a non-com mechanic whose name I never learned."

The Major was followed to his desk that morning by a young corporal in overalls, who reported that four C-47s, loaded to the roof, had come in during the night. The Major was surprised and annoyed. The transports never arrived in groups but always one by one, at random. Usually they were empty, and were loaded from the warehouse. These, being already jammed, were useless to the pipeline. He thought irritably of his backlog of freight.

Radar in Lend-Lease Planes

But that was not the problem troubling the Corporal. In each of the four planes, he said, was an installation which he believed to be radar. "What is radar?" demanded Jordan, who had never heard the noun. The Corporal answered that he had just come from an air-base in England, where he was taught that radar was the most secret thing in the Army. He wondered whether the Major knew that planes going to Russia had this forbidden device. Jordan asked him to spell the word and wrote out "R-a-d-a-r."

He took the Corporal to Captain (later Major) John C. Starkie, assistant maintenance officer, and the three boarded one of the transports. Jordan remembers vaguely a box-like affair with tubes, electric wire and a plate of ground glass. It was unfamiliar to Starkie. After inquiry he identified the instrument as "navigational radar," classified as unavailable to the Soviet Union.

Jordan had a guard thrown round the planes and telephoned to his superior at Wright Field, Lt. Col. Charles H. Gitzinger, chief of the Russian Unit, United Nations Branch, Army Air Forces. "But that's impossible!" Gitzinger exclaimed. "Radar is much too secret to get in the Russian pipeline." Jordan assured him that four C-47s, all with radar, were standing at that moment under his window.

Gitzinger demanded their serial numbers and held the wire while Jordan looked them up on arrival slips in another office. When they were read, the Colonel protested that there were no planes with such numbers on the Soviet schedule. "Well," Jordan answered, "they are sitting right out here and they won't do us any good either. They are loaded so heavily you couldn't squeeze in another pound." That seemed to mystify the Dayton officer more than ever, and he advised Jordan to get in touch with Washington.

Jordan called Col. H. Ray Paige, chief of the Air Staff's International Section, who said there must be a mistake. The Russians had been trying for months to get radar, and had always been refused. But he ordered the planes held for further instructions. After a while Col. Gitzinger telephoned that a number of C-47s had been drafted from the Oklahoma City pool for a "special shipment." He concluded: "I want you to rip that radar out personally, with your own hands, and call me the instant you've done so! Then have the equipment flown back to Oklahoma City under guard." Capt. Starkie and a crew of mechanics helped Jordan remove the apparatus.

Col. Gitzinger said there was a fifth plane loose somewhere about, and warned the Major to look out for it. Jordan recalls watching the skies for the missing craft, which never turned up. It proved later that the extra C-47 was in charge of Major General Alexander I. Belayev, former chief of the Red Army Air Force and retiring chairman of the Soviet Purchasing Commission. With a cargo for which he successfully claimed diplomatic immunity, the General bypassed Great Falls by following a beeline to Alaska through Milwaukee and Edmonton. Presumably there was a radar in his plane, as in the four C-47s of the same group which Jordan examined. If so, he got away with it. State Department records show that Gen. Belayev left the United States on September 26, 1943.

According to testimony of Victor A. Kravchenko, author of "I Chose Freedom" and once an economic attaché of the Purchasing Commission, Gen. Belayev was chosen for the honor of escorting to Russia the "cream of Super Lend-Lease," consisting of two tons of data on American aircraft production, past, present and future. It is Jordan's conviction that the four C-47s passing through Great Falls carried about eight tons of Super Lend-Lease, which was protected likewise by "diplomatic immunity."

Soon afterward the Major received and forwarded to Moscow a bundle weighing 1000 pounds and bearing the tag "Belayev plane." It was learned that in his anxiety to reach Moscow—or to evade inspection—the General ordered his crew to lighten the C-47 at the Washington airport by stripping it of all non-essential weight. In the bundle were life rafts, snowshoes, first aid kits, spare radio parts, winter clothing and even a cover wrenched from a toilet seat.

Was It Accidental?

In view of the fearful triumphs of Soviet espionage in the United States, there is ground for asking if radar got into the Russian pipeline by accident or design. The following evidence may throw light on the problem:

In December 1942, while Jordan was still in Newark, radar receiving equipment was taken from Lend-Lease pursuit planes, medium bombers and cargo craft at Great Falls. During September 1943, also at Great Falls, Maj. Jordan aided in tearing navigational radar devices from four C-47 transport planes. By avoiding Great Falls a fifth plane of the same group is believed to have escaped with radar to Moscow.

In the spring of 1944 Maj. Bernard Green of Army Intelligence, security officer at the Washington Airport, detected radar instruments in a Moscow-bound C-47. He ripped them out by order of the field commander, Col. Frank H. Collins.

During 1944 Capt. Lloyd Chestley, radar officer of a U. S. airbase near Gluntoe, Ireland, gave information to a Soviet general who was accompanied by an American officer and had "authorization" to inspect secret equipment.

The cruiser Milwaukee had radar apparatus aboard when it was lend-leased to Russia in April, 1944.

At its Miami training center, the U. S. Navy taught Soviet officers to operate radar equipment on Lend-Lease submarine chasers. Later in the same year the War Department trained a dozen officers in radar at its Signal Corps Center, Fort Monmouth, N. J. They were instructed in three types—for aiming artillery, identifying aircraft and tracing low-flying planes and bombs.

The Norden Bombsight "Blunder"

Four months after Jordan's encounter with radar, a quantity consignment of another secret device actually got as far as Montana, on the way to Russia, before it was intercepted. This was the Norden bombsight, which ranked prior to the atom bomb as the greatest of American military inventions. Like the bomb and radar, it was barred to the Russians, and was consequently an object of feverish espionage.

This incident caused a furor unequalled in Jordan's experience at Great Falls. For days the air was filled with messages to and from Gen. Arnold's headquarters in the Pentagon, the ATC center at Gravelly Point, Wright Field and the B-25 staging post in Kansas City. For the first and last time, Col. Paige asked the airbase commander, Colonel Russell L. Meredith, to set up a check on Jordan's execution of orders. To the Norden "blunder" are devoted nine entries in his 1944 date-book.

On January 28, the diary shows, Lt. Allen S. Aldridge, liaison officer at Wright Field, telephoned Jordan and asked whether he had been getting any B-25s. These were Mitchell medium bombers. Aldridge was told that a few were settling down at that moment. "Then they're beginning to come," he answered, "and I have something distressing to report."

It was all very mysterious, he said, and no one had the faintest idea how it occurred. No less than 38 Mitchell bombers for the Alsib pipeline had left Kansas City with the wrong bombsight—the Norden M-9 instead of the D-8. The M-9, for medium bombers, stood next below the Norden Flying Fortress instrument. It was protocol for the Russians to have only the D-8, which was not a Norden and was much further down the scale.

The matter was so serious, Aldridge declared, that all B-25s reaching Great Falls would have to be grounded. He asked whether the Russians could be kept from finding out why. Jordan said he would do his best, but it was doubtful. There was fear that if they caught on, Col. Kotikov would telephone the White House for permission to keep the bombsights. Of course he learned everything, if he did not know it beforehand. But for once he kept quiet.

Kansas City flew out five Norden installation specialists, who removed the Norden M-9s and replaced them with D-8s. Not until February 28, a month later, was the last of the M-25s released. A final diary entry, on March 7, recorded that bombsights still on Jordan's hands were being returned under guard to Kansas City.

Nearly six years later a renowned American scientist, Dr. Harold C. Urey, told the Atlantic Union Committee that Maj. Jordan should have been courtmartialed if he removed anything from planes bound for Russia. Dr. Urey, who won the Nobel chemistry prize in 1934 for the discovery of heavy hydrogen, sat in the innermost circle of the Manhattan Project.

"The only things I ever took from planes going to Russia," answers Jordan, "were radar and Norden bombsights. In each case I acted on express orders from military superiors. I should have deserved courtmartial if I had disobeyed."

An entry for April 5 refers to a new gadget designed, as Jordan recalls it, for stepping up engine performance. The time was two months before D-Day. The contrivance was being distributed among air squadrons forming along the Atlantic coast for the Normandy invasion. Gen. Arnold thought so well of the novelty that he issued a technical order with red margins, signifying that military planes without it must be grounded.

Among those stopped were Airacobras flying through Great Falls to Russia. By telephoning the supply base at Wright Field, Jordan learned that drawings for the device had just come in, and deliveries could not be expected for some weeks. Pursuit planes piled up—100 and then 150. Col. Kotikov hit the roof. He stormed at the expediter to let the craft go through without the missing parts. Then the Russian brought out his invariable formula in every emergency. He would call Harry Hopkins.

"I could scarcely believe my eyes, a few days later," says Jordan, "when an Army transport descended



The Scoffers Retracted

Major Jordan's 1949 testimony that he had removed radar from Lend-Lease craft bound for Moscow was laughed to scorn. One critic, Edward R. Murrow, ended his broadcast of December 6 with an ironical flourish. "Incidentally," he scoffed, "there were no C-47s equipped with radar at that time!" Mr. Murrow made a retraction after Col. Paige authorized Fulton Lewis to quote the following statement: "It is correct that radar was not standard equipment on C-47 transport planes at the time referred to. It is true, however, that radar was being installed, experimentally, on a considerable number of C-47s at that time, and some of them undoubtedly got into the Russian pipeline."