government went on supporting Renamo, with the indication that in May, June and July they sent a total of 14 aircraft full of war materiel to Renamo. 2. That there are officers in South African military circles directly linked to this support, with a mention of Colonel Vanikerke as one of them.

**Aug. 16**——We had a meeting with Brigadier Van Tonque, at our request, where we explained our request nel Vanikerfor war materiel. They gave us the following reply:

As regards war materiel, AK-47 ammunition, we have this for you, and ... will send it, but at the moment there are transport difficulties. We can no longer use the C-130 aircraft, as these aircraft are under Air Force control, nor can we use the Navy, as there might be an information leak as well as involving many people. And in the event ... we were caught, this would imply a heavy sentence for General Van Der West Huisen, Brigadier Van Tonder and Colonel Vanikerke, as it would constitute a serious violation of the Incomati Accord, which is vital at this moment for our South African Government. ...

To overcome this difficulty we are going to use civilian aircraft that will land. So Colonel Vanikerke will go to Gorongosa on 22 Aug. 84 to meet the President of Renamo so as to organize landing strips. ...

**Sept. 3**——IMPORTANT:
31 Aug. 84——We left Gorongosa for SA where we arrived at 21h30 in the city of Pretoria.
1 Sept. 84——At 11h30 we had a meeting with Brigadier Van Tonder and Colonel Charles. At this meeting the following points were raised:

- Evacuation of the generals from the South and North to Gorongosa in accordance with His Excellency's plan. As this request was granted, Brigadier Van Tonder was to inform us how the withdrawal operations would be done.
- Separate meetings were arranged with the Chief of Staff Visloen; with the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, and with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pick Botha. With the first two it is for us to request "humanitarian aid," and with the last-named to sound out his point of view about the expected talks with Frelimo.



**Photocopy of a page from the Renamo journals.**

**6 Sept. 84**——At 17h00 we had a meeting with the Chief of Staff of the South African Armed Forces, General Visloen; General Van Der West Huisen, Br. Van Tonder and Colonel Vanikerke were present at the meeting. The following was discussed:

- General Vilsoen agreed to send us "humanitarian aid" in Air Force C-130 planes.
- He recommended us not to lose military strength and control, in the face of these negotiations.
- He said that the cease-fire mustn't be effective, he agreed with the plan of two to three months maximum.
- He recommended us not to accept the amnesty.
- The General recommended us not to be fooled by the schemes of Pick Botha because he is a traitor; he even agreed with Chester Crocker's idea of Frelimo offering an amnesty to Renamo members.

General Visloen went on to say: I agree with a joint strategy for putting Machel out. Because we want to remove the Russians from our region of Southern Africa, we have to employ a joint strategy to be able to defeat communism. In such a way as not to let the outside world ("USA") perceive it. Because the world is convinced that Machel is changing, because he doesn't seem to them to be entirely communist. The USA has its way of fighting the Russians, like South African politicians too, who have their way of fighting communism. And we soldiers have our way of fighting the Russians.

Finally, General Visloen guaranteed us that he is on our side until final victory. C-130 planes for Mozambique, humanitarian aid. Common strategy to defeat communism in southern Africa.

**Sept. 17**—— They will install microphones in the negotiating room to listen in on the talks between Pick Botha and the Mozambican delegation; it will be very advantageous for us. In this way we will know Pick Botha's plan and Frelimo's; this

*continued on next page*

## PRETORIA'S MILITARY AND RENAMO

[AN] In June 1976, only three months after a newly independent Mozambique had closed its border to white minority-ruled Rhodesia, a new Mozambican movement proclaimed its existence over the Voice of Free Africa, broadcasting from transmitters in Rhodesia. Attacking the "communism" of Mozambique's Frelimo government, the Mozambican National Resistance ("MNR" or "Renamo") called for the overthrow of Samora Machel.

According to numerous sources, including former Rhodesian intelligence officers, the shadowy organization was a project of Salisbury's Central Intelligence Organization, gaining recruits from a medley of former Portuguese intelligence agents, black soldiers in the Portuguese army and a few deserters from Frelimo. Largely a propaganda and espionage unit for several years, the group began to be used for offensive raids into Mozambique in 1979. With Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, however, Renamo was orphaned.

In April 1980, the operation's headquarters were transferred wholesale to South Africa, assigned to the South African Military Intelligence Service and initially based at Phalaborwa, near Kruger Park in the northern Transvaal. After a respite in 1980, Mozambique began to suffer intensified attacks from what the Maputo government called "armed bandits," a term meant to disparage the insurgents' claim to be an autonomous political movement.

Though it lacked political respectability among African states, Renamo nevertheless inflicted increasingly devastating damage on Mozambique's fragile economy. It targeted communications links and food relief convoys, and assassinated or kidnapped government supporters, teachers and foreign aid workers. With the South African military handling supplies, training, transport and communications, the attackers often had technological superiority over Mozambique's forces. They could erode the government's credibility simply by showing its incapacity to defend or to provide basic services to local people.

In mid-March 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati Accord, each pledging to refrain from any collaboration in violent attacks against the other. Mozambique, which had in any case denied giving any military backing to the exiled African National Congress, strictly limited that movement's presence in Mozambique. South Africa claimed to have stopped any backing for Renamo. Government officials in Maputo at the time said South Africa had already supplied enough weaponry so that it would take at least two years for the government to regain full control, even if all new supplies were stopped.

In fact, the attacks in many areas became even more frequent after Nkomati. Maputo Province suffered new and repeated raids. In October 1984, the South African government reportedly brokered an agreement by which Renamo accepted a cease-fire and the authority of Mozambican President Machel, but it quickly proved ineffective.

Three months ago, a combined Mozambican-Zimbabwean force overran the Renamo "capital" at Gorongosa, capturing documents that appeared to confirm a South African military role in sponsoring and supplying the Renamo forces. Mozambique angrily presented this evidence to South Africa in September, spurring a partial admission of guilt by South African Foreign Minister Roelof "Pik" Botha.

*—William Minter* ■