

Former Presidents Ford and Carter.

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7) Current and future negotiations, while not conducted in a vacuum, should not be hostage to linkage with other unrelated issues between the signers.

8) Neither side should seek to achieve real or apparent superiority through negotiations.

9) In the future, both sides should move more ambitiously in negotiating comprehensive arms agreements without excluding limited steps in the short term.

10) The public in both countries should be educated to the fact that the issues are complex and that both countries enter with asymmetries, many unchangeable.

11) The parties should consider as an interim goal a relatively small number of single-warhead launchers (perhaps 2000) deployed as invulnerably as possible—in a mobile mode, in deep and hardened silos on the protected southern side of mountain ranges, or in ocean safe havens. The exact number is not as important as survivability and assured deterrence. Prior to the implementation of such a decision by the superpowers, it will be necessary to induce the other nuclear nations to accept a comparable reduction in their arsenals. We should seek agreement from other nuclear powers, such as Great Britain, France, and China, to make comparable reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

12) The United States should ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty or make it clear that its terms will continue to be honored. Through mutual agreement, the explosion limits should be rapidly lowered commensurate with the technical ability for verification, ultimately to achieve a comprehensive test ban agreement.

Recommendations read by President Ford:

"As President Carter indicated, the recommendations that he has read related almost exclusively to US/Soviet relations. The ones that I will read are more in the line of recommendations that cover relations between the United States and its allies, with some broader implications. The Soviet Union had no participation in effect, as far as these were concerned, because of the focus of what we are recommending."

1) The United States, as the leader of the West, will have to pay greater attention to the views and interests of its allies in order to maintain the cohesion and effectiveness of both the Atlantic and Pacific alliances.

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3) The West should develop and allocate the resources necessary to implement longer term strategies for preventing or limiting regional conflicts. Leadership must, in most cases, come from the United States, but in some situations, as in the past, individual allies must be prepared to play a leading role.

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5) Nuclear proliferation remains a very potent threat to world order. New technology and increased concern by potential nuclear powers about regional threats require renewed vigor in dealing with this problem. Firm controls on the transfer of nuclear technology must be maintained and new ways for thwarting the clandestine diffusion of this technology must be devised. The cause of non-proliferation must be kept high on the international agenda.

Soviet Threat Assessment

Reproduced, with permission, from the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour for April 2, 1985 (PBS)

Sec. CASPAR WEINBERGER: Today we are releasing for the fourth time the United States' Defense Department publication, *Soviet Military Power of 1985.*

Correspondent JUNE CROSS *(voice-over): Soviet Military Power* shows everything the Pentagon and the intelligence agencies want the world to know about the Soviet military threat.

Sec. WEINBERGER: It's available to free peoples everywhere, the information on the very relentless and continuing growth of Soviet armed forces and their global activities.

The Document

CROSS *(voice-over):* The 143-page book documents a large buildup with emphasis on new Soviet missile systems, systems similar to those President Reagan is trying to sell to the U.S. Congress. The Pentagon report says the Soviets have two new land-based nuclear weapons, the SS-x25, a single-warhead missile like the proposed U.S. Midgetman, and the SS-x24, a multi-warhead missile that will counter our MX. But the Russians will operate theirs on railroad tracks. There are also photos of a new submarine with a ballistic missile which Secretary Weinberger says has global reach, like the Trident submarine missiles that the U.S. military wants to deploy. The book depicts Soviet adaptations of Western technology—a lookalike space shuttle which has yet to fly on its own; a new fighter plane resembling the American F-15; and an attack helicopter which looks like the high-tech U.S. Apache helicopter. In addition, *Soviet Military Power* stresses Soviet capabilities for aggression—increases in ground forces, tanks and other conventional weaponry, illustrations of a new naval base under construction in Vietnam, and spy photos showing delivery of military equipment in Nicaragua. The most striking information, and Secretary Weinberger highlighted it in this morning's press conference, relates to Soviet work on a Star Wars plan of its own. According to Weinberger, the Soviets are well ahead of the U.S. in Star Wars research.

Sec. WEINBERGER: They aren't working on it from a theoretical aspect. They've already deployed, as we've said, large portions of the more or less traditional ABM, and they have the only operating anti-satellite system.

CROSS *(voice-over):* Weinberger said the Soviet militarization of space includes new rockets to take space weapons into orbit and a space plane that could be used to defend manned space stations.

Sec. WEINBERGER: And they've very clearly pointed toward acquiring the precise kind of capability that they not only deride but argue is so terribly destabilizing and dangerous. And, from their point of view, it probably is because it would mean it would break their monopoly.

CROSS *(voice-over):* Weinberger's emphasis on Star Wars was aimed in part at his audience. This press conference was simulcast to journalists in Bonn, Brussels and Tokyo, places where concern over U.S. plans for space defense runs high. But Weinberger said he hoped the U.S. Congress would heed his message too.

Sec. WEINBERGER: It is absolutely vital that we not sit back quietly and listen to the Soviet blandishments about how dangerous strategic defense is while they're doing all the work.

A Question

REPORTER: Why is it stabilizing for us to get it first and destabilizing if they get it first?

Sec. WEINBERGER: Well, because of the difference in the systems, because of the difference in usage, because of the way they have behaved in the past and because of their obvious world ambitions.

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Robert MacNEIL: For more on that we turn to Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense for international security policy. Mr. Perle is a key advisor to Secretary Weinberger on arms control and other U.S.-Soviet issues . . . Does the Pentagon believe that there is an aggressive element identified in the nature of the weaponry that is listed in this report?

Sec. PERLE: I don't think there's any question. If you look at the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile force, for example, they have placed great emphasis on missiles that are capable of attacking and destroying our missiles. If you look at something as simple as the massing of bridging equipment in Eastern Europe, that bridging equipment is to cross rivers into the West, not to facilitate the protection of the Soviet Union. So I think both conventionally and strategically the Soviet program is an aggressive program.

MacNEIL: Is this a Pentagon-only view, or is this the collective wisdom of the Reagan administration, the White House and the State Department and the National Security Council too?

Sec. PERLE: I believe it reflects the views of the administration broadly. Any publication of this kind is coordinated within the administration by all of the departments concerned, and of course the material in here depends very heavily on intelligence data gathered by the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency and other intelligence organizations.

MacNEIL: What is the connection between the publication of this document now this year and the on-going struggle in Congress over the size of the defense budget this year, or for '86?

Sec. PERLE: Well, the Congress can't make decisions unless it's well-informed, and we have been asked repeatedly to provide as much information and in public as we possibly can so that the constituents who elect the members and who ultimately decide the fate of this or any other defense budget will be informed and can express themselves, and I don't see how, in a democracy, we can make these decisions without an abundance of information.

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MacNEIL: Well, Mr. Secretary, thank you. Jim?

LEHRER: A different view of it now from Michael MccGwire, a specialist on the Soviet military at the Brookings Institution. Mr. MccGwire served for 25 years as an officer in Britain's Royal Navy, where he served as the military attache at the British Embassy in Moscow, among other things. He is the author of a soon-to-be-published study of Soviet military intentions . . .

Another Reading

LEHRER: All right, you heard what Secretary Perle said are (Soviet) motives. How do you read their motives?

Mr. MccGWIRE: The thing that determines their requirements for military force is the contingency of world war. They obviously hope to avoid a world war: they are not seeking a world war, because they see it as an absolute catastrophe. But it is a possibility. And so they shape their forces for that. Now, if they think war is likely, they will put more resources into that structure. They've begun to think war is more likely since about '81, and I would be expecting to see their buildup increase.

LEHRER: Why would they think war is more likely since 1981?

Mr. MccGWIRE: Basically there was a very confrontational style, I mean, . . . that Russia is an illegal state, it ultimately will fail, you know, "evil empire." That kind of thing. And of course the arms race had been depicted by many people in the administration as a way of breaking Russia economically. From Russia's point of view, they see themselves highly threatened, and they rode this out for the first two or three years. Haig mentioned their patience on this. But in '83 I think they made major decisions which we'll see coming down the pike in about five to seven years.

LEHRER: Secretary Perle says the buildup is an aggressive program, a program of aggression. Do you agree?

Mr. MccGWIRE: No, I think that that is a terrible oversimplification, and it's the way we present the Russians the whole time. We don't try and think through what the problem is. They don't actually believe that military force is the prime instrument of policy. Their doctrine doesn't say that war is a useful instrument of policy: in fact, it says you shouldn't get involved in war unless you are certain that, (a) you can have victory and (b), the benefits will greatly outweigh the costs. And neither of those pertains in this case. It's a very simplistic assertion. This is one of the problems (about our dealings) with the Russians. We don't analyze them. We just assert what they're about.