United States does not intend to do anything about Iran even though "chaos" may threaten in Teheran. There's Secretary of Defense George Marshall, who recently informed the Chinese Communists that any movement of United States troops north of the 38th Parallel in Korea would be tactical in nature. . . . Boy, that's the way to keep our opponents off-balance. Just tell 'em what we intend to do (or, better, what we don't intend to do). All we can say is that we hope Assistant Secretary of State McGhee and Secretary of Defense Marshall will shortly be hearing from outraged American sports fans. They have a sound prejudice against the fighter who telegraphs his punch.

Speaking of the telegraphed intention, the biggest botch of all has been made by the UN in collaboration with the foreign offices of Britain, France and the United States. For just after General MacArthur (who really understands the use of the deceptive feint) had informed Mao Tse-tung that he had better quit or look to be hit from any number of unspecified directions, the high-level dumb bunnies back home in London, Paris, Washington and Lake Success all combined to wigwag the signal to Peiping that MacArthur has no authority to say anything. This denial to the UN Commander of the right to use the methods of psychological warfare must have caused Mao Tse-tung to snicker up his sleeve. He knows that MacArthur has been limited to pitching soft flutterballs over the outside corner. . . . If, as the new British Foreign Minister, Herbert Morrison, hopes, our telegraphed softness will lead to successful peace conversations with Peiping, we may be sure that the peace will be made on the worst possible terms.

The European arms program becomes stranger the further it goes and the more it is pondered. As Lawrence R. Brown pointed out in our issue of March 12, Europe is in no danger unless America is in grave danger. Russian occupation of Europe means war, and the Russians will not start a general war without means at hand to injure us seriously on this continent. Furthermore, there was never any reason for Congressional discussion or public hullabaloo about sending troops to Europe. The Administration has sole and unhindered power to reenforce our garrison in Germany with all the troops it desires.

Why then the whole extraordinary performance? To get a general Congressional authority to send troops anywhere in the world. And what places has Mr. Truman in mind? Meanwhile we learn that the Administration has begun a whispering campaign in Congress that, much as it would like to do so, it unfortunately can not give serious support to the Chinese Nationalists because everything must be sent to Europe. We dislike to suppose that the sole reason for the Administration's sudden and unnecessarily public passion to arm Europe was to gain this dishonest excuse for neglecting the vital war in Asia. But what other intelligible motive is there?

The tempter is abroad in New England. He comes in the guise, not of a serpent, but of an individual named Walter H. Wheeler, Jr., President of something miscalled the New England Council. According to Mr. Wheeler, New England's industrialists have been far too conservative about accepting Federal subsidies. "Where it's warranted," says Mr. Wheeler, "we [meaning New Englanders] have got to change our attitude a bit."

Well, all we can say is that we hope New England will resist Mr. Wheeler to the uttermost. No doubt Mr. Wheeler would have the State of Connecticut, for example, accept a Federal subsidy to build a steel mill near New London. But what good would such a subsidized mill do Connecticut? Aside from ruining a lot of good landscape, it would saddle the state in perpetuity with a large new labor group dependent on Washington politicians for continuing favors. The crucial vote in Connecticut would henceforward be controlled from CIO national headquarters — and John Lodge would in all probability be the last Republican governor to sit in Hartford for a generation.

Mr. Wheeler pleads expediency as a reason for subsidies; he argues that New England is at a competitive disadvantage as compared to the rest of the country. But New England has always been at a competitive disadvantage, even in the days when it had to go to Cuba to get sugar for rum. There's never been any natural wealth in New England: its intervale farmlands are narrow and flinty, its brass mills have had to scour the ends of the earth for copper and zinc, its textile mills have had to import cotton from the South — and in the days of the clipper ships Salem business men had to go to China for goods to put in their shop windows! During the entire 300 years of its existence New England has got by on brains, ingenuity and moral stamina. When its textile mills went bust, it established local developmental corporations and discovered new uses for the old factory space. New England has needed no help from the outside, and it has continued to call its soul its own. Now comes Mr. Wheeler advocating that it rid itself of its one great commodity: its character. Just "where it's warranted," mind you. As the serpent said to Eve, "Just one little bite."

We went to see the moving picture version of Kipling's "Kim" the other night, and found it faithful to all that we remembered from several childhood readings of the book. The self-reliant hero was all boy, yet he was also a young man who could be accepted by men. No Hamlet tainted Kim; no Mom emasculated him. But what interested us most about the showing of the picture was the comment it drew from a woman who categorically stated that Hollywood had called the spies in it "Russian" in order to whip up war hysteria. She seemed utterly oblivious of the fact that Russia had not only coveted India in Kipling's day but even as long ago as 1722. In that year Peter the Great fought a war against Persia. Said a contemporary: "The hopes of his Majesty were not concerned with Persia alone; if he had been lucky in Persia and still living, he would of course have attempted to reach India or even China. This I heard from his Majesty himself."

"Truman Urges Burning Faith Against Reds" — headline in the *New York World-Telegram*. Like Joe McCarthy's, for instance?

AMERICANS ARE EXPENDABLE

ON MARCH 31 the *New York Times* published a startling dispatch from its correspondent, George Barrett, in South Korea. The South Korean Government, it stated, was being forced to release 120,000 men from its military reserve camps of 400,000, because it lacked the means to arm or even to feed them. President Syngman Rhee, it continued, "has told the United Nations that he is prepared to supply 500,000 men in addition to the 250,000 South Koreans who are now fighting and he has repeatedly asked for guns to arm at least 100,000 members of the National Guard, the first echelon of Army reserves." Mr. Barrett also said: "The propaganda perils inherent in any kind of demobilization program for the South Korean Army . . . are obvious to all Koreans when they see troop replacements continually coming into the country to fill up the ranks of fighters from thirteen foreign nations."

Quite aside from this obvious danger, there is a practical aspect of the situation which the veriest tyro in military matters could hardly help seeing. With 400,000 unarmed South Korean reserves already on the ground, it would be infinitely more economical for the UN to avail itself largely of those reserves while it used its shipping to transport tanks and guns and food instead of reinforcements. Hoping to get some light on the reasons why these South Koreans were not being equipped to fight, the *Freeman* immediately sent the following wire to General MacArthur:

> Why do we fail or refuse arms to 400,000 South Korean draftees as reported N. Y. Times March 31 dispatch from Taegu? Previous statements President Rhee reported requests for such arms.

We are in receipt of the following answer from General MacArthur, dated April 5:

> I have delayed reply to your message of the thirty-first pending receipt here of the referenced New York Times dispatch. There is nothing I can add to the information therein contained. The issue is one determined by the Republic of Korea and the United States Government, and involves basic political decisions beyond my authority.

So there, once more, you have it — the politicians hamstringing the military in the conduct of the war, and thereby adding enormously to the cost in blood and money. Not only have Washington and the UN steadily refused to allow the Free Chinese to fight their enemy, and ours; they even seem to be resolved that the South Koreans shall not be allowed to defend their own country, and thereby lessen the drain on our own manpower.

Consider, for example, the effect of the reaction in the State Department and the UN to General MacArthur's offer to discuss a cease-fire with Red China. It was one of undisguised dismay — not because the UN and the State Department don't want a cease-fire in Korea but because they want it in terms of the virtual sell-out which Mao contemptously rejected in January. Both Washington and London lost no time in repudiating MacArthur and giving Mao to understand, in effect, that he could continue to concentrate his armies against our troops in Korea without the slightest fear of a flank attack. It is not to be wondered at that Lieutenant General H. G. Martin, military correspondent of the London *Daily Telegraph*, recently quoted General MacArthur in that paper as saying that "it was not the soldier who had encroached on the realm of the politician but the politician who had encroached on that of the soldier."

Why do the politicians in Washington and the UN give the advantage to the aggressor at the expense of the UN forces, which are 90 per cent American? Why do they constantly talk about peace and at the same time, by their actions, encourage Red China to refuse peace? Why do they refuse to equip and feed the South Korean reserves; in other words, why do they insist on fighting at the greatest possible cost instead of the least? The Russians are said to be massing troops in Manchuria. If those troops attack our Korean forces, will the virtual assurance of immunity for the Chinese mainland still hold? And wouldn't it be both politically and strategically a good idea to have armed and trained South Korean reserves ready to help fight the fresh Soviet troops? Above all, why do Washington and the UN appear to regard our army in Korea as expendable and refuse to permit General MacArthur to take the obvious measures to relieve the pressure upon them and reduce their losses?

These are questions which should be asked daily of Washington by all American fathers and mothers whose boys are in the Army, whether in Korea or anywhere else. Truman, Acheson and Marshall owe these fathers and mothers satisfactory answers.

THIS DEDUCTIBLE AGE

NOT so long ago Bernard DeVoto, in an open letter to his doctor which appeared in *Harper's Magazine*, calmly announced that he was knocking twenty-five cents off his check in payment for his doctor's bill. "I will not," so Mr. DeVoto informed Dr. Jay, "I will not help pay for the $25 you sent to the AMA."

This somewhat cavalier attitude toward the tacit contractual relationship that exists between doctor and patient may seem a little astonishing at first glance. It didn't go down very well with a certain newsstand proprietor when we tried to knock a nickel off the fifty-cent price of *Harper's* on the ground that we didn't feel we should help support Mr. DeVoto's sabotage of Dr. Jay. But on deeper reflection we have decided that Mr. DeVoto's idea has real merit. We kept thinking of the DeVoto approach to commercial ethics during the sunny Sunday afternoon we wasted on our 1950 Federal income tax. Neither Mr. DeVoto nor James M. Thurber's Walter Mitty had anything on us as we concocted brave and bitter marginalia to send along with a diminished check to the U. S. Collector of Internal Revenue.

"Dear Tax Collector," we wrote on a mythical scratch pad, "we hope you have been reading Mr. DeVoto in *Harper's*. We are sure that his theory of morally justifiable *ex post facto* deductions will appeal to your well-defined ethical sense. In accordance with the DeVoto theory, which we are sure must come to have the status of good common law, we are calling to your attention certain deductions that we have made from our 1950 income tax.

"The first deduction — the one for $350 — is because of the RFC. We really can not see why we should be taxed to help support that fragrant little institution. The basis for our $350 deduction may seem a little mysterious to