In 1981, knowing that I had been coming there since 1960, Gorbachev said he wanted me to appreciate the changes that have taken place in economic relationships over that period. The huge post-war gaps between the United States and the rest of the world have shrunk, he said, and the input from the Soviet Union has had something to do with that. In 1960, he observed, the United States was first in everything; now they are first in most everything. We need to understand that though the United States still has enormous advantages over most of the rest of the world, those differences have been narrowed.

I don't know if Mr. Gorbachev's views are good or bad for the United States, but I suspect that it is good for us to have a more stable and secure person in charge in that country. Gorbachev in my estimation is enormously popular. I would think he is as popular as Kennedy was in the first few months of his administration. He was far more popular on my visit last summer than I had assumed he would be. I think the reason was that people want authority and responsibility to be restored. They want to be able to look forward with some kind of confidence to the future. This popularity should help him with the public as he organizes the economy for the future—a tremendous undertaking.

Rebuilding Imperatives

We sometimes forget or overlook how devastated the Russians have been throughout their history by invasions and other calamities. War has perhaps been worse for Russia than for any other country. They have been attacked by all their neighbors since their nation was organized. There have been three major victories over those attackers: one over Charles V of Sweden several hundred years ago; over Napoleon in the early 1800's; and over Hitler in World War II. These victories were so painful as to equal defeats in most wars. Hitler occupied the USSR over a territory as wide as from New York to Chicago. Eighty-five percent of the housing, and all of the light industry, was eliminated. Most of the livestock and fixed assets were destroyed. Education was interrupted. Twenty million people were killed, mostly male, and mostly young. It is hard to get this next figure into our heads, but 60 Soviets were killed for every American lost, and this comparison does not include the wounded. War is incredibly real to the Soviet people.

The Soviets have been rebuilding now for 40 years and they still have a long way to go. They are spending a hefty percentage of their national budget on arms and they need to have that proportion go down. They need agriculture; they need better roads, they need transportation; they need lots of things.

Still the Soviets will make any sacrifice they believe is necessary for the defense of their country, and we should not forget that.

Parallel Burdens

The United States for its part has paid out a trillion dollars for defense since 1980. That is hitting us hard. When banks charge 12% to farmers in an industry that earns 3.5%, we are headed for economic disaster. The dollar is so high it prices us out of world markets. We simply cannot endure continued budget deficits of the magnitude we have experienced, and the place that predominantly causes those deficits is the defense budget. We spend so much to defend ourselves that we risk destroying what we intend to defend.

People in this country threw a president out of office once, a Democrat, because he conducted an unpopular war. A few years later we forced his Republican successor out of office because he conducted his presidency in a manner that was not to our liking. I do not advocate a constant state of rebellion, but these are examples of how irresponsibility or inattention to duty can eventually pull us all together and force a change. I think the Russians will be a long-time challenge for us, and we have to come to terms with that. It is irresponsible to indulge in hostile posturing, when what we need are considered solutions. I think the American people are ready for a change on this point.

I feel an obligation and I hope you do, too, to attempt to find some understanding between these two great countries; an understanding other than friendship, which I think is probably an impossibility to achieve. If there are both pragmatic and moral reasons for solution, then it seems to me you and I should strive for that solution.

A Reasoned View of SDI

A two-year study by the Committee on International Arms Control and Security Affairs of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York recommends a comprehensive arms control program, to be initiated by an agreement limiting the Strategic Defense Initiative to research in return for major reductions in offensive Soviet nuclear weapons, including substantial reductions in land-based missiles.

The new study, entitled *Achieving Effective Arms Control: Recommendations, Background and Analysis,* sees the United States facing a grave danger and an historic opportunity. The danger is that a large U.S. ballistic missile defense program will accelerate the Soviet offensive buildup, undermine the ABM Treaty of 1972, and lead to an arms competition, unlimited in expense, danger and duration. The opportunity lies in the chance to achieve the most far-reaching limitations on nuclear weapons so far, and to begin a long-range arms control process which could significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war. The study recommends that the United States choose the path of reaffirming and strengthening the ABM Treaty, prohibiting the testing of anti-satellite weapons, and pressing for major reductions in offensive nuclear weapons.

The Committee's Chairman is Stanley Resor, a former Under Secretary of Defense and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations in Europe. The Project Director was Alan F. Neidle, a former State Department official and arms control negotiator. Both are members of the American Committee on East-West Accord.

The report (180 pages, including texts of treaties and sources of further information) is available on request at $5.00 per copy from The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 42 West 44th Street, New York, NY 10036 (attention: Susan Narod).

The Diffusion of Polarity

The handshake at the Summit may, ironically, have marked the high-water point of a receding bipolarity. For all that remains to be transacted between the governments of the superpowers, they are not the only interested or competent actors on the world stage. Mr. Gorbachev has shown himself to be awake to this reality. In speeches to the French Parliament and to American businessmen, he has conspicuously declined to allot controlling importance to the U.S.-Soviet relationship:

"We want to have good relations not only with Western Europe but also with the United States. Just as for that matter also with China, Japan and other countries."

"Our two countries (to the businessmen) are economic giants fully able to live and develop without any trade with each other whatsoever."

Multipolarity and cross-polarity are themes that others can sound, as shown by Secretary of State George Shultz' tour through Eastern Europe in December. How to wean the East Europeans from their patrons is a question of some importance and delicacy, as Congressman Lee Hamilton exhibits in this issue.

Soviet-European Relations

by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
to the French Parliament, Paris,
October 3, 1985

Mr. Chairman,
Esteemed Deputies and Senators,
Ladies and Gentleman,

. . . When talking with the President of the Republic and when addressing you today I strive, naturally, for the essence, the main directedness of the Soviet state's foreign policy to be understood better, to a fuller extent in France. Like the foreign policy of any state, it is determined first of all by internal requirements.

Permit me to dwell briefly on this question. I believe you know what a long and in many respects difficult road has been traversed by my country in the years of existence of Soviet government. From tsarist Russian we inherited extreme economic backwardness. Three quarters of the population were illiterate. Within a very short period of time, if the yardstick of history is applied, the USSR turned into a mighty, in all respects modern power with a high level of the people's culture. We put an end to unemployment and ensured for the population such social boons as free provision of housing, medical services and education. . . .

We are fully aware also of the shortcomings that exist in our work, of the existing difficulties and problems, quite often sufficiently serious ones. The main task that we set ourselves today can be expressed in a brief formula: to accelerate society's social and economic development.

This requires that many things be raised to a higher level—the scientific and technical base of the national economy, the methods of management and man himself, his consciousness, skills and qualification.

Our main task is to make the economy more efficient and dynamic, to make the life of people spiritually richer, more full-blooded and meaningful, to develop the socialist self-government of the people.

It is not difficult to understand that not only reliable peace but also a calm, normal international situation are a paramount condition of attaining these aims. . . .

Our world, a multifaced and contradictory world, is rapidly approaching the end of the century and the millenium. It has more than its fair share of complex problems of a political, economic and social nature. The co-existence on our planet of two social systems, each of which is living and developing according to its laws, has long become a reality. . . .

We are strong enough to give a crushing rebuff to any attempt to encroach on our people's security and peaceful work. But we hold that it is not by force of arms but only and exclusively by force of example one must prove the correctness of one's ideology, the advantages of the system that each people has chosen of its own will. Such is our firm conviction. . . .

I consider it important to explain our position on such a question as the place of the nuclear potential of France and Britain in the European balance of forces. This potential is growing rapidly and we can no longer ignore it. It was said from the French side that the nuclear forces of France are not subject to discussion without her participation. This stands to reason. It follows from this that it is time to start between us a direct dialogue on this theme and try to find an acceptable way out through joint effort. . . .

You know that we have announced a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe. . . . The SS-20 missiles that were additionally deployed have been withdrawn from standby alert and the stationary installations for housing these missiles will be dismantled within the next two months. As to our reply measures in respect of the territory of the United States itself they continue to remain in force. . . .

In accepting this self-limitation we proceed from the broad interests of European security. I think Europe is now entitled to expect a reply step by the United States—the termination by it of the further deployment of its medium-range missiles on the European continent.

As I speak here, in Paris, in the heart, it can be said, of Western Europe, I cannot but speak about some substantial problems of European security, about how we in the Soviet Union see them.

I will start with the most general question. What, after all, is security in Europe? It is absence of war and war danger. The inter-dependence, the intertwining of the destinies of peoples, despite the difference of the social roads chosen by them, is felt in Europe with special force. Be-