<mods:mods xmlns:mods="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-8.xsd"><mods:titleInfo><mods:title>Direct-to-Prescription Telehealth and the Corporatization of Medicine</mods:title></mods:titleInfo><mods:typeOfResource authority="primo">technical_reports</mods:typeOfResource><mods:abstract>Direct-to-Prescription (DTP) models exploit the convergence of three long-standing trends: decades of direct-to-consumer drug advertising, the rapid normalization of telehealth, and the growth of affiliated mail-order pharmacies. Together, these developments enable prescription-on-demand systems in which patients are steered—often by manufacturer-linked advertising—toward platforms designed to convert consumer demand into recurring pharmaceutical utilization. In these settings, physicians function less as independent fiduciaries and more as transactional intermediaries within vertically integrated commercial pipelines. The resulting conflicts of interest threaten patient safety, fragment care, and drive unsustainable spending, while eroding the relational foundations of the physician-patient relationship. The Article demonstrates that existing legal tools are poorly calibrated to address these structural risks. Fraud-and-abuse statutes such as the Anti-Kickback Statute require fact-dependent proof of unlawful intent and payment by federal health care programs, leaving the deeper relational and professional harms largely untouched. Meanwhile, state licensing and corporate practice of medicine doctrines have been weakened by under enforcement and contractual evasion. Refocusing regulation on the physician-patient relationship as a protected professional institution, the Article proposes a hybrid response: clear state medical board prohibitions on physicians’ financial entanglement with entities that profit from prescribing decisions, coupled with a targeted federal statute that would prohibit conflicted prescription-writing and support enforcement through the False Claims Act. Absent such intervention, the commercialization of prescribing threatens not only patient safety and public spending, but the integrity of medical judgment itself.</mods:abstract><mods:name><mods:namePart>Jacob T. Elberg</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm authority="marcrelator" authorityURI="http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators" valueURI="http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut">Author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:name><mods:namePart>Erin C. Fuse Brown</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm authority="marcrelator" authorityURI="http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators" valueURI="http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut">Author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:originInfo><mods:dateCreated>2026</mods:dateCreated></mods:originInfo><mods:subject authority="local"><mods:topic>Telehealth</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:subject authority="local"><mods:topic>Direct-to-Prescription</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:genre>Working Paper</mods:genre><mods:accessCondition type="use and reproduction">All rights reserved</mods:accessCondition><mods:accessCondition type="rights statement" xlink:href="http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/">In Copyright</mods:accessCondition><mods:accessCondition type="restriction on access">All Rights Reserved</mods:accessCondition><mods:identifier type="doi">10.26300/pmcv-fe94</mods:identifier></mods:mods>