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## Death and Politics: The Unknown Warrior at the Center of the Political Memory of the First World War in Portugal

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#### Abstract

In George L. Mosse's words, the modern war's most essential experience was the mass murder endorsed by the State (1990). The extent of the conflict and its path of destruction would affect not only the combatants, but society as a whole. Going beyond the veterans' individual or group memory, death ended up being a structural element in the construction of the political memory of the First World War. This analysis focuses not only on the impact death had on individual combatants or the soldiers as a group, but mainly on the way in which it was appropriated by society and political powers through processes specifically designed to disguise death. The aim of States was to erase the destabilizing impact that casualties had on public opinion, neutralizing it into new and old environmental and architectural structures, thereby creating a new lexicon for death. The idea was to avoid a revolt over the mass sacrifice. The government wanted to use death cult rituals to create a consensual pride in the name of the nation, an idyllic and metaphorical attempt to reevaluate death in a religious, political and ideological sense, trying to surpass the physicality of mass death on the battlefield.

Taking into account the deeply funereal nature of the Great War remembrance processes in Portugal, this article will highlight the integration of Portuguese memorial rites into the European war culture and will enable an understanding of the central role of death in the Great War remembrance process. This text will also seek to describe the treatment of the dead and the delineation of places of memory, mostly focusing on the Portuguese Unknown Soldiers, as a way of understanding the nature and the main questions surrounding the official memory of the First World War in Portugal between 1918 and 1933.

#### Keywords

First World War; Republic; Memory; War Culture; Unknown Soldier.

#### Resumo

Nas palavras de George L. Mosse, a experiência mais marcante da guerra moderna foi o assassinato de massa sancionado pelo Estado (1990). A extensão do conflito e o seu rastro de destruição afetariam não só os combatentes, mas a sociedade como um todo. Muito além da experiência individual dos veteranos ou da memória do grupo dos soldados, a morte foi um elemento estrutural na construção da memória política da Primeira Guerra Mundial. Esta análise centra-se não só sobre o impacto da morte sobre os combatentes individuais ou os combatentes, como um grupo, mas principalmente sobre a maneira pela qual foi apropriada pela sociedade e pelos

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poderes políticos através de processos, especificamente concebidos, para a mascarar. O objetivo do Estado passa por apagar o desestabilizador impacto na opinião pública das vítimas, neutralizando-as em novas e antigas estruturas ambientais e arquitectónicas, criando um novo léxico da morte. A ideia era evitar uma revolta pelo sacrifício de massa. Assim, o governo procurava, pelo culto dos mortos, estabelecer um consensual orgulho em nome da nação, uma tentativa idílica e metafórica de revalorizar a morte num sentido religioso, político e ideológico, tentando superar a realidade da morte de massa no campo de batalha.

Tendo em conta a natureza profundamente fúnebre dos processos de rememoração da Grande Guerra em Portugal, este artigo irá abordar a integração dos ritos memoriais portugueses na cultura de guerra europeia e irá permitir o entendimento do papel central da morte no processo de rememoração da Grande Guerra. Este texto procurará, também, descrever o tratamento dos mortos e a delineação dos lugares de memória, focando principalmente nos soldados desconhecidos portugueses, como forma de compreender a natureza e as principais questões em torno da memória oficial da Primeira Guerra Mundial em Portugal entre 1918 e 1933.

#### Palavras-chave

Primeira Guerra Mundial; República; Memória; Cultura de Guerra; Soldado Desconhecido.

The Unknown Soldier represented the zenith of official ceremonies in memory of the First World War. The ritual of choosing, transporting and ceremonially burying the Unknown Soldier was transformed into a homogeneous and key practice in European war culture. The ceremonial burial of Unknown Soldiers represented a generalized compensation, which reflected the power and the attraction of the cult of the dead at the end of the war (Mosse, 1990: 104). Thus, in keeping with what was happening throughout Europe, the existence of a body in Portuguese territory embodied the funereal dimension inherent in military cemeteries, which did not exist in Portugal, and tended to become an important focus of action.

The de-structuring caused by the "total war" in liberal societies created a space for new heroes, serving to ideologically reconcile an official interpretation of the historic past. Heroes were exceptional human beings who had sacrificed their lives for the homeland, offering a lesson in solidarity. Heroes thus served the purpose of regenerating the nation in the context of the postwar crisis, in which the value of nation states unraveled.

Mourning in the context of war is extremely specific. It reverses the natural order of things and the normal succession of the generations. Ever since the Great War ushered in human losses on a mass scale, combined with the aspect of mobilization, death became a theme that was hard to approach. The evolution of the cultural history of war brought death – its meaning, assimilation and representation – into the spotlight (Winter and Prost 2005). During the 1970s, while reinterpreting the memorials to the war dead, historians such as George Mosse (1975), Reinhart Koselleck (1979) and Antoine Prost (1977) made up for the scant attention paid until then to death and mourning against the backdrop of the armed conflict and brought these subjects to the center of the debate (Becker, 1991; King, 1998; Inglis, 1998).

Mosse's structure of the myth of the war experience (1975) will be used to explain and understand the elements that comprise the historical rememoration of the First World War. The construction of this myth exalts death and cancels its horror by emphasizing the values of sacrifice in combat of a generation involved in a veritable crusade (Mosse, 1990: 7). In adapting Mosse's "model" for Italy and Germany, it is important to emphasize the national differences and exceptions between those and other countries. According to George L. Mosse, the process of naturalization, trivialization and sanctification made mass death acceptable, disguising it in natural and architectural structures, and associating it with religious sentiments in a type of civic service. Antoine Prost partially disagreed with Mosse's idea. Prost affirmed that the naturalization of tombs and the sanctification of the

dead did not mean indifference, but were instead a way of dealing with such strong emotions (Prost, 1994: 209). Jean-Jacques Becker and Prost framed this rememorative phenomenon in the new civic rituals of renewing the secular cult, serving to "(re)write" Republican values (Prost, 1977: 1984). Jay Winter views the commemorations as an existential response to universal loss (Winter, 1995: 3). <sup>2</sup> Thus, understanding the representations of the war in the context of cultural history encompasses multiple and overlapping explanations.

War culture enabled the "assimilation" of the mortal brutality of the conflict by means of its abstraction and generalization<sup>3</sup>, owing to the multiple dimensions of the conflict and its subsequent rememoration. It was an effort to cancel the destabilizing impact of mass deaths on public opinion, neutralizing it in new environmental and architectural structures incorporating local traditions, and offering a new lexicon for death. As Gibelli stated, "one does not die in war but rather falls on the battlefield, life is not lost but is given, the individual does not disappear into nothingness but lives eternally in the realm of patriotic heroism" (Gibelli, 1998: 341). War culture prevented consternation over the unjustified mass sacrifice and individual mourning; the ritual of the cult of the dead morphed into a consensual pride in death on behalf of the homeland. The paradoxical intention was to transform physical death in a religious, political and ideological sense in order to enhance its value (Gibelli, 1998: 341).

The war experience resulted in multiple representative and national forms, depending on the way in which it was assimilated and, above all, the way in which a consensual memory was constructed by the entities in power. What representative form emerged in Portugal? Was the process of making death abstract a guarantee that the nation would look beyond these losses? Did the phenomena of war culture serve to assimilate the mortal brutality of the conflict and smooth over ruptures or did they serve to perpetuate traditional and familiar forms of political culture?

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In *Sites of War, Sites of Mourning*, Winter develops an in-depth analysis of cultural codes and the language of mourning by selecting a group of artists and writers who are not included in the modernist canon. He proposed going beyond the usual divisions between modernism and traditionalism, suggesting, to the contrary, the adoption of a more careful formula for how Europeans imagined the war and its consequences, avoiding creating a rupture in terms of interpretations and results (Winter, 1995: 3). In this regard, see also Prost (1994). From a different perspective, pointing out a deep and modernizing rupture provoked by the war, see Fussell (1975); Eksteins (1991); Hynes (1991, 1997).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> War culture is a set of mental tools that the men and women who live through a conflict use to make it intelligible. It was defined following two conferences organized in France, namely *Les sociétés européennes et la guerre de 1914-1918* (Nanterre, 1988) and *Guerre et cultures* (Historial de Péronne, 1992) (Lemoine, 2006: 136). It is important to add that the history of war culture should not be confused with the history of cultural, literary or artistic works or their creators (Prost, 2002: 96).

Through the elements that emerged and comprised the post-conflict war culture, this study will try to understand the nature of the official memory of the First World War in Portugal during the First Portuguese Republic<sup>4</sup>.

This text will analyze the immediate memorial construction, focusing on the glorification of the Unknown Soldiers as the maximum and ephemeral consecration of official rememorative projects in Portugal. Firstly, it highlights the inevitable integration into the context of a European war culture, safeguarding the specific national features of this culture, and paving the way for de-codifying the central role of death in the rememorative process of the Great War. Secondly, it examines the concepts of "nation" and "hero", which were inextricably intertwined. It then follows the trajectories of Portuguese Unknown Soldier(s): from how these representative dead were selected to their fragile, but definitive, implantation in Portuguese territory. Finally it analyzes to what extent war deaths were a political tool used by the First Portuguese Republic, and seeks to understand how dead heroes were brought to the centre stage of the national liturgy and helped regimes, representations and political forms endure over time.

#### The Dead Hero in the Restructuring of Nations after the War - The Consecration of the Portuguese Unknown Soldiers

The extreme difficulty in dealing with mourning and death in societies in the interwar period resulted in the planning of memorial phenomena that allowed the living to experience mourning collectively, lightening the burden of death. The "myth of the lost generation" was created, used both by the German far right as well as by the English upper classes in the context of the postwar crisis. Discourses and memorials served processes of disseminating death, transforming soldiers who had perished into heroes of national salvation: "This heightened value of the First World War dead clung to a heroic and sanctifying dimension of their disappearance, rooted in this war culture resulting from the conflict, which transformed the dead into voluntary sacrifices in a great crusade" (Becker and Audoin-Rouzeau, 2000: 296). The discourse of the crusade of the "new man", as well as the hero-fiction of the common soldier who "happily" sacrificed his life to defend the homeland, were an integral part of the myth of the war experience. A construction that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> It is important here to clarify what is meant by official memory: "That one of the State structures focused on the glorification, mystification, concealment and building and maintaining an identity and national "La (Frank. mémoire l'histoire". IHTP. http://www.ihtp.cnrs.fr/spip.php%3Farticle233&lang=fr.html).

perforce incorporated a necessary transcendence of death, creating alternatives for a catharsis, based on themes from classical antiquity and, even more so, from Christianity, i.e. the belief in the resurrection of men. This was the symbolic discourse present from the immediate cult of the dead to the monumentalization of the sites that became focal points for a "new" civil religion (Mosse, 1990: 34).

The idea of a national hero thus implied the idea of a nation as a space that recognized a national hero and a place where the concept could be applied. The role of a hero was intertwined with national identity and the political use of memory, revealing founding values and constituting an ideological patrimony. In this formulation, the hero worked as the "guarantee" of the salvation of the national destiny and the required messiah for faith in the future. In a secularized republic, where the hierarchies of homage had disappeared, the nation became a substitute for God or the king, changing the logic of political legitimization. The values of Christianity, just like the idea of voluntary sacrifice for greater good, are, in this context, subject to a re-appropriation. Common men are sacred heroes and are transferred to the national pantheon, conceived horizontally. Religion provided the guidelines of the new civic liturgy (Catroga, 2006: 177). In *Calvário da Flandres*, Augusto Casimiro, a Republican and war volunteer, explored this regenerating role played by combatants who had died during the war – a crusade in defense of the homeland:

Dead? Why is it so difficult for me to say this word? Death does not annihilate or reduce the true living [...] and those who died in this war have lived a true life. Death [...] made them transparent, and, integrating them into the great current of devotion flooding the world and renewing it, it gave those who had been condemned to silence and resigned to sacrifice, divine active forces, an immaterial existence, the inexhaustible strength of symbols, which have shielded hearts and safeguarded the world's dreams throughout the ages. [...] Those who died in the Great War will be the calm conductors of a painful hour. [...] The world will know then how, and to what extent, this war was, in heaven and on earth, at sea and in our souls – the great war of God (Casimiro, 1920: 177-183).

Writing about the war experience often uses the historical power of knowledge of the cause in order to project a tone of "political subject" or "self-justification", a form of legitimizing the individual actions of the soldier, but also, consciously or unconsciously,

working as a political justification. As Ernesto Castro Leal has highlighted, "The war sentiment reflected in the Republican memorialisms of Jaime Cortesão, Augusto Casimiro or Carlos Selvagem [...] conveyed a redeeming prophetic vision, anchored in a dual justification of patriotic meaning" (Leal, 2000: 445).

With death on the horizon, what took shape here was a certain attempt to "relieve" its impact, by means of representative abstraction and uniformity. In other words, given that the nation did not have a pre-political existence, it was up to the new forces of power to create elements of collective identification, embodied in the character of the hero, which offered an example that other citizens of the nation could follow, and thus to overcome the rupture and trauma of the war. By going beyond individual mourning, through a collective consolation of glorification and the cancellation of death, reverence for the dead emerged as a key focal point in the nations that participated in the Great War.

Millions of people died as a result of the First World War, creating an "insurmountable" void in the communities of the countries that fought in the conflict. It was necessary for society, earlier moved by a belief in the nation's prosperity, to once again be given hope and compensation. Thus, the political preparation of the mourning required, over the course of several years, a profound material investment and the definition of new symbolic codes – a set of forms capable of bringing together multiple and diverse experiences (Gibelli, 1998: 337).

The Unknown Soldier concentrated the patriotic and ethical value of the nation and enabled its political action. The abstraction of reverence at a distance would harden, or even inhibit, the recognition of the value of the sacrifice – intensified, with regard to Portugal, by the absence of combat in the national territory – and would transform the experience of death and destruction into an unbearable monopoly of veterans. The "body" needed to be present, in that place of memory<sup>5</sup>, to overcome individual compensation, serving the homeland, above all else.<sup>6</sup>

These heroes were not identifiable or liable to have a "finger pointed at them", since they served first and foremost as an essential abstraction of mass death. It was necessary to have an idealized, transversal and universal symbol, without any identifiable

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In an introductory approach to the collective work *Les lieux de mémoire*, Pierre Nora explains what is meant by places of memory: any significant identity, material or ideal, resulting from human will in a given time, becomes a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of a community. The book outlines a set of perspectives and interpretations in the context of cultural history, but the allusions to the Great War are rare and seen as the zenith of the Third Republic's celebrations (Nora, 1984).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The concepts of "nation" and "homeland" are applied with the meaning given by the historical and political context.

elements, so that the official entities could confer "desirable qualities." Although Portugal didn't experience mass death like other belligerents, the idea of the Unknown Soldier responded perfectly to the impersonal mass dimension of the national sacrifice, as well as the massified and mechanical reproduction of figurative arts that occupied both public and private spaces (Gibelli, 1998: 345).

Neither the notion of an empty tomb nor that of the unknown soldier (used as effigies to compensate for soldiers who disappeared in faraway wars) are hallmarks solely of the First World War, but they became widespread due to this conflict. The idea of appropriating this symbolic resource appeared during the war itself in various forms.<sup>8</sup> First in London and Paris, on November 11, 1920; in 1921, in Washington, Rome and Brussels; in 1922, in Prague, Belgrade, and then Warsaw and Athens.<sup>9</sup>

In Portugal, the consecration of two Unknown Soldiers, one from Africa and another from Flanders, occurred in 1921. During this decade, the cult of the Unknown Soldier was transformed into the high point of the war commemorations. However, it had a dual nature: concentrating the culmination of the fervor and controversy around the memory of the war and its implementation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> In Portugal, attempts were made to recreate an Olympus, providing a set of war heroes for the national pantheon. The intense media campaign and political appropriation conferred special qualities upon common soldiers, with a view to regenerating the epic of the Portuguese "race". The dead heroes (the soldier Curado or Carvalho Araújo) and living heroes (the Serrano, the Minho Brigade, and the soldier Milhões) that were identified perfectly served the myths created during the war and developed during the remembrance processes. For example, the Serrano (an informal term for the Portuguese First World War soldier, meaning mountain man), purified by the simplicity of a rural life, acquires superhuman qualities to defend higher values that represented the homeland. On Carvalho Araújo, see *Diário de Governo*; Decree nr. 5.044 – *Diário do Governo*, I Series, n° 268, December 11, 1918. On the Minho Brigade, see "Honra aos que morrem pela Pátria!", *Ilustração Portuguesa*, nr. 586, May 14, 1917: 381; "A Brigada do Minho", *Ilustração Portuguesa*, nr. 650, August 5, 1918: 102-103. On the Serrano, see Rodrigues (2005). On the soldier Milhões, see *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, April 8, 1924: 4-5; "Comemorando o 9 de Abril", *O Século*, April 6. 1924: 1; and "Um herói da Flandres", *Diário de Lisboa*, November 21, 1924: 2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Copying rituals from antiquity, the idea of having an Unknown Soldier from the Great War appeared initially in France, but it was Britain that embodied the phenomenon by first choosing a ritualized anonymous soldier killed in conflict and placing him in Westminster Abbey on November 11, 1920. France reproduced the same phenomenon under the Arc de Triomphe on the same date. In London, Sir Edward Lutyens, chosen by Lloyd George, created a (provisional) cenotaph in a perishable material. This was the first major manifestation of abstraction combined with the cult of the dead of the First World War to be integrated into the official process of the construction of war memory.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> There were particular features in the memorial processes, including the fact that the Armistice Day ceremony takes place around an empty tomb in Protestant England, in contrast to the occupied tomb in Catholic countries, like France and Italy. In Paris, there were controversies surrounding the initial idea of putting the *Soldat Inconnu* in the Panthéon, until the Minister for Education chose the Arc de Triomphe. The ceremony took place in the presence of Communists and members of the Catholic Church, among others. It started at the Panthéon and ended at the Arc de Triomphe, where the body was interred. The same issues concerning the participation of members of the Church did not exist in Britain, mostly due to the placement of the tomb in Westminster Abbey and the position of the church in the British State. The procedure was however more or less the same. The corpses were brought from the battlefields and an officer, mother, widow, orphan or father that lost a loved one would choose between several unidentified bodies. From the selection process, to the arrival in the capital to the consecration ceremony, it was one of the most grandiose commemorations of the war effort.

The ceremonies, organized by the Ministry of War<sup>10</sup>, began with an important convocation of the participants, encompassing national and international associations and individuals 11, and seeking to ensure an enduring international memory of Portugal's participation in the conflict.<sup>12</sup> The commemorations began on April 5, 1921, as soon as the first diplomatic delegations arrived in Lisbon, parallel to the disembarking of the Unknown Soldier from Africa. Between April 7 and 9, 1921, the bodies were kept at the Parliament, where they were awarded honors by the President of the Republic and a wake was held by the Portuguese people. The main day of the commemorations – April 9 1921 – was marked by a triumphal parade in Lisbon. The parade began with due pomp and sobriety, "the war wounded and foreign contingents being hailed by heartfelt popular demonstrations. On every street along the way, the windows were full of people who tirelessly lauded the representatives of the allied nations [...] the windows were draped with ornamental banners, some of which were very valuable, and flowers were showered down from above as the coffins went by". 13 The parade ended at the Rossio Station, where the coffins remained until they were taken the following day to the Santa Maria Vitória monastery in the town of Batalha. A final ceremony was held there and the coffins were deposited in the tombs. 14 Finally, the Unknown Soldiers became part of the pantheon of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The Ministry for War negotiated a program for paying homage at quite an early stage. Everything went through this ministry: discourse, policing and invitations to national and international delegations. Starting in March of that year, correspondence was exchanged extensively with local, public and private institutions and associations that would participate in the celebrations (AHM, 1.ª Divisão, 35.ª Secção, Caixa 443).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> They were Maréchal Joffre; Generalissimo Diaz; Admiral Don Pedro Zofia, and the Governor of Gibraltar, General Smith-Dorrien, and L. Carnegie, the English attaché in Portugal (reflecting little effort on the part of Britain to be represented); the chiefs of the Spanish Army and the Spanish battleship *Alfonso XIII*, a senior officer from the Romanian Army; Major Lucien Busini from Belgium and the American Army (AHM, 1<sup>a</sup> Divisão, 35<sup>a</sup> Secção, Caixa 441).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> As can be seen in the large amount of correspondence exchanged with the allies (AMAE, Correspondance Commerciale et Politique, Europe, 1918-1929, Portugal – n° 9 – Armée, dossier Générale. DOCS. 56; 65; 72). <sup>13</sup> "Na Praça Dom Pedro e no Largo Camões", *O Século*, April 10, 1921, 1. The parade went through the main streets of Lisbon up to the Parliament (Rua do Ouro, Rossio, Praça dos Restauradores, Avenida da Liberdade, Rua Alexandre Herculano, Largo do Rato and Rua de São Bento). The national anthem was played at the entrance to the Parliament and then national and foreign political and ecclesiastical entities entered the building to attend the special ceremony paying homage. After dignitaries mourned the heroes, the doors were opened to the public until 12 pm on the 9th. During the parade, attention was respectfully directed towards the central core, comprising foreign diplomatic representations, disabled veterans, war generals and members of the Government, who formed a guard of honor that escorted the Unknown Soldiers' coffins ("As homenagens aos heróis desconhecidos", *O Século*, April 8, 1921: 1; *O Século*, April 9, 1921: 2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The ceremonies on April 10 began in the Rossio Station with a journey in three special trains that carried not only the two bodies, but also the President, the Patriarch, the Government, the entire diplomatic corps and foreign military missions. In Batalha, the "triumphal parade" went from the train station to the Monastery where the corpses would be placed. Here, the final ceremony began at 5pm with speeches, first by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Abílio Marçal, then by the President of the Republic and later by other dignitaries, until the end of the festivities honoring the Unknown Soldiers. The press, regardless of political affiliation, covered the events widely in several articles published in April 1921. See *O Século*, "Chegou a missão italiana" (April 5); "O Heroe de África" (April 6); "Programa de homenagens" (April 7); "Glória aos heróis" and "O desfile do povo no átrio do Congresso" (April 9).

recognized and accepted national heroes.

## "To the Unknown Soldier / who died by the Homeland"

#### "Ao seu soldado desconhecido / morto pela pátria"

Placing the coffins in the Chapter House at the monastery in Batalha was the finishing touch to the most important phenomenon that served as the basis for the construction of the myth of the war experience. This did not, however, prevent the immediate eruption of controversies and debates about choices relating, in turn, to time, space and rituals, as well as, above all, to the subsequent neglect of the Unknown Soldiers. The passage of time did not forgive Republican negligence and the biers fell to ruin in full sight of everyone. In 1922, "[i]t is in a state of utter negligence. It looks like the chapter house has been dismantled. Instead of covering the coffins of the Unknown Soldiers, the national flags are torn and in disarray. Rats have nested there. In short, everything is in a comatose state."

Public opinion was aware of the neglect that had befallen the Unknown Soldiers and a campaign emerged in the press to entomb their bodies. Three years passed before the bodies were brought there and were finally buried. In 1924, the "burial" of the Unknown Soldiers finally took place in the chapter house of the Santa Maria Vitória Monastery. Widely reported in the press, the ceremonies were held between the burial of the Unknown Soldiers (April 7)<sup>17</sup> and the lighting of the Eternal Flame (April 9). Once the Flame had been lit, the Minister for War, Américo Olavo stated, "The dead who lie there, heroes and martyrs, anonymous and glorious, are the eternal example of the effort that it is necessary

<sup>15</sup> Ramos Costa, Diário do Senado, May 16, 1922: 23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> The idea did not come from the parliament, but from António Augusto Gonçalves, an art critic and professor in Coimbra, who began the debate in the press about the urgent need to bury the Unknown Soldiers. Accordingly, on October 29, 1923, a special credit was created for the burial costs, after a decision by the Ministry for War (June 13, 1922). See *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, June 13, 1922: 35; October 29: 49; Law nr. 1.674 – *Diário do Governo*, I Series, nº 262: 22 November 1924; Decree nr. 10.398 – *Diário do Governo*, I Series, nº 283, December 20, 1924.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> The burial ceremony began on April 7, 1924, at about 10.30 am. The charter was read at the end of the ceremony. It concluded with the graves' inscription: "Portugal/eternal at sea/ and in its races/in honor of its unknown warrior/who died by the homeland/1924". See "Comemorando a data gloriosa", O Século, April 8, 1924: 1-2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> The *Chama da Pátria* (National Flame), an adaptation of the *Soldat Inconnu* flame (Paris, 1923), was the brainchild of Henrique Lopes Mendonça and António Augusto Gonçalves. It was built by a veteran, Lourenço de Almeida (Infantry Battalion No. 23), and was sponsored by the old 5. Division (Coimbra) commanded by General Simas Machado, who chaired the Great War Monuments Commission. This Commission was responsible for creating the Offerings Museum at the monastery (1925) and for maintaining the cult of the *Chama da Pátria* (CPGG 1936, 153).

to make and the sacrifice that it is necessary to bear, whenever called upon to do so for the sacred interests of the Homeland."<sup>19</sup>

In much the same manner, other exhortations contributed towards the epic legitimization of the Portuguese effort. The Portuguese experience in the war was "historically transfigured" into an act of sacrifice to benefit the nation, whose heroism once again demonstrated the "nature of the Portuguese race". Extremely "rhetorical", "stereotypical" and "moralistic" discourses emerged that championed Portugal's historic past as a way of legitimizing a new liturgy, serving to satisfy the need to believe in a future that the war had shattered<sup>20</sup>. In his speech to Parliament on April 7, 1921, paying homage to the Unknown Soldiers, António José de Almeida, the President of the Republic, outlined the basic guidelines of the official liturgy for remembering the war. The discourse of the "lay cult theologian" summarized the significance of the event with three fundamental purposes, in an apologetic and justificatory tone: "strengthening national unity, emphasizing their significance in the present, highlighting and honoring tradition and preparing lessons for the future". 21 The suffering of the men in the trenches purified them and they were an example to be followed. However, the "most important service that this use of Christianity provided the war was how it helped overcome the fear of death and of dying. The hope of an eternal and full life – the continuation of a patriotic mission – made it possible not only to transcend death but also to inspire life before death" (Mosse, 1990: 87).

The celebration of the Unknown Soldier embodied the primary instance of the immanent reconciliation of all forms of the cult of the dead and the Republican liturgy in the most effective manner. The site where the bodies were interred, the "Batalha Monastery is, simultaneously, a work of poets, warriors and believers. [...] Everybody can enter there, everybody, starting with the Republic-Regime itself, the Republic-State itself, which, without adopting any religious faith, but while respecting all religions, cannot help

<sup>19</sup> "Ultimas notícias. Foi hontem acesa, na Batalha, a Chama da Pátria", O Século, April 10, 1924: 2. See also "Jornada gloriosa do 9 de Abril", O Século, April 9, 1924: 5).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>206</sup>The Portuguese Homeland lives and will triumph! In the crazy ardor of the battle, the [heroes] felt both their independence and their fulfillment of duty. [They] fell brave and heroic, watering the soil with the blood of the holy sacrifice of their life, given for the homeland. Just as three years ago, today steel and bronze stand together to celebrate the same belief, praising and glorifying the memory of those who, in France, in Africa and at Sea, knew how to die for their country. Portugal dignifies itself, paying the highest tribute of appreciation and gratitude to its sons who gave their lives for it in a massive effort! Portugal, which once had the New World and long seemed to have fallen into a lethargic sleep, appears again in all its splendor over the whole earth. Glory for our immortal comrades, honor to their patriotism and their courage!" (AHM, 1.ª Divisão, 35.ª Secção, Caixa 442 – Alocuções de 9 de Abril de 1921: Quartel do Funchal [Infantry Regiment nr. 27], April 9, 1921).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> António José de Almeida, *Diário das Sessões do Congresso*, April 7, 1921: 1-8.

but feel a special deference for the religion that, apart from being the faith of most Portuguese, has Christ as the supreme deity, Christ, who, there in Batalha, as I have said in the past, in the name of the Government of the Republic, at the doors of the temple itself, is not just the God of Catholics, but in the History of Portugal is also the companion in arms of Nun'Alvares."<sup>22</sup> This reverence made use of elements derived from a traditional and "historic" liturgy. The death experience resulted in a reinforcement of a familiar, intimate, non-clerical and non-official Christianity, more in keeping with popular devotion. Those who died in the war were compared to Christ, as they had sacrificed themselves for the whole – the homeland.

More than the standardization of military cemeteries in faraway lands in Flanders<sup>23</sup>, the Unknown Soldier allowed for the necessary consolation in the homeland, reinforcing the idea of the equality of those who rendered homage and those to whom homage was paid. Both the discourse of the President of the Republic, as well as that of the Minister for War, in 1924, revealed the dynamics that these men wished to see implemented in the Sacred Union<sup>24</sup> and now in the rememoration of its greatest cause: the participation in the war. They urged the formation of a national union to defend the homeland, in a "common" prayer of recognizing the sacrifice of its heroes. It was suggested that all men were equal before the homeland and in the face of death, so equal as to be indistinguishable, bereft of connotations of military rank and social status (Gibelli, 1998: 346). No matter how much the inscription on the tombs of the Unknown Soldiers – PORTUGAL/ ETERNAL AT SEA / AND IN ITS RACES /IN HONOR OF ITS UNKNOWN SOLDIER / WHO DIED BY THE HOMELAND – sought simply to glorify the homeland and put an end to criticism focusing on this phenomenon, it was unable to avoid the biting comments. *O Dia*, a monarchic daily newspaper, criticized this inscription, namely with regard to its inability

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> António José de Almeida, *Diário das Sessões do Congresso*, April 7, 1921: 1-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> The end of the war left unimaginable destruction and death. The dead accumulated on the battlefield or in improvised graves, requiring the government to issue legislation to regulate the burial of corpses. Until the Great War, dead soldiers had no special space in graveyards and they were mostly interred in mass graves (largely due to the difficulty of identification) and honored though impersonal or hierarchic monuments. However, the idea of building the nation's army demanded that these men should be respected and honored regardless of their rank. In Portugal, the first legislation regarding the treatment of the war dead appeared in 1917. The Portuguese War Graves Commission (CPSG) was created and was responsible for the identification, concentration and burial of bodies in a single Portuguese cemetery in Richebourg l'Avoué (France). This "presents itself as a sanctuary. You enter through a wrought iron fence; the graves are lined up in front of a stone altar. It is both a place of Christian sacrifice and dedication to the Portuguese homeland. Faithful among the faithful, the fighters are already installed among the great mass" (Becker, 1991:121). It is a simple example of design and iconography, where the symbols of the homeland guaranteed the continuity of classical historicism from mid-nineteenth century art, perpetuated by the First Republic. On the First World War Portuguese cemetery, see Correia (chapter VIII, 2011).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> The Sacred Union government (March 16, 1916 to April 25, 1917) emerged from the need to create an alliance that would guarantee national unity in times of war. In practice, only two parties joined this union.

to create an original national memory:

Eternal at sea... in continents... and in its races... What does this bunch of broccoli mean!? Why isn't Portugal also eternal in the adjacent islands, in São Tomé & Príncipe, in Cape Verde and in Macao and Timor? And above all, what does it mean by saying eternal... in its races? We all know that this doesn't mean anything; but if that is the case then what was the need to desecrate this marvel of seriousness, which is the Chapter House, with the vacuity of this flowery charabanc!? And in the terrible translation of 'mort pour la patrie', which translates as "died for the Homeland", but has instead been translated as "by the Homeland". In grammatically correct Portuguese this would signify that it was the Homeland that killed the poor soldier. And perhaps that really was the case!<sup>25</sup>

The "consecration" of the Unknown Soldiers did not leave much scope for illusion. Despite its grandeur and imposing presence, the Unknown Soldier as a process for remembering the Great War, a moment when the nation consensually united around a universal and egalitarian representation, was not an effective balm. The war heroes – whether living or dead – did not become unquestionably indispensable. Not even a grand reformulation of the cult in this final act of burial made it possible to overcome underlying errors and incapacities while constructing the Republican memory of the Great War. The burial of the dead also buried this possibility and once again revealed an inability to construct a consensual, uniting and enduring myth of the experience of the war.

#### The hardening of published opinion and the fragility of the national hero

Thus, those who believed that the magnificence of the event would in itself bring about a generalized agreement were mistaken. In truth, not just on that day, but over the course of the anniversaries of that date, there was opposition to the formal commemorative choices that had been made, to the implications of the meaning of the celebration and, even, its subsequent loss of meaning. Just like the national decision with regard to intervening in the conflict on the western front, the consecration of the most significant symbol/ritual of the myth of the war experience was distanced from the atemporal success that was inherently implied in it in most European nations.

The chosen date, April 9, was associated with the greatest defeat that the Portuguese army had suffered on the western front, as well as, primarily, death as a

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> O Dia, April 11, 1924: 1.

consensual and unifying element.<sup>26</sup> The possible use of Armistice Day for this act could weaken the development of a national identity, owing to the essentially universal dimension of Armistice Day.

The need to have two Unknown Soldiers was due to the important efforts that had been made on two battlefields. One soldier came from Flanders – the European front – and the other from Portugal's empire in Africa, two fields of Portuguese interest and international influence in the conflict. Despite this, the symbolic choice, exceptional among the warring nations, of having two Unknown Soldiers was not enough to smooth over the internal disagreement about Portugal's intervention on the European front. The apparently consensual symbols were not enough to overcome internal schisms about intervention in the war<sup>27</sup>.

Despite everything, and just as in other nations, the item that provoked the most heated debate was the choice of the site where the coffins were to be interred.

The first site proposed was the Jerónimos Monastery, which was situated in the capital and served the purpose perfectly because of its grandeur and central location. The idea was presented in Parliament on November 11, 1920<sup>28</sup>, but the ensuing debate was not an entirely peaceful process, with discussions continuing in the two Houses until March 1921. The reason for the controversy was, as immediately pointed out in December by Bernardino Machado, the coexistence with the tomb of Sidónio Pais<sup>29</sup>. The Republicans feared that installing the tombs of the Unknown Soldiers in the same space would allow for an association of the cults, and a consequent reinforcement of the veneration for the "president-king". António Granjo<sup>30</sup> was the main figure behind this heated debate and proposed that the soldiers be interred at São Vicente (the national pantheon) or in Batalha as alternatives. After the tomb of Sidónio Pais was violated, this MP stated, "IIt saves] the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> With regard to the dates of the Portuguese commemoration of the First World War and their meaning, see Correia (chapter VI, 2011).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> On the Portuguese participation in the First World War and the Republican and Military Dictatorship governments, see the works by Filipe Ribeiro Meneses, such as *União Sagrada e Sidonismo: Portugal em Guerra, 1916-1918*, or *Portugal 1914-1926: From the First World War to Military Dictatorship*. On the disagreements regarding the Portuguese intervention at the European front, see Teixeira (1996).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> António Granjo, *Diário do Governo*, November 11, 1920: 1. On this same day, Bernardino Machado presented to the Senate his proposal for a monument/mausoleum in Jerónimos Monastery to soldiers killed in the war, a proposal that was sent to the House of Representatives and was later approved by the War Commission (*Diário do Senado*, November 12, 1920: 3; AHP, SECÇÃO VII – CX 58A: 2314-2376, SENADO, November 30, 1920). See also Law nr. 1.099 – *Diário do Governo*, I Series, n° 267, December 31, 1920; Decree nr. 7.351 – *Diário do Governo*, I Series, n° 37, February 21, 1921.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Cf. António Granjo, *Diário do Senado*, December 8, 1920: 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> António Granjo was a lawyer and Freemason. He was affiliated with the Portuguese Republican Party, and was a Liberal and Evolutionist; he took part in the CEP as a lieutenant, and held various ministerial responsibilities between 1919 and 1921. He was murdered during the "bloody night" (October 19, 1921).

need to have to take any stance, whose purpose is to prevent the unknown soldiers from the Great War from reposing in Jerónimos, alongside the body of Sidónio Pais."<sup>31</sup> The government, through the Ministry for the Interior, authorized the bodies to be taken to Batalha only on April 6 1921, and declared April 9, 1921 to be a national holiday.<sup>32</sup>

Chosen, in 1924, as the "provisionally definitive" site, due to the eschatological imperative of the deterioration of the tombs, these clearly divergent opinions became public. The section of the press that was favorably inclined towards the regime justified the choice "historically", as did members of the government, "Your place [is], there in Batalha, – there under the shadow of the Master of Aviz and Nuno Álvares. [...] In no other place would you be so visible in the memory of your compatriots, for whom you are the most symbolic and unsullied personification. Commemorating you means taking part in your heroism: the grandeur of a people can be gauged by the vitality of their memories". The opposition saw this decision as representing the Democratic Party's need to divest itself of responsibility. At the time of the definitive burial, O Dia stated, "The Republic has consigned the body resulting from its nefarious crime far away, like a nightmare, to the remote fog of royal legends. The victims will rest well in Batalha, because executioners do not frequent temples". <sup>34</sup>

The debate continued and, in October 1926, the Commission for the National Monument to the Dead of the Great War (Lisbon) proposed that the tombs be moved to the base of the monument being built, since Batalha, being a remote site that was difficult to access, discouraged pilgrimages and virtually eliminated visits by foreign dignitaries. This idea was debated and strong objections were raised, both for artistic reasons (owing to the changes that would have been necessary in the design, and the expenditure that would have had to be made on the national monument) and "due to a strangely religious education, our people cannot witness without astonishment the unprecedented fact of a human being

<sup>31</sup> Diário da Câmara dos Deputados, March 10, 1921: 34; March 8, 1921,:10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> At a session of the House of Representatives on June 13, 1922, the Minister for War, Correia Barreto, presented the "final" decision – "with respect to the Unknown Soldier, the Parliament has decided that this grave will be in Batalha. We will designate a retired sergeant and four soldiers to care for the Chapter House, in order not to embarrass the army or the Nation" (*Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, June 13, 1922: 35). Also see Law nr. 1.148 – *Diário do Governo*, I Series, n° 76, April 3, 1921; Law nr. 1.140 – *Diário do Governo*, I Series, n° 70, April 6, 1921; *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, April 4, 1921: 11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel Mário de Campos, *Ilustração Portuguesa*, April 19, 1921.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> O Dia, April 9, 1924: 1.

buried among us above the ground for this purpose, at the side of the road like an animal".<sup>35</sup>

Placed outside the capital, the chosen site, Batalha, which was a medieval Gothic monastery with all the inherent religious connotations, revealed the Republic's lack of confidence and its inability to create its own temples. While the placement of the tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Westminster Abbey was due to the peculiar nature of the Church in the United Kingdom, in Portugal the insertion of a memorial in a religious space reflected the precarious state of the Republic, which needed to legitimize its memorials with the old and deep-rooted traditions of the Church and the Monarchy<sup>36</sup>.

One cannot, however, overlook the vast and complex universe of meanings appropriated from history to be found at the Santa Maria da Vitória monastery, as Batalha was called until it was restored in the 19th century under the aegis of the liberal Luís Mouzinho de Albuquerque. This restoration included a discernible effort to remove religious symbols and showcase the monastery as the pantheon of the Aviz dynasty, or at least of the illustrious generation of Camões, the generation repeatedly evoked by Republican historic patriotism.

The choice of Batalha, far from the capital Lisbon, as the site offered a way for the Republic to lessen its friction with the Church. After Sidónio Pais<sup>37</sup> and the Vatican had forged closer ties, the postwar period marked the re-emergence of the *distance* between the government of the Republic and the Church. In this context, the cult of Nuno Álvares Pereira (beatified in January 1918) was renewed. Influenced by the cult of Joan of Arc, which was being promoted by the French Republican right, this new devotion revealed the "political militancy against Republican Jacobinism, bringing together multiple focal points (Republicans, Monarchists and Catholics)" (Leal, 1993: 68). It consecrated (in 1920) yet another hero for the pantheon of civic religion to celebrate on August 14 – a reconciling hero in social and political terms – "enabling the political-ideological and moral audience of the social symbol Nuno Álvares to be expanded, at least until the commemorations of the 5th centenary of his death, in 1931" (Leal, 1999: 78). The Batalha Monastery thus brought

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> These justifications were pointed out by the Association of Veterans of the Great War, which complained to the Portuguese Association of Monuments to the Great War "on behalf of all combatants", persuading it not to do so (LCGG, 1929: 89-91).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Doubts still remain as to why the National Pantheon (São Vicente de Fora – Lisbon) was not used for the burial of the Unknown Soldiers. Although the pantheon could be associated with a monarchic past, since the kings had been responsible for building the edifice, its construction was already completed and would have avoided several costs (<a href="http://www.ippar.pt/monumentos/se\_staengracia.html">http://www.ippar.pt/monumentos/se\_staengracia.html</a> [Accessed on September 14, 2009]). To understand more about the First World War memorials in Portugal, see Correia (2013).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> *Sidonismo* was a conservative and anti-parliamentary regime headed by Sidónio Pais. It was established on December 5, 1917, and lasted until the assassination of the Head of State in Lisbon on December 14, 1918.

together a desired (although not always achieved) consensus. Not only did it evoke a hero of the "renewed" national consensus<sup>38</sup>, born of a victory against Castilian troops – an underlying element of the belligerence on the European front (recognition as compared to a neutral Spain) – but it also symbolically brought [the battle of] Aljubarrota and one of its symbols into the public domain. It thus removed the Unknown Soldiers from the discussions associated with the pantheons in Lisbon, the heated political struggles of the capital, and created, by the will of the Republican government, yet another element of pacification and reconciliation.

The symbolism of this event had an impact and showed even the most revolutionary bases of the First Republic to be "corrupted". The violent secularization of the early years of the regime were diminished in the context of the war, a phenomenon that is evident in the official commemorative initiatives, which gave prominence to members of the Church and associated spaces in consecrating the two anonymous soldiers. This outcome was not as surprising as it might at first appear to be. Throughout this memorial process, there was an attempt at political and social pacification on the part of the Republicans. This situation is, in fact, clearly evident in the reports sent by foreign missions in Portugal, as well as in the speech given by the President of the Republic on April 7, 1921. In his final report about the diverse ceremonies to bury the two Unknown Soldiers, L. Carnegie emphasized three important elements. Firstly, the numerous allusions to religious themes by the President of the Republic in his speech paying tribute on April 7: "The Republic, without adopting any religious faith, but respecting all religions, cannot but feel especial deference for the faith which, besides being that of the vast majority of the Portuguese, has at its supreme divinity that same Christ. who at Batalha [where the soldiers were to be buried is not only the God of Catholics, but is also a companion in arms of Nun'Alvares [a national hero] in the history of Portugal<sup>39</sup>. Secondly, the prominent presence of monarchical representatives at the religious ceremonies held on April 8: "It was evident that Count Sabugosa, representing the former monarch, King Manuel, occupied the main place in the Church, opposite the presidential box". Finally, one of the most striking images of the ceremonies was the cordiality of relations between the Church and the State: "On every occasion positions of marked importance were assigned to the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>The President of the Republic continued to participate in the *Festa da Pátria* (homeland celebrations), an ephemerid that was officialized with António Granjo's support. Granjo, who had opposed the placing of the tombs of the Unknown Soldiers in the Jerónimos Monastery, recognized the importance of this "monarchic" hero in the national liturgy (*Diário do Senado*, August 6, 1920: 12).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> NAUK, Western Europe, Western Europe, War Office/W4425/3044/36, April 25, 1921 – Portuguese Unknown Warrior.

Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon and other high-placed Church dignitaries, who were moreover, frequently to be seen engaging in friendly and intimate conversations with members of the Government and the political world. I noticed also that one of the coffins of the unknown soldiers bore a large silver cross on the lid, a concession to religion which would hardly have been allowed by the Government a few years ago."40

#### Conclusion

The Republic's inability to stimulate recognition of the interventionist cause and, more controversially, the muted celebrations of Portugal's allied victory, precipitated the decline and banalization of the commemorative efforts. The possibility of transforming the conflict into a tool to ideologically reinforce the identity of the First Republic as the legitimate representative of the Portuguese people thus came to naught. However, the policies adopted in relation to the memory of the war during the First Republic showed that this process did not lead linearly to a political and cultural rupture in the postwar period.

This article has proposed an alternative to Mosse's generalized explanation of the radicalization of politics. Representations of the Great War in Portugal were imbued with a profound traditionalism, visibly connoted with Republican values, far removed from the modernizing forms that had marked some efforts in countries such as Italy or Germany. A set of funereal commemorative processes was planned, rather than commemorations of victory, centered on the cult of the dead and reinforcing the idea of their sacrifice for the Republican Homeland, more than for the nation. The most evident vestiges of the war remained profoundly attached to traditions, fearing a rupture and constructing a historical memory that guaranteed continuity in terms of a national identity. 41 This study has incorporated Mosse's model regarding the cult of fallen heroes, but has cautioned against generalization. In this respect, there is a crucial divergence with regard to understanding the investment. The funereal direct relationship between the massification/abstraction/sacralization of death and the brutalization of politics, with an underlying uniformity in the participating countries with regard to the construction of the myth of the war experience, can be compared with different forms of nationalism.

A set of rituals and symbols were transposed into the ceremonial process being analyzed, present not only in the military cemeteries and the mythology surrounding those

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> NAUK, Western Europe, Western Europe, War Office/W4425/3044/36, April 25, 1921 – Portuguese Unknown Warrior.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> On the politics of the memory of the First World War in Portugal, see Correia (2011).

who had died in the war, but also in the symbolic reconstruction of the Portuguese nationstate, which was largely due to the Republicans (Republican nationalism) and which was now condensed into a single ceremony and into a single image – the Unknown Soldier.

The Unknown Soldier became the national hero around whom the Republican liturgy was renewed on Armistice Day, as well as, above all, on the national holiday of April 9. It can be noted that the manifestations of war culture tend, in this context, to be profoundly sustained by a religious type of hope (irrespective of the entity responsible) and by the "antiquity" of the values of national identity constructed (Hobsbawm and Terence, 1996: 86). Just as in France, in Portugal too new and old political, cultural and social groups appeared or reappeared against this backdrop commemorating the war, as was the case with the Church. 42 The strong secularization that characterized the Republic now disappeared, since, in a country with a deep-rooted Catholic tradition, it would be problematic to think of a process to instrumentalize pain and death without resorting to a transcendent compensation for the losses and the solutions of the Christian liturgy, officially adapted to the temporal and spatial formats of the official framework for representing the war. Although the effects of war in Portugal were far less "dramatic" than in the other European countries, the Republican Government had to promote social and political reconciliation to overcome the consequences of a "mutilated victory". The national and international dimension of the April celebrations allowed interventionists, once again in power, to legitimize their decision to take part in the European front.<sup>43</sup> In short, as Ravignan, the French representative in Portugal, stated, an effort was made, whether desired or not, to ensure national reconciliation at least with regard to the processes necessary to remember the war, "[t]he fact that the Portuguese clergy, especially the Cardinal Patriarch, took part in all the ceremonies and that the President of the Republic, as well as members of the government, attended a religious service in one of the city's main churches is worthy of note. This rapprochement in terms of the political passions that divide Portugal will probably not last long; nevertheless it is interesting to see."44

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> An analysis of the role that the Church played in the Great War remembrance project does not fall within the scope of this article, which focuses on the official memory policies of a secular state. For further information about the critics of the rapprochement that took place between the Government and the Church during the war commemorations, see "A reação religiosa triunfante", *A Batalha: Suplemento Literário e Ilustrado*, April 14, 1924: 2; Catroga (2006).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> In order to understand the gradual forgetfulness of the Unknown Soldier, it is important to place it within the wider process of war remembrance. See Correia (chapter VI and conclusion, 2011).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Cf. AMAE, Correspondance Commerciale et Politique, Europe, 1918-1929, Portugal n° 9 – Armée, dossier Générale. Doc. 66.

One can thus conclude that this process was far from assuming modern configurations, worthy of dictatorial pictorial languages. It resorted to familiar and traditional molds and broke with the "radicalism" of the regime's early years, which the Republic invoked, both in terms of the Christian tradition and in terms of the ideological construction of the nation-state in the transition from the 19th to the 20th century.

#### **Figures**



Figure 1. Triumphal parade in Lisbon (9 April).

Source: Fundo LC

Figure 2. Marechal Joffre among foreign representatives waiting for the Unknown Warriors tombs outside the Parliament in Lisbon (9 April).



Source: Fundo LC

Figure 3. Unknown Warrior tombs hold by generals Abel Hipólito and Gomes da Costa at Batalha's entrance (10 April).



Source: Fundo LC

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# The Monarchists and the Great War: the practices and representations of counterpropaganda

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#### Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present a cultural approach to the Great War within the social and intellectual field of monarchist thought, reconstructing its practices and discourse about the conflict. By deciphering the contents and instruments of counterpropaganda, an analysis is made of the contribution of monarchists both to the formation of a social conscience (public opinion), which gradually became more and more opposed to the war effort, and to the creation of a social atmosphere that favored revolutionary action between 1914 and 1919.

#### Keywords

Great War, counterpropaganda, public opinion, revolution, monarchists.

#### Resumo

Neste artigo, procura-se uma abordagem cultural da Grande Guerra dentro do campo social e intelectual monárquico, reconstruindo as suas práticas e representações sobre o conflito. Trata-se de analisar o seu contributo, decifrando conteúdos e instrumentos da contra-propaganda, na edificação de uma consciência social (opinião pública) que lentamente se opôs ao esforço de guerra; e na criação de uma atmosfera social que favoreceu a acção revolucionária entre 1914 e 1919.

#### Palavras-chave

Grande Guerra, contra-propaganda, opinião pública, revolução, monárquicos

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#### Introduction

In the last few decades, there has been a renewed interest in the history of the Great War. This has been increasingly studied through historiographical approaches to cultures and mentalities, which have gradually tended to prevail over political, ideological and military approaches. With the analysis now being focused on the discourse, practices and representations of this conflict, the writing of the cultural history of the Great War has strengthened the connections between memory and national identity, opening up new directions for research (Prost, 2002). These new paths are defined through the study of other objects or documents, such as memoirs, photos, films, State schools, posters or literature, which have proved invaluable in creating a social and cultural history of the Great War and understanding the collective psychology of the nations involved in the conflict (Winter, 2006).

In adopting this approach, the study of propaganda and counterpropaganda acquires a fresh interest that goes far beyond merely writing the political, ideological or military history of the Great War. In fact, for the first time, this conflict led to the total mobilization of nations around a common goal, in which propaganda played an important role. Internally, propaganda was used to stimulate patriotic values, promote loyalty to the Government and foster a hatred of the common enemy, by creating a "stereotype" (Afonso, 2008: 68). Propaganda was needed in order to persuade and to seduce, convincing people of the legitimacy of the war and the necessity for each nation to become involved in the conflict. Its aim was to convince people by resorting to lies, making them believe in something that was not real. It was regarded as a necessary lie that could be used to mobilize a nation towards concerted action, and to create a national conscience about a war that was seen as fair and necessary (Subtil, 2006). It could even be used to stimulate belligerence in a neutral nation, raise the troops' morale in combat or diminish the motivation of the enemy. The Great War was probably the first conflict in which propaganda became inseparable from public opinion (Paddock, 2004: 3).

In the Portuguese case, it is generally agreed that the governments of the First Republic did not establish a propaganda machine designed to communicate with public opinion, nor did they even take advantage of the State's institutions to stimulate patriotic values. In France, for instance, primary schools played an important role in reinforcing patriotic values and creating a nationalist fervor that did not exist in 1914 (Prost, 2002: 73-89). Even so, in Portugal, a campaign was conducted in support of the war effort, making

use of several propaganda instruments, such as the press, books, posters, photos, illustrated postcards, lectures, films and demonstrations. Apart from the interventions of politicians and officers linked to the Democratic Party, such as the "young Turks" (Santos, 2012: 245), republican propaganda was largely produced by republican intellectuals or others that were ideologically close to the republican cause. The republicans' aim was to develop cultural projects centered around belligerence, which included magazines, books and the press. Jaime Cortesão, João de Barros, Teixeira de Pascoais, Guerra Junqueiro, Teófilo Braga, Raul Proença, Leonardo Coimbra, Gomes Leal and Henrique Lopes de Mendonça, among others, should all be mentioned here, even though they had different affiliations. Magazines such as Atlântida, A Águia and Alma Nova also stood out through their defense of the Allied cause, based on cultural arguments. "Saudosismo" was a predominant value at that time, linked to the Arte de Ser Português, by Teixeira de Pascoais. War was seen as a regenerating catastrophe, an ideal answer to the needs of "collective achievement", reattaching the present to the threads of historical tradition. The conflict was supposed to mark the beginning of a new era of "heroism", seen as a necessary sacrifice to wake the nation up from its apathy, and involving it in a crusade for humanist values and democracy. As can be demonstrated, this was the propaganda of elites addressed to an enlightened and educated public. The love of the motherland, as celebrated by João de Barros in Ode à Bélgica (Barros, 1914) or Oração à Pátria (Barros, 1917), did not reach down to the common people. For these, Jaime Cortesão wrote a didactic text entitled Cartilha do Povo (1916), explaining the war and justifying the need for belligerence through the use of simple and understandable dialogues. Together with the magazine Portugal na Guerra, edited by Augusto Pina and published in 1917, this book was one of the few propaganda instruments sponsored by the State (Santos, 2010b).

#### 1. The monarchists against the war: strategies and instruments

Counterpropaganda used the same mechanisms of communication and persuasion in seeking to influence public opinion. In Portugal, it systematically attacked the State's war efforts and its mobilization of the troops, creating a state of mind that made the opposition's revolutionary activities much easier.

The nation was divided at that time into interventionists and anti-interventionists (Meneses, 2010: 267-276). Despite their leading role in the opposition to the war, the monarchists were not alone in this political crusade. Many republicans joined them,

especially Machado Santos and Brito Camacho's friends, as well as socialists and unionists. This was indeed a vast political and social grouping that did not accept the participation of Portuguese troops in the European theatre of war, for whom only the defense of threatened territory, including the African colonies, could legitimize the mobilization of the Army. The study of this systematic opposition to the government's war policy is important for understanding the political and social divisions that determined the evolution of the First Republic until 1926, and for explaining the political radicalization that took place in these troubled years between 1914 and 1919 (Meneses, 2000; Santos, 2010).

In this sense, the Portuguese experience was different from that of the rest of Europe, where opposition to the conflict was promoted mainly by pacifist and antimilitary movements that gradually came to favor desertion (Prost, 1992: 58-71). In Portugal, despite the appeals for peace made by Catholics and socialists, the war years were marked by permanent disturbances, insurrections and revolutions, attempted coups and military actions, reflecting the growing animosity to the party of war and to the main republican leaders, especially Afonso Costa. Can the subversive behavior of the army be analyzed without taking into account this counterpropaganda activity? In my opinion, this is not possible, nor can one minimize the effects of counterpropaganda on public opinion, which reacted violently to the high prices and poverty imposed by the war economy (Santos, 2010: 355-357).

The monarchist movement was divided into several political and ideological tendencies, which explains the diversity to be noted in the discourses and strategies that were adopted. The monarchist cause was not a political party, nor was it even a cohesive and homogeneous movement. Despite the dynastic division between 'miguelistas' and 'manuelistas', Dom Manuel was able to count on the loyalty of different doctrinal groups, including the traditionalist nationalists (the integralists and all the neo-traditionalists) and the group of liberal-conservative constitutionalists. The monarchist cause included many Catholics as well, who were torn between the adoption of modern conceptions of the nation state – Christian democracy – and a continuation of political traditionalism. These divisions serve to explain the existence of two antagonistic responses to the war: a pro-England one and a strong pro-Germany one, which accepted the idea that Germany's victory in the war could favor the restoration of the throne (Santos, 2010: 179-242).

A powerful propaganda campaign opposing Portugal's involvement in the European war was directed against the political orientations of Dom Manuel, which were made public in August, 1914. The last king of Portugal, now exiled in England, called upon

his fellow countrymen to lend their 'patriotic' support to the State's efforts and to participate in the conflict alongside the Allies (Santos, 2010: 277). However, his supporters did not heed his pleas. In general, monarchists had a great admiration for Germany, including some of the groups that were very close to Dom Manuel. At the same time, the hatred that was directed against England as the main supporter of the Republic had been gradually increasing since 1910. This situation gave rise to both a pro-German discourse and an anti-war one at the same time (Santos, 2010: 331; BNP, ELM, doc. nr. 12061, letter from Luís de Magalhães to Dom Manuel, August, 1916).

It is therefore understandable that anti-war propaganda was not made openly, as this might seem unpatriotic. At the same time, censorship and the preventive actions taken by the police meant that the anti-war rhetoric did not circulate easily. Censorship was introduced through Law nr. 45, of March 28, 1916, but by that time a monarchist newspaper had already written that "of all the countries of Europe, the one where the right to write about the war, about how people feel and how they think, is most weakened is undoubtedly Portugal<sup>2</sup>" (A Monarchia, nr. 5, 08-02-1916, p. 4). This periodical, whose opinions were close to those of the reactionary faction, mainly regretted that the monarchists could not openly proclaim their 'admiration' for Germany: "so that those who, like us, are admirers of the Germans, their discipline, science, order and hard work are in serious danger of having their possessions taken and their ribs crushed<sup>3</sup>" (A Monarchia, nr. 5, 8-02-1916, p. 4). In fact, any demonstration against the military intervention was labeled as "pro-German", and all those who opposed Portugal's participation in the war were treated as traitors (Silva, 2006: 387).

Censorship did not make the opposition's life any easier, but, in actual fact, this was offset by the inefficacy (or the absence) of the regime's propaganda and the lack of an information policy that explained its political options. According to some quarters of the British press, some of the suspicions of the Portuguese people, which were manipulated by the opponents to the war, were caused by the government's "lack of honesty" and its policy of "secrecy and repression". As quoted in the republican newspaper *A Capital* (and therefore one that must be considered above suspicion), the editor of *The Times* wrote that the sacrifices imposed on the people obliged republicans to explain "exactly what the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> "(...) de todos os países da Europa aquele em que o direito a escrever sobre a Guerra como se sente e como se pensa, está mais tolhido é sem dúvida Portugal."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> "(...) de forma que quem como nós, seja admirador dos alemães, pela sua disciplina, ciência, ordem e trabalho, corre sério risco de ver tenir os seus haveres e amolgar as suas costelas."

situation is and what measures the government is taking<sup>4</sup>" (*A Capital*, 03-12-1916, p. 1). The army officers also complained about the government's "lack of honesty". In 1917, when preparing the shipping of troops to Flanders, a group of 35 Officers from Infantry Regiment nr. 7 delivered to several other regiments a copy of the letter that they had sent to the President. In it, they demanded publication of "the note in which England asks us for our personal aid, thus proving that our departure for the battlefields is not a mere political whim<sup>5</sup>" (AHM, 1.ª Divisão, 35.ª secção, caixa 1263, pasta 1, doc. nr. 54).

The "lack of honesty" was exploited by counterpropaganda. This was used mainly by the countries involved in the war to influence the populations of the enemy countries. This was not, however, the case with Portugal; there are signs which suggest that some propaganda handed out by monarchists had its origin in German espionage, or that, at least, it may have been financed by Berlin (Meneses, 2000: 206). As far as Portugal was concerned, however, such propaganda had to be seen in the context of the political and revolutionary activity that the monarchists and their allies were perpetrating against the Republic. The main instruments of this propaganda were the pamphlet, the manifesto and the flyer, as well as direct contact with the population. The press explained the strategy of communication that was adopted in these counterpropaganda instruments, revealing that the anti-republican combat was being effected "through flyers, leaflets and brochures (...). The flyers use strong wording and warning phrases, while the pamphlets and brochures are romantic and use discursive language; all of these are profusely distributed, and, of course, at a low price. They even make use of the distribution of explicit engravings, and have managed to have products placed in shops that use these as their advertising<sup>6</sup>" (A Monarchia, nr. 9, 22-02-1916, p. 2). On its front page, the A Monarchia newspaper used inflammatory phrases, printed in bold letters or underlined in order to emphasize them. Frequently, these were resounding statements made by high-ranking republicans, which were used to shock public opinion, such as, for example, this one: "At the banquet at the São Carlos Theatre, Dr. Alexandre Braga said that our abstention from the conflict was – a sacrifice<sup>7</sup>" (A Monarchia, nr. 1, 25-01-1916, p. 2). Despite all this, the

<sup>4 &</sup>quot;(...) exactamente qual a situação e quais as medidas que o governo toma."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> " (...) a nota em que a Inglaterra nos pede o nosso auxílio pessoal, provando assim que a nossa partida para os campos de batalha não é um mero capricho político."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> "(...) por meio de prospectos, folhetos e brochuras (...) Nos pasquins usar-se-á de estilo arrebatador e frases de sobreaviso, e nos folhetos e brochuras, de forma romântica ou em palestras; tudo isto distribuído profusamente, e a preço baixo o que não puder deixar de ser. Usar mesmo de distribuição de gravuras explícitas, e conseguir que no comércio apareçam produtos com elas pro reclame."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> " (...) O Sr. Dr. Alexandre Braga no banquete de S. Carlos disse que a nossa abstenção no conflito era – <u>um sacrifício."</u>

realistic press could not be explicitly involved in the anti-intervention campaign, at least after 1916. That is why, apart from a few exceptions, the sources for the study of counterpropaganda are to be found in clandestine "literature".

#### 2. Counterpropaganda

The propaganda against the war intensified in 1914, particularly after the revolution of October 20, which was regarded as the first organized movement against Portuguese belligerence. (Santos; 2010b: 292). By this time, the first pamphlets had appeared in military units, without mentioning an explicit author, but simply signed by "a patriot", by "a Portuguese familiar with the situation" or by "a friend of the people". They came hidden in French newspapers and were delivered by mail to the military units with the handwritten instruction "Read this and pass it on". These pamphlets were then stuck on the walls of villages and towns throughout the country. The fact that they were first delivered to the military units can be explained by the "fear of going to war", according to the words of a monarchist officer (ADG, Fundo General João de Almeida, letter from Eurico Cameira, 4-10-1914). The idea was to take advantage of this fear and stop the belligerence, forcing the army to intervene by force (Santos, 2010: 284-285).

An analysis of this particular kind of pamphlet literature, clandestine as it was, proves that its intention was to influence the reluctant members of the army and public opinion in the provinces, from where the mobilized contingents would emerge. Suggestion, exaggeration and falsehood, among other devices, were the basic mechanisms used to spread the political and ideological message intended to intensify the tension and the hatred felt by the population, and to widen the gulf between public opinion and politicians. In order to understand the contents of those pamphlets and flyers, some of which were produced abroad, it is important to remember that the republican rhetoric sought to legitimize the Portuguese involvement in the war by invoking some of the clauses of the country's treaty of alliance with Great Britain. Then there was the threat to the colonies, as well as a vague and ill defined "Spanish threat" (Teixeira, 1996). These were arguments that were not understood by the public opinion, which by now was, generally speaking, alienated from the war. Through its participation in the conflict, the Portuguese Republic actually sought to revive the country's historical tradition of greatness and Portugal's former "destiny of expansion". That is to say, the war was seen as the modern equivalent to an epic story of heroism and sacrifice (Santos, 2010: 168-169). But, ultimately, it was in the name of justice that propaganda upheld the decision to engage in a military intervention alongside the allies.

However, for the Republic's adversaries, belligerence was designed above all to consolidate the regime and the Democratic Party itself, through the use of diplomacy and by concentrating on foreign affairs (Santos, 2010:337). Conscious of this hidden political agenda, monarchists tried to dismantle the republican propaganda with the help of their unexpected allies. But, more than that, they intended to spread fear and anger in Portuguese society and make way for the restoration of the monarchy.

The lack of clarity to be noted in the republican propaganda favored the monarchists' strategy. Nobody understood the strange threads of diplomacy that bound Portugal's participation in the war to the Luso-British alliance, and which considered that Portugal and Germany had already been at war since 1914. It was not easy to understand the demand that was contained in Britain's formal request for help. The regime's ambiguous policy, which had determined the need for military intervention without assuming it publicly (Vincent-Smith, 1975), paved the way for the counterpropaganda strategy of depicting the war as the regime's private business, necessary in order to "consolidate the Republic".

In O Thalassa, a humoristic periodical edited by Jorge Colaço, a cartoon depicted the war as a prize awarded to the Democratic Party in 1914. Afonso Costa and Bernardino Machado, the heads of government at the time, rejoiced with the beginning of the war and the postponement of the elections due to take place at the end of the same year. Another quite different newspaper, Restauração, stated that "as there has been no request nor even any invitation, as the nation's security is not under threat, and as the national opinion does not demand it, why should we intervene and for what purpose? (...) It seems to us that in this gesture of foolish generosity, there is more concern with safeguarding the Republic than with dignifying the nation8" (nr. 25, 22-10-1914, p. 1). The pamphlets repeated these arguments, claiming that participation in the war should be a matter of "national conscience", since it was "everyone's blood" that was involved.

Propaganda against the war did not only exploit the image of the Portuguese soldier shedding his blood in order to defend foreign territories. In fact, a closer analysis of this literature shows that there was little interest in such political and ideological considerations as the conflict of cultures and civilizations or the defense of international laws. These were

<sup>8 &</sup>quot; (...) não havendo pedido nem sequer convite, não perigando a segurança da pátria e não exigindo a opinião nacional, intervir porquê e para quê? (...) Quer-nos parecer que neste gesto de generosidade tola se olha mais a salvaguardar a república do que a engrandecer a pátria."

also the arguments of the pro-allies (Santos, 2010: 253-255). The message in the pamphlets was directed mainly at emotional and irrational feelings, especially the fear of death. The horrors of war, death and the waste of human lives lay at the core of the imagery that was used as counterpropaganda. In fact, the destructive violence of the conflict was noticed immediately after its beginning. Another cartoon published in O Thalassa broached the subject of the destruction of European civilization in an ironic fashion, showing the most primeval appetites of Man in his destructive voracity. The cartoon was entitled "Assembleia geral da pancadaria" (General Assembly of the Fighting). In it, Jorge Colaço depicted, in the background, the massacres, the violence and the destruction. In the foreground, we can see a Moroccan and another African native witnessing the European savagery and remarking: "And they say that we are savages9" (O Thalassa, nr. 73, 13-08-1914, p. 5. See Appendix 2).

The rhetoric of death is one of the essential components in counterpropaganda. Thus, as in the rest of Europe, the favorite target of the speeches of those opposed to the war was the female audience, in their dual role as wives and mothers. The destruction of both Portuguese homes and families was described in a simple and suggestive language, so as to provoke an emotional reaction: "Portuguese Women, those criminals, who have trampled all over the family and religion, wish to send your husbands and children to the slaughter like lambs<sup>10</sup>" (AHM, 1.ª Divisão, 35.ª secção, cx. 1276). In a 1914 pamphlet, one of those "friends of the people", addressed the Portuguese with exalted imprecations against the war and the Republic:

"People, army, old men, women and children of my unfortunate country, please listen to me..

The fatal moment of your complete ruin is drawing nearer, the moment of the dark misery of your homes, the dishonor of your families, the death of your motherland.

You must all awake and unite as one to destroy that more than infamous republic, which for four years now has abused your patience and is dragging you down to ignominy and death.

So, take up arms!

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> "E nós é que somos selvagens."

<sup>10 &</sup>quot; (...)'Mulheres Portuguesas', esses celerados, que tanto têm tripudiado sobre a família e a religião, querem mandar os vossos maridos e filhos para o matadouro como borregos."

It is essential to defend not only the nation's honor, but your own as well.

Remember that it is not only these unfortunates, who are now being sent to slaughter, that will flood the battlefields with their blood.

Every month, and indeed perhaps every week, fresh victims will be continuously sent to sacrifice, to take the place of those who have been slaughtered like cattle, for the master, to whom the Republic has sold you, in other words the English, will fatally oblige the nation to maintain the number of men that were sent at the beginning. This means that all men aged between 18 and 50 will continue to be sent to the slaughter, in order to be killed or rendered incapable. [...]

Think about this, Portuguese women and mothers. [...]

Save your husbands and sons from death and dishonor and shout with me

To arms!

Down with the accursed republic, death to the traitors!" (AHM, 1.ª Divisão, 35.ª secção, cx. 1276)

The widely disseminated image of war as a "European slaughter" of sons and husbands, the victims of some sort of unfortunate business deal, fighting as "slaves to the British", was circulated in pamphlets, letters and other subversive documents sent to the army officers. This process was to intensify after 1916, when Portugal requisitioned German ships, on February, 23. A monarchist newspaper announced in large letters that

Abaixo a maldita república, morte aos traidores!"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> "Povo, exército, velhos, mulheres e crianças do meu desditoso País, ouvi-me.

Aproxima-se o momento fatal da vossa completa ruína, da negra miséria dos vossos lares, da desonra das vossas famílias, da morte da vossa Pátria.

É preciso acordar todos e todos unidos como um só homem derrubarmos essa mais do que infame república, que há 4 anos abusa da vossa paciência e vos arrasta à ignomínia e à morte.

Às armas pois!

É indispensável defender não só a honra nacional, mas também a vossa própria.

Lembrai-vos que não são só esses infelizes, que agora são mandados ao *matadouro*, que com o seu sangue vão inundar os campos de batalha.

Todos os meses e quem sabe mesmo todas as semanas serão continuamente mandadas novas vítimas ao sacrifício, para tomar o lugar dos que forem sido [sic] abatidos como rezes, pois o *dono*, a quem a republica vos vendeu, isto é, o Inglês, obrigará fatalmente o País a manter o número de homens que de princípio fossem enviados, quer dizer, todos os homens de 18 a 50 anos irão sendo mandados sucessivamente ao açougue para serem mortos ou inutilizados. [...]

Pensai nisto mulheres e mães portuguesas. [...]

Salvai da morte e da desonra vossos maridos e filhos e gritai comigo

As Armas!

this was the "Finis" of the motherland and wrote that "all that remains is for you to go and irrigate the foreign land with your blood<sup>12</sup>". In a text that was full of inflammatory expressions such as "holocaust" and "sacrifice", the appeal to the "Women of Portugal" was renewed: "Weep for the fact that your home will be left without its backbone, who has made it so abundant and happy! Mothers! Weep for your sons who, in order to satisfy the unspeakable conveniences of a political faction, will fight against the formidable cannons of the powers at war.<sup>13</sup>" (A Restauração, nr. 11, 29-02-1916, p. 2-3).

In fact, the diplomacy of the democratic and evolutionist Republic had finally paid off. The participation of Portugal in the war took place under the psychological trauma of more than two years of trench warfare. Pictures of the wounded, of those killed in combat and of the destruction of fields and cities circulated both in newspapers and magazines (see *Ilustração Portuguesa*, 1914-1916). This knowledge increased the fear and the animosity of public opinion, giving rise to feelings that counterpropaganda sought to take advantage of. The idea was again reiterated that participation in the war was nothing more than a business that was being managed by the Republicans. This exaggerated lie circulated in papers and in rumors, as can be seen in a description published by the press, which the Government was forced to deny: "It is said everywhere that three Portuguese citizens went to the French Ministry of War to volunteer to lead an army of 20,000 to 60,000 men into battle, in return for one pound in gold for each man that they took with them<sup>14</sup>" (A *Monarchia*, nr. 1, 25-01-1916, p. 5).

The image of war as a business run by politicians influenced the tone of propaganda during 1916, precisely when the Army was being prepared for battle at Tancos. The region was flooded with revolutionary agents and propaganda that encouraged the officers to reject mobilization (Marques, 2004: XXVI). At the time, the military police apprehended several pamphlets originating from Spain, suggestively entitled "Soldiers or sheep?". At the end of 1916, during the uprising led by Machado Santos, a pamphlet was published entitled "Os Bandidos vendilhões de carne humana" (The bandits that deal in human flesh), which insisted on the idea of seeing the war as a trade in soldiers. It was then revealed that 1,500 soldiers had already been killed in Africa, either in combat or by hunger,

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<sup>12 &</sup>quot; (...) falta unicamente ir regar a terra estrangeira com o nosso sangue."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> " (...) Chorai que o vosso lar vai ficar sem o braço forte que o tornava farto e alegre! Mães! Chorai os vossos filhos que as conveniências inconfessáveis duma facção política, vai atirar contra os canhões formidáveis das potências em guerra."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> "(...) Diz-se aí por toda a parte que três portugueses foram oferecer ao ministério da guerra francês levarem para os campos de batalha um exército de 20.000 a 60.000 homens, contanto que recebessem uma libra em oiro, por cada homem."

and that the same thing was about to happen to several thousand more: "90,000 Portuguese men – sold or hired out to foreigners – are ready and still waiting to be sent to the slaughterhouse of Europe. The proceeds from their sale will be paid to the peddlers, thus considerably increasing their already large fortunes stolen from the Country and the People, and unscrupulously spreading widowhood, orphanage and misery, and, who knows?, perhaps even prostitution too<sup>15</sup>" (AHM, 1.ª Divisão, 35.ª secção, cx. 1262).

The years of 1916-1917 were not marked only by the mobilization of 55,000 soldiers belonging to the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps. The intensity of propaganda and counterpropaganda increased, being reflected in the growing political and social tension. The revolutionary activity of monarchists, republicans, unionists, socialists and workers became stronger, and they participated together in conspiracies and revolutionary activities. In the monarchist world, conspiracy took in the form of direct contact with the population, this being the strategy recommended in a memorandum sent to 46 monarchists, including nobles, local political bosses and priests. The memorandum asked for propaganda against the war, counting on the "provincial simplicity" to demonstrate "how greatly the Portuguese are missed in their home lands and among their families since those who have gone to war will certainly not return<sup>16</sup>" (Santos, 2010: 335-336). In 1916, the authorities recognized that the war "was not a popular issue" and that there was a "deep sense of revolt" against participation in the war in foreign territory (Meneses, 2010: 58). The attempted coup of December 13, 1916, led by Machado Santos and involving both monarchists and unionists, led to an elucidative pamphlet being handed out in Lisbon:

"That the Portuguese should happily Defend himself against the German In the Portuguese colonies Why not!!!

But that he should leave this land That he should go to France and die

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> "(...) Ainda à sua espera, estão prestes a seguir para o Matadouro da Europa 90:000 Portugueses, Vendidos ou Alugados a Estrangeiros, cujo produto de venda reverterá a favor dos vendilhões, aumentando-lhes assim consideravelmente as suas já grandes fortunas roubadas ao País e ao Povo, semeando, sem escrúpulos, a viuvez, a orfandade, a miséria e, quem sabe, se a prostituição."

<sup>16 &</sup>quot; (...) a falta que os portugueses fazem à sua terra e às suas famílias, pois pela certa, não voltarão os que seguirem para a guerra."

To save England

Most definitely not!!!<sup>17</sup>

Viva a <u>Pátria Portuguesa!</u>" (AHM, 1.ª Divisão, 35.ª secção, cx. 1262)

During 1917, counterpropaganda went hand in hand with conspiracy. Civilian and military groups spread rumors, according to which "the troops that went to France" would not come back; they would be vanquished by the Germans and would end up as "slaves to the Germans"; "it is the English who are deceiving us and what they wish is to save their own people<sup>18</sup>" (AHM, 1.ª Divisão, 35.ª secção, cx. 1263). In towns like Évora or Viseu, the military regiments received propaganda against the war. In the case of Viseu, where there was a very active cell led by Visconde do Banho, the population was deeply hostile both to the republicans and the war (Santos, 2010: 342).

The idea was to increase the population's hatred of the war and lead the soldiers towards revolution, preparing them for "desertion and revolt". The Army's state of mind explains why in August, 1917, 6 officers, 37 sergeants and 1,102 corporals and soldiers failed to present themselves at the time of the embarkation. (AHM, 1.ª Divisão, 35.ª secção, cx. 1263). In the provinces, many youngsters who were old enough to be mobilized deserted by crossing over the Spanish border, especially those who came from areas where a large volume of "pro-German" propaganda was to be found in circulation (AHM, 1.ª Divisão, 35.ª secção, cx. 1262, pasta 1).

The result of this intense propaganda can be seen in the population's hatred of Afonso Costa and the Democratic Party. Between 1916 and 1917, Portugal lived in a permanent state of war: populations did not respect the Republican authority and, driven by hunger and poverty, they robbed warehouses and freight trains containing food in several regions of Portugal. Strikes and demonstrations highlighted the workers' hatred of the last Government of the "Sacred Union", led by Afonso Costa, while the Unionist

Mas que parta desta terra Que vá para a França e que morra P'ra poupar a Inglaterra

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Isso Porra!!!"

<sup>&</sup>quot;Que o português sem tristezas Se defenda do alemão Nas colónias Portuguesas Porque não!!!

<sup>18 &</sup>quot;(...) que os ingleses que nos estão a enganar e que o que desejam é poupar a sua gente."

officers prepared the revolution that would defeat the war policy and give power to Sidónio Pais. In that period, the monarchists' intervention and propaganda against the war reached its highest peak.

The truth is that Dom Manuel and the leading figures in the Monarchist Cause, such as Aires de Ornelas, supported the interventionist policy of the Republic. The proallies could not, however, stop the predominant pro-German feeling amongst the rank and file. The most revolutionary section of the Monarchist Cause included Luís de Magalhães, José de Azevedo Castelo Branco, the Visconde de Azevedo and the Visconde do Banho, amongst many others. Abroad, in Spain, the dominant group was the one led by Paiva Couceiro and the influential "miguelista" sector, drawing up plans for the restoration of the monarchy (Santos, 2010: 343-345). Internally, the subversive group linked to the *O Liberal* newspaper, edited by António Teles de Vasconcelos was the one that stood out, consisting of men like António Cabral, Fernando Lindoso, António Costa Pinto and Eurico Satúrio Pires, Paiva Couceiro's officer in Galicia. Besides publishing his chronicles against belligerence, the group maintained an intense subversive activity, producing and handing out pamphlets and flyers against the Republic and the war.

One of the most controversial flyers of the counterpropaganda campaign appeared at that time: the Rol da Deshonra (Roll of dishonor). As was known, during that period, from time to time the press would print a "Rol da Honra" (Roll of honor), giving an account of the Portuguese casualties in Flanders (A Capital, nr. 2592, 06-11-1917, p. 1). The liberal group responded to this public homage to the victims of war by publishing a 14-page flyer, called the Rol da Deshonra. The flyer circulated clandestinely throughout the country and was allegedly written by an officer in the trenches. Dated September, 1917, it revealed the position of the armies in the trench warfare, separated by the so-called "no man's land", and organized by the lines of infantry, artillery and the logistical and command backup. The infantry was described as "the zone shelled at the front by the mortars from the enemy trenches, swept by the machine guns and bombarded at the rear by the artillery. It is the zone over which death hovers<sup>19</sup>". This first zone of death contrasted with the "large area of the capaxins (toadies or bootlickers)", where it was "impossible to hear the sibilant sound of a bullet": "That is where the general lives surrounded by incompetent bootlickers whose mission is to get fat and have the illusion of an easy life, with a car to drive around in, taking tea at five o'clock and with music being played in front of their house. Also to be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> " (...) a zona batida na frente pelos morteiros das trincheiras inimigas, rasada pelas metralhadoras e batida à retaguarda pela artilharia. É a zona onde paira a morte."

found there are all the groups – sons from good families, heirs and princes, *embuscados* (men in reserved occupations or "cushy jobs"), whose mission consisted of setting the example of coming to the front, but, of course, to the "toadies' front", and who do not know what danger is, unless they are having a nightmare caused by indigestion<sup>20</sup>".

The Rol da Deshonra was an important piece of propaganda against the republican rulers, accused of sending Portuguese soldiers to their deaths while the republican officers were given safe military posts in the rear. The flyer's goal was described in the document: "to clarify the future with the role played by the heroic interpreters, who in Portugal have shown such capability to fight for freedom, the rule of law and justice and have so enthusiastically volunteered to take part in such a disinterested war<sup>21</sup>" (Rol da Deshonra, p. 5). The flyer records for posterity the name of the "capaxins", republican officers who came "to make war sitting at their tables in the office, or driving along the roads of France in a speedy car". Amongst these officers were the names of many soldiers who enjoyed close links with the Democratic Party and occupied the leading positions at the headquarters of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps: Roberto Batista, Fernando Freiria, Pires Monteiro, Helder Ribeiro, Vitorino Magalhães, Vitorino Godinho, Pina Lopes, Sá Cardoso, Álvaro Poppe, among others. This was the group of "young Turks", responsible for directing the Republic's war policy, along with Norton de Matos. But the Rol da Deshonra did not vilify only the republican officers, whom it accused of avoiding the dangerous trenches. It also listed the names of the sons of the main republican leaders, such as Afonso Costa, Bernardino Machado, Leotte do Rego and Sousa Rosa, who were placed by the Government in safe positions well away from the trenches. Just to give an example: Bernardino Machado's son was named as an adjutant at the headquarters of the 1st division, while Sebastião Costa, a sapper officer, was appointed as the interpreter at the headquarters.

Reality or fiction? The commander of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps, General Tamagnini Barbosa, wrote that this image was a common one in Lisbon. Tamagnini confirms that there were officers who did nothing more than "having fun", contrasting with a "minority of great officers": "There was a little of everything: [-] officers

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> "Ahi vive o general rodeado de capaxins incompetentes cuja missão é engordar e ter a ilusão primeira duma vida desafogada, com automóvel para passear, chá das cinco e música a dar concerto em frente de casa. Há ainda os agregados todos, filhos família, príncipes herdeiros, embuscados, cuja missão consiste em dar o exemplo da vinda para o front, mas bem entendido, o «*front capaxinal»*, e que não sabem o que é o perigo, a não ser em pesadelo de noite de indigestão."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> " (...) esclarecer o futuro com o papel desempenhado pelas heróicas línguas, que em Portugal tanto souberam combater pela liberdade, direito e justiça e tão briosamente se ofereceram para tomar parte em tão desinteressada guerra."

who spent their time having fun; those who engaged in politics, considering this to be their main function; those who sought out every opportunity to skive off work; those who did their job unsatisfactorily, without any energy, some through a lack of interest, and others through a lack of military education, and because they were riddled with bad habits acquired in performing the demoralized service provided by the garrison<sup>22</sup>, (Marques, 2004: LXXVII). Apparently, despite the natural exaggeration used in this sort of literature, there was a glimmer of truth to be found in a pamphlet that was already circulating throughout the country by the end of 1917.

After the intervention of the authorities, who made use of an undercover agent, the O Liberal newspaper was closed and some of the men responsible for it were expelled from Portugal. However, by that time, the December revolution was already in progress, which would bring to power a strange coalition of forces that had opposed the Republic's war policy. Counterpropaganda, together with economic and social difficulties, had successfully produced an effect, creating an even wider gap between public opinion and the republican governments. In part, "Sidonismo" was a political phenomenon generated by the anti-interventionist sector (Meneses, 2000) and it opened the doors of the Republic to both moderates and enemies. The first were deluded with the idea of authoritarian presidentialism, while the latter were obsessed with the idea of restoration (Santos, 2003).

# Conclusion

The propaganda directed against the war demonstrates how well the Republic's adversaries had taken advantage of the ambiguities of the official discourse and had turned the absence of an official propaganda strategy to their favor. Counterpropaganda spread the message that the war was unlawful, as it did not serve national interests, which proved that this was neither a fair nor a necessary war. Its role was to shape a public opinion that was opposed to the Great War and to promote a climate of civil unrest, thus undermining the State's capacity for mobilization and the chances of its obtaining the necessary consensus. As far as the means that were used to spread the propaganda were concerned, and because of the limitations imposed by censorship, counterpropaganda mainly made use of the pamphlet and the manifesto, seeking to persuade public opinion that the war was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> "Houve de tudo: [-] oficiais que se divertiram; os que faziam política, considerando ser isso a sua principal função; os que procuravam todos os meios de fugir ao serviço; os que cumpriam pouco satisfatoriamente, sem energia, uns por falta de vontade, e outros de educação militar, e por estarem eivados de vícios adquiridos no desmoralizado serviço de guarnicão."

nothing more than a business, and arousing a fear of death amongst the mobilized troops. While it is certain that counterpropaganda could not take advantage of the modern media that are now available to address and reach the masses, it nonetheless seems evident that the resources that were used, as well as the subversive context in which they were used, can serve to explain the capacity of penetration of the monarchist revolutionary sectors and their allies against the Great War.

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
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# Appendix 1



Cartoon by Jorge Colaço about the reaction of Bernardino Machado's government to the war, in *O Thalassa*, nr. 73, 13-08-1914 (Caption: The best prize that could have befallen the election ticket)

# Appendix 2

# Assembleia geral da pancadaria O marroquino para o companheiro i E nós é que somos selvagens...

Cartoon by Jorge Colaço about the violence of the Great War, in O Thalassa, nr. 73, 13-08-1914, pp. 4-5. (Caption: The Moroccan turns to his companion and says: "And they say that we are savages...")

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# The People in Arms in the People's Entertainment: Cinema and Political Propaganda in Portugal (1916–1917)

Helena Pinto Janeiro<sup>1</sup>

# Abstract

This article seeks to contribute to the historiographical debate on First World War propaganda in Portugal. The fact that it was precisely during this war that the first official body concerned with film production appeared (the Photographic and Cinematographic Section of the Army, SFCE) is a strong indication that the First Republic kept pace with the most innovatory aspects of this conflict in the various belligerent countries. In fact, it was precisely at this time that official bodies devoted to cinema appeared in countries such as Great Britain, France and Germany. We start by studying the pioneering experiment in film which made the people in arms the protagonists in the people's entertainment, in the context of a military and propaganda exercise conducted by the Minister of War, Norton de Matos, in the summer of 1916. The success of this first film was so great that the captain who produced it was asked to set up the SFCE, in time to film the embarkation of the first troops for France, in January 1917. As well as clarifying the origins, objectives and more institutional aspects of the SFCE, which previously had remained obscure, the article presents data about the exhibition and the public reception of films produced by this unit.

# Keywords

World War I; Republic; War Culture; Propaganda; Cinema; Portugal

# Resumo

Este artigo pretende ser um contributo para o debate historiográfico sobre propaganda durante a I Guerra Mundial em Portugal. O facto de ter sido precisamente durante esta guerra que surge o primeiro organismo oficial de produção cinematográfica – a Secção Fotográfica e Cinematográfica do Exército (SFCE) – é um forte indício de que a I República não terá passado ao lado das tendências mais inovadoras que marcaram esse conflito nos vários países beligerantes. Afinal, é precisamente nessa altura que surgem na Grã-Bretanha, em França ou na Alemanha os primeiros órgãos oficiais dedicados ao cinema. Começámos por estudar a experiência pioneira do filme que colocou o povo em armas como protagonista do espectáculo do povo, no âmbito da operação militar e de propaganda promovida pelo ministro da Guerra Norton de Matos no Verão de 1916. O sucesso da fita foi de tal ordem que o capitão que a produziu será chamado para montar a SFCE, mesmo a tempo de filmar o embarque das primeiras tropas para França, em Janeiro de 1917. Para além da clarificação das origens, objectivos e

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aspectos mais institucionais da SFCE até agora incertos, apresentam-se dados sobre a exibição e recepção pública dos filmes nele produzidos.

# Palavras-chave

I Guerra Mundial, República, Cultura de Guerra, Propaganda, Cinema, Portugal

# Introduction

In this article<sup>2</sup>, I examine the use of cinema as political propaganda during the First World War by the Minister of War, José Norton de Matos<sup>3</sup>. My aim is to identify the first time that an official Portuguese body attempted its own cinematic production and to discuss the role of this inaugural experiment in the context of the most ambitious propaganda operation carried out by any Republican government during the war, namely Operation Tancos. An attempt will then be made to clarify when, how, for whom, and for what ends the first government organization concerned with cinematic production, the Photographic and Cinematographic Section of the Army (SFCE), was created in Portugal.

The fact that hardly any of the earliest films produced by the Portuguese State (in 1916 and 1917) have survived led me to adopt an approach based on the exhibition of the films and their public reception, with respect both to the public showings in Lisbon and Porto and to the private showings made to people in key positions for negotiating the mechanics of the Portuguese military collaboration with the Allies on the western front.

While it was in the course of this war that we first saw "the world-wide 20th century shift to massive state participation in the manipulation of public opinion" (Messinger, 1993: 117), this was a shift that took place at varying paces and on varying scales in the different belligerent countries. In Portugal, state investment in war propaganda is generally considered to have been insignificant (Meneses, 2000: 81-96), which seems to be confirmed by its poor results: with the exception of some elites, the governments of the First Republic were unable to win over the Portuguese to the war cause. However, some writers have claimed that state investment in this area should not be dismissed (Sousa, 2011: 94-99). To date, however, there has been no exhaustive work devoted to this topic either reflecting the more specialized studies produced on the occasion of the recent centenary of the Republic or taking an in-depth look at the material that still remains to be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> I am grateful for the help I received in researching this article from Captain Carlos Prada of the Army Audio-visual Center (CAVE), Dr Sara Moreira, of the National Moving Picture Archive (ANIM), the team that organized the Cinema and Debate Cycle of the exhibition *Portugal in the Trenches: The Republic's First World War* (Lisbon, 2010), and the filmmaker Joana Pontes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Norton de Matos (1867-1955) was Minister of War from July 22, 1915, to December 8, 1917, in four successive governments, being responsible for the preparation of the Portuguese Expeditionary Force (*Corpo Expedicionário Português* – CEP). The CEP fought on the western front, integrated into the British Army, from the beginning of 1917 onwards.

investigated. This is the case, for example, with the SFCE, whose history still remains to be written.<sup>4</sup>

At the time, the frontiers between propaganda and information were remarkably fluid. Propaganda was often synonymous with the idea of informing or making public, rather than controlling or manipulating. The need for "measures of a moral nature designed to prepare public opinion for participation in the European war" was, nevertheless, defended by Portuguese intellectuals, such as the parliamentary deputy, Jaime Cortesão, himself the author of a propaganda pamphlet aimed at the soldier. In his view, as in that of many intellectuals in France and Great Britain who worked as committed propagandists, it was not a matter of manipulation, but rather of "preparing the opinion" of the public to "participate". The crux of the question was the just nature of the cause, and that was defended above all by going to fight.

What was most important was the fact of Portugal's going to war — that is, having an army in a position to join the war taking place in the European theater, and actually doing so. Once this had been achieved, the propaganda could be considered to have been successful, precisely because fact was the best possible propaganda. This argument was defended by the head of the Portuguese government, António José de Almeida, in reply to an intervention by Cortesão two months after Germany declared war on Portugal. If the "two types of propaganda are useful," he said, "propaganda by way of fact is always the better one".<sup>6</sup>

The proposition that facts speak for themselves is, of course, itself a form of propaganda,<sup>7</sup> and one that was quickly employed by Cortesão himself. A few months later, we see him praising the virtues of propaganda, and of the man who embodied it, the minister Norton de Matos (Cortesão 1919: 25). It was not by chance that he did this at the end of the summer of 1916, following an event that exemplified the concept in Portugal. This *fact* was the mobilization, transport and military training of tens of thousands in a training camp in the middle of the country, the military polygon of Tancos, constituted for that purpose as a city of "wood and canvas". After just three months of training, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The importance of the creation of this section has, however, been underlined by Ribeiro (1983: 186) and Sousa (2011: 98). In a recent study, Tiago Baptista gives little importance to this body, even considering that there was "a divorce between cinema and the Republic" (Baptista, 2012: 455).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Jaime Cortesão, in *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados (DCD)*, May 20, 1916: 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Almeida did, however, agree that initiatives of a moral nature designed to transform "the condition of the Portuguese soul with regard to the war" were necessary, particularly because it was not Portugal that was under attack, with the exception of the distant Portuguese colonies in Africa (*DCD*, May 20, 1916: 11-12).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> This assertion is itself highly characteristic of British propaganda. Regarding the subjectivity and objectivity of the modern fact, see Wollaeger (2006: 22-24).

impoverished Portuguese army was revived, drawing for its raw material on a mass of civilians from the interior of Portugal, mostly rural and illiterate, and of dubious republican leanings. The achievement was immediately dubbed the "Miracle of Tancos", celebrated both as a civil liturgy of republicanism, drawing on and appropriating traditional Catholic imagery, and as evidence of the modernity of the Republic.<sup>8</sup>

A similar dialogue between the vernacular and the modern took place in cinema in that decade. Certainly, a properly modernist aesthetic was to be found in Portuguese cinematography only much later, in the late 1920s and early 1930s. However, as James Donald remarks, "the modernism of cinema, as well as its modernity, may be found just as much in the vernacular experience of cinema as in supposedly modernist films" (Donald, 2010: 514). The cultural practice of going to the cinema, as a mass entertainment, was also a new form of acculturation for the soldiers at the front.

However, a methodological approach focusing on war culture is hindered by the lack of any historical studies of the SFCE. This is an obstacle that affects the study of other institutions of the First Republic, and one that prevents us from tackling war culture without, at the same time, engaging in a study of the institutional and political framework (Correia, 2011: 31). It is for this reason that significant space is devoted in this study to clearing up elements such as the date of the creation of the new organization and the context in which it appeared, its objectives, and the themes of the films produced.

After a first section in which I shall try to situate the Portuguese experience in its context, an analysis is then made of the initial experiment that, in the summer of 1916, placed the Miracle of Tancos on the screen, followed by an analysis of the SFCE in its first year of operation.

# 1. The creation of the first official cinematic organizations in the belligerent countries

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> On civic Republican religion, see Catroga (2010); on the birth of the Miracle of Tancos as a propaganda theme, see Janeiro (2010); and on the achievements that led to this designation, namely the political and military operation that allowed the Portuguese army to fight in the European theater of war, see Teixeira (1998), Meneses (2000) and Fraga (2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> "Until then [...], and during the whole of the First Republic, cinema still lacked that modernist legitimization" (Baptista, 2012: 462).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> However, cinema only became a mass phenomenon in Portugal in the 1920s (Costa, 1983: 23).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> For many of them, going to the cinema was a recent experience that became a habit precisely behind the lines, during breaks from combat (Ferro, 1999: 303).

Although it was not the first time that moving images had been used in the context of military conflict, 12 the First World War was the first truly mediatized war in history (Véray, 2008: 28). Cinema became a mass industry at the same time as war, too, became a mass phenomenon, a total experience that affected an unprecedented number of people, both military and civilian, belligerent and neutral. By being a late entrant into the war (March 1916), Portugal was to benefit from the steps already taken by the other belligerent nations, for whom the use of cinema had not seemed to be an immediate priority at the outbreak of the conflict (Véray, 2008: 30). First it was necessary, amongst other things, to overcome the prejudices of the leading elites, for whom cinema was a vulgar, not to say disreputable, form of entertainment that was more to the taste of the popular classes (Reeves, 1999: 23).

The tremendous potential of cinematography was in time recognized by the principal belligerents, who invested in the creation of organizations for the production of films, particularly newsreel. In January 1917, in the same month that the SFCE was formed in Lisbon, a *Section photographique et cinématographique de l'armée* was established in France. This section was formed from two separate organizations, concerned with photography and cinema respectively, but the change was not merely bureaucratic. Instead, it symbolized the French government's desire to start its own cinematographic production, rather than limiting itself to working with the major film companies, as had been the case with the former *Section cinématographique de l'armée*.

In Great Britain, an official body dedicated to wartime films, the *War Office Cinema Committee* (*WOCC*), had been formed shortly before this, in the last quarter of 1916, as had the German *Militärische Film- und Photostelle* (Military Film and Photo Office). The latter body emerged in November of that year to supervise filming related to the war, being transformed in early 1917 into a new *Bild- und Filmamt* (Picture and Film Office), under the joint control of the Army High Command and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While Germany showed no hesitation in publicly acknowledging its commitment to cinema as a weapon of war, Britain preferred to conceal its involvement in propaganda. The creation of the *WOCC* nevertheless preceded the formation of an official propaganda body for the home front by a year and a half, since, by focusing on the production of newsreel, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> In 1898, they had been used in the Spanish-American War in Cuba (Vincenot, 2008).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> This does not mean that British investment in war propaganda had not been quite considerable since the outbreak of war. In fact, such investment took place on an unprecedented scale, going far beyond the bodies that the public was then aware of. Initially, the focus was on foreign propaganda aimed at the neutral countries, especially the US, seeking to persuade public opinion there that the nation should enter the war on the side of the Allies.

government could maintain the impression that it was portraying reality, and not producing propaganda as such (Reeves, 1999: 22-23).

# 2. The first experiment: the Miracle of Tancos in film

In Portugal, the Ministry of War headed by Major Norton de Matos started to invest in producing propaganda for cinema, even before it was agreed that Portugal should enter the European theater of war, and not simply — as its old ally, Britain, wished — send workers and war materials to France, while confining its troops to the African theater, on the two fronts in Angola and Mozambique.

In the first phase, cinema produced at the government's initiative had a double objective. On the one hand, it sought to exhibit the people in arms at private showings for key foreign figures, and to promote the Portuguese government's desire to send troops to Flanders. On the other hand, it sought to exhibit the people in arms to those who went to the cinema, which was still insecure in its social status. In fact, in the 1910s, the showing of films was a cheap form of entertainment, generally conducted in premises constructed for other purposes, and not greatly favored by the upper classes, who tended to disdain it.

With the training at Tancos, and particularly the military parade that took place on July 22 1916 in the neighboring camps at Montalvo, the people "now have their theater, which is indispensable for the crowd. The People only learn by looking" (Cortesão, 1919: 25). The parade impressed the country and for a moment silenced those who opposed participation in the European war. In fact, more than being just a piece of theater, the operation at Tancos was set up by Norton de Matos' ministry as a massive cinematic production, and the protagonists of the production were the people themselves. The people in arms were considered a collective personality, embodied in the 20,000 Portuguese who paraded in order to show Portugal and the world that the Portuguese Republic was in a position to fight in Flanders. The parade was recorded in two cinematic productions, one being an initiative of the Ministry of War, and the other being the work of a private company based in Porto, *Invicta Film*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The parade at Montalvo was the most spectacular manifestation of the "people in arms" into which the Portuguese army wished to transform itself after the foundation of the Republic, although not dispensing with a professional military force. On the concept of "the people in the cinema" in the double sense (on the screen as characters, and in the theater as the audience), see Baptista 2010.

The production by *Invicta Film*, in two parts, was entitled "The Portuguese Mobilization at Tancos". It was premièred on August 3 1916 at the Salão Teatro Passos Manuel, in Porto, and was advertised in the press that morning as being an "impressive patriotic spectacle" and a "cinematic event of the most sensational and exciting topicality". To some extent, this made amends for the absence of journalists from Porto at the parade, because there had not been enough takers for the special train that the Ministry of War had tried to organize, along the lines of the one that came from Lisbon.

The next day, the Porto morning paper *O Primeiro de Janeiro* judged the double showing of the previous evening to have been a success, with an attendance of:

several hundred people. The tickets sold out completely. And no one failed to praise the clarity of the picture and the splendid way it had been employed. It is without doubt the best Portuguese cinematic film that has been seen here. Furthermore, there is a certain pride in seeing that the Portuguese soldier in no way disgraces the glorious traditions of our warrior of old, and that he may well match the heights to which his name has been raised, in the present war. As we know, the training division at Tancos was composed of 20,000 men; and the film launched yesterday, which is 1,200 meters long, splendidly reproduces all the details of life on campaign, giving an exact and very clear idea of those exercises undertaken at the vast military concentration camp.

("A divisão militar em Tancos Um 'film' sensacional", O Primeiro de Janeiro, August 4, 1916: 2)

# And it continued, emphasizing:

the interest and enthusiasm amongst the public to see the screening of a magnificent and impressive film of the most burning topicality [...] the audience felt thrilled by the sight of that magnificent avalanche of men, all well-disciplined soldiers, undertaking splendid exercises.

(TEATROS [...] Jardim Passos Manuel. O Primeiro de Janeiro, August 4, 1916: 3)

Shortly afterwards, two other cinemas in Porto, the Salão da Trindade and the High Life-Batalha, announced the exhibition of another film about the same military events. The "Great military parade in Montalvo", also presented as "Military exercises at Tancos", was to be:

a faithful reproduction of the recent military maneuvers [...] an admirable *film* specially commissioned by the Ministry of War, directed and supervised by a distinguished army officer [...]

Its exhibition was authorized by the respective Minister, as a way of publicizing the progress that has been made in military matters by our armies.

(Grande Parada [...]. O Primeiro de Janeiro, August 11, 1916: 2)

Here the stamp of approval from the Ministry is offered as further guarantee of its authenticity. In fact, the announcement in *Primeiro de Janeiro* claims that it is the "only [film] not to contain worthless material", in what amounts to a clear rebuke to the rival documentary from *Invicta Film*. It had been specially commissioned by the Ministry from the retired captain Carlos Nogueira Ferrão (1871-1938), <sup>15</sup> and was shot by an operator from the Laboratory of Portuguese Cinematographic Films, Ernesto de Albuquerque (1833-1940).

Recently retired from the army, Ferrão was an enthusiast not only of the still image but also of the moving image, having taken part, since 1912, in the management of a film distribution company (the Companhia Cinematográfica de Portugal), and eventually becoming the owner of a film theater in Lisbon. The choice of Albuquerque, in turn, was a guarantee of success from the outset, bearing in mind the impact of his first film, made in 1909, about cocoa production in São Tomé, commissioned by the Lisbon Geographic Society. There was at the time a heated international controversy over the alleged use of Angolan slave labor for cocoa production in the Portuguese colony of São Tomé, known in Portugal as "A Questão dos Serviçais" (the Contract Labor Question), and in the Anglo-Saxon world as the "cocoa slave" scandal. It was most likely the controversy, rather than

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> "A historic day in Tancos. The parade of the Training Division". República, July 23, 1916: 1. On Ferrão, see the Arquivo Histórico-Militar (AHU), Caixa 2396, and Ribeiro (1973: 82).

the exotic colonial setting, that guaranteed Albuquerque's film a wide audience. According to the magazine *Cine-Revista*, it had been "shown on the world's principal screens". <sup>16</sup>

Being about a matter that was of considerable interest, the Tancos film was shown in the largest theater in Lisbon at that time, the Coliseu dos Recreios, on August 10, 1916. It appeared under the title of "Infantry, cavalry and artillery exercises by the Tancos Military Division", and was considered by a Lisbon evening paper to be:

[...] a remarkable national *film*: an admirably complete sequence of the different aspects of the Tancos Division on the occasion of the recent period of training.

Nothing better is produced abroad. The perfection of the technical work demonstrates that Portuguese cinematic operators can produce works that are as good as those made anywhere in the world [...]. The *film* is excellent, the scenes well chosen, the clarity of the projection simply unsurpassable. Anyone who did not witness the extraordinary efforts of our army at the scene itself can form a very complete idea of it from the film's showing at the Colyseu.

It remains only to say that the public literally filled the huge auditorium, and repeatedly showed their gratitude and their patriotism by prolonged and lively applause.

(As manobras em Tancos: O "film" do Colyseu. *A Capital*, August 11, 1916: 2)

Although we do not know in full the theaters at which the two films were shown, or the audiences they received, we can see that they were exhibited with great success in major cinemas in at least two of the country's principal cities, in the context of what constituted, at that time, the most complex military operation ever undertaken in Portugal. The operation was a major event, whose potential for public entertainment and commercial success was recognized by a private company such as *Invicta Film*, which was already positioning itself as the most important film production company in the country. Concomitantly, it was one of the different vehicles through which the Ministry of War

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> F. Gomes de Sousa, "Ernesto d'Albuquerque", *Cine-Revista*, n. Ano IV – nr. 44, November 15, 1920: 1-2. Norton de Matos, who to some extent owed his entry into Republican politics to his opposition in the press, in 1910, to slavery-like practices in the cocoa plantations of São Tomé, would certainly have known and admired the film.

recorded and simultaneously *created* the Miracle of Tancos (Janeiro, 2010). Moving pictures thus took their place alongside another medium of modern propaganda, also employed by the Ministry: the still picture, or photograph. In fact, the Ministry did not simply authorize the work of photojournalists from the Portuguese press, but also engaged a civilian photographer (Arnaldo Garcês) to make an official feature about Tancos (Vicente, 2000).<sup>17</sup>

Less than two minutes' footage survives of the film that was made at Tancos. This was integrated into Pathé's *Journal Actualité* and the *Hearst Pathé News* the following year<sup>18</sup>, when the Portuguese troops in France had effectively been incorporated into the British army. There are thirty-five meters of film, which does not allow for a very detailed analysis of the content.<sup>19</sup> In the first part, Portuguese troops cross a pontoon of boats at Vila Nova da Barquinha, and hundreds of soldiers march in a column on the Montalvo plain. After scenes of trench digging, it is the turn of the cavalry, first seen crossing the plain in formation, and then performing exercises on uneven terrain and crossing a river. In the later scenes, we see troops marching to a railway station, accompanied by civilians, and the departure of the train, full of soldiers waving their handkerchiefs to the civilians on the platform. The intertitles added to the version of the newsreel seen in the US, by arrangement with Pathé, underscore the moving images on the screen: "The young Republic is supplying its quota of men to the Allied Armies and thousands of recruits prepare for duty."

We have no way of knowing if the images in the Pathé newsreel were taken from the *Invicta* film or from that made by the Ministry. Both possibilities are plausible. On the one hand, *Invicta Film* had a contract with *Pathé* and *Gaumont* to supply images of Portuguese news to France (Ribeiro, 1983: 71). It would not be surprising, therefore, if images from the *Invicta* film had been integrated into the newsreel produced in France. On the other hand, we know that at the end of 1916 the minister at the Portuguese Legation in Paris, João Chagas, urged Norton de Matos to have the film exhibited in France, thereby capitalizing for propaganda purposes on the interest amongst the French media in the imminent disembarkation of Portuguese troops in France (ANM, letter from João Chagas

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> The propaganda operation also involved the press. Although the Ministry of War was somewhat amateurish in its handling of journalists — even resulting in their making a formal complaint to the President of the Republic — the truth is that the press was completely won over by the Miracle of Tancos (Janeiro, 2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Gaumont Pathé Archives (GPA), Journal Actualité Pathé/Hearst Pathé News, 1917 117/ 16384, *Contingent portugais*, 1917, 01:41 min., B&W, silent, accessed May 12, 2013, at http://www.gaumontpathearchives.com.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> We have no information about the length of the original film made by the War Ministry. We conclude, however, from press reports that, it cannot have been much longer than the 1200 meters of its rival made by *Invicta Film* ("A divisão militar em Tancos. Um 'film' sensacional." *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, August 4, 1916, p. 2).

to Norton de Matos, Paris, December 18, 1916, MS, signed). In any case, the images were shown in France, the United States, and very probably in Great Britain, <sup>20</sup> thus contributing to the propaganda about the Portuguese war effort abroad.

In Portugal, as well as being shown to the general public in cinemas, the film produced for Norton de Matos was shown to important foreign figures at private sessions. These included Major-General Nathaniel Barnardiston (1858-1919), head of the Franco-British military mission that came to Portugal on August 30, 1916, to negotiate the conditions under which Portugal should participate in the war effort on the western front. Shortly after arriving, he was invited to accompany the Minister of War at a private showing with films from the Tancos camp, which he considered to be "very good" (KCL-LHCMA, Barnardiston Papers, Barnardiston: 3/3, [Diary] 1916, MS). Two days later, in an official report to the War Office, he made a favorable overall assessment of the meetings that had taken place, and of the visits effected by the mission that he led:

Both I and my French colleagues have been impressed by the energy and systematic manner in which the Portuguese Military Authorities are working at strengthening and developing their military resources. Great attention is being paid to training, as well as to the adequate equipment of the Expeditionary Force and the accumulation of supplies in ammunition (inasmuch as production will allow) and equipment.

It is not possible to give a very definite opinion on the qualities of the Portuguese Army after such a short acquaintance. I can only give my impression, gathered from the opportunities already mentioned. They are, on the whole, distinctly favorable, and I see no reason why the Portuguese Expeditionary Force should not, after further training, be of considerable use. [...] it would be unwise not to take advantage of such assistance as they are ready to give. They will certainly be able to supply one reinforced division and perhaps two, with a third Division in reserve in Portugal [...]. (NA-UK, WO/106/546, General remarks. Official report by N.W. Barnardiston to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lisbon, September 15, 1916)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> This is likely to have been the case since French newsreels dominated the British market (Reeves, 1999: 32).

These words are particularly significant, bearing in mind that they were written barely two weeks after Barnardiston had arrived in Lisbon with precise instructions from the War Office to persuade the Portuguese authorities to restrict their participation in the war to the African front, sending to the European front only workers and war material, and never, in any circumstances, troops. That the British officer should have changed his position so significantly, after just a few days, was surely not related only to the fact that he did not wish to be outflanked by the French, who did not conceal their interest in bringing Portuguese troops into the heart of their own army. His contacts with the Portuguese troops — not only at official meetings and in visits to various military establishments, but also by way of the documentary film of the maneuvers at Tancos — must certainly have contributed to the marked improvement in Barnardiston's impression of the value of the Portuguese army since his arrival in Lisbon.

We see, then, that the commissioning by the Ministry of War of a documentary film of the military maneuvers at Tancos was an integral part of the propaganda exercise mounted by the War Minister, Norton de Matos, to demonstrate that the Portuguese army was ready to fight in France. The official film from Tancos was also used to strengthen his position in negotiations with the allies over the nature and scale of Portugal's participation in the Flanders theater of war. The private showings on this diplomatic front were held in parallel to the public screenings on the Portuguese cinema circuit. The fact that the most important commercial cinema company in the country, based in Porto, had also made a film about Tancos, specifically of the July 22 parade, and that they had both been a success at the box office, shows the eagerness of the Portuguese public to see the war on the screen, even when, as here, it had not moved from the war games conducted in training camps to the real war in the trenches.

# 3. Institutionalization: the Photographic and Cinematographic Section of the Army in the year of its foundation

The commission given by Norton de Matos to Captain Ferrão in the summer of 1916 started out as an isolated experiment related to an exceptional event. Having had such good results, the Minister decided to take the next step, creating, through his order of January 12, 1917,<sup>21</sup> an organization capable of producing its own films: the Photographic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Reference to the ministerial order, the original copy of which cannot be located, was made in the 1919 decree that transformed the SFCE into a body with "initiative, autonomy and its own funding", namely the Army's Directorate of Graphic Services (Decree nr. 5.935, of June 28, 1919 in *Diário do Governo (DG)*, I Série,

and Cinematographic Section of the Army (SFCE). Once again, the timing is not accidental, as this date fell just two weeks before the Portuguese Expeditionary Force (CEP) was set to sail from Lisbon to Flanders, on board three British steamships.

On January 17, five days after the order creating the SFCE, Captain Ferrão received an urgent summons to active military service from the Minister of War. Two days later, he found himself engaged with the 4th Department of the 1st General Staff of the War Secretariat, working on the setting up of the new section devoted to photography and cinema, under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Desidério Beça (AHM, Cx. 2396). One of the first films to be produced under this new arrangement was the embarkation of Portuguese troops for France.<sup>22</sup>

The Department headed by Beça had a decidedly educational role, given that it was in charge of all matters related to the training establishments under the supervision of the Ministry of War and the organization of Preparatory Military Training.<sup>23</sup> For an army that was in the throes of a paradigm shift, transforming itself into a nation-in-arms while still maintaining a professional force, it was essential to provide instruction to the civilians engaged in military service. In general, education in republican values, both for civilians and career soldiers, was vital for the consolidation of the young Republican regime. Furthermore, the great value of a medium such as cinema in the education of soldiers had already been recognized by officers' associations in Lisbon, such as the Military Fraternity, which had been providing training sessions for this purpose in a Lisbon cinema since 1914.<sup>24</sup>

It is not surprising, then, that it was the educational aspect that was highlighted by the cinephile press when it reported that the SFCE had set up provisional headquarters in

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N° 130, July 4, 1919). In the preamble to this law, it is unequivocally affirmed that Decree 4.214, of April 13, 1918, signed by Sidónio Pais and which created the SFCE, merely "ratified" an already existing body, created on January 12 of the previous year, with precisely that same designation: SFCE.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> The film entitled "Embarkation of Portuguese troops", dealing with the first embarkation of January 26 or the following one, on February 23, was part of the first batch of productions made by the new body during its first three months of existence (Cf. Arquivo Norton de Matos (ANM), D. Beça, "Programa para a inauguração das primeiras fitas da Secção Fotografica e Cinematografica do Exército", April 1, 1917, typescript, signed). Unlike the film of the embarkation, the film of the troops disembarking in France actually did survive. Filmed by operators from Pathé, it was shown in their newsreel Journal Actualité. The version for the North American public followed, in the name of Hearst Pathé News, with explanatory intertitles: "Somewhere in France. Another contingent of Portuguese troops arrives in France, ready to do its share for the common cause." (GPA, Journal Actualité Pathé / Hearst Pathé News, 1917 297/ 16562, Contingent 00:52 accessed 1917, secs, B&W, silent, on May 12, http://www.gaumontpathearchives.com).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> As well as other matters related to military justice, in accordance with the decree with the force of law of May 25, 1911, which reorganized the army, in *DG*, nr. 122, of May 26, 1911.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> "Assisted by the company Salão Central [the officers] have greatly contributed to this [the education of the soldier] by promoting cinema sessions at which they show films related to army matters." ("A educação militar pelo cinematógrafo", *Ilustração Portuguesa*, II Série, n° 427, 27 April 1914, p. 540).

Lisbon. While the cinema could also serve to entertain the soldier during his rest periods, it should above all educate him as a citizen, instilling in him a love for his country, so as to be better able to defend it against the enemy:

The usefulness of cinematography is being increasingly confirmed and recognized. Now it is the Minister of War, Mr Norton de Mattos, who has taken the initiative in organizing a cinematographic service, dealing with the nation's historical and military matters, and producing films to be shown to the Portuguese soldiers who are going to take part, in France, in the great European conflagration.

Entrusted with the task of organizing this special service is Lieutenant-Colonel Desidério Beça, who will try to make it as useful as possible, employing it both for the entertainment of the troops, when resting, and for our nation's propaganda amongst our English and French allies. It appears that the illustrious officer mentioned will organize films on matters that are characteristic of different regions of Portugal, with the aim of stimulating in the soldiers the love for their native soil, which they must defend against German ambition and aggression.

(A cinemathographia na guerra. Cine-Revista, nr. 1, March 15, 1917: 7)

After three months of operations, the SFCE had four documentary films ready: "Trials at the Military Aeronautical School and the launch of the gunship *Bengo*", "The fall of a Zeppelin", "Trials at the War School" and "Embarkation of the Portuguese troops". These were to be shown at a matinee performance to mark the official inauguration of the Section, <sup>25</sup> to take place, with due pomp and circumstance, at the São Carlos Theater, in Lisbon. <sup>26</sup> The ceremony was intended to coincide with the second anniversary of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> To this clutch of short films should also be added a fifth, entitled "Cities destroyed in France", which could hardly have been produced by the SFCE, since there is no indication that any Portuguese cameraman traveled with the troops to France.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> ANM, D. Beça, "Programa para a inauguração das primeiras fitas da Secção Fotografica e Cinematografica do Exército", April 1, 1917, typescript, signed.

revolution of May 14, 1915,<sup>27</sup> but did not take place because of a more pressing matter: the Minister's visit to France and England.<sup>28</sup>

If education was one of the main functions of the new official body devoted to cinema, it also had two further objectives: to create propaganda and to leave a record for the future. This was the triple aim of the SFCE, set out by the Minister of War in an order at the beginning of April: "that of constituting a historical archive," that of instruction, and that of propaganda for the military institutions".<sup>30</sup>

The aim of constituting a historical archive was closely linked to that of instructing the troops, seeking to provide "study elements for our military schools and army units, by way of photography and of still and moving projection".<sup>31</sup>

The Minister of War himself envisaged the creation of a historical record, and in May he gave the first instructions for the creation of a future Portuguese Museum of the Great War, which was formalized by a decree published in October.<sup>32</sup> In order "to perpetuate the memory of Portugal's armed intervention and to document, in the most complete way possible, the efforts of the nation and the political and military work of the Republic", he decided to gather together an extensive and varied list of objects. Amongst them were included "photographic and cinematographic records referring to the facts, aspects, incidents and propaganda of our military preparation and action". The following month, the general press in Lisbon, in assessing the cinematic production of the SFCE

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> This revolution, in which Norton de Matos took part, had sought to put an end to the non-interventionist government of General Pimento de Castro. In the mythology of the Democratic Party, to which Norton belonged, this event signified a reconsecration of the revolution of October 5, 1910 which had overthrown the monarchy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> On May 14, the Minister of War arrived in the French capital, where he signed a military convention with his counterpart, Paul Painlevé, and visited the Portuguese troops. The more important part of his trip, however, and the reason for its timing, was the visit to London that followed it. The trip was intended to resolve the vital question of the transportation of the CEP to France, which Great Britain had first promised to undertake, but now tried to relinquish. In London, Norton entered into difficult negotiations with Lloyd George's government to persuade it to honor its earlier promise to provide the necessary ships, for which the British Admiralty had other uses that it considered more pressing for the war effort. In the end, he achieved the agreement that he sought, although it was only a partial victory and turned out to be ephemeral.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> The creation of an archive of images for public memory was also an essential objective for the French institution of the same name (Véray, 2008: 39), with the difference that the images that the Section Photographique et Cinématographique de l'Armée filmed for its archive included images of the war itself, and not just of the preparatory exercises or events in the rear. Another difference, naturally, was the scale of the production: the quantity of film produced in France (where there was a tradition of regular newsreel production, prior to the war) far exceeded the modest output of the SFCE.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> In the order, the Minister further stipulates that the Section shall be free of any commercial concerns, and not have any "type of monopoly" (ANM, Despacho aposto ao "Programa…", as previously cited).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> "A Cinematographia Official", Cine-Revista, nr. 4, June 15, 1917: 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> The ministerial order entrusting Reserve General José Castelo Branco with the task of organizing the Portuguese Museum of the Great War is dated May 15, 1917, from Paris. (Cf. AD-MNE, Arquivo da Legação de Portugal em Londres, Maço 92). The creation of the museum was formalized by Decree nr. 3.468, of October 19, 1917, *DG*, I Série, N° 180, October 19, 1917.

since its creation, regarded it as being precisely a methodical effort in support of the Museum of the Great War and of a film archive for the purposes of military training.<sup>33</sup> Unhappily for the historian, Norton de Matos' decree was annulled shortly after the revolution of December 5 1917, which ushered in the dictatorship of Sidónio Pais.<sup>34</sup> His efforts to use films for public memory were thus thwarted.

Despite this, we can form an idea of the propaganda potential of the films produced by the Ministry of War's film unit in 1917 from the themes that they dealt with. As well as the military preparations themselves, they covered patriotic festivals which had a highly symbolic value in the Republican imagination. An example of this was the celebration organized by pupils at the Odivelas Institute, a boarding school for the daughters of the military, on June 10, the day of the national poet, Camões.<sup>35</sup>

The commemorations, in 1880, of the third centenary of the death of Camões had inaugurated a "nationalist-imperialist cycle" of commemorative civic liturgies (Catroga, 1998: 226), bringing the Republican masses into the streets. In 1917, with the Republic now a few years old and undergoing its baptism of fire in the war, the mobilizing power of the celebrations of the author of the national epic of the Discoveries, suitably republicanized, was not as great as in earlier times. Its evocative potential remained considerable, however, being used to reinforce the belief in an Allied victory, and with it a Portuguese victory. At the celebrations held on June 10, 1917, presided over by the Head of State, Bernardino Machado, and filmed by the SFCE, the girls of the school paraded with the flags of the Allied nations, wearing the regional costumes of these same countries. The anniversary of the Portuguese national poet was thus associated with the Allied troops at war, whose victory was declared in advance, since it was already called the "Victory Festival". In the postwar years, June 10 would become associated precisely with the memory of the war dead, and, more enduringly, would be transformed from a Lisbon festival into a national festival. <sup>36</sup> By filming the Camões celebrations, reinvented as a celebration of the Republican

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> "The Section is working methodically towards the creation of the museum of the great war and the historical archive, which will be properly classified, to facilitate educational use by our teaching establishments." (Secção Fotografica e Cinematografica do Exercito: Uma visita ás suas instalações provisorias. *Diário de Notícias*, November 9, 1917, p. 1). Apart from collections of artefacts, the museum was to have an archive and a library.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Decree nr. 3.920, of January 28, 1918, *DG*, I Série, N° 49, March 13, 1918.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> The event was filmed by the SFCE: cf. "A Cinematographia Official", *Cine-Revista*, nr. 4, June 15, 1917: 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Under the First Republic, June 10 started as a municipal holiday in Lisbon (from 1913 onwards), being celebrated, exceptionally, as a national holiday in 1920. In that year, it was decided that the day of the death of Camões would coincide with the day "dedicated to the inauguration of the municipal monuments in homage to the Portuguese who had died for the Fatherland in the Great War in Africa, in France, and at Sea" (Andrade, 2001: 76). In 1925, in the aftermath of the previous year's commemorations of the Fourth Centenary of the birth of Camões, June 10 was declared a national festival, called the "Festival of Portugal",

victory in the war, the SFCE was making propaganda by using an imagery that was not only Republican but national.<sup>37</sup>

The other films shown on the commercial circuit in Lisbon the following autumn were all related to events of a military nature taking place in the country. On October 19, in the Salão Trindade, the film "Final trials for trainees of the School of War" was premièred. At the end of the month, a further five "official films by the Portuguese Ministry of War" were premièred, this time in two Lisbon cinemas simultaneously, the Chiado Terrace and the Olympia: "Delivery of the flag of the city of Lisbon to the cruiser *Vasco da Gama*"; "Transport of troops for France"; "School for officers of the militia (Queluz)"; "Flying school in Vila Nova da Rainha"; and "Launch of the gunship *Bengo*". The cinephile press regarded them as "titles worthy of the national effort, which, in their attention to detail and as we have said above, are placed in absolutely competent hands" ("Filmes nacionais", *Cine-Revista*, Ano I - N° 9, November 15, 1917). Another film, this time about the oath to the flag at the School of War, was already planned for early exhibition at the Salão Central.

On October 25, the SFCE filmed the return to Lisbon from the Portuguese front in France of the President of the Republic, Bernardino Machado, accompanied by the Prime Minister, Afonso Costa. In the short four and a half-minute clip, there are no close-ups of the returning dignitaries, or of the civil and military authorities that, according to press reports, had attended the railway station in strength. The action takes place outside and the dignitaries are seen from a distance, with the principal role being given to the crowd. The film starts as the President and a number of ministers arrive at the exit to Rossio station and prepare to get into their carriages, escorted by a cavalry squadron of the Republican Guard, in full uniform. Facing them are hundreds of cadets on parade, from various military schools. The second scene takes place in the Dom Pedro square, where, lined by a large naval contingent with its own band, the cortege passes with its carriages

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also known from that time on as the "Festival of the Portuguese Race". It was only in 1929, under the military dictatorship, that the national festival of June 10 was also definitively established as a national holiday. In 1952, the Estado Novo established its name as the "Day of Portugal" (Andrade, 2001: 74-76; 83; 100-101).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> It therefore satisfied one of the characteristics of sociological propaganda as defined in the classic study by Jacques Ellul: "Propaganda must be familiar with collective sociological presuppositions, spontaneous myths, and broad ideologies. [...] Only if it rests on the proper collective beliefs will it be understood and accepted." (Ellul, 1973: 38-39).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> This was the only film produced by the SFCE in its foundation year (1917) that has survived in the archives of that institution (the present-day CAVE), according to information from ANIM, in whose care the remaining films from the SFCE-CAVE are to be found. ANIM, Participation of Portugal in the War – Return of the President of the Republic from his journey to the Portuguese "Front" [Lisbon]: SFCE, 1917, B&W, silent, 35mm, 04:33 min (also available at <a href="http://www.cinemateca.pt/Cinemateca-Digital/Ficha.aspx?obraid=2121&type=Video">http://www.cinemateca.pt/Cinemateca-Digital/Ficha.aspx?obraid=2121&type=Video</a> [consulted on July 22, 2013]). We have no record of the date on which it was shown.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Cf. for example, *A Capital*, in its editions of October 24 and 25.

and its cavalry escort. Behind this follow motor cars with the remainder of the entourage and members of the public, in great numbers. The crowd that presses forward and fills the streets appears prominently in the following scenes. Certainly many of them were there because they had been mobilized for the purpose by the authorities, not only the military personnel but the civilians as well, since public servants had been given leave to attend. Even so, Republicans had turned out in force, and, by the title it gave to the film (Portuguese Participation in the War), the SFCE sought to link this public display with a demonstration of support not only for Machado and Costa, but also for the troops in France.<sup>40</sup>

While Portugal's military preparations for war were recorded on film by the SFCE, the same cannot be said of the war itself. It is known that, in October, the commander of the CEP was warned that the government would soon be discussing a proposal to send a camera operator to France, with the appropriate equipment. A newsreel reporter, together with a photographer and a journalist — the latter promoted to the rank of Captain — would thus join the photographer Arnaldo Garcês and the painter Sousa Lopes, already in France with the CEP, on the orders of Norton de Matos. The aim behind strengthening the personnel was to create "propaganda and publicity in our country, as well as to draw out all the relevant political and social advantages of our intervention in the war". <sup>41</sup> Even if it was now the Minister of Training who was responsible for this objective, the truth is that the initiative continued to come from his colleague at the War Ministry. It was from the latter that the invitation to Ernesto de Albuquerque to film the CEP in France originated. <sup>42</sup>

The choice was understandable, seeing that Albuquerque had worked with Captain Ferrão when the latter had been commissioned by Norton de Matos the previous summer to film the maneuvers at Tancos. The "great and worthy success" of that film was recalled by the cinephile press years later, which then highlighted the role of Albuquerque, while leaving Ferrão in the shadows.<sup>44</sup>

Albuquerque never set out for France to film the war, or even the rearguard of the war, since the revolution by Sidónio Pais had thwarted his departure. The cinematic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> The rapturous welcoming crowd in Lisbon can hardly be attributed to broad electoral support for the government and its policies, since the governing party was about to suffer a heavy defeat in the municipal elections on November 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Cf. excerpt of a letter from the Minister of Training, Barbosa de Magalhães, to General Fernando Tamagnini Abreu e Silva. In Tamagnini (2004 [1923]: CXXXII).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> F. Gomes de Sousa, "Ernesto d'Albuquerque", *Cine-Revista*, n. Ano IV - nr. 44, November 15, 1920: 1-2. <sup>43</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Contrary to the behavior of the papers in the summer of 1916. It should be remembered that at the time, especially in the case of documentaries and reportage, it was "difficult [...] to distinguish functions — between camera operators, directors, and those responsible for the production" (Cruz, 1989: 7).

coverage of the Portuguese involvement on the western front of the twentieth century's first world war remained in the hands of French and British film crews. In it, death — death on a massive scale, which was the great protagonist of the war — would play no part.<sup>45</sup>

# Conclusion

The politician who lifted up the impoverished Portuguese army and took it to fight in the European theater in the First World War, the Minister of War, Norton de Matos, was also responsible for the creation of the first official body devoted to cinema in Portugal, the Photographic and Cinematographic Section of the Army (SFCE). It is known that, in the early stages, political interest in silent documentary cinema seems to have been intended solely to record an improbable fact: the Portuguese people were from then on ready to go and fight in Europe. In fact, in the film of the military parade at Tancos, in the summer of 1916, the protagonist is the people in arms, which the people would see in cinemas (in Portugal, France, the US and, very probably, in Great Britain), and which political and military figures would also see at private showings, used by the Minister of War for purposes of military diplomacy. This single experiment that summer, to capture an exceptional event, was to become institutionalized through its own organization when the first troops were on the point of embarking for France, in 1917. The new body, named along the lines of its French counterpart, was charged with a triple task: to build up historical archives, to aid training, and to make propaganda for the military institutions. At the end of the year, when Norton de Matos was planning to extend cinematic coverage from the rearguard of the war, in Portugal, to the country where the Portuguese were actually fighting, his government fell victim to a revolution led by a politician who placed cinema at the service of his own personal promotion to the popular masses, by filming his own reception by crowds, which his journeys around the country had turned into (Sousa, 2011: 132-142). The impression he left was so strong that when, a few months later, in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> French and British films in which the CEP appears are relatively scarce, though an exhaustive survey has yet to be made. The soldiers were filmed on the ships as they arrived in France, in march-pasts, and in military training. Also filmed were Portuguese politicians visiting France, such as the Minister of War, the head of the government, and the President of the Republic. In the films from the final year of the war, the overall picture is not very different. (For films from GPA, see http://www.gaumontpathearchives.com; for exhibits of the Imperial War Museum, cf. Smither (1994)).

April 1918, he published a decree allegedly creating the SFCE, everyone quickly forgot that Sidónio Pais had simply made use of the infrastructure that Norton de Matos had created, and had left in place and still running.

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# The Stage of Mars: Representations of the First World War and its Social Effects on Portuguese Dramaturgy

Cláudia Figueiredo<sup>1</sup>

# Abstract

The theme of the First World War and its effects on European arts and literature is a theme that has already been widely explored, most notably in the theatrical field. Taking as its starting point a set of plays written both during the early stages of the war and in the postwar period, this article examines the evolution of attitudes towards the conflict in the dramaturgy produced in Portugal, paying particular attention to two main areas of influence: the traumatic nature of the conflict and the specificities of the national historical context.

# Keywords

Great War, Theatre, Culture, Perceptions, Discourses

# Resumo

O tema da Primeira Grande Guerra e dos seus efeitos foi por toda a Europa amplamente explorado na arte e na literatura, tendo tido significativa expressão na área do teatro. Partindo de um conjunto de peças escritas na fase inicial da guerra e no pós-guerra, este artigo tem como principal objectivo propor uma leitura da evolução das atitudes face ao conflito na dramaturgia em Portugal. Esta leitura contempla duas ordens de razões: a natureza traumática da conflagração e as especificidades do contexto histórico nacional.

# Palavras-chave

Grande Guerra, Teatro, Cultura, Percepções, Discursos

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Figueiredo The Stage of Mars

# Introduction

The Great War has a "unique place" in the cultural history of Europe (Winter, 1994: 28). The great commotion caused by the unprecedented and brutal nature of the events that took place between 1914 and 1918 meant that culture would remain the "hostage" of war themes both during the conflict and in the years that followed it, as has been stressed by recent historiography (Ferro, 1999: 295). There were multiple representations of the war and its effects to be noted in all the arts throughout Europe: theatre, cinema, photography, prose and poetry, music and the visual arts. Partly generated by the great need for self-expression caused by the phenomena of war, this stream of words, sounds and images was, on the other hand, further enhanced by the expansion of the cultural industries and by the technological advances made during this period, as, for example, those taking place in the areas of cinema and photography.

However, the heterogeneity of this cultural production did not derive only from the wide range of available resources: it was based on the diversity of contents as well. This production had its roots in an enlarged participation, and included not only the work of artists, writers and intellectuals, but also of people from the civilian world who were occasionally involved in the arts world, and of many ex-soldiers, who contributed with their "aesthetics of direct experience" (Winter, 1995: 2). The unprecedented scale of this intellectual and artistic mobilization was one of the distinctive features of this cultural production, in which highly diverse creative impulses tended to intersect.

In spite of the belated and rather limited participation of Portuguese troops in the conflict, albeit with non-negligible effects (Samara, 1998: 89), this artistic mobilization was also to be noted in Portugal, where several *fado* songs, memoirs, poems and other texts inspired were written that were inspired by the war, including theatrical plays. As in other European countries, such as England and France, where the theme of the war had already been flourishing on stages since 1914, theatre was one of the media used in Portugal for representing war and its consequences. Between the first year of the conflict (1914) and the beginning of the dictatorial regime (1933), a considerable number of plays were written on the theme of the conflict and its effects, a subject that has not merited the full attention of theatre historians. In his work *Três Espelhos*, Luiz Francisco Rebello lists a large number of plays that were inspired by the Great War, although he does not attribute great importance

to this theme within the context of national dramaturgy<sup>2</sup>. Rebello's account of the plays written on the theme is not an exhaustive one, and the numbers are naturally swelled when they are complemented by the results of empirical studies, as well as by information provided by other authors, such as Pedro Caldeira Rodrigues. In a recent study of theatrical revues during the period of the First Republic (1910-1926), he stresses the influence that the war had on Portuguese stages (Rodrigues, 2011). The pervasive influence of war themes in the country's artistic imagination can be easily observed not only in *fado* and musical theatre (which are the genres on which the author focuses his attention), but also in a considerable number of dramas and in several shorter texts intended to be read at private venues and frequently published in the theatrical almanacs of the time<sup>3</sup>. At the same time, there was also a tendency for foreign plays about the conflict to be included in national theatrical repertoires, traditionally consisting of Portuguese translations of French originals<sup>4</sup>.

Far from being exhaustive, this article seeks to contribute to our knowledge of the dramaturgy written about war in Portugal through the recovery of some lesser known texts, frequently overlooked by the historiography written on the subject of theatre. Belonging to a variety of theatrical genres (revue, comedy, drama) and serving different purposes (propaganda, reflection, denunciation), these plays suggest the existence of two distinct moments in the evolution of people's perceptions and attitudes about the conflict and its

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> "Contrary to what happened in the field of literary memoirs (A Malta das Trincheiras, by André Brun, 1918; Nas Trincheiras da Flandres, by Augusto Casimiro; Memórias da Grande Guerra, by Jaime Cortesão; Ao Parapeito, by Pina de Morais; Tropa d'África, by Carlos Selvagem; all dating from 1919), the world conflict had little repercussion on our dramatic literature. Nonetheless, one must mention the purely circumstantial episodes of the plays written by Henrique Roldão (Avante, Franceses!, 1914, and A Grande Guerra, written with Emílio Alves, 1916), António de Oliveira (Paz Bendita, 1915) and Artur Marinha de Campos (Depois da Vitória, 1916) and, with direct reference to the Portuguese involvement in the war, the plays O Amor na Base do C.E.P. (Corpo Expedicionário Português), by Alexandre Malheiro, first staged in 1918 at the German prisoner-ofwar camp in Bressen and published by Renascença Portuguesa the following year, 9 de Abril, by Teresa Leitão de Barros (unpublished, 1919), Portugal nas Trincheiras, by Augusto Casimiro (1923), A Irmã de Cruz de Guerra, by Carlos Ferreira (1924), all of which were one-act plays, Os Cegos, by Joaquim Leitão (1926), O Mutilado, by J. Lapas de Gusmão (1928) and, lastly, O Último dia d'um Condenado, a 'dramatic episode occurring during the world conflagration', written by the Azorean journalist Carlos de Ornelas (1932), and another 9 de Abril, by António Boto, which had little impact in terms of Portuguese dramaturgy (1938). But it was in the field of musical theatre, with the operetta João Ratão, by Ernesto Rodrigues, João Bastos and Felix Bermudes (1920), that the Portuguese army's presence in France was to find its most popular expression." (Rebello 2010: 245-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Although these plays do not form part of the present analysis, we should mention as examples of these "minor texts": "A Guerra: para lembrança dos dias calamitosos de 1914-15" (*Almanaque dos Palcos e Salas para 1916, 1915*: 80); "Amor militar: dueto cómico" (*Almanaque dos Palcos e Salas para 1919, 1918*: 75-77); "A volta do soldado" (*Idem*: 39-42); "Hora Fatal: monólogo dramático" (*Almanaque dos Palcos e Salas para 1920*, 1919: 70-73), and "Na Bélgica Mártir: para as mães portuguesas" (*Idem*: 80).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Examples of such plays include *A Alma Francesa*, by Artur Bernede and Aristide Bruent, premièred in September 1914 at Teatro Apolo (*O Mundo Teatral*, 15-11-1914:11-12), and *La charrette anglaise*, by George Berr, translated into Portuguese as *Os Três Noivos de Germana* and performed at Teatro Ginásio in December 1916 (*Eco Artístico*, 12-1916: 8-9).

individual and collective consequences. In analyzing part of this dramaturgy, this article proposes a reading of this evolution, divided into two parts.

The first part takes us back to 1916, the year of Portugal's official involvement in the war. Although it was not a new subject to be represented on Portuguese stages, the war theme became particularly popular in the months immediately following the country's official involvement in the conflict. In the prevailing environment of pro-war propaganda, the 1916 plays referred to in this article were characterized by a "nationalist reductionism", a feature that was common to all European interventionist discourse (Ferro, 1999: 298). Written by supporters of the interventionist cause, who included both military personnel and members of civil society, these texts represented attempts to create a national consensus around the Portuguese participation in the war and to achieve the "total mobilization of society" (Roshwald and Stites, 1999: 5). Seen as a path that would lead to the victory of civilization over barbarism, the Great War was already an immediate reality in 1916, yet still far from being understood in its catastrophic modern dimension.

The use of symbolic and celebratory language in the 1916 plays contrasts sharply with the dramatic tone of the postwar plays. In a second set of plays, written between 1920 and 1932, the initial enthusiasm is replaced by a sense of disillusion, and a feeling of loss and defeat is consequently prevalent in this second stage, despite the Allies' victory. A general awareness of the brutalities of war was added to its already evident effects, namely a severe social crisis and the subsequent abandonment of many of those who had returned from the battlefront. Consisting of an examination of three main threads – the internal conflict, anti-militarism and the problems of the ex-soldiers – this second stage marked a turning point in people's perceptions of the conflict, which culminated in the "demythologizing" of the Great War (Robb, 2002: 129), as well as in the confirmation of the vulnerability not only of the individual, but also of social relations.

## 1916: Portugal's involvement in the war and plays about the conflagration

Although the presence of Portuguese military forces in Angola and Mozambique had been a reality since 1914, Portugal only officially entered the conflict after the German declaration of war on the country on March 9, 1916. Taking place somewhat belatedly in the course of events, the involvement in war was not a peaceful matter within Portuguese society. At a political level, the "Sacred Union" government – formed one week after the declaration of war and based on an alliance between the Democratic Party, controlled by

Afonso Costa, and the Evolutionist Party, led by António José de Almeida – excluded from its composition the republican Unionist wing, the Socialists, the Royalists and the Catholics. Instead of reflecting a united position about the need to participate in the war, the Sacred Union was a political solution reached by the two main republican parties in order to guarantee their hold of power, and thus to impose their interventionist plan: to strengthen the patriotic republican project at an internal level, and to consolidate Portugal's position in an international context, by demonstrating the country's collaboration with Allied troops and thus reinforcing the old alliance with England.

And while the entry into the war was not a unanimous decision politically, the issue also gave rise to tension among a number of social forces. Just like the international anarchist movement, the Portuguese working-class movement was divided, and during those years a fierce ideological debate was opened in the press between pro-war and antiwar supporters (Santos and Ribeiro, 1986, Ventura, 1986). Split into two groups – those who condemned German imperialistic ambitions and those who defended the union of the proletariat against all wars – the movement had an ambiguous position towards the country's participation in the war. However, the anti-war argument became progressively identified with the fight against the high cost of living, so that this position eventually prevailed within the movement; during the tough years of 1917-18, there was little doubt that the war could only exacerbate the already precarious living conditions of the proletariat (Samara, 2002: 60).

Despite the considerable opposition to Portugal's participation in the conflict, news of the country's involvement in the war was warmly welcomed by many others. The inefficiency of the State's propaganda machine was offset by the strong determination and volunteer spirit of a significant number of supporters of the interventionist cause, leading to several unofficial initiatives being taken to mobilize public opinion in support of military intervention. The spontaneity of these actions demonstrated the existence of vigorous and genuine support for the interventionist cause, which was frequently promoted in newspapers, at conferences and at other events organized by non-State institutions and by many leading figures in intellectual circles. Nevertheless, these propaganda campaigns were based on the written and spoken word and largely focused on urban centers, having little impact on an essentially rural and illiterate population (Meneses, 2000: 95). But, as also happened in the belligerent countries (Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 2002: 109-110), other non-coercive methods were used to reach a political consensus about the imperative need for Portuguese participation in the conflict. The patriotic and militarist plays that were

written, published and performed in 1916, the year of Portugal's entry into the war, formed part of this initial wave of propagandistic zeal.

Unlike written texts, theatre offered the possibility of wider access to interventionist propaganda, providing a tool that could overcome the limits imposed by widespread illiteracy. However, since it was "the most heavily censored of the art forms" (Robb, 2002: 136), theatre was subject to constraints of a different nature: censorship, which had been formally abolished from the theatre world during the transition to the republican regime, was maintained in practical terms throughout the republican period. The State never renounced its effective control over the programs planned by theatres, which it enforced through the continuous presence of police and representatives of the Civil Government at rehearsals and performances. Due to this veiled and sometimes quite active form of censorship, a number of plays were banned between the year of the implantation of the Republic (1910) and the year of the military coup that opened the doors for the introduction of a lengthy fascist regime in Portugal (1926)<sup>5</sup>. In 1916, the state of exception dictated by war justified a reinforcement of the government's control over the press. As in other belligerent countries, prior restraint was also established in Portugal, through the law of March 28. This law resulted in thousands of blank spaces appearing in newspapers, which caused great indignation among journalists (Carvalho, 1973: 20).

Despite the State's control over the theatre, the question of freedom of speech provoked a strong reaction among playwrights as well. In 1916, war censorship was criticized through comedy on the stage of Teatro Apolo in the revue 1916, written by the playwright and Army officer André Brun. A year after the première of 1916, the author, who was also a staunch republican, joined the war front, eventually returning home as a major. His memoirs of the conflict were published in 1919 under the title *A Malta das Trincheiras* (1919). Presented to the public on July 7 1916, 1916 is a musical play composed in verse, and was considered by some critics as "monotonous and graceless" (*O Mundo*, 8-7-1916: 2) and "scarcely original" (*Eco Artístico*, 7-1916: 5). In the two acts and seven scenes that make up the play, allusions are constantly made to "everything that is more or less concerned with the war – the major issue, dominating and compelling throughout that year in Portugal as well as in the world" (*Eco Teatral*, 4<sup>th</sup> week – 9-1916: 7). During the course of the play's action, a workman, student, seamstress, "street woman", and policeman, among

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Glória Bastos and Ana Isabel Vasconcelos have identified some plays whose performance was banned during the First Republic: in 1912, *Ordinário, Marchel*, by Bento Mântua; in 1918, the play *Os Mineiros*, and a few years later *Mar Alto*, by António Ferro; and, in 1923, *O Lodo*, by Alfredo Cortez (Bastos, Vasconcelos 2004: 83-86).

others, come on stage to comment on the events of the year. Censorship is invoked by the group of policemen who refer to it as follows: "the newspapers' censorship / we make merciless / cuts to letters and rubbish / which offend authority" (Brun, 1916: 15). Brun uses comedy and laughter to address the problem of censorship without actually being censored.

The references to war censorship are matched in the play by a call for patriotic unity and for taking a stance in the war. It is significant that the reference to the need for social cohesion comes from the workman's mouth:

"In the old days it was easy / to preach peace or disarmament / the motherland was not yet threatened / with the most cruel and ferocious upheaval. / One could then be a utopian / but in the cruel hour in which you see us / do not say I am a unionist' again / State only 'I am Portuguese'." (*Idem*: 8)

Although he exposed the tensions that existed at the social level, embodied by the character of the workman, Brun simultaneously called for the elimination of social divisions and for all classes to unite in support of the national cause. At the same time, besides the need for mobilization within the country itself, the state of exception created by the war also required the involvement of all nations, and the "Chorus of Neutrals" was thus used to criticize Spain's refusal to adopt a position with regard to the conflict (*Idem*: 5).

The patriotic pro-war feeling was also fueled by leading figures from the proletarian world, such as the typographer, composer of *fado* songs, poet and dramatist Avelino de Sousa<sup>7</sup>. In the play *Portugal na Guerra*, written in verse and published in 1916, the typographer introduces a series of allegorical characters (the Law of Force = the imperial forces, and the Force of Law = the allied forces, France, England, Italy, Russia, Montenegro, Serbia, Romania, King Albert and Portugal) in order to justify the allied cause, as well as to situate Portugal in the conflict by stressing the decisive role played by this small country's participation in liberating peoples from the "German hoof" (Sousa, 1916: 9). Written in a more serious tone than the one favored by Brun in his revue, Avelino de

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Another revue performed in 1916, *Novo Mundo*, written by A Parceria (Felix Bermudes, Ernesto Rodrigues and João Bastos), invoked the problem of war censorship in the section "Tio Verdades e Tio Censura" (Rodrigues 2011: 62-63). This play by A Parceria was a resounding success, being by far the most popular play at the box office at that time (*Eco Teatral*, 1st week -10-1916:1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Highly active in the theatrical press, Avelino de Sousa was also the author of another play inspired by the world conflict, entitled *A Guerra*, and performed for the first time on August 8, 1919, at Teatro Avenida.

Sousa's play has epic tones, using both a symbolic language and certain scenic devices to highlight the belligerent message. In a crescendo, the allied nations gather together on the stage to the sound of military marches. In the middle of the action, Portugal, embodied by a white-bearded old man wearing a sailor's outfit (an obvious allusion to Portugal's overseas history), joins the "Chorus of Nations" against imperial tyranny. In keeping with the same line of ideas, the ancient nation defends itself against the accusation of subservience towards British interests, which was leveled against it by Germany in its declaration of war<sup>8</sup>: "T've been called a vassal of England! (...) It is necessary to sweep the insult away!" (*Idem*: 15). The German offense is dealt with by the courage of the Portuguese troops (both army and navy forces) who enter the scene to the sound of another military march. Throughout the text, the racial virtues of the "free, stringent, audacious and unyielding" Portuguese people are repeatedly praised (*Ibidem*).

The "race" theme inspired another play in 1916, *Raça Lusitana*, a one-act play written in prose and taking place on the day that Germany declared war on Portugal, written by Carlos d'Alcântara Carreira. Performed on May 16 that year at the República Theatre, the play aroused a negative response from the specialist press, and the language was described as being "very banal, without any ideas at all" (*Eco Artístico*, 5-1916: 7). The plot is based on the story of an old major with a brilliant military past in Africa. A man of action, the major returns home reduced to a mere shadow of his former self: "And then he is attacked by that accursed paralysis, the sedentary life into which he is thrown after a life full of combat under the great African sun! They shut the eagle in an office cage, and as such they atrophy him" (Carreira, 1916: 17). His demobilization and consequent acceptance of a bureaucratic occupation takes away all the meaning from his life. However, on hearing the news of Portugal's involvement in the war, the major is healed, as if by miracle.

War is depicted in the play as having magical qualities, showing the capacity to revive the active side to the major's character. Standing up suddenly, and "quickly donning a uniform", he immediately volunteers to join the troops (*Idem*: 28). The grandeur of the "Lusitanian race" is stressed throughout the play by blending extracts from *Os Lusíadas*, an epic poem written in the 16th century by the Portuguese poet, Luís de Camões, with countless references to national heroes. The play ends to the sound of the republican national anthem, *A Portuguesa*, "SUNG BY ALL" (*Idem*: 32), a finale which, according to the newspaper *Diário de Notícias*, "made the audience pulsate in a united display of great

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> "In this way, the Portuguese Government made it known that it considers itself a vassal of England, which submits all other considerations to English interests and wishes" (quoted in Meneses, 2009: 275).

patriotic affection" (*Diário de Notícias*, 17-5-1916: 2). It should be noted that, although this was a common feature of musical theatre at that time, the frequent use of a chorus in these patriotic plays acquired its own special meaning: a sense of unison, with the chorus symbolizing collective harmony, and in these specific cases this may be seen as a technique used to unleash the highly prized national unity of the people.

Other patriotic plays were written in 1916, and some of them were performed by amateur groups from outside the capital city, Lisbon, in order to take the pro-war propaganda to the population living on the periphery of the large urban centers. This was the case with Mulheres da Cruz Vermelha, a dialogue written by Firmino Vilhena. The play was performed in Lisbon, Aveiro and Viseu by women from the Cruzada das Mulheres Portuguesas, the main female institution placed at the service of interventionist propaganda, and benefited from the money generated by the sales of the published text. The play tells the story of a French nurse who volunteers to join the Red Cross in order to perform what she understands as her duty. Although it meditates upon the brutal nature of war, which "spreads gloom, misery and mourning" (Vilhena, 1916: 4), the play nevertheless acts as a spur to patriotic action, while also attempting to define the women's role in the conflict: to ease the suffering of others and to bravely bear their own suffering with stoicism and selflessness. This nurturing function is stressed in another 1916 play, Depois da Vitória, a one-act drama written by the Army officer Marinha de Campos. The play is set inside an ambulance where a Red Cross nurse and a Charity nurse attend to men wounded in the war (Almanaque dos Palcos e Salas para 1917, 1916: 8). As was the case with Mulheres da Cruz Vermelha, the play was performed by amateur groups for the purposes of solidarity, but it was also used as an instrument for mobilizing civilians in support of the war efforts.

# An unfinished war? The turning point in the sphere of representations.

When the war ended, on November 11 1918, it was a time for settling accounts: nearly 14 million casualties and 20 million wounded was the outcome of the tragic four-year-long conflict that no one had expected would last so long. Although it was enthusiastically celebrated by the people, the final victory of the allied forces was not enough to provide a feeling of complete victory in the medium term. With a total of 105,000 men mobilized, the young Portuguese Republic reached the end of the war with 8,000 deaths to mourn and an identical number of disabled people to take care of (Afonso 2009: 297). Furthermore, the political climate was particularly unstable and the economic

and social crisis had been aggravated even further by the conflict. Faced with this picture of individual and collective grief, it ceased to be possible to go on projecting light or epic images of war: these simply did not match the reality of a tragedy whose effects persisted long after the end of the conflagration. War had inflicted hard-to-heal wounds on the national social fabric, and, besides the problem of how to reintegrate the demobilized soldiers, there was also a severe problem of subsistence. Contrary to what was expected, the end of the war had not brought a halt to the hoarding and speculation in essential goods, and complaints about shortages, the rate of inflation and even the adulteration of food were a constant feature of Portuguese life that lasted well after the conflict. In the preface that he wrote in 1931 to the memoirs of the ex-soldier Eduardo de Faria, published under the title *Expedicionários*, General Norton de Matos, who had been the Minister of War at the time when Portugal officially entered the conflict, referred to the continuing durability of this internal tension:

"But with the Great War, as with all wars, it was not just soldiers who suffered. The group of those who profited from it is always limited, and in our country these people can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The bulk of the population continues to suffer, and quite terribly too, due to a war that ended 13 years ago. Ended? Are we not just passing through a period of truce? (...). Disgracefully, among us, the days of anxiety did not end with the Armistice; there is no external peace, and, worst of all, we do not have internal peace." (Faria 1931: v-vi).

Almost prophetically, Norton de Matos' words give us an idea of the social atmosphere experienced in the transition to the fascist regime. The sense of outrage people felt about the illicit enrichment of others, which caused a significant part of the population to endure severe deprivation, was expressed in organized actions during and after the war, such as rallies in protest against the high cost of living, promoted by the proletariat, and strikes demanding wage increases, or in spontaneous initiatives such as attacks on warehouses designed to ensure the availability of the essential goods that were being hoarded. As noted by the historian Fernando Rosas, the conflict had plunged the country into a state of "larval civil war" (Rosas, 2009: 248); even though the cessation of hostilities had brought an end to the international conflagration, this did not solve the internal contradictions, and the large mass of workers and consumers still remained hostages of the

greed of the agricultural, industrial and commercial forces. On the other hand, successive republican governments had shown themselves to be incapable of solving the situation, resulting in the ever greater discredit of the regime in the eyes of large sections of society.

Some Portuguese plays from the postwar period incorporated this idea of an internal front that had developed as a consequence of the conflict. One of these was Adão e Eva, written by Jaime Cortesão, one of the intellectuals who most actively contributed to the republican interventionist propaganda in the early years of the conflict. As a volunteer, he joined the Flanders front as a medical captain. In 1919, he published his War Memoirs which, according to Elisa Travessa, launched "a new stage of reflections and a new form of writing in Jaime Cortesão's work" (Travessa, 2004: 89). In her opinion, the war's cutting edge can be seen in Cortesão's writing; in his first two plays, Infante de Sagres (1916) and Egas Moniz (1918), written in the period of interventionist propaganda, Cortesão used the national past to embellish the Portuguese spirit; in the drama Adão e Eva, premièred on May 21, 1921, at the Ginásio Theatre, Cortesão shifted his attention to his own time, which he questioned through the main character (Idem: 48-49).

The action takes place against a background of social unrest, and the protagonist is Marcos, an idealistic young man who has just returned from Flanders and onto whose character Cortesão seems to project himself. On his return, Marcos encounters a society that is divided between opulence and deprivation, he falls out with his future father-in-law, an industrialist and war profiteer, who "lives by conjuring up dark trades" (Cortesão, 1921: 92), and eventually he leads a workers' movement at his factory. Meanwhile, a popular uprising breaks out on the streets, an "explosion of despair (...) a heavy sum of accumulated mistakes and hatreds" (*Idem*: 22). In spite of Marcos' pleas to the raged mob, the episode culminates in the wounding and killing of people. In Marcos' account of events, the mob is depicted as a "group of harassed wolves" and the police repression is understood to have been a matter of great violence (*Idem*: 75). In symbolic terms, one can say that Cortesão's mob represents the very opposite of the first play's chorus, a perfectly identifiable collective, which is strong and ordered; it is rather an anonymous mass, disjointed and chaotic, with little hope of victory.

After the mob's defeat, Marcos ironically congratulates his future father-in-law: "We were beaten, me and the scum. You, on the contrary, have triumphed. You are about to accomplish your ideal: to transform the Earth into a sales counter and the whole of life into a business" (*Idem*: 91). This condemnation of war profiteers does not mean Marcos supports the mob's actions: deeply disappointed, he asks himself: "Are they all the same on

both sides?! Is there something unrepentant in human evil?" (*Idem*: 82). The problem that is raised is that of human nature itself, which Cortesão believes to be vile and corrupted.

The play aroused widespread and vigorous public criticism. In response to a call from Diário de Lisboa, several leading intellectuals expressed their opinion about the play. In this survey, writers such as Raul Brandão, Raul Proença and Aquilino Ribeiro defended their Seara Nova colleague against the hostility and lack of understanding shown by his conservative critics. (Diário de Lisboa, 1-6-1921: 2; 2-6-1921: 2; 3-6-1921: 2). As for Norberto de Araújo and Almada Negreiros, these two were less kind about Cortesão's work: the former considered the play to be "poorly developed" and "primitively declaratory" (*Idem*, 7-6-1921: 2), while the latter confessed his disappointment with a play that he considered excessive in thought and lacking in imagination (*Idem*, 4-6-1921: 3). The survey thus revealed evidence of aesthetic tensions between the Seara Nova group and the emerging modernist movement. In the theatrical press, the political message of this drama was negatively explained; in *Jornal dos Teatros*, despite the recognition of the literary value and the refinement of the language used, the text was described as an "excellent partisan lecture" and the play was said to be worth little or nothing in itself (Jornal dos Teatros, 29-5-1921: 6). On the other hand, in spite of its having a philosophical rather than a political purpose, as explained by the author himself, the play was immediately put to use in proletarian circles as trade union propaganda; the attack on war profiteers and the demand for social justice that the drama partly showed, were mentioned in great detail by the daily newspaper A Batalha – the mouthpiece of the Portuguese workers' organization. In its pages, various performances were documented, as well as other initiatives that were complementary to the play, such as conferences promoted by those involved in the workers' movement<sup>10</sup>.

The successful formula of Adão e Eva among proletarian audiences was to be repeated the following year, in 1922, when another play was performed dealing with postwar social issues. Written by Jorge Teixeira, the three-act drama Gatunos de Luva Branca is a vehement condemnation of hoarding and exploitation and an (unreserved) defense of the population. First staged in a rural environment, in the city of Évora, and performed in aid of the Francisco Ferrer School, by the amateur troupe Luz e Liberdade (organized by the railway workers of the South and South-East region), the play has the same structure as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> "However, I believe that if my play reaches any conclusion, this takes the form of a religious and philosophical assertion. If it seeks to define anything, it is a heroic concept of freedom." (Jaime Cortesão *in Diário de Lisboa*, 5-5-1921:5).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> This was the case with the talks given by Mário Domingues, on June 6 at the *Associação dos Caixeiros* (Association of Clerks) and promoted by the Center of Young Trade Unionists (*A Batalha*, 7-6-1921: 1); by Cristiano Lima, on June 8 at the *Associação dos Empregados de Escritório* (Association of Office Workers) (*Idem*, 4-6-1921: 1); and by Câmara Reis, on June 3 at the Universidade Livre (*Ibidem*).

Adão e Eva; a young couple in love (she an industrialist's daughter, he an idealistic engineer with revolutionary sympathies), and a riot that breaks out on the streets. According to the local press, the venue was "ordinary but warm" and in the end the audience received the play with "much clapping and cheering" (O Alentejo, 30-5-1922: 2).

The theme of "popular anger" is portrayed in the play through a crowd armed with "rifles, sticks and sickles" (Teixeira, 1923: 69). Composed not only of workers, the crowd "is the people, the anonymous lion", enraged by exploitative and greedy forces, although the protagonist, Rafael, unlike Marcos, is able to control them with words (*Idem*: 70). After avoiding further excesses, Rafael completes his mission by persuading the industrialists of the need for social justice. Like Marcos, Rafael is an apostle of a new world, but his political stance is much less ambiguous. Unlike Marcos, isolated in his moral superiority, Rafael supports the dictatorship of the proletariat as a "transitional measure" ultimately leading to "the communist society" (Idem: 75), identifying himself with the collective revolutionary project launched in Russia in 1917, in which the international proletariat had pinned great hopes. The play's final appeal is not aimed at the individual consciousness but rather at the concerted action of workers, the "laborers of the new society" (Idem: 74). The internal conflict is understood by Teixeira as a clash of class interests and not, as it is by Cortesão, as a dispute between good and evil. However ideologically different they may be from one another, Teixeira and Cortesão's plays converge in relation to one particular aspect: the perception that the end of the conflagration did not mean peace and that, on the contrary, the maintenance of an exploitative economic system in the years that followed the war prolonged the internal crisis, which was often expressed in violent confrontations.

The overriding social problem is not the only topic of these postwar plays. As Antoine Prost stresses, death also occupied a central place in the literary and artistic representations of this period (Prost, 1994: 17-18), a tendency that is also to be found in these texts. In the tragic farce Não Matarás, death plays a central role in the plot. Written by the anarchist writer César Porto, the play was published in installments between January and March 1924 over the course of nine issues of the literary supplement of the proletarian daily newspaper A Batalha. The drama centers around the grief of two parents suffering from the loss of their young and only son, killed in the war. Those to blame for the tragedy are identified: Afonso Costa and Bernardino Machado, the main architects of the republican interventionist plan. Based on an individual tragedy, the death of a child, César Porto's play is an exercise in dismantling the patriotic argument, and was immediately considered by a journalist of A Batalha to be "a vibrant cry of Down with War!", in keeping

"with the best antimilitarist literary and philosophical works" (*A Batalha*, 3-1-1924: 1). Sharing internationalist and pacifist libertarian views, César Porto tackles the roots of the patriotic feeling that the 1916 plays tried to create, by depicting the motherland as a "gargantuan boy" who "seems to live off human flesh" (Porto, 28-1-1924: 3), and war as a useless phenomenon that is synonymous with an inferior state of civilization (Porto, 3-3-1924: 6).

The drama of the survivors is another subject that is invoked in this second stage of representations of the war and its effects. The end of the conflagration presented a new problem, one of war invalids who, unable to work and deprived of any support from the State, were frequently driven to begging and crime. Several initiatives were introduced to try and remedy these men's precarious situation, such as the foundation of support organizations, (as, for example, the *Liga dos Combatentes da Grande Guerra*, 1921), and the reporting of the problem in newspapers such as *O Mutilado*, a "newspaper for the humble" published between 1920 and 1921 in order to "demand justice and recognition for those who have fought in wars" (Afonso, 1986).

This theme corresponds to another sort of loss: the loss of physical or mental integrity. This is what we find in the play *O Mutilado*, written by the ex-soldier Lapas de Gusmão. Published in 1928, four years before the edition of his memoirs (*Visão da Guerra*), the play was written in 1920, shortly after the author's return from the battlefields of Flanders. Set in the spring of 1919, the plot is about a soldier who has been badly wounded in the war and now returns home. There he finds that his wife, who thought that he had vanished forever, has taken up with a new partner. In the personal drama of the wounded war veteran, Lapas de Gusmão exposes the situation of ex-warriors, reminding us of the difficulties of their social and affective reintegration. Moreover, as the author states in the preface, the play is "a cry of indignation and outrage against a society of cynics and hypocrites", which had only "forgetfulness, contempt, abomination and crime" to offer its soldiers (Gusmão, 1928: vi).

The bitterness caused by oblivion and ingratitude towards ex-soldiers, a central theme in the memoirs of veterans, is also explored in the one-act drama *E quando a Guerra acabou*, written by ex-expeditionary Eduardo de Faria. The text was printed at the *Liga dos Combatentes* print shop in 1932, with the revenue from the sale of copies being handed to the institution. The play consists of a dialogue between two friends, both of them exsoldiers in France, one of whom is "a man with discernment" (yet suffering from tuberculosis), while the other is simply "mad". The former pays the latter a visit at the

mental institution where he spends his days washing his hands compulsively, hands which he stills believes to be stained by the blood from the trenches. No longer heroic or regenerating, such as it was depicted in the 1916 plays, war is now described by Eduardo de Faria as a collective and persistent tragedy:

"But war exists and will exist as long as just one of us remains alive. War is you, it is me, it is the multitude that has suffered (...). War is that cripple with his legs ripped off by a grenade; war is that little child without a father; war is that woman dressed in black who does not have her daily bread; and war is also that spectacle of selfishness and deaf resentment, the tremendous odyssey of so many, the calvary of plenty, the abandonment of immensity." (Faria, 1932: 16)

War did not end with the Armistice; instead, it was being reactivated in the daily drama of misery and oblivion into which a sizeable part of the population had been plunged. The hardening of the internal front rapidly swept away the fragile illusions of patriotic unity produced by the earlier plays. While the enormous difficulties deriving from the conflagration had contributed to the fall of the First Republic and led to the emergence of a dictatorial regime in Portugal that would last for another 48 years, they also seem to have shaped the representations of a war that had in fact been an inglorious one for most of the population. In the years that followed the conflict, theatre became one of the forms used for describing the pain of warfare and engaging in an exercise of metaphysical reflection, but, at the same time, it also offered a platform for denouncing forgetfulness and dramatizing the aggravated internal tensions.

# Conclusion

The shift in representations of the Great War, from the expansive optimism of earlier plays to the dismal and introspective tone of postwar texts, reflects a change in the perception of the conflict. It came to be regarded as an "immense cataclysm", and led to the disappearance of "an aesthetic and ethical code of heroism, courage and violent battle" (Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 2002: 28). The simplified language of the traditional representational codes used in 1916, which reflected the spirit of a crusade and were also inspired by old "notions of chivalry" (Winter, 2004: 206), was rendered outdated by the

awareness of the modern nature of the conflict. This shift corresponded to an evolution in the use of theatrical genres for the representation of war themes: if, in the year of 1916, we can note a prevalence of comedies and plays written in an epic tone, which lighten the heart and exalt the phenomena of war, later on it was drama that tended to be the predominant tone, and patriotic feelings were replaced by a sense of loss and defeat. Thus the dramatization of the theatrical narrative matched the dramatization of individual and collective life during this period, making it possible, on the one hand, to deal with the past and to consolidate the memory of the conflict through a written medium, and, on the other hand, to consider the present in the light of the new social and political conditions created by the war.

The dramatization of the theme of the Great War and its effects mobilized very different wills and projects. Calling for the participation of people that were quite distinct from one another (some of them, such as ex-soldiers, had previously been left on the margins of playwriting activity), there was a great diversity to be noted in the plays that were inspired by this theme, a situation that possibly explains the unequal literary quality of this set of plays. This aspect should not discourage further research; instead it should be an incentive to think more systematically about the increased participation in artistic production that the war seems to have stimulated. On the other hand, the conflict's repercussions on Portuguese theatre still needs to be examined in greater depth in order to clarify certain aspects, not only those related to the texts or their reception, but also those relating to the processes of staging and performing these and other plays, some of which have already been identified although there are others that still remain to be identified. I hope that this article may serve as a stimulus for future research into a theme that is still underexplored and lends itself to be studied from a wide range of different perspectives.

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# Jorge Borges de Macedo: Problems of the History of Portuguese Economic and Political Thought in the Eighteenth-Century<sup>1</sup>

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# Methodological framework

The title of this paper is an adaptation of the title of one of Jorge Borges de Macedo's best-known works (1963a). It has been deliberately chosen to highlight as explicitly and unequivocally as possible the direction that I wish to follow here: to present paths and problems that are relevant for the study of Portuguese economic and political thought in the eighteenth century in the light of Borges de Macedo's reflections upon the subject.

In one of his best-known and most influential essays on historical problematization, Borges de Macedo offers a global framework for interpretation that I believe to be particularly rich and opportune for research on the history of ideas:

What is of interest to us is to place men in their own immediate social environment, to describe them in their field of action, not in an abstract way, but concretely defined in terms of their stimuli, needs, requirements and possibilities. So, we need to define the particular problems faced by the Portuguese society of that time and to check whether or not the national community was capable of finding a suitable solution for them all. (Macedo 1966, 122-23)

According to Borges de Macedo, if an object of study is to acquire pertinence and meaning, it needs to be duly adapted and contextualized by the national historical reality that suggested and aroused its study. In his own words:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> E-jph Conference – *Portuguese History in a Global Context*. Round-table on Contemporary Portuguese Historiography. Brown University, 12 October 2012.

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Portuguese culture uses those results from European culture that are really of interest to it, seeking to understand them, develop them and apply them to national problems. (*ibid*, 132)

These were the research guidelines that, with just a few differences and nuances, were to remain a constant feature of all of his subsequent essay production. In another text that is equally rich in analytical suggestions and has had a major impact on Portuguese historiography (Macedo 1974), Borges de Macedo again displays the same concern with analyzing national problems that do not allow for the indiscriminate application of recipes defined in accordance with other historical and geographical horizons. Instead, in order to be understood, they require a comparative approach.

That same approach contains two fundamental messages or meanings that need to be borne in mind: first of all, it provides a safe and historically grounded challenge to the view of Portugal as a moribund and decadent nation, incapable of producing an elite of thinkers or men of action that measured up to the responsibilities of an adult nation with some international standing. Or, in other words, a criticism of the pessimistic views that have been nurtured about the decadence of Portugal's historical development. Second, the approach is based on the affirmation of a cultural and intellectual history that, in analyzing the processes adopted for the dissemination and spread of ideas, devotes special attention to the national contexts of their assimilation, adaptation and appropriation.

I believe that these two aspects may be regarded as indispensable pillars for understanding the dynamics of economic ideas throughout the eighteenth century in Portugal.

# The construction of the modern economic historiography of the eighteenth century

Jorge Borges de Macedo's vast work as a historian prevents us from isolating just one century as the central theme or object of his research. There do, however, appear to be some grounds for considering the eighteenth century to occupy an essential place in his work.

In fact, the eighteenth century was to be the focus of his initial and pioneering research about the economic situation in the time of the Marquis of Pombal (Macedo 1951) or about the history of industry in the reigns of Dom João V and Dom José (Macedo 1963b). The analysis that he made of previously unpublished sources that had remained

largely ignored or underexplored until then (particularly the documentation about the Board of Trade [Junta do Comércio] and about the commercial activity taking place at the ports) enabled Borges de Macedo to construct a new interpretation about the pace of Portuguese industrialization in the eighteenth century and about the driving forces and constraints upon the growth of industry in that period. We can unreservedly consider that these texts laid the foundations of our modern knowledge about Portuguese economic history of that period.

His works also dealt with two milestones that marked the history of the eighteenth century: the Treaty of Methuen, signed in 1703 between Portugal and Great Britain, about which he wrote at two distinct moments (Macedo 1966b and Macedo 1989), and the political and diplomatic situation from the beginning of the nineteenth century, associated with the Portuguese participation in the Napoleonic wars due to the non-acceptance of the Continental Blockade (Macedo 1962).

His approach to these subjects was to be taken further and more completely contextualized in the work that he dedicated to the study of the guiding principles and main thrust of Portuguese diplomacy (Macedo 1987), in which one is struck by his concern with demonstrating that the strategic options and decisions of Portuguese economic policy always coincided with wider-reaching political and diplomatic decisions in which Portugal's own destiny as a sovereign and independent nation was at stake. Consequently, the trade agreements signed in 1703 and the 1810 Trade Treaties clearly show how the eighteenth century was marked by external events that were to map out a quite distinct route for the development of the Portuguese economy.

As he wended his way through the Portuguese economy of the eighteenth century, Borges de Macedo naturally could not fail to become interested in the economic and financial thought of that period. The richest part of that work was perhaps the analysis that he made of textual sources in his dissertation on the history of industry (Macedo 1963a). In fact, the emphasis that he gave to the study of the *Memórias Económicas* of the Lisbon Academy of Sciences, as well as to the works of José Acúrsio das Neves or Joaquim José Rodrigues de Brito, is quite remarkable. He was interested in them not only because of the descriptive testimonies they provided of the state of the Portuguese economy in the second half of the eighteenth century, but above all as the protagonists of a considered and strategic reflection upon the paths and opportunities that were being offered at that time for the country's economic development.

His other more monographic texts include the study that he made of Cardeal da Mota's economic thought and the general guidelines of economic policy in the reign of Dom João V (Macedo 1960), as well as the text that he wrote summarizing the different types of mercantilism in Portugal, with special attention being paid to its belated repercussions throughout the eighteenth century (Macedo 1966a). Finally, mention should also be made of the pioneering attention that he paid to the statesmanlike figure of Dom Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho and his plans for financial restructuring at the end of the eighteenth century, clearly demonstrated in his study of the origins of Portuguese banking (Macedo 1963b).

In all of these digressions, one can detect a thread that runs through all of Borges de Macedo's historical thinking, namely his explanation of the crucial role played by ideas in the construction and fulfillment of our collective future.

## Elements for the history of Portuguese economic thought in the eighteenth century

The works that I have just mentioned offer a variety of readings about Portuguese economic and political thought in the eighteenth century, always seen from the perspective of the innovative application of principles that can be used for interpreting economic and social reality, while at the same time helping to define strategies and policies with a view to their reform and/or development.

Without exhausting or forestalling the development of any other categorizations that might help us to understand the essential features of the economic doctrines and policies that prevailed in Portugal throughout the eighteenth century, I believe it is pertinent to suggest three central ways of organizing economic discourse in this period, deliberately taking as our starting point the reflections provided by Jorge Borges de Macedo in his essays.

The first of these ways relates to the definition of *economic policies without a system, but with a direction*. Such a view applies specifically to the study of mercantilism which, for Borges de Macedo, "is not a systematic theory, but rather a series of useful items of knowledge that do not form a chain leading to a systematic interpretive coordination of the whole economic reality" (Macedo 1966a). He therefore sought to identify and highlight a variety of influences and a range of strategic options converging in such a way as to fulfill an objective or a central purpose that, in short, consisted of strengthening the State's economic performance.

Mercantilist economic policies resulted from practices that did not express a coherent program of action. In some cases, they chose to defend gold as a strong currency and the circulation of money as a central instrument for promoting economic activity. In eighteenth-century Portugal, this was the prevailing direction to be noted, for example, in the writings of Alexandre de Gusmão and the opinions that he expressed. In other cases, such policies highlighted manufacturing protectionism as a privileged instrument for establishing equilibrium in the balance of trade and increasing the State's wealth, countering the inconveniences of conspicuous consumption and favoring the approval of pragmatic laws against luxury and against imports of foreign manufactured products. The writings of Dom Luís da Cunha and Cardeal da Mota, for example, clearly illustrate this economic perspective. In yet other cases, mercantilist policies considered it essential to establish procedures for institutional reform, to ensure equilibrium between the various economic and social agents, to concede rents resulting from the award of privileges, or to form monopoly companies that enjoyed exclusivity in terms of either trade or production. The policies and governance of the Marquis of Pombal provide us with countless examples of this particular aspect of the mercantilist economic literature.

The second path that I consider faithfully portrays another dimension of Portuguese economic discourse in the last quarter of the eighteenth century may be expressed in the following phrase: *getting to know the kingdom better in order to change it.* And, once again, in Borges de Macedo's work, we rediscover the perspicacious attention that he paid to a remarkable group of authors who either acted independently or under the institutional auspices of the Lisbon Academy of Sciences and other learned institutions of the governments of Dona Maria I and the Prince Regent Dom João. As Borges de Macedo so clearly summarized the situation:

The end of the 18th century was overcome by a genuine anxiety for analysis and creativity that led to the formation of the richest, most varied and most fertile Portuguese technological bibliography, with the appearance of books ranging from the debate about metropolitan and overseas agrarian problems to studies of accountancy, mechanics, ballistics and medicine. The problems were studied from a practical point of view and were clearly adapted to the national realities (Macedo 1966, 131-32).

Such "anxiety for analysis and creativity" resulted in the definition of a strategy to make the fullest possible use of available natural and human resources, which in turn presupposed the undertaking of a stringent diagnosis of both the favorable conditions and the limits that were imposed on economic activity. Science and technology, together with the knowledge of the natural and social world, were instruments placed at the service of economic development processes. But it was also important to understand that, if human activity were to be effective in the economic field, then agents had to be free to act as they wished and principles and measures were called for that favored the extension and enhancement of mercantile relations.

Finally, a third idea/principle that summarizes the emblematic expressions of Portuguese economic thought in the eighteenth century can be conveyed in the following way: managing the economic conjuncture in order to develop the country. Jorge Borges de Macedo's works also tell us about the pragmatism resulting both from an external political alignment that imposed negotiated trajectories and from an attitude of cautious prudence resulting from internal financial difficulties. The example and testimony provided by Dom Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho's activity between 1796 and 1803, in the exercise of his governmental responsibilities, as well as in the programmatic texts that he bequeathed to us, merit a special mention. In fact, this explanatory context enables us to understand the extent of economic and financial reforms and changes designed to guarantee the indispensable political and institutional stability. Correction of the mistakes caused by the uncontrolled issue of paper money, plans for the creation of a banking institution, financial restructuring programs and reforms of the colonial administration were some of the subjects to which Dom Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho devoted the full attention of his public mission. The sense of proportion and priority, which is the hallmark of the great statesmen, was demonstrated by him in that particular international conjuncture in which Portugal's fate was at stake and which it was important to manage without jeopardizing the country's future.

## Concluding remark

The historiographic renewal effected by Jorge Borges de Macedo (evoked here through the studies that he specifically dedicated to the Portuguese economy in the eighteenth century) produced a series of teachings that still endure today. His invaluable legacy has been continued, renewed and criticized.

In this brief attempt to evoke his memory, I have sought to clarify to what extent Borges de Macedo's studies demonstrated the impossibility of an abstract history of economic, social and political ideas, as well as the irrelevance of a history that does not take into consideration the factors, conditions, instruments and concrete processes of assimilating and making use of such ideas. It can therefore be concluded that the history of Portuguese economic and political thought in the eighteenth century is a field of research that is ideally suited to the critical application and renewal of the teachings inspired by the work of Jorge Borges de Macedo.

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# In the Shadow of Independence: Portugal, Brazil, and Their Mutual Influence after the End of Empire (late 1820s-early 1840s)<sup>1</sup>

Gabriel Paquette<sup>2</sup>

Historians have long recognized how the formal achievement of independence meant neither that the legacies of colonialism had been extirpated nor that the newly won sovereignty was unencumbered. Legacies of colonialism in Latin America after independence were numerous and included older forms of indigenous tribute and taxation, labor regimes such as slavery, legal codes, and the position of the post-colonial polity in the world economy, the latter of which also circumscribed sovereignty as scholars working in the Dependency Theory, Informal Empire, and World Systems traditions have demonstrated.

Recently, historians have begun to recognize that many non-economic connections and relationships between Europe and Latin America survived the disintegration of the Ibero-Atlantic empires and that many new ones, both overtly coercive and less so, were formed (e.g., the circulation of political ideas; European immigration schemes) (Brown and Paquette 2013). Three phenomena—the "persistence of mutual influence," the repair or rethickening of frayed threads, and the spinning of new, unprecedented transatlantic webs—may be understood as combining to make plausible the notion of "Late Atlantic History" (Rothschild 2011); that is, an Atlantic History after the demise of formal empire. Traditionally, Atlantic History's outer chronological limit was defined by the separation of the European metropolises from their American dominions, episodes normally considered

<sup>1</sup> Earlier versions of this article were given as papers at the "Portuguese History in a Global Context" Colloquium held at Brown University (October 2012) and at the American Historical Association Annual Meeting in New Orleans (January 2013). The author is grateful for the numerous helpful suggestions and criticisms he received in response to both presentations, which were used in revising this article for

publication.

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part of the "Age of Atlantic Revolutions" (Armitage and Subrahmanyan 2010), after the recognition of "independence" was recognized and enshrined in international law. The survival of many links and connections, however, makes it plausible to think of those links within the context of an Atlantic History with enlarged temporal boundaries.

Late Atlantic History might also confront, this article suggests, the problem of absence, how the severance of links during the process of emancipation had lingering effects on individuals, institutions, and states. For the present purposes, Portugal's situation for the two decades following formal recognition of Brazilian independence in August 1825 is an ideal case study. The problem of absence, or the whole host of dilemmas generated by the sudden deprivation of a centuries-old overseas empire, is something that few historians have investigated.

The theme might profitably be split into two, though still entwined areas of enquiry: first, the impact of these "Atlantic emancipations" on the ex-metropolises (Spain and Portugal); and, second, the degree to which newfound sovereignty in the Americas was felt to be secure from the machinations of the former metropolises; that is, to what degree and to what effect did Brazilians fear Portuguese recolonization? The argument sustained for the remainder of this article is this: first, the impact on Portugal of Brazil's independence was tremendous, not so much in economic terms, but in its impact on domestic politics, international stature, and subsequent colonial policy; and, second, fears of a Portuguese "reconquest" or "recolonization" scheme, apart from generalized Lusophobia, especially in the 1831-34 period, had a pronounced impact on Brazilian politics in the aftermath of independence.

## PART I

How was Portugal impacted by Brazilian independence? In a word, significantly, though nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historians tended to erase, or at least relegate to the background, the profundity and ubiquity of this impact. As in Spain, there has been a tendency to downplay the economic impact of independence, or at least to portray it as something other than a disaster. There seems to be good evidence on both sides of this question (see, for example, the Lains-Alexandre debate over the economic impact of Brazilian independence in Portugal), but what is both surprising, as well as well-documented, even if scarcely studied, is the impact of Brazil's independence, and the survival of monarchy and the Braganza dynasty in Brazil, on Portuguese politics in the 1820s and 1830s, as well as on Portuguese deliberations concerning how to approach the remnants of its empire (in Central-Southern Africa).

The present author has written extensively elsewhere on the constitutional question (Paquette 2011), so little will be mentioned here regarding the constitutional question in this article. Suffice to say that Dom Pedro remained heir to the Portuguese throne after Portugal's recognition of Brazil's independence in August 1825, so that when his father Dom João died in 1826, he succeeded to the Portuguese throne. Unable to wear both crowns according to the terms of the constitution he had bestowed upon Brazil in 1824, he abdicated in favor of his daughter, Dona Maria, and promulgated a constitution which he imposed on Portugal, the 1826 *Carta Constitucional*. Portuguese constitutionalism in the nineteenth century would be indelibly marked by empire's strange death and Dom Pedro's unrealized ambition to unite both crowns, as the *Carta* remained Portugal's constitution, with several important modifications, until the fall of the monarchy in 1910.

There were other connections beyond constitutionalism: many of the enslaved Africans sold into bondage in Brazil in the 1820s and 1830s were disembarked from

Portuguese controlled enclaves in central and southern Africa. The enclaves assumed a greater importance after Brazil's independence. Without colonies, and therefore without colonial products to re-export and markets to open up to allies, Portugal's policymakers believed, the Lusitanian monarchy's very survival was imperiled and many feared that its absorption into Spain was inevitable. Yet, paradoxically, and a cruel paradox it was, Portuguese Africa's economy remained entirely dependent on the slave trade, which was itself reliant on the Brazilian market for slaves. This meant that Portuguese policy was at the mercy of Brazilian demand and also that any attempt to move away from dependence on the slave trade threatened to lead to disturbances in Angola and Mozambique (in particular), which some feared would join with Brazil as part of a South Atlantic confederation. In these two ways, constitutionalism and colonialism, then, among many others, Portugal's post-imperial experience was shaped indelibly, in terms of both presence and absence, by the experience of imperial dismemberment.

From this vantage point, the Portuguese Civil War, occurring between 1828 and 1834, is not the insular event which it is usually understood to have been, but instead may be more helpfully conceived against the backdrop of decolonization, as an episode of late Atlantic history, in which the ambiguity of Brazil's break from Portugal loomed large. The Civil War, of course, broke out when Dom Miguel, Dom Pedro's younger brother, refused to accept the legitimacy of the *Carta* or the marital arrangement to his niece, Dona Maria. This rejection led many of the *Carta* 's supporters, the so-called Cartistas, into exile and they eventually coalesced on the Azorean island of Terceira, from which by 1834 they eventually emerged triumphant with Dona Maria II installed and the *Carta* the law of the land.

Prior to his abdication of the Brazilian throne in 1831, the pro-Carta Regency assembled from 1829 on Terceira recognized that its success hinged on Dom Pedro.<sup>3</sup> Vigorous efforts to persuade him to travel to Terceira were made from March 1830. Yet Dom Pedro's centrality to the Civil War's outcome would have seemed far-fetched several years earlier. After granting his Carta and abdicating the throne, the emperor publicly evinced little interest in Portugal's predicament before his bother Dom Miguel's coup d'état. There were various domestic reasons why Dom Pedro distanced himself from European affairs between 1826 and 1831, including mounting levels of Lusophobia in Brazil. For their part, the Carta's supporters expected little aid from Dom Pedro or the Brazilian government. A leading figure argued that, given the "difficult and extraordinary" relations with Brazil, Portugal would be served best by "maintaining the status quo;" that is, receiving regular payments from Brazil in accordance with the terms of the still-secret pecuniary convention that accompanied formal recognition of Brazil's independence in August 1825. Even as the Civil War approached, few, if any, partisans of the Carta expected the succor of its framer.

There were several interconnected reasons why the Regency suddenly regarded Dom Pedro as a savior, which not easy to disentangle. The first and most obvious reason was the emperor's personal connection to what was transpiring, particularly to his daughter, in whose name the Regency justified its existence and armed struggle. The second reason was Dom Pedro's status as titular head of a sovereign state. Unless Dom Pedro recognized the Regency as the legitimate government of Portugal, to which he was linked by "so many titles and blood," and in which he had "direct interest," there was little hope for other governments to do so.<sup>5</sup> Part of the justification for permitting Dom Pedro to nominate the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> ANTT, MNE, livro 356, Mouzinho de Albuquerque to Luiz de Vasconcellos e Sousa, "Circular no. 3," 19 March 1830.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> ANTT, MNE, cx. 153, Lavradio to Palmela, 23 September 1826.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> ANTT, MNE, livro 356, Mouzinho de Albuquerque to Conde do Sabugal, "Circular no. 5", 22 March 1830.

members of the Regency in 1829 was precisely to secure such formal recognition. The third reason for Dom Pedro's pertinence to the *emigrado* cause was his authorship of the *Carta*. Dom Pedro's right to compose and impose a constitution, during his brief tenure as King of Portugal in 1826, became an essential aspect in the defense of the *Carta* as well as Dona Maria, whose right to rule was derived directly from it.

The recognition of Dom Pedro's Brazilian government was sought by liberal exiles for material reasons as well: to obtain the funds needed to keep the almost penniless Regency afloat. As the fledgling Spanish American republics had less than a decade earlier, the Regency plainly understood that international recognition was required to obtain a loan from European financiers. With a loan, as previously mentioned, the Regency would obtain munitions and raise a foreign legion, for the number and resources of the *emigradus* were too small to mount an invasion of Portugal.<sup>6</sup> Recognition of the Regency as the legitimate government of Portugal would enable Brazil to either bankroll the Regency directly or to serve as the guarantor of its debt (and debt service). Either way, Brazil would supply the funds owed to Portugal by the terms of the 1825 pecuniary convention of the recognition treaty. These funds, of course, were justified officially as compensation for public property lost due to Brazil's independence, but in fact they were ear-marked to repay the loan taken by Portugal in London in 1823, which had underwritten its botched reconquest of Brazil.

This new arrangement, however, could be effected only if the Regency were recognized, first by Brazil and subsequently by other European powers, as Portugal's legitimate government. Throughout the year 1830, gaining official diplomatic recognition was the chief aim of the Regency's diplomacy. Recognition, one leading Regency figure hoped, would presage robust relations between Brazil and Portugal. He authorized a Portuguese agent to enter into negotiations in 1830 for a "permanent and reciprocal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> On the desirability of a foreign legion, see Palmela to Abreu e Lima, 8 March 1831, reproduced in Abreu e Lima 1874, p. 43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> ANTT, MNE, livro 356, Mouzinho de Albuquerque to Conde do Sabugal, "Circular no. 4," 22 March 1830.

defensive alliance." Such an alliance would make it incumbent upon the Brazilian government to "declare war on the usurping government of Portugal," suspend commerce between Dom Miguel's Portugal and Brazil, and, finally, supply the regency with "three of four frigates" with which it could "establish its authority throughout the Azores and take control of Madeira, whose possession would provide the Regency with the resources it currently lacks." It was unclear why some believed that the Brazilian government would be tempted into such an alliance, except out of altruism, or what concessions the Regency would have to make in order to obtain such favorable terms. But the urgency of the situation was unmistakable. "We cannot hope," a leading *emigrado* concluded, "that a serious movement against Dom Miguel will appear in Portugal while the Regency languishes without resources and remains isolated due to the blockade of Terceira."

Yet the Brazilian government never formally recognized the Regency, a source of immense disappointment and cause for endless complaint. Dom Pedro did little, even in a private capacity, furnishing those stranded on Terceira with inadequate material support. Palmela and Vila Flor, two leading figures of the regency, expressed their dismay directly to Dom Pedro: "our actions on this island are necessarily passive, for the material assistance VM promised has arrived slowly and only in part. It scarcely sustains 4,000 men in great hardship." These pleas did not win the formal recognition they so desperately desired. Nor did they gain material relief, leading another Portuguese *emigrado* to curse the "horrible duplicity," "bad faith," and "perfidy" of the Brazilian government, which "paralyzes us" and "forces us into violent and desperate action." He sarcastically asked Brazil's emissary to Britain whether the Brazilian government, "by depriving the Regency of all means to

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> ANTT, MNE, livro 356, Mouzinho de Albuquerque to Conde do Sabugal, "Circular no. 5," 22 March,1830.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> ANTT, MR (Regência em Angra do Heroísmo), livro 451, Palmela and Vila Flor to Dom Pedro, 20 March

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> ANTT, MNE, livro 469, Abreu e Lima to Mouzinho de Albuquerque, 4 November 1830.

sustain itself," sought to "oblige [it] to surrender to the Usurper?" <sup>11</sup> In private correspondence, an exasperated *emigrado* exclaimed, "it is extraordinary that we have never received a single favorable thing from Brazil ... from wicked Brazil come only bad things which muddle matters further." <sup>12</sup>

After arriving in Paris after his abdication in 1831, Dom Pedro warmed to the emigrado cause. He joined the Regency on Terceira, where he eventually maneuvered to place himself at its head. Some emigrados were both incredulous and apoplectic: "the Men of 1820 working for the ex-Emperor of Brazil to become King of Portugal? Who would have predicted it!"13 Even to his staunch supporters, Dom Pedro's spasmodic engagement and long stretches of indifferent lethargy were perplexing, his motives far from transparent. Mouzinho da Silveira could not fathom "what caused Pedro to issue the Carta or why he later seemed to abandon it and remain in Brazil" (Mouzinho da Silveira 1989, II: 639). Yet the ex-Emperor eventually became semi-palatable to most emigrado factions, for both strategic as well as ideological reasons, so long as he operated within the limits they imposed. As two emigrado pamphleteers joked, they supported Dom Pedro because "he was a revolutionary in 1820; he gave the Carta to Portugal; he is the father of our Queen; and, besides, without him, the cause of our puny Regency would never stand a chance of gaining a foothold in the patria" (Passos 1831: 4). Furthermore, the fact that Dom Pedro's meddling exasperated the despised Courts of Europe only enhanced his appeal. As one of Dom Pedro's champions remarked, with pleasure and a great deal of hyperbole, to one of the ex-Emperor's confidants, "His crimes cannot be expiated: he gave two liberal

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> ANTT, MNE, livro 469, Abreu e Lima to Marquês de Santo Amaro [José Egidio Álvares de Almeida, 1767-1832], 22 December 1830.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Marquês de Sta. Iria to Condessa de Vila Real, 31 December 1830, in Ventura 2000, pp. 69-70.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> BPMP, MSS. 1916, "Carta a Rodrigo Pinto Pizarro [por hum Emigrado Portuguez em Paris]," 31 October 1831, fos. 43-44.

constitutions to two countries in two hemispheres, and thus destroyed the misguided Holy Alliance."<sup>14</sup>

It may be enquired why Dom Pedro hesitated and perseverated, actions at odds with his much-criticized impetuousness at many junctures, both political and personal. There are several explanations, most of which relate to the delicate Brazilian political context in which he operated, where his continued involvement with Iberian affairs rankled the increasingly vocal "nativist" party. Certainly, the precarious and destabilized state of Brazil's finances left him without expendable resources. Some of his behavior must be attributed to the steady stream of information he received concerning Portuguese affairs from his advisors. After the promulgation of the *Carta* yet before Dom Miguel's usurpation, the letters of Dom Pedro's envoy to Europe (Resende) caused disquiet. In a December 1827 missive, Resende made clear that "ultra-liberals were falsely professing love for VM, draping themselves in the *Carta* for the nefarious end of re-establishing the infernal [1822 constitution]," whereas the "ultra-royalists" were swapping the banner of Dom Pedro for that of Dom Miguel.

But Dom Pedro, who evidently thrived on adulation, received further entreaties that aroused his interest in European affairs. In a January 1828 letter from Saldanha, who was in communication with exiled Spanish general and conspirator Espoz y Mina about a federal (or confederated) Iberian Peninsula, with Dom Pedro as its constitutional monarch, the general insisted that European liberals esteemed him: "Is it possible, *Senhor*", Saldanha enquired, "that VM does not wish to rule fourteen million men, Portuguese and Spaniards, with whose support you might sustain your authority in America, to the alternative of ruling over three million men of every color who nurture in their hearts the darkest ingratitude?" But even Saldanha's sycophantic exhortation failed to move Dom Pedro,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Silva Carvalho to Gomes da Silva, 13 June 1831, reproduced in Vianna 1891, vol. I, doc. 69, p.76.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> AMI, II-PAN-05.01 .1828-Dau.C., Saldanha to Dom Pedro, 5 January 1828; see also Braz Augusto Aquino Brancato, "D. Pedro: Uma Opção Liberal para a Espanha," in Oliveira Ramos 2001.

who refused to jeopardize Brazil's de facto geopolitical neutrality. Beyond a smattering of proclamations and dispatching diplomats to European courts to generate support for his daughter's cause, Dom Pedro recused himself from direct action. His involvement in the Portuguese civil war emerged less from commitment to his daughter's cause or liberal ideas, than his hasty abdication, which left him casting about aimlessly in Europe, bereft of throne and funds.

His failure to act before 1831, however, should not be mistaken for indifference. Dom Pedro allotted much attention to the affairs of Portugal, even if he proved stingy in the material relief of the *emigrados* and withheld explicit, formal recognition of their cause. In his private correspondence, Dom Pedro lamented the fate of "the much compromised Portuguese refugees ... martyrs of legitimacy and lovers (amantes) of the Carta' whereas his proclamations urged the Portuguese to "save the Carta." He sought to answer emigrado pleas for material assistance. Barbacena suggested that whatever was allocated could be recouped after Dona Maria was installed on the throne by selling Bissau to France or else Timor to the United States.<sup>17</sup> The minutes of the Brazilian Conselho de Estado reveal an intense and abiding interest in Portuguese affairs but also conflicting views concerning the desirable extent of Brazil's interference. In November 1829, the question arose whether the £300,000 still owed to the Portuguese government according to the terms of the 1825 Pecuniary Convention should be diverted to support the *emigrados* in Brazil. Most members of the Conselho, a body composed of devout monarchists, concurred with Marquês de Aracati that the emigrados should receive the funds still owed, but Marquês de Paranaguá dissented, claiming that if it were to "compromise the government in any way", the funds should not be dispensed. 18 Evidently, these funds never reached the emigrados, though the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See AMI, II-POB.1828.P1.B.do.1-151 (pasta 1), Dom Pedro to Barbacena, 23 December 1828; and Dom Pedro, "Proclamação á Nação Portuguesa" (1828), found in the same folder.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Barbacena to Dom Pedro, 6 March 1829, quoted in Oliveira Lima 1933, p. 72.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Conselho de Estado (Brazil), Session 36, 30 November 1829, in Senado Federal 1973, p. 95.

historical record is unclear whether or not they were disbursed following Dom Pedro's abdication.

## PART II

What about Brazil? To what degree did the machinations of the ex-metropolis, real or imagined, impact the development of politics in the early national period? In the case of Spain and Spanish America, the much better known case, the retention of Cuba and Puerto Rico provided an archipelagic beachhead for peninsular reconquest dreams, especially as Fernando VII refused to countenance formal recognition of the new Spanish American states' independence. The 1829 abortive invasion of Mexico, which triggered mass expulsions of peninsular Spaniards, was a clear-cut case of how independence, whether de facto or de jure, did not lead to the abrupt end of schemes for reconquest.

As it turns out, the insecure nature of independence was a concern over which many Brazilians fretted in the decades after Portugal's formal recognition of that fact, in 1825. Much of the cause of the distress was mistrust of the motives of the Braganza family, particularly the ambitions of Dom Pedro I, emperor of Brazil, whose great stake in the outcome of Portuguese political strife rankled many Brazilian who wished the avoid entanglements in European politics. In fact, it was Dom Pedro's inability to refrain from meddling in peninsular affairs, or at least the perception that he was interfering behind the scenes, which hastened his abdication.

Ignominious 1831 abdication aside, Dom Pedro retained no dearth of allies in Brazil, many of whom entertained fantasies of a restoration until his premature death in 1834. And some of these so-called "restorationists" retained hope for a grand reconciliation between Portugal and Brazil, which seemed plausible for reasons to be addressed subsequently in this article. The existence of such "restorationists" was a major,

if largely neglected, factor in the development of Brazilian politics in the early 1830s. Support for Dom Pedro percolated not only at the elite level, but also was ubiquitous among the lower and middle classes. His 1831 abdication sparked urban uprisings led by disgruntled troops in Bahia, Pernambuco, and Minas Gerais. Unrest also spread among the civilian population—rural and urban—of the Northeast, which had suffered through severe drought in 1824-1825 and which was afflicted by another protracted bout with drought (1830-1834) (Reis 1993: 15).

In the backlands of Ceará, the ex-military official Pinto Madeira fomented a proDom Pedro I revolt. His pro-Portuguese sentiments were well-known already, for he led an
ill-fated, pro-Portuguese uprising in 1825. Brazilian authorities claimed, accurately, that
Pinto Madeira aimed to "re-establish the old system of Portuguese government, and
introduce a political schism among the rural folk who cry out for the *rey velho*", using this
doctrine as a cover to "rob, murder, and disturb the peace." In 1832, after Dom Pedro's
abdication, Pinto Madeira renewed his resistance, determining that the restoration of the
deposed Emperor was his last, best hope at a regime capable of keeping nativist fury at bay.
Though his movement was dismissed as a "crazy insurrection" by an "idiotic *sertanejo*" in
the urban press, his actions were heeded as a warning that "fratricide" could "devastate
entire cities," reminiscent of the wars then pulverizing the nascent Spanish American
polities.<sup>20</sup>

Pinto Madeira's threat dissipated, due to a combination of brutal repression and weak leadership, but he proved to be a harbinger for more serious, popular threats to the Regency governing Brazil while Dom Pedro II was a child. In April 1832, a coalition of Portuguese-born troops, merchants, and artisans revolted in Recife, aiming to restore Dom

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> "Officio de José Felix de Azevedo e Sá, Presidente da Provincia do Ceará, ao Ouvidor Interino da Comarca do Crato—Ordenado que se proceda á devassa sobre os crimes de Joaquim Pinto Madeira," 20 July 1825, published in *Publicações do Archivo Nacional* 1929, vol. XXIV, pp. 297-98.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> O Harmonizador, no. 7 (12 March 1832), pp. 27-29 passim.

Pedro I to the throne. Shouts of "Viva Dom Pedro, Rei de Portugal, e do Brasil"<sup>21</sup> echoed in the streets.<sup>22</sup> In rural Pernambuco, planters and Portuguese merchants fomented a rebellion, mobilizing peasants uneasy with the land encroachment of the period.<sup>23</sup> Even when elites withdrew their support, frightened by the social revolutionary turn, the peasant rebellion continued. These revolutionaries became known as "Cabanos," after the humble forest huts or shacks, called cabanas, in which they dwelled. Cabano, of course, was a derogatory term, with negative connotations of backwardness and poverty. By 1832, the War of the Cabanos, or Cabanada, was raging. A guerilla force composed of Indians, runaway slaves, and other discontents coalesced around the charismatic figure of Vicente de Paula, a former sergeant in the now-disbanded colonial militia, who assumed the rather grandiose title "General of the Royalist Forces." Paula claimed that the "blood-thirsty" Regency and "corrupt, lowly" Assembly jointly had "usurped" Dom Pedro I's throne and were doing the same to his underage successor, thus legitimizing their struggle against the "Jacobins" of Rio de Janeiro, who manipulated the constitution to pursue their personal ambitions and advance their material interests.<sup>24</sup>

Dom Pedro I's 1831 abdication also was greeted throughout Brazil with anti-Portuguese riots, with attacks on Portuguese-owned inns, houses, and stores, accompanied by the ubiquitous cry of "mata-marotos" ("kill the rascals[!]"). <sup>25</sup> Portuguese-born Brazilians and Portuguese were beaten and killed, while stores were looted, ransacked, and burned. Anti-Portuguese attacks in 1831-1832, in Bahia at least, often were associated with a federalist political sympathies, but most lacked a clearly defined program of social or

<sup>21</sup> IAHGP, cx. 215, mç. 4, "Oficios do Presidente" (25 April 1832).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> APEJE, B.L. Ferreira to Pedro Ara[ú]jo Lima, 24 September 1832, fo. 160.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> On elite support for the Cabanos, see Ferraz 1996, p. 196; on the *Abrilada* and its connection to rural unrest, see Mosher 2008, pp. 92-93.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Vicente de Paula, Proclamation of 16 November 1833, quoted in Andrade 1965, p. 208.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> In part, anger was exacerbated by a fresh wave of Portuguese immigration to Brazil after 1825. As one newspaper in Maranhão noted, "the Portuguese who come [to Brazil] are for the most part born in the backward *sertões* of their provinces, and they unite the innate stupidity of country folk in Europe with all of the vices which percolate in the cities of Porto and Lisbon," *O Brasileiro*, no. 3 (6 September 1832), p. 10.

political reform. The Portuguese were convenient scapegoats, and the notion of expelling them from Brazilian soil, or at least depriving them of civil, military, and ecclesiastical appointments, was an attractive distraction from deep-seated problems (Reis 1993: 32-38; Souza 1987: 180). It is difficult to determine whether Lusophobia served to inspire or further inflame such "restorationist" movements or whether the outbreak of rebellion itself generated (or at least brought into the open) fierce anti-Portuguese sentiments. In all likelihood, it was a feedback loop. It is clear that the aftermath of the abdication and the onset of what historians lump together as the early Regency rebellions heightened sentiments which, in turn, made the possibility of Dom Pedro I's return semi-plausible.

Some commentators dismissed fears of Portugal and the Portuguese resident in Brazil, disparaging rumors of plots as "fantasies concocted by hyper-active patriotic imaginations. The Brazilians have more than adequate strength to sustain their independence." Restoration was more than a fantasy, however, though the figure of Dom Pedro was of far greater importance than some sentimental affinity with Portugal or a nostalgic saudade for the colonial regime. An active Sociedade Conservadora da Constituição Jurada do Império flourished in Rio de Janeiro from 1832, with three of Andrada brothers among its charter members. They made overtures to Dom Pedro in 1832-34, to which he responded evasively and ambivalently. Several of the members of the Sociedade held positions in the Council of State and occupied senate seats from which they could not be dislodged except by death, according to the life-terms enshrined in the 1824 Constitution (Kirschner 2009: 277).

The threat, then, was palpable, but the fear it produced was wildly disproportionate, even hysterical. It confused disaffection with Dom Pedro's abdication with an imminent threat to Brazil's sovereignty, whether blinded by genuine paranoia or motivated by the benefits of intentional obfuscation. "The Portuguese are without doubt the true motors of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> O Harmonizador, no. 5 (January 16, 1832), pp. 19-22 passim.

the disorder which is destroying this province," an official in Pará reported, "they cannot accept that the Brazilians are not their slaves any longer." He alleged that many Portuguese in Pará had "almost confessed to a criminal union with Dom Miguel." When local disturbances occurred, they were blamed routinely on the "Luso-Restorationist club" which sought to return Dom Pedro to his former throne. As Dom Pedro's fortunes in Portugal's Civil War improved, he became the object of reconquest ambition fears. In Recife, O Carapuceiro assumed that Dom Pedro would not be "content to retire to England or France and live a quiet, private life. He is ambitious." In Maranhão, one newspaper noted that while the deposed Dom Pedro "recognized the impossibility of conquering all of Brazil," the provinces of the North, upon which "the Portuguese never gazed without sandades," remained a target of reconquest due to their "wealth and proximity to Portugal." There were constant reports in São Luis during 1833-34 of the mysterious machinations of a "restorationist faction" and their legions of shadowy Portuguese supporters.

Evidently, high-ranking officials expected Portuguese warships to appear on the horizon at any moment. "Duque de Braganza will attempt to invade Brazil to restore his throne", one alarmed Pernambucan official reported, and "we must destroy the miserable horde of slaves [in Brazil] who support the Duque, who seeks to destroy our liberties and re-impose the insupportable yoke of tyranny." The impact of these "recolonization" anxieties and Luso-Restorationist rumors were felt at many registers of society. On a local level, they spawned grotesque anti-Portuguese violence. In Rio Negro, Pará, it was reported that "horrible robberies, violence, and massacres were perpetrated against those who did

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> ANRJ, Serie Interior, IJJ<sup>9</sup>, 108 (Pará), Visconde de Goiana to Ministro do Império, 30 August 1831, fos. 328, 332, 338.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> IHGB, lata 286, livro 5 (Colleccão de Documentos sobre a Cabanagem no Pará, 1834-36), "Decreto de Presidente Bernard Lobo de Souza", 13 October 1834.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> O Carapuceiro, no. 26 (2 July 1834), p. 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Echo do Norte, no. 3 (10 July 1834), pp. 11-12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> See, for example, *Echo do Norte*, no. 35 (4 November 1834), p. 139.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> APEJE, PP8, José Marciano de Albuquerque e Cavalcanti to Manuel Seferino dos Santos, August 8, 1833.

not have the fortune to be born in Brazil."<sup>33</sup> In the small town of Arraial do Pilar, in Matto Grosso, Portuguese-born inhabitants were attacked for allegedly stock-piling weapons for use in the anticipated war to restore Portuguese rule. The resulted mob violence claimed the lives of thirty of the town's Portuguese inhabitants (Barbosa 1999: 80). In Maceió, an official admitted that "adoptive citizens and Portuguese are persecuted to inhumane extremes by extremist radicals [exaltados], to the extent that commerce here is stagnant, and the city is entirely deserted."<sup>34</sup> During the Cabanada, Pernambuco's provincial government proposed the transport of all Portuguese-born Brazilians "accused, according to public opinion," of being restorationists to the island of Fernando de Noronha, dispensing with legal due process.<sup>35</sup>

At the level of national politics, the Luso-Restorationist "threat" lent urgency to constitutional and other types of legal-administrative reform. Such fears were expressed publicly by leading national politicians in the Assembly. Vasconcelos, for example, described the likelihood of Dom Pedro's attempted restoration as "very probable" and a "natural" step. He observed that the common people were "very frightened" of this "dangerous" prospect and that "measures must be taken to prevent it." In 1834, the Assembly voted by a large majority to exclude permanently Dom Pedro I's return to Brazil, though this measure was defeated in the Senate, most of whose members the ex-Emperor had appointed personally. As an historian noted recently, the passage of the 1834 Additional Act was "aided by fears that the former Emperor would succumb to the siren call of his supporters in Brazil and recross the Atlantic at the head of an army" (Barman 1999: 60). Many reforms, therefore, were conceived as safeguards against the alleged

<sup>33</sup> APEJE, PP<sup>8</sup>, [President of Pará] J.J. Machado de Oliveira to [President of Pernambuco] F. Paes de Carvalho, October 31, 1832.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> ANRJ, IJJ<sup>9</sup> 280 (Alagoas), Presidente Manoel Lobo da Miranda Henriques to José Lino Coutinho [Ministério do Império], November 19, 1831, fo. 185.

<sup>35</sup> IAHGP, cx. 215, mç. 4, "Inquerito contra Luis António Vieira" (1834).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Vasconcelos, "Discurso na Câmara dos Deputados, Sessão de 4 de Julho de 1833", reproduced in Carvalho 1999, p. 213.

Portuguese menace, which was considered a palpable threat until Dom Pedro's premature death in 1834.

Dom Pedro I's death did not diminish the passion of the parties who used or abused his name, though it did undermine those who manipulated and exploited the vague threat of Portuguese reconquest (Flory 1981: 132). Still, even at the highest levels of government, fears of Portuguese meddling in Brazilian affairs persisted, of its efforts to cause strife which might harm Brazil's territorial integrity and pave the way for Portugal to carve out some bit of Brazilian soil for its. During the Cabanagem in Pará in 1835, for example, Brazil's envoy to Portugal continued to send back reports refuting the insinuation of his government that Portuguese agents were to blame for the unrest in that distant province. As late as April 1835, he had to insist that it was far-fetched ("não é crivel") to blame the Portuguese government for the "disorders that torment that province of the empire," insisting that its causes "should not be looked for outside of [Brazil]." <sup>37</sup>

These anecdotes strongly suggest the conclusion that the boundary separating colonial and national history, traditionally based upon international law (e.g. official recognition) is somewhat arbitrary and unsatisfactory. Reunification and reconquest schemes, however far-fetched in theory and unrealized in practice, percolated widely and had important effects on what are often thought to be post-colonial or national politics. Thus, the line between colony and nation (or, in Portugal's case, between imperial and post-imperial power) was much fuzzier and more imprecise than the existing historiography generally acknowledges. Furthermore, nineteenth-century Portugal, at least the quarter century after 1825, should be recast or at least viewed afresh in light of the persistence of connections with Brazil, which exerted great influence over key episodes of Portugal's purportedly post-Brazilian history, from constitutionalism to colonialism.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> AHI, 213-4-1, Sergio Teixeira de Macedo [from Lisbon] to Aureliano de Souza de Oliveira Coutinho, Reservado no. 2, 6 April 1835.

### **Abbreviations**

AHI Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty (Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil)

AMI Arquivo do Museu Imperial (Petrópolis, RJ, Brazil)

ANTT Arquivos Nacionais / Torre do Tombo (Lisbon, Portugal)

ANRJ Arquivo Nacional (Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil)

APEJE Arquivo Público Estadual Jordão Emerenciano (Recife, PE, Brazil)

BPMP Biblioteca Pública Municipal do Porto (Porto, Portugal)

IAHGP Instituto Arqueológico, Histórico e Geográfico Pernambucano (Recife, PE,

Brazil)

IHGB Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil)

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## A. H. de Oliveira Marques and the First Republic<sup>1</sup>

Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses<sup>2</sup>

I was invited to contribute to this special edition of the *e-Journal of Portuguese History* with a short piece on the late Professor Oliveira Marques and his contribution to Portuguese historiography, more specifically his contribution to our understanding of the First Republic (1910-1926). As someone who began his graduate studies in 1992 having completed an undergraduate degree outside Portugal, and having set out to write a thesis about Portugal's intervention in World War One, I owe—like all other scholars of the period—an immense debt of gratitude to Oliveira Marques, who over the course of some forty years of febrile activity contributed enormously to our understanding of the period. But this is a debt of gratitude qualified by the realization that there were certain limitations to Oliveira Marques' writings on the subject of the First Republic, and that these ought to be borne in mind.

An initial consultation of the catalogue at the Biblioteca Nacional in Lisbon as an Erasmus student naturally led me naturally to Oliveira Marques' work. More than anyone else, it seemed, Oliveira Marques had taken a systematic approach to understanding the First Republic; his publications were unavoidable. I had already acquired, and devoured, his *Guia de História da I República*, an invaluable guide to the sources of the period; and I had already read, in the first months of graduate study, the relevant chapters of his *History of Portugal*, which had raised as many questions as it answered. Now I was delighted to find some of those answers in works written or edited by Oliveira Marques: his *A Primeira República Portuguesa: Alguns Aspectos Estruturais* (first published in 1971 and the basis of much of his later work, notably in the relevant volume of the *Nova História de Portugal* which he helped to coordinate); the collection of primary sources brought together under the title

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> E-jph Conference – *Portuguese History in a Global Context*. Round-table on Contemporary Portuguese Historiography. Brown University, 12 October 2012.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *Guia de História da 1<sup>a</sup> República Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Estampa, 1981).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal* Vol. 2, *From Empire to Corporate State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *A Primeira República Portuguesa: Alguns Aspectos Estruturais* 3rd Edition (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 1980).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Joel Serrão & A. H. de Oliveira Marques (eds), *Nova História de Portugal* Vol. 11, *Portugal da Monarquia para a República* (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1991).

Afonso Costa (1972);<sup>7</sup> Afonso Costa's collected speeches<sup>8</sup> and a first volume of his "political correspondence" (although I was puzzled by the lack of a corresponding second volume, since the first one ended in 1910); and, most importantly for me—a real treasure trove, which I never tire of reading and rereading—the minutes of the Councils of Ministers of the second and third Afonso Costa governments, in 1915-16, just before Portugal entered the Great War, and 1917, when the myriad problems occasioned by the conflict threatened to overwhelm—as they eventually did—the still fragile Republic.<sup>10</sup>

The pace at which I requested and consulted these works led one librarian to suggest that I look out for Oliveira Marques, a regular reader in the Library he had headed in a singularly difficult moment of its existence, in the wake of the 1974 Revolution. I was expected to know what he looked like; everyone did. I didn't approach Oliveira Marques at that point and put off meeting him in person until I had a set of specific questions to ask of him. I soon found one that intrigued me: in his collection of Afonso Costa's speeches, he had included Costa's contributions to the July 1917 secret sessions of parliament. Having studied France and World War One under John Horne—later my dissertation supervisor as a senior sophister in Trinity College Dublin, I knew just how crucial secret sessions of parliament could be when plotting the political landscape of a country at war: where might I find the corresponding minutes for the Portuguese secret sessions? In my innocence, when I went to the Universidade Nova de Lisboa to arrange a meeting, I called into the History Department. I found him, of course, in another department; he took the time to welcome me, to discuss my still incipient work, to complain about the inordinate length of Portuguese dissertations, and to point me in the direction of the safe in the library of the Assembleia da República, Portugal's parliament, where the minutes I wanted to consult were to be found (only many years later would they be published). 11 His enthusiasm for the topic was clear, as was his eagerness to help a young scholar just setting out on his career. Knowing what I would find, however, he also admitted in advance that he had left out

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> A. H. de Oliveira Marques (ed.), *Afonso Costa* (Lisbon: Arcádia, 1972).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> A. H. de Oliveira Marques (ed.), *Discursos parlamentares/Afonso Costa* (Mem Martins: Europa-América, 1973); see also A. H. de Oliveira Marques (ed.), *Afonso Costa. Discursos Parlamentares 1914-1926* (Amadora: Bertrand, 1977).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> A. H. de Oliveira Marques (ed.), Correspondência Política de Afonso Costa: 1896-1910 (Lisbon: Estampa, 1982).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> A. H. de Oliveira Marques (ed.), O Segundo Governo de Afonso Costa (1915-1916) (Mem Martins: Europa-América, 1974); A. H. de Oliveira Marques (ed.), O Terceiro Governo de Afonso Costa (1917) (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 1977).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Ana Mira (ed.), Actas das Sessões Secretas da Câmara dos Deputados e do Senado da República Sobre a Participação de Portugal na I Grande Guerra (Lisbon: Assembleia da República/Afrontamento, 2002).

passages of Afonso Costa's speech—passages which referred to Africa and which, he said, might have created problems when the book was first published.

This was a strange admission, I thought at the time, but, looking back, it was an important one. The passages in question referred to one of the central issues of the secret sessions, the minutes of which I duly consulted at the Assembleia da República: the behaviour of the military column which, under General Pereira d'Eça, had operated in southern Angola in 1915. Its task had been to restore Portuguese rule after its collapse in the wake of the defeat at Naulila, during a major German incursion into Portuguese territory; this it did with great ruthlessness. Pereira d'Eça was, in July 1917, military governor of Lisbon, a city which, during the secret sessions of parliament, was under martial law—that is, its population's constitutional guarantees had been suspended—as a result of a construction workers' strike. In other words, Afonso Costa was speaking in defence of a senior officer being accused, in a series of signed affidavits, of having ordered, or at least tolerated, gruesome atrocities, but who now had the power of life and death over the population of Lisbon. In so doing, Costa did not deny that atrocities had been committed, but castigated those who both raised the issue in wartime and expressed exaggerated humanitarian concern for the indigenous population of the African colonies, on whom such concerns were, he argued, lost. I wondered—and still do—what exactly Oliveira Marques had decided to protect when censoring those passages in a work published in 1977: Portuguese-Angolan relations (it is worth remembering, in this respect, that the following year René Pélissier would publish his Les Guerres Grises, 12 in which devastating conclusions were reached about Portugal's continued campaigns of pacification during World War One)? Or Afonso Costa's reputation? The material was so extraordinary that it wrote itself into an article—one of my first—published in 1998 in the Journal of Contemporary History. 13

On the occasion of Oliveira Marques' death, António Costa Pinto wrote, in *Diário de Notícias*,

Marques was a historian who believed in the historian's objectivity, carrying out his research on the basis of the documents bequeathed by the past. I do not mean by this that he did not have avowed sympathies when it came to

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> René Pélissier, Les Guerres Grises: Résistance et Révoltes en Angola (1845-1941) (Orgeval: R. Pélissier, 1978).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, 'Too Serious a Matter to be Left to the Generals? Parliament and the Army in Wartime Portugal, 1914-1918', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 33, no. 1 (January 1998), 85-96.

contemporary history, namely in relation to Afonso Costa, that 'tyrannical father' of the First Republic, but he was far from the more common ideological manipulations of many of his colleagues.<sup>14</sup>

We know that Oliveira Marques turned to contemporary history in part because of the physical distance that separated him, in exile, from the documentation he needed to continue his investigations into the medieval period; but the timing of the publication, in Portuguese, of his initial works on the First Republic, notably the material collected in the Afonso Costa volume (for which he had been granted access to the material held by the Costa family) also carried a powerful political message. With the New State in a cul-de-sac occasioned by three unwinnable wars in Africa, Marques wished his countrymen to look in sober, dispassionate manner at the Republic. Oliveira Marques portrayed this regime not as the lunatic asylum or ante-chamber of red revolution of Salazar's propagandists, but rather as Portugal's first democratic experiment, capable of correcting its mistakes but felled by the army in 1926 before it could do so. One can and should discuss this vision (I personally don't agree with it), but it told the Portuguese, as the dictatorship agonized, that they could look forward to a democratic future with confidence, since they already had a democratic past; and in men like Afonso Costa and Bernadino Machado, twice President of the Republic, and twice deposed by the force of arms, they had statesmen whose words and deeds might inspire them in the trials to come.

What Oliveira Marques never wrote, however, was a political history of the Republic; what he never really did—and he had the means at his disposal, given his enormous knowledge of the period—was breathe life into the regime whose social structures and economic underpinnings he had unearthed. In the pages of the journal whose tenth anniversary we are today celebrating, Douglas Wheeler wrote,

Similarly appealing to me as a historian, was Oliveira Marques' approach to the history of the first Republic. While more material on politics would have been helpful, for the politics of the Republic was the main focus of my 1978 book, the Portuguese historian's anatomy of society, culture and economic trends was invaluable; based on a mastery of a lot of material, his

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Diário de Notícias (Lisbon), 27 January 2007.

approach did not assign great importance to the roles of personalities, psychological history, and moral questions.<sup>15</sup>

Douglas Wheeler is undoubtedly correct, but the picture of he painted of Oliveira Marques' account of the Republic strikes me—perhaps unfairly—as an incomplete history. The men of 1910, having toppled an 800-year-old monarchy, had before them huge questions to resolve, and as if these were not enough, the World War, the Russian Revolution, and the refashioning of the world order at Versailles would soon be upon them. How politicians, intellectuals, business leaders and trade unionists, men and women, civilians and officers, tried to make sense of this changing world, and Portugal's place within it, must surely have been a tempting field for someone who knew so much about the period. But with the exception of some minor essays, or a summary published in the relevant volume of his Nova História de Portugal, Oliveira Marques baulked at the challenge.

Also on occasion of Oliveira Marques's death, José Medeiros Ferreira wrote,

Oliveira Marques' pioneering work shakes the apathy present in the academic and political worlds. The facts of the Republic's existence had been exploited by anti-parliamentary propaganda, which revealed only their negative side. And it was seen by Marxists as a period of bourgeois domination over the working class. The most evolved Churchmen preferred to prolong the silence regarding the First Republic. There were many sorts of resistance to overcome. And the criticisms made of A. H. de Oliveira Marques' work concentrate on the positivist way in which he approached the study of the Portuguese twentieth century. <sup>16</sup>

My own criticism, however, is of a different nature—and it is this: that Oliveira Marques' work in relation to the Republic was in fact incomplete, that he never really moved beyond laying the foundations for others' research. When we read the works currently being produced on the subject of the First Republic, which undoubtedly build on foundations he laid down, we see that he barely figures as a reference: he is twice, or three-times removed

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> 'Tribute To a Portuguese Historian: A Foreign Historian's Perspective On Oliveira Marques' Principal Historical Studies in English' *e-IPH*, Vol. 5, number 2, Winter 2007.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Diário de Notícias (Lisbon) 30 January 2007.

from current authors and their preoccupations. And this, in turn, brings me back to the question of the self-censorship he practiced when collecting Afonso Costa's speeches, which he readily acknowledged when speaking to me all those years ago: was it out of concern for Luso-Angolan relations, or concern for Afonso Costa's reputation, that led him to cut out passages in the speech? Broadening out this question, then, as a suggestion for further debate: Did Oliveira Marques fail to produce a political history of the First Republic because of the many constraints that limit academics' research and writing time, and because he had spread himself too thinly, or because he suspected—or, better, knew—that it would conflict with the positive idea he had struggled to create of the Republic? Were there simply too many negative aspects to the Republic, and to its principal figures, beginning with Afonso Costa himself, to countenance writing about?

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# Marcocci, Giuseppe & Paiva, José Pedro: *História* da Inquisição Portuguesa. (1536-1821), Lisbon: A Esfera dos Livros, 2013. ISBN: 978-989-626-452-9.

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The historiography of the Portuguese Inquisition is experiencing a moment of great expansion, both in terms of the quantity and the quality of most of the works written about the subject. The body of scientific studies has been steadily increasing since the 1980s and the different research lines have been gradually filling in a significant part of the gaps relating to what was still unknown about the Inquisition early on in that decade. There are several reasons for this and it is not my intention to list them all here. First of all, the peak of quantitative history resulted in attempts to measure the rhythms of inquisitorial repression in an accurate way. Later, the interest shown in the problems caused by intolerance gave a fresh impetus to the study of certain defendants, especially those who were New Christians. The most recent debates about the Catholic Reformation and the process of social disciplining have given rise to new analytic perspectives on the activity of the Holy Office and on the relationships it established with other ecclesiastical institutions. Finally, reflections on the State during the Early Modern Age have also resulted in attempts to assess the relationships between the Tribunal of the Holy Office, the Crown and other secular and ecclesiastical institutions. Furthermore, from a material point of view, we should not forget the policy of research promotion that has been implemented over the last few years by several public institutions, both in Portugal (FCT-Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia) and in Brazil (CNPq-Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico; Capes-Coordenação de aperfeiçoamento de pessoal de nivel superior, etc.), which has made numerous PhD theses and research works possible. More recently, the complete digitalization of the archive of the Tribunal of Lisbon has even allowed historians who live outside Portugal to rely on cheaper – but not always easier – access to sources.

It is in this context that, in Portugal, several master's degree theses and doctoral dissertations about the Inquisition have been presented over the last few years at the universities of Porto, under the guidance of Elvira Mea, and Coimbra, under the guidance of José Pedro Paiva. In Brazil, a group of highly qualified professors, such as, initially,

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Anita Novinsky, or, more recently, Laura de Mello e Souza and Ronaldo Vainfas, have also helped to encourage the emergence of several generations of researchers – educated mainly at the Universidade de São Paulo and the Universidade Federal Fluminense - who have focused on analyzing the impact of the Portuguese Inquisition in Brazilian territory. To these, we should add the increasing number of foreign researchers (especially Italian and Spanish, but also French or North American) or Brazilian researchers educated in France (such as E. Sales e Souza or B. Feitler), who have also dedicated their doctoral dissertations to the study of the Portuguese Inquisition. Not to mention the magnificent and almost unmanageable historiographical production – mostly produced by historians of Jewish origin – about the New Christians and the Sephardic Jews of the diaspora, in which there is an inevitable analysis of issues associated with the inquisitorial repression. In fact, it is quite clear that, as far as the Portuguese Inquisition is concerned, we are witnessing a trend which is the opposite of what is happening in the case of the Spanish Inquisition. In Spain, after the glorious period enjoyed by inquisitorial studies in the 1980s, we are currently witnessing a lack of interest in this subject and, in fact, it is foreign - much more than Spanish – historians who continue to study this institution and its consequences.

Amid such an abundant historiographical production, we must make an obligatory reference to the great work *História das Inquisições: Portugal, Espanha e Itália*, by Francisco Bethencourt, which was published for the first time in Portugal, in 1994, and has had numerous editions in French (1995), in Spanish (1997) and – reviewed – in English (2009). In my opinion, this is a work that, as the author himself stated, gave rise to a paradigm shift in studies about the Inquisition. In fact, the importance and influence of Bethencourt's work have been growing over the years and it is currently an inexhaustible source of information about the most diverse aspects of the three modern Inquisitions.

However, despite the vast historiographical production about the Tribunal, we were lacking a general history of the Portuguese Inquisition, until now. This lacuna contrasts sharply with the number of synthetic studies of the Spanish Inquisition that have appeared over the last few years. That is why, in my opinion, this *História da Inquisição Portuguesa* (1536-1821) is of paramount importance. Besides, it is not a coincidence that the first major synthetic study of the Portuguese Inquisition was written by Giuseppe Marcocci and José Pedro Paiva. Marcocci, who is currently a professor at the Università degli Studi della Tuscia (Viterbo), completed his doctorate at the Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, under the guidance of Professor Adriano Prosperi, one of the greatest specialists in the subject of the Modern Inquisition. On the other hand, Paiva is a professor at the Universidade de

Coimbra (Portugal) and one of the leading figures in the field of religious history studies in Portugal, an area he helped to renovate thanks to his works about the bishops and the Inquisition. The dialogue between the two takes us back a few years to the time when they had an interesting debate about the relationships between the episcopate and the Portuguese Inquisition. Their collaboration yielded its first fruits in the *Dizionario storico dell'Inquisizione*, directed by Adriano Prosperi in collaboration with John Tedeschi and Vincenzo Lavenia, and published in Pisa in 2010. This great work had more than 150 entries related to the Portuguese Inquisition or to New Christians of Portuguese origin, in addition to countless references to Portugal in other entries of a general nature. José Pedro Paiva and Giuseppe Marcocci coordinated the entries associated with Portugal, the former as a member of the Scientific Committee and the latter as a member of the Editorial Committee. After that moment, the two of them decided to undertake the massive task of writing the first general history of the Portuguese Inquisition.

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The História da Inquisição Portuguesa (1536-1821), which I am commenting on here, has a great internal logic and an extremely meticulous structure, which is praiseworthy from all points of view. The authors chose to present a chronological but simultaneously thematic history of the Portuguese Inquisition. And, indeed, they managed to do so with great expertise, because the book successfully combines a sequential analysis with the study of certain key issues. So, a significant part of the work is dedicated to an analysis of the history of the Holy Office based on the policy of the successive general inquisitors, the relationships between the Tribunal of the Holy Office, the Crown and the Holy See, the transformation of the institutional, bureaucratic and financial structures of the Inquisition and the rhythms of inquisitorial repression. But, at the same time, the authors decided to pay special attention to the major subjects or problems that marked the life of the Tribunal of the Holy Office: the repression of the New Christians and the issue of the purity of blood (Chapters 2 and 6), the development of the inquisitorial process (Chapter 7), the acts of faiths (autos de fê) and other public ceremonies associated with the representation of the inquisitorial power (Chapter 10), etc.

The work is divided into five parts with 4 chapters each (except for the last one). These five parts correspond to the five stages into which the authors divide the history of the Holy Office. Any historical division is, obviously, artificial. Besides, each historian

would probably suggest a different periodization for the history of the Portuguese Inquisition. We have already learned with Joaquim Romero Magalhães that the different times (tempos) of the Inquisition cannot be rigidly demarcated and depend on the specific aspects on which we focus (Magalhães, 1987; Magalhães, 1992). Nevertheless, I find the five stages defined by Marcocci and Paiva particularly appropriate for two reasons: they are based on the internal evolution of the Tribunal and go beyond the traditional history divided by reigns, or the no less artificial history divided by political events, such as the ones that occurred in 1580 or 1640.

The first part is dedicated to the period when the Holy Office was established and consolidated in Portugal, that is, from its foundation to the crisis that led to the general pardon granted by Clement VIII to the New Christians in 1604, and implemented in 1605. The authors call this section Inquisição e Renascimento (Inquisition and Renaissance) and, in my opinion, these two nouns could perfectly well be joined by a third one: Reformation. There is obviously a central figure whose omnipresence marks this entire period: the Cardinal Prince Dom Henrique, who was responsible for the way in which the Holy Office was organized, and which ended up lasting over some time (Chapter 1). We might ask why the authors decided to extend this stage until 1604 instead of interrupting it in 1578 (when the Cardinal Prince ascended the throne), or in 1580 (when Portugal was integrated into the Spanish Monarchy). The answer probably lies in the fact that there wasn't any rupture in the Holy Office in 1578 or in 1580. Even the issue of Dom Henrique abandoning the management of the Tribunal had already been raised before the death of King Sebastião. On the contrary, 1604-1605 did actually give rise to a true break in the history of the Inquisition, because the general pardon had been preceded by an intense battle in Madrid, Valladolid, and Rome, which was the first one that the Holy Office had lost since 1547. Inevitably, one of the chapters of the first part is dedicated to the repression of the Crypto-Jews, triggered after the Inquisition was established in Portugal (Chapter 2). But, at the same time, the authors decided to dedicate another chapter to the impact of the Holy Office on 16th-century Portuguese society, the control of the Old Christian majority and the influence of the Tribunal in the process of Catholic Reformation that occurred during and after the Council of Trent (Chapter 3).

The second part – O Santo Oficio entre duas dinastias<sup>2</sup> – focuses on the stage when the Tribunal of the Holy Office reached its greatest apogee and power, between the years that followed the general pardon of 1605 and the suspension of the Holy Office by Rome

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Holy Office between Two Dynasties.

(1674-1681). Obviously, the authors decided to dedicate different chapters to the periods of the Iberian Union (Chapter 5) and the Restoration War (Chapter 7). Furthermore, there is another chapter dedicated to the study of the repression of the New Christians and the social and cultural consequences of the obsession with blood purity that characterized Portuguese society for over two centuries (Chapter 6). On the other hand, in the chapter dedicated to the Empire, the authors focus on the strong controversies created by the Chinese and the Malabar rites, and also on the proposals to create an inquisitorial tribunal in Brazil (Chapter 7).

The third part – A Inquisição Barroca<sup>3</sup> – covers the period between the reinstatement of the Holy Office (when its second major crisis after the general pardon was solved) and the beginning of the reforms introduced by Pombal. This period is marked by two major figures: King João V and Dom Nuno da Cunha, who held the position of general inquisitor between 1707 and 1750. This stage is characterized by a decline in inquisitorial repression, partly due to the bull Romanus Pontifex (August 22, 1681), which restored the Holy Office in Portugal. After this moment, it was mandatory to question witnesses once again after the defense. This meant that proceedings became a lot slower and, as a consequence, there was a decrease in the total number of trials. But, although this number was decreasing, the numbers of ministers and, especially, of commissaries and familiars of the Holy Office grew because, as José Veiga Torres demonstrated in a masterful work (Torres, 1994), the rising social groups increasingly resorted to the Tribunal - especially through the figure of the familiars – in order to consolidate their social prestige. The power and support on which the Holy Office relied was expressed in particular during the acts of faith, to which the authors dedicate Chapter 10. By this time, the Inquisition was having to cope with new heresies like Molinosism (from the 1690s onwards, but especially in the 1720s and 1730s), Freemasonry and Sigilism (in the 1740s), to which the authors dedicate Chapter 11.

The fourth part – *Um tribunal dominado*<sup>4</sup> – focuses on the decadence and protracted agony of the Tribunal of the Holy Office, which was completely tamed and controlled by the royal power thanks to the reforms introduced by the Marquis of Pombal. At this point, the Inquisition lost both its traditional enemy and the main reason for its existence in Portugal, because the New Christians were no longer being prosecuted in the 1760s. In Chapter 13, the authors reconstruct the process through which the Marquis of Pombal managed to control the Holy Office and completely subdue it to the Crown, in keeping

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Baroque Inquisition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> A Dominated Tribunal.

with his strategy of combating the Society of Jesus. Thus, Pombal managed to have the Jesuits who were accused of instigating the attack against King José I prosecuted by the Holy Office, which was governed by his own brother. Gabriele Malagria, S.J., was the last man to be sentenced to death by the Portuguese Inquisition (1761), having been found guilty of feigned holiness. Pombal also managed to put an end to the *motu proprio* formula contained in the briefs relating to the appointment of the general inquisitors and got Rome to specify, in the corresponding documents, that the appointment had to be made through a presentation made by the king of Portugal. Furthermore, in 1773, the Crown eliminated the distinction between Old and New Christians, and, in the following year, approved the new regulations of the Inquisition. Since the Inquisition had lost its traditional enemy, it had to look for others, such as the Freemasons, the Libertines and the Deists. In this context, there was a strong emphasis on the collaboration between the Holy Office and the General Intendancy of Police, which is highlighted by the authors.

Finally, the fifth part – O ocaso da Inquisição<sup>5</sup> – focuses on the study of the extinction of the Tribunal of the Holy Office, which had already been completely garbled and moribund for a long time. The Liberal Revolution that put an end to the Inquisition broke out on August 24, 1820. Marcocci and Paiva reconstruct the debates about the Holy Office that took place in the Constitutional Assembly until the approval of the decree that extinguished the Tribunal, on March 31, 1821. At that point, nobody defended the Holy Office, neither the general inquisitor nor the ministers of the Holy Office nor even the bishops.

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We are undoubtedly facing a monumental and outstanding work, which was absolutely necessary, considering the current state of affairs in the area of inquisitorial studies. The thesis that supports the entire book is already stated in the introduction. For the authors, the Inquisition was not a monolithic and immutable block throughout its nearly three centuries of existence. On the contrary, it was a multifaceted institution. It was an ecclesiastical court of law and a power that – supported by the Crown – evolved and changed and had an enormous impact on Portuguese society. Indeed, from that point of view and throughout their work, the authors show us the evolution of the Tribunal and the different functions it performed during the whole of its history: a tribunal for the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The Twilight of the Inquisition.

repression of heresy, an institution for the control of morality and customs, a power at the service of the Crown, an instrument used by the bourgeoisie for its social promotion, etc.

Writing the history of the nearly three centuries of the Tribunal was a true challenge and the authors are aware of the difficulty and the risks associated with the task they undertook. For this very reason, in the introduction they already call upon scholars to "correct its inaccuracies". Based on this incentive given by the authors themselves, I am going to allow myself to make a few comments that will be limited to the Iberian Union, which is the period I know best.

First of all, I believe that the use of the expression "Castilian domination" to describe the period of the Iberian Union should be avoided. The classic works by H. G. Koenigsberger and J. Elliott had already demonstrated that the Spanish Monarchy was a structure made up of aggregated territories. In accordance with the research works by A. Manuel Hespanha, F. Bouza, R. Valladares, P. Cardim and many others, I don't believe that there was ever actually a Castilian domination in Portugal, but rather a single dynasty – the Habsburgs - that governed both territories based on dynastic rights. Portugal wasn't dominated by Castilian interests. The interests of a family, the Habsburgs, were what determined the future of the entire Spanish Monarchy. As Rafael Valladares pointed out some years ago while mentioning the consequences of the Cortes of Tomar: "hence, there was no absorption or domination of Castile over Portugal, but a complete autonomy of the former with regard to the latter" (Valladares, 2000: 15)8. In my opinion, the adjective "Castilian" is a generic reference that, furthermore, may prove incomplete. I will give just one example: Paiva and Marcocci mention a junta that held a meeting in Madrid in 1602 and whose "members were mostly from Castile". However, it is known that in this junta there was a Catalonian minister (P. Franqueza), a Valencian one (Juan de Borja), a Portuguese one (the Duke of Vilanova) and only one Castilian minister (Friar Gaspar de Córdoba). For the same reason, I believe that a mere correspondence between the Spanish Monarchy and Castile should be avoided. In that regard, stating that the Moriscos were

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<sup>6 &</sup>quot;... os estudiosos e especialistas, que saberão recolher o desafio intelectual desta tentativa, corrigir as suas inexactidões e desbravar as pistas que, por vezes, foram indicadas, mas não exaustivamente exploradas" (p. 19).

<sup>7 &</sup>quot;No quinto capítulo analisa-se a sua evolução institucional durante a dominação castelhana" (p. 18).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> In the epilogue of the same essay, Valladares said: "The conflict of 1640 wasn't mainly, nor essentially a horizontal (national) conflict between the Spanish and the Portuguese, but rather a vertical conflict between the different Portuguese social groups subject to a crown that was *only circumstantially embodied by the Habsburgs from Madrid* between 1580 and 1640" (Valladares, 2000: 58, my emphasis added). On the status of the kingdom of Portugal within the Spanish Monarchy, see the recent study by Pedro Cardim, *Portugal unido y separado*. Felipe II, la unión de territorios y el debate sobre la condición política del reino de Portugal (preprint).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> "E se em 1585 D. Filipe II consultara o Conselho sobre o provimento do novo inquisidor-geral, agora o assunto foi apreciado por junta em Madrid, maioritariamente composta por castelhanos" (p. 140).

"expelled from Castile in 1609" is incorrect<sup>10</sup>. The *Moriscos* were expelled from the entire Spanish territory (1609-1614), and actually the first decrees from 1609 mentioned only Valencia. The *Moriscos* from Castile, as well as those from Aragon, were only expelled nearly a year later<sup>11</sup>. Besides, most of the *Moriscos* who were expelled came from the territories of the Crown of Aragon, and especially from the kingdom of Valencia (Domínguez Ortiz and Vincent, 1978: 200).

Still in the context of the Iberian Union, I believe that it would perhaps be advisable to correct a few statements about the issues of censorship and purity of blood. So, for example, the authors argue that the Index of Prohibited Books of 1624 banned *Don Quixote* by Cervantes<sup>12</sup>. However, the Index never banned the book. Instead, like the Spanish Inquisition, it simply purged a few excerpts (López-Salazar, 2010: 159, note 44). In fact, *Don Quixote* was widely read in Portugal and had a great impact on Portuguese culture (Glaser 1955).

I also disagree with the authors when they state that "in Portugal, contrary to what happened in Spain [...] there was never a general and single law about purity"<sup>13</sup>. In Spain there wasn't a general blood purity law either. Some institutions and corporations (university colleges, certain religious orders, cathedral chapters, the Military Orders, a few town councils, etc.) created purity statutes, but there was never a general law. Therefore, the system was the same in Spain and Portugal. In this regard, Juan Ignacio Gutiérrez Nieto, one of the greatest specialists on the question of purity of blood, said: "Filipe II did not implement a complete and systematic policy for the creation of castes and, while he authorized statutes in a few Castilian town councils, he refused to generalize them, mainly for fiscal reasons" (Gutiérrez Nieto, 1995: 447).

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At this point, having made these remarks, I would also like to stress what are, in my opinion, the most significant merits of this work. First of all, the authors have provided us with a comprehensive and chronological picture of the history of the Portuguese Holy

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> "Sentia-se também o efeito da política da Coroa em relação aos mouriscos, expulsos de Castela em 1609" (p. 161).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> The decrees relating to the *Moriscos* from Castile were published between January and June, 1610, while the decrees relating to the *Moriscos* from Aragon were published in May.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> "Espraiava-se por várias áreas, proibindo títulos em castelhano, como o *Don Quijote de la Mancha* de Miguel de Cervantes..." (p. 150).

<sup>13 &</sup>quot;Em Portugal, ao contrario do sucedido em Espanha, onde as primeiras normas de segregação remontavam aos estatutos de Toledo (1449), nunca houve uma lei geral e única sobre a limpeza" (p. 172).

Office from the origins of the Inquisition to its extinction. That was not an easy task. Up until now, a few periods were relatively well known, especially the period when the Tribunal was established, or the period of the Habsburg government. However, we knew far less about other stages, especially about the 18th century. The aspects of the inquisitorial repression (against New Christians, Molinosists, Sigilists or Freemasons) were indeed known and we had a magnificent and key article by Pedro Vilas Boas Tavares about the 70 final years of the Tribunal's existence (Tavares, 2002: 203-240). Marcocci and Paiva have managed to synthesize the contributions made by the historiography of the Inquisition, fill in the gaps and provide us with a complete, coherent, and comprehensive image of the Tribunal's life.

Secondly, I find it highly relevant that there are constant references to individuals. The Inquisition is not an institution – a factory – without a face. In all cases, the authors chose to present us with the general inquisitors and, in order of appearance, also other ministers of the Tribunal. Thanks to them, we learn about the importance of given individuals within the Holy Office in terms of the adoption of specific policies. A good example of this is the key role played by Paulo de Carvalho e Mendonça, the brother of the Marquis of Pombal and a deputy of the General Council, in the submission of the Holy Office to the Crown, which is illustrated by the famous trial of the Jesuit Gabriele Malagrida. But, while the ministers of the Holy Office are given a name, the defendants aren't reduced to mere numbers. The book is rich when it comes to presenting the individual stories of the suspects, whether these were Converts, Protestants, Molinosists, Freemasons or Freethinkers. Some individuals, such as Padre António Vieira or António Homem, are truly exceptional, and the specialists knew their stories rather well. But others are completely normal and ordinary - almost anonymous - people, whose anguish and suffering are placed by the authors at the same level as those of the defendants from the most important trials. In fact, the reason why there isn't any one specific chapter dedicated to the defendants is because they are ubiquitous throughout the entire work, and are not confined to a single section or to mere quantitative analyses.

Thirdly, the authors constantly frame the Inquisition within the history of Portugal and its Empire during the early modern centuries. We all know the extent to which, on numerous occasions, inquisitorial studies were closed in on themselves. On the contrary, in this work, the Inquisition is in permanent dialogue with the Monarchy and with the other ecclesiastical and secular institutions of modern Portugal. We should not forget that the authors dedicated a significant part of their research to the study of the complex

relationships between the Tribunal of the Holy Office and other ecclesiastical institutions, such as the bishops and the religious orders (especially the Dominicans and the Jesuits).

Fourthly, I find it extremely appropriate that the last chapter of each part is dedicated to the specific reality of the Holy Office in the immense Portuguese overseas territories, from India to Brazil. The study of the Inquisition within the kingdom has too often been disengaged from the inquisitorial actions that were implemented overseas and vice versa. Simultaneously, the authors' intensive efforts at synthesis and reflection on the inquisitorial actions that were implemented in territories as vast and as different as the Far East, Africa and Brazil allows the reader to understand the challenges that this European institution had to face when it came into contact with extremely different sociocultural and religious realities.

Fifthly, this book, like all major research works, serves to highlight the gaps that still exist in our knowledge of the Holy Office. The authors tried to fill them in as best they could. The extremely interesting and new data about the inquisitorial economy – especially the information relating to the 18th century – should be understood as a warning about the need for a comprehensive study focused on the finances of the Holy Office.

Finally, I echo the words of Professor Gérard Dufour who, while praising Maximiliano Barrios' work, regretted the fact that certain historians had a tendency not to make use of the archival resources<sup>14</sup>. Marcocci and Paiva are historians who rely on the archives; who, in order to substantiate any given thesis, present the necessary empirical support; who bring new data to light because they have referred to the sources; who want to retrieve the value of the documents. And, of course, this provides their work with an unquestionable solidity. Besides, I cannot help but highlight the precision and clarity of the written content. At times like these, when the obligation to produce frequently results in a predominance of quantity over quality and in a constant disregard for style, the readers can thank Marcocci and Paiva for offering them a well-written, elegant and clear text.

Last, but not least, I would like to briefly refer to the way in which the work was received. It was published in February 2013, and *A Esfera dos Livros* immediately launched a widespread campaign that allowed the work to be promoted outside the academic field<sup>15</sup>. This *History of the Portuguese Inquisition* has demonstrated that top-quality scientific history

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Hispania Sacra, LXIII, 127, (2011), 402.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> So, for example, José Pedro Paiva was interviewed on the Antena 3 radio show "Prova Oral" (February 6, 2013) and also, together with Marcocci, on the RDP Internacional radio show "Forum" (May 29, 2013). Furthermore, the *History of the Portuguese Inquisition* was commented on during the TSF-Rádio Notícias radio show "O livro do dia" (February 12, 2013). And the book was reviewed by Professor Diogo Ramada Curto in the April 12, 2013 issue of *Ípsilon*.

can also meet the interests of the general public. In other words, the non-academic population wants to be able to read history books whose contents are simultaneously accessible (through the way in which they are presented) and accurate. So, Paiva and Marcocci have accomplished one of the hardest goals that a historian can achieve.

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