<mods:mods xmlns:mods="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-7.xsd"><mods:titleInfo><mods:title>General Equilibrium Effects of Recruiting High-Performing Teachers for School Turnaround: Evidence from Tennessee</mods:title></mods:titleInfo><mods:name><mods:namePart>Adam Kho</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm authority="marcrelator" authorityURI="http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators" valueURI="http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name><mods:namePart>Gary T. Henry</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm authority="marcrelator" authorityURI="http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators" valueURI="http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name><mods:namePart>Ron Zimmer</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm authority="marcrelator" authorityURI="http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators" valueURI="http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name><mods:namePart>Lam Pham</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm authority="marcrelator" authorityURI="http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators" valueURI="http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:subject><mods:topic>Teacher Turnover</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:subject><mods:topic>General Equilibrium</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:subject><mods:topic>Teacher Incentives</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:subject><mods:topic>School Turnaround</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:subject authority="edworkp"><mods:topic>K-12 Education</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:subject authority="edworkp"><mods:topic>Educator labor markets</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:subject authority="edworkp"><mods:topic>Program and policy effects</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:originInfo><mods:dateCreated>2019</mods:dateCreated><mods:publisher>Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University</mods:publisher></mods:originInfo><mods:abstract>Many districts and states have begun implementing incentives to attract high-performing teachers to low-performing schools.  Previous research has found that these incentives are effective.  However, effects on the schools and students these teachers leave behind has not been examined.  This study focuses on the general equilibrium effects of recruiting effective teachers to Tennessee’s Innovation Zone (iZone) schools, one of the most successful turnaround initiatives in the nation (Zimmer, Henry, &amp;amp; Kho, 2017).  While there is some variation in the effects of losing these teachers, we find they range between -0.04 and -0.12 standard deviations in student test score gains.  However, an estimate including both these negative effects and the positive effects in iZone schools yields overall net positive effects.</mods:abstract><mods:language><mods:languageTerm authority="iso639-2b" type="code">eng</mods:languageTerm></mods:language><mods:typeOfResource>text</mods:typeOfResource><mods:genre authority="aat">grey literature</mods:genre><mods:relatedItem type="series"><mods:titleInfo><mods:title>edworkingpapers.com</mods:title></mods:titleInfo></mods:relatedItem><mods:relatedItem><mods:identifier type="DOI">10.26300/7nj2-3219</mods:identifier></mods:relatedItem><mods:accessCondition type="use and reproduction" xlink:href="http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/">In Copyright</mods:accessCondition></mods:mods>