

game. Arms control's main difficulty lies with inspection. The SALT treaties have shown how difficult and time consuming it is to establish satisfactory verification of agreements. Freeze advocates claim that inspection of freeze agreements would work because large missile and bomber bases, and missile and bomber production and assembly facilities, can be monitored by satellites, and that there are so many nuclear weapons that minor treaty violations won't matter. This suggests that arms control will work only at levels of nuclear arms about equal to present ones, and that's inadequate for preventing nuclear war. The difficulty of developing satisfactory inspection procedures for lower levels of nuclear weapons can be understood by recalling that nuclear weapons can now be made so compact that hundreds will fit into a small room, only a few weapons are needed to give military superiority over conventional arsenals, the U.S. and the Soviet Union have tens of thousands of weapons, and bombs can be delivered by many means other than large missiles, such as cruise missiles, submarines, disguised boats, disguised airplanes, and even trucks, automobiles, and large suitcases. The temptation for a nation engaged in arms control to hide a cache of weapons would be enormous, and no way of preventing this from happening seems available.

Despite arms control's difficulties, freeze agreements followed by attempts to reduce arms levels are plainly more rational and scientific than the Establishment's strategy.

Unilateral disarmament would immediately reduce many of the values in the probability equation by about half and therefore make war less likely. It's unlikely that a nation engaging in unilateral nuclear disarmament would suffer a nuclear attack. First-strike attacks are made probable by the increasing armaments of an "enemy," not by decreasing armaments. The present fears about a "window of vulnerability," and

the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which was designed to halt the growing power of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and Air Force, are examples of this principle. A nation with nuclear arms would have strong reasons *not* to attack a nation that was disarming. An attack would poison the ecosphere shared by everyone, risk a retaliatory attack, destroy valuable human and other resources, and wreak great damage to the attacking nation's global political image. Since nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous and costly, the rational response to unilateral disarmament would be to quickly reduce one's own arsenals of nuclear weapons.

Thus, unilateral nuclear disarmament probably would greatly decrease the likelihood of nuclear war.

A nation engaging in unilateral nuclear disarmament would have good reasons to reduce its conventional arms as well. Conventional arms are no match for nuclear arms, and their use against an enemy armed with nuclear weapons would invite a nuclear attack, as the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki show. Furthermore, conventional weapons are expensive and contribute to inflation.

The principles that make unilateral disarmament an effective way to end the arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and to prevent nuclear war, would apply to arms races between other nations—for example, to the arms race between the Soviet Union and China.

Any nation that practiced unilateral disarmament would be wise to pursue nonmilitary alternatives for defending its values and institutions. Massive economic-aid programs to combat poverty and other causes of cynicism, desperation, and aggression; the development of global institutions that would promote political freedom and economic justice; and preparation for non-violent resistance to cope with the possibility of invasion and occupation are examples of alternatives.

International relations conducted in such a manner might or might not be expressions of a new paradigm. Certainly, they would be more rational and scientific than the strategies based on conjectures now being followed by the superpowers, which can be shown by statistical analysis to be propelling the world toward nuclear war.

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