

ing now directed to take shelter in the least dangerous portions of ordinary buildings, helpless against a direct hit but adequate against splinters.

As is now made clear to civilian defense groups, the government in war time aims first to protect things—factories and military supplies—and second to protect people, but restriction of funds sets definite limits to those efforts. A pacifist government, on the other hand, would not be hampered in this way, but could direct its entire resources to the defense of civilian life and property.

It would be comparatively easy also to effect the evacuation of threatened towns. Considerable progress has already been made in plans for such organized evacuation, motivated to some extent by regard for civilian life, but chiefly by fear of military disasters such as occurred in Belgium and France when roads were blocked by refugees. Military governments are strictly limited in these matters, as the conventional defense requires the concentration of soldiers at danger points, with civilians for essential services, but the non-violent state could arrange for the complete evacuation of danger zones, and would, of course, gain efficiency by being able to employ all its resources for the defense of civilians.

After making all allowances, the number of casualties is no easier to compute than in an old style conflict. In the battle of the Somme British losses alone were reported as 60,000, but this was a desperate struggle under the slogan, "Their lives or ours." Is there any general sufficiently barbarous to decree even fifty percent of this slaughter against unarmed civilians? It is possible, but improbable.

Between the two courses of nominal seizure of government and ruthless terrorism or bombardment there are of course countless

degrees and modifications which would approach far more nearly a true forecast.

### ***The Enemy Has Gained Nothing***

Be the losses little or great, however, the important point is that the enemy has gained nothing by the engagement, whether in indemnity, supplies or capitulation. If an air force has been employed it will of course be unable to occupy the district, and an army attempting to follow up its advantage would meet in exaggerated form the conditions already indicated, a city stripped of supplies and of all inhabitants but an unyielding even if starving group of survivors.

In any case the invaders will proceed to press on into the interior, leaving a garrison behind them with workers for transport and communication.

Everywhere the invaders meet with communities of unyielding civilians, resolute in giving obedience to none but their own government; they receive no services of any kind from the population, and can secure supplies only from the forcible seizure of small stocks, which diminish and disappear in proportion to the degree of ruthlessness exerted.

The invading soldiers must depend upon imported supplies and as they advance into the interior transportation becomes a serious problem. In the World War, 100,000 men and 25,000 animals required the transportation of 780 to 2,100 tons daily, aside from ammunition. A present day authority, Major George Fielding Eliot, considers four tons of supplies necessary for every soldier, "plus eight tons for his equipment, etc."\*; for an invading force of 100,000 this would require the transportation of 1,200,000 tons.

In order to avoid increasing the transportation problem by adding an immense force of

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\* "The Ramparts We Watch."