélia! What are they waiting for?”²⁵

Africa and the War in Europe

In the aftermath of Great Britain's declaration of war against Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 734 German ships sought refuge in neutral waters; of these, some seventy, amounting to 242,000 tons, were to be found in Portuguese ports. At the end of December 1915, Portugal's merchant marine was composed of a mere 471 vessels, for a total of 91,859 tons, and the yearly output of the country's shipyards, the largest of which was to be found in Viana do Castelo, was a mere 4,600 tons (Pires, 2011). On 23 February 1916, the Portuguese navy sent a party of men to seize German and Austrian vessels laying at anchor on the Tagus and, with full military honors, replaced their respective flags with that of Portugal.

On 9 March 1916, Germany declared war on Portugal. Days later, the Province of Mozambique's military called to the colors all reservists living in the district of Lourenço Marques. The Governing Council also ordered the suspension of constitutional guarantees across Mozambique; the press was subjected to censorship; and all newspaper supplements in the Landim language were banned. In a telegram sent to the Minister of the Colonies, the Governor General stated that the declaration of war had been received “with calm and serenity,”²⁶ but the press made clear the distrust of the German community through reminders of what had occurred during the December 1914 battle of Naulila, in Angola:

To protect a German, to help him, to aid his freedom of action within our territory, is a crime against the fatherland, and, if we are to be permitted a small criticism of the law, we would say that the conditional freedom of the enemy nations' subjects should be granted solely and exclusively by the Governor General [...] Let there be no weakness or excessive pity on our part, because it has been shown time and time again that the Germans have not consideration or respect for us, no greater proof being required than the repugnant and brutal way in which they treated our prisoners after

²⁵ ‘Vieram para as colónias 6 ou 8 mil homens armados e equipados, para quê ? Para defender a nossa soberania colonial, não é isso que dizem ? Pois vão ver onde está essa defesa: as tropas que há meses vieram para esta província, ainda hoje se conservam, segundo as informações que temos, em Porto Amélia! Esperando o quê?’ ‘Sempre Neutros ! Portugal e a Alemanha’, in *O Africano*, 30 December 1914.

²⁶ ‘com calma e serenidade (...)’. ‘Um Telegrama para Lisboa’, in *O Africano*, 15 March 1916.

Naulila [...] War cannot be waged gently and we must absolutely and immediately take to heart that the Germans are our enemies.²⁷

It was in this spirit that the *Foreign Office* pressured the Portuguese Government to arrest all German residents of military age in Portugal and its colonies, recommending as well that all others be kept under strict and relentless vigilance.²⁸ Nevertheless one should not overlook the opportunist drive behind this initiative, which foretold the ambition of the British authorities and their desire to strangle all German economic activity, commercial or otherwise. Afonso Costa assured Lancelot Carnegie that the British authorities could count on the support of Portugal, even if, to that end, “the interests of Portuguese citizens were temporarily affected.”²⁹

On 14 March, the Society for Preparatory Military Training³⁰ met in the headquarters of the Lourenço Marques Association of Commercial and Industrial Employees.³¹ During the meeting, “its support for our government’s attitude to Germany, the Allies’ cause and above all the defense of our fatherland was loudly proclaimed.”³² Moreover, a proposal was made for a demonstration of support for the Governor General and the consuls of the Allied nations. The directors of the Goan Institute³³ also held a general assembly, whose main purpose was to demonstrate that “all of the children of India here resident and apt for military service [...] were at the disposal [...] of the government

²⁷ ‘Proteger um alemão, auxiliá-lo, facilitar a sua liberdade de acção dentro do nosso território, é um crime de lesa-pátria, e, se nos for permitido criticar uma pequena disposição da lei, diremos que relativamente à liberdade condicional dos súbditos das nações inimigas deve tal liberdade ser concedida única e exclusivamente pelo Governador Geral [...] Que não haja tibiezas nem sentimentos piegas da nossa parte porque está mais do que provado que os alemães não tem tido a mínima consideração ou respeito por nós, e bastará citar a forma repugnante e brutal como eles trataram os nossos prisioneiros de Naulila. [...] Não é com branduras que se faz a guerra e é indispensável que nos compenetrems desde já da ideia de que os alemães todos são nossos inimigos’. ‘Portugal na Guerra. A Situação – Notas e Comentários – Notícias Diversas’, in *O Africano*, 15 March 1916.

²⁸ NAUK, FO 371/2761, Lancelot Carnegie to Edward Grey, 20 March 1916. In October the Portuguese Legation in Spain gave notice of the German Government’s desire to reach a deal with Portugal on this issue. Arquivo Histórico Diplomático do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros [AHDMNE], ‘Requisição dos Navios Alemães’, Third Floor, Closet 7, Stack 24, From the Spanish Legation at Lisbon to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Augusto Soares, 24 October 1916.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ ‘Sociedade de Instrução Militar Preparatória’.

³¹ ‘Associação dos Empregados do Comércio e Indústria’.

³² ‘proclamou-se bem alto o seu apoio à atitude do nosso Governo perante a Alemanha, à causa dos aliados e sobretudo à defesa da nossa Pátria’. ‘A Manifestação de Ontem à Noite. Uma Sessão Histórica’, in *O Africano*, 15 March 1916.

³³ ‘Instituto Goano’.

for all tasks that might contribute to the defense of the Portuguese Fatherland.”³⁴ In Lourenço Marques, rumors had begun to spread about the alleged pro-German sentiments of the Indian colony and the circulation of German propaganda aimed at its Muslim population: “We have been informed that in the mosques of the *Indianized* natives one can hear songs in praise of the Turkish Army and its allies, alongside denunciations of the opposing cause.”³⁵ It should be noted that in North Africa, the European conflagration stimulated the development of nationalism, making possible the appearance of *jibadi* ‘religious wars’ against Europe.

Six days later, the Minister of the Interior, António Pereira Reis, placed all German citizens “under the discrete vigilance of the police”³⁶ and gave instructions to the Civil Governors to make those same Germans appear before their districts’ administrative authorities in order to declare their name, age, place of birth, profession, and civil state.³⁷ Sometime later, the use of passports was regulated and the entry into Portugal of the subjects of Germany and its allies was banned.³⁸ This strategic orientation resulted, some days later, in the expulsion order promulgated by Afonso Costa.³⁹

The distrust and critical tone originally reserved for the dispatch of Portuguese troops to the colonies since 1914 now gave way to support for the option taken by the Republic’s leadership: “While war remains a calamity, it is nevertheless a necessity, and all Portuguese should be in no doubt that we could no longer remain in the dubious and intolerable position in which we have found ourselves since war was declared between England and Germany.”⁴⁰ On 24 May 1916, the Minister of War, Norton de Matos, published a decree which ordered the military registration of all citizens between the ages of 20 and 45, without exception. Later came the creation of the Corpo Expedicionário

³⁴ ‘todos os filhos da Índia aqui residentes e aptos para o serviço militar [...] estavam à disposição [...] do Governo para tudo que possam ser úteis na defesa da Pátria Portuguesa’. ‘A Colónia Indiana desta Cidade Oferece os Seus Serviços ao Governo’, in *O Africano*, 18 March 1916.

³⁵ ‘Disseram-nos que nas *mesquitas* dos indígenas amonhesados se vêm entoando cânticos em louvor do Exército Turco e dos seus aliados, ao mesmo tempo que anatematiza a causa dos contrários’. ‘A Quem Competir’, in *A Cidade*, 28 March 1916.

³⁶ ‘sob vigilância discreta da polícia’.

³⁷ See the register of German subjects resident in Portugal, Direção Geral de Arquivos – Torre do Tombo, Ministério do Interior, Direção Geral da Administração Política e Civil, 1st Bureau, 1st Section (Segurança Pública), Stack 66, From the Diretor Geral da Administração Política e Civil to the Civil Governors, 20 March 1916.

³⁸ Decree n. 2313, *Diário do Governo*, First Series, n. 64, 4 April 1916.

³⁹ Males between the ages of sixteen and forty-five subject to mobilization by the Portuguese Government were not covered by this piece of legislation. Decree n. 2350, Supplement to *Diário do Governo*, n. 77, 20 April 1916.

⁴⁰ ‘Se a guerra é uma calamidade não deixa por isso de ser uma necessidade, e não deve restar dúvida a nenhum português, que nós não podíamos permanecer na atitude dúbia e intolerável em que temos estado desde que a guerra foi declarada entre a Inglaterra e a Alemanha.’ ‘Portugal na Guerra. A Situação – Notas e Comentários – Notícias Diversas’ in *O Africano*, 15 March 1916.

Português [Portuguese Expeditionary Corps, CEP] and the Corpo de Artilharia Pesada Independente [Independent Heavy Artillery Corps, CAPI] as Portugal left behind the ambiguous position it had found itself in since 1914, definitively taking its place alongside the Allies and putting an end to the Iberian Peninsula's 'neutrality' (Pires, 2015). The departure of troops from Lisbon to Africa was watched by a resigned population:

One afternoon, at the start of June, the battalion marched from Campolide to the Areia dock. The troops marched in a resigned and fatalistic mood towards the unknown. Neither enthusiasm nor despair. And from the public, throughout the long crossing of the city, the most complete indifference, as if it were a regiment on its way to manoeuvres in the city's outskirts. No interest, not even curiosity: a vacuum more painful even than mere hostility (Lima, 1933: 7).

Another consequence of the declaration of war was the establishment in Mozambique of a preparatory school for temporary officers.⁴¹ The training period was fixed at nine weeks and since it was found that Portuguese troops sent to Africa found it difficult to adapt to the climate, suffering countless casualties as a result, ten indigenous companies were hastily assembled during the third expedition. Their training period was short – only four months – when it was already known that the minimum time needed to produce a good indigenous soldier was four years (Martins, 1934: 151). Portuguese residents in South Africa also presented themselves at the Army Headquarters in Lourenço Marques, enlisting as volunteers to defend the colony from German attack.⁴² It should be noted that since the start of the war, the whole of East Africa was coveted not only by Germany but also by the government of India, which had ambitions of establishing its own colony there.

Between 1914 and 1918, some two and a half million Africans were mobilized as soldiers, workers, or porters, a number which corresponds roughly to one percent of the continent's population (Das, 2011: 4). The mass recruitment of porters had immediate effects, especially on agricultural production; despite the fact that women continued to sow and harvest, without men to plough, production fell and it was quickly realized that it

⁴¹ Decree n. 3120 - A, *Boletim Oficial de Moçambique*, 4 August 1917; Decree n. 3165, *Boletim Oficial de Moçambique*, 4 August 1917.

⁴² See 'Umas Perguntas', in *A Cidade*, 28 March 1916, and 'Pela Defesa da Pátria ! Oferecimentos Patrióticos. Voluntários que Pedem para se Alistar', in *O Africano*, 18 March 1916.

would be insufficient to meet the nutritional needs of the population. The price of scarce crops increased quickly and hunger began to be experienced throughout the whole continent, only being alleviated, in part, by the importation of foodstuffs from India and South Africa. Mozambique suffered from a lack of labor “in factories and estates, with recruitment even provoking mass flight among the population. Private firms protested, one of them complaining that the *prazo* Luabo was being depopulated by recruitment carried out at gunpoint.”⁴³

It should be noted that at this stage of the war the supply of porters, who were still volunteers but/yet available to integrate and meet the needs of the armies on the move, quickly began to decline. During the war years, some 100,000 porters died in East Africa alone. Álvaro Rosas compared them to slaves and left an account, in his memoirs, of the conditions in which they participated in the war: “From the eyes of those macabre rows of porters, with hollow stomachs and bones as if puncturing their skin, walking black specters, a wire collar around their neck, and guarded like animals by ferocious soldiers, could be seen the desire to escape in search of freedom. They form a horrible tableau which will attach itself indelibly in the memory of any sensitive man (Rosas, 1935).”

The press lamented the military disorganization of the Portuguese colonies and questioned the role of indigenous troops: “If the indigenous troops are necessary – as we believe them to be – then nothing is more important than their organization. If this is not taken care of and the present farce is maintained merely to preserve the mummifying overseas table, which is reminiscent of a legendary past, then it would be best just to abolish them.”⁴⁴

Racial prejudice and racism played an important part in the modes of colonial governance of the European empires, and Portugal was no exception. As Robert McNamara highlighted, despite the theories of equality, which underpinned the French brand of republicanism, having been applied since 1910 to the Portuguese colonial possessions, the truth is that racism continued to be widely disseminated (Mcnamara, 2011: 74). Colonial authorities had a very pragmatic understanding of the black population: “the Portuguese, throughout the centuries of their occupation of East Africa, have never viewed

⁴³ ‘nas fábricas e nas fazendas, e o recrutamento provoca mesmo a fuga das populações. As companhias reclamam, e uma delas queixa-se que o prazo Luabo está sendo despovoado, devido a fazer-se o recrutamento à mão armada’. AHDMNE, 3rd Floor, Closet 6, Stack 18, File n. 2, From Ernesto Vilhena to the British Minister at Lisbon, Lancelot Carnegie, 5 December 1917.

⁴⁴ ‘Se a tropa indígena é necessária – como nos parece que é – nada mais urgente do que a sua organização. Se não é e se se mantém essa fantochada apenas para justificar o mumificante quadro do ultramar que lembra um passado de lenda, o melhor é acabar-se com ela’. ‘Recrutamento Militar’, in *O Africano*, 23 February 1916, 1.

him [the African] in any but a proper and practical light: for them is first and last the *mão de obra* (labouring hand).”⁴⁵

According to a note drawn up by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Vasconcelos e Sá, Portugal supplied some 30,000 porters to Great Britain⁴⁶. In a process that was beset with difficulty, given the growing needs for labor felt by the Portuguese military forces to deal with the revolt that had, in the meantime, broken out in the Barué region – as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made clear to Lancelot Carnegie.⁴⁷ Simões Alberto, in his memoirs of the Mozambican campaign, praised the bravery of the African soldiers and described the difficult conditions in which they were made to operate: “He fought the whole campaign barefoot, his legs exposed; he never complained of fatigue, even though at times were bloodshot, as if wanting to burst from such a violent effort; and when, his bones bent over on the hard earth, he rested his weary, sweaty, and smelly body, he still looked fondly at his commander, not hesitating to sacrifice his own life so that the life of his ‘senhor,’ his ‘mesugo,’ might be spared (Alberto, 1933: 143).” Close to the coast, they were paid 15 cents per day, whereas in the interior regions the received only 5 cents per day.⁴⁸

Conclusions

The armistice marked the end of the German colonial experience and led to the redrawing of the continent’s map. Although the African Empire was part of the national imaginary and Portugal defined itself as a colonial power, from January 1917 onwards the Portuguese military intervention on the African battlefield always played second fiddle to the sending of troops to Flanders. This reality was described by some combatants, like António de Cértima, who voiced his discontent in a small work published in 1925: “Look at what’s going on outside! It’s the ‘9 April,’ the apotheosis of your brother who died in Flanders, richer and nobler than you, covered with honors, medals, and glorious citations, serving, no doubt, a better Fatherland than you [...] Soldier of Africa! How many medals were pinned to your chest?” (Cértima, 1925: xi).

⁴⁵ *A Manual of Portuguese East Africa* (1920), 129.

⁴⁶ AHDMNE, 3rd Floor, Closet 6, Stack 18, File n. 2, Note writte by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alexandre José Botelho de Vasconcelos e Sá, November 1918.

⁴⁷ AHDMNE, 3rd Floor, Closet 6, Stack 18, File n. 2, Ernesto Vilhena to the British Minister at Lisbon, Lancelot Carnegie, 5 December 1917.

⁴⁸ NAUK, WO 106/587, *Notes on Mozambique District, Portuguese East Africa*.

In truth, whatever consensus the sending of troops to Africa generated was restricted to the political elite, provoking grave doubts among the colonial and metropolitan population regarding its necessity, doubts which fueled many debates in the press. This attitude changed in March 1916 when Germany declared war on Portugal and thus began the preparations for the dispatch of the CEP to France. Portugal's entry into the conflict brought about a change by politicians and industrialists in regards to the hows and whys of the defense and the need for a closer relationship between the metropolitan territory and the colonial space, taking advantage of possibilities and resources that were proving decisive in the attempt to feed a growing war effort. Or, in the words of the engineer Lisboa de Lima, the Portuguese could only rise to the challenge of the war "combining the efforts of one and all [...] be it in the metropole or in the colonies, all pulling in the same direction and not seeking to safeguard either colonial or metropolitan interests, because they are all Portuguese."⁴⁹

⁴⁹ 'Conferência na Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa em 8 de Maio de 1916 Feita por Lisboa de Lima', in *Revista Colonial*, Year 4, n. 41, 25 May 1916, 120-121.

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Macau Between Republics: Neither War nor Peace (1914-1918)

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Abstract

During World War I, the Portuguese far-eastern colony of Macau underwent an intensification of the climate of instability that had hitherto characterized its life. Portugal and China, young republics both, projected their internal convulsions into their foreign policy. The two nations also nurtured an old dispute concerning the territorial delimitation of Macau. Dependent for its protection on Portugal's traditional ally, Great Britain, via Hong Kong, the Portuguese colony survived thanks to a precarious *modus vivendi* with the Chinese. Portugal exercised in Macau a limited sovereignty, threatened continuously by the nationalist impetus of China. The risk of a Chinese military offensive against Macau never ceased. Although sheltered from the world conflict, Macau went through a time of great tension from 1914 to 1918.

Keywords

Macau, China, Borders, World War One, Carlos da Maia.

Resumo

Durante a I Guerra Mundial, Macau viu agravado o clima de instabilidade que caracterizava a vida daquela colónia portuguesa no Extremo Oriente. Portugal e a China, jovens Repúblicas, projectavam as suas convulsões internas na política externa. As duas nações alimentavam um litígio antigo a propósito da delimitação territorial de Macau. Dependente da protecção da aliada britânica, via Hong Kong, a colónia portuguesa sobrevivia graças a um precário *modus vivendi* com os chineses. Portugal exercia em Macau uma soberania exígua, ameaçada em permanência pelo ímpeto nacionalista da China. O espectro de uma ofensiva militar chinesa contra Macau nunca cessou. Embora resguardada do conflito mundial, Macau viveu uma realidade de tensão.

Palavras-chave

Macau, China, delimitação, Grande Guerra, Carlos da Maia.

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Introduction

In the years that preceded the outbreak of the Great War, the colonial authorities in Macau had attempted to find a balance between the distant (and not always well-informed) supervision from Lisbon, Imperial China's political pressure, and the conflicting drives of an administration permeable to the influence of local and regional interests. The impunity with which pirates and opium smugglers operated in the waters and islands adjacent to Macau, which Portugal claimed as its own, completed the complex tableau that was local government, structurally precarious and resting on agreements of doubtful validity. Secret societies – Portuguese and Chinese – saw in Macau fertile ground for their machinations.

Some months before the proclamation of the Republic, Portuguese authorities in Macau were given the chance to renew the long-delayed question of the territorial delineation of Macau. Pearl River pirates, daring and used to acting with impunity, kidnapped children from Macau's neighboring villages, taking them to their headquarters on Coloane Island. The Macau government reacted with vigor, mobilizing military and police forces, backed by heavy artillery, gun-boats, and a cruiser. The Battle of Coloane resulted in the liberation of almost all the hostages and the arrest of the surviving pirates. Conditions were created for the reaffirmation of Portuguese sovereignty over an island which, for centuries, had been at the heart of a dispute with China.

This episode neatly illustrates the precarious nature of Portuguese colonial ambitions in this portion of the Far East, since Macau was regularly submitted to internal and external pressures. This scenario would become more serious still during the first years of the young Republics – Portuguese and Chinese – and, more specifically, during the period of the Great War. Macau would once more survive, thanks mostly to the erratic evolution of China's foreign policy and the civil war which absorbed the various centers of power in Nationalist China. It should be noted, however, that the highly problematic political agenda which surrounded the Macau question remained unresolved in the years that followed the conclusion of a conflict which raged throughout the entire world and which involved two accidental allies – Portugal and China.

As was the case in other Portuguese colonies, the question of borders was the most delicate issue in Macau's political and administrative agenda. The Treaty of Friendship and Commerce concluded in Beijing on 1 December 1887 and ratified on 28 April 1888 had left open the question of Macau's borders on land and at sea. This meant that the sovereignty claimed by the Portuguese over the islands of D. João, Montanha, and Lapa

would, alongside the territory's maritime limits, be disputed by China for a number of decades. In truth, for China the issue was never simply one of establishing precise borders; it was, instead, a full-blown territorial dispute (Saldanha, 2006, 916-917). This would remain, until the first decades of the 20th Century, the most troubling question for Portugal's foreign policy in the Far East.

The Delayed Republic

The telegram by which Lisbon announced the proclamation of the Republic was only published in the *Boletim Oficial de Macau* on October 10, 1910. The reasons for this delay seem to lie in the metropolis's unruly political life. In other words, there was no guarantee that the change of regime was really an accomplished fact, as a result of which the local authorities played it safe. "A Republic was proclaimed yesterday with the help of the army, the navy, and the people. Enthusiasm. Absolute Order," stated the telegram.² News of the Republic's advent did not give rise to the same kind of enthusiasm in Macau, where indifference reigned. On 11 October a new supplement to the official gazette invited – in very unenthusiastic fashion, and by order of the governor – "all officers, public servants and clergy" to participate, "out of inclination or duty," in the proclamation of the new Republic in the *Leal Senado*, Macau's municipal body.³ Not long after the Republic's proclamation, the governor was replaced and the Chinese population began to abandon the colony, fearing the unknown consequences of the impact of the new regime on Macau's administration. The local government was forced to take measures to entice the Chinese to return to the Portuguese-administered territory. This aside, the political party's agitation experienced in the Metropolis did not have, in this early stage, visible consequences among the various social classes which made up the Portuguese community.

One should note that in the years between the proclamation of the Republic and the outbreak of the Great War, the governing action of Aníbal Sanches de Miranda was responsible for increasing the profit which resulted from the opium contract, a source of considerable revenue for the colony's administration. At the International Opium Convention, held in 1912 at The Hague, this army officer was responsible for defending the preservation of the monopoly on the sale of that particular drug in Macau. Until the nomination of Carlos da Maia in 1914, Macau would know four interim administrators.

² AM, *Boletim Oficial do Governo da Província de Macau*, Supplement to N. 41, 10 October 1910.

³ AM, *Boletim Oficial do Governo da Província de Macau*, Second Supplement to N. 41, 11 October 1910.

At the start of 1914, Macau was a territorially asphyxiated colony, beset by problems old and new. Its territorial integrity and sovereignty were, more than ever, at risk. The latter was exercised *de facto*, but not *de jure*, notably over the islands adjacent to Macau and the waters of the Inner Harbor. Local administration was divided up between two constituencies (*circunscrições*), that is, the municipality of Macau, with four parishes, and the Military Command of Taipa and Coloane, which together made up a single parish. The overlapping of administrative bodies and their respective duties created a complex web in which all Portuguese of note were caught. The mission of the *Leal Senado* was restricted by the governor, while in Taipa and Coloane it fell to the military commander to carry out the duties of municipal administrator, president of the municipal commission, and maritime delegate.

The majority of the population was Chinese. It took no part, and had no interest, in the bureaucratic intricacies typical of Portuguese colonial administration. The inhabitants were divided up between Chinese and Portuguese quarters. The *Procuradoria Administrativa dos Negócios Sínicos* was charged with looking after the interests of the Chinese population. Restricted to the colony's center, notably the surroundings of the principal fortifications and churches, the Portuguese found themselves in an area no larger than three square kilometers. The population stood at 79,807 inhabitants (11.8% of today's total), of whom 3,000 were born in Macau and around 1,000 were born in the metropole. Demographic density was high, with some 16,000 inhabitants for every square kilometer in the Macau peninsula. In the islands of Taipa and Coloane, density fell sharply to 211 inhabitants per square kilometer (Cónim;Teixeira, 1999: 134).

Portuguese citizens occupied all the leadership roles available in the civil service, the military garrison, religious orders, and the press. Officers had a privileged role in local society, with pride of place going to the governor, usually a military man. The Macau peninsula was some three kilometers long from the Inner Harbor to the land border with China, tellingly given the name of *Portas do Cerco* (Siege Gates). In truth, the colony was surrounded by an overwhelming Chinese presence which did not hesitate, on a cyclical basis, to undertake hostile actions, covert or very visible, against the Portuguese presence. Macau depended for its survival on foodstuffs from China and drinking water from the island of Lapa, which overlooked the Portuguese colony and was claimed by China. Macau was living on borrowed time and space.

Carlos da Maia

On the eve of the Great War, Carlos da Maia, a new governor sent by the Republic, arrived in Macau. He would go down in history for both good and bad reasons. His consulate was the subject of positive references in the official historiography, but, as we shall see, his administration was far from consensual. His legacy was remarkable, but Carlos da Maia courted controversy by leaving the territory in circumstances which were far from clear, never to return.

Carlos da Maia alighted in Macau on 10 July 1914, after having been received in Hong Kong with the pomp and circumstance characteristic of the British authorities there. The new governor, one of the founders of the republican regime, which he had already served in a number of high-profile positions, knew Macau well, having already been posted there at the service of the Navy (1903-5). He was appointed by Bernardino Machado, a republican whose colonial policy followed in the footsteps of the Monarchy, and who stated publicly that the overseas possessions constituted as sacred a patrimony as the territory of the *Pátria*. It now fell to his party colleague, Carlos da Maia, to watch over the perpetuation of Portugal's imperial designs. This is just what he did, even if in a slightly excessive fashion. The hero of the republican revolution was intent on shaking the *status quo* in Macau, with little regard for the consequences.

At this time the colony's security was at risk as a result of the instability experienced in China. Communications between the two Republics, China and Portugal, were carried out at two levels: Lisbon favored Beijing while Macau took care to preserve good relations with the succession of rulers in Canton, the nearest Chinese province, who exercised a good deal of influence over the life of the Portuguese colony. This scenario was further complicated by the fact that Macau's governance was frequently the victim of the poor communication between the Ministry of the Colonies, to which it was subordinated, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and War.

On the very day of Carlos da Maia's arrival in Macau, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Freire de Andrade, sent a confidential telegram to the head of the legation in Beijing, informing him of the doubts expressed by the Chinese chargé d'affaires in Lisbon about the new negotiations over the delineation of the colony. The Governor of Macau soon intervened in the dialogue, confirming his willingness to support Portuguese

diplomacy in its search for the longed-for solution to the border question.⁴ Carlos da Maia made clear the problematic relationship with China, source of frequent incidents, provoked or tolerated by the Chinese authorities. China did not, for example, recognize the right of the harbor authorities, the *Capitania dos Portos*, to register and concede licenses to vessels. The pernicious dependence on China for the supply of foodstuffs and water to Macau was another of the issues which the governor highlighted to the central power in Lisbon, as well as the activity of pirates around the islands contested by Portugal and China. To break that dependence, Carlos da Maia proposed the raising of livestock on Coloane Island and the seizure of Lapa Island, Macau's source of drinking water. Neither of these proposals would come to fruition in the ensuing decades.

Carrying on from his initial communication in July, the holder of the Foreign Affairs portfolio conveyed his scepticism in regards to the reestablishment of bilateral contacts regarding the delineation of Macau. In a message sent to Beijing he noted,

I must inform Your Excellency that I have no great hope that in this new negotiation we shall be more fortunate than in previous occasions. In Canton, more than in any other part of the new Republic, there continues to prevail the desire to abrogate the rights which foreigners possess in China.⁵

The evaluation made in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, MNE] was correct in that, as was underlined in that communication, the eventual failure of the negotiations might reawaken Cantonese hostilities against Macau. Taking care to avoid developments that might spin out of control, the MNE eventually instructed its diplomat in Beijing to avoid the start of negotiations. The recurring question of the territorial delineation of Macau would have to wait until the end of the Great War.⁶

⁴ AHD, Box N. 1236/Limites de Macau, Governo da Província de Macau, General Correspondence N. 39, confidential, 23 July 1914, p. 1.

⁵ 'Devo dizer a V. Ex.^a que não tenho grande esperança de que nesta nova negociação sejamos mais felizes que nas anteriores. Em Cantão, mais do que em qualquer outra parte da nova república continua a dominar o espírito da recuperação dos direitos que os estrangeiros possuem na China.' AHD, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, confidential despatch N. 3, Box N. 1236/Limites de Macau, 19 September 1914, p. 2.

⁶ Problems related to the delineation of Macau's territory did not come to an end with the passing of the colonial age. In December 2015, the People's Republic of China's Council of State approved a new map establishing the land and sea borders of the *Região Administrativa Especial de Macau* (RAEM). The RAEM's authorities and the government of the Province of Canton then negotiated the demarcation of their territories, which had not been done before, and which gave rise to difficulties when it came to maritime security. The transition of the territory to China had occurred, it should be remembered, on 19 December

The Longed-for war

On 9 March 1916, Portugal finally entered the First World War. This was merely an official step, since the armed conflict with Germany had begun much earlier in the African colonies. Two days later, on 11 March, the supplement of the *Boletim Oficial de Macau* published the historic news. Since the start of the war, the neighboring British colony of Hong Kong had taken steps to ready itself for an active participation in the conflict (Man, 2014). However, the conquest of the German colony of Shandong by the Imperial Japanese Army at the end of 1914 had neutralized the widening of the conflict to China (Cunha, 2014). Through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, signed in 1902 and renewed in 1905 and 1912, Great Britain had entrusted the protection of its interests in Chinese waters to the Empire of the Rising Sun. As a result, the most immediate danger to Macau did not arise out of a possible extension of the conflict between Allies and Central Powers to that part of the world, but rather out of the recurring Chinese threat, in the shape of the uncontrollable warlords of the Canton region. The authorities in Beijing were in no position to guarantee that the Chinese Republic would be one and indivisible. On the contrary, the provinces insisted on an autonomy which proved problematic and which was supported by the armies-for-hire of generals interested only in the accumulation of wealth and political favors.

The announcement of Portugal's involvement in the war had little impact on daily life in Macau. A report to Lisbon by the manager of the *Banco Nacional Ultramarino* (BNU) noted the paralysis of business activity and an increase in the cost of living, but the colony's finances were buoyant, thanks to the revenue generated by opium and gambling.⁷ This made Macau unique in the Portuguese overseas empire, which stretched from Lisbon to Timor.

Macau Funds the War

Shortly after the new governor took up his post, the colony's life was agitated by an administrative row with Lisbon. This involved the imposition of an important loan (120,000 *escudos*, or 270,000 *patacas*) to the overseas province of Angola, where Portugal, as in Mozambique, was fighting a war of attrition with the Germans. Macau was the sole

1999; 444 years after the arrival of the Portuguese the process of establishing Macau's precise borders was finally concluded.

⁷AHCGD (BNU fund), file 012.8/92, reserved report n° 47, Macau 21 August 1914.

overseas province that enjoyed a fiscal surplus and the government in Lisbon did not hesitate to make the most of that advantageous condition. The reaction was not long in coming. The *Leal Senado* published the minutes of its extraordinary session, held on 15 June 1914. Recognizing the good financial situation in which the colony found itself – all the while pointing out that this was merely temporary – the signatories manifested forcefully against the loan imposed by Lisbon, which called into question, they said, the important works needed for the development of Macau.

A telegram sent by the *Leal Senado* to Lisbon, having as its intended recipients the Presidents of the Republic and of the Ministry, the Minister of the Colonies, and the capital's leading newspapers – namely *O Século*, *Luta*, *Notícias*, *Intransigente*, *Mundo*, and *República* – underscored the need for improvements to the Inner Harbor, susceptible to the build-up of sand, to the sanitary condition of the territory, which did not even have a supply of drinking water, and to its inadequate police organization. “[...] In these terrible conditions – Metropole takes away our surplus – accumulated by good fortune – preventing it from resolving the needs of the colony – provoking general upset [...].”⁸

This evaluation was refuted by the local manager of the *Banco Nacional Ultramarino* [BNU], Arthur Drouhin, who in letters sent to the bank's headquarters considered the attitude of the *Leal Senado* ‘electorally-minded’ since the improvements referred to in the minutes/telegram were not even agreed to in any definitive sense. According to this BNU official, who played an important role in Macanese society, the 120,000 *escudos* loaned to Angola did not in any way affect the oriental colony's economy, which benefitted from the monopoly of cooked opium and the concession of the Chim-Pu-Pio Chinese lottery (Coelho, 1991, 37). In subsequent confidential dispatches to Lisbon, the local BNU manager went as far as to consider it unfair to keep money unused in Macau when Angola and Mozambique were confronted with an absolute lack of funds. It will therefore come as no surprise that this official was responsible for the polemical transference of funds to the African colony, carried out in secret in order to sidestep the susceptibilities of the local authorities. One thing is for sure: the money forcibly lent to Angola was never repaid.

⁸ “[...] Nestas desgraçadas condições – Metrópole arranca saldo – fortuitamente acumulado – impedindo aplicação necessidades colónia – causando desânimo geral [...]” AHCGD (BNU fund), file 012.8/92, copy of the minutes of the extraordinary session of the *Leal Senado* of 15 June 1914.

Expulsion of the ‘White Wolves’

In the meantime, the governor attempted to ensure that the subversive activities of some Chinese agitators who operated clandestinely in Macau did not provoke irreparable harm to Portuguese-Chinese relations. Denoting a careful reading of the evolving political situation in China, Carlos da Maia ensured the internal security of the colony while simultaneously attempting to extract political dividends from China, since Macau

[...] performs great services to China, and this might prove of unquestionable use in our future relations – attempting to instill in the Chinese feelings of friendship for us, putting an end to the disagreements that have prevented the delineation [...] ⁹

The governor was here referring to the expulsion from Macau of the followers of the “White Wolf,” Pai Lang, a bandit who terrorized Central China between the fall of 1913 and August 1914. His rebel army operated in a number of provinces, wherein he attacked government garrisons with success. Carlos da Maia’s strategy did not, however, meet with the desired result, since, in accordance with a dispatch sent to Lisbon, “despite the services rendered to China by the province’s government in the expulsion of the white wolves the Cantonese authorities continue to defy our sovereignty.” ¹⁰

Taking advantage of intelligence gathered by missionaries and the secret police, the highest figure in the local administration recounted the goings-on in southern China that might yet jeopardize Macau’s safety. Carlos da Maia alerted Lisbon to the fact that the Chinese authorities were very aware of the colony’s weakness, “knowing full well that the small number of available troops renders Macau vulnerable to an audacious coup.” ¹¹ In the face of this delicate situation, the governor was forced to ask the Ministry of the Colonies for the reinforcement of his military means, including two companies of *landins*

⁹ [...] presta importantes serviços à China, e isso nos pode ser de incontestável utilidade nas relações futuras – procurar levar os chineses a sentimentos de amizade para connosco, fazendo cessar os mal entendidos que têm impedido a delimitação [...]’ AHD, Box N.1236/Limites de Macau, telegram from the governor of Macau, Carlos da Maia, to the 6th Bureau of the Directorate General of the Colonies, Ministry of the Colonies, General Correspondence N. 141, 21 September 1914.

¹⁰ ‘Apesar dos serviços prestados à China pelo Governo da província na expulsão dos lobos brancos as autoridades de Cantão desacatam soberania.’ AHD, Box N. 1236/Limites de Macau, telegram from the governor of Macau, Carlos da Maia, to the 6th Bureau of the Directorate General of the Colonies, Ministry of the Colonies, 6 October 1914.

¹¹ ‘Sabendo muito bem o reduzido efectivo de forças, donde resulta estar Macau à mercê de golpe audacioso.’ *Ibid.*

(Mozambican soldiers) and the rerouting of Timor-bound troops. There is no trace of this request having been approved of by Lisbon. The 46th Indigenous Company of Mozambique only reached Macau in 1920 (Cação, 1999, 24). The deterioration of relations with the Governor of Canton was also confirmed by the MNE, which, in a letter sent to the Ministry of the Colonies, considered the situation in Macau “extremely delicate [...] as a result of the current international conflagration.”¹² The MNE, noting that the Governor of Macau and the Portuguese minister in Beijing should speak with one voice, called attention to the urgent need to avoid conflicts which, given Chinese instability, could result in situations harmful to Portuguese interests. Such conflicts did not take long to appear.

Volunteer Corps

Conscious of Macau’s weaknesses in matters of defense and security, governor Carlos da Maia, a career officer, quickly attempted to organize all available men, civilians and soldiers alike, in accordance with a contingency plan designed to ensure the protection of the territory. The most emblematic of these initiatives was the creation of the Volunteer Corps, created by government order on 12 August 1914. All Portuguese residents in Macau over seventeen and under forty-five years old could enlist, provided that they demonstrated the required stamina. This order did not establish time limits for volunteer service. Macau’s press greeted the initiative in patriotic terms, recalling the Volunteer Corps that the Portuguese community in Shanghai – made up mostly of Macau-born citizens – had previously created and deployed. This *Colonel Mesquita* company had earned the recognition of the international settlement within that cosmopolitan Chinese city.

One hundred and ten men responded in Macau to the patriotic appeal, enlisting in the Volunteer Corps, which was to be led by a captain aided by other subaltern officers and sergeants from the police corps. The municipal band of the *Leal Senado* was also assigned to the Volunteer Corps. Volunteers with a university degree were exempted from military instruction. In the years to come, the Volunteer Corps would grow to four hundred men. It became known for its eye-catching public march-pasts and for its band’s concerts. It never took up arms in defense of the colony’s territorial integrity, even though it carried out a number of dressrehearsals for just such an occasion. The Macau government invited its

¹² ‘Extremamente delicada [...] por motivo da atual conflagração internacional’. AHD, Box N. 1236/Limites de Macau, Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of the Colonies, 25 November 1914, p. 1.

Hong Kong counterpart to be present at the celebrations of the first anniversary of the Volunteer Corps.

On 28 March 1916, after Portugal entered the war, the Volunteer Corps was the subject of a reorganization. A few days later, its men were called on to perform military service, given the state of war with Germany. Trained and disciplined, the Corps became a regular second-line force, supporting the colonial army and navy in Macau. It comprised a number of companies, each with no more than 150 men. After the war, the Volunteer Corps lost much of its original patriotic and republican élan. In 1919, the Macau newspaper *A Colónia* praised the dedication of the volunteers, but called attention to the need for a shooting range – “Volunteers who cannot shoot are a dangerous institution.”¹³ A second reorganization, in 1920, introduced a period of mandatory service of four years for the members of the Volunteer Corps, which could be extended by periods of two years. However, by 1920 the Volunteer Corps had shrunk to a mere twenty men. In September of that year it would be called on to collaborate in the support of military forces which neutralized yet another conflict with the Chinese. In May of the following year, all valid Portuguese citizens were directed to present themselves at the Volunteer Corps barracks, given the revolutionary mutinies that had occurred in Macau. The Chinese population abandoned the territory and a state of siege was declared. The firm response of the then governor, Commander Correa da Silva-Paço, prevented the escalation of the crisis. The Macau Volunteer Corps was disbanded in 1936.

Military situation

The creation of a Volunteer Corps had very positive effects on the morale of the colony’s population. In practice, though, everyone knew that Macau was militarily indefensible. This had been the case before the Great War, and would remain the case long after it. An interesting and very complete report drawn up in 1922 by Macau’s military services for the attention of General Gomes da Costa, charged at the time with inspecting the military forces in Macau and Portuguese India, was disconcertingly realistic:

[...] With such numbers and given the Macau Peninsula’s geographical situation, completely overlooked by the heights of Lapa Island, to the West, and the Kat-Tai Mountains, to the North, no-one will be as bold as to think

¹³ BIACM, *A Colónia*, Macau, 29 March 1919, p. 1.

Macau defensible, and its resistance assured for anything over half a dozen days, against a strong external attack, which would naturally result in a Chinese uprising [...].¹⁴

In truth, the territory's geography rendered it absolutely permeable to external aggression. Internally it could count on the barest of military means, split between the colonial army and navy. The artillery batteries installed on Guia Hill and the Mong Ha Fortress would be of little use against a well-coordinated external attack. The same could be said of the territory's colonial navy, composed of two gunboats, *Pátria* and *Macau*, and some motor boats. The demands of the vast Portuguese colonial empire and the war then being waged against Germany in the African colonies did not allow for the permanent stationing of a navy cruiser in Macau.

Available military equipment was insufficient to hold back a Chinese offensive. The colony would only acquire a substantial quantity of modern war material, from the surplus stockpiles of the Great War armies, from 1919 onwards. By 1922, Macau possessed "[...] one of the most important deposits in our Colonies, if not the most important of all."¹⁵ Any defensive strategy necessarily relied on the guarantee of a supply of foodstuffs and drinking water. Here Macau's shortcomings were even more evident. Its drinking water came from the disputed island of Lapa. Carlos da Maia could not be clearer: "The eastern slope of Lapa Island in the effective hands of China renders impossible the defense and security of Macau."¹⁶ This vulnerability, soon to be tested, was also known to the MNE, clearly adamant about the impossibility of Macau going to war against China.¹⁷

Unlike its British counterpart, the Portuguese Empire lacked the means, especially naval means, to defend Portuguese sovereignty throughout its extensive and distant overseas territory. The projection of force was a mirage. Should the political situation

¹⁴ '[...] Com tais efectivos e dada a situação geográfica da Península de Macau, absolutamente dominada pelas alturas da ilha da Lapa, a Oeste, e pelas montanhas de Kat-Tai, ao norte, ninguém certamente terá a veleidade de supor mantida a defesa de Macau, e assegurada a sua resistência além de meia dúzia de dias, contra um forte ataque externo, havendo demais a contar, em tal caso, com a sublevação dos chineses [...]' AHM, Report on the Military Services of the Province of Macau to General Inspector Gomes da Costa, F. 62, S.I., Box N. 923, n. 5, 22 October 1922, p. 8.

¹⁵ '[...] de um dos mais importantes depósitos das nossas Colónias, senão o mais importante de todos.' AHM, Report on the Military Services of the Province of Macau to General Inspector Gomes da Costa, F. 62, S.I., Box N. 923, n. 5, 22 October 1922, p. 23.

¹⁶ 'A vertente oriental da ilha da Lapa na posse efetiva da China significa a impossibilidade da segurança e da defesa de Macau.' AHD, Box N. 1236/Limites de Macau, government of the Province of Macau, General Correspondence N. 39, Confidential 23 July 1914, p. 2.

¹⁷ AHD, Box N. 1236/Limites de Macau, Confidential report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Beijing, 19 September 1914, p. 3.

degenerate into a threat to its territorial integrity, Macau would have to rely on Great Britain, Portugal's ancient ally, and its powerful Royal Navy. Salvation was expected to come from the British colony of Hong Kong, itself experiencing problems in its relations with China similar to those of Macau. Busy as it was with its own participation in the Great War, however, it was doubtful that Great Britain would be able to render Macau any emergency help, as it had already done in the past.

Macau's troops were organized in accordance with the new military plan for overseas Portugal, approved in November 1901 and in place until 1921. Its military forces were made up of a headquarters, one European garrison artillery company (of about 100 men), and the Police Corps, made up of three companies (one European, one mixed, made up of Europeans and Macanese, and a third with Indian and Chinese troops), for a total of 600 men. The European infantry company had been incorporated in the Police Corps in 1911. The garrison military band, then a part of the Police Corps, had been abolished in 1912, being transferred to the *Leal Senado*. Tours of duty on colonial service in Macau lasted two years, with many soldiers staying on for an extra two years.

In May 1915, governor Carlos da Maia prepared the organization of a Defense Council, to be composed of senior officers, commanders, and heads of the military and naval bureaus, with the objective of studying military and defense matters. The Military Defense Council, a consultative organ of the Macau government, would only be formally created in October 1920, long after the end of the Great War. In accordance with the regulations then applicable to the colonies, the Governor of Macau was the supreme military authority, with the status of general or vice-admiral. It was in that quality that he commanded both the land and sea forces.

Gunboat *Pátria*

The gunboat *Pátria* and its crews marked an era in Macau's history. The most powerful unit of Macau's colonial navy served uninterruptedly in that territory for twenty-five years. Its complement was 160 men, including twelve officers. Many of these played an important role in Macau's social circles, both military and civilian. In 1910, this ship had played a leading part in the fight against the pirates operating out of Coloane island. In November of that year, after the proclamation of the Republic, the governor tried to remove the *Pátria* to Hong Kong, "since it was considered one of the most dangerous

elements.”¹⁸ Some of its sailors had participated in public demonstrations, demanding the expulsion of priests from Macau. There were also doubts about the crew’s loyalty to the new Republic. In 1912, the same year that it was called on to help suppress an insurrection in Timor, known as the Manufahi War, the *Pátria* was assigned to the Colonial Navy, separate from the Portuguese Navy and having as its mission the policing and preservation of law and order on colonial coasts, rivers, and canals. The Colonial Navy was overseen by the Ministry of the Colonies.

At the start of 1914, interim administrator Aníbal Sanches de Miranda sent a report to Lisbon which raised doubts about the usefulness of the services rendered by the gunboat *Pátria*, whose very presence strained the Colony’s budget: “Given its poor construction and multiplicity of mechanisms, it will never properly adapt itself to the naval needs of Macau,” stated the report.¹⁹ The interim administrator was basing his opinion on overwhelmingly negative intelligence about the gunships *Pátria* and *Macau* gathered by the Macau Naval Administration, which considered the first vessel useless for surveillance and policing of rivers and the second incapable of operating on the high seas. In response, the Minister of the Colonies overruled the interim administrator, calling the latter’s attention to Portugal’s need to reaffirm its sovereignty and to fly the flag at various points along the Chinese coast where Portuguese communities were to be found, a mission which only the *Pátria* was in any way able to perform – even if, as both the Macau authorities and the Ministry of the Colonies recognized, it had to spend months on end at anchor.

In the years that followed, the *Pátria*’s operational characteristics, its constant need for repairs, the poor state of the ammunition stored on board, and the growing expense associated with its crew were the subjects of an intense correspondence between the Governor of Macau and the Minister of the Colonies. The former wanted to replace the *Pátria* with motorboats similar to those of the Chinese Navy, suited to operations in the region’s rivers. But little came of this effort; the controversial vessel would eventually be decommissioned in 1936, while still in Macau. Purchased by a Chinese citizen, who in turn sold it to the Nationalist Government, it would again take to the seas as part of the Chinese Navy.²⁰

¹⁸ ‘por se considerar que ela representava um dos elementos mais perigosos’. Reis, 2003: 21-22.

¹⁹ ‘Pela sua fraca construção e multiplicidade de mecanismos, nunca se poderá adaptar convenientemente aos serviços da marinha de Macau.’ AHU, Report sent by the governor of Macau *ad interim*, Aníbal Sanches de Miranda, to the Ministry of the Colonies, Box 2501 (Colonial Navy), DGC/6R/MAC/1L, 9 January 1914.

²⁰ Some years later, during the Second World War, it would be the turn of the gunboat *Macau* to be sold – in this case to the Japanese – in order to make the colony’s ends meet. See Day and Garrett (eds) (2014). The Imperial Japanese Army occupied at this time the whole region, including Hong Kong, but Portuguese

Leal Senado

The polemic surrounding the *Leal Senado*'s future was one of the most public aspects of Carlos da Maia's time as governor of Macau. A number of old studies recommended the dissolution of Macau's municipal assembly, but these had never led to any action worthy of note. Carlos da Maia decided to break with the *status quo*, adopting, from the very first moment, a position of opposition to the survival of the *Leal Senado*. In an extensive report sent to the Ministry of the Colonies in May 1915, the governor, signing off as a "simple citizen who renders a service to his country and conveys information to this Government,"²¹ considered the *Leal Senado* to be "an institution whose advantages no one can ever discern."²²

Taking advantage of the ongoing project to draft an Organic Charter for Macau, Carlos da Maia decided to lead the movement that argued for the definitive elimination of Macau's municipal organ. In a careful strategic move, he decided to carry out a public consultation about this delicate matter, to be conducted through the *Leal Senado* itself, before making such a radical decision. At a public meeting called for the debate of this most important of issues, the population decided to delegate the study of the delicate case to a specialized commission, which included the Vice President of the *Leal Senado*. This commission, perhaps surprisingly, voted in favour of the organ's extinction. The governor was thus amassing precious ammunition for his battle against the municipal power.

There were justifiable reasons for the governor's offensive against the *Leal Senado*. In accordance with the Colonies' Organic Charters, residents who could read and write in any language could vote, including foreigners with over two years' residence in a given territory. In the case of Macau, where the overwhelming majority of the population was made up of literate Chinese, the risk that Chinese interests might very well take over the *Leal Senado* was a real one. Carlos da Maia warned, in the already cited report,

If the municipality of Macau is preserved, Chinese control is guaranteed and the government of the city of Macau will clearly lie in the hands of the Mandarin of Canton.²³

neutrality was generally respected in Macau. Timor was not as fortunate, having been invaded and occupied by the Japanese. See Cunha, 1996: 32-46.

²¹ 'Simples cidadão que presta ao seu país um serviço e ao Governo uma informação'.

²² 'Uma instituição cujas vantagens ninguém descobre.' Bessa, 1999: 111.

²³ 'Se for conservado o município de Macau os chineses terão nele definitivamente a entrada garantida e será o mandarim de Cantão quem aberta e claramente governará a cidade de Macau.' Bessa, 1999: 134.

Moreover, Carlos da Maia considered it unjustifiable that there should exist municipal institutions whose activity interfered directly with public administration. He argued that the colony's minuscule dimension did not allow for administrative subdivisions, and that these merely contributed to create an overlap of roles and their distribution with neither rhyme nor reason. The governor was also basing his argument on the Organic Charters which, in their final dispositions, determined that in small provinces there should be no municipal corporations, their functions being exercised directly by the Government Councils (Fava, 2010, 46).

In the end, the Governor forwarded the project for a new Organic Charter of Macau to Lisbon, including in it the proposal for the abolition of the *Leal Senado*. The institution's uncertain future was hotly debated in the parliamentary sessions of 1916 and 1917 by deputies who either attacked, or defended, the arguments put forward by the governor of Macau. But nothing came of the initiative, which ended with an anti-climax. Carlos da Maia's project was eventually forgotten about by both the Ministry of the Colonies and the Parliament. An Organic Charter of Macau was indeed published in 1917, quickly suspended as a result of Sidónio Pais's revolution and then reinstated in 1919. However, the *Leal Senado* would survive all political storms.

Sun Yat-sen's Recognition

The father of the Chinese Republic and one of the founders of the Portuguese Republic would see their paths cross in Macau. Sun Yat-sen and Carlos da Maia had in common a republican ideal and membership in secret societies. The Triad, a secret association present in various countries, was led by Sun Yat-sen, and enjoyed good relations with the Freemasons, of which Carlos da Maia was allegedly a member. The Camões Lodge gained fresh impetus during Maia's time in Macau, although there is no record of his active participation in its activities.

Sun Yat-sen was born in a village located close to Macau, and it was in the Portuguese colony that this Chinese republican leader had sought shelter for his conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the Manchu dynasty. He practiced as a doctor in Macau beginning in the fall of 1892. But while Sun Yat-sen stayed in Macau, he established a friendship with a local, Francisco Hermengildo Fernandes, editor of the *Echo Macaense* newspaper and another alleged freemason. An intricate web of personal relationships anchored in

membership of the masons allowed for the “balancing of loyalties and the articulation of strategies”²⁴ amongst the leading figures in Macau society” (Gonçalves, 2010, 55). However, Sun Yat-sen “did not stay long in Macao” for two reasons: “lacked favorable condition for political activities” an “[i]n addition, Portuguese doctors in Macao tried to expel him” (Lei, 2006, 55). In the fall of 1893, he decided to go to Guangzhou.

On the other side of the border, China was undergoing a troubled political period. The general to whom Sun Yat-sen had ceded the presidency of the Republic, Yuan Shikai, took under his wing the movement for the restoration of the monarchy, eventually proclaiming himself emperor in December 1915. Yuan Shikai would prove an ephemeral emperor, dying in June 1916. Members of Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), now illegal, took refuge in Japan, Hong Kong, and Macau. The province of Canton became the stage for armed conflict which threatened to engulf the Portuguese colony. Two governments, one in the South (Canton) and one in the North (Beijing), would fight for power over the whole of China in years to come. The civil war, carried on by the so-called warlords, would last until 1928. In June 1916, Sun Yat-sen wrote to Governor Carlos da Maia, expressing his thanks for the support offered to the Nationalists who had sought temporary shelter in the Portuguese colony (Bessa, 1999). Not long after, Carlos da Maia would seek to capitalize – in a somewhat hurried fashion – on China’s political instability.

China Threatens Macau

According to the available historiography, the reasons for governor Carlos da Maia’s controversial resignation lie either in the opposition to Macau’s forced loan to Angola (Reis, 2003, 22) or to the battle waged to abolish the *Leal Senado* (Fava, 2010, 47-48). Other historians refer also to the need to discuss the financing of works in the Port of Macau that led Carlos da Maia to travel to Lisbon, from where he would not return (Spooner, 2010, 27). However, as has already been noted, Carlos da Maia never hid his dissatisfaction with the hybrid situation in which Macau’s adjacent islands, over which Portugal claimed sovereignty, found themselves. The most problematic of all was Lapa, separated from the Portuguese colony by the Pearl River. A mere three months after his arrival in Macau, Carlos da Maia, in his reports back to Lisbon, argued for the establishment by the Portuguese authorities of a military governor on the island.²⁵

²⁴ ‘Concertar lealdades e articular estratégias’.

²⁵ AHD, Box N. 1236/*Limites de Macau*, telegram from the governor of Macau, Carlos da Maia, to the 6th Bureau of the Directorate General of the Colonies, Ministry of the Colonies, 6 October 1914.

Early in April 1916, Macau was shaken by shots which, fired by light weapons from Lapa, hit a number of houses and the waters close to where the *Pátria* lay at anchor. The struggle between the factions which fought to control southern China had reached the gates of Macau. In the report he produced regarding these incidents, the harbour master, João de Freitas Ribeiro, noted that the time had come for Portugal to assume a more assertive posture over Lapa in order to guarantee the safety of the population of Macau. In other words, this officer recommended a police intervention on the disputed island so as to extend Portuguese protection to its population. He wrote,

If our action in Lapa overshadows that of China, the Chinese nation will not be able to consider that fact as an attack or an insult to its rights; on the contrary, a justified Portuguese intervention will result only in a straitening of relations which the victorious party will easily recognize.²⁶

Still in April, the governor decided to send an Army officer at the head of twenty policemen to Lapa in order to assert Portuguese sovereignty over the disputed island. They disembarked in plain clothes “every once in a while,”²⁷ being thus “the target of the natives’ ridicule.”²⁸ The harbour master was initially kept on the margins of this initiative, which involved naval means under his overall command. Feeling slighted and in an open conflict with the officer who led the expedition to Lapa, he sent a formal complaint against governor Carlos da Maia to the authorities in Lisbon. The row between the harbour master and Carlos da Maia, both naval officers, was not entirely new. In 1915, the first had complained of the inconvenient nature of the obligatory accumulation of functions, which included the supervision of the opium trade. As far as Freitas Ribeiro was concerned, the management of this trade was harmful to his prestige as a naval officer. Late in August 1916, the governor sent the Ministry of the Colonies his reply to his naval colleague’s complaint, leaving for Lisbon “temporarily” in order to deal directly with the Minister “about matters related to this province’s administration.”²⁹

²⁶ ‘Se a nossa acção na Lapa sobrelevar, por momentos, à da China, não pode a nação chinesa considerar esse facto como atentatório ou postergador dos seus direitos: pelo contrário, da justificada intervenção portuguesa não pode resultar senão um estreitamento de relações que o partido vencedor facilmente reconhecerá.’ AHU, Report by the Harbor Master, Box N. 2503, Colonial Navy, Macau, 6th Bureau, 19 April 1916, p. 2.

²⁷ ‘De vez em quando’.

²⁸ ‘Motivo de zombaria dos indígenas’.

²⁹ ‘Temporariamente [...] sobre assuntos da administração desta província.’ AM, Supplement to N. *Boletim Oficial* n. 36, government of the Province of Macau, 4 September 1916.

At year's end, the Chinese reacted to the Portuguese moves, sending 100 soldiers to Lapa Island and another military force to the Chinese side of the *Portas do Cerco*. In a note sent to his bank's Lisbon headquarters, BNU manager Arthur Drouhin recorded the state of anxiety being experienced in Macau. This bank official believed that

The causes for these shows of strength by the Chinese Government could form the basis for a very long report which most probably would not be favourable to the highest authority in this colony, now absent from Macau.³⁰

Carlos da Maia had indeed left the colony at the end of the summer of 1916, never to return. Although Portugal was in a state of war, Lisbon was in no hurry to send a new plenipotentiary governor to Macau. For almost two years, until the arrival of Artur Tamagnini Barbosa in October 1918, the governance of Macau was left to provisional administrations. In the meantime, China, in August 1917, entered what had become a globalized war.

It would also take the Ministry of the Colonies nearly one year to reach a verdict on the complaint made against the governor of Macau. Although, Solomon-like, it strove to allow the two parties to save face, the Ministry of the Colonies, in a note issued in May 1917, recognized that “[...] it is hard to understand the political aims of the attempted mission on Lapa Island, or to conceive of its chances of success [...]”.³¹ In other words, the actions of governor Carlos da Maia, who by then had been in Lisbon for many months, was clearly denounced by the Ministry which oversaw Macau. Coincidentally, the minutes of the Council of Ministers for the same month reveal that the government “did not agree at all with his policy.”³²

Carlos da Maia left a mark on Macau, thanks in part to a strong presence and the work accomplished, but also because of his unexpected absence. In his desire to abolish the *Leal Senado* and, especially, in his clash with China over the disputed Lapa Island, his

³⁰ ‘As causas destas justas manifestações de força por parte do Governo chinês dariam material para um extenso relatório que decerto não poderia ser favorável à primeira autoridade da colónia hoje ausente de Macau.’ AHCGD (BNU fund), file 012.8/92, *Political Situation of the Colony*, Report N. 53 from the BNU Manager to Lisbon, 12 December 1916.

³¹ ‘[...] não se compreendem bem os intuitos políticos da pretendida missão na ilha da Lapa, nem se concebem as possibilidades de êxito [...]’ AHU, Complaint by the Harbour Master of Macau, Captain João Ribeiro, against the governor of the Province, Carlos da Maia, 6th Bureau of the Directorate General of the Colonies, Ministry of the Colonies, Box N. 2501, Colonial Navy, 1917, Macau, 16 May 1917, p. 7.

³² ‘Não concordava em absoluto com a sua orientação’. Marques, 2009, 95.

patriotic zeal went too far. The government order which related to his removal from the post was annulled in 1918, during Sidónio Pais's consulate, but Carlos da Maia would never return to Macau. He would later become Minister of the Navy and of the Colonies, before being murdered in October 1921, during the events collectively known as the *Noite Sangrenta* (Bloody Night).

Conclusion

At the starting point of the movements that led to the formation of the Portuguese and Chinese Republics there lay a nationalist ideology that would pit them against one another. In truth, while Portuguese nationalism, embodied in and interpreted by republicanism, fought for the *mise-en-valeur* of the empire – in accordance with a sovereign vision of the overseas colonial space – Chinese nationalism was completely opposed to the presence of foreign powers in China, underpinned by the so-called *unequal treaties*. However, this republican nationalism would lead Portugal, first, and China, later, to enter the world war on the same side. Mindful of their republican legitimacy and of the ever present spectrum of a monarchical/imperial restoration, the governments of the two nations would opt to address and dilute internal structural difficulties through a high-risk foreign policy.³³ Even so, the two countries would be kept at arm's length by the international directory which resulted from the Great War.

The two nations would know periods of great political instability, dictatorial leaders, attempts to restore the monarchy, short-lived governments, and even armed conflict. In both cases, the attempts to establish a republican regime were more the result of the exhaustion of the monarchical option than an affirmation of an ideological alternative. The Chinese Emperor was kept in place, still benefitting from many of his expensive privileges. The Portuguese monarch was sent into a golden exile in London. Portugal and China made the changeover to republican regimes in the same period, being among the first to do so in their respective continents. They had in common the need to reach a decision over Macau.

Portugal and China, weak powers charged with administering vast territories, saw in their participation in the war an unmissable opportunity to acquire the respect of the international community. Among other objectives, they hoped to gain a seat at the post-war peace talks, where their wartime effort might be recognized. This hope was undone by both the reconfiguration of the international system and the actions of uneasy allies: Great

³³ See Oliveira, 2011: 199-332; Teixeira, 1996: 377-83; Xu, 2005.

Britain in the case of Portugal, the United States and Japan in the case of China. The dubious handling of the Shandong affair by President Woodrow Wilson would undermine the League of Nations. For its part, the Macau question would remain unresolved, thanks to civil war in China. The two questions would come before the Washington Conference of 1921-22.

Macau, a diminutive Asian oasis, survived the Great War unscathed. The later unveiling of the Communist regime in China would create new difficulties for the Portuguese administered territory in the Far East, most notably in 1955 when Premier Zhou Enlai forbade Macao's fourth centennial celebrations and during the 1966 mutinies that resulted from the Maoist *great proletarian cultural revolution*. Macau would eventually be handed back to China on 19 December 1999, the final day of the old Portuguese Empire.

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Portugal's Empire in the Wake of WWI: Coping with the Challenges of Pan-Africanism and the League of Nations

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Abstract

In the aftermath of the Great War, similar to other colonial powers, Portugal was under greater pressure to meet the requirements of the more 'enlightened' concept of imperial rule. Even if Woodrow Wilson's rhetoric regarding the condition of the colonial populations was quickly perceived as deeply flawed by nationalist and proto-nationalist leaders across the colonial world, the emergence of the League of Nations was a significant development in the new international landscape. In the 1920s, these new developments became the focal point for the critics of the colonial status quo. This paper sets out to explore various facets of this new chapter of European imperialism. It will start by assessing the challenges met by Portugal at the Peace Conference and the compromises that came out of it. It will then examine the agency displayed by some creole leaders from Portugal's empire who managed to forge connections with the Pan Africanist movement, as well as explore the ambiguities of their relationship with the Portuguese authorities. Additionally, it will also examine the challenges posed by the League of Nations in the fields in which Portugal's 'civilizing' record appeared more dubious (above all, matters pertaining to labour relations).

Keywords

Portuguese colonialism; Paris Peace Conference; League of Nations; Pan Africanism; Creole Elites.

Resumo

No rescaldo da Grande Guerra, e à semelhança de outras potências coloniais, Portugal enfrentava pressões crescentes para ir ao encontro das exigências de um conceito de domínio imperial mais 'esclarecido'. Mesmo se a retórica wilsoniana relativa à condição das populações coloniais depressa foi vista como dúbia por líderes nacionalistas e proto-nacionalistas no mundo colonial, a emergência da Liga das Nações constituiu um desenvolvimento assinalável na nova paisagem internacional. Nos anos de 1920, esses desenvolvimentos estiveram no centro das atenções dos críticos do status quo colonial. Este artigo procura explorar as várias facetas desse novo capítulo da história do imperialismo europeu. Começa-se por aferir os desafios enfrentados por Portugal na Conferência de paz e os compromissos que os seus representantes aí alcançaram. Seguidamente, examina-se a iniciativa evidenciada por algumas elites crioulas de partes do império português que forjaram ligações ao movimento Pan-Africanista, bem como as ambiguidades do seu relacionamento com as autoridades portuguesas. Adicionalmente, analisam-

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se os desafios colocados pela Liga das Nações num dos domínios onde o registo ‘civilizacional’ de Portugal aparecia como mais dúbio, designadamente o das relações laborais.

Palavras-chave

Colonialismo Português; Sociedade das Nações; Conferência de Paz de Paris; Pan-Africanismo; Elites Crioulas.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, Portugal's overseas possessions were generally seen as a critical component of the nation's self-identity and standing in the world. Even though many contradictions and paradoxes can be identified in Portugal's imperial project, it seems indisputable that among the ruling classes and large sectors of the nation's public opinion there was a solid consensus regarding the necessity of defending the 'sacred heritage' of the overseas expansion.

As a small, backward, semi-peripheral, and near bankrupt country, Portugal struggled to mobilize the necessary means to take full advantage of its vast African possessions and hence meet the demands of the 'civilizing mission' that was imputed to every European nation engaged in the business of empire. Ever since the consolidation of its imperial frontiers in the late nineteenth century, the country had to deploy its scarce resources to undertake the effective occupation of Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique, which implied, first and foremost, the launching of several expensive military campaigns against some of the more independence-minded and bellicose African tribes. Those campaigns consumed most of the available fiscal resources of the state, leaving it with few means to promote the economic development of the territories. In order to prevent accusations of 'neglect' regarding its contribution to the 'progress' and 'well-being' of its colonial subjects, Portugal had to resort to 'outsourcing' schemes in some its overseas territories, granting the economic exploitation and the direct administration of huge regions to foreign chartered companies – a "kind of corporate feudalism," as Newitt has put it (Newitt, 1981:78). In colonies like Mozambique until the late 1920s, Portugal's sovereignty was therefore largely nominal, with the colonial state administering little more than 25 percent of the whole territory. But if this strategy of co-opting foreign investors from wealthy European powers to its colonial empire may have earned Lisbon a breathing space in the decades that followed the African 'scramble,' that does not mean that Portugal suddenly became free from external pressures regarding its performance as a modern colonial power. In fact, since the early twentieth century, labor conditions in the Portuguese African empire were closely scrutinized by a host of humanitarian critics, missionaries, journalists, and diplomats, who denounced the harsh conditions surrounding the recruitment and employment of African indentured workers in several Portuguese colonies. With a complicated record of resistance to abolitionist endeavors in the nineteenth century, Portugal became an easy target for liberal-minded critics in Britain, the nation that had spearheaded successive anti-slavery campaigns in that period, and was now

passionately following the campaign that denounced the appalling human rights violations in King Leopold's 'private' colony of the Congo (Grant, 2005).

Needless to say, the effectiveness of these campaigns, whatever the sincerity of some of its protagonists, relied on their capacity to gather concrete evidence against the accused. Between 1904 and the outbreak of the World War, a press report authored by a renowned British journalist, Henry W. Nevinson, was at the heart of a major scandal concerning the recruitment and crude exploitations of those *serviçais* in the cocoa farms of São Tomé, some of the main suppliers of Cadbury Bros. The operation of Portugal's plantation system in places like São Tomé was made possible by the supply of significant contingents of 'indentured labor' from Angola, the so-called *serviçais*, men forcibly recruited in the hinterland of the colony by officials of private agents who relied on the collaboration of village chiefs (usually obtained by threats or blackmail) – aspects well documented in Nevinson's report (Nevinson, 1963).² The scandal became a *cause célèbre* that instead of sparking a serious soul-searching exercise in Lisbon regarding the wisdom of condoning such crude methods of human exploitation in the colonies, in fact entrenched the 'siege mentality' and sense of victimhood of the nation's elites (Jerónimo, 2010). The notion that both Portugal's pioneering efforts as empire-builder and the 'special aptitude' of its settlers and officials to deal with 'lazy' and 'primitive' Africans were not recognized by jealous foreigners was voiced again and again by politicians and intellectuals across the political divide (even though some Republicans in the opposition were sensitive to the need of correcting the worse 'excesses' of the colonial situation). The fact that the 'slave cocoa' affair coincided with diplomatic leaks concerning an hypothetical carve-up of the Portuguese African empire between Britain and Germany in 1912-13 (actually, a remake of a previous negotiation which took place in 1898), only added to the sense of insecurity of the Portuguese ruling elites (Duffy, 1967 and Telo, 1993).

Even though the preservation of the colonies may not have been the key issue behind Portugal's decision to play an active part in the Western Front in 1916, it was nevertheless an important element in the debates sparked by the outbreak of the hostilities in Europe and Africa in 1914. The defense of the colonial patrimony was a rallying cry for the Republican leaders, notwithstanding differences in opinion regarding the sort of contribution that Portugal was prepared to make to the allied war effort. Again, a consensus can be said to have existed as to the centrality of the empire in the nation's collective consciousness and sense of purpose. Apart from some legislative innovations

² For the impact of the scandal in Anglo-Portuguese relations, see Duffy, 1967 and Stone, 2009.

(such as the administrative reforms of 1914, which barely had any sort of impact due to their suspension shortly after the outbreak of the war), the Republicans chanted the familiar mantra of the empire as key to the nation's 'regeneration,' while keeping in place, for essentially pragmatic reasons, the pillars of the colonial system ('corporate feudalism,' compulsory labor, *indigénat* laws, land expropriation, tightening of the fiscal apparatus, and use of military force to crush mutinies and rebellions) (Wheeler, 2000). Portugal's military performance in the African theatres in 1914-18 may have left much to be desired according to all sorts of contemporary accounts and recent historical assessments (especially in Mozambique), but the military mobilization required by the war greatly contributed to the consolidation of Portugal's effective rule in the vast hinterlands of Angola and Mozambique – even if such consolidation was in many instances secured as a result of particularly brutal and pitiless tactics employed against African rebels (Pélissier, 2006 and Meneses, 2014).

At the Peace Conference

The fact that Portugal ended the war on the winning side, even though at the cost of immense sacrifices, both human and material, brought a sense of relief to the members of the *parti colonial* in the metropole. The minutes of the Portuguese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 underline the salience of the colonial question in its agenda in the French capital, from the conversations with eminent foreign diplomats to the work undertaken by its delegates in various committees (Cruz, 2009). It was, however, a very bumpy ride for the politicians and diplomats invested with the mission of safeguarding Portugal's colonial assets, on account of the expectations created by some of Woodrow Wilson's pronouncements as well as cruder, old-fashioned power politics (Ferreira, 1992 and Oliveira, 2011).

If the initial instructions of the delegation, set forth in a meeting chaired by President Sidónio Pais in December 1918, stressed the need to be cautious (avoiding the impression of seeking territorial aggrandizements) and follow Britain's lead (Cruz, 2009: 99), the arrival in Paris in March 1919 of Afonso Costa, the former leader of the Democratic Party and chief architect of Portugal's involvement in the war, brought a sudden change of strategy (Meneses, 2010). Portugal would no longer be satisfied with simply maintaining its colonial frontiers and reclaiming the small enclave south of the Rovuma river in Mozambique (the so called Kionga Triangle), which Germany had

annexed in 1894. True to his headstrong style, Costa decided to raise the stakes and seek a League of Nations Mandate for Portugal in Africa, having his eyes set on one of Germany's colonial morsels in Central-Eastern Africa – present day Rwanda and Burundi. When his intentions became known, the reaction of several influential figures among British and American circles was far from encouraging (Louis, 2006: 243-244). Belgium, a small power with a recent past of outrageous mistreatment of its colonial subjects in the Congo, but nevertheless an economic powerhouse in Europe and a nation which could claim an 'honorable' contribution to Britain's military manoeuvre in East Africa, was awarded the Mandate. It was one of Costa's bitter disappointments at the Peace Conference – the other being the loss of one of the League of Nations Council non-permanent seats to neutral Spain, a decision that elicited one of his most energetic – and one might almost add, pathetic – protests (Ferreira, 2015: 153).

Throughout the Conference, there were a number of signs that Portugal's fragilities could be exploited by other players seeking to increase their leverage vis-a-vis Lisbon. A telling episode was the pressure exerted by the British following reports from their diplomatic agents in Mozambique that detailed several atrocities tolerated, or perpetrated, by Portuguese authorities, including some episodes involving British subjects. The British representatives demanded a thorough inquiry into such allegations, as well as harsh measures to punish the responsible officials. To emphasize the potential seriousness of the case, they alluded to the revulsion of their domestic public if the facts were to become known, something that would likely lead to a demand for the intervention of an international court (Hespanha, 2010: 173).

The awareness that a new colonial paradigm might be taking shape was, evidently, related to the impact obtained by some of Wilson's pronouncements prior to the Conference, particularly the allusion to the "interests of the colonial peoples" contained in point five of his famous "Fourteen Points" speech of 18 January 1918.³ Naïve as Wilson may have been perceived to be in some European circles, the fact remained that in the first half of 1919, the statesmen from the old continent were hardly in a position to challenge his ideas. Moreover, they were not able to anticipate the US Congress non-ratification of the Versailles Treaty and the resulting room for manoeuvring that they would be able to secure in the future League of Nations. Portugal was therefore attentive to the need to polish its 'civilizing' credentials in Africa and seize every opportunity to make its voice heard in Paris. One of those opportunities was the Pan-African Conference of February

³ For Wilson's views on empire and the post-war settlement, see Knock, 1992 and, especially, Manela, 2007.

1919, a forum that brought together Caribbean and African creole elites (prominent among these being the Senegalese Blaise Diagne, French Undersecretary for the Colonies), African-American activists and intellectuals, and European officials (Contee, 1972: 12-28). Originally planned as a meeting that would allow representatives from the segregated black minorities of America and colonial populations from Africa to take a stand against the harshest features of racism and imperialism, the conference seems to have been effectively neutralized by the intervention of the colonial powers' representatives. One of the speakers was a Portuguese official who would be assigned important positions in the League of Nations, Colonel Augusto Freire de Andrade, a former Mozambican governor and Foreign Affairs minister. Andrade delivered his address in a room in the Grand Hotel in Paris, sitting next to the president of the Congress, Diagne. The content of the speech – much appreciated by the audience, according to another Portuguese diplomat – was a classic apologia of Portugal's alleged 'universalist' imperial project: its Constitution made no discrimination between the metropole's inhabitants and the overseas territories' respective populations; all of them enjoyed the same political rights, Africans occupying seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic, having been elected "not only by their fellow Africans but also ... by European citizens." Andrade even went to the point of contradicting one of the key complaints made by the African creole elites since the late nineteenth-century (the downgrading of their social status due to segregationist measures issued by the metropole), when stating that Africans were commonly found in Portugal as "ministers, judges, professors, public servants and army officers," treated always without the slightest prejudice. The only distinction, Andrade conceded, was the one established by the "education, knowledge, work, and moral value of each individual."⁴

Since the tone of the final resolutions of the Pan-African gathering was a fairly moderate one, and the approach of the Peace Conference to all matters involving the rights of the colonial populations was a markedly paternalistic one, revolving around the imperial concept of 'tutelage', the Portuguese delegation had, for the time being at least, few reasons to perceive an immediate threat from the expectations raised by Wilson's remarks among the non-white populations of the globe.

More threatening to Portugal's imperial standing, however, were some of the ambitions and blueprints which circulated in the diplomatic corridors in Paris. Two types of challenges can be identified. One was spearheaded by figures affiliated with the British

⁴ Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático (Lisbon), 3º P., A 3, M. 626. Text of Freire de Andrade's speech at the Congrès Pan Africain Pour la Protection des Indigènes d'Afrique et des Peuples d'Origine Africaine, 19 February 1919.

humanitarian movement (H. N. Brailsford, S. Webb, L. Woolf, E. D. Morel, among others), or those espousing 'liberal-imperialist' views (J. A. Hobson), who had attained some influence in the War Cabinet headed by Lloyd George. It was they who, according to historian William Roger Louis, supplied the intellectual basis for the doctrine of 'international trusteeship' which threatened to disturb the imperial status quo: self-determination (although in a long-term perspective), a provisional supranational control, free-trade, and the primacy of the well-being of the native populations (Louis, 1967). One of the most articulated advocates of this overhaul of the colonial system, E. D. Morel, a key figure in the Congo Reform Association, had helped to set the parameters of the colonial debate in British liberal and radical circles with a tract entitled *Africa and the Peace of Europe* (1917). Morel argued that a future peace settlement should fulfil some of the neglected goals of the final Act of the Berlin Conference (1885): on the one hand, the 'neutralization' and safeguard of free-trade through 'open-door' regimes would give the Western powers unrestricted access to African resources and markets, thereby eliminating one of the causes of interimperial rivalry and violent competition; on the other hand, the recognition of the paramountcy of the well-being of the Africans should allow for the creation of a supranational authority that would act as the vehicle for the Western powers to perform their 'civilizing mission' among the continent's 'backward' peoples (Grant, 2005: 148-14). Morel's proposals would somehow be echoed in the book *Portugal: Old and Young* (1917), authored by George Young, a former member of the British embassy in Lisbon, in which the stability of the future international system was perceived as closely linked to the "neutralization of the national character of some of the colonies." Young put forward the idea of a major reorganization of Central Africa, preferably along federal lines. Portugal, as a decapitalized nation, should make its contribution to the creation of the aforementioned scheme and surrender its "imperial privileges," albeit with the guarantee of a relief from its crushing debt (Young, 1917: 331-332).

Having secured a representation in the committee that would prepare the draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Portuguese delegation was well placed to follow the evolution of the debates concerning the 'internationalization' of the African question. The entry of 31 January 1919 of the Portuguese delegation's Conference diary is a telling one. For the record, Freire de Andrade stated that Portugal should close ranks with Belgium in order to resist the "strange doctrines" of President Wilson, particularly his attempt to submit all the colonial possessions to "a special economic and natives affairs regime, under the supervision of the League of Nations." According to Andrade, the

consequences of such an outcome were ominous to a country like Portugal: “Put into practice, such doctrines would have as a result the loss of our colonies ... since they would leave us under circumstances which would make life impossible to us. For this reason, we cannot remain aloof in these discussions, we cannot but make our voice heard” (Cruz, 2009:28). These remarks went to the heart of Portugal’s predicament in the age of modern imperialism – a greater transparency and accountability of its colonial administration was perceived as deeply threatening to its imperial sovereignty, which rested upon methods and policies deemed as ‘archaic’ or ‘immoral’ in the light of the international norms which underpinned the performance of the colonial mandate. In an interview with Robert Cecil, his counterpart in the commission appointed to draft the League’s Covenant, diplomat Batalha Reis drew the ‘red line’ for Portugal in the reform of the international system. Although favorable to the League’s creation, Portugal could not condone a regime of “supervision that bypassed its [colonial] administration” (Cruz, 2009: 217). As in many other related issues, Portugal was lucky enough to find common ground with other European powers, equally fearful of the repercussions of a reform of the imperial status quo along the lines suggested by certain liberal and radical thinkers and experts. Acting jointly, the old imperial powers were able to check the wave of internationalism that had been sweeping the globe in the aftermath of the war by limiting the application of the ‘trusteeship doctrine’ to the German and Ottoman possessions, now converted to international mandates. Portugal may have not been a winner in the carve-up of the German and Ottoman empires in Versailles, but at least was able to prevent the destabilizing impact that would result from the triumph of the reforms envisaged by the liberal internationalist critics.

In fact, the most threatening move to its colonial interests was the one made by the Union of South Africa, created in 1910 as a Dominion of the British Crown, whose chief representative at the Peace Conference enjoyed immense prestige in Britain’s political scene, general Jan Christian Smuts. Among the ideologues of South Africa’s expansionism, many believed that the Zambezi, and not the Limpopo river, was the natural border of the Union’s eastern half, with Lourenço Marques (or Delagoa Bay) serving as the Transvaal’s best harbor, an ambition that became ever more pressing with the formidable mining development of the region.⁵ With the political settlement of 1910, London’s opposition to the Afrikaner’s ambitions vis-à-vis southern Mozambique tended to become more diluted – and Smuts and other South African politicians were quick to recognize the potential

⁵ On this topic see Hyam, 1973.

dividends that could be reaped from a South African military intervention in German East Africa (Hyam, 1973: 29). In 1916, Pretoria informed London that a general recomposition of Central-Southern African should not limit itself to the spoils of the German empire, but also include Mozambique. Shortly after taking his seat in the Imperial War Cabinet in 1917, Smuts submitted to Lloyd George a secret memorandum laying out, in a rather candid manner, his views for the territorial adjustments to take place in the region. Under various pretexts (Portugal's poor administration, a 'revolutionary atmosphere' in Lourenço Marques, difficult access of the British Central African territories to the Indian Ocean), Smuts deemed as 'imperative' the liquidation of the 'Portuguese colonial situation,' something which he expected to resolve with Mozambique's incorporation into the Union. The Portuguese, he argued, could be financially compensated (and even territorially, "with small bits of Togo and Cameroon"), and they might even retain their suzerainty and a "separate flag;" but the effective administrative control of the province had to be transferred to Pretoria. Smuts' ambitions went further than Mozambique, though – his idealized territorial reconfiguration foreshadowed an aggrandizement of the Union that would include Southern Rhodesia, German's Southwest Africa, the Angolan plateaus up to Benguela, and the Katanga mining region (Katzellenbongen, 1982: 122-123). Even if some of these proposals were eventually dismissed in London as impolitic – they presupposed a sacrifice of one of Britain's allied territory – Smuts was nevertheless able to exercise significant influence throughout the Peace Conference. His views were supported by former British imperial pro-consuls, such as Earl Buxton, and even by Woodrow Wilson himself. Smut's pamphlet, *The League of Nations: a Practical Suggestion* (1918), which rapidly caught the President's attention, sought to create a pretext to place Portugal's territories under international supervision, followed by a South African intervention. Both Louis Botha, the other key South African figure in Paris, and Smuts considered that the negotiation of the peace settlement was, most likely, the best occasion that South Africa had ever had to annex Delagoa Bay, and they did not miss an opportunity to enter into conversations with the Portuguese to see if such a goal might be negotiable bilaterally (Hyam, 1973: 32). Such a scenario was, needless to say, a taboo for the Portuguese, who were equally pressed by Lord Alfred Milner, Britain's Colonial Secretary and the man who had helped to bring about the reconciliation between his country and the Boers in South Africa. In a conversation with Afonso Costa in March 21 1919, Milner practically made himself the spokesman of the Union's ambitions when he advised Portugal to "come to terms directly with South Africa" in all matters concerning the common usage of ports and

railways, while adding that the best solution for Mozambique would be an association with the Union as one of its “dominions” (Ferreira, 1992: 30-32). Costa understood the seriousness of these suggestions and was quick to grasp what was at stake. He therefore argued that Portugal would be willing to step up the development of Mozambique, even if this might require a major overhaul of its colonial administration (and, ideally, he added, with Britain’s financial assistance). The diplomatic records show the determination with which Costa pressed this subject to Lisbon, urging the Foreign Ministry to prepare a speedy approval of a new regime of High Commissioners to Angola and Mozambique (Cruz, 2009: 267 and Meneses, 2010: 96-97). Even if the appointment of two of his trusted colonial pro-consuls (Álvaro de Castro and Norton de Matos) was only partially fulfilled, with the latter becoming the High Commissioner in Angola in 1921, Costa’s reaction was swift and, eventually, an important factor in frustrating Pretoria’s ambitions vis-à-vis Portuguese territory in Mozambique south of the Zambezi.

Portugal’s accomplishments in the Peace Conference were, therefore, of an essentially negative nature: lacking prestige, bullied by allies, its territories coveted by greater powers, the Portuguese delegation was at least able to hold its colonial assets and close ranks with other like-minded imperial powers who felt uncomfortable with the demands for change unleashed by Wilson’s high-minded rhetoric. All things considered, it was possibly the best outcome to which they could aspire.

Lending a Hand: Pan-African Activists in Portugal and the Colonial Establishment

With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see how some of the aspirations of the ‘subject races’ were easily neutralized by the ruthless action of the imperial powers and the withdrawal of the United States – the Wilsonian Moment was indeed a very short-lived experience. In the case of the Portuguese empire, one might say that it was in the 1920s and early 1930s that the illusions of those who claimed to speak on behalf of the colonial underdogs came to an end. This was a process that had started to unravel some time before the Great War, since the First Republic’s inception in 1910. From Cape Verde to Mozambique, associations of members made up of the creole elites of the five African territories sprung up in Lisbon and in several African cities.⁶ In their newspapers, pamphlets, and manifestos they tried to articulate their demands and somehow change the

⁶ See the survey by Andrade, 1997. For the nativist elites in São Tomé at the time of the Republic (1910-1926), see Nascimento, 2005; for Guinea-Bissau see Sousa, 2012; for Angola see Rodrigues, 2005 and Wheeler and Pélissier, 1972 and Wheeler, 2007; and for Mozambique see Rocha, 2006.

terms of the colonial relationship. They have sometimes been identified either as the forerunners of local nationalisms or as 'proto-nationalists', but some caution is in order when one tries to assess the link between their grievances and aspirations and the nationalist protest of the second half of the twentieth century.

In most of the cases, the core constituency of these groups was an intermediary class of creole or 'assimilated' Africans who had a long past of collaboration with the Portuguese, something that is important to recognize in order to make sense of the ambivalence of their attitudes and trajectories. Those from São Tomé and Angola, for instance, came from families who, until the mid to late nineteenth century, either held a prominent socio-economic position as land owners and traders, or occupied intermediary positions in the local bureaucracies, the armed forces, or the ecclesiastical apparatus. In other places, the situation was more nuanced. In Guinea-Bissau, a colony which the Portuguese were only able to 'pacify' between c. 1912-c.1915, the equivalent elite was actually tiny. In Cape Verde, the best lands were monopolized by the Church or by white landowners, but the local creoles constituted a significant strata of clerks, bureaucrats, 'men of letters,' and professionals. In Mozambique, the establishment of the large chartered or concession companies after 1890 brought with it a process of dispossession of land from the Africans, but in expanding cities like Lourenço Marques there was a group of educated natives who managed to secure some intermediate positions in the local government apparatus and in certain economic sectors (ports and railways).

In the final years of the Monarchy, these groups experienced a growing sense of alienation towards some of the key features of Portugal's imperial project: the attempts to reserve the intermediary bureaucratic positions to whites from the metropole; the enactment of *indigénat* norms, and the intensification of compulsory labor schemes; land expropriations and the tightening of the tax system; plans of urban 'hygiene' and renewal which resulted in the segregation of Africans; and a general complaint about a metropole that seemed focused only on the exploitative character of the imperial enterprise, thereby neglecting the 'civilizing' and 'humanitarian' component of its mission. Their resentment, therefore, was already transcending the narrow boundaries of their class interests and they were claiming a legitimacy to speak on behalf of their 'race brothers', echoing some of the claims put forward by figures from the Pan-African movement. Most of them, though, still presented themselves as genuine Portuguese 'patriots'. They appealed to an idealized notion of Portugal's liberal-humanitarian traditions (the name of Sá da Bandeira was sometimes invoked), and placed their best hopes in the reforms promised by the Republic.

In the first years of the new regime they were quite active; the year 1912 witnessed the creation of the Junta da Defesa dos Direitos de África (JDDA), a federation of the main groupings from Portuguese Africa, dominated by an elite of relatively affluent assimilated natives from São Tomé and Cape Verde. Its founding charter stated as its main goal the attainment of 'an autonomy regime for the colonies, based on the premise that modern colonization should fundamentally consist of the exercise of a humanitarian and civilizing action, the purpose of which is the education of the colonies for its own self-government'.⁷ The Junta was energetic in its demands for the abolishment of the 'exception laws' that brought discrimination against the Africans,⁸ and expressed its solidarity with the Africans persecuted by authoritarian governors like Teixeira Pinto in Guinea and Norton de Matos in Angola. Overall, though, the Junta's spokesmen espoused a moderate discourse: the improvement of the African race was to be achieved through education, which was perceived as key to the acquisition of the skills required by a modern economy, and, afterwards, for the enjoyment of full civic rights. This very gradual reform agenda, though, did not find many supporters in the midst of the Republican establishment. Some Republican figures may have paid lip service to a vaguely humanitarian rhetoric regarding the plight of the Africans, but their on the ground legislation and decisions were defined by a fundamental continuity in relation to policies pursued by the Monarchy or theorized by some of its colonial ideologues – in no other field was this more evident than that of the 'native policies' and the labour legislation.⁹

While some of the organizations led by 'assimilated' natives in the African colonies were harshly persecuted by the local authorities (this was particularly the case in Angola, where Norton de Matos imprisoned and deported several assimilated journalists and outlawed the Liga Angolana, the main nativist association which had emerged after 1910) (Wheeler and Péliissier, 1972: 120-128), in the metropole their counterparts were able to carry on their activities. In 1919, there was a schism in the JDDA with the establishment of two splinter groups – the Liga Africana (1919), closer to the gradualist approach favoured by Diagne and Du Bois, and the Partido Nacional Africano [PNA], which proclaimed its affinity with the more militant line associated with the Jamaican Marcus Garvey (Andrade,

⁷ See the Junta's *Estatutos* (Lisboa Typographia Colonial: 1912). On the JDDA and the nativist associations in the metropole see Andrade, 1997 and also Santos, 1968 and Oliveira, 1998.

⁸ See for instance their vigorous protest against the project for a new labour code (which would result in the General Regulation for the Native Labour in the Portuguese Colonies of 4 October 1914), JDDA (1914), *A Lei do Garrote*. Lisbon: Typografia Industrial Portuguesa.

⁹ On the Republican regime and the colonies, see, among others, the edited volume by Sardica, 2010 and Meneses, 2014.

1997). Most likely, they were tolerated by the Portuguese government for two reasons: either they were perceived as inoffensive; or they were seen as potentially useful pawns in Portugal's public relations operations abroad.

The Liga's participation in the Pan African Congresses, which the Du Bois 'tendency' helped to organize in 1921 and 1923 in several European capitals (London, Paris and Brussels),¹⁰ provides a clear illustration of this. In September 1921, José Magalhães and Nicolau Pinto dos Santos, leading figures of the Liga Africana (the former an Angolan physician and professor at the School of Tropical Medicine in Lisbon; the latter a rich mulatto landowner from São Tomé), took part in the Paris and Brussels sessions of the Pan African Congress, a gathering where the influence of the colonial interests was again quite evident (the social program, for instance, included a visit to the Tervuren Museum for Central Africa, in the outskirts of Brussels, the showcase of Belgium imperialism). Magalhães' and Pinto's interventions probably had a greater effect than anything that might have been said by a Portuguese official – and the possibility that this might have been arranged between them and the Portuguese Foreign Affairs or Colonial Ministries cannot be ruled out. Addressing the second session of Congress at the Palais Mondial in Brussels, Pinto 'protested against the mischievously spread opinion that slavery still existed in the Portuguese colonies'. 'That,' he claimed, 'was completely false'¹¹. His colleague Magalhães made an appeal for a policy of 'conciliation' in colonial Africa and argued that it was in the best interest of the colonial powers to have 'self-reliant and educated Africans' in places that were unfit for a massive colonization of white settlers.¹²

Unsurprisingly, such statements were denounced as a 'glorification' of Portuguese colonialism by the anarchist newspaper *A Batalha*, sympathetic to the views of the PNA, which added that the likes of Diagne and the Liga Africana were only representative of "the aspirations of some hundreds of mulattos", not of the African masses.¹³ Be that as it may, the fact was that Magalhães and the Liga were able to position themselves as the interlocutors of the respected Du Bois when the idea of organizing a special session of the third Pan-African Congress in Portugal took shape in 1923. The reasons for the staging of such a session in Lisbon are not entirely clear, but they were most likely related to the

¹⁰ For the Pan Africanist initiatives (and schisms) in the first half of the twentieth-century, see Thompson, 1971: 23-63.

¹¹ *Correio de África*, 22 September 1921.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ See *A Batalha*, 4 October 1921. Comments on the Pan African Congress of 1921 can also be found in several issues of late September and early October of the same newspaper. On *A Batalha's* dissenting comments on colonial affairs, see Castro and García, 1995.

persistence of evidence which attested to the practice of compulsory labor in some of Portugal's colonies (for both public and private purposes), or, possibly, the persecutions that Norton de Matos was carrying out against the nativist associations in Angola. Some of these matters had been recently addressed by Kamba Simango, an American-educated Mozambican pastor, working for the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, in the London sessions of the Pan-African Congress. Du Bois's initial plans, however, met with the opposition of the Liga's leaders, who invoked 'logistical' reasons for the postponement of the meeting (Andrade, 1997: 174-175).

A compromise solution was then found: the African-American scholar would come to Lisbon and deliver a public conference. Du Bois' address took place on 1 December 1923 (Portugal's national holiday that marks the restoration of its independence from Spain in 1640), at the Liga Africana headquarters in Lisbon. Portugal's press paid little or no attention to the event.¹⁴ The most complete account comes from Du Bois himself, who describes a session attended by "mostly black men, students, well-dressed and courteous in manner" from Portugal's eight colonies, but also by "black physicians, lawyers, engineers, merchants." Among other guest speakers were people like Vicente Ferreira, the Portuguese Minister for Colonies, and Vieira da Rocha, who had twice held that same position (Du Bois, 1924: 170).¹⁵ Du Bois was clearly flattered by the attention he received from his Portuguese guests and in a strikingly uncritical tone went on to praise the remarkable racial 'inclusiveness' of the Portuguese empire. Writing in the recently launched journal *Foreign Affairs*, Du Bois admitted that it was unlikely to "find a black man married to a Portuguese of family and wealth, but on the other hand it seemed quite natural for Portugal to make all the blacks of her African empire citizens of Portugal with the rights of the European born". (Du Bois, [1925]). Perhaps even more significant were his extremely flattering remarks on the situation in São Tomé and Príncipe, where the 'slave cocoa' scandal of the early years of the century had, allegedly, allowed for the rise of a new class of African cultivators, willing to endure slimmer margins of profit:

Thus in this part of Portuguese Africa the worst aspects of slavery melted away and colonial proprietors with smaller holdings could afford to

¹⁴ The event was not reported by either *Diário de Notícias* or *O Século*, two leading newspapers of the time.

¹⁵ For the context of Du Bois' trip to Lisbon, see Lewis, 2000: 110-117, as well as the recollection of Du Bois' talk by the Santomense Manuel Graça Dias in *A Mocidade Africana*, 1 January 1931, quoted in Oliveira, 1998: 360-361. According to Graça, Du Bois urged the Africans present to follow a 'a quiet policy, in which collaboration with the whites should be a paramount feature' ['uma política calma, na qual a colaboração com o branco seja um elemento principal'].

compete with the great planters; wherefore democracy, both industrially and politically, took new life in black Portugal. Intelligent black deputies appeared in the Portuguese parliaments, a hundred black students studied in the Portuguese universities and a new colonial code made black men citizens of Portugal with full rights. (Du Bois, [1925]).

Du Bois's observations, of course, could not be more distant from the crude social and racial realities of Portuguese Africa in that specific moment, notwithstanding the existence of a thin layer of relatively well-off, literate natives who felt that an improvement of the colonial injustices might be accomplished through a dialogue with the imperial establishment.

Some of them may have sensed that a fragile and beleaguered Republican regime would appreciate the advantage of working with their organizations – more specifically, they could be mobilized to act as advocates of Portugal's imperial project in the European arenas where matters pertaining to colonial administration were being discussed, and not always in positive terms in relation to a country like Portugal. This was the case of Geneva, the headquarters of the League of Nations (and its sister organization, the ILO), where questions involving the persistence of forms of compulsory labour once more invited a critical scrutiny of Portugal's colonial reputation. Even though on a less grandiose scale than was initially hoped, the 1920s were an epoch of economic expansion in tropical Africa, with colonial governments committed to large infrastructure projects that would serve the needs of private investments in the agricultural and mining sectors (Maul, 2007: 479). Portuguese Angola became one of the best examples of this short-lived colonial boom: the Benguela Railway project, originally planned to serve the mining regions of Katanga and Northern Rhodesia, was completed in 1927; some years before, in 1921, a multinational mining consortium (Diamang) was invited to explore the diamond reserves of the Lunda region, in the Northeast of Angola; and the High Commissioner Norton de Matos (1921-24) pressed ahead with a grandiose plan of infrastructural modernization across the colony, which ran parallel with an expansion of the number of Portuguese white settlers, hungry for the best agricultural lands. This new scenario was hardly congenial for the black African peasants, who in many instances were deprived of their lands, burdened with taxes, and forcibly enrolled into public works schemes (Wheeler, 2000).

As might have been expected, Portugal followed with some anxiety the emergence of what Daniel R. Maul has called “a European/North-America dominated ‘international

colonial issue network”, rooted in the anti-slavery humanitarian tradition, and drawing support from a wide range of actors – “philanthropic and academic associations to individual members of parliament, ministerial bureaucrats in the colonial metropolises, isolated local colonial civil servants and representatives of Christian missions” (Maul, 2007: 480). It was from this milieu that in 1925 a new *cause célèbre* involving Portugal’s administration broke out. This was, of course, the impact made by a report produced by an American sociologist from Wisconsin University, Edward Alsworth Ross, which detailed the extremely harsh methods of labor recruitment in the colonies of Angola and Mozambique (Ross, 1925). Supported by evidence obtained from first-hand observation, the Ross Report was appreciated by the Temporary Slavery Commission, appointed by the League’s Council in 1924, and enjoyed a wide international circulation.¹⁶ These sorts of initiatives, though, were perceived by the Portuguese imperial establishment as a kind of smokescreen for unaltruistic interests, which were willing to use all kinds of expedients to discredit Portugal’s colonial oeuvre before the international public opinion.¹⁷ Portugal’s strategy in the mid-1920s, though, was not one of pure obstruction of the critical inquiries concerning the social conditions in its African territories. For domestic consumption, some of its spokesmen were quick to denounce the ‘jealousy’ and veiled ambitions of unnamed external powers vis-à-vis Angola, Mozambique, and their ‘splendid’ ports (Andrade, 1925). Nevertheless, until the end of the decade, Portuguese policy seems to have involved a measure of appeasement; that is, the introduction of a number of cosmetic changes that would accommodate the accepted international standards in matters related to the recruitment and employment of native laborers.

Portugal’s reaction to the process leading up to the adoption of the Anti-Slavery Convention (25 September 1926) is a good illustration of this. A result of the lobbying efforts carried out by well-connected British humanitarians, such as John Harris, from the Anti-Slavery Society, the Convention took some three years to organize and, in several stages of the process, faced the opposition of several European powers (Miers, 2003, Chap. 8 and 9). Enjoying a permanent seat in the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC), the organ which appointed the members of the Temporary Slavery Commission, Portugal was able to secure an active voice throughout the whole process of the drafting of the Convention – Freire de Andrade, who acted as the Commission’s vice-chairman and found a trusted ally in Chairman Albrecht Gohr, the Belgian representative. They both worked effectively to circumscribe the

¹⁶ See Miers, 2003: 123 and Jerónimo, 2010.

¹⁷ See Alexandre, 1993 and Jerónimo and Monteiro, 2012.

input of non-state actors in the gathering of information – for instance, petitions could only be addressed through national governments, who were apt to reject them – (Grant, 2005: 163) and made sure that the imperial policies of member states would not be under discussion. The result of this activism from the representatives of the colonial establishments was a paradoxical, almost perverse one – by laying down the specific conditions under which forced labor could be mobilized for public purposes (article 5), the Convention ended up, as Kevin Grant has observed, legitimizing “the continued coercion of labor by the imperial state” (Grant, 2005:165)¹⁸ Slavery and coercion were defined in appropriately narrow terms and not a word on indigenous land rights was said. Africans were thus left in a position in which they would only be able to fulfil their tax obligations by joining the colonial labor market. Portugal would ratify the Convention on 26 August 1927, some months after the breakdown of its parliamentary regime. Even though a more assertive and chauvinistic stance prevailed in Lisbon since the advent of a military dictatorship on 28 May 1926, the new authorities believed in the advantages of enacting legislation that appeared to comply with the new international norms regarding the conditions of the native populations – thus, the new Labor Code for the Natives of the Portuguese African Colonies was promulgated on 6 December 1928, followed by the Political, Civil and Criminal Statute of the Natives on 6 February 1929 (Ferreira, 2015: 163-173).

With the support of the British Labor government, the humanitarian lobby was able to keep the issue of forced labor on the top of the international agenda, its efforts resulting in the drafting of a new convention on that very same issue (Miers, 2003, chap. 10). Predictably, a strong opposition to a distinction between forced labor for public ends and private interests emerged from countries like France, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, and South Africa. The final version obliged the signatories to abolish forced labor “in all its forms,” allowing only for “transitional periods” in schemes involving “public purposes” (Maul, 2007: 481-483). In the debates that took place in Geneva, familiar figures from the Pan African movement again attempted to legitimize the opposition put forward by those governments. Blaise Diagne, advisor to the French delegation at the ILO Conference of 1929, endorsed the employment of coercive measures to bring Africans to work in the name of France’s “civilizing mission” (Maul, 2007: 481-483).¹⁹ In Portugal, even though the political atmosphere had become less congenial to the expression of nativist opinions after

¹⁸ And, as Suzanne Miers has remarked, ‘no mechanisms were established for enforcement or even for monitoring its results.’ Miers, 2003:130.

¹⁹ On the meaning of Diagne’s alignment with French imperial propaganda (along lines very similar to the ones which motivated the endorsement of Portuguese policies by members of its nativist intelligentsia), see Atlan and Jézéquel, 2002: 102-106.

the downfall of the Republic, the PNA had been able to stage a sort of a comeback in 1927, relaunching its newspaper *Voz de África*. It may have been the case that the prestige enjoyed by the League in that decade provided a stimulus for this resurgence of the nativist movement in the metropole – some of its newspapers expressed the hope that a thorough reform of the international organization might enhance its profile, allowing it to accommodate the representation of “all the world’s races”.²⁰

Their leaders also made appeals to a reorganization of the Portuguese state (to ensure “the adequate representation of the important material and moral interests of the African peoples”) and were bold – or naïve – enough to put forward a proposal, a month after the promulgation of Salazar’s highly centralizing Colonial Act (July 1930), for a constitutional scheme that contemplated a separate jurisdiction “for each of Portugal’s peoples,” and their federal association and confederate link with Portugal.²¹ At the same time, though, they were also eager to ingratiate themselves with the dictatorship. The way they found to show their usefulness was to lend the new rulers a hand in refuting some of the charges brought against Portugal’s African labor policies – this seems to have happened by the time of the ILO Conference of May 1929 (Andrade, 1997). Mário Domingues, a mulatto journalist who had established his credentials as a fearsome critic of the colonial project in a series of articles for *A Batalha* in the early 1920s (Garcia, 2012), wrote to the Minister for Colonies in that year to offer his services as an independent journalist of African origin who, for that reason, could provide Portugal with additional credibility when endorsing its positions in Geneva (Jerónimo, 2010: 261-262). In November 1930, Domingues’s party, the PNA, was still addressing the government headed by Domingos Oliveira to solicit an official backing to an international Congress of the Negro Race to be held in Lisbon in the following year. Such an event, they argued, would demonstrate to an international audience the complete absence or racial prejudices of the Portuguese people and its willingness to recognize the Africans’ useful cooperation in the “general work of civilization,” while also allowing the PNA members, in their conversations with representatives from other black nations, “to dissipate the malevolent canards that have been circulating abroad with the purpose of exciting the conscience of the world against the civilizing work of Portugal in Africa.”²²

²⁰ *Voz de África*, 1 December 1927.

²¹ *Voz de África*, 8 August 1930.

²² AHD, 3º P, A 12, M 280 – Congresso Pan-Africano (Raça Negra). Copy of a letter from the Secretary General of the PNA to the Minister of the Colonies, 20 October 1930.

However, while in previous years the Portuguese authorities may have acknowledged some utility in such offerings, the zeitgeist of the early 1930s had changed quite significantly. Portugal's willingness to play an active role in the international stage, and particularly in Geneva, was now replaced by a more autarchic and chauvinistic outlook, sometimes verging on the paranoid whenever there was a suspicion of bolshevist inspiration or involvement (as was the case with the initiative of the International Negro Congress). Social Darwinism, sometimes tinged by unashamed racism, was about to become the dominant strand in the official mindset of the regime that emerged from the Military Dictatorship.²³ In the context of the 1930s, the high tide of the New State's imperial 'mystique,' there was very little tolerance for the assertion of a Pan Africanist identity, or even for the expression of creole autonomist aspirations within Portuguese imperial formation.

Conclusion

Portugal displayed reserve and suspicion towards some of the features of the international setting that emerged after the Great War, particularly the agency of international actors that tried to take advantage of the possibilities opened up by the League of Nations to promote changes to the imperial status quo.²⁴ For various historical reasons, Portugal was never home to a humanitarian movement resembling the one that emerged in Britain and other European nations since the early nineteenth century, triggered by the outrage against slavery, the slave trade, and all kinds of abuses committed in the colonial territories acquired during the 'scramble.'²⁵ An uncompromising nationalist approach to the empire was widely shared in Portugal since the mid to late nineteenth century, with few individuals and organizations questioning the myths of Portugal's imperial benevolence. Such a consensus rested upon certain assumptions, such as Portugal's 'exceptional' vocation to colonize and civilize overseas territories, as well as its singular aptitude to 'assimilate,' in a gradual way, the native populations which fell under its authority. Part and parcel of this mindset was also the notion that Portugal's pioneer efforts at empire building were the cause of jealousy among other nations, who were constantly waiting for an opportunity to seize a portion of its overseas assets. They were usually prone

²³ For the imperial 'mystique' of the 1930s, see Léonard, 1998.

²⁴ On this topic, and the role played by several Portuguese officials (Freire de Andrade and Penha Garcia) in the PMC in Geneva, see Pedersen, 2015.

²⁵ See Marques, 2006.

to use 'humanitarian' or 'philanthropic' pretexts to claim Portugal's inability to pursue its colonial mission, and, according to this view, the pressure for 'internationalizing' colonial issues was but a smoke screen designed to conceal those predatory attitudes. Hence, until the early 1930s, Portugal's policies in Geneva followed a very precise script: its representatives should remain vigilant and take steps to thwart each initiative that threatened to infringe upon Portugal's colonial sovereignty or enhance the oversight of any international body vis-à-vis its internal colonial affairs, particularly those which lent themselves to a more 'moralizing' reproach – the compulsory work schemes and some illicit traffics, like the opium trade in Macau (Oliveira, 2011).

With the advent of an authoritarian, quasi-fascist regime in the early 1930s, Portugal would take an even more defensive line in Geneva, accompanied by a reversal of the decentralizing tendencies of its colonial administration (the High Commissioners' regime was cancelled in 1930) and an assertion of a deeply ethnocentric 'imperial mystique.' By then, international colonial exhibitions, like the one which took place in Vincennes, Paris (1931), seemed to attract much more attention from its decision makers than most of the meetings and debates held in Geneva.

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The South Atlantic and Transatlantic Slave Trade: Review Essay

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Abstract

This essay will review two recent books on the transatlantic slave trade, which privilege the Southern Atlantic dynamics of this trade. Centred on the common contributions of both works, this article will address two main issues: firstly, it will reflect upon the southern directions that the study of transatlantic slave trade is experiencing, focusing on the importance of ‘trans-regional’ and ‘trans-national’ approaches, and on the importance of African agency; secondly, it will address the operational capacities of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database to the field, thoroughly used in both volumes, which will serve as an excuse to briefly reflect upon the importance of Digital Humanities as a whole.

Keywords

Transatlantic slave trade, South Atlantic, Digital Humanities.

Resumo

Esta reflexão historiográfica recensará dois livros recentes sobre o tráfico de escravos transatlântico que privilegiam o Atlântico sul. Focado principalmente nos elementos que os dois livros têm em comum, o artigo tratará de dois temas: em primeiro lugar, reflectirá sobre a atenção que o Atlântico sul tem recebido pela parte dos estudos sobre o tráfico de escravos transatlântico, focando-se na importância das abordagens ‘trans-regionais’ e ‘trans-nacionais’ e na importância da agência africana; em segundo lugar, tratará das capacidades operacionais que a Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, abundantemente utilizada em ambos os volumes, tem trazido a este campo de estudos, o que servirá de pretexto, por sua vez, para pensar brevemente sobre a importância das Humanidades Digitais.

Palavras-chave

Tráfico de escravos transatlântico, Atlântico Sul, Humanidades Digitais.

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David Richardson and Filipa Ribeiro da Silva (ed.) (2015), *Networks and Trans-Cultural Exchange: Slave Trading in the South Atlantic, 1590-1867*. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Dale T. Graden (2014), *Disease, Resistance, and Lies: The Demise of the Transatlantic Slave Trade to Brazil and Cuba*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

1. Introduction

This essay will review two recent works on the transatlantic slave trade that pay special attention to the South Atlantic dynamics of this same trade: David Richardson and Filipa Ribeiro da Silva's *Networks and Trans-Cultural Exchange: Slave Trading in the South Atlantic, 1590-1867* (2015), and Dale T. Graden's *Disease, Resistance, and Lies: The Demise of the Transatlantic Slave Trade to Brazil and Cuba* (2014). These are two works that differ widely in their nature, but which share a number of features in common.

First of all, while Graden's is a single-authored book, Richardson and Silva's book is an edited collection resulting from the European-funded project "Slave Trade, Slavery Abolitions and their Legacies in European Histories and Identities,"² and, as a co-edited book, it brings together a vast array of texts by different authors and covers a broad time period, from the late sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. In turn, Graden's monograph is his second book on this subject, an important complement to his first book, "From Slavery to Freedom in Brazil: Bahia, 1835-1900" (2006), where he again demonstrates his expertise in the study of abolitionism throughout the nineteenth century.

Being a collection of essays written by several scholars, the range of topics addressed and the diversity of sources and archives used throughout Richardson and Silva's volume are very wide-reaching, but this does not mean that the broader objective of delivering a coherent collection of essays on the subject of the transatlantic slave trade in the South Atlantic is not achieved quite consistently. Graden's book, on the other hand, focuses on a narrower subject and time period, but the study by the University of Idaho scholar is no less relevant to the field, since, by resorting to a vast array of sources and archives, Graden presents his arguments coherently and effectively. While Richardson and Silva's volume has a more economic and cultural approach, Graden's monograph adopts a perspective that is more political and social. Historiographically speaking, both volumes rely on an extensive bibliography.

² See www.EURESCL.eu.

Regardless of the differences between the two, both books reveal the dynamic interest that the study of the transatlantic slave trade is currently experiencing.³ This review essay will focus, in particular, on the common contributions of the two works, seeking to address the main inputs of them both, not only to the vibrant field of the history of the slave trade, “the largest forced movement of peoples in history” (Morgan 2009: 224), but also to Atlantic history as a whole. The two books have several aspects in common, but, for the sake of internal coherence, this historiographical reflection will concentrate on only two. First of all, apart from confirming the focus on the southern hemisphere that the field of slave trade studies has been experiencing for a while, the two books illustrate very clearly how transregional and transnational approaches may enrich the study of the South Atlantic dimension of this international institution. It is precisely because of these combined approaches (transregional and transnational) that, as the two volumes also demonstrate, it is possible to paint a full picture of the leading role played by all the actors and agents (not only European or American, but also African) involved in the tragic story of the transatlantic slave trade. Secondly, the two books also richly exemplify the remarkable operational capabilities of the “Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database,” a digital tool that has become essential for any work on this multidimensional subject. Hence, after briefly presenting the contents of each book, as well as their internal organization, this review essay will reflect upon each of these elements separately.

2. Contents and Internal Organization

As its title points out, Dale T. Graden’s book is centered on the demise of the transatlantic slave trade in the South Atlantic. Graden’s study is, as mentioned above, a single-authored work and focuses on a very specific period and topic: the final decades of the transatlantic slave trade to Brazil and Cuba from roughly the early nineteenth century until the late 1860s, when this traffic was suppressed in Cuba (1867). Without ever overlooking the impact of British diplomatic endeavors on the evolution of abolitionism after the suppression of the slave trade, Graden underlines the influence of two additional elements, namely the threat of infectious diseases brought by slaves coming from Africa,

³ This review essay addresses several aspects related with the slave trade, slavery, the African diaspora, Atlantic history, etc.; all areas of study that have already been extensively dealt with by historiography. See, for instance, the review articles by Patrick Manning (2003b) or Kenneth Morgan (2008). Thus, the references that will be cited are not intended to be exhaustive. Instead, they are simply designed to exemplify some of the most relevant works for each of the topics.

and the threat of slave resistance, which gradually took on the dimension of a broader collective movement.

Graden's arguments are explained quite convincingly throughout the book's seven chapters. In the first chapter, the US involvement in the slave trade with Cuba and Brazil is examined, particularly the way in which US actors (not only investors or ship captains and crews, but also, for example, American diplomats in Brazil or Cuba) evaded British and American laws after the slave trade to the US was suppressed. Chapters 2 and 3 address the way in which the fear of infectious diseases and epidemic outbreaks carried by ships disembarking African slaves in Cuba and Brazil fuelled public and medical opposition to this trade. As for Chapters 4 and 5, these deal with the effects of the slave and free black resistance movements on political debates and on popular public opinion regarding the slave trade, and the way in which the fear of rebellions contributed to the eventual suppression of the slave trade in both societies. In Chapter 6, Graden turns his attention to the role played by interpreters and translators, both Atlantic Creoles and Europeans, in keeping the traffic going, and in exerting "subaltern pressures" (Graden 2014: 177) on the international abolitionism movement that began to evolve from the late eighteenth century onwards. The last chapter is dedicated to the final years of the slave trade in Brazil and Cuba.

In turn, since it is a collection of essays, Richardson and Silva's book brings together scholars from different academic backgrounds and historical traditions who have been actively engaged in studying slavery and the slave trade for the past few years. Such institutional and profile diversity is to be noted not only in academic terms (professors, senior researchers, postdoctoral researchers, etc.), but also in geographic terms (United Kingdom, Netherlands, Brazil, Portugal, United States, and South Africa), which allows for a complementarity of approaches and knowledge, mainly archival and language-based, that is always welcome in academia. Since these authors have each been working on different chronologies, bringing them together here also allows for the coverage of a much larger time frame, 1590-1867, something that the volume as a whole delivers quite consistently. Simultaneously, this combination of authors also allows for the analysis of several topics related to the transatlantic slave trade in the South Atlantic, even if each chapter is more or less devoted to the broader umbrella of networks and cultural exchanges.

Thus, the approaches are certainly varied. Gustavo Acioli Lopes analyzes the connection, and interdependence, between Brazil's colonial economy and the labor of African slaves, particularly the way in which slaves fuelled the production, trade, and export

of products such as sugar or tobacco, as well as the mining of gold. Filipa Ribeiro da Silva examines the transnational nature of the participation of private businessmen in the Dutch Republic's trade with Angola from the late sixteenth century to the late eighteenth century. In turn, Arlindo Manuel Caldeira links the seventeenth-century Angolan slave trade to the broader Atlantic world, paying particular attention to the acquisition and transport of slaves, as well as to the harsh conditions that slaves endured aboard ships crossing the Atlantic towards the Americas. Mariana Candido focuses on trade networks in Benguela, from the early eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, highlighting the roles played by African men and women as key agents in the West-Central African traffic of slaves, linking Benguela to its hinterland, as well as to the wider oceanic space, in what she termed an "Atlantic enterprise" (p. 164). As for the chapter by José Capela, to whom the volume is dedicated, it addresses the connections between the slave trade networks in eighteenth-century Mozambique and the Atlantic dimension of this trade, examining, in particular, the links between the East African ports of Mozambique and Brazil, the French Antilles, and Spanish America. Stacey Sommerdyk analyzes twelve voyages undertaken by the Dutch vessel *Prins Willem V* to the Loango coast in the mid-eighteenth century, seeking to emphasize the agency of African merchants from Malemba and Loango Bay in the broader transatlantic slave trade. Finally, Roquinaldo Ferreira discusses the contribution of diplomatic and military abolitionism to the gradual erosion of the slave trade system in the South Atlantic from the early nineteenth century to the late 1860s.

As mentioned in the introduction, the two books are quite different in nature, but the characteristics that they do, in fact, share are a good pretext for reflecting upon the recent dynamic development that the study of the transatlantic slave trade has been experiencing. This reflection will be made in the next two sections of this article.

3. Atlantic History and the South Atlantic Slave Trade

If we had to pinpoint one of the most, if not the most, dynamic fields in Atlantic history, we would unarguably choose the history of slavery and the slave trade, and what Patrick Manning termed "Africa-Diaspora studies" (Manning 2003b: 487).⁴ As Allison Games states, "No other field has been so aggressively engaged for so many decades in pursuing an Atlantic vision and in framing the field as a whole" (Games 2006: 743). In fact, the relationship between the two is far from being a new one. In his reflections on the idea

⁴ On the slave trade and the African diaspora, see also Miller 1988 and Thornton 2015.

and contours of Atlantic history, Bernard Bailyn demonstrated how slavery, slaves, and the slave trade have long been consistently linked to the gradual development of Atlantic history (Bailyn 2005). Pierre Verger's *Flux et reflux de la traite des nègres entre le golfe de Benin et Bahia de Todos os Santos du dix-septième au dix-neuvième siècle* (1968) and Philip Curtin's *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (1969) were perhaps pioneers in approaching the slave trade from an Atlantic perspective.⁵ While linking Bahia to the Bight of Benin, Verger balanced both sides of the Atlantic equally and impartially, hence making his approach an essential one for the development of an Atlantic perspective. Curtin's *Census* was equally crucial, and ended up building a school of followers committed to looking at slavery and the slave trade from the Atlantic viewpoint, a framework that he himself pursued in other seminal studies on the African diaspora.⁶

Curtin's *Census* was published long before Atlantic history had established itself as such, but this did not mean that other historians, particularly Africanist and Brazilianist historians, did not follow in Curtin's footsteps, examining the various aspects – political, economic, social, cultural, etc. – involved in the so-called Middle Passage, “a metaphor of the inhumanity and brutality of the Atlantic slave trade” (Richardson and Ribeiro da Silva 2015: 2), and placing their findings in the new and fast-growing field of Atlantic history.⁷ Soon, scholars following Curtin's tradition in the study of slavery and related issues conceptualized what came to be known as the “Atlantic system” (Bailyn 2005: 33).⁸ In time, other in-depth works emerged, focusing on the slave trade while also pursuing a conceptualization of the Atlantic world. Such was the case with Paul Gilroy's “The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness” (Gilroy 1993) or David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick's “The British Atlantic World” (Armitage and Braddick 2002).

Within this Atlantic world, many topics were under scrutiny and several different perspectives were adopted. Economic historians sought to understand the particularities of the trade, the partners involved, and the numbers as well. Political historians sought to

⁵ Frédéric Mauro's work is also worth mentioning. Mauro addresses the slave trade within the framework of his broader analysis of the Portuguese and Brazilian Atlantic economy from the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth century, but his classic study is key because of the integrated analysis he makes of the South Atlantic economy, particularly the interdependent links between Portugal and Brazil, as well as the links with the Atlantic islands and northern and western Africa. See Mauro 1960, and Mauro 1983. A similar approach, albeit wider in its scope and with far more archival material available, was carried out by Pierre and Huguette Chaunu in their classic multi-volume *Séville et l'Atlantique* (1956-1960).

⁶ For instance, Curtin 1969, Curtin 1975, and Curtin 1990. On the broader contribution of Philip Curtin and, in particular, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* to World History, see Manning 2003a: 57-61.

⁷ The volume edited by Paul E. Lovejoy and dedicated to Philip D. Curtin is a very good example of a generation of scholars deeply influenced by this professor and scholar from the University of Wisconsin. See Lovejoy 1986.

⁸ See also Solow 1991.

reveal the relationship between the slave trade and empire building, the place of this traffic within inter-imperial rivalries, and consequently its place in the relationships between European powers and local African rulers. Social historians, in turn, were curious about the impact of slavery and the slave trade in the shaping of colonial societies, and about the dissatisfaction that was gradually felt among enslaved and freed Africans. They have examined how this dissatisfaction developed into forms of resistance and rebellion, resulting in the growth of abolitionist movements, and, eventually, in the suppression of the slave traffic throughout the nineteenth century.

While the study of slavery and the slave trade has rapidly gained its own niche in Atlantic history, the hemispheric perspective suggested by Jack Green, has had greater difficulty in becoming consolidated, since, when it comes to the studies of slavery and the slave trade, the division of the Atlantic Ocean into north and south has hindered an integrated and comparative approach to the two hemispheres. In this respect, the North Atlantic has been clearly more privileged than the South. Gilroy's "The Black Atlantic" is, yet again, a good example of this, since it focuses primarily on the northern tip of the ocean, leaving its African coast behind (Manning 2003b: 493-494; Ferreira 2012: 10).

This does not mean, though, that the South Atlantic has been completely forgotten by historians of slavery, the slave trade, and the African diaspora. We just have to think, for example, of the remarkable works by Joseph Miller, John Thornton, Herbert Klein, Stuart Schwartz, Linda Heywood, João José Reis, Manolo Florentino, Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, José Curto, Roquinaldo Ferreira, and Mariana Candido.⁹ These studies, however important their analyses of the southern dimensions of the transatlantic slave trade may be, do not conceal the fact that, so far, the English-language literature on the Atlantic slave trade has paid more attention to the northern hemisphere, partly because, as Richardson and Silva note, the southern trade was dominated by Portuguese-Brazilian traders (Richardson and Ribeiro da Silva 2015: 3-4).¹⁰ It is just a matter of scale, which is why any "southern" contribution to this intricate field is more than welcome.

The two works that serve as the pretext for this brief historiographical reflection consolidate the important southern dimensions of the study of the transatlantic slave trade. David Richardson and Filipa Ribeiro da Silva's volume has a clear geographical focus on

⁹ See, among other equally pertinent examples, Miller 1976 and 1988, Klein 1978 and 1999, Klein and Vidal Luna 2009, Thornton 1983 and 1992, Schwartz 1985, Reis 1995, Florentino 1995, Alencastro 2000, Heywood 2002, Curto 2004, Curto and Lovejoy 2004, Heywood and Thornton 2007, Ferreira 2012, or Candido 2013. On Atlantic history and the slave trade to Spanish America, see Borucki, Eltis, and Wheat 2015.

¹⁰ As the editors remark, historical literature on the south Atlantic dimension of slave trade has been mostly written in Portuguese (Richardson and Silva 2015: 3-4).

the South Atlantic, an option they justify because the South Atlantic “trading systems [...] lasted almost four centuries,” a time span that, the editors believe, “provides vital insights into the workings of the Atlantic slave trade as a whole.” Besides, by focusing on the southern half of the ocean, the editors sought to “go beyond the commercial world shaped by Atlantic winds and currents” (Richardson and Ribeiro da Silva 2015: 4). Thus, although considerable attention is paid to connections with Europe, the Loango coast, and even Mozambique, most of the essays gathered together in this collection analyze trade networks between Brazil and West-Central Africa, particularly Angola. By doing so, these essays intersect with the path proposed by Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, who, in his well-known *O Trato dos Videntes*, suggested that, “united by the ocean,” the American and African sides of the South Atlantic complemented each other in a “sole system of colonial exploration,” a system where slavery and the slave trade played a fundamental role (Alencastro 2000: 9).¹¹ The relevance of the connections emphasized throughout Richardson and Silva’s volume is unquestionable, but our understanding of this South Atlantic system would have been further enriched had more attention been paid to the ties with the Bight of Benin, as was the case with the classic study by Pierre Verger (1968).¹²

In turn, Graden’s study focuses on Brazil, Cuba, and the United States, pointing to the existence of two triangles in the transatlantic slave trade during the nineteenth century: a northern triangle, linking the United States to Africa and Cuba; and a southern triangle, linking Cuba, Brazil, and Africa. Apart from highlighting the crucial role played by the US in both triangles, Graden emphasizes the multiple inter-connections between each of them, using the South Atlantic space to “bind international commerce, public health, and social history” (Graden 2014: 1, 9). Furthermore, by stressing the US involvement in the dynamics of the southern trade, Graden’s monograph succeeds in approaching the study of the transatlantic slave trade, and, thus, of Atlantic history, from the hemispheric perspective proposed by Jack Green.

At the same time, while following the connections between these different players, and thereby drawing attention to the dynamics that have been generally overlooked by historiography, Graden also illustrates the advantages of pursuing a transnational approach to the analysis of the transatlantic slave trade, in general, and to the study of the South Atlantic, in particular. The links he examines are never only one or two-way. Instead, he

¹¹ Although the two works differ in terms of methodology, Roquinaldo Ferreira makes the same proposition in his *Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World* (Ferreira 2012: 245-246).

¹² See also the article by Law and Mann (1999), where the authors suggest the existence of an “Atlantic Community” that linked Bahia and the Bight of Benin (the so-called Slave Coast) through commercial, social, and cultural connections.

clearly demonstrates the multiple connections operating in many different directions and contributing to the persistence of this traffic even after the British suppression of the slave trade in the early nineteenth century, as well as to its eventual demise in the late 1860s. For example, Graden tells the story of the slave ship *Venus*, built in Baltimore, in the United States, in 1838. The *Venus* sailed to Cuba in the same year, and, once in Havana, the captain replaced his crewmen. From Cuba, the *Venus* sailed towards the islands of Cape Verde, and then to Mozambique, in Southeast Africa. In Mozambique, 1,120 African slaves were purchased and taken to Cuba aboard the *Venus* (Graden 2014: 18-19). The US participation in these trade circuits, Dale Graden argues, did much to delay the definitive suppression of the traffic, and such an understanding would otherwise have become blurred had the focus been exclusively on one nation's participation in the broader Atlantic enterprise that the slave trade truly was.

The transnational perspective is yet another element that Graden's monograph shares with Richardson and Silva's volume. Indeed, both books present the South Atlantic as a transnational space, where slave trade networks linked diverse locations across the Atlantic – Europe, Africa, and the Americas – as well as a wide array of actors, whose agency was much richer than is often believed.¹³ As pointed out earlier in this essay, one of the reasons for the predominance of studies on the North Atlantic in the English-language literature on the slave trade was the belief that Portuguese and Brazilian traders dominated the slave trade south of the Equator. This assumption is shown to be a rather narrow one by some of the chapters of *Networks and Trans-Cultural Exchange*.

A good example is provided by Filipa Ribeiro da Silva's study on the trade that took place between private businessmen based in the Dutch Republic (although such traders were not necessarily Dutch) and Angola. Silva's analysis of insurance, finance, commercial partnerships, and their respective agents lead her to acknowledge the Atlantic connections that these private businessmen developed across political, religious and cultural borders, thus participating together in the development of Dutch trade with Angola and, consequently, in the growth of the transatlantic slave trade (Silva 2015). Silva goes even further to suggest that the transnational organization of these voyages anticipated "forms of multinational endeavor that we commonly associate with the modern world" (Silva 2015: 99). In turn, José Capela, while exploring the Atlantic connections of Mozambique in terms of the traffic of forced African labor, observes that these networks

¹³ This fits in with David Eltis, Philip Morgan, and David Richardson's observation that "Atlantic history was the result of the Creolization of peoples from four continents" (Eltis, Morgan and Richardson 2017: 1358).

were not maintained exclusively with Brazil; rather, up until the late eighteenth century, a considerable part of this traffic also headed to the French and Spanish Atlantic markets, thus involving a participation that was not exclusive to Portuguese or Brazilian traders (Capela 2015).¹⁴ A transnational perspective also proves to be useful when addressing the international or multi-national character of abolitionism. This is what Roquinaldo Ferreira does in his chapter (just like Dale Graden, although from a different angle). He shows how several dynamics contributed to the eventual suppression of the slave trade in the South Atlantic. It was not only the strong diplomatic pressure applied by the British and their seizure of Portuguese and Brazilian slave ships that made the difference, but also the military threat that they posed to the Portuguese territories in Africa. In their efforts to force Portugal and Brazil to end the forced labor of African slaves, Ferreira demonstrates how the British were able to play with the Portuguese and Brazilian “desire” for sovereignty, which was threatened in Portugal by the French, and in Portuguese Africa by the British, and which was claimed by Brazil after its independence in the early 1820s (Ferreira 2015). Ferreira’s approach exemplifies how a transnational perspective is crucial for grasping not only the multiple connections across the South Atlantic, but also all the reverberations involved in the eighteenth-century international abolitionist movement.

Europeans were, undoubtedly, key actors in the development of transatlantic trade, but the agency and participation of Africans must not be disregarded. For a long time, the history of slavery and the slave trade was told nearly exclusively from the European perspective. Many scholars have drawn attention to the agency of African actors and the possibility of studying them by bringing together diverse sources, as well as comparing and combining methodologies. The works by these scholars, with John Thornton and Roquinaldo Ferreira both being fine examples, have contradicted the idea of “African passivity” (Thornton 1992), and have overcome the assumption of the slave trade as a “process driven primarily by European actions and African resistance” (Ferreira 2012: 242).¹⁵ Indeed, as Philip Morgan recalls, “In terms of migration, Africa, not Europe, dominated the Atlantic” (Morgan 2009: 224), which is why it is crucial to look at the African agency in the various dynamics involved in the slave trade. The two books under analysis give these actors their due attention, proving once again their importance for an overall understanding of the transatlantic slave trade.

¹⁴ Luiz Felipe de Alencastro described these connections in a later period (at the beginning of the nineteenth century) as the “Atlantization of Mozambique” (Alencastro 2000: 19).

¹⁵ In his *Way of Death*, Joseph Miller also tried to explain the slave trade from the perspective of Africa and Africans. See Miller 1988.

The attention given by some of Richardson and Silva's contributors to African agency is, perhaps, responsible for the inclusion in the title of the expression "trans-cultural exchange." Indeed, the focus on these agents makes it possible, as Arlindo Caldeira has shown, to understand the dynamics involved in the acquisition of slaves, which often depended on negotiations with African merchants brokered by the so-called *pombeiros*, "enslaved or manumitted individuals of African or mixed descent," who, in the service of Luanda traders and residents, penetrated deep into the African interior to purchase slaves from African traders (Caldeira 2015: 112-118). This broad perspective also allows for the observation of a range of different actors involved in this process, as Mariana Candido does when stressing the role played by African women (*donas*) in local merchant networks in Benguela and its hinterland, not only as traders, but also as slave owners.¹⁶ Candido demonstrates how these *donas*, along with their descendants (born from their relations with Europeans), "became intermediaries *par excellence* between Portuguese and African cultures," assuring the healthy relationship between colonial Benguela and the neighboring states, and between European traders and indigenous populations (Candido 2015: 157-163). Candido is able to show how the mediation of these women was crucial for these African societies in adapting to the demands of international trade, a mediation that often involved providing slaves from the African inlands to coastal markets, thus connecting the hinterland to the Atlantic world. This diversity of agency is also explored in Stacey Sommerdyk's chapter. By looking into trade negotiations between African brokers and mediators and Dutch merchants on the Loango coast, Sommerdyk highlights African agency in the broader Atlantic slave trade (Sommerdyk 2015: 206-213). Indeed, the exercises put into practice in these chapters achieve what David Eltis and David Richardson's *Extending the Frontiers* was once criticized for; not making the due connection between the history of the forced migration of enslaved Africans and African history itself (Lovejoy 2009: 65-67).

In the case of Dale Graden's approach, when he stresses the role of interpreters and translators in defending the continuity of the trade or in disseminating the "spoken word" of resistance, he focuses not only on Europeans, but also gives voice to the Atlantic Creoles, agents that have been characterized by their "linguistic dexterity, cultural plasticity, and social agility."¹⁷ In acknowledging the crucial role played by Atlantic Creoles in shaping the course of the international abolitionist movement, Graden follows the approaches of

¹⁶ On women and slavery, see, for example, Campbell, Miers, and Miller 2008. See also Patrick Manning's reflections on the theorization of women and slavery while reviewing the latter (Manning 2009).

¹⁷ On the definition of Atlantic Creoles, see Berlin 2000: 24, quoted by Graden 2014: 151.

Ira Berlin and Jane Landers. As the latter emphasizes, the actions of these “African and African-descended actors” were of key importance to “European and American revolutions, Indian wars, slave revolts, and the international efforts to abolish slavery” (Landers 2010: 5),¹⁸ an assumption whose pertinence Graden demonstrates in Chapter 6 of his book. Here Graden distinguishes the interpreter, “an intermediary who enables face-to-face interaction between persons who speak different languages,” from the translator, “someone who translates a written document from one language to another” (Graden 2014: 152), and the agency he concedes to both groups coincides with Philip Morgan’s observation that “Africans, not Europeans, took the initiative in learning the others’ languages; and the grammar of the various trading languages (or pidgins) that emerged on the coast owed most to African languages” (Morgan 2009: 225).

The inclusion of diverse actors and agents in the analysis of the transatlantic slave trade depends greatly upon the theoretical and methodological approach chosen. This does not have to do exclusively with the choice of Atlantic history as the framework or angle of analysis; it also has much to do with the empirical support on which historians base their research. The opportunities posed by the digital era in which we are currently living tend to be widening, with the day-to-day appearance of new projects and tools in open-access modes. In fact, digital outputs are now a necessary feature of any project applying for funding, including in the area of the Humanities.

4. The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database

The inclusion of a diversity of actors and agents in the analysis of slave trade networks and of transatlantic traffic as a whole allows us to understand the various dynamics involved in the forced migration of African slaves, thus contributing to a much more complete understanding of the way in which this trade operated, its short-term impacts, and its long-term consequences. The effort that all the authors contributing to the two books made in highlighting the diversity and agency of these actors is laudable, but their achievements owe much to one of the most important tools yet devised to help scholars of slavery and the slave trade in the pursuit of their research goals: the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database.¹⁹ Coordinated by David Eltis, the database has been praised by academia in general ever since it went online in 2008. It has also, of course, received

¹⁸ See also Berlin 1996; Berlin 2000; and Graden 2014: 150-152.

¹⁹ Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database: <http://www.slavevoyages.org/> (accessed May 2017).

some criticism, but the success it has so far achieved proves, among other things, that the Digital Humanities are, and will long continue to be, an absolutely crucial complementary field of historical research.

For a long time, it was believed that the study of slavery, slaves, and the slave trade, as well as the broader study of the African diaspora, lacked the necessary sources to allow for a full understanding of all the dynamics involved. As pointed out earlier in this essay, historians protected themselves by invoking this presumed absence in order to avoid addressing the subject other than from a clear European perspective. In the last few decades, however, the picture has changed quite considerably, and historians now have access to a diversity of sources and archives that have greatly enriched their perspectives for analyzing the field.

The two studies clearly demonstrate the usefulness of this diversity. In *Disease, Resistance, and Lies*, there is an evident predominance of English consular documentation, namely from the Foreign Office Records. Of these Dale Graden focused on the correspondence of British diplomats and officials residing in Cuba and Brazil. Despite the scanty references to Cuban and Spanish documentation, Graden made an effort to complete his study with American and Brazilian archival research, as well as with the use of published sources, namely medical reports and writings on diseases deriving from the African slaves who disembarked in the Americas.

As for the essays published by David Richardson and Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, these confirm all the advantages to be gained by gathering together a group of historians with varied historiographical profiles and from a range of institutional backgrounds. Not only do they have different language skills, but they also have quite different sources to draw from, as well as different approaches to the study of such sources, so that the combined contribution of these authors provides a significant introduction to the study of the slave trade in the South Atlantic. The volume brings together research carried out in Portuguese, Brazilian, Angolan, Mozambican, Dutch, English, and Italian archives, and the types of sources used are most varied, including notarial documents, official correspondence, diplomatic documentation, commercial records, and even literary sources, to name only a few examples, even if, in the case of some chapters, it would suit the reader better to have complete information about the particular document cited (e.g. type, author, recipient, date, location, etc.). Even if most of these chapters are syntheses of more extensive and previously published works, they consist of original archival research that greatly enriches the overall contribution made by this volume.

Although the diversity of sources used in both works speaks for itself, the combined use that the two volumes make of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database completes and consolidates the archival research carried out by their authors. The two books under consideration here reflect the impressive operational capacities of the Slave Voyages project and demonstrate, once again, why this database has become essential in conducting any study on the transatlantic slave trade, coming very close to fulfilling David Eltis and David Richardson's hopes of representing a "new era of slave-trade studies" (Eltis and Richardson 2008a: 5). Indeed, the database is believed to be "the most significant work on the quantification of the Atlantic slave trade to have appeared since Philip D. Curtin produced his census of the commerce" (Silva and Sommerdyk 2010: 77), and to have "challenged scholars to reconsider the impact of the slave trade on the Atlantic world" (Curto and Lovejoy 2010).

The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, or the Slave Voyages project, is not new. Not only does it constitute a timeless working instrument for students, teachers, and specialists undertaking studies of the slave trade, and a platform that is accessible to the public in general, but scholars are also still discovering and exploring innovative ways in which the database can be used. In fact, the potential and relevance of this type of data has been generally recognized ever since Philip Curtin published the *Census*. The original seed of the project was planted long ago, and its first major harvest was reaped in 1999 in the form of a CD-ROM, "The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: a Database on CD-ROM", which comprised records on 27,233 voyages (Eltis, Behrendt, Richardson and Klein 1999). At that time, digital projects were still very much a mirage in a dim future, and it took nine years for an upgraded, revised and enhanced version of the CD-ROM to be put together in the form of an open-access website (2008). The "Voyages" website now includes information and data on nearly 36,000 slave voyages, and, as can be read on the website, "no less than sixty percent of the slave voyages in the Voyages Database contain information unavailable in 1999."²⁰ To this end, and aside from the many people belonging to the project team, over fifty scholars have contributed with their own data and research, allowing the estimates provided by the database to cover the whole Atlantic basin in an extremely solid manner. The level of collaboration involved in the database is absolutely remarkable.

²⁰ "History of the project," at <http://www.slavevoyages.org/about/history> (accessed May 2017). On the history and evolution of the project, see also Eltis and Richardson 2008a.

Throughout the life of the project, which began long before the CD-ROM was launched in 1999, many studies have been carried out using its information, but the online database has, indeed, increased the availability of its data to a growing number of scholars. David Eltis and David Richardson illustrated the potential of the database with the publication of a collection of essays demonstrating the possible approaches, as well as the publication of an atlas that visually maps these slave voyages, a work that the Africanist historian Joseph Miller has described as “monumental” (Miller 2011: 589). If Eltis and Richardson’s *Extending the Frontiers* and *Atlas of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* reinforced many of the avenues of research made possible by the data set, other authors who have been utilizing this digital project have not lagged behind, having benefited from its data in making their important contributions to the understanding of the transatlantic slave trade, the African diaspora, abolitionism, etc.²¹ These studies exemplify the full range of the information pertaining to the slave voyages that is available in the data set: ship’s name; ship’s owner; ship’s captain and size of crew; place of embarkation of the slaves in Africa and their disembarkation in the Americas; age and gender of disembarked slaves; tonnage of vessels; numbers of Africans that died on board; and information on rebellions taking place on board slave ships, among other records.²² Such a diversity allows for a panoply of different approaches to the study of the transatlantic slave trade, not only from the perspective of economic history, but also from the standpoint of social, cultural, and even political history. Methodologically speaking, the Slave Voyages database facilitates comparative studies and large-scale approaches, thus encouraging the study of slavery and the slave trade from a perspective of global history that embraces the multiple connections both within and outside the Atlantic basin (Caldeira 2015: 103).

Regardless of its potential, and just like any project of such a large dimension, the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database does, of course, have its weaknesses. Much of the criticism that was made of the database was related to the numbers and the estimates, and the debate it has triggered is far from being closed (we may even assume that it will never be so).²³ On the other hand, the database reveals some limitations when it comes to indicate the exact place where the slaves came from within Africa, as well as their final

²¹ See, for instance, Silva 2011, Ferreira 2012, and the special issue of the journal *African Economic History* edited by José C. Curto and Paul E. Lovejoy, “The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database and African Economic History” (vol. 38, 2010), with essays by Paul Lovejoy, Jelmer Vos, Daniel Domingues da Silva, Filipa Ribeiro da Silva and Stacey Sommerdyk, Henry B. Lovejoy, and Suzanne Schwarz.

²² See the table entitled “Select Summary Information Contained in the Revised Trans-Atlantic Slave Voyage Data Set (TSTD2)”, Table 1.1, in Eltis and Richardson 2008a: 9.

²³ See, for instance, Inikori 2011.

destination after their disembarkation in the Americas. Likewise, it is not the best source for understanding the cultural dimension of the African diaspora; nor does it provide the necessary information to address the emotions involved in the slave trade and in slavery in general, not only the pain and suffering, both physical and emotional, but also the conditions experienced by slaves when in captivity.²⁴ These are weaknesses that the two books under consideration do not conceal or resolve, nor do they attempt to do so. What the two volumes do demonstrate is some of the methodological possibilities described above.

In the volume edited by Richardson and Silva, the use of this database appears as one of the central objectives of the book or, as Richardson and Silva put it, it “provides an important evidential foundation for several of the essays in this volume [...] thereby underlining the centrality of electronic resources to ongoing research into the multi-national history of transatlantic slavery” (Richardson and Silva 2015: 8). This makes perfect sense, given that David Richardson has been involved in the development of this powerful tool since its very early stages. Indeed, albeit in different ways and with different degrees of centrality, nearly every author in this collection uses or mentions the database, making the volume a palpable example of the diversity of approaches and possible uses of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, while also demonstrating the great explanatory capacities of the information contained in it.

Hence, Arlindo Caldeira, for instance, while acknowledging the underrepresentation of slave voyages from Luanda, uses the database to look at the number of slaves recorded as embarking at Luanda during the first half of the seventeenth century (Caldeira 2015: 103-104, 111), and to assess mortality rates among slaves on board ships disembarking at Brazilian ports (Caldeira 2015: 141). The Slave Voyages’ data set can also be used to examine the average length of the voyages from African to American ports, as Mariana Candido does in her chapter to reinforce her argument that slave voyages from Benguela to Rio de Janeiro or Salvador da Bahia, in Brazil, could be shorter and, therefore, more profitable for Brazilian traders than for the owners of ships that set sail from Lisbon (Candido 2015: 148-149). Candido also employs the database to calculate the number of slaves embarking in Benguela and disembarking in Rio de Janeiro or Salvador da Bahia in the second half of the eighteenth century, a number that rose to as high as 305,057 slaves (Candido 2015: 152). In turn, José Capela shows how this digital tool may help to link the

²⁴ Some of the criticisms made of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database are pointed out in Paul Lovejoy’s review essay “Extending the Frontiers”. See Lovejoy 2009.

Indian Ocean to the Atlantic world. He demonstrates, for instance, how, throughout the eighteenth century, expeditions between Southeast Africa and Brazil were no more than sporadic, never exceeding twelve voyages per year, and only achieving this figure in the years of 1786, 1790, and 1797 (Capela 2015: 182). He also uses the data collected from the database to show how slaves leaving Mozambique were transported mainly to the Atlantic markets of Spanish America and the French Antilles.²⁵ The database can also be used to analyze slave voyages according to ship owners, as Stacey Sommerdyk did with the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie. In an effort to understand the key role of the Loango coast as a supplier of slaves to the Dutch company, Sommerdyk sorted the number of slaves supplied to the company by port and by West African region. She realized that Malemba, on the Loango coast, was the main supplier of slaves to the company, providing 7,651 slaves. Compared with the 6,325 supplied by Cape Lahou on the Windward coast, the Loango coast was “the largest single regional supplier of slaves in western Africa” (Sommerdyk 2015: 204-205).

The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database is no less important in Graden’s study. It proves to be an indispensable tool when, for instance, Graden examines the widespread fear of infectious diseases caused by the disembarkation of African slaves in the Brazilian ports. Graden uses the Slave Voyages project, for example, to follow the voyages of the US-built ship *Brazil* and to measure its hypothetical involvement in the spread of the 1849 yellow fever epidemic in Brazil. The *Brazil* had set sail from New Orleans and had arrived in Salvador da Bahia in September 1849. According to its captain, the journey from the former to the latter had been direct, but, going through the database, Graden observed that the *Brazil* had previously disembarked African slaves both in Brazil, in 1848, and subsequently in Cuba. By June 1849, yellow fever had already spread throughout Havana, which leads Graden to suggest that the epidemic in Bahia had Cuban origins (Graden 2014: 70). The database also proves to be a crucial tool when Graden examines the ship connections between Cuba and the African coast, as well as the slave expeditions and disembarkations in Cuba from 1821 until the suppression of this traffic in 1867. The importance of the Slave Voyages project in Graden’s study as a whole is illustrated by the tables he included in the appendices, most of them drawing upon information contained in the database, even if in combination with other sources.

²⁵ Capela 2015: 185. In the period between 1717 and 1799, of the 16,393 slaves that had embarked in Mozambique, 13,373 disembarked at the ports of Spanish America. As for the French Atlantic markets, in the period between 1759 and 1793, of the 35,697 slaves that had embarked in Mozambique, 25,843 disembarked in the French colonies.

5. Conclusion

The close examination of the two books reviewed in this essay was an opportunity to reflect upon the past, the present, and the future of transatlantic slave trade studies, particularly as far as its southern dimension was concerned. This essay has sought to stress the dynamic interest that this field of research is currently experiencing, but also to assess some avenues that are being followed and should keep being pursued in the future. The focus on the South Atlantic has brought to light many relevant dynamics regarding the functioning of the transatlantic slave trade as a whole, as David Richardson and Filipa Ribeiro da Silva noted in their introductory essay. The “transregional” and “transnational” approaches that are being developed have greatly contributed to this situation. They have highlighted additional and multi-directional connections and interactions, and they have drawn attention to the participation of multiple actors in the South Atlantic slave trade besides the Portuguese and Brazilian traders. Hence, these works demonstrate that the Dutch or the Americans, for instance, also played a significant role in the dynamics of the slave trade south of the Equator. They also show that African agents, both men and women, played a crucial role in the overall functioning of the trade and, later on, in its eventual suppression, something that often implied, for example, looking beyond the coastal regions of West Africa and considering the internal dynamics of the African hinterland.

The examination of both volumes is also an opportunity to think about the benefits of digital collaborative projects, in general, and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, in particular. What the database has been doing for the field is absolutely remarkable, regardless of the shortcomings that it may have or the debate that it may have caused regarding some of its estimates. The dialogue that it has stimulated is actually good evidence of its success and of its usefulness. In the future, one can hardly imagine any study on the transatlantic slave trade, north or south, which does not at least partly utilize the information contained in the Slave Voyages project. The close collaboration involved in its development will guarantee the gradual improvement of what might today be considered by some critics to be flaws or limitations in the database.

It is expected that the richness of the approaches that have been put to such stimulating use in both books may inspire others that have so far tended to be absent from slave trade studies. For example, what can a transnational perspective or the Slave Voyages database do for our understanding of the suffering of slaves, not only in the course of their

capture, but also on board slave ships, and during their subsequent captivity, working on plantations, and so on? Studying the lives of slaves from the standpoint of the history of emotions, for example, is something that is not solved only with a broader approach or by resorting to computerized data (apart from the slave revolts on board ships that clearly express collective forms of anger and discontent). This, however, does not make broader perspectives, whether transregional or transnational, nor the database itself any less valuable. It simply draws attention to the need to seek new ways of understanding the more human dimension of slave traffic.²⁶

Another possible approach is, for example, the study of slavery and the slave trade from the perspective of the history of human rights in the long term.²⁷ Oral history is, of course, a good path to follow in seeking to achieve that objective, as too are slave biographies.²⁸ However, more effort should be taken in uncovering and compiling archival evidence similar to that contained in Gomes Eanes de Zurara's description of the first mass arrival of African slaves in the Portuguese slave market of Lagos, and the slaves' partition thereat. In his description, the chronicler demonstrated that, already in the fifteenth century, there was something close to a "humanized" perception of slaves and of their suffering, which they expressed in both tears and screams (Zurara 1841, Chapter XXV).²⁹ The exercise of looking beyond the numbers and the purely commercial and economic reasoning behind the slave trade could perhaps link the early stories of slavery and the slave trade to those that, albeit silent, still exist today in many different forms.

²⁶ Roquinaldo Ferreira's *Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World* has nonetheless contributed to filling in this gap (Ferreira 2012).

²⁷ This has, for example, been done from the perspective of legal history. See, for example, Martinez 2012.

²⁸ Although their goal is not to place slavery or the slave trade within the broader framework of the history of human rights, Roquinaldo Ferreira's *Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World* and Arlindo Caldeira's recent *Escravos em Portugal* provide some good examples of the usefulness of these biographies. See Ferreira 2012 and Caldeira 2017.

²⁹ See also Russell-Wood 1978: 29-31.

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Journal, Memorials and Letters of Cornelis Matelieff de Jonge: Security, Diplomacy and Commerce in 17th-century Southeast Asia. Edited by Peter Borschberg, NUS Press, 2015. ISBN: 978-9971-69-798-3, Paperback – ISBN: 978-9971-69-527-9.

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Historians and scholars are well aware of how important the publication of sources is for producing accurate and reliable research. Those who have studied the Portuguese presence in Southeast Asia are especially sensitive to the difficult task of reaching beyond the scanty information provided by Portuguese sources, particularly in relation to local frameworks and Asian contexts. Therefore, new documentary materials are always welcomed when they serve to fill in the gaps in information and make it possible to compare data, especially after the arrival of the Dutch in the region in the early seventeenth century. Moreover, the publication of historical sources has become an outdated and old-fashioned tradition among scholars in recent times, due to the present focus on debating, reinterpreting or reframing facts and historical contexts. Fortunately, a handful of historians have persisted in this sometimes difficult and thankless task of collecting and sharing these key tools for the work of scholars and historians.

Peter Borschberg, Associate Professor at the National University of Singapore and the author of a large number of works, books and articles, combines his extensive and skilled historical research with a fruitful edition of clear, annotated and well-prepared sources translated into English. Having begun by focusing his attention on the works of Hugo Grotius, Borschberg has since extended the scope of his research to include the formation of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and its subsequent rivalry with the Portuguese in the region of the Malacca-Singapore Straits. The publication of *Journal, Memorials and Letters of Cornelis Matelieff de Jonge* is his most recent contribution to this field, following the publication of another important, contemporary source, *The Memoirs and Memorials of Jacques de Coutre* (Singapore, NUS Press, 2014).

This volume goes far beyond the simple edition of a historical source. It is a compilation of memorials, letters and other materials, carefully selected, translated from Dutch and published with abundant notes and critical comments, providing a broader

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perspective of the historical context of the Straits region in the early seventeenth century. The main focus is obviously on the works and plans of Cornelis Matelieff, one of the architects of the VOC's strategy in the early stages of this company, but Borschberg also gives readers an impressive set of additional information about the Dutch Admiral's actions, the conflict with the Portuguese rivals and the Asian context.

The book is divided into three parts: an introduction; the documents (Matelieff's journal, memorials and letters and additional sources); and a final section composed of appendices (glossary, bibliography and index). A set of 71 carefully chosen and very useful illustrations completes the volume. A large number of footnotes are also included, providing extra information and references.

In a long introduction, Peter Borschberg gives us a fresh and broad historical overview of the events that occurred over a specific time span, ranging from background information about the period prior to the Dutch voyages – the treaties of Tordesillas and Saragossa between Portugal and Spain, the sparking of the Eighty Years War and the changes that followed the 1581 election of Filipe II as King of Portugal – to Matelieff's arrival in Middelburg in 1608. A synopsis and description are also provided of the materials included in the book and the editorial criteria.

The central core of the work consists of two sets of documents, most of which have been translated, for the first time, from the original Dutch into English. Most of the documents were already available in old editions, but were hard to find for those not used to dealing with Dutch sources and the Dutch language. The editor provides extensive and accurate information about each one of them. For Portuguese scholars and anyone who may be interested in the history of the Portuguese presence in Southeast Asia but is unfamiliar with Dutch sources, these documents are particularly useful and add important data about the political and economic framework involving Portuguese Malacca and the neighboring Malay sultanates. They also provide a broader knowledge about how the VOC was able to emerge in the initial years of the seventeenth century as a tremendous and powerful challenge to the Portuguese naval presence and trade in Asia.

However, there are a few minor problems to be pointed out. Different criteria were used in the sections entitled "Documents" (Dutch originals translated into English) and "Supplementary Documents" (transcriptions of seventeenth-century English translations); it is unclear why, in the Documents section, the editor decided to correct the spelling of the names in the texts and yet continued to provide the original misspelled or corrupted forms in the footnotes, while he did the opposite in the Supplementary Documents section. This

surely confuses the reader. Similarly, it is not clear why the original Dutch captions from a map were included as “Supplementary Document X” (pp. 451-453), when the same map is reproduced twice in the book (pp. 173-174 and extra text pp. 440-441) with English translations. There are also some misspelled Portuguese names, such as “Martim Alfonso de Castro”, “Alfonso de Albuquerque”, “Álvaro Carvailho”, “Rodrigo d’Acosta”, “João Brovo” or “feijãos”, while many others are written correctly. A final revision by a Portuguese-speaking reader would have been useful in avoiding these mistakes.

The footnotes are scrupulous and provide complete – sometimes even excessive – information about every single aspect contained in the documents, but there are some inaccuracies that should be mentioned. Some explanations are repeated or are of little interest, while others contain errors, such as the definition of “pagans” as “Muslims, Buddhists and probably also Hindus and animists” (p. 265, n. 57), or the presentation of two editions of Morga’s *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas* as two separate and distinct works (p. 273, n. 100). Finally, extra care could have been taken in the transcription of manuscripts: the “Johor” mentioned on page 391 is an obvious error for “Solor”, for it is an island next to Timor which “produces sandalwood” and “it is suspected that the Portuguese have a fortress there”.

The final part of the book includes a glossary and a list of place names and geographic terms. As in the previous section, this part provides extensive information about each item, both in the text and in the footnotes. However, there are also some flaws that should be taken into consideration here. Firstly, a few missing Portuguese sources could shed some light on several issues. For instance, in *bahar* (pp. 459-460), nothing is said about the basic distinction between the “big” and the “small” *bahar* used in Asia and adopted by the Portuguese, useful information that could clarify the confusing text; the footnote points to several works, but just a single one – which is absent in the book – would suffice to elucidate this and other cases included in the glossary: the “Livro dos pesos da Índia, e assy medidas e mohedas” by António Nunes (ed. Rodrigo J. Lima Felner, in “Subsídios para a História da Índia Portuguesa”, *Monumentos Inéditos para a História das Conquistas dos Portugueses*, vol. V, 1st series, Lisbon, Academia Real de Ciências, 1868). Furthermore, some imperfect information about several terms or place names would be better explained if a wider knowledge of Portuguese sources was displayed; a good example is Fernão Mendes Pinto’s *Peregrinação*, which provides useful information about Aru (p. 529) and other places near Malacca.

Secondly, there is some inaccurate information. A few examples are given here: the Portuguese coin minted in Goa was not called “*xerafina*” (p. 468), but “*xerafim*” or “*xarafim*” – its origin was the Arabic *ashrafi* and it had nothing to do with an “angel”; there was no “Union of the Two Crowns” (p. 523) referring to Portugal and Spain in the period 1581–1640, because there was no “Crown of Spain”, but only of Castile and Aragon, aside from Burgundy and Milan; contrary to what is written (p. 531), Banda has never been under Portuguese rule; “captain” was not a “military rank” (p. 466), but a common ordinary name for someone who was in charge, whether of a ship, a fortress or a group of soldiers; and finally, the statement that the original name of the tower built in Malacca by Albuquerque was “Formosa” and not “Famosa” (p. 527) is not correct, as a closer reading of the very same letter mentioned in the text (from the Captain of Malacca to Albuquerque – also quoted wrongly and in a confused way in note 2) clearly shows.

Still in relation to minor details, there are a few remarks to be added regarding the bibliography and the footnotes. As far as the latter is concerned, it is perhaps fair to say that fewer footnotes would have been more helpful to the reader, since some of them do not add any useful information by referring to the secondary literature and not to the sources where the original data could be found. A significant example of this is to be found on page 475, where a letter from the Portuguese captain Dom Paulo de Lima Pereira is quoted. The footnote (30) on the following page refers to several books (some of them by Borschberg), but nothing is said about where the original document may be consulted (it is published in *Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa*, Lisbon, Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, I, 1960, pp. 9–15, by the way).

Finally, in the case of the bibliography, it would have been advisable to separate the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century sources (both the Portuguese ones, such as A. Bocarro, G. Correia, Faria e Sousa or F. Guerreiro and the Dutch ones, such as I. Commelin, H. Grotius or W. Lodewycksz) from the secondary literature and not mix them all together under the heading of “Books”. Furthermore, some important works by Portuguese authors are missing (namely Manuel Lobato’s *Política e Comércio dos Portugueses na Insulíndia – Malaca e as Molucas de 1575 a 1605*, Jorge Alves’ *O Domínio do Norte de Samatra: A história dos sultanatos de Samudera-Pacém e de Achém, e das suas relações com os Portugueses (1500–1580)* and Luís Filipe Thomaz’s comprehensive studies), a fault that may be extended to the seminal articles by Ian MacGregor about the Portuguese in Malaya, the most important of these being ‘Johore Lama in the sixteenth century’ (*Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 28/2, 1955, pp. 48–125); if it had been used instead of Peter Borschberg’s own books and

Andaya's work (note 52), the factual errors in "Johore Lama" (p. 549) could have been prevented.

The mistakes and inaccuracies mentioned above do not compromise the work involved in the book as a whole, mostly because they relate to Portuguese materials and this *Journals, Memorials and Letters*...does not focus in particular on Portuguese materials or affairs. On the contrary, it displays a considerable work of compilation and the publication of very useful documents combined with appropriate explanatory information and Peter Borschberg deserves praise for another industrious publication of sources, which many people – both the general public and scholars – have a great deal to be thankful for.

Pinto, António Costa. *Os Camisas Azuis e Salazar. Rolão Preto e o fascismo em Portugal*, Lisbon, Edições 70, 2015, 363 pp. ISBN: 978-972-44-1872-8 [republished Pinto, António Costa. *Os camisas azuis. Rolão Preto e o fascismo em Portugal*. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS - Editora Universitária da PUCRS; EDUPE, 2016, 390 pp. ISBN:978-85-397-0740-9]

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António Costa Pinto has already published two books based on his PhD thesis on the National Syndicalist Movement (NS) in Portugal, which was presented at the European University Institute in Florence. The first of these is entitled *O Salazarismo e o Fascismo Europeu: problemas de interpretação nas ciências sociais*, and it seeks to include the Salazarist regime in the debates on the various fascist regimes in Europe. The second, *Os Camisas Azuis. Ideologia, elites e movimentos fascistas em Portugal (1914-1945)*, deals with the history of the NS, the brief and somewhat belated fascist movement led by Francisco Rolão Preto.²

It is this latter book that, freshly revised and updated, has recently been published in two new editions, one in Portugal and the other in Brazil.³ Incorporating new documentation and paying heed to the more recently produced literature on the subject, the book raises new questions about both the authoritarian ideologies in Portugal and the various authoritarian regimes that came into being between the beginning of the First World War and the end of the Second.

António Costa Pinto seeks to make a comprehensive analysis of the “Blue Shirts” from their origin in the *Integralismo Lusitano* (IL) movement until their own formation as a movement and their subsequent decline in the mid-1940s. To a large extent, the author maintains the theses that he had previously put forward: both IL and NS are understood to have been elite movements that created a corpus of right-wing doctrine that was largely influenced by the conservative and reactionary winds of Europe, with the *Action Française* at the forefront. Not only this, but also the fascist radical right and the conservative Catholic thinking.

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² Pinto, A. C. *O Salazarismo e o fascismo europeu: problemas de interpretação nas ciências sociais*. Lisbon: Estampa, 1992; Pinto, A. C. *Os camisas azuis. Ideologia, elites e movimentos fascistas em Portugal (1914-1945)*. Lisbon: Estampa, 1994.

³ For quotation purposes, I used the Brazilian edition.

The author begins with an analysis of the genesis of fascist ideology and its accompanying movements in Portugal. From the first decades of the twentieth century onwards, conservative and traditionalist currents in Portugal were opposed to the growing secularization of Portuguese society. The journal entitled *Integralismo Lusitano*, founded by young monarchists on the eve of the outbreak of the First World War, was thus the result of the conflict that occurred, initially in the field of ideas, not only with the Republic that had been established with the Republican Revolution of October 5, 1910 (the “extended reproduction of the principles of 1789”, p. 20), but also with liberalism and rationalism, which were regarded as values that should be eliminated. Within a short time, the ideological dispute proved to be insufficient, so that the IL transformed into a political movement, with a program based on the restoration of the monarchy and an anti-liberalist ideology. Presenting itself as a revolutionary strand of the Portuguese radical right, it sought to consolidate its position in the midst of the constant crises of the First Republic. But it was in the 1920s, following the authoritarian and protocorporatist experiments of Sidónio Pais and the failure of the Portuguese involvement in the War, that several groups became radicalized and began to draw up projects designed to cause a complete break with the Republic. Among these groups were the Lusitanian Nationalism (*Nacionalismo Lusitano*) movement and the Dom Nuno Álvares Pereira National Crusade.

At the same time, the triumph of anti-democratic movements in Europe, especially in Italy, mobilized the hearts and minds of the Portuguese radical right. The overthrow of liberalism, in 1926, was not led by the fascist movement. On the contrary, it had as its main actor an army that had become increasingly politicized after Portugal’s tragic involvement in the world conflict and the brief dictatorship of Sidónio Pais.

As Manuel Villaverde Cabral wrote: “If the question of Portugal’s participation in the war was of extreme importance to the parties and other political forces, it was absolutely decisive as regards the evolution of the armed forces and their ever greater intervention in the political life of the country.”⁴ This was a politicization that was largely marked by Caesarian models. It was as a result of this heterogeneous shift to the right that fascism was born in Portugal. The Fascists imagined the possibility of a transformation taking place “inside” the regime, however, without having a clear definition of purpose or an organizational model. Gradually, Salazar’s leadership and the creation of the União Nacional (National Union) party sought to lead the dictatorship in an increasingly

⁴ Cabral, M. V., A Grande Guerra e o sidonismo (esboço interpretativo). In P. Lains and N. E. Pereira (eds.). *Portugal em análise: Antologia*. Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2017: 75-95.

conservative direction based on traditional values. Here, Costa Pinto points to the problems arising from the fact that the Salazarist regime simultaneously drew closer to and distanced itself from the vast European ‘fascist family’. On the one hand, it is true that, as was also the case in Italy and Spain, a liberal secular regime was overthrown in Portugal; on the other hand, it was a country with a very small “bourgeois” elite that was similarly not very “cosmopolitan”. Therefore, the birth of the Portuguese authoritarian regime did not arise from the “nefarious hyperdemocracy,” as Ortega y Gasset⁵ put it, as was the case in Italy and Germany. At the same time, it can be said that, sociologically, the Portuguese case resembles the Spanish one, whose regime still retains the indelible and ineradicable marks of fascism. That is why Portugal did not have a civil war, as Spain did. This lack of a civil war avoided the large-scale mobilization of a single party which, contrary to what was the case in the fascist countries, was regarded as more of a complement to the State than a device that was designed to stir up tensions within it (pp. 54-104). Following this more comprehensive analysis, the book seeks to clarify the formation of the NS movement, which was typically considered to be the main fascist movement in Portugal. Founded by young student leaders linked to the IL journal and movement, it no longer practiced politics in a traditional sense. After all, it was war that was responsible for training the great leaders who were capable of protecting the nations from the evils of democracy.

It was the Great War that produced Mussolini, the “Bonaparte of the Counter-Revolution” (p. 106). Already, therefore, completely attuned to fascism, the NS movement gradually began to organize itself effectively as a party. And, in this context, just like its European counterparts, the party/movement was organized around the undisputed leadership of Francisco Rolão Preto, the youngest of the leaders of the Junta Central do Integralismo Lusitano (Central Junta of Lusitanian Integralism) when it was formed. As far as the reasons that explain the formation of the NS movement are concerned, two in particular deserve to be emphasized: the need to go beyond the reactive profile of IL in order to found a movement that was genuinely proactive; and Salazar’s refusal to accept a radical movement within the dictatorship. Thus, Portuguese fascism, a latecomer from an organizational point of view, was also born through its confrontation with another type of anti-liberalism, one that was more conservative and more traditionalist. At the same time, the text compares the NS movement with the other fascist movements equally influenced by the Italian experience, such as the Spanish FET-JONS (Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista – Traditionalist Spanish

⁵ Ortega y Gasset, José. *A rebelião das massas*. Lisbon: Relógio D’Água, 2007: 81-88.

Phalanx of the Committees of the National Syndicalist Offensive) and the AIB (Ação Integralista Brasileira – Brazilian Integralist Action), the Brazilian fascist movement led by Plínio Salgado. The organizational structure of the NS movement is treated in such a way as to illustrate its strictly vertical character, centered on the figure of the chief and reaching down to its municipal bases. This was a model that was strongly influenced by other European fascist parties, not only the Italian one, but also the *Faïxceaux de Valois* in France and the aforementioned JONS from neighboring Spain. It produced a structure that is said to have been preoccupied with the recruitment of workers in order to constitute a corporate project, to the extent that it was more efficient in recruiting workers from branches of services than in training workers themselves. Besides, of course, intellectuals and Young officers trained in anti-republican struggles. A party, in short, that was created predominantly from the middle class and the urban strata of society. When Salazar led the transition from the Military Dictatorship to the *Estado Novo*, he created the National Union as a way of bringing together the various and heterogeneous right-wing groups that supported the regime. The republican parties were consequently dissolved; even the Catholic Center Party itself, of which Salazar himself had been a member. In this way, the National Union established itself as a unique vector of party participation, although it was, in fact, a “non-party”, in the words of Salazar. The National Union imposed itself as an institutional structure without the need for large-scale mass mobilizations, such as were common among the fascist parties that were organized from “below”.

Resulting from the various clashes that had taken place between the different right-wing factions active during the dictatorship, these groups continued to coexist for a while in order to dispute the same political threats. As Marc Bloch points out, António Costa Pinto also makes an “inventory of differences”, seeking to compare the two political organizations.⁶ Who were their leaders, what socio-economic profile did they have, what was their organizational structure, etc.? In this context, the author also compares the formation and functioning of the European fascist parties, especially in Italy and Spain. Given equal importance in this part of the book is the fact that, albeit not without some tensions, members of the NS movement even participated in the local and regional structures of the National Union. This was not exactly a contradiction, given the intention of the governing party to co-opt the local elites that were in favor of the dictatorship. The gradual institutionalization of the *Estado Novo* therefore highlighted how the impossibility of turning the regime into a strictly fascist structure brought the NS movement and Salazar

⁶ Bloch, Marc. *História e historiadores*. Lisbon: Teorema, 1998:109-174.

into collision with one another, primarily as a result of the critical observations made by foreign allies (and in particular the United Kingdom), who were concerned about the threat of the radicalization of the regime going beyond what was considered desirable.

Furthermore, internally, the NS movement carried with it a somewhat radical, “plebeian” stigma which was not very much to the liking of the Portuguese elites, nor even of the Portuguese in general. Above all, it was far removed from the model of the regime that was being orchestrated by Salazar. Similarly, the Catholic offensive against the NS movement weakened its internal support. It was thus a Catholic movement without the support of the Catholic Church.

All of this gave Salazar room to isolate the movement and then counterattack, firstly, through the introduction of corporatist legislation, and then, secondly, with repressive measures designed to strengthen the institutional unification around the National Union. For some, the choice was to seek membership in the National Union, as was the case, in the 1920s, with young supporters of the magazine *Ordem Nova*, such as Pedro Teotónio Pereira and Marcello Caetano. For others, the solution was exile and clandestine opposition.

In his “Final Thoughts”, António Costa Pinto reaffirms that, since it was a regime that came into being in the “era of fascism”, the *Estado Novo* was always more conservative and therefore based more on the support of the elites and the Church, rather than originating from new “mass” movements. Nevertheless, it did incorporate clear elements of the fascist universe, “creating an entire apparatus of cultural socialization that was directly inspired by Italian fascism” (365).

Despite exhibiting some fascist traits and participating in the field of corporate dictatorships, albeit at a distance from the NS movement, the configuration of the *Estado Novo* was closer to that of other European dictatorships that did not completely follow the Italian and German models. The author does not seek to state peremptorily that the *Estado Novo* was not a fascist regime, being more concerned with including it among the regimes of the “Era of Fascism”. António Costa Pinto recognizes nuances and differences that illustrate both the importance and the complexity of the theme. For those who did not read the first edition, this is a book, as Juan Lins says, that is fundamental for “those studying authoritarian politics and fascist movements.” For those of us interested in the first of these themes, it is very important to read a work such as *Os Camisas Azuis*, that is updated and shows the modern-day relevance of studies about the radical right, as well as the changes that have been taking place in this area, and not only in Europe.