war, we diverted a large part of our equipment and men to Europe where no visible war was in prospect. By this blunder we permitted the Red Chinese to build up military superiority and to force us into a hopeless war of position.

2. *The opportunity to use the Korean crisis as a chance to wipe out Mao Tse-tung's rule in China and to restore a pro-American government to China.* It is so vitally important to American security that China be restored to the free world that this should have been our Number One objective in the fighting. Mao virtually delivered himself into our hands in November 1950 by attacking our troops. We could have seized this opening for a bold frontal attack upon Red China, and our "allies" would have had to accept our decision. Instead, we allowed ourselves to be talked out of this logical move by silly warnings about a "third World War"—something which Russia was patently unready to launch.

The Chinese Communists would have collapsed like a house of cards if we had undertaken the following operations, all of which were within our power: (a) a tight blockade of the China coast, including Hong Kong; (b) another Inchon operation behind the Yalu River line at any one of the following points: Antung, Hulatao, Yingkow, Chinwangtao, or even Tangku; (c) equipment and support of Chiang Kai-shek's Formosa army to make a southern landing either in Chekiang or Kwangtung, and establish a third front in Mao's rear; (d) systematic bombing of all Manchuria and North China railway lines and bridges to paralyze troop and supply movements; and (e) preparedness to use the atom bomb to relieve any situation where we encountered unbeatable opposition. There can be little question that the unhesitating application of these measures would have toppled Mao's regime, which was still unstabilized in 1950 and challenged by large numbers of Nationalist guerillas throughout China. Moreover, such a strategy would have immediately ended the Korean War on our terms, as Mao would have been forced to pull back his troops to defend China itself.

3. *The opportunity, by bringing off a spectacular victory in Korea, to regain the respect of such fence-sitting nations as Burma, Indonesia, and India.* Such a victory would have created a psychological situation which would have disinclined these nations to follow Mao Tse-tung's lead in the future. Everyone wants to be with the winner. Vice versa, the American failure in Korea will definitely range these "neutralists" with the Communist bloc in Asia.

4. *The opportunity to create a strong alliance of West-oriented nations in Asia to counterbalance Russia.* Mr. Acheson torpedoed such an attempt, initiated by the Asiatics themselves, in 1949. It was still possible to set up such an Asiatic NATO in 1950. But what Asiatic nation in its right mind would now trust us after the exhibition of our irresolution, first in China and now in Korea?

5. *The opportunity to readjust our relations with our so-called "allies" and regain freedom of American initiative in the Far East.* The repeated refusal of Great Britain, India, and other U.N. allies to back our play in Korea gave us justification to detach our Asiatic policies and to adopt a course based solely on American self-interest. The enunciation of such a policy would have saved us from most of the frustrations which led us to defeat in Korea. We muffed this chance. In consequence, we have lost a particularly advantageous opportunity to escape intolerable foreign involvements and to place our foreign policy upon the sound basis of American self-interest.

International Bush-Leaguers

These five forfeited opportunities will stand before the American people like specters in the evil days which may lie ahead. Never has a nation had such a gratuitous chance to redeem its past mistakes and to redress its balance by one all-out military thrust. Never has a great nation so ignobly bungled the chance. Having attained paramount power in the world, are we too faltering—too racked with Hamletian self-doubt—to use that power to advance the interests of America?

Some fatal quirk in the American character seems to turn us into veritable bush-leaguers when we face other and weaker nations in the international arena. Transcendently great in technology and economic imaginativeness, our genius stops at the water's edge. Possessing supreme world power, we are afraid to use it unilaterally, and we erect an unnecessary United Nations as a dreary vehicle for the sharing of our hegemony. We bribe when we could command. We compromise and appease when we could halt opposition to our will by a simple gesture. We carry on our back a whole continent of vacillating "allies," and we allow them to veto our decisions in matters of the most vital national interest. And to complete the absurdity, we do all this in the name of idealism, and we rationalize our ineptitude by smug phrases about the new world order.

The Korean debacle has objectified this national fault in black relief. It has been a nightmarish revelation of just what is wrong with us.

Let us face the naked truth that we have muffed the Korean chance because we have been more concerned with placating Britain than with advancing our own American interests. In the name of fidelity to our "allies," we have walked out on two allies who were willing to fight for us—Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek—in order to please a third "ally," Britain, which was not even willing to abandon its profitable trade with the enemy we were fighting.

Until the United States looks these ugly facts in the face, it will be doomed to other and greater Koreas, as the world shadows lower.

The Great Confrontation

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

America and Russia are locked in a struggle that will determine the future of the world. We must face squarely the strengths and weaknesses of both.

"There are, at the present time, two great nations in the world which seem to tend toward the same end although they started from different points; I allude to the Russians and the Americans. . . . The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common sense of the citizen; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal instrument of the former is freedom, of the latter servitude. Their starting point is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems to be marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."

There are few examples of prophetic insight so conspicuously vindicated by the course of events. When Alexis de Tocqueville wrote these thoughts (1835-1840) the young American Republic counted for little in European politics. Russia was already a great power, though somewhat later in the century Great Britain and France successfully invaded Russia during the Crimean War—a venture neither would embark on today.

But there were elements of fundamental strength in the future of the United States and Russia which de Tocqueville comprehended in making his forecast. Both countries possessed, for the needs of their growing populations, untapped resources of continental scope. In the Russian Far East, as in the American Far West, there were only sparse settlements of primitive tribesmen.

Neither Russia nor the United States felt any economic pressure to build up overseas empires which might become restive and break away. Both held vast stretches of land which only awaited migration for development. A thoughtful observer could foresee the time when both America and Russia could undertake enterprises of internal development beyond the possibilities of the comparatively small and crowded European countries.

Moreover, America and Russia each symbolized an idea, carried to its final conclusion. The United States represented a new experiment in social equality and individual opportunity, within a framework of free institutions, protected by a system of checks and balances against excessive concentration of government power. In Russia, in our time as in de Tocqueville's, all the authority of society was and is indeed centered in "a single arm." Stalin was a far more absolute ruler than Nicholas I because he added to the unlimited political authority of the tsars complete control of the national economy.

More than a century and a half elapsed after the American Revolution before America and Russia came face to face in the arena of world politics. The Second World War fulfilled de Tocqueville's prophecy of a supreme confrontation. In spite of America's wish for friendship, this relation could not from the very start have been amicable. The cushions that had formerly softened American-Russian contacts had disappeared. Every continental European nation except a few minor neutrals had been overrun and shattered by Nazi Germany. Germany itself had been finally hurled into complete defeat. Great Britain, technically a victor, emerged from the war impoverished and weakened, no longer able or willing to apply those principles of free trade and keen competition on which its rise to industrial power in the nineteenth century was based. The postwar anti-colonial revolts in Asia destroyed or impaired major sources of British wealth.

Prophecies Fulfilled

The destruction of German military power in Europe and of the Japanese empire in Asia left power vacuums which the Soviet Union was quick to fill. The late Jan Christian Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa, clearly foresaw the shape of things to come. In a speech delivered toward the end of 1943 he summed up the prospect:

> Russia is the new colossus on the European continent. What the after-effects of that will be no one can say. We can but recognize that this is a new fact to reckon with, and we must reckon with it coldly and objectively. With the others (Germany, France, and Italy) down-and-out and herself the mistress of the continent, her power will not only be great on that account, but will be still greater because the Japanese empire will have gone the way of all flesh. Therefore any check or balance that might have arisen in the East will have disappeared. You will have Russia in a position which no country has ever occupied in the history of Europe.

Smuts proved as true a prophet as de Tocqueville. Stalin after the war achieved conquests, direct and indirect, which far surpassed those of his most imperialist tsarist predecessors.