

to believe that another individual of one's own species can suffer. There is good evidence that pain is a function of the nervous system and that many animals have nervous systems very much like our own — so, is it not reasonable to assume that when a wounded animal screams and struggles it is suffering in a way similar to that in which a wounded man can suffer? The capacity to suffer is the crucial similarity between men and animals that binds us all together and places us all in a similar moral category.¹

Mr. Ryder is not alone in this judgment. A recent editorial in the *New England Journal of Medicine* titled, "Immoral and Moral Use of Animals" makes a similar point:

It is fair to say that no one has yet given good reasons to accept a moral perspective that grants a privileged moral status to all and only human beings . . . The exclusion of animals from the moral domain . . . is, in any case, arbitrary and unfounded in good moral argument.

Furthermore, the author of this article states: *Scientists who perform experiments on animals rarely see the need to justify them, but when they do they almost always stress the seriousness of the research. Although it may be regrettable that animals are harmed, their suffering is seen as an unavoidable casualty of scientific progress. The moral philosopher must still ask: is the price in animal misery worth it?*²

Tom Regan, a well-known academic philosopher concerned with the question of animal rights, has devoted the bulk of his professional career to this issue of the morality of animal research. He has concluded that the vast majority of animal research is morally wrong:

. . . we can be justified in using animals for scientific purposes harmful to them only if we have made a conscientious effort to avoid using them — that is, only if we have made

*a conscientious effort to find alternatives to using them or other innocent beings (for example, human beings). Unless and until we have made such an effort, to harm animals in the course of scientific inquiry must be judged to be morally unjustified. And it is precisely because a conscientious effort to avoid using animals has not been made that we must conclude that, as things stand, at least most, and possibly all, use made of animals for scientific purposes harmful to them is morally wrong.*³

The question to be asked is how many scientists really do make a conscientious effort to avoid using and harming animals. Few of the cases outlined in this booklet are encouraging in this regard.

¹Ryder, R.D. *Victims of Science* (London: National Anti-Vivisection Society, 1983), p. 4.

²Hoff, C., *New England Journal of Medicine*, (1980), 302:115.

³Regan, T. and Jamieson, D. (1980) "The Case for Alternatives to Laboratory Animal Experiments" presented at the Fall 1980 Humane Conference of the Anti-Cruelty Society, Chicago.

VIVISECTION: THE MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR INDUSTRY SUPPORTED BY PUBLIC FUNDS

Animal research is big business. A survey of laboratory animal facilities and resources indicated that "Nonprofit biomedical research organizations reported expenditures of approximately \$2.2 billion for biomedical research in fiscal year 1978 . . . Approximately \$800 million of this amount was for research projects involving the use of some laboratory animals, of which \$571 million was furnished by grants and contracts from the NIH" (National Institutes of Health).⁴