Chiang Kai-shek's Formosan army and his mainland guerrillas. Hence our insistence that United States air and sea power be stepped up to the point where they can give formidable support, "cover" and mobility to the soldiers of Free Europe and Free China.

It is an almost insuperably difficult job to prove the roundness of the globe to a Frenchman in Picardy or a Walloon in Belgium. After all, the inhabitants of Picardy and Belgium are dwellers on the North European plain, and this fact gives them the optical illusion of a flatness stretching all the way east to the Urals. When Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium asks a promise that the United States "will engage itself without limit" in Europe, he is speaking as a North European plain dweller who has seen two generations of Germans march in hob-nailed boots across Belgium from the east. Yet despite the fact that Belgium has been occupied by an alien power from the east during two world wars, it is today a free nation. Why? Because the island powers of England and America were able to hold the outer globe.

They did this by limiting the nature of their commitment to Europe itself, holding out sufficient reserve to make sure Germany could not win outside of Europe. British Tommies fought in Europe in World War I, but other Britishers held the sea, and it was a gifted British agent, T. E. Lawrence, who brought over the Arabs to the Allies.

It may not please continental Europeans to be told the facts of geography, but Europe itself does not control the world. Conquest of Europe by a power that can not break out of Europe into Africa, into oil-rich Arabia, or into the East Indies, must be ultimately meaningless. Europe can be a trap for a conquerer, as well as a lever.

It is precisely because Europe can be made into a trap that the United States must have a second line of battle — which means air power and sea power and enough uncommitted mobile army units to hold the line of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Until recently, the British have understood the policy of the strong second line. They won the Napoleonic wars by maintaining their second line. Trafalgar was a second-line battle; Lord Nelson a second-line hero! The British in the Napoleonic period were maligned and cursed. To the Austrians, the Prussians, the Italians, the Spaniards, the Dutch and the Flemings, England was "Perfidious Albion." To use the lingo of modern internationalism, Britain seemed addicted to the policy of "too little and too late." It was maddening to the Europeans that Britain should refuse to raise mass conscript armies for continental use. It annoyed them no end to watch the Fabian dilatoriness of the British strategy that eventually led Napoleon to lengthen his supply lines to the breaking point in Spain and Russia. But how else could British energies have been utilized for eventual victory? The proof of the pudding was in the post-1814 victory period: England had not only saved Europe from Napoleon; it had also saved out enough energy to create an international economic system that gave the western world the most truly liberal century it has ever known.

Despite the lessons of their own past, the British make the same mistake as the continental Europeans when they try to advise the United States on foreign policy matters. Under the Attlee policy of transforming imperial-minded Britain into an island Sweden, the British are losing their old military instincts. Even more than the continental Europeans, the British seem to want to cut and run in the Far East. They are willing to give Formosa to the Communists under the illusion that they are thus saving Kenya and Gibraltar. They are willing to chaffer for a few pounds by letting the sinews of war flow to Mao Tse-tung through Hongkong. They do not seem to care that Hongkong must fall if Formosa falls: one island off the Chinese coast must go the way of the other. And what if Formosa and Hongkong go to the Communists? Will this lessen the pressure on Singapore and India? And if Singapore and India go, what about Australia and New Zealand? What about Iran and Arabia? What about Kenya? Can not the British see that Stalin will be able to turn all his energies to conquest of the West once he no longer has to worry about the East?

The American people might complain, with some justice, that the European members of the UN are letting the United States down in Korea. The vast bulk of the 400,000-man UN army in Korea consists of Americans and South Koreans. It has cost the United States some 20 billion dollars to date to fight Stalin's North Korean and Red Chinese stooges on the Korean peninsula. American casualties in Korea now total some 50,000; the other casualties among the UN forces, as last announced, were a meager 2785!

But if complaints can justly be made that Europe is not holding up its end in the Korean theater, the *Freeman* would be willing to forget the whole matter on one condition: that western Europe get to work organizing an army capable of deterring Stalin in Europe while the United States fights him in Asia. It takes a big bridge of ships, plus some 800,000 men organized in services of supply, transportation, communications and so on, to keep a small army at fighting peak in Korea. If America is also expected to supply the bulk of the soldiers needed to hold Europe as well as Korea, just think of the extra men that must be tied up in supply and transport to support them! No doubt 140 million Americans can do a lot toward providing both soldiers and transport for Europe as well as for Korea. But at what cost to the proper utilization of American factory power to turn out planes, warships, rockets, atomic bombs and all the other paraphernalia of war that would make Europe's own soldiers doubly, nay trebly, effective against the hordes of Stalin? Europeans can hardly have it both ways: if they insist on masses of American men to defend Europeans in Europe, they must forego a perhaps critical amount of the strength that could be had out of full use of the American machines.

Since the Communists have succeeded in debauching both words and arithmetic to the point where virtually nobody can react to them any more, this editorial addressed to our European friends may or may not reach its mark. But we like to think that words can still be refurbished and that figures can still be made to convey a message of truth. We would like to hear from Europeans who read this editorial; their comments might help us better to explain ourselves, or to change our thinking if there are some relevant points that we have overlooked. Anyway, we have done our best to explain our way of thinking, and we hope there will be no more complaints about "isolationism" when the *Freeman* is above all concerned with cheating Stalin of his intended European prey.

THE XXII AMENDMENT

When the Twenty-second Amendment went into effect on February 26, there was formally embodied in the Constitution a provision that had been part of our unwritten and unbroken political tradition during the whole century and a half between the period when the Constitution was adopted in 1788 and when Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected to a third term in 1940.

As so often happens, not until this tradition was violated were its value and necessity adequately recognized. The reasons for it were not fully understood by either of Roosevelt's Republican opponents when he ran, successively, for his third and his fourth term. Neither Wendell Willkie nor Governor Dewey presented the real case against more than two terms for any President. It was not merely that George Washington had set a precedent by refusing a third term. It was not merely that the precedent had since then been unbroken. And it was not merely to "give somebody else a chance" — as if the presidency were a prize to be distributed among as many individuals as possible.

The real reasons went much deeper. Probably the most important is that the President in office, through his power of appointment and removal, in effect controls the votes of the overwhelming majority of officeholders, and the votes of this group and their families are the determining factor in swinging an otherwise close election. (If, for example, we deduct the presumptive Federal officeholder vote from Roosevelt's popular majority in 1944, we get an actual majority for Dewey.)

There are many factors in addition to this. One of them is the tremendous prestige and authority of the Presidential office itself; the power of the incumbent to command the front pages of the newspapers and the radio channels for any statement he cares to make or any version of the facts he cares to promulgate; and the use of almost the whole articulate Federal bureaucracy as at least part-time apologists and publicity agents for his own Administration. The incumbent is able to campaign in a much more effective manner than his opponent. He may command national radio hook-ups free of charge for "nonpartisan" speeches as President. In the midst of an election campaign he may make dramatic "inspection" tours of war plants, or hold spectacular conferences as "commander-in-chief" with the top general in the field in war time.

Finally, he can help to create the myth of the "indispensable man," build up a constant atmosphere of crisis, control the nominating convention, and argue that a time of crisis is no time for a change and that his hand will be weakened in negotiating with foreign countries if there is even a suspicion that he may be supplanted by someone else.

Therefore the ratification of the Twenty-second Amendment has made and will make a profound change in the political atmosphere. Its ratification is also in itself a symptom that a marked change in the political atmosphere had already taken place. From this standpoint the "box score" on ratifications is impressive. The amendment as passed by Congress was submitted to the States on March 24, 1947. In the next two months it was ratified by eighteen State legislatures, practically all Republican. The Democrats would have nothing to do with it because they felt it was in effect a slur on the memory of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

There were no more ratifications until 1948, and in that year there were only three, two of them, however, Southern Democratic — Virginia and Mississippi. In the whole of 1949 there were only two more ratifications; in the whole of 1950 only one. The proposed amendment seemed about to become a dead letter. But then came the Korean episode, the 1950 elections, the draft, enormous budgets, the price-fixing mess, the RFC scandals. When the State legislatures met this year things happened fast. Before two months were up the twelve ratifications still necessary for enactment had been secured.

There is a curious irony about this amendment. On paper, only one person in the United States is exempted from its provisions — Harry S. Truman. Technically, he could still continue to run for President for the rest of his life. Yet *practically*, Harry S. Truman is the one person whom the amendment affects *most*. His nomination for a third term would violate the principle that has now been explicitly embodied in our basic law. And therefore that nomination has become, psychologically and politically, all but impossible. The effects of this are already noticeable in the new freedom with which Congressional committees under Democratic leadership are beginning to expose the corruption among Truman appointees.

For the paradox of the new amendment is that, though President Truman is the one man exempted from its provisions, it is clearly the resentments and fears raised by his Administration (among both Republicans and Democrats) that were mainly responsible for the rush of legislative ratifications this January and February. And this situation has encouraged at least one member of Congress, Representative Frederic R. Coudert, Jr. of New York, to go a step further, and to introduce a resolution for a constitutional amendment that would authorize the Congress, by a concurrent resolution and on a two-thirds vote of lack of confidence in the President, either to compel the resignation of the President or to force a national election for both President and Congress within forty days.

Readers of the *Freeman* will recall that we have repeatedly urged precisely an amendment of this type. As Mr. Coudert declares: "Some such action as this is made necessary by the enormous growth of the power of the Presidency and the corresponding decline of Congress."

But Mr. Coudert's amendment (in spite of the fact that like the Twenty-second Amendment it specifically exempts Mr. Truman from its provisions) will probably face both indifference and determined hostility. Representative Emanuel Celler of New York, for example, has openly promised to abuse his accidental power as chairman of the Judiciary Committee by declaring: "I am going to push [this proposal] into a hole and bury it so deep that it will never see the light of day."

Therefore we hope Mr. Coudert and other members of Congress will not be discouraged, but will proceed to offer still another amendment, to make the amending process itself less time-consuming and cumbrous. The most promising method is that already in use in Australia, where constitutional amendments can be submitted to a simultaneous direct vote of the people, and are carried if approved by a majority of all the voters as well as a majority of the States.