dents and authorities, each obliged by the perceived logic of its own being to resist the claims of the other. The main independent variable in this equation is international tension, whose rise or persistence at a high level can be and is used by the regime to undercut the legitimacy of internal protest.

There are in the 1980's some preliminary signs of intra-establishment or "authorized" dissent. Re-examination by Party analysts of Lenin's New Economic Policy, with its greater orientation towards market-based economics, is one such sign. Then too, the emergence of information technologies as a potential force for decentralization gives Soviet leaders the opportunity—at some risk to their own authority—of opening up the system. It is too early to say how far or how soon this opportunity will be taken.

The experience with Soviet television may be instructive in this regard. It is something in which the authorities have taken a strong promotional interest, and which of course affects the interests of Soviet society as a whole—the bulge in the bell-shaped curve—not just its dissident wings.

Broadcast television is a paternalistic, powerful, one-to-many, top-down, mass medium; it was the one chosen by George Orwell in *1984* to dramatize totalitarian surveillance and control. ("Information technologies," by contrast—the personal computer, the photocopier, the telephone transmission grid—operate in a more democratic and decentralized manner.) Soviet authorities have built up the production of television sets to the point where they now are found in 90 percent of all households. The government has also established a network of satellite relay stations capable of carrying centralized programming across all eleven Soviet time zones to each of the many ethnic and linguistic audiences of the USSR.

If the attempt was to indoctrinate these audiences with the official party line, there is evidence that it has, in part, failed. Surveys conducted by the authorities themselves show that TV and newspaper audiences alike fail to understand key elements of the official litany, such as "imperialism," no matter how often repeated. Heavy emphasis on the malign propensities of "the West," moreover, has bred in Soviet audiences a fixed belief in the central importance of the West to the Soviet Union and to the world. And where those audiences have a chance to compare the news they hear with the world they know—as is true of local news—the evidence shows that they tend to reject and disregard the news. (That is not true of Soviet international news, whose scenes of U.S.-related violence or wretchedness—among the poor, the non-white, in authoritarian client states—carry much higher credibility.) At least as regards the treatment of domestic affairs, skepticism of the "party line" comes across as a culture-bridging phenomenon.

Democratic Caucus chairman Richard Gephardt pursues a question as Congressman Charles Hayes considers.

Discussion

Foreign radio broadcasts into the Soviet Union fill an informational and solidarity need of the dissident community. The most effective are those that are low-key and factual; in Professor Tucker's phrase, "it's as simple as BBC."

The Jackson-Vanik amendment, tying U.S.-Soviet trade to Jewish emigration from the USSR, has probably been a minor or ineffective factor on the human-rights landscape. Emigration went up when the Soviets thought that could forestall the legislation, then declined after its adoption—as if to show that the Soviet authorities could not be coerced. Thereafter, it increased dramatically in the 1977-1979 period, only to plummet after Afghanistan and associated U.S. sanctions. More recently, emigration has expanded slightly at least from principal population centers.

The lesson from this seems to be that the general state of U.S.-Soviet relations has had more to do with the allowance of emigration than any particular legislation. There was liberalization after Helsinki (1975) and hardening after the collapse of detente (1979). Jackson-Vanik has now come to symbolize for the Soviets a confrontational or coercive U.S. stance, and in this sense may have become counter-productive to its original objective. It would be possible to test this proposition by shifting from explicit to implicit "linkage," *i.e.*, by according MFN treatment to Soviet imports on the extra-statutory understanding that emigration statistics will importantly affect the climate for retention of that status.

The confrontational character of the post-Helsinki review meetings should be assessed in terms of the various audiences to which these meetings are directed. Keeping up the morale of a Sakharov or a Scharansky, and showing the continuing relevance of Western political culture to such figures, is an important task. But there is no great prospect of persuading or even embarrassing Soviet delegations, all of whom are schooled in defensiveness. It is worthwhile to meet separately and informally with these delegates, after the denunciations have been read out, to impress on them in private the genuine public dismay in the United States aroused by repression of dissent.

The Specialists emphasized that Congress and its members are increasingly important to the calculations of Soviet authorities, who have learned in recent years that Americans are serious about their checks-and-balances system of government and that judgments about programs and funding are not automatically controlled in this country by the Executive. Members and groupings of the Congress will accordingly have occasion to want the best possible information—to the extent possible, objective information—about the Soviet Union and its patterns of behavior.

Professor Robert Tucker makes a point with breakfast chairman Steny Hoyer as an audience.

Expanding Trade and Scientific Cooperation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

By William C. Norris



Mr. Norris is chairman and CEO of Control Data Corporation. He delivered these remarks at a recent Duke University conference on East-West Trade, sponsored in part by the American Committee on East-West Accord.

For the past 20 years, I have been a strong advocate of expanding trade and scientific cooperation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. And Control Data has made a substantial investment in developing such relationships with a number of those countries.

Recently, the apparent relaxation in U.S.-Soviet relations offers American companies a renewed opportunity to enlarge commercial engagements with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe through the establishment of long-term cooperative ventures.

I believe it is desirable for U.S. companies once again to commence carefully planned programs to expand East-West trade based primarily on cooperative ventures in areas of technology within the export control guidelines. While hopes for improved trade relations between the U.S. and the Soviet bloc are clearly dependent upon a parallel thaw in diplomatic relations, the resumption of strategic arms discussions in Geneva could point the way toward a rekindling of economic interaction between the U.S. and the USSR.

Control Data Corporation knows something about the ups and downs. Our company established numerous cooperative projects in the USSR and several Eastern European countries in the 1960's and 1970's. We then had to drastically reduce those business activities because of the deterioration in overall U.S.-Soviet relations.

Nevertheless, I can say that we have accumulated a substantial amount of experience and have proven what we postulated initially, namely that there was great potential for profitable business relationships between the East and West based on long-term cooperative ventures.

The successful transfer of Soviet technology to Control Data and other U.S. companies during the Nixon administration, and the large number of available Soviet technologies today, confirm the enormous potential for U.S. companies to commercialize Soviet research results through cooperative ventures.

Two-Way Benefits

What the Soviet bloc lacks is a marketing capability to commercialize its research output. Marketing is a major strength of U.S. companies; hence, the great opportunity for mutually rewarding relationships through cooperative ventures.

Based on Control Data's experience in countries like Romania, where a successful joint venture to manufacture magnetic disk products was established in 1973, I would assert that such ventures can be flexible enough to accommodate to the requirements of both capitalist and socialist economies.

As for the Soviet Union, even though many Americans see it as a competitor and adversary, few favor destructive economic warfare. On the other hand, there is a reluctance—usually unspoken—on the part of some to do business at all because they don't want to see the Soviet economy strengthened. Whenever a business transaction is proposed, reasons are sought for opposing it, usually related to enhancing Soviet military capability—because virtually any technology has military application to one extent or another. This has led to extensive controls, which, as we have learned, have reduced the U.S. share of the market in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, closed the doors on our access to important technologies in those countries, and caused concerns in Western Europe about being able to gain the full benefits from cooperative research with U.S. organizations.

Evidence is mounting that U.S. restrictive policies have not achieved their declared objectives. The Soviet military doesn't appear to have been materially disadvantaged and business opportunities denied U.S. companies have invariably been snapped up by other countries.

What is needed is a reduction in export controls as recently recognized by the Presidential Commission on Industrial Competitiveness. In addition, we should be prepared to demonstrate that entering into transactions with the Soviet Union to transfer important technology, generates return transactions that get back equivalent technology.

U.S. Jobs

One of the major benefits accruing to the U.S. from the import of Soviet technologies would be the creation of new jobs. People sometimes fail to realize that technology has to be converted into goods or services before it enters the

Joint Commercial Commission Report

The text of the "Agreed Report of the Eighth Session of the Joint U.S.-USSR Commercial Commission," which took place in Moscow on May 20-21, together with an exploratory interview with Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige from the Department's publication *Business America,* have been acquired by the American Committee on East-West Accord and are available to readers on request.