

defensive terms at the beginning and correctly putting the onus for violence on the class enemy led by Chiang Kai-shek.

There is no evidence whatever of any support by Stalin for this strategy before the year 1947, and very little in that year either.

12. Most of the difficulty lay in Stalin's previous relations with Mao, which were chauvinist enough. But according to Han Suyin, in what appears to be after-the-fact reasoning, the Soviet relations with *China itself*—i.e., bourgeois China—were of a great-nation chauvinist character.

"The cavalier way in which at Yalta Stalin asked for his share of the booty in China cannot have any other implication than this 'chauvinism' which today the People's Republic of China denounces with such vigour in the present Soviet hierarchy." (Same, p. 504).

Stalin was undoubtedly chauvinist here, but it should be noted in his defense that the demands at Yalta were against the butcher Chiang Kai-shek and everything taken from bourgeois China at this time was later returned to socialist China. Stalin's chauvinism, although based in Russian nationalism, in this case consisted far more in his underestimation of Mao and the Chinese CP (which in turn summed up his lack of faith in the Chinese revolution itself) than it did in designs on Chinese territory. But the theoretical question here is this: If Han Suyin is really right about this, then wasn't the Soviet Union an imperialist country also during World War II? And no Marxist-Leninist could possibly answer yes to that question.

13. Han Suyin says that Stalin remained suspicious of Mao until after the Korean war began in June 1950! (*Morning Deluge*, p. 522.)

14. See the stories about Li Li-san, Wang Ming, the Forty Returned Bolshevik Students, etc., in such hostile bourgeois books as *Mao Tse-tung in Opposition*, by John E. Rue; *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, by Benjamin Schwartz; also Mao's conversation with Edgar Snow in the latter's pro-Chinese *Red Star Over China*, especially pp. 167-69, about how Mao had been "dismissed from the Politburo" (in 1927) although he doesn't mention how this could have happened without Moscow's knowledge—and initiative—at the time. Han Suyin deals with Mao's later struggles with Stalin during the 1930s and early 1940s and shows how Mao succeeded against Stalin's agents in those years. But she constructs a thesis of Stalin's "misunderstanding" of Mao's real stature to explain it.

15. Except for Outer Mongolia, these are all provinces of China. In "predicting" that the USSR would dismember China, it should be noted that Sulzberger also added *Outer Mongolia*, which was *not* a part of China and for years had been the independent People's Republic of Mongolia, closely connected to the Soviet Union. This provocative reference to it was calculated to frighten the Soviet leaders and at the same time

possibly strike a chauvinist chord in the Chinese, because Outer Mongolia had once been a part of the greater Chinese Empire.

The reader should also note that the imperialist New York Times here called the USSR a country of "imperialism" two decades before the Chinese CP did.

16. New York Times semi-editorial in News of the Week section, Sunday, Feb. 5, 1950.

17. *Memorandum on the Unfolding War* (Sam Marcy, internal document), Oct. 29, 1950.

18. This was a bourgeois prayer enclosed in a joke. It is difficult to find actual quotes of it at this late date. But Han Suyin reveals that Stalin himself had such feelings:

"And now Stalin asked himself (in the winter of 1949-50—V.C.) whether Mao Tse-tung, who had exhibited such independence, would also turn out to be a Tito. In the West, many hoped so, loudly and repeatedly." (*Morning Deluge*, p. 511.)

19. So great is the Chinese CP's hostility to the USSR now that they are revising their estimate of the Korean war. Han Suyin even speculates that great-nation chauvinism was the biggest factor in the eruption of that conflict. She says that a U.S. disengagement from Asia at the time the Korean war began—in 1950—"would have meant more (U.S.) concentration against Eastern Europe and consequent pressure on the USSR at its more vulnerable flank." And therefore, she speculates, the Stalin leadership *wanted* the Korean war.

"Some cynics have even felt that the withdrawal of the Soviet delegation from the UN on the ground that it would not stay while Chiang was seated (it returned, she says, after seven months despite the same delegation's presence) was a deliberate move *not* to block by its vote the UN resolution which made the Korean war possible."

Han carefully adds, "but this may be assuming too much."

20. See Chou's speech on "The Present International Situation and China's Foreign Policy" at the second session of the First National People's Congress, July 30, 1955, printed in *Peking Review*.

21. *More On the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us*, *Peking Review*, Mar. 4, 1963, p. 27.

22. Mao's speech "Greeting the Fifth Anniversary of the Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Sovereignty and Mutual Assistance," Nov. 1961. Printed later in *Peking Review*.

23. Quoted in *People's China*, Mar. 16, 1956.

24. The Eighth Party Congress was held in September 1956. The fact that Mao would say this at an important national congress of the Party—only the eighth in more than a half century—cannot be emphasized enough. It was no casual comment and cannot be dismissed as mere diplomatic window dressing, as for instance might be the case in an anniversary speech.