

House, he was said to have told President Eisenhower about his fear that the Soviet Union was reinforcing Egyptian armaments to a dangerous level and about his hope that an arrangement at the summit might put an end to the arms race. One such arrangement might be an arms embargo on deliveries to the Arab States and Israel joined in by both Soviet Union and the Western States.

In a New York Times report (March 26) Dana Adams Schmidt writes that the Israel leader offered four basic arguments in favor of this initiative. These were: (1) despite surface incidents and alarms the Middle East was moving into a period of relative calm; (2) Arab-Israel hostilities have been somewhat diminished; (3) if advantage is not taken of the present opportunity, renewed and far more serious hostilities might break out; and (4) as experience has shown, action to pacify the Middle East must have the participation of both Western powers and the Soviet Union. Moreover, Ben Gurion pointed out, most of the arms now flowing to the United Arab Republic from the Soviet bloc are spare parts rather than new weapons.

Another possible Big Four move in aid of an Arab-Israel settlement was along the lines of the U.K.-U.S.S.R. communique of April 25th, 1956. This announcement, which was issued on the occasion of Khrushchev's and Bulganin's visit to England reads as follows:

The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have the firm intention to do everything in their power to facilitate the maintenance of peace and security in the Near and Middle East ... The Governments of the two countries ... will also support the UN initiative to secure a peaceful settlement on a mutually acceptable basis of the dispute between Arab States and Israel.

But what are the actual chances of Big Four agreement on Palestine affairs -- whatever the precise form of agreement may be? From the Western standpoint the U.S. would probably accept an East-West embargo on arms to the Arab States and Israel, even though important segments of Washington opinion are against giving any official Middle East status to the Kremlin. As it is, the U.S. has made no arms deliveries of any appreciable size to either Israel or its immediate Arab neighbors. The Soviet Union, however, has, since its famous arms-for-cotton deal with Egypt in 1956, shipped an amount calculated at half a billion dollars worth of armaments to the Arab States.

Khrushchev is therefore likely to press, as he has in previous notes, for an arms embargo applied to the whole Middle East. The Soviet Union is hardly likely to exclude the CENTO Pact countries, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, from any such embargo. And this, of course, is the price which the West is not willing to pay. The Soviet successes in hurdling the Baghdad Pact have isolated the Northern Tier countries and driven them even more closely into the arms of the West. It thus remains highly doubtful that we shall risk endangering the security (internal as well as external) of the Northern Tier states even at the possible gain of an Arab-Israel pacification.