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VISIT OF PRESIDENT-ELECT COSTA E SILVA OF BRAZIL
January 26-27, 1967

Scope Paper

Purpose of Visit

The visit of President-elect Arthur da Costa e Silva is part of a six weeks' round-the-world tour which he is making prior to his inauguration March 15, 1967. Through this tour he hopes to demonstrate abroad that he is an authentic leader of Brazil and, at home, that he is an accepted figure on the international scene. The trip also keeps him out of Brazil at a time when pending controversial legislation is causing serious criticism of the Castello Branco administration and when his presence as President-elect could cause difficulties.

In addition, his purpose in visiting the United States is to meet United States Government leaders and to sense at firsthand their reaction to him as President-elect.

Expected Atmosphere

The visit is expected to be informal and friendly. Costa e Silva will not seek to negotiate substantive issues. He will not press for any commitments, nor is he likely to make any. He will want to take his

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own measure of United States officials, to convey a favorable image of himself, and to discuss in a general way topics of mutual interest.

He will respond best to a warm and friendly attitude in which there is also a clear indication of respect for his importance and independence. He is known to be sensitive on this score. He will also be looking for evidence that the United States values its close and friendly relations with Brazil and fully realizes Brazil's importance in world affairs. He feels that Brazil's large population, potential, and record of cooperation with the United States entitle it to be treated as something far more than "just another Latin American republic," something more like our highest priority allies in other parts of the world.

Brazilian Objectives

Costa e Silva will wish to assess the attitude of the United States Government toward himself and the regime which he represents. He will aim to dispel any impression that he intends to be a military dictator by emphasizing both his concern with social and economic problems and his desire for a return to normal democratic processes. Nonetheless, he will want to prepare United States leaders for the possibility of further exceptional measures during his term of office if in his judgment Brazil's security or further development requires them. He will be seeking understanding and general support. He will also want to leave a clear impression that he considers cooperation to be a two-way street.

United States Objectives

We want to explain United States policies and to lay the groundwork for continued close cooperation with Brazil after Costa e Silva takes office. We want to encourage him to strengthen democratic government and institutions in Brazil, to broaden the base of the regime's support, and to maintain the main lines of the Castello Branco Government's economic and financial policies.

We look for Brazil to play a leading role in the Alliance for Progress, in working toward regional economic integration, and in reducing expenditures on unnecessary armaments. We hope for Costa e Silva's cooperation in maintaining pressure on Cuba and combatting subversion in the hemisphere. We want Brazil to assume a more active role in Vietnam.

By a warm, friendly and respectful welcome to him and Mrs. Costa e Silva, we also hope to erase any possible trace of concern which he may harbor from his visit as War Minister in 1965, when he reportedly felt that he did not receive enough high-level attention.

Topics to be Discussed

The principal topics of conversation are expected to be: (1) The proposed summit meeting of American Presidents, including its timing, location, and agenda; (2) The Alliance for Progress, with particular emphasis on agriculture, education, health, and political development; (3) The Brazilian Government's economic/financial program; (4) Hemisphere and world security, with strong emphasis on Vietnam; and (5) Military assistance programs.

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