

but also the beautiful and magnificent prospects communism has for mankind.²⁹

He took the occasion to emphasize China's support for the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of 1956, too:

Since the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet people, under the correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party headed by Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, have achieved great successes in all fields.

And to make his meaning crystal clear, Chou complimented the Khrushchev group for their victory over the "anti-party bloc"—i.e., the Stalin faction after Stalin's death.

Reiterating support for Khrushchev's concept of "peaceful co-existence," he said it would "unite the peace-loving countries and peoples of the world to consolidate peace and"—again the revisionist phrase—"relax international tensions and the danger of war."

Mao's message to the Twenty-first Congress showed even greater support for Khrushchev's line:

Since the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet people, under the correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party headed by Comrade Khrushchev, have achieved a series of great successes in building communism. . . .

And Mao had so much confidence in Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership at that time that he added:

*The fulfillment of this plan [Soviet production plan of 1959-65] will lay down a firm, material and spiritual foundation for the transition to communism in the Soviet Union and enrich the treasury of Marxism-Leninism with valuable experience gained in building communism. (Our emphasis.)*³⁰

Why did Mao give such glowing support to Khrushchev at this time? The truth is that the Soviet leader had taken something of a

left turn and at the Twenty-first Congress he laid down the most optimistic and apparently realistic perspective of achieving "full communism" surpassing the U.S., producing abundance for all, etc. However mistaken Khrushchev was (as was Mao, too, with his applause for Khrushchev) it is unfair to erase the record and pretend that Khrushchev was a monster in this period. For if that were so we would have to say also that Mao was a fool.

In August of 1959 when the news first came out that Khrushchev was going to visit Eisenhower in the U.S., the Chinese greeted it with the greatest of good wishes. And during the rest of the year they made all kinds of approving statements explaining how this would help bring about world peace and was in fact "the indispensable prerequisite for peaceful coexistence."³¹

The hidden blow

However, only a short time after the Twenty-first Congress and in the very midst of Khrushchev's "summit" diplomacy, the Soviet leaders acted in a very uncomradely fashion, although it was never publicly mentioned by the Chinese.

When the People's Republic was forced to intervene in Tibet in the spring of that year, there was not a word of support or solidarity from the Soviet Union for them as there had been from them for the Soviet Union when the latter intervened in Hungary three years earlier.

This was further compounded later in the year when the first boundary quarrels with India began. India was trying to edge into Chinese territory, egged on, of course, by U.S. imperialism.

Behind this Soviet disregard of Chinese interests was Khrushchev's—and later Brezhnev's—diplomatic dealings with the Indian bourgeois government. Khrushchev was aiming at an alliance with India in order to diminish the U.S. imperialist influence in Southern Asia and the Indian Ocean. This in itself was progressive, especially insofar as it really checked U.S. imperialism and did not inhibit the Indian proletarian revolution.

But the Soviet leader also brushed aside the problems of People's China. This was not a mere oversight. Khrushchev must have known that he could not get an alliance with bourgeois India without infringing at least to some extent upon the interests of India's neighbor, socialist China. And instead of consulting with