

THE RETURN OF THE (CORDIAL) ANTHROPOPHAGIC¹

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Abstract: Após considerações preliminares sobre as práticas do canibalismo e da antropofagia e sua especificação no âmbito do campo discursivo, este artigo analisa a Filosofia Antropófaga de Oswald de Andrade a partir do “Manifesto Antropófago” (1928) sob uma perspectiva paralela à crítica pós-moderna. Mostra que Andrade responde ao intelectual europeu que se autoquestiona, assombrado que está entre a carnificina da Primeira Guerra Mundial e a iminência do Fascismo. O Antropofágico de Andrade, também conjecturando sobre formas mais prósperas de sociabilidade, consegue abalar os fundamentos da tríade sujeito/ego-objeto-outro com o que sugere solapar a supremacia ocidental do Indivíduo. A reflexão de Andrade se desdobra numa figuração alternativa da pessoa (sujeito/ego) em relação ao seu ambiente (objeto) e à sua companhia (outro). Sua *Weltanschauung* em *A Crise da Filosofia Messiânica* e em “Um aspecto antropofágico do homem cordial” conecta o Antropofágico/Matriarcal (como incorporação da alteridade) àquela relação descrita por ele mesmo como o “sentimento do outro”.

Palavras-chave: Oswald de Andrade filósofo; a filosofia política antropofágica; o antropofágico pós-moderno; o antropofágico pós-colonial; o antropofágico feminista.

...the Real is full, and “lacks” nothing.

Jacques Lacan

Myth is thus the Real of the logos: the foreign intruder,
impossible to get rid of, impossible to remain fully within it.

Slavoj Zizek

The question of representation of difference is therefore
always also a problem of authority

Homi Bhabha

In this essay, after some considerations about cannibalism and anthropophagy, I concentrate on Oswald de Andrade's Anthropophagic philosophy in an assessment that runs parallel to the critique found in some postmodern thinkers. I intend to show that Andrade dialogues with the self-conscious European, and that his Anthropophagy² undermines the triad subject/self-object-other and thereby induces the undoing of the Occidental supremacy of the individual. His reflection unfolds into an alternative figuration of the person (subject/self) in relation to its environment (object) and to its company (other). Andrade's Anthropophagy refers to the incorporation of alterity as the cordial relationship of the "sentiment of the other."

Cannibalism: A European Shadow

Is cannibalism a myth? Or is it the human feral secret? One of the historical sources leading to the invention of cannibalism was the Spaniards' search for cannibals among the Antilles' Carib in the New World that was instigated by Queen Isabella's 1503 rule allowing the enslavement of those "so inhuman as to resist Spanish arms and evangelism" (*Cannibal Encounters* Boucher: 16). Recent studies, though, insist on showing evidence of actual cannibalism, as if to dismantle one-dimensional notions of humanness (*Consuming Grief* Conklin, *Dark Shamans* Whitehead). Whether cannibalism is a calumny or our innermost disposition, if we consider Christopher Columbus' accounts of the Caribbean enterprise to the king and queen of Spain as the source of imputations of anthropophagy among the primitive as much as of cannibalism as discourse (*Colonial Encounters* Hulme), it is ironic that newly discovered vestiges provide convincing substantiation of man-eating practices in Spain, at the archaeological site of Sierra de Atapuerca ("Once Were Cannibals" White)!

So if we accept this mounting evidence of the acceptance of anthropophagy³ – it may be that, once they stepped into the New World, Spaniards experienced naked life in wilderness as a voyage back into their own ancestry. In their all-too-human condition, maybe knowing of a shared bestial urge carried out in their imagination from time immemorial, Spaniards had a second chance to educate ‘barbarian humans’ – while righteously ‘cultivating’ them for profit.⁴ Besides, regarding this European fixation on marching back to an origin, Sergio Paulo Rouanet reminds us that the savage, as the necessary other of knowledge in the drive to conquer the unknown (to invoke a somehow faded but still useful postcolonial image) is certainly a European invention.⁵ “The noble savage is a European animal. He was the good centaur, as Chiron, who took care of the wounded and ill, and directed Achilles education [...]. At the time of the discoveries, this European animal was found again in Brazil” (“As migrações do bom selvagem” 5).⁶

Cannibalism thus remains as the most terrifying among the three instinctual drives (murder and incest being the other two) with which, according to Sigmund Freud, every child is born (*The Future of an Illusion* 1955, 17). It appears as the extreme metaphor when the so-called human primordial force and hunger are at stake in modern socio-political philosophy. And this becomes an increasingly fascinating issue if one recalls that the Janus-faced figurations of humanity such as the wolf-man conceived by Thomas Hobbes versus Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s noble savage⁷ are the backdrop when matters of communal repression or liberation are debated. This is especially fascinating because both the ‘man-in-war-against-all’ and his opposite, the ‘prone-to-social-contract one,’ are possibly the most notable remnants of Columbus images of the Amerindians, still alive in the social sciences and in literature (Boucher: 110-1). Ultimately, it appears that accepting the cannibal self or marginalizing it when it comes to reflections on the human community –

that is, seeing cannibalism as plainly human or else related to a certain level of civility – implies a choice between cynicism or faith, destiny or prospect, circular eternity versus progressive futurity, structure or action.

But beyond the irresolvable anthropological controversy about the taste for human flesh, the crux of the matter lies in the very search for and reproduction of such human configurations as either essentially benign or utterly evil as the basis for social bond and government, a cultural procedure intertwining real bites and intellectual appetites. In other words, the itch for self-knowledge (are we good or corrupt?) driving the individual to revolve around his own shadows turns cannibalistic his campaign for spotting savages, for the authority to posit the violence of the other (e.g. cannibalism) is the well-known preliminary to elevating oneself to the honorable position that warrants the use of force. The struggle that ensued between the Amerindians and the Iberians, although paradigmatically plotted in the discriminatory practices of cannibal discourse, of course, was not simply a controversy. It was a battle fought within a body of knowledge and more importantly through a bodily confrontation which resulted in the colonial social formation. Andrade's Anthropophagy will bite into this complex.

Andrade's Anthropophagus Philosophy or the Artificial Anthropophagus⁸

Oswald de Andrade's "Anthropophagus Manifesto" (*"Manifesto Antropófago"* 1928) is most commonly read firstly as within the field of cultural production,⁹ secondly as a borrowing of the colonized-as-lacking from the colonizer-as-authorial-provider, and thirdly as a feeding from that which may be culturally enriching. The nourishing Andrade's Anthropophagus seeks exceeds a figuration of savage voracity or a mere

acquisitive tendency, even if the material basis for what I call the ‘artificial anthropophagus’ is the legendary man-eating practice that intends to attain the powers of the defeated enemy.

Andrade’s Anthropophagy rather insinuates a semiotic appropriation, disconnecting and dislocating itineraries, directions, cartographies, journeys, paths, scripts (*roteiros*)¹⁰ aiming to delineate heterogeneity and resistance in relation to a tendentially univocal, totalizing tradition, such as the enterprise of colonization/modernity. It continues the dialogue on alterity established as early as Columbus’ setting foot in the Americas. More exactly it takes up fresher views of the Other – the subject/object of the colonizing modern endeavor. Andrade’s line of argument is akin to Michel de Montaigne’s incisive conclusions about “primitive” life, extended toward the last decades of the 20th century to shape postcolonial scholarship. In Brazil, a similar determination of the colonized to get their story back is the catalyst for the recurring invocation of Anthropophagy’s, whether in connection to Romanticism, Modernism or Tropicalism (“Let Us Devour Oswald de Andrade” Rocha: 6-7).

And the Manifesto communicates as much when it speaks through pointed attacks; “a logic of instantaneous – the development of ideas through short and quick phrases, fragmentary and multidirectional,” as captured by Luiz Costa Lima in *Thinking in the Tropics* (*Pensando nos trópicos*) (26). The impetus of the Anthropophagic which this article assumes then imitates the movement of opening trajectories suggested by Andrade (*roteiros*) in order to reveal some of the lesser-talked-about traits of the Anthropophagus.

I explore Andrade’s Anthropophagus philosophy in the Manifesto to revive its complexity vis-à-vis issues of postmodern/postcolonial/feminist slants which has not yet attracted careful consideration. The perspectives I highlight in Andrade’s Anthropophagy (postmodern, postcolonial, and feminist) expand a few discussions already engaged with

the seriousness of his ideas. Andrade's insights pertain to contemporary political perspectives which question modernity's mystifications as connected to the nefarious aspects of the capitalist world system.

The Traditional and the Modernist Anthropophagus

Known in Brazilian literary history as part of the Modernist Movement (1922-45), Anthropophagy is generally explained as a transformative mode of assimilation applied to cultural artifacts such as literature, music and cinema. Regarding the literary realm, in "Brazilian Anthropophagy Revisited," Sérgio Bellei finely presents Anthropophagy as an interrogation of boundary expressing a crisis of identity. Anthropophagy, as a continuing trend in Brazilian culture – and not as a rupture with tradition as both Benedito Nunes and Augusto de Campos view it – follows the theoretical footsteps of celebrated critic Antonio Candido (Bellei 97), according to which Andrade would have emblemized the "traveling anthropophagus" i.e. all those writers who had traveled to Europe in search of novelties as a traditionally Brazilian "anthropophagic practice of devouring and digesting foreign discourses as a previous step for the production of national literature" (98, 99).¹¹

Another issue very dear to this somewhat structural view of the colonized cultural production is touched upon in Bellei's useful review of Anthropophagy: the implications of the Manifesto with regards to Brazil's development stage (103-4). Citing Campos' argument, Bellei states that Anthropophagy as an artistic multicultural practice would question matters of canon and standardization and overcome "the sociological fallacy of 'underdeveloped literatures'" (102). But in a backward country such as Brazil, this analysis goes, the aesthetic modernist program cannot replace society's modernization or development – the very valorizing of

aesthetics denounces this disparity. An irresistible conflation of modernization and modernism, without questioning the modern/western project or the inadequacy of such mix-up, therefore, leads Bellei to doubt Anthropophagy both as “emancipatory potential” and “political commitment to reform” (109). The impasse throws us back into a dead end to echo Gayatri Spivak: “Can the Subaltern Speak?” No, neither can the subaltern speak its modernizations nor can modernist literature achieve any degree of expansion for the subaltern.

Adding to the discussion on “to be or not to be modern,” in his painstaking argumentation, in “A Cannibal Recipe to Turn a Dessert Country into the Main Course,” Luís Madureira suggests that despite the fact that Andrade attacks European tradition while relying on it, “Anthropophagy may indeed question the authority of Europe’s ‘long story’ of modernity” (99). Madureira sharply accentuates Anthropophagy as a dialogue with Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. He also points out the pitfalls of joining the modern/modernist enterprise:

Anthropophagy’s gap [...] registers not so much an asynchrony between core and peripheral modernisms, but a historically determined discontinuity between modernism’s figural appeal to the new and the content of a revolutionary future. It discloses the insuperable restrictions which ideology imposes upon modernism utopian desire, whether the latter originates in the core or the periphery (113).

How Can The Anthropophagus Be Postmodern?

Keeping in mind less a prescriptive utopia than a hopeful figuration to rectify the misfortune of colonization, I propose looking into Anthropophagy as going beyond the production of identitary pieces whose purpose is reduced to substantiate “national advancement.” Anthropophagy rather belongs to a philosophical discussion of communal potentiality and

I would go so far as to say that the Anthropophagus' outcry is prompted by and joins forces with the protests against the European political belligerent determinations in the first decades of the twentieth century. This view of the Manifesto requires that we abandon its reading as an artistic metaphor and take it up as a political practice – as an exploration of communal life.

Benedito Nunes hints at that when in “Anthropophagy at Everyone's Reach” (“*Antropofagia ao Alcance de Todos*”) he proposes to analyze the Manifesto taking into consideration its cultural, politico-historical and philosophical stances (xxvii). Nunes understands the shock value of Andrade's Anthropophagy concept-building and indicates the views this article intends to deepen:

[Anthropophagy] is a catalyst word, reactive and elastic [...], of which the anthropophagic devouring is the bloody symbol, a mixture of insult and sacrilege [...] as a verbal replacement for the physical aggression against an enemy of many faces [...]. These faces are: the repressive political-religious colonial apparatus under which the Brazilian civilization was formed, the patriarchal society with its moral standards, its messianic hopes, the rhetoric of its intellectuals, who imitated the metropolis and curved to the foreign, indigenism as a sublimation of the colonized frustrations, who imitated the colonizer's attitude (xxv).¹²

Later, in *Cannibal Oswald (Oswald Canibal)* Nunes observes that Anthropophagy is an intervention in the European philosophical scene. He notes that the cannibal was a metaphor circulating at the time when Andrade was writing and “belonged to a common repertoire that resulted from primitivism rediscovered, to which was also integrated the magic mentality of Levy-Bruhl and the Freudian unconscious” (16-19). João Cezar de Castro Rocha in “Let Us Devour Oswald de Andrade” supports this idea that Andrade cannot be “limited exclusively to Brazilian intellectual history” and cites other cannibals which confronted the paradoxes of European development expressed by the WWI (11).

This is the point where Andrade's Anthropophagy has never exactly aborted modernity but was rather pregnant with postmodernity: at the border of both the *wreck* and the *lack* of modernization, at the intersection and necessary relation between development and underdevelopment, that condition which Walter Mignolo calls "modernity/coloniality" in *Local Histories/Global Designs* (50-51). From his own "border thinking" (Mignolo 8), imbued with coloniality, Andrade's Anthropophagy embarks on the reflection of European philosophers setting his way toward a "post-Occidental" beyond enlightened imperialism (Mignolo 6-7).¹³

From this, I hope it is clear that postmodern and postcolonial are not used here as a given phenomenon or established discourse. While a target under attack for its pervasive relativism, the postmodern that this article subscribes to is that of a self-dissecting critique of European thought and politics as is also seen in the Frankfurt School and its French followers as proto-postmodern/postcolonial approaches. As in Peter Beardsell's succinct expression: "The present era is postmodern because it is postcolonial." (*Europe and Latin America* 12). Postmodern and postcolonial perspectives are opportune in their potential to dismantle European/imperial power systems constituted also through discursive authorities. Thus the postmodern/postcolonial must neither be read as a historical period nor as an authoritative description of reality. In addition, Andrade's Anthropophagy also exhibits Mignolo's concerns about knowledge and thus may be tied to Jean-François Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Although Lyotard opens his book by demarcating his inquiry within the postindustrial, highly developed societies to which a postmodern culture corresponds, postmodernity is reported as essentially the kind of knowledge that purports "incredulity toward [modern] meta-narratives." Also in this sense the postmodern is amalgamated to the postcolonial condition as the postcolonial tries to debunk modernity's heroes and goals to denounce the failure of a project.

As Costa Lima puts it, *Anthropophagy* presents an “existential question: to adjust the Brazilian experience of life with our inherited tradition. [...] which] finds its best formulation in the tropical glossing of the Shakespearian phrase: ‘Tupi or not tupi that is the question’” (26). Advising against reading Andrade’s *Anthropophagy* as a naïve Rousseauism, Costa Lima regards his expression as the result of “a primitive force to resist the indoctrination promoted by the colonizer” (27). In Costa Lima’s reading, Andrade’s *Anthropophagy* recognizes the enemy and the need to fight – but proposes the “incorporation of alterity” instead of its negation (31).

Sacred Cannibals

Costa Lima also sees in Andrade’s reflections a dialogue with the European and will explore the comparability between the Manifesto and George Bataille’s “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice” (28-9). For Costa Lima, both works are analogous but distinct as he highlights the Manifesto’s liberating, vital and exultant quality contrasting with Bataille’s “agonic and paroxysmal” approach whose horizon is an imminent death. The disparity is shown in yet another respect – the myth. Posited as a necessary conception to overcome the dead-end of individualism and to recover human sensibility in Europe during the rise of fascism, in the Manifesto it appears as a parodic, polemical or farcical foundation, “a mocking tool able to signal that European colonization did not tame a primitive energy” (29). Costa Lima’s reflection concludes nevertheless that Bataille’s “agonic vitalism” has in common with Andrade’s “optimistic cannibalism” a critique of rationalism and tradition, at the period between the European wars, when the continuity of Europe’s institutions is interrogated and attention is paid to rupture in social processes, a self-conscious reflection prompted

by outrage against totalitarianism – a critique that the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno fully exposes (30-1). So not only rational scientific skepticism and language performative logic is responsible for the distrust of modernity's meta-narratives, as Lyotard would put it, but also local, sacred, poetic, libidinal, feminist, de-colonizing “knowledges” have done so when they turn against rationalized malefic political and cultural enterprises.

Thus three readings of Anthropophagy are discernible: 1) traditional and continuing a trend in Brazilian *ethos*, no different than the Romantic search for autochthonous values in the past; 2) modern and concerned rather with modernization, even if only a proponent of an *avant-garde* aesthetics; 3) and postmodern or a perspectival analysis that scrutinizes the grand modernizing project expressed in a rational tradition of progressiveness.

Thus, less with the evolutionary view of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl than with the speculative look into religion and solidarity of Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, Anthropophagy broke the silence and talked back to the European to reflect on the possibility of social life in the face of imperialism. In *Cannibal Oswald*, Nunes observes as much: “there began the dialogue [...] between logic thought and ‘savage thought,’” a self-analysis in which Europeans examine themselves by revisiting their own myths. Next I present Andrade's argument that roots what I see as his postcolonial and feminist political approaches.

Reversing a Foundational Myth:

Descending beyond the Misdeeds of Civilization

Oswald de Andrade's Manifesto opposes primarily patriarchy and catechism, i.e. the structure of colonization. He will attack colonization archetypes (Padre Vieira, Anchieta, Goethe, Mother of the Gracchi, king

Don João VI) and suggest a kinship redefinition, by chewing up, spitting out, and replacing the historic figures imposed by colonization, irreverently casting the myths from “the instinctive imaginary reservoir of the primitive unconscious” (Nunes, 1972: xxviii).

This is Andrade’s conversion of taboo into totem which refers to the legend reclaimed by Sigmund Freud in *Totem and Taboo* to account for the inception of culture/civilization: the myth of the brothers who killed and ate their omnipotent father (“feared and envied model of each one”) thus founding patriarchal symbolic order: “in the act of devouring him they accomplished their identification with him, and each one acquired a portion of his strength” (142). In Freud’s recasting of the primal horde myth, totem replaced the forefather to signify the death and cannibalizing of the polygamous alpha male – the absolute libidinous – in the name of brotherhood. After the killing of the ruler, its replacement, totem, stood as the prohibition of endogamy to avoid incest and enforce exogamy. Totem was revered thereof in recognition of the feared ancestral father and as guarantee of the law of the father so prohibition would be respected under the rule of the brothers – who now replaced their forerunner and became monogamous fathers themselves in the male-centered exclusive family. In short a tale of discrimination and ruling through dividing and excluding.

Obviously congruous with its time, Freud’s Oedipus complex asserted that a new generation will kill the older master and that this very act will stand as a remembrance to uphold the new generation’s complicity into social obedience. In our days no one better than Slavoj Žižek shows the usefulness of this myth in order to defend the notion of authority as the proper symbolic grounding for socialization, thus in *The Ticklish Subject* he maintains the universality of the Freudian entrance-into-culture model.¹⁴ Following *Totem and Taboo*, he cleverly asserts that being in culture is necessarily having symbolically committed parricide: “the passage from direct brutal force [libidinal forefather] to the rule of symbolic authority, of the

prohibitory Law, is always grounded in a (disavowed) act of primordial crime” (314–6). So it is not the father who forbids and forms authority, but internalized guilt establishes the taboo and the sanction of social law.

In his usually adroit reiterations of psychoanalysis to account for modernity, Žižek explains how the fusion of the symbol of authority (totem) with the actual man who inseminates the mother, forming the father figure of the nuclear family, “created the psychic conditions for modern Western dynamic creative individualism” (313), i.e. because of the jealousy the paternal position provokes – would not be rather modernity as competitive progressivism that which provoked the need of an enemy in every home? For Žižek the absence of an order of prohibition (such as in the crisis of authority since the nineteenth century which has granted certain freedoms to the individual) propitiates not exactly freedom, but extreme subjection, identified as “the conformist ‘other-oriented’ personality (344). Andrade’s *Totem and Taboo*’s reversal will address this very view of an inexorable need for estrangement at home offering a journey away from guilt.

Anthropophagy as the Inclusive Recasting of the Naked

Critics such as Madureira, Costa Lima and Nunes, who embody the historicity and locality of knowledge, are sensitive to Andrade’s new treatment of this founding myth of society, namely the “transfiguration of taboo into totem” (Madureira: 104), whose outcome would be “the metamorphosis of the symbol from exclusive to inclusive” (Costa Lima: 31). Nunes elaborates a bit more on that: “It is the transformation of taboo into totem [with Sol, Cobra Grande, Jaboti, Guaraci, Jacy] that which relieves historical repression and liberates the [colonized] collective unconscious” (xxviii). Moreover, Andrade illustrates this movement of converting taboo into totem by naming it an anthropophagic *descida*

(a downward dive), a descent which downplays European civilization and does not propose the return *to*, but *of* the anthropophagic, i.e. not the impossible revisiting 'primitive life' but rather the inclusion of the life that does not oppose the "primitive body": "Portugal dressed the savage. Let's undress him" (Campos Revista: 8). Also Lucia Helena summarizes this liberating aspect of the Manifesto, a repudiation of colonization, of patriarchy, of the idealized native (156), as in Andrade's initial exhortations of the Manifesto: "Against all catechization. And against the mother of the Gracchi.¹⁵ [...] "We are tired of all the suspicious catholic husbands" (27).

And while relating Anthropophagy as a universal ("Only anthropophagy unites us. Socially. Economically. Philosophically." 27), Andrade also inverts the ascendance and prominence of European civilization over the primitive. And he goes on listing all that the primitive *already had before* colonization, as if composing a primitive declaration of wealth or the social assets which the disillusioned European white men of the 1920's with whom he dialogues were striving for ("We did not have speculation. But we had foresight. We had politics which is the science of distribution. As a planetary social system" 29). Andrade rejects constraints, ascertain existential self-sufficiency, affirms abundance: "Before the Portuguese had discovered Brazil, Brazil had already discovered happiness" (30). Now I highlight some of Andrade's undertakings in the Manifesto as parallel to specific postmodern/feminist-oriented works which are directed along the lines just suggested.

Self-reliance and... Sustenance

One of the Manifesto's concerns is equivalent to proposing a re-connection between human and nature (the person and the environment) which comes down to refuting the colonized condition of lack. Want is first repudiated by listing what one already had ("We already had

communism. We already had the surrealist language. The golden age” 29). For it is the modern European, when faced with those in the last instance alienated as Other, he who ‘searches back’ into an ancestry (the native) in order to recapitulate his self/individual constitution. The native, following Andrade’s reasoning, *was IT already* and *had IT already*, with nothing coming before them; with recourse to no historicism.

This idea is similar in some ways to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s reading of George Büchner’s Lenz in *Anti-Oedipus*, as they note that this protagonist “does not live nature as nature but as a process of production” (2). This idea impresses both authors’ views on the subject/self-formation as a springboard for transformative action because they see humans not in a functional way, but as inextricable from the big working mechanism of production that life is. The person and the environment are not opposed to one another but “they are one and the same essential reality, the producer-product” where production equals nature and may thus generate “the production of a new humanity” (5, 17). Hence for Deleuze and Guattari, the agent of production as desiring machine must go through a fundamental rectification in relation to the ego, as understood by psychoanalysis, i.e. an adjustment in relation to lack as constitutive of the self/individual must be made.

Deleuze and Guattari find Freud’s conceptualization of the unconscious a breakthrough, only to become limited by the Oedipus complex. Proposing a materialist angle to the psyche (thus as factory and not fantasy/tragedy), the authors disengage desire (the energy at the core of human constitution, of becoming) from the mother-father-child triad of the Oedipus story. They understand that the myth stifles the unconscious, which is thus “buried beneath a new brand of idealism” – since with Plato, desire sides with acquisition and not production, the core notion that Deleuze and Guattari criticize: “on the side of acquisition, we make desire an idealistic (dialectical, nihilistic) conception, which causes

us to look upon it as primarily a lack” (24, 25). For Deleuze and Guattari desire is a productive force, it is inventive and not prompted by lack and so they see the Oedipus complex as an idealist repression of the unconscious: “a classical theater was substituted for the unconscious as a factory; representation was substituted for the units of production of the unconscious; and an unconscious that was capable of nothing but expressing itself – in myth, tragedy, dreams – was substituted for the productive unconscious” (24). Deleuze and Guattari ultimately rebut psychoanalysis for turning the desiring-production into representation (296), i.e. into the Oedipus complex as the belief in the big Other, the law, the prohibition that one has to time and again overcome.

This disapproval echoes Andrade’s protests against idealism and the (rational) separation between human and environment; self and object: “Death and life of the hypotheses. Of the equation I part of the Kosmos to the axiom Kosmos part of I [...]. We are concretists. [...] Let us suppress ideas and other paralyses. For itineraries [...]” (30). Also the acquisitive drive is ridiculed in the Manifesto in order to be redressed or rather undressed (“What hindered truth was clothing, the impermeable between the interior world and the exterior world” 27), along with other superfluous importations:

... we never had grammar, neither collections of old vegetation. And we never knew what was urban or suburban, borderline and continental. [...] Against all the importers of canned consciousness. The palpable existence of life. And the pre-logic mentality for Mr. Levy Bruhl to study. [...]. But we never admitted the logic to be born among us (27).

Further refuting the idea of an essential lack, some lines down Andrade will list more of what *we* (colony) *already had* (“We already had justice codification of vengeance. Science codification of Magic” 28) and will propose “Anthropophagy. The permanent transformation of taboo into totem” (28). So Andrade renders explicit a clever equivalence between justice, science and totem, as metaphors for social constructs, suggesting instead that vengeance, magic and the content of taboo be transformed

into totem, into the culture that *already was* and lacked nothing. In other words, the content/body that was dressed by civilization and made dangerous, inaccessible, isolated and unclean will be *totemized*, i.e. in its immediacy and permeability it will be itself the productively transforming process constitutive of the transformed symbolic.

Incorporation of Death: Cyclical Time

Some of Jean Baudrillard reflections also converge with Andrade's Anthropophagy. Reflecting on the transformation of the symbolic into the semiotic, Baudrillard deems a mistake to think in Marxian terms, that is, to look at society as determined by the mode of production in place. In *Symbolic Exchange and Death* – a book on the vertigo in which human exchange has been going astray – Baudrillard thinks society as beyond production. Hence his argument takes a slightly different turn in relation to the desire-as-production which Deleuze and Guatari suggest, but still holds even if one opposes to his view due to the fact that production may be invisible only in the service societies of the northwestern countries – the argument holds because one cannot ignore the playing of postindustrial “third-order simulacra” – beyond ideology – (4) in the apparent randomness of politics.

In an argument that resembles the motivation of the Collège de Sociologie's explorations of the sacred, thus having symbolic exchange as his conceptual backdrop – “Only symbolic disorder can bring about an interruption in the code” (4) – Baudrillard states that since semiotic indeterminacy renders the Real inaccessible it is the law of value that which controls hyperreality (4). Because in his evaluation we moved from the mode to the code (semiotic play) of production (12) value attains a “fantastic autonomy” (7). More importantly, Baudrillard traces the path from symbolic to value in the west as a progressive discrimination of humanness – not

simply opposed to a “something else” but constituted as a universal opposed to the inhuman: “Previous races or cultures were ignored or eliminated, but never under the sign of a universal Reason” (125). In modern times, racism appears under “the metaphysical purity of Western culture” (125).

Baudrillard locates the banishing of death (“little by little, the dead cease to exist. They are thrown out of the group’s symbolic circulation. They are no longer [...] worthy partners in exchange” 126) as pivotal to exclusionary rationality, the escalating isolation of the “poor, the under-developed [...] perverts, transsexuals, intellectuals and women [...] on the basis of an increasingly racist definition of the ‘normal human’” (126). Paradoxically, rationality, materialized in the “great operational metropolis” brought us to a “culture of death” (127). Separating death from life is thus useless because social life is bound to symbolic exchange, apparent in the “indifferent fatality of survival” (127) as possibly opposed to a “sensitive exuberance of existence.” With the primitive, on the other hand, death is not the threshold, neither is it controlled for the institution of power nor isolated in individuality – it is instead regarded as part of social exchange. The connection between Baudrillard’s and Andrade’s thought is obvious. Moreover when the former touches on the subject of anthropophagy:

This devouring is a social act, a symbolic act [...]. We think of anthropophagia as despicable in view of the fact that we despise what we eat, the act of eating and ultimately our own bodies [...] [but it] is a social act, a sacrificial process where the metabolism of the whole group is at stake [...] it is an act of expenditure, consumption or consummation, and of the transmutation of the flesh into a symbolic relation, the transformation of the body into social exchange (138).

At the basis of Anthropophagy we find a reassertion of this symbolic exchange and the erasure of the dichotomous understanding of death as a subtraction from the life of the body. Key to this welcoming of the whole endurance of the body is the embedded declaration of *all that we already had*, especially happiness, which renounces the Other-in-death

represented by prohibition and constraint: “Happiness is the proof [...] Against the social reality, dressed and oppressed, catalogued by Freud – a reality without complexes, without madness, without prostitution and without penitentiaries” (30-1).

Our ‘artificial Anthropophagus’ first denies that there is a fundamental lack, because the motto *we already had it* affirms that the native was already in possession of the equality and happiness that Europeans seek in their speculative social sciences, i.e. the native was already in a bare state of nation (the native as the mythical raw material Europe’s concept of humanity and rights needs to constitute a nation): “Without us Europe would not have even its poor declaration of human rights” (Andrade 28). Then elevating the symbolic act of Anthropophagy, Andrade posits the reincorporation of death and the dead into sociability and thereby reconfigures knowledge (history) – for if death returns to the social body, time becomes cyclical, non-linear, reversible and symbolic thus opposed to the “reality principle,” thus ruled by the gift and not by economy as the law of ration (Baudrillard: 1-2). Having in mind the defeat of the third-order simulacra that rules society, “the aleatory processes of control” (3), Baudrillard wonders:

Is there a theory or a practice which is subversive because it is more aleatory than the system itself? [...]. Can we fight DNA? Certainly not by means of the class struggle. Perhaps simulacra of a higher logical (or illogical) order, could be invented: beyond the current third order, beyond determinacy and indeterminacy. But would they still be simulacra? Perhaps death and death alone, the irreversibility of death, belongs to a higher order than the code (4).

At the core of this controversial logic or illogic of a higher degree – of reversibility or ex-termination (5) – is the consuming, exhausting drive of the ‘artificial Anthropophagus’. Andrade’s eerily intuits into a figuration that addresses technology in his *Crisis of Messianic Philosophy* (*A Crise da Filosofia Messiânica*), imagining a techno-barbarian, possibly a code-interrupter, who is the synthesis between the natural and the civilized

men (Andrade: 1972, 79). Could also the “sentiment of the other” – for Andrade, a mark of Anthropophagic/matriarchal society, as opposed to the messianic/patriarchal – be the ultimate code-interrupter, for its radical reversibility (being in alterity, the ultimate gift) and intrinsic disregard for value?

Naked Life Unbounded

Giorgio Agamben adds to these ideas with his reflection on “happy life” as a potential reunion of natural life (*zōē*) and political life (*bios*). He starts *Homo Sacer* with Aristotle’s idea that a human is a “living animal [of *zōē*] with the additional capacity for political existence [as *bios*]” (HS 7) and that communal life eventually necessitates that *zōē*, or natural (bare/naked¹⁶) life, be excluded from political (good) life, which Agamben explicates as a need to transform naked life into good life (HS 7). The “city of men” – men, according to Aristotle again, as “the living being who has language” – is thus founded on the exclusion of natural life, which for Agamben turns out as the very politization of natural life operating a crucial paradigm shift in modern thought – and specifically a “transition from voice to language” (*logos*) (HS 7, 4):

Politics therefore appears as the truly fundamental structure of Western metaphysics insofar as it occupies the threshold on which the relation between the living being and the *logos* is realized. In the “politization” of bare life – the metaphysical task par excellence – the humanity of living man is decided (HS 8).

Some of Agamben’s considerations of the relation between natural life and political life are similar to Baudrillard’s insight into how Western reason and law operate around the manipulation of life in terms of death, thus offering only the way of survival.

Agamben will repeat Andrade's idea mentioned above about the native as the prototype for the assertion of human rights in Europe; the paradox contained in the 1789 liberating declaration of rights with its exclusion of bare life from the polis (HS 127). Observing the fact that modern democracy tried but did not manage "saving *zoç*" when making it the basis of human rights (HS 10) causes Agamben to hope for a "new politics" that will not isolate naked life (HS 11). For as it is now, biopolitics (that results from the politization of naked life, *zoç*) will not conciliate simple life and good life as one and the only way of living, but will go on as the structuring principle of totalitarian ("blood and death") and/or consumerist ("perfect senselessness") societies (HS 11).

Agamben takes from Aristotle's suggestion that there is indeed something enticing about simple life, *zoç* – "clearly most men will tolerate much suffering and hold on to life [*zoç*] as if it were a kind of serenity [*euçmeria*, beautiful day] and a natural sweetness" (HS 2) – and will speculate about a new politics based on "happy life" which must absolutely be out of the grasp of power or law. This idea is evidently in agreement with Andrade's proposition to repossess happiness in all that *we already had* and away from (capitalist) civilization, with its law (of the father) and its (corresponding) logos.

Return of the Body

Agamben thinks that one of the implications of the instrumentalization of simple life is paradoxically expressed in the most basic of modern democratic laws – the *Habeas Corpus* Act passed in the Parliament of England in 1679, for he understands this writ brings both freedom (makes unjust imprisonment illegal) and subjection (ensures the

accused's presence at a trial) (HS 125), together as "law's desire to have a body" (HS 124).¹⁷ In this connection, what would then be an alternative *presentification* (making present) of the body beyond modern democracy, the semiotic simulacra and the lacking self, that is, in happy life?

We must start by turning Agamben against himself, as Catherine Mills does when she notes that the Italian author does not consider the "gendered dimension" of the politicized natural life (58), i.e. the exclusion of life as reproduction (*zoç*) from life in the polity (*bios*) which signifies and puts in place the refusal of the body (the extra-symbolic or rather the pre-symbolic) – the realm which precedes the entry of every newly-born human into culture; the relation with the mother.

The obvious issue is: Can the un-repressed or positive politicizing of the maternal embodiment be posed as the paradigmatic human relation informing the desired union between *zoç* and *bios*? Agamben's historical prospect clarifies what I believe Andrade proposes with his Matriarchy, as in Mills explanation:

It is only the inauguration of that which has never been, the not having been of the past, that will suffice to overturn the Nothing maintained by the law in force without significance and thereby restore human life to the unity of *bios* and *zoç*, a unity that itself has never yet been. As Agamben states "this – what has never happened – is the historical and wholly actual homeland of humanity" (52).

Furthering his *descida* toward simple life or the life of the body, Andrade will postulate that which will relinquish control over the other, not as an occupation of an idyllic paradise, but the socialization (and not deprivation) of a resource which exists but is just cast outside the symbolic and transformed into the conquerable (woman's body, land). This relies on the assumption of a world with no transcendence, a non-redemptive, godless existence in which only responsiveness, affect and care – "the sentiment of the other" – placate the fear of an imagined imminent danger that an other would present (Andrade, 1972: 141). This sentiment opposes

the abstract god – “the repressive trauma of which the Catechization would constitute the exemplar cause, a censoring instance, a collective Superego” (Nunes, 1972: xxvi) with concrete goddesses: “Against the antagonistic sublimations. Brought in the caravels [...] If God is the consciousness of Uncreated Universe, Guaraci is the mother of the living. Jaci is the mother of vegetation” (Manifesto 29).¹⁸

Andrade’s happiness thus proposes both overcoming the suppressing displacements, the dichotomies through which Western reason operates, and his Anthropophagic *descida* to salvage *zoç*, naked life. Thus Andrade’s Anthropophagic Matriarchy must not be seen as a social structure dependent on anthropological or scientific evidence but with the hopeful eyes of those who foresee the unfathomable “coming community” insinuated but not pinpointed by Agamben, a hopeful potentiality whose contour is our present responsibility to explore.

Andrade’s new political/cultural/communal, as is known, foreshadow two items, the most difficult to deal with and often dismissed in appraisals of his *oeuvre* concerning his alternative views out of oppressive patriarchal occupations: the “technized barbarian” (28), which may be seen as the agent within his second configuration: “Happiness [...] In the Pindorama matriarchy” (30). From the outset, though, Matriarchy should be regarded now as a return *to* (and not *of*) the maternal instead of women’s *ruling*.

Maternal Embodiment

Julia Kristeva’s effort in *Revolution in Poetic Language* to delineate the realm of semiotic *chora* – that which precedes language, logos, the origin of culture – also involves a descent toward the archaic (90). Kristeva’s semiotic *chora* is similar to the Lacanian Imaginary, the symbiotic relation

with the mother before the child, impelled by a supposed lack, needs language thereby entering into the realm of the Symbolic, the Western culture beyond the body and ruled by the big Other – the paternal. The *chora*, a reservoir existing beyond or even beneath logos, culture and repression, accounts for drives that can be mapped back directly onto the body (16).

As Andrade is opposing the primacy of the logos and picturing a material social life before the word (“We were never evangelized. We lived through a somnambulist right. [...] But we never admitted logic to be born among us” 28) so too is Kristeva traversing the limit of language, a move that in *Powers of Horror* she takes as a suggestion from Freud: “There would be a ‘beginning’ preceding the word. Freud, echoing Goethe, says so at the end of *Totem and Taboo*: ‘In the beginning there was the deed.’” (61) – the deed to which Freud refers, Kristeva will indicate, is incest (and also murder and anthropophagy, it is fair to assume).

And so the fear of incest turns into taboo as the foundation of culture. In a thorough fashion too detailed to reproduce here, Kristeva shows that the deed is based on the mother-child dyad, the unnamable-before-logos when “drives hold sway” (14). The incest taboo, “the prohibition placed on the maternal body” (14); the confrontation with the “impossible within” (5), is pointed to as the primary limit, exclusion and interdict, the “[a]bjection as a rite of defilement and pollution,” (17) upon which the edifice of culture is erected as the conventional, the sacred, morality, etc.: “The abject might appear as the most fragile (from a synchronic point of view), the most archaic (from a diachronic one) sublimation of an ‘object’ still inseparable from drives ... *The abject would thus be the ‘object’ of primal repression*” (Kristeva: 12).

Important here is first Kristeva’s explanation of the *chora* preceding language, as simply the corporeal that enables language – the body part

tongue precedes the language it can produce. Significant too is the abjection that founds culture and commands a permanent exile or extrication of the body from “the *chora*, receptacle of narcissism” – i.e. from fulfilling self-eroticism, from the mother-child dyad – upon the person who then becomes a disheartened being: “the one by whom the abject exists is thus a deject...” (8).

Andrade’s Pindorama Matriarchy connects to these ideas not to propose a form of government or return to a heavenly tribal commune, but as an insight into the fact that the formation of culture as we know it has also been a confrontation with the womanly/motherly. This expresses a fear of and a need to limit the possibility of falling back into the mother-child relation, a condition which would utter the love and loath for the feeling of being engulfed into an inchoate blob of sameness – also interpreted as an archaic monadic state of wholeness (as described in Aristophanes’ speech in the *Symposium* by Plato as a positive original completeness) or a negative absorption or death of the (modern, creative) ego/individual (that to which Zizek alludes with fear).

For Andrade, though, this state is not a threat but the positive aspect of a particular affect that reconnects and draws a full circle with the sense of abundance, the happiness and satiation through all that *we already had*. This original vigor is the material basis for the rejection of the want civilization set in motion around the exchange of value – which returns to the fact that “colonization did not tame a primitive energy” (Costa Lima 29).

And before we can speculate about the failure of these concepts as an implausible utopia, an ineffective euphoria, Maria Margaroni’s warning is in order with regard to Kristeva’s work, so Andrade’s thought will not be measured for its applicability: at stake “is not the truth value of the fiction narrated to us but the difference it makes in how we understand and intervene in the real” (84).¹⁹

In his intention to reverse the civilizing process, Andrade could have suggested the return of the pre-culture Freudian libidinous father or conveyed an anti-social disregard for kinship rules. Instead, he completes his Anthropophagic *descida* toward a ground zero, so to speak. To carry on this sort of monument demolition, Andrade knocks down all that has been useless to the native and was yet created at their expense. He evokes the (impossible) salvaging of the (Lacanian) Real, *zoç*, before-culture/language, the materiality of the body, whose prototype is the mother-child integral relation.

Hence Andrade's Anthropophagy targets three interconnected aspects of modern culture: 1) civilization as rooted in a fundamental lack – the body/concrete (relation with maternal) administered by the prohibition/culture (paternal regulation);²⁰ 2) civilization as reason/ration dichotomizing relationships (mother/child/father, nature/human, life/death etc.) – i.e. instrumentality creating the economy necessary to deal with a lacking perspective; 3) thus, civilization as a control over that which is made to yield profit, the surplus/other (“dehumanized inferior”):²¹ women, children, the barbarian, the elderly, nature and the environment as means to satiation, etc.

Like all Others, the putative cannibal and the anthropophagus that bite back descend from this long line of specters with which the European has contended. We have seen that the primitive as the archaic is a presence to reckon with synchronically – the story of human development, diachronically – the circling back of historicity, and also spatially as the relocation of knowledge, an alternative culture/cultivation. These processes entail a battle for the prevalence of the European self and power through and above its elected antipodes to establish a global hierarchy in the form of kinship, ultimately constituted as race and gender systems interlocked. In this regard specifically, it is remarkable that Andrade pinpointed and engaged his

thought with the womanly/maternal in his figuration of a communal, cordial Anthropophagy as the “incorporation of alterity,” (Costa Lima: 31):

The sentiment of the other, that is, to see the other in oneself, to verify in oneself the disaster, the mortification and the happiness of the other. This term thus becomes just the opposite of ... the feeling of being other, different, isolated and contrary (Andrade 1972 141).

This is precisely what Žižek, fond of “creative individualism,” criticized as “the conformist ‘other-oriented’ personality” (344).

The Anthropophagus talking back affirms the motto *we/the native already had it*, evidenced on the body/material, thereby asserting a primal/previous contentment and a substantiation of local experience. Although some may disregard the issue of Matriarchy that this article emphasizes in Andrade’s Manifesto as being out of touch with reality, I hope to have shown the potentiality of his speculations. Let us remember that Andrade posits the Anthropophagic/matriarchal as a *Weltanschauung* (1972: 77) and his point in this regard is specific: “The rupture with the matriarchal world was produced when men did not devour each other anymore but rather started to enslave each other” (81). Cathartic primitive violence is civilized as the institutionalized violent economic system (Nunes, 1972: xlvi), while the Anthropophagic is reaffirmed in the ludic, festive, leisurely, generous, hospitable (Nunes, 1972: xlvii).

In his arguments the foreshadowing of a Carahíba Revolution exposes the *corporeal desire of politics* (or “law’s desire for a body” as in Agamben) which may be inverted to inform the political promise of the primary human associations: reproduction and the other-oriented love as in the mother-child bond – the utmost “sentiment of the other” as the building block of community. Because, after all, to echo Andrade again: “... it was not crusaders who came. They were fugitives of a civilization that we are eating, because we are strong and revengeful like the Jabuti” (29).

NOTES

¹ I would like to thank Professor of French James McNab and Professor of Portuguese Susan C. Quinlan for their invaluable comments and suggestions on this essay.

² Capitalized Anthropophagy designates Andrade's concept and non-capitalized anthropophagy indicates the human flesh-eating act.

³ See Frank Lestringant, to whom the cannibal has always existed but has been progressively silenced by the "attenuations" of "idealism and intellectual high mindedness" or by sensationalism (7).

⁴ As Deborah Root notes (from Jack Forbes's *Columbus and other Cannibals*), Western culture transformed all of us "into cannibals, consuming human bodies for profit" (10).

⁵ As Tzvetan Todorov notes: "... self-knowledge develops through knowledge of the Other... the conquest of knowledge leads to the conquest of power" (254).

⁶ The translation of works not available in English is of my own responsibility.

⁷ This refers to Thomas Hobbes thought (1588-1679) in *Leviathan* (1651) and Jean J. Rousseau (1708-78) in *Discourse on Inequality* (1754) and *The Social Contract* (1762).

⁸ Andrade's Anthropophagus is *artificial* for at least two reasons. First, although the very act of anthropophagy refers to the body materiality and Andrade himself attests to that concreteness in the Manifesto, he also points toward an ideal dimension later in his life: "the metaphysical operation that is linked to the Anthropophagic is the transformation of taboo into totem" (1972: 77). Andrade also imagines the *techno-natural* man as the fusion which will replace both his ancestors: the natural and the civilized men (1972: 128).

⁹ Expression coined by Pierre Bourdieu. *The Field of Cultural Production*. Ed. Randal Johnson. New York: Columbia UP, 1993.

¹⁰ I translate *roteiros* as *itineraries* in order to incorporate all the senses of the philosophical/ideological mapping out which I believe Andrade's work points to: the suggestion of journeys on physical paths, on abstract orientations, and also toward new technologies, as in cinema *scripts* for instance. In other words, an encompassing territory/field recognition and expansion, as his view of a techno-barbarian suggests. In her very thoughtful translation, Leslie Bary opts to follow an etymological method and translates *roteiros* into *routes*. I have her translation as a reference but worked out my own adaptation to keep expanded Andrade's conceptual scope.

¹¹ This view in this particular text seems rather to highlight the "shopping around" attitude of the able colonized and to disregard the self-conscious disposition that underlies their paranoid urge to be up-to-date with the metropolis' cultural productions, still falling short in their endeavors, as Homi Bhabha's observation conveys so well in the "almost but not quite/white" complex.

¹² Anthropophagy implies the calculated intimidation that Homi Bhabha suggests with his concept of mimicry: "The success of colonial appropriation depends on a proliferation of inappropriate objects that ensure its strategic failure, so that mimicry is at once resemblance and menace" (86).

¹³ In his explanation Walter Mignolo shows how modernity is made up of coloniality (51) as the latter forms the Occidentalism necessary to Orientalism, i.e. it creates

marginalized knowledge in relation to an authoritative universality. Even if he distinguishes *post* as belonging to the European linear historicism – that is, “post [as] entrenched within the logic of the ‘modern’” (91) – Mignolo proposes Post-Occidentalism as a beyond in space, a locality that gives shape to an open-ended postcolonial (92), and insists in the specific locations of the postcolonial as a geopolitical basis for knowledge (93). In this regard, more recently, Mignolo proposes decolonization rather than the postcolonial.

¹⁴ I cannot do justice to Žižek’s arguments in the space of this essay – even because his shifting and deliberately inconclusive line of thought is not to be summarized. Suffice it to say that this is his typical reasoning – at one point seemingly grounding itself, in the following thrust dispersing in multiple ways, often leading to a dead end. In relation to the argument just mentioned, his noting the absence of a big law seems to declare a humanist concern. But such an absence is the Freudian discovery: there is no good, we are all caught inside the funhouse of indeterminacy, “between bad and worse” (392).

¹⁵ The Roman Cornélia Gracchus (185 BC) was the model wife and mother of Caius and Tiberius and was recognized by her virtue and fidelity.

¹⁶ I agree rather with Binetti and Casarino’s (*Means Without End*) translation of Agamben’s term *nuda vita* as *naked life* than with Heller-Roazen’s (*Homo Sacer*) *bare life*.

¹⁷ Agamben comments on the fact that before this Act, the invocation of liberties was addressed to authorities, people of the community, “free man,” those who later came to be ‘the citizens’ (123). He points that from then on the habeas corpus literally requires only a body: “It is not the free man and his statutes and prerogatives, nor even simply *homo*, but rather *corpus* that is the new subject of politics. And democracy is born precisely as the assertion and presentation of this body: *habeas corpus ad subjiciendum*, ‘you will have to have a body to show’” (124). My point is that we are accustomed to think of politics as the art of speech and communication. Accustomed to considering rights and privileges abstractly, as in the rights of men (and not men and women *et al.*), we forget that every political decision and negotiation has a resolution with bodies in mind, so to say. Andrade’s Anthropophagic philosophy makes present the utmost acknowledgment of material existence. As the “sentiment of the other” it invites the demystification of generalizations.

¹⁸ In Tupi-Guarani mythology, Guaraci is the Sun, Jaci is the Moon. Together with Rudá, love and relationship, the trilogy of creation is formed.

¹⁹ See Vinkler, Beth who would not agree with my conclusions and interprets Andrade’s feminism under a different light.

²⁰ Gayle Rubin views Claude Lévi-Strauss kinship theory (*The Elementary Structures of Kinship*) of exogamic rule to be based on the pervasive patriarchal notion that a woman is “a conduit of a relationship [among men] rather than a partner to it” (174). She mentions that even if this exchange of women does not turn them into an object in the modern sense we understand it, the transaction on the other hand definitely distinguish between men as having the power to be the giver and women as a gift “in no position to realize the benefits of their own circulation” (174).

²¹ Audre Lorde points out how capitalist ideology creates “the dehumanized inferior” who will be designated as workforce (4). This goes along with Baudrillard’s assertion that workers are a caste destined to the “sub-humanity of labour” (29).

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