commanders of the period of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping aimed at further reducing the political power of the army, at diminishing its weight in the political decisions of the top leadership, and generally speaking, in the life of the country. In order to avoid any reaction by the military staffs, especially by the officers corps, he accused the former generals of having wanted to assassinate Mao—precisely the one who defended the privileges of the military men and who had made the army the decisive political force at home, a force which had more weight than the party and state power themselves.

But the calculations made at the beginning do not always come true at the end. The trial did not prove the accusations. The so-called plot of the military men to assassinate Mao remained in a fog.

The targets the court had set for itself were not achieved at all. The clan of Hua Guofeng, though very weak in the high forums of the party, the state power, and the army, continues to enjoy the support of those hundreds of thousand or millions of middle and low cadres elevated by the Cultural Revolution, who feel, realize and see that the purge Deng has begun on the top levels of the Chinese hierarchy will be carried out in the low levels too, and will throw them out. The military men feel the same thing. After the senior chiefs, the turn comes for those who are below. Under these conditions, it is difficult to think that the Chinese army, due to its militarist traditions, will allow its political power to be corroded bit by bit and remain cloistered in the barracks. Moreover, this is impossible also for the fact that the present policy of the Chinese leadership has as its first objective the modernization of the army and its transformation into a big striking force comparable to those of the superpowers. The construction of big industrial-military complexes automatically assigns a role of first rate importance to the army in the whole economic, political, and social life of the country.

A VERDICT IN THE SPIRIT OF REVENGE

The feeling of revenge, not only political, but personal as well, was seen in the attempts of the judges and the great campaign of the Chinese press to describe the accused as ordinary criminals, as adventurers. All their batteries were directed especially against Jiang Qing; but this objective too was not achieved. From what the Xinhua (news) agency has reported and from the films shown on the Chinese TV, Mao's widow not only did not bow her head, but openly attacked her judges and described them as a revisionist clique, traitors and agents of the Kuomingtang. The people could see on the TV not a subdued and repentant person, but the arbitrariness of the judges, who did not let her speak, and the brutality of the police, who tightened the shackles and forcefully pushed her out of the hall.

According to the verdict of the court trial, death sentences were passed only on Jiang Qing and Chang Chunqiao, but a period of two years repentance has been given to them to save their souls. The others, in particular the military men, received punishment according to the charges, but relatively not so harsh. At first glance, it would seem as though this is a Chinese tradition; but in reality, the postponement of the implementation of the verdict as well as the previous hesitation with regard to the organization of the trial bring into evidence that powers of diverse political forces always operate in China, that the hands of Deng are not yet fully free to act as he likes.

CHINA'S CAPITALIST ROAD FURTHER EXPOSED

The Beijing trial was a self-exposure of the Chinese revisionists, because it brought to light more clearly the whole rottenness of the capitalist political system and of the bourgeois ideological basis which has existed in China. The chaos, the grave situation and crimes for which the present team in power blames only the Cultural Revolution and the persons who launched and directed it, without saving even the ghost of Mao, are the result of the counter-revolutionary course and the capitalist road which China has consistently pursued.

Since its liberation and up to now, China, which is almost a continent, has found no stability and has failed to build a stable political-economic and state-organizational structure of whatever nature it might be.

At the beginning, they adopted the slogan of "a new democracy" which later on was baptized "socialism" and even "dictatorship of the proletariat." But in reality the structure of the new Chinese state has been and remains a feudo-bourgeois structure. In practice, there was no evidence of efforts to renovate these structures, because the political and ideological clarity which was needed to guide these transformations was absent. Since 1949 when the People's Republic of China was founded, up to the present, the Chinese leaders not only have not been and are not Marxist-Leninists, but their aims, too, for the development of the country and economy on the bourgeois-capitalist road have been and remain camouflaged. The fight among various factions went on with formulas and quotations, the structures and systems were experimented with, they were concentrated nowhere, and they sought to present themselves for what they were not. China has always lived, and continues to live from one day to another.

POSITIVE ASPECTS OF MAO GROUP

The rivalries between various groups which were fighting for power, for domination, were taking place in this fog, in this political-ideological unclarity. Each one of the groups or individuals had its or his unclear, indefinite road, but the feeling of revenge, and toppling of one another was predominant in all of them. This road is followed today too. The group of Mao Zedong and Chou Enlai was completely immersed in these waters. But irrespective of this, it was the most positive group, which sought and did something good—albeit lame—for China; but it *did* do something for her.

The Liu Shaoqi group was the most reactionary, and at present the Deng group has passed over into feudo-fascism, into ultra-reaction.

At present, Deng with his group seems to be in the first row of boxes, receives and sees people off, gives speeches and makes threats. The result: China is being discredited both internally and externally. Everyone has doubts about China. Its economy, previously restored by Mao and Chou Enlai, is almost ruined. The present leadership is lying when it tries to shift the blame onto the "Gang of Four."

ANARCHY AND CHAOS IN CHINA

Present-day China is at the crossroad. It lives in chaos, anarchy and uncertainty. Each step the present leadership takes is not only pragmatic, but also shifts with the passing circumstances in the internal and external situation. This is an unprincipled, anachronistic, feudal, domineering policy. It fools nobody when it pretends to be "democratic" and least of all "socialist."

If we may use a literary figure, China resembles a great old house, without sound foundations, built without a plan and structure. Every political earthquake brings down whole large fragments of it. The builders who come to repair it are worse and destroy it completely.

The Chinese "great power" megalomania does not carry much weight in present-day world politics, and the ideas of Deng and Hua cannot succeed. Imperialism and hegemonism, be it American, Soviet, Chinese or of the other developed capitalist powers, are hated and combatted by the peoples of the world.

This is the century of the great crisis of the capitalist-revisionist world, this is the century of the liberation struggles and revolutions.

Its external enemies seek to plunder China, making investments for more profits for themselves. But they have many doubts and distrust about China. China itself can make neither head nor tail out of its situation. For the enemies of the Chinese people, chaos in China is desirable. Neither America, nor the reactionary bourgeoisie, fear China today. The Soviet Union is more afraid of Lech Walesa than Deng Xioaping.

This situation was reflected in and proven by the Beijing trial. Deng's and Hua's group condemned the "Gang of Four" and the group of military men allegedly as "ordinary criminals and plotters," but in reality they condemned all the policies and the economic-state system of China since its liberation up to today. And who are those who are condemning this system? It is precisely those who built it and who aim at "repairing" it atrociously and with even more catastrophic results for China.

Although the Beijing trial seems to have put an end to a chapter in the struggle for power in China, in reality it does not put an end to this struggle between the clans, does not eliminate the internal political enmities and splits in that country. It further instigates them and creates new conditions for their further sharpening. Just as the Cultural Revolution laid the foundations for the current struggle between the clans, the trial of the "Gang of Four" lays the foundations for struggle between new clans, which at times will unite and at other times will divide, and at other times will kill one another. One group will rise to power and another will be overthrown. The latter will hatch up plots to topple the former, till the Chinese people will wake up and put an end to

(cont. on pg. 2)

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