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S/S - Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

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## HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT

For the first time in the history of U.S. foreign relations, a comprehensive statement of our foreign policy -- including a "new strategy for peace" -- has been set down for close examination.

### Introduction

"This first annual report is more than a record of one year. It is this Administration's statement of a new approach to foreign policy, to match a new era of international relations."

The President notes that while the war in Vietnam was the most immediate problem facing our nation when this Administration came into office, the fundamental task confronting us was more profound. "We could see that the whole pattern of international politics was changing. Our challenge was to understand that change, to define America's goals for the next period, and to set in motion policies to achieve them."

The Report stresses that for the new era of international relations that is beginning, we need a new positive vision of peace, toward which our new actions and new directions should lead. "Peace must be far more than the absence of war. Peace must provide a durable structure or relationships which inhibits or removes the causes of war."

The President outlines the tasks of American foreign policy in the 1970's that follow from this vision of a durable structure of peace:

"Peace requires partnership" among friends and allies. "Its obligations, like its benefits, must be shared." Our own contribution is to encourage and support the collaborative effort without which no objective -- whether defense or development -- can be achieved.

"Peace requires strength." There is an irreducible minimum of military strength which is essential to our own security and to that of our allies, so long as there are others who would threaten that security with military force. At the same time, in this age, we can also pursue the objective of security through arms control, as well as through maintaining our own defenses.

"Peace requires a willingness to negotiate." All nations -- including the United States -- have important national interests to protect. But the most fundamental interest of all nations lies in building the structure of peace. "If some nations define their security in a manner that means insecurity for other nations, then peace is threatened and the security of all is diminished." We stand willing to negotiate our points of difference in a fair and businesslike manner with Communist countries.

Partnership, strength, and the willingness to negotiate are the three pillars of the structure of a durable peace, and also the three central principles of the new American foreign policy for the 1970's. The broad policies we have devised in the past year, and some of the programs we have initiated to realize this vision, are set forth in the Report under these three headings.

The new foreign policy for the 1970's required a restructuring of the policy-making process, which the President describes in the section on The National Security Council System, (Part I).

#### Partnership and the Nixon Doctrine (Part II)

A major portion of the Report reviews the new U.S. foreign policy approach as it is applied in each of the areas of the world.

"A more responsible participation by our foreign friends in their own defense and progress means a more effective common effort toward the goals we all seek. Peace in the world will continue to require us to maintain our commitments -- and we will....But a more balanced and realistic American role in the world is essential if American commitments are to be sustained over the long pull.... Our objective, in the first instance, is to support our interests over the long run with a sound foreign policy. The more that policy is based on a realistic assessment of our and other's interests, the more effective our role in the world can be. We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around."

In Europe, where the President went at the outset of his term, the three elements of a durable peace apply. "Genuine partnership must increasingly characterize our alliance" as together with our allies we must maintain the necessary strength and must be prepared to negotiate. The President calls for "the balance of burdens and responsibilities" to be "adjusted to reflect the economic and political realities of European progress." He notes that "as we move from dominance to partnership, there is the possibility that some will see this as a step towards disengagement. But...we can no more disengage from Europe than from Alaska." Reaffirming our support of European unity, he recognizes that "the structure of Western Europe itself -- the organization of its unity -- is fundamentally the concern of the Europeans." The common agenda for the future includes devising a rational defense strategy and force levels for the longer term, European-American understandings on East-West negotiations and cooperation in facing "the common social and human challenges of modern societies."

In the Western Hemisphere, the Administration is exhibiting a new spirit and approach, "recalling our special relationship but changing our attitude to accommodate the forces of change." The emphasis, as reflected in the President's October 31 speech, is on "an action program for progress that offers cooperative action rather than paternal promises and panaceas." The Report outlines the essential principles of the new partnership, "in which all voices are heard and none is predominant" and spells out the specific actions underway to implement the new approach.

In Asia, where the Nixon Doctrine was first set forth, the President states, "We are a Pacific power." He notes that "our Asian friends, especially Japan, are in a position to shoulder larger responsibilities..." Thus, "while we will maintain our interests in Asia, and the commitments that flow from them, the changes taking place in that region enable us to change the character of our involvement. The responsibilities once borne by the United States at such great cost can now be shared." We must strike a balance between doing too much and too little, between our Asian friends' disillusion and dependence. The President reviews the doctrine first enunciated at Guam and repeated November 3 concerning our security policy. As for economic development, the President, emphasizes that "our goal must be particularly close cooperation," where "our most effective contribution will be to support Asian initiatives in an Asian framework." We "have laid the foundation for U.S.-Japanese cooperation in the 1970's."

In this context we reached agreement on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan which was considered "among the most important decisions I have taken as President."

In Vietnam, the President reaffirms his policy of seeking a just peace through negotiations and Vietnamization. Our negotiations, "the key to peace in Hanoi...it is time for Hanoi to heed the concern of mankind and turn our negotiations into a serious give-and-take." On Vietnamization, the President says, "We have reversed the trend of American military engagement in Vietnam and the South Vietnamese have assumed a greater role in combat operations." In addition, the President reports that the pacification program "is succeeding." He makes a special point about prisoners of war: "a matter of basic humanity...I state again our readiness to proceed at once to arrangements for the release of prisoners of war on both sides." He promises continuing close scrutiny of all aspects of Vietnam to determine "the depth and durability of the progress which has been made," noting we cannot fool the enemy and must not fool ourselves.

In the Middle East, where the conflict between Arabs and Israel is "still far from settlement," the President says "the United Nations cease-fire resolutions define the minimal conditions that must prevail on the ground if a settlement is to be achieved." He stresses again that a settlement, which should still be sought, "can only be achieved through the give and take of negotiation by those involved." Our job is to help create a framework for negotiations in accordance with the UN resolution of November 22, 1967. Admitting "we have not achieved as much as we had hoped twelve months ago with the Soviet Union or the Four Power talks" in searching for compromise, he says, "we have gone as far as we believe useful in making new proposals until there is a response from other parties." He notes the need to avoid great power confrontation in the area and cautions the Soviets against seeking predominance in the Middle East. "I believe that the time has passed in which powerful nations can or should dictate the future to less powerful nations." We will continue to work for an agreement to limit the shipments of arms to the Middle East, but the President reaffirms "our stated intention to maintain careful watch on the balance of military forces and to provide arms to friendly states as the need arises."

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In Africa, where "the primary challenge is economic development," the U.S. will help sustain Africa's economic progress. As for the second challenge of developing nationhood, the U.S. is committed as well "to non-interference in the Continent, but Africa's future depends also on the restraint of other great powers." We will help seek non-violent solutions to racial problems.

In international economic policy, the President notes that in 1969 "the world took a step of profound importance" by creating international money in the form of Special Drawing Rights, but that the mutual adjustment of national economies still needs improvement. He reviews the proposals made in 1969 to reduce trade barriers for developing and developed countries alike, holding that "the principle of true reciprocity must lie at the heart of trade policy -- as it lies at the heart of all foreign policy." The President recognizes "a continuing requirement for international assistance to developing countries" and says that the Administration is thoroughly reappraising the purposes and techniques of foreign aid. "I expect a new approach to foreign assistance to be one of our major foreign policy initiatives in coming years."

The United Nations, the symbol of international partnership, will receive our continued strong support as it marks its 25th Anniversary."

### America's Strength (Part III)

The President emphasizes that "America's strength is the second pillar of the structure of a durable peace." He notes his two primary obligations to maintain sufficient strength to deter aggression but to avoid provoking an arms race which might threaten our security.

The Report outlines the Administrations's thorough review of all aspects of our defense policy in order to "begin shaping a military posture appropriate to the environment of the 1970's." It reviews the new defense planning process which relates military and arms control issues, plans five years ahead, weighs our defense and domestic priorities for the first time and integrates our planning approach.

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Defense spending "must never fall short of the minimum need for security. If it does, the problem of domestic programs may become moot. But neither must we let defense spending grow beyond that justified by the defense of our vital interests while domestic needs go unmet."

In strategic forces, the President notes the changing military balance since World War II -- "an inescapable reality of the 1970's (being) the Soviet Union's possession of powerful and sophisticated strategic forces approaching, and in some categories, exceeding ours in numbers and capability." Against the background of a continuing Soviet build-up and the mass destruction of today's weapons, the President settled on new criteria of strategic sufficiency to evaluate the adequacy of our strategic forces and guide us in arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. The overriding purpose of our strategic posture remains political and defensive, "to insure that all potential aggressors see unacceptable risks in contemplating a nuclear attack." As an integral part of our strategic posture, the President reviews the role of ballistic missile defense and his reasons for proceeding with SAFEGUARD.

The President outlines his Administration's thorough review of the objectives and programs for our conventional, general purpose forces. He notes that the stated goal of our conventional posture in the 1960's -- of retaining the capacity to fight two major wars and handle a minor contingency simultaneously -- was never reached and was based on faulty premises for defense planning. "In the effort to harmonize doctrine and capability" the President has chosen what can be described as a "1-1/2 war" strategy. "Under it we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere."

#### An Era of Negotiation (Part IV)

Our commitment to peace, the President's Report declares, is most convincingly demonstrated in our willingness to negotiate with Communist countries on the issues that divide us. "We are confident that tensions can be eased and the danger of war reduced by patient and precise efforts to reconcile conflicting interests on concrete issues."

This is the spirit in which the United States in 1969 ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty and entered into negotiation with the Soviet Union on arms control for the seabeds, on the framework for a settlement in the Middle East, and on limitation of strategic arms.

While the President notes certain successes in negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1969 and expresses "cautious optimism" about future ones, he views our overall relationship as "far from satisfactory." "To the detriment of the cause of peace, the Soviet leadership has failed to exert a helpful influence on the North Vietnamese in Paris." Their shipments of arms to the North Vietnamese, as well as their attempt to gain position in the Middle East, "cannot help but cloud the rest of our relationship."

In concert with our allies, the President states, we have offered to negotiate on concrete issues affecting the security and future of Europe, East and West, knowing that "the peace of Europe is crucial to the peace of the world." In Eastern Europe, "the United States and the nations of Western Europe have historic ties with the people and nations of Eastern Europe, which we wish to maintain and renew." The United States has no intention on undermining the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union in Europe; "our pursuit of negotiation and detente is meant to reduce existing tensions, not to stir up new ones." The President adds, "By the same token, the United States views the countries of Eastern Europe as sovereign, not as parts of a monolith. And we accept no doctrine that abridges their right to seek reciprocal improvement of relations with us or others."

The people of China "should not remain isolated from the international community," the report declares. "It is certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking." The report affirms the President's intention to maintain our treaty commitment to the defense of the Republic of China, and points out that "we will not ignore hostile acts" on the part of Communist China. But, as the report explains, the U.S. took specific steps in 1969 to underline our willingness to have "a more normal and constructive relationship." These steps, and the resumption of talks with Communist China in

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Warsaw, "may not lead to major results at once," the President notes, "but sooner or later Communist China will be ready to re-enter the international community."

As for the Sino-Soviet dispute, "we see no benefit to us in the intensification of that conflict, and we have no intention of taking sides."

Arms control is an area of basic common interest. Our preparations for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union, described for the first time in this report, were "the most thorough in which the U.S. Government has ever engaged" for arms control negotiations. For, as the President states, the bilateral talks at Helsinki and Vienna "could be the most important arms control discussions ever undertaken."

The President points out that 1969 also saw significant progress in two other areas of arms control: Unilaterally, the United States announced a new policy toward chemical and biological weapons, a policy designed to "strengthen ongoing multilateral efforts to restrict the use of these weapons by international law." The United States also gave its support to the multilateral efforts at Geneva to prohibit the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in the bed of the sea.

### Conclusion

In summation, the President turns once again to the topic with which the report begins -- the nature of peace. The report then concludes with a passage from a toast he delivered last summer in India during his trip around the world. Its subject: a new definition of peace.

"Peace is much more than the absence of war," he declared in India, "...peace is not the absence of change. Peace today must be a creative force, a dynamic process, that embraces both the satisfaction of man's material needs and the fulfillment of his spiritual needs."

In his report today, the President adds: "There is no greater idealism, no higher adventure than taking a realistic road for peace. It is an adventure realized not in the exhilaration of a single moment, but in the lasting rewards of patient, detailed and specific efforts -- a step at a time."