bank opened, to establish a correspondent relationship with Korean banks. Kim met with the KCIA Director in Seoul, and the KCIA apparently smoothed the way for him to meet the appropriate banking officials in the Government. Kim worked through the KCIA because "it is customary that no business can be done unless the Government opens the door for you * * *."[614]

The subcommittee found no evidence that money of the Korean Government helped finance initial investments in the bank. However, the government may have provided the $50,000 later invested by Choi Che Yung, who bought stock sold back to the bank by Duk Moon Aum. He used some of the funds Yang Doo Won sent to the KCIA in Washington with instructions that it be given to Choi. The money, according to Choi and Kim Sang Keun, could have been Yang's private funds, which he—perhaps along with others—sought to invest in the United States. Choi told subcommittee staff that he invested the money in the Diplomat National Bank without Yang's knowledge.

Although the subcommittee could not interview Yang and had no evidence to contradict Choi's statement, it should be noted that Choi's company had business dealings with the KCIA during this period and that Choi once told Charles Kim that the money to buy the bank stock came from a research contract with the Korean Government. Moreover, the purchase of stock with Yang's money occurred only a few months after Yang and Charles Kim had discussed the Diplomat National Bank during Kim's trip to Korea. Taking all of these factors into consideration, the subcommittee could not dismiss the possibility that the $50,000 invested by Choi was KCIA money, although it is more probable that Yang Doo Won regarded the money as his own.

There was no evidence that the money invested by Tongsun Park came from Korean Government sources, although it is noteworthy that at the time he made the investment, Park was acting as a KCIA agent in other respects.[615] Likewise, there was no evidence that the funds invested in the bank by the Moon Organization came from the Korean Government.

Until the true source of the cash used in these purchases is documented and it is known how the cash was brought into the United States, it will not be possible to make a definitive statement about whether or not the Moon Organization received aid and direction from the Korean Government in connection with its investment in the Diplomat National Bank.

Whether the Moon Organization did or did not invest in the bank in cooperation with the Korean Government, it was clear to the subcommittee that control over the bank was the Moon Organization's objective. It would have helped the organization keep currency "freely coming back and forth," in Moon's own words, without attracting the attention of neutral bank officers, and would have facilitated loans for business investments.

By early 1976, both the Moon Organization, through its investments and deposits, and to a lesser extent the Korean Government,

[614] Sworn statement of Charles Kim.

[615] Kim Sang Keun, KCIA officer at the Korean Embassy, was instructed to teach Park how to transmit intelligence reports to Seoul for the KCIA. This operation lasted only 1 month, in August and September 1975. The details are set forth in House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct Hearings, October 1977.

through its control over correspondent banking relationships, were in a position to influence the future course of the Diplomat National Bank. Adverse publicity beginning in the spring of 1976 interrupted whatever plans either the Government or the Moon Organization might have had to use and control the bank. Since then, the Moon Organization has been preoccupied with explaining its investment and the sources of funds to investigating authorities, and minimizing the adverse publicity arising from its attempt to gain control of an American bank.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The subcommittee findings regarding the Moon Organization may be summarized as follows:

(1) The UC and numerous other religious and secular organizations headed by Sun Myung Moon constitute essentially one international organization. This organization depends heavily upon the interchangeability of its components and upon its ability to move personnel and financial assets freely across international boundaries and between businesses and nonprofit organizations.

(2) The Moon Organization attempts to achieve goals outlined by Sun Myung Moon, who has substantial control over the economic, political, and spiritual activities undertaken by the organization in pursuit of those goals.

(3) Among the goals of the Moon Organization is the establishment of a worldwide government in which the separation of church and state would be abolished and which would be governed by Moon and his followers.

(4) In pursuit of this and other goals, the Moon Organization has attempted, with varying degrees of success, to gain control over or establish business and other secular institutions in the United States and elsewhere, and has engaged in political activities in the United States. Some of these activities were undertaken to benefit the ROK Government or otherwise to influence U.S. foreign policy.

(5) While pursuing its own goals, the Moon Organization promoted the interests of the ROK Government, and at times did so in cooperation with, or at the direction of, ROK agencies and officials. The Moon Organization maintained mutually beneficial ties with a number of Korean officials.

(6) The Moon Organization established the KCFF ostensibly as a nonprofit foundation to promote Korean-American relations, but used the KCFF to promote its own political and economic interests and those of the ROK Government.

(7) The Moon Organization extensively used the names of Senators, Congressmen, U.S. Presidents, and other prominent Americans to raise funds and to create political influence for itself and the ROK Government.

(8) A Moon Organization business is an important defense contractor in Korea. It is involved in the production of M-16 rifles, antiaircraft guns, and other weapons.

(9) Moon Organization agents attempted to obtain permission from an American corporation to export M-16's manufactured in Korea. The M-16's are manufactured under a coproduction

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