

the original relationship between the Albanian Peoples Republic established in 1945, and Yugoslavia, which at the time held a preeminent position in Eastern Europe. Both Tito and the Yugoslav Revolution had attained tremendous prestige as a result of the victorious liberation struggle conducted against fascist aggression during the Second World War. But at the time of the split between Yugoslavia and the USSR, Albania was in a difficult position.

According to Yugoslav sources after the split, especially Djilas in his book **Conversations with Stalin** and Dedijer's book, **Tito**, Stalin appeared to be urging Tito "to swallow up" Albania. There is no way to confirm this, as both the sources are extremely tendentious and Djilas is an out-and-out counter-revolutionary. But the existence of an Albanian ethnic minority in Yugoslavia under oppressive conditions, notwithstanding much-touted social achievements and material improvements by the Yugoslav authorities, has been an ever-present concern of the Albanian government and people.

It is possible that Albania as a Balkan state might have become part of a federation with Yugoslavia, or that Tito might have been interested in achieving such a federation. In the period right after World War II, he had expressed interest in forming a Balkan federation in East Europe, and even Dimitrov, the Bulgarian leader, lent support to it. The latter was immediately rebuked in a public statement by Pravda, which scotched the plan.

ALBANIA DIFFERED ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA

All this is important in viewing the later developments of the ideological struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism, especially since Albania and China had in reality differing appraisals of the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Albanians had conducted a far more realistic and more accurate appraisal of the deepening of revisionist trends in Eastern Europe, which of course both China and Albania correctly held to be the responsibility of the so-called de-Stalinization efforts of the Khrushchev era in the first place.

But as the struggle between the two trends in Eastern Europe developed, particularly in Czechoslovakia, the Albanians stressed more the aspect that the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev was a continuation and deepening of the Khrushchev period and that the development of the "liberalizers" and the so-called Spring Thaw in Czechoslovakia demonstrated that the Soviet bureaucracy, which

had introduced the deepening revisionist trend, was now incapable of arresting it. Their position clearly reflected the view that the Czechoslovak developments **were reactionary** and were leading to bourgeois counter-revolution similar to what had taken place in Hungary in 1956, and that the Soviet bureaucracy was either too cowardly or too helpless to do anything about it.

They wrote in the March 24, 1968, Zeri i Popullit, "The new Czech counter-revolutionaries resort to new and multilateral methods. They attach great importance to the complete taking into their hands of the internal situation, without neglecting foreign policy. **Naturally, out of demagogy, they openly speak of friendship with the Soviet Union, in order to completely undermine it.**

"Their principal aim is the liquidation of Novotny and of his clique which is for the Soviet revisionist leadership and the reduction of the relations with the Soviet Union to mere trade relations. In the van of the campaign for the liquidation of Novotny, for his exposure, his compromisation and, finally, for his removal were the Slovak nationalists and the anti-Czech chauvinists, also the old bourgeois intellectuals and the new revisionist intellectuals as well as the students and hooligans who came out and still come out in demonstrations.

"... It [the Dubcek clique] enjoys the guaranty of the West... [and] the interests of world capitalism are visible in central Europe and Czechoslovakia is its epicenter."

Zeri i Popullit asks, "What will the Soviets do? Nothing, but take Novotny into their old people's home, if the revisionists permit it, and give him a villa like Rakosi."

It follows from their analysis that the intervention of the Warsaw Pact, which they had not expected, was no more than a defensive move against Czechoslovakia becoming the "epicenter of world capitalism," as they put it.

But in 1968, during the fierce struggle that had been unfolding against the Liu Shao-chi and Teng forces, any kind of indication that the USSR had moved in a progressive direction and was in reality taking a defensive move against capitalist restoration could only have weakened the Maoist struggle against the domestic right. Thus, a real contradiction developed in China and Albania's respective appraisals of trends in Eastern Europe and later for all of Europe.