

able to live with each other at all. This is surely not realism. It is like regarding the normal human world as an insane asylum, a way of looking which tends to make it so. Before we dismiss unilateral disarmament as a pipe dream we should ask ourselves whether the current vision of human affairs is not an even more unreal nightmare.

In order to appreciate this pamphlet in its historical setting, a number of misunderstandings should be cleared away. First, we have to understand that Hughan's ideas are presented as an hypothesis—*what would happen if*. She is well aware that, with two or three notable exceptions—the Pennsylvania colony and Gandhi's independence movement are mentioned—nonviolent resistance has certainly not been tried on any large scale and certainly not by super-powers. It is unprecedented. But what has happened in the development of war is unprecedented too.

Secondly, when group nonviolent resistance has been tried, it has usually been out of necessity, because no deadly weapons were available or there was an overwhelming preponderance of them on the other side. Such is the situation at this writing in Poland and on the West Bank, where Palestinians have for several years been using nonviolent non-cooperation, boycotts, and peaceful marches to resist illegitimate Israeli rule. In both these areas, occupation and oppression have to be resisted by nonviolent means out of necessity. Indeed, they are at this moment the main testing grounds for non-violent resistance. Hughan's proposal of renunciation of military power by a super-power has no precedent at all.

Thirdly, it is obvious that there are many gradations between violence and nonviolence and that even the term civil disobedience covers a wide spectrum, ranging all the way from simple refusal of cooperation to various forms of what amounts to sabotage. Hughan does not discuss these questions or the extent to which, and under what conditions, clandestine and covert activities might be accepted as nonviolent.

Nonviolent resistance as national policy undertaken by free and democratic choice—does it even make sense? If, as Randolph Bourne maintained,

war is the health of the state and the modern nation exists mainly for the sake of making war or preparing for war, then renunciation of war would mean a metamorphosis in the concept of the nation. So much the worse then for the concept of the nation, which has become a constrictive and dangerous force, destructive of all other loyalties and blocking human growth.

Some will doubtless tell us that transforming tribal feelings in such a fundamental way will require a drastic change in human nature. In the long millenia of human existence on this planet, comparable changes have occurred, and, faced with another alternative of change or perish, who is to say what is or is not possible? The emergence recently of a kind of nationalism borne of cultural identity and not dependent upon military power—exemplified by the Scots, the Basques, and American Indians—show that there are many possible dimensions of group loyalties and that the modern super-power is an artificial and even pathological construction and not an eternal and necessary feature of human life.

Jessie Hughan's essay finally makes us aware of two other points often overlooked today. First, she reminds us of what has been said by all theoreticians of war from Xenophon to Clausewitz—that the aim of war is ultimately to win the will of the enemy. If a people can resist inward submission (i.e. refuse to feel defeated whatever their outward situation) they cannot be said in any final sense to have lost any war. It is only when morale and cultural and spiritual validity are measured in terms of military strength that defeat in war becomes decisive.

Second, the essay links war of whatever kind to two fundamental human emotions—fear and covetousness—which are often manifested in patterns of domination. (She might perhaps also have mentioned anger and outraged pride and honor.) This suggests that even so-called wars of liberation—to the extent that they employ violence—involve elements of fear which ape the methods of the oppressors and prepare the way for a continuation of oppression in other forms. The French philosopher Alain said that all war has its seat in