The second phrase—purporting to safeguard the status of non-Palestinean Jews—was a concession, grudgingly made by Zionists at the insistence of the British Jews, led by Sir Edwin Montagu. Lord Montagu was then Secretary of State for India and a member of the Cabinet. It is, I think, self-evident that so responsible a man—and so devoted a Jew—did not lead the fight for safeguards of the rights of Jews against "Jewish" nationalism, just to hear himself talk. *He* knew Zionism and he recognized the assent of his country to "a national home for the Jewish people" as a political promise to a nationalism embracing an entity as vague as "all Jews."

The distinguished British Jew was not alone in uncovering the threat to his status and that of all Jews. In France there was the equally distinguished Jew, Sylvain Levi; and in the United States there was an intrepid group who, upon hearing of the Balfour declaration, attempted to organize what would have been the first American Council for Judaism. Had they succeeded the face of history might have been changed; and our efforts in 1943 might have been superfluous.

Dr. David Philipson, one of the distinguished founders and perseveringly loyal members of this organization, was among the leaders of the American resistance. In 1918, Philipson called on the leading "non-Zionists"—as distinguished from his own, unconfused anti-Zionism—to form an organization to repudiate the Balfour Declaration. Led by Louis Marshall, the "non-Zionists" refused. The reasons offered by Marshall are all interesting but the punch-line is a testament to "non-Zionists" cowardice and expediency.

"... There are times," Marshall wrote, "when it is an act of fatuity to stand up and be counted, especially when the other side has a thorough organization and can apparently call together at a moment's notice a much greater number than you can ever dream of bringing together..."

The effort to organize failed—because of "non-Zionist" statesmanship! On March 4, 1918, some 300 Jews of great prominence presented a document to Woodrow Wilson expressing their historical and religious objections to Zionism.* They hoped Wilson would consider their views during the Peace Conference where the Zionists had already indicated they would be lobbying for recognition of the Balfour Declaration as a part of the final peace. A few sentences from the document are interesting.

Zionism, these men said, "not only misinterprets the trend of history of the Jews, who ceased to be a nation 2,000 years ago, but involves limitation and possible annulment of the larger claims of Jews for full citizenship and human rights in all lands in which those rights are not yet secure."

The Zionists "demand and hail with delight the 'Balfour Declaration' to establish 'a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine,' i.e., a home not merely for Jews living in countries in which they are oppressed, but for Jews universally. No Jew, wherever he may live, can consider himself free from the implications of such a grant."

Further, these men said to the President of the United States, "As a rule those who favor such a restoration (a Jewish state) advocate it not for themselves but for others. Those who act thus, and yet insist on their patriotic attachment to the countries of which they are citizens, are self-deceived in their profession of Zionism or of a religious sentiment fostered through centuries of gloom."

And still further, these spiritual and intellectual predecessors of ours said, "A Jewish State involves fundamental limitations as to race and religion, else the term 'Jewish' means nothing... It is contrary to the democratic principles for which the World War was waged to found a nation on either or both of these bases."

But since the "non-Zionists" refused to create an *organization*, statements by *ad hoc* groups of anti-Zionists were ignored by politicians in *all* the countries of the Western alliance. Political leaders rather licked their chops at the action taken by Jews to segregate themselves out of a body-politic on the political question. Jews made themselves another political issue and the substance of political trades in countries where the politicians who had suggested such ideas previously had been labelled as pre-democratic medieval and reactionary.

So the first crisis ended in victory for "Jewish" nationalism and defeat for anti-Zionism. "Non-Zionism" had swung the balance of power by refusing to act and by rationalizing away the issues. There was, the "non-Zionists" said, nothing to worry about—and anyway, it was fatuous to stand up and be counted against heavy odds.

* *The New York Times*, March 5, 1919.

The Second Crisis

The second crisis occurred around 1925-1929. It is redolent with the same issues, the same efforts by anti-Zionists, the same failures of "non-Zionists."

In 1917-1919 the "neutralists," the "I am not a Zionist—but" American Jews had refused to repudiate the first internationally recognized political instrument of "Jewish" nationalism. Zionism, therefore, had its foot in the door. But by the middle 1920's history was calling the bluff which Weizmann and his Zionist colleagues had played in 1917. There were no Jews going to Palestine. More importantly, perhaps, there were no funds for Zionism to use to organize immigration to Palestine; and practically no money to develop the Zionist enclave in Palestine.

Weizmann was desperately worried. He admitted all this in Roumania, in 1927—far from the American Jews he had decided could put up the money to make good his gamble in 1917.

"The Balfour Declaration of 1917," he said, "was built on air... I trembled lest the British Government would call me and ask: 'Tell us, what is the Zionist Organization? Where are they, your Zionists?' For these people think in terms different from ours. The Jews, they knew, were against us..."

Weizmann's plan was simple. He would persuade the "I am not a Zionist—but" American Jews to join the Jewish Agency. These anti-nationalist Jews would then be collaborated into the politically internationally recognized agency to build a "national home" for "the Jewish people" in Palestine.

How would he square this circle and join the like and the unlike? He would count on the naiveté, the lack of organization and program with which the "non-Zionists" had helped him a decade earlier.

Twenty years after he staged this second coup, he admitted, in his autobiography how he had managed to persuade American Jews to finance a movement which opposed everything they believed. Using the Hebrew University as an example, he said:

"... Those wealthy Jews who could not wholly divorce themselves from a feeling of responsibility toward their people, but at the same time could not identify themselves with the hopes of the masses, were prepared with a sort of left-handed generosity, on condition that their right hand did not know what their left hand was doing. To them the university-to-be in Jerusalem was a philanthropy, which did not compromise them; to us it was National Renaissance. They would give—with disclaimer. We would accept—with reservations."*

The pact between the Zionists and the "non-Zionists" to join the latter in the Jewish Agency was signed at the Biltmore Hotel in New York, on March 22, 1927. It was the second defeat to which the anti-Zionists of America were led by "non-Zionist" leaders.

Although the agreement was signed in 1927, the ratification in the form of a contribution for the enlarged Jewish Agency was not scheduled until 1929. In the two year interim, the "non-Zionist" leaders of American Jews had occasion all over again to learn the duplicity of Zionism.

It had been agreed that membership in the Agency was to be equally divided; fifty percent Zionist and fifty percent "non-Zionist." As the day drew near for actually forming the new body—in fact only weeks before this date—Louis Marshall learned that the Zionists were rigging the election machinery. The Zionists would be electing their own bloc; but they would also be electing the "non-Zionist" constituency from most of the European nations and from Palestine.

On June 6, 1929, therefore, the "non-Zionists" who had pontificated about the fatuity of standing up to be counted wrote Weizmann informing him that this slightly malodorous election machinery would embarrass his friends "who in the utmost good faith went into this enterprise."

"They would be derided," Louis Marshall wrote, "for their innocent gullibility and would with reason forfeit the confidence which they have hitherto enjoyed of those who have loyally trusted them..."

It apparently never occurred to these "non-Zionists" to withdraw from a bargain which had already been violated by the other party.

Marshall signed the constitution. The American "non-Zionists" confronted the world with an international political mechanism dedicated to nation-building in Palestine for all Jews. The second crisis had been resolved as the first.

*"Trial and Error," Chaim Weizmann (Illustrated Edition), Harper & Brothers, N. Y., page 111.