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LIMDIS

FOR MANN FROM AMBASSADOR

DEPCIRCTEL 1530

TRADITIONALLY BRAZILIAN MILITARY (ALL THREE SERVICES, BUT ARMY IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT) HAVE BEEN A STABILIZING AND MODERATING FACTOR IN BRAZILIAN POLITICAL SCENE. THEY ARE AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR NOW IN STRATEGY FOR RESTRAINING LEFT-WING EXCESSES OF GOULART GOVERNMENT AND MAINTAINING PROSPECTS FOR FAIR ELECTION 1965 AND INSTALLATION SUCCESSOR 1966. UNLIKE MANY SPANISH-AMERICAN OFFICER CORPS, THEY ARE NOT AN ARISTOCRATIC CASTE SEPARATE FROM GENERAL PUBLIC. BASIC ORIENTATION OF GREAT MAJORITY IS MODERATELY NATIONALIST BUT NOT ANTI-US, ANTI-COMMUNIST BUT NOT FASCIST, AND PRO-DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALIST. THE MILITARY NOT ONLY HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF SUPPRESSING POSSIBLE INTERNAL DISORDERS BUT ALSO SERVE AS MODERATORS ON BRAZILIAN POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIRECTED AT KEEPING THEM WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL LIMITS. BESIDES THEIR POLITICAL WEIGHT MILITARY ARE IMPORTANT SOURCE OF TRAINED ADMINISTRATORS FOR GOVERNMENT CIVIL ENTERPRISES.

DURING POSTWAR PERIOD US HAS BENEFITTED FROM PRO-AMERICAN ORIENTATION OF OFFICER CORPS BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES, TO LARGE EXTENT RESULT OF ACTIVE WARTIME ALLIANCE. THIS ASSET NOW BEING DILUTED BY RETIREMENT SENIOR OFFICERS AND IT MOST IMPORTANT WE ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CLOSE EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE YOUNGER MILITARY GROUP. IT IS ALSO ESSENTIAL WE COUNTERACT THE VISIBLE GROWTH OF ANTI-US FEELING IN SUBSTANTIAL NON-COMMUNIST MILITARY CIRCLES BASED ON BELIEF THAT US IGNORES THE IMPORTANCE OF BRAZILIAN MILITARY, FEELS THAT BRAZIL HAS NO CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE TO HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE, AND WILL LIMIT

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE EXCLUSIVELY TO UNITS WITH POLICE OR CIVIC ACTION ROLE.

BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES ARE INDEED STRONGLY CONSCIOUS THEIR INTERNAL SECURITY ROLE AND THEIR ACTIVITIES IN CONSTRUCTIVE NATION BUILDING, INCLUDING ROAD CONSTRUCTION, FRONTIER POST MAINTENANCE, COMMUNICATIONS IN REMOTE INTERIOR, TRAINING OF CONSCRIPTS IN LITERACY AND USEFUL TRADES, ETC. AT SAME TIME, AS BEARERS OF PROUD TRADITION IN LARGEST LA NATION, THEY RESENT IDEA, ESPECIALLY WHEN PROPAGATED BY AMERICANS, THAT ONLY DANGER THEY MUST PREPARE AGAINST COMES FROM THEIR OWN PEOPLE. BRAZILIAN MILITARY FEEL THAT COUNTRY IS ON THRESHOLD OF BEING A SIGNIFICANT WORLD POWER AND CONSIDERING ITS SIZE AND POPULATION RESENT BEING ASSIGNED A STRICTLY POLICE ROLE AND EQUATED WITH SMALL LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS. THIS IS FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT IN PSYCHOLOGY OF BRAZILIAN MILITARY NATIONALISM, WHICH WE MUST RECOGNIZE AS A FACT AND CAN TURN TO OUR ADVANTAGE IF WE TAKE ACTION TO MAINTAIN GOODWILL DEVELOPED DURING WAR AND THROUGH POST-WAR MAP RELATIONS.

BY GENERAL LA OR WORLDWIDE STANDARDS, BRAZILIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES ARE NOT EXCESSIVE, RUNNING WELL UNDER 70 PERCENT FEDERAL BUDGET AND ABOUT 2 1/2 PERCENT OF GNP.

FOLLOWING RESPONSES ARE NOT IN ORDER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS LISTED REFTEL BUT ARE NUMBERED TO CORRESPOND TO THOSE QUESTIONS.

1. OUR MAP IS A HIGHLY IMPORTANT FACTOR INFLUENCING MILITARY TO BE PRO-U.S. AND PRO-WESTERN AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THIS RESPECT IS GROWING. ON BOTH TRAINING AND HARDWARE SIDES, MAP IS A MAJOR VEHICLE FOR ESTABLISHING CLOSE RELATIONS WITH PERSONNEL OF ARMED FORCES.

3. AND 9. PRESENTLY PLANNED MAP IS INADEQUATE FOR REASONS DESCRIBED ABOVE. MAINTENANCE OF PRO-US ORIENTATION BRAZILIAN MILITARY REQUIRES HARDWARE AVAILABILITY CONSONANT BOTH WITH EFFECTIVE DISCHARGE CRITICAL INTERNAL SECURITY ROLE AND WITH SENSE OF DIGNITY OF ARMED FORCES OF LARGE NATION. DURING YEARS OF NORONHA AGREEMENT, AID LEVEL AROUND 25 MILLION PER YEAR DID THIS WELL. WITH PRESENT PROGRAMS LEVELS OF UNDER 10 MILLION, MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS LEAVE LITTLE OR NO MAP FUNDS FOR FORCE IMPROVEMENT. OBSOLETE AND OBSOLESCENT MATERIAL IS GREATEST PRESENT WEAKNESS BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES. I AM

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ENTIRELY OPPOSED TO US GRANTS OF SHINY WEAPONRY FOR PURE PRESTIGE PURPOSES. WITHOUT INCLUDING ANY SUCH ITEMS, HOWEVER, AND SIMPLY TO SUPPORT CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS ARMED FORCES AND A REASONABLE DEGREE OF PROGRESSIVE MODERNIZATION, BRAZILIAN MAP LEVELS SHOULD BE IN NEIGHBORHOOD 20 MILLION PER YEAR. MAAG HAS CLEAR VIEW OF PRIORITY USES FOR THIS SCALE MAP.

ALSO IMPORTANT TO MODIFY GUIDE LINES WHICH OUTLAW CERTAIN MODERN TYPES EQUIPMENT ON GROUNDS EXCESSIVE SOPHISTICATION FOR LATIN AMERICA. LA IS NOT HOMOGENEOUS, AND UNIFORM GUIDE LINES FOR BRAZIL AND CENTRAL AMERICA ARE JUSTLY RESENTED HERE.

WAR MINISTER WILL SHORTLY BE SUBMITTING REQUEST FOR SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITIES THROUGH FILLING OUT INFANTRY AND PARACHUTE UNITS AND CREATING SMALL NUMBER CRACK MECHANIZED UNITS FOR STATIONING RECIFE, BELO HORIZONTE, SAO PAULO, AND PORTO ALEGRE. MAAG CHIEF BELIEVES THIS COULD BE WELL DONE AT HARDWARE COST 7 TO 10 MILLION DOLLARS, AND WOULD BE MAJOR IMPROVEMENT ARMY CAPABILITY IN SITUATION GROWING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RESTLESSNESS. BETTER AIR AND SEA TRANSPORTATION BOTH BADLY NEEDED IN VIEW SIZE AND TERRAIN OF COUNTRY.

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LIMDIS FOR MANN FROM AMBASSADOR

AS TO DESIRE FOR MODERNIZATION, AIR FORCE INSISTENCE ON TURBO PROPS IN PLACE 20 TO 30 YEAR OLD PROPELLER TYPES IS AN INESCAPABLE FACT OF LIFE. RECENT BRAZILIAN ARMY DECISION TO BUY BELGIAN RIFLES IN BARTER FOR IRON ORE ANOTHER SIMILAR EXAMPLE. BOTH ARMY AND NAVY ARE ALSO WORKING TOWARD INSTALLATION MANUFACTURING FACILITIES CERTAIN MATERIEL IN BRAZIL, WHICH IS NATURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SEMI-INDUSTRIALIZED NATION, WITH STRONG GENERAL INDUSTRY BASE IN SAO PAULO REGION. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS TREND PROMOTED BUT STANDARDIZED ON US TYPES AND DESIGNS.

TOTAL MAP COST TO US MIGHT BE KEPT UNDER 20 MILLION PER YEAR IF WE LOOK TO TRANSFER OBSOLESCENT EUROPEAN THEATER HARDWARE ONLY ONE GENERATION OLD AS IT BECOMES REPLACED IN EUROPE.

4. U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE DOES NOT INCREASE DANGER OF FASCIST-TYPE MILITARY TAKEOVER. DESPITE SOME EXTREME NATIONALISTIC AND LEFTIST ELEMENTS IN ALL THREE SERVICES, GREAT MAJORITY ARE STILL BASICALLY FAITHFUL TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC TRADITION AND ARE PREDOMINANTLY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND PRO U.S. IF REACTION TO LEFT-WING COUP ATTEMPT LED TO TEMPORARY MILITARY TAKEOVER, THEY WOULD BE QUICK TO RESTORE CONSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND RETURN POWER TO CIVILIAN HANDS. THE ARMED FORCES STILL ARE THE MOST POWERFUL SINGLE FORCE OF RESISTANCE AGAINST INROADS OF ANTI-DEMOCRATIC (AS WELL AS ANTI-AMERICAN) ELEMENTS IN BRAZIL.

2. AND 7. THERE IS NO DUPLICATION IN AID SUPPORT TO POLICE AND MAP SUPPORT OF MILITARY. BRAZIL DOES NOT HAVE UNIFIED NATIONAL POLICE. STATE, FEDERAL, AND MILITARY POLICE VARY WIDELY IN EFFECTIVENESS WITH LITTLE OR NO COORDINATION AMONG THEM.

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REGULAR ARMED FORCES ARE ONLY FORCE CAPABLE OF PUTTING DOWN LARGE SCALE UPRISINGS OR DISORDERS. IMPROVEMENT OF STATE POLICE IMPORTANT TO MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER AGAINST MINOR DISTURBANCE, CRIME PREVENTION, AND REDUCING NEED FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION.

5. BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES HAVE LONG HISTORY AND TRADITION IN FIELD OF CIVIC ACTION. ALMOST EVERY UNIT IS INVOLVED TO A DEGREE, AND SOME SUCH AS ARMY ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION BATTALION DEVOTE FULL TIME TO THIS EFFORT. ARMED FORCES PLAY SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN SETTLEMENT AND SUPPORT OF LARGE FRONTIER AREAS, EDUCATING LARGE NUMBER OF CONSTRICTS, INCULCATING THEM WITH NATIONAL FEELING. THEY ALSO INTRODUCE RECRUITS TO MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND PROVIDE HEALTH, SANITATION, MAIL AND OTHER SERVICES TO REMOTE AREAS. ARMY PARTICULARLY PROVIDES AN ELEMENT OF SOCIAL MOBILITY. MANY OF ITS LEADING OFFICERS HAVE RISEN FROM THE RANKS.

6. WITHIN AVAILABLE FUNDS WE ARE SUPPORTING PROPER BALANCE AMONG VARIOUS FORCES. HOWEVER, AS INDICATED IN THREE ABOVE, ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR ARMED FORCES WOULD PROVIDE BETTER DEPLOYMENT AND BALANCE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES.

8. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES IN GENERAL DOES NOT CREATE CONCERN TO BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES DUE TO THEIR OWN SIZE AND STRENGTH. A CRITICAL ATTITUDE DOES EXIST CONCERNING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA, WHERE BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE AND NAVY ESPECIALLY WATCH RELATIVE STRENGTH JEALOUSLY. MORE BROADLY, BRAZILIAN MILITARY HAVE OCCASIONALLY COMMENTED ON RELATIVE DISPARITY OF TYPE AND QUANTITY OF ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO COUNTRIES WHICH THEY CONSIDER SMALLER AND OF LESS IMPORTANCE TO US IN TERMS OF PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE RELATIONS. BEING ONE-THIRD OF LA IN AREA AND POPULATION, HAVING FOUGHT IN ITALY AND NOW CONTRIBUTING TO UN CONTINGENTS, THEY FIND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY THEY RECEIVE ONLY ONE-SIXTH OF LA MAP.

10. WE ARE IN NO CASE SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT TOO SOPHISTICATED FOR BRAZIL. ON THE CONTRARY. COMMON CRITICISM OUR MAP IS IMPRESSION THAT US IS GENERALLY PROVIDING BADLY OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT WHICH DOES NOT MEET BRAZIL'S CURRENT REQUIREMENTS AND IS NOT COMMENSURATE WITH IMPORTANCE COUNTRY IN SCHEME OF

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WORLD AFFAIRS AND US-BRAZIL MILITARY INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA. BRAZILIAN MILITARY LEADERS SHARE WELL FOUNDED WORRY

THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO ATTRACT AND KEEP ENERGETIC AND ABLE YOUNG OFFICERS UNLESS FORCES ARE PROVIDED WITH REASONABLY MODERN EQUIPMENT.

11. WE DO NOT FEEL GRANT AID PROGRAMS CAN BE PHASED DOWN UNDER EXISTING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. THEY SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE SUPPLEMENTED BY MAP CREDIT SALES PROGRAMS IN SPECIAL CASES SUCH AS THE C-130 AIRCRAFT SALE NOW CONTEMPLATED.

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FOR MANN FROM AMBASSADOR

12. TO INFLUENCE MILITARY SALES THE PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS ARE:

A. QUICKER REACTION TIME IN WASHINGTON TO PROPOSALS FOR MILITARY SALES.

B. USE OF COST SHARING FORMULA, THAT I, PART GRANT AND PART SALES TO OFFSET PRICE DIFFERENTIALS WHERE US EQUIPMENT IS MORE EXPENSIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, IF WE HAD PROVIDED SOME \$600,000 OF GRANT AID FOR APPROXIMATELY 3,300 M-14 RIFLES, INITIAL SPARES AND AMMUNITION WITH PROVISION THAT BRAZIL ACQUIRE THE REST OF ITS NEEDS THROUGH COMBINATION SALES AND LOCAL PRODUCTION BRAZIL, IT QUITE LIKELY WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN BRAZILIAN ARMY SELECTING M-14 RIFLE INSTEAD OF BELGIAN FN RIFLE WHICH THEY ARE NOW BUYING. NEGOTIATIONS FOR SALE OF C-130 AIRCRAFT TO BRAZIL HAVE EXTENDED OVER MORE THAN TWO YEARS.

C. EFFORTS BY WASHINGTON TO OVERCOME FAVORABLE POSITION OF THIRD COUNTRY FIRMS WHO REPRESENT NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES OR ARE STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY GOVERNMENT SALES VENTURES AND WHO OFTEN SEND SPECIAL MIXED MILITARY CIVILIAN SALES TEAMS EMPOWERED TO NEGOTIATE ON THE SPOT COMBINATIONS OF SALES, BARTER AND LOCAL PRODUCTION. OUR LIMITED ASSISTANCE AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS AND LONG REACTION TIME TEND HAMPER US IN MEETING SUCH COMPETITION.

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D. MORE POSITIVE APPROACH ESTABLISHING POLICY ON TYPES OF

EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE FOR SALE. TODAY WE OFTEN DISCOURAGE SALE ON BASIS THAT EQUIPMENT TOO SOPHISTICATED, LACK OF SUPPORT RESOURCES IN COUNTRY, FEAR OF FOSTERING UNDESIRABLE ARMS BUILDUP.

NEVERTHELESS, HISTORY DEMONSTRATES THAT BRAZIL WILL TURN ELSEWHERE TO PURCHASE MANY ITEMS WE REFUSE. IF WE MODIFY POLICY LIMITATIONS ONLY WHEN GOB ALREADY ACTIVELY NEGOTIATING ELSEWHERE,

THIS IS TOO LATE IN MOST CASES TO FOSTER THE SALE OF US EQUIPMENT. RIFLES AND TURBO-PROP AIRCRAFT HAVE ALREADY SHOWN THIS, AND OTHER ITEMS WILL BE ADDED SOON IF WE DO NOT FORESTALL.

I REGRET DELAY IN THIS REPLY DUE TO MY RECIFE TRIP LAST WEEKEND AND CURRENT FLOOD DISTINGUISHED VISITORS.

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