diverted from the Mediterranean countries and the needs of the Egyptian economy become peremptory. An additional revolutionary pressure will emanate from the present Baghdad government. It is possible that some palliative solution, such as a UN trusteeship, may preserve the British position in this area, but this seems doubtful. However, even if worst should come to worst, an eventuality surely not unexpected in London, a British ouster should not provoke an East-West crisis. The same ultimate lot may fall to King Saud in the 1960's. But, again, a Saudi Arabian republic (or province of the UAR) is not in itself grounds for East-West intervention.

Arab nationalism has thus partly domesticated itself. A broader base of support underlies Arab governments as contrasted with the 1950's. Neutralism and statism were the mass gods and these are now worshipped at almost every governmental altar, at which army officers perform the functions of priesthood. The price paid is the collapse of parliamentary democracy. But, for the desperate Arab, the price was not too high and representative government is a largely unlamented casualty. While tensions have not been dissipated, they have to some extent been turned inward, and in the future are likely to be provoked by conditions normal to unsettled areas everywhere -- such as conflicts over succession (but within the relatively safer lines of army politics), over boundary claims, over ethnic grievances. In the 1960's, the Arab world, so often likened in the past to the Balkan tinderbox, may find itself evoking a Latin America of not long ago.

Most difficult country problems for the U.S. during the 1960's may actually arise in non-Arab lands and among our closest allies. Turkey and Iran, for instance, related to the U.S. through CENTO, have not found altogether encouraging the shift of the cold war to more temperate zones. For these countries, Mr. Dulles' question "Do nations which play both sides get better treatment than nations which are stalwart and work with us?" seems disturbingly non-rhetorical today. (This disquiet is not peculiar to the Middle East. Thailand, a SEATO member, has recently complained that while its share of U.S. aid has been cut back 10% for 1960, the flow to neutral India for the same year has increased.) Greater U.S. attention, political as well as fiscal, to the demands of neutralist countries, brings about a corresponding loss of prestige for committed governments among local constituencies.

Ankara has suffered severe economic disabilities, at least partly induced by its heavy military commitments to the West. The Istanbul riots of 1955 bared the existence of ugly domestic tensions, to which must be added the repressive measures of the Menderes government against freedom of assembly and of the press. But Turkey, under whatever government and stresses, should remain securely "pro-Western" (or anti-Russian). In Iran, where the problem is more serious, much depends on whether the Shah can overcome the opposition of the landowning class, most loyal of his supporters, to put through the vitally needed land and other reforms that he is initiating. Meanwhile, the main safeguards of his regime are the continuing rift between the military and the politicans and the pervading cynicism and pessimism of the urban intelligentsia. A republican government, neutralized under the UN, remains a definite possibility for Iran in the 1960's.

Between the Arabs and Israelis

On the surface, very little improvement seems to have been registered in Arab-Israel relations through the years. As the new decade got under way, newspaper reports in January and in the first part of February revealed a familiar glimpse into the war potentials lurking in the Palestine controversy. These were some of the press items: Nasser of the U.A.R. rebuffed Dag Hammarskjold's efforts to obtain Suez passage for the Danish freighter Inge Toft and its Israel-destined cargo; Kassem of Iraq proposed (and allocated funds for) the establishment of an "immortal Palestine