explained that "it was impossible for him to do more than tell the Russians the principle on which the bomb was made. It was up to the Russians to produce their own industrial equipment, and he had been astonished they had produced the bomb so quickly."

Carleton S. Proctor, a leading American engineer with experience in the Soviet Union—though he was careful to point out that he was not an authority on atomic fission—made it plain that it takes far more than scientists to produce an A-bomb:

> The Russians probably have had for some time all the theoretical data on the A-bomb, but the production of the A-bomb requires a highly integrated industrial plant and the smooth-running coordination of thousands of extremely delicate operations. That sort of integrated effort calls for a mutual confidence among groups that anyone who has worked in the Soviet Union knows is completely unattainable there. Nobody dares trust anybody else there under any conditions. Mutual confidence is taboo. Initiative is stifled. The only rewards are for spying on your neighbor. I haven't known anyone who has worked with the Soviets, as I have, who has found them capable of this integrated effort.

Six years passed between the explosion of the first successful atomic bomb at Alamagordo, New Mexico, and the successful conclusion at Eniwetok Atoll in 1951 of "experiments contributing to the thermonuclear weapons research [H-bomb]." Yet, if the implications of the AEC's estimation of the situation is correct, the Russians would have developed their H-bomb only four years after the first recorded atomic explosion in the U.S.S.R.—and it is even doubtful that that was a bomb.

Zhdanov Told Too Much

The first definite indication that they did not yet have the A-bomb came on October 22, 1947. The full text of a speech made in Warsaw by Colonel General Andrei Zhdanov, a member of the Politburo, appeared in a special supplement to the Polish Communist newspaper *Glos Ludu*. It contained a sentence which was omitted in the report of Moscow's *Pravda:* "American politicians now plan the early start of a preventive war against the Soviet Union and insist on using the atomic bomb, of which America has a temporary monopoly." Two weeks later Molotov tried to repair the damage of Zhdanov's admission by saying that the "secret [of the atomic bomb] is known." Zhdanov died the following year under circumstances which are not yet clear. And again in 1948, Deputy Foreign Minister Vishinsky implied that the Soviet Union had the bomb.

But it was not until President Truman had announced on September 22, 1949 that an atomic explosion had occurred "recently" in the Soviet Union that the Kremlin really opened its propaganda guns. The following day the official Soviet news agency, Tass, reported that the U.S.S.R. had had the bomb secret and atomic weapon since 1947.

Dr. Harold C. Urey called the Russians' 1947 claim a bluff, but again, on October 19, Vishinsky stressed that they had had possession of the bomb since 1947. After the announcement by the White House on October 3, 1951 of the explosion of a second "atomic bomb," Stalin himself confirmed that "there recently was carried out here a trial of one of the types of atomic bomb." He went on to say that "trial of atomic weapons of various calibers will be carried out in the future also."

Was the word "bomb" put into the second White House announcement in an attempt to counter Soviet leaders' claims that they were developing atomic energy for peaceful purposes? And were these Soviet claims a sour-grapes cover for their atomic backwardness?

The third atomic explosion registered in the Soviet Union was announced in the United States on October 22, 1951. This time the White House significantly omitted the word "bomb" in the communiqué. In spite of Stalin's boast, no nuclear explosions took place in the U.S.S.R. for the next twenty-one months, while during the same period the U. S. exploded at least twenty-eight atomic or H-bombs and artillery war-heads.

The AEC reported that a fourth "fission type of explosion" had occurred in Russia on August 23. 1953, but did not attribute this to a bomb.

Dr. Medford Evans, former chief of training of the AEC, in an article in the FREEMAN of January 12, 1953 pointed to the curious anomaly of the Russians supposedly beating the British by three years in their first atomic explosion. The British. he indicated, were privy to practically all American A-bomb data during World War Two and up to 1946, and are known to be tops both in research and industrial know-how. Yet they didn't explode their first A-bomb until October 1952, three full years after the Russians—if the Russians exploded one in 1949. To this might be added the strange speed with which the Russians are supposed to have outdistanced the British on the H-bomb.

It is quite possible that the U.S.S.R. has been able to produce in limited quantity a crude sort of atomic bomb which can be detonated from a tower. That the Soviets possess in large quantity workable atomic bombs which can be delivered by long-range aircraft or guided missiles is less certain. There can be no quarrel with the school which holds it would be dangerously foolish to assume that the Russians do not have any atomic weapon. However, we are doing ourselves irreparable damage in the war of diplomatic maneuver by playing up Soviet strength in the hope of keeping defense expenditures popular at home and among our allies. The public must learn to meet the Soviet threat without alarmist shots in the arm. Every time we talk up Soviet strength we weaken our own position and the resistance to Communism of the already faint-hearted neutralists in Europe and Asia.

The Duty to Investigate

By C. DICKERMAN WILLIAMS

Those who deplore the probing of congressional committees should review the history of this informing function of our legislative branch.

Congressional investigations are denounced for many things. There often runs through these criticisms the implication that somehow congressional committees are taking time off, not really sticking to business, when they engage in investigations.

No comment on congressional functions could be more wide of the mark. Woodrow Wilson went so far as to say, in effect, that investigation was a more important congressional function than legislation itself. His view was:

> Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration; and even more important than legislation is the instruction and guidance in political affairs which the people might receive from a body which kept all national concerns suffused in a broad daylight of discussion. . . It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. . . The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function.

President Wilson's assertion is more valid today than when it was made. For the truth is, unpleasant as it may be to champions of the legislative branch, that Congress today plays a relatively minor, although varying part in the legislative process, despite the Constitution's grant to Congress of "all legislative powers" of the government. In respect of legislation Congress has largely become, like the English Parliament of old, a consenting rather than an originating body. In foreign affairs, at present the most important subject and always a special prerogative of the executive branch, the Senate and the House normally await the President's proposals before taking legislative action of any kind. Even domestic matters are now so complex that it is difficult for Congress to initiate action. There are outstanding but rare exceptions such as the Taft-Hartley Act and the tidelands bills. But certainly under the New Deal-Fair Deal the role of Congress was primarily to consider whether or not, or to what extent, to consent to measures proposed by the President. And the President has on occasion gone so far as to demand that Congress adopt certain bills, described as "must legislation," although the Constitution only authorizes the President to "recommend."

The decline of congressional stature in the field of legislation proper has been somewhat compensated by the increasing importance of what President Wilson called its "informing function." Certainly Congress has responded to this greater responsibility. In many quarters the complaint is that its response has been too vigorous. Before considering the complaint let us examine briefly the accomplishments of congressional investigations.

Most congressional investigations deal with economic problems lacking in general interest, and the witnesses usually appear gladly. It is not necessary to coerce farmers or shipmasters to tell Congress why they need subsidies. Although perhaps of far-reaching importance, the evidence is so colorless from an emotional point of view that the public hears little of it. The investigations conducted by the Cullom Committee and the Alexander Committee, leading to the Interstate Commerce Act and the Shipping Act of 1916, were of this kind.

Inquiries into Misconduct

The controversial investigations are those inquiring into real or supposed misconduct. They may be of officials of the federal government, like the recent investigations of the Departments of State and Justice and of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; of private industry, like the investigations of the investment bankers in 1933; of the relations between private industry and government officials, like the oil investigations of the 20's and the shipping investigations of the 30's; or of the relations between criminals and municipal officials, like the crime investigation of 1950-51. Although these investigations were marked by violent indignation and even what is called today "hysteria," it is impossible to deny that they had beneficial results in legislation, administrative reform, and civil and criminal prosecutions.

Thus the investigations of the bankers and the shipping companies led to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. The recent investigations of the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Internal Revenue led to reorganization of those offices and also caused both candidates in the Presidential campaign of 1952 to pledge high-principled administration. The oil investigations of the 20's brought about