Cocoa Marketing Board, along with similar lay-offs at other state-owned corporations. Workers were "growing demoralized by the sheer weight of social hardships and stress," said the TUC, which cited "the notorious hand of the IMF in what is today passing as government policy."

The indictments against the PNDC include matters of political organization as well. The Jan. 22 statement alleged a "structural undermining of the basis of ... people's power," and objected specifically to three PNDC decisions in late 1984: the replacement of the Workers' Defense Committees and People's Defense Committees with Committees for the Defense of the Revolution; a reduction in the role of worker committees in the management of statutory boards and corporations; and the dissolution of the National Defense Committee.

Student leader Yaw Abaidoo took up this theme later in the year when he addressed a National Union of Ghanaian Students symposium, charging that the people are "still being denied the inherent and inalienable right of deciding for themselves."

As a result of these attacks, PNDC officials have been extremely guarded and sometimes defensive in their public pronouncements, pleading again and again that the economic recovery plan is not being dictated by the IMF but, as Finance Minister Kwesi Botchwey often says, by the hard realities inherited from previous regimes. Speaking on Ghana's 28th anniversary of independence, March 5, PNDC Chairman Rawlings expressed a concern that Ghanaians were once again be-

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U.S./GHANA

CIA CASE ANNOYS GHANAIANS

[AN] The people of Ghana are more indignant than embarrassed over U.S. allegations that a Ghanaian national collaborated with a former employee of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in espionage against the U.S. government.

For many Ghanaians, the arrest of former CIA clerk Sharon Scranage, who once worked at the U.S. Embassy in Accra, only confirmed long-standing suspicions that the agency had been actively trying to influence events in their country. But whenever the Ghanaian government had complained of CIA activity, noted a recent commentary by the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, it had been assured that "nothing of the sort is going on."

Scranage was arrested on July 11, just two months after returning from a two-year stint as a clerk in Accra. She is accused of passing names of intelligence agency operatives and Ghanaians who cooperate with the CIA to her Ghanaian lover, Michael Agbotui Soussoudis, a relative of Head of State Jerry Rawlings. Soussoudis was arrested in Washington on the same day.

On Aug. 12, Scranage pled guilty to two counts of identifying a U.S. intelligence agent and not guilty to 16 other charges, including espionage. Soussoudis, who has denied working for Ghanaian intelligence but has said he is related to Rawlings,

Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah with U.S. Ambassador William Mahoney in 1962: Did the CIA later play a key role in ousting the charismatic Ghanaian leader? */JFK: Ordeal in Africa*

also appeared in District Court in Washington and pled not guilty to the espionage charges against him.

Previous allegations of covert U.S. activity "were brushed aside by the Americans as a work of our overheated imaginations," noted the recent ernment had accused Miss Scranage of being a CIA agent, no doubt the American authorities would have held up their hands in horror and would have told us that we were either sadly mistaken or that we were deliberately trying to concoct some story to spoil the clean-cut image of the mom and apple pie-loving American people. But we did not make any accusation."

The old allegations to which the radio referred date back two decades to the regime of Kwame Nkrumah. According to various recently-published accounts, the CIA had a part in several coup plots against Nkrumah, including the one that succeeded in 1966.

Richard D. Mahoney, in *JFK:Ordeal in Africa* (published by Oxford University Press in 1983), says Komla Gbedemah, one of Nkrumah's top aides, "had no problem in obtaining CIA backing for his conspiracy" in 1961 and "spent as much time plotting with the CIA station chief in Accra as he did with other Ghanaian conspirators." Mahoney gives as his source confidential interviews with a Ghanaian CIA operative and a senior CIA officer in the U.S. embassy.

The plot failed, Mahoney says, after the Accra representative for a New York diamond merchant, Leon Tempelsman and Son, described all the details of the operation in a call to his employer on a telephone line that was being monitored by the Ghanaian intelligence agency.

CIA association with Nkrumah's opponents continued, Mahoney writes, with the agency covertly supporting a "leadership alternative" in neighboring Togo.

The group of military officers who overthrew Nkrumah in February of 1966 also received CIA assistance, according to John Stockwell, whose 12-year career with the CIA included three tours in Africa. Although Nkrumah in his memoirs accused the CIA of involvement in his overthrow, no public evidence of an agency role emerged in the extensive Congressional inquiries in the 1970s.

But Stockwell, in his critical account of CIA actions in Angola, *In Search of Enemies*, cites the 1966 coup to support his assertion that many CIA actions are undertaken by field offices, averting the necessity for cable traffic and other documentary evidence.

The agency's proposal to oust Nkrumah was rejected by the U.S. National Security Council committee responsible for overseeing covert actions, he says. "The Accra station was nevertheless encouraged by headquarters to maintain contacts with dissidents of the Ghanaian army for the purpose of gathering intelligence on their activities.

"It was given a generous budget, and maintained intimate contact with the plotters as a coup was hatched. So close was the station's involvement that it was able to coordinate the recovery of some classified Soviet military equipment by the United States as the coup took place."

In a *New York Times* follow-up to Stockwell's disclosure, Seymour Hersch cited intelligence sources as saying "many CIA operatives in Africa considered the agency's role in the overthrow of Mr. Nkrumah to have been pivotal." The station chief in Accra "was quickly promoted to a senior position," Hersch reported.

In recent years, since Rawlings came to power in 1981, suspicions about CIA actions have again been voiced in Accra. On several occasions in 1983, the ruling military council accused the agency of plotting against it.

In a statement on the Scranage/Soussoudis case last month, the Ghana Information Ministry recounted an incident in February of 1983 when "a group of dissident soldiers were surprised in the house of a Dr. Antwi," while distributing weapons for a coup attempt. The ministry reported that "a U.S. embassy vehicle, CD 251, appeared on the scene and whisked away" Dr. Antwi's American contact. The U.S. denied any involvement, the statement said.

In its commentary on July 14, Accra radio stated that "Ghanaians bear no ill-will towards Americans but will deeply resent covert interference in our internal affairs, and more so when such interference is bluntly denied. Now it has been admitted." ■