you, but let us explain. For no reason at all the RFC elected to lend a quite hefty sum of money to the Lustron Corporation. Lustron, we believe, was in the business of making prefabricated steel houses. Well, during all those years the RFC was using our taxes to support Lustron while it was busy making houses for other people, our own house went without repairs. This year we decided to shoot the works and have our bathroom fixed up. The cost of the new plumbing, deferred during all those years when Lustron was collecting RFC dough, comes to $350. So we are deducting that amount from the income tax. If you feel that you must have that amount of extra dough to run the Federal Government, you might take it out of the bank account of a Lustron officer or stockholder. This would, of course, be a somewhat arbitrary application of the principle of capital levy, but if DeVoto can take money out of his doctor's till for moral reasons you can soak the Lustron boys the same way.

"Our second deduction — the one for $600 — is because of our annual food bill. We arrived at this deduction rather simply: it is the excess of our 1950 payments to the Fulton Market over what we used to pay before government-supported 'parity' came into the picture. We don't really see that it is our business to help support 'parity' for farmers as long as the Federal Government refuses to support 'parity' for magazine writers. What's sauce for a cabbage is sauce for an adjective. Let the Federal Government institute 'parity' as applied to magazine word rates and we'll go along with 'parity' for corn and hogs. But until then, not a nickel for 'parity' on our tax bill.

"Our third deduction — the one for $1000 — just covers the cost of a mink stole for the wife. If Mrs. Merl Young, the White House stenographer, can have a mink coat because of her 'influence' with the government, we don't see why the principle shouldn't be extended to every taxpayer. We are sure you will use your influence with the Treasury Department to see that our $1000 deduction is allowed.

"Adding up the deductions, we are paying you $1950 less than we might have paid if we had not providentially run across the DeVoto article. The amount may seem a little steep to you, but we feel that we are letting you off rather easy. After all, we might have deducted a lot more if we had really been in a mood to cavil. For example, we don't see why we should be called upon to pay Major General Harry Vaughan's salary; he could make plenty of dough by getting himself a deep-freeze agency for the District of Columbia. Nor do we see why we should be taxed to send grain to Prime Minister Nehru; after all, he proposes to *sell* the grain to his own citizens. The only reason why we have desisted from making deductions for these items (and many others like them) is that we are in the middle of a war with Russia. As long as Americans are being shot at in Korea, we feel that we ought to pay something to keep the war effort going. Wait until peace comes and we won't give you a nickel!"

Needless to say, we sent no such letter to the Collector of Internal Revenue. Guess we aren't as brave as Bernard DeVoto. Or maybe our timidity is only relative. Mr. DeVoto's doctor would have to go to court to collect his money, but the Federal Government could put *us* in jail.

RED — BUT NOT HERRING

THE House Committee on Un-American Activities, which has just issued a notable report on Communist "peace" fronts, can recall the old saying that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. Two new investigative groups have set up shop — a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and Admiral Nimitz's Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights.

The Nimitz Commission was created by President Truman, who not long ago slighted the House Committee by accusing it of "red herring" tactics. One possible reason why Truman has set up the Commission is that he may feel he needs it to take some of the wind out of the sails of Congressional investigators. The Nimitz group has an opportunity to do a good job, but no matter what it does its very existence proves that Truman is no longer trying to laugh off the problem of Red infiltration.

Year after year, Communists and their friends laid down a barrage of vilification and ridicule against the House Committee. Its weaknesses were exaggerated and its accomplishments ignored. Mr. Truman's famous "red herring" remark created plenty of glee in the wrong places; it did nothing to set the distorted record straight.

With competition for the Committee sprouting all over the place, its record deserves another look. If it hadn't been for the Committee on Un-American Activities, which first heard the testimony of Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley, Alger Hiss and William Remington would never have been convicted of perjury. While the Truman Administration flaunted its lack of anti-Communist savvy, the House Committee went after the facts.

In the Remington case, the Committee made a thorough and effective investigation. Its latest annual report has noted that "the case of Remington, a Government employee, demonstrates the difficulty with which the committee is faced from Government files." Remington had been cleared by the President's Loyalty Review Board. So the Committee had to go out and get its own corroboration of Miss Bentley's testimony.

Last year the Committee, without publicity fanfares, investigated the shipment of atomic materials to the Soviet Union during World War II. It sent investigators to Montana, Illinois, Kansas, Georgia, Pennsylvania and New York. It examined 10,000 documents from the files of the Army, the Air Force, and the Departments of State and Commerce. To expose Communist activities in western Pennsylvania, the Committee's investigators interviewed one hundred people and studied thousands of documents. Painstaking work was done to get a picture of Communist organizations in Hawaii and Cincinnati, as well as of important front organizations.

All this was done quietly and efficiently, away from newsreel cameras, and without the air of a Grand Inquisition. The Committee long ago realized the gravity of its task. Its effectiveness has undoubtedly been diminished by the promotion to the Senate of two of its ablest members — Mundt and Nixon — and by the loss of its most experienced investigator, Benjamin Mandel, to the new McCarran Subcommittee on Internal Security. But nothing can detract from the credit it deserves for having exposed the machinations of Moscow's agents when the Administration was pasting "red herring" labels on efforts to guard the nation's security.

STABILIZATION OR DISPUTES?

By LEO WOLMAN

THE MORE the Federal Government does, the harder it is for most people to understand what it is all about. It is easy enough to accept the promises of a better and fuller life which accompany the launching of each new public policy and each new assumption of authority by the State over its citizens. But what the policies really mean and how they will in time affect the fortunes of all of us — those are unexplored questions.

In this country we had hardly begun to comprehend and digest the innumerable activities taken on by the government in the past 15 years when the resumption of military mobilization started the whole process all over again. Washington once more is being filled with functionaries who will be empowered to stop inflation, control credit, money, prices and wages, regulate the operations of industry and business, collect more taxes and borrow more money, and in ways with which no one is yet familiar regulate the conduct of everyone. This exercise in government expansion is variously estimated to end in 1953, 1960 or 1970. We know from sad experience that none of these estimates is to be taken seriously and that the longer, rather than the shorter, duration is what our political leaders have in mind. We also know that, whatever the duration, powers once granted are rarely fully surrendered.

These observations apply to the differences of opinion in Washington over labor policies which reached their climax when the representatives of organized labor walked out of the boards and advisory posts to which they had not long before accepted appointments. One of the reasons for the walk-out is perfectly clear. The leaders of the CIO, the AFL, and certain independent unions, which comprise the membership of the United Labor Policy Committee, are dissatisfied with the 10 per cent ceiling on wages voted by the public and industry members of the now-defunct Wage Stabilization Board and with everything that has been done to stabilize prices.

This is a plain issue, the pros and cons of which can be debated and understood and the merits of which are, in the judgment of this writer, not entirely obvious. But the formula of wage stabilization is only one, and perhaps not the most important, of the questions precipitated by the labor walk-out. Since the union spokesmen refused to play with the Administration and C. E. Wilson and Eric Johnston made their hurried visits to the President in Florida, wages have receded into the background and the area of disagreement has grown. Ominous and fateful words are used to describe the issues. The United Labor Policy Committee becomes "deeply concerned over Mr. Wilson's arrogant seizure of control over manpower." Or it asserts that "Mr. Wilson has demonstrated time and again that he considers the mobilization program his private preserve." There exists "a crisis in our defense program" — a crisis, moreover, which has not "lessened," but has become more "acute."

Mr. George Harrison, president of the railway clerks' union and before the walk-out special assistant to Eric Johnston, was constrained by this crisis to say: "It might be 20 years until we no longer have a fear of aggression. In that time under present policies we'll certainly be a bunch of regimented serfs." President Hayes of the machinists believes that the mobilization program of Wilson "is going on the rocks," and George Meany, secretary-treasurer of the AFL, asserts: "If I ever met a man who thinks in terms of labor as a commodity, this man Wilson is he." (Quotations from AFL *Weekly News Service*, March 23, 1951.)

It must have come as a shock to the American people to be told that the mobilization program was "going on the rocks." The evidence at their disposal seemed to show otherwise. Factory employment and industrial production have been increasing. Unemployment is low. Military production has been steadily displacing civilian production. Government spending — the supreme test — has been mounting by the month. There have been no complaints of the victimization of labor and, so far as the record shows, no one has been dragooned into a job against his will. Of course, prices have gone up, but so have wages. Not all wages have risen by the same amount, but then they never have. The shops of the country appear to be running normally, except that they are busier than last year, are offering more overtime, and are working additional shifts. There are strikes. But there always are strikes, and there were strikes during the war, when we had a National War Labor Board and a no-strike pledge. The railroad employees are having difficulty in coming to terms with the roads. But that is mainly due to the habitual interference of the Federal Government in railroad labor matters and the mess in railroad labor relations which that practice has created.

We all know that it is possible for interests that are powerful enough to do so to bring on a crisis. Their motives for behaving that way are mixed, but they are nonetheless clear. Emergency conditions, of the kind under which we have been living as the result of public policy since 1933, lend themselves naturally to the making of a succession of crises. The essence of crisis government is the invention by the government of means for dealing with the crisis. The outcome is the uninterrupted accumulation of power by the government, which has the solution of all problems. Thus, a policy of full employment requires huge public expenditures, which produce inflation, which is in turn "cured" by price and wage-fixing, and related controls. In this context, any alert and resourceful group does not find it difficult to invent new proposals which add to the power and activities of the central government and serve its own private purposes.

In large part, such considerations account for the current strategy of organized labor. Nothing else explains the walk-out and the almost hysterical and extreme statements which followed it. Experienced men do not