

To this should also be added that the profoundly class-conscious proletariat of Japan, which ordinarily would have served as a tremendous revolutionary ally to revolutionary China, became somewhat neutralized as a result of the confusion arising out of the ideological split and the denunciation of Stalin. Its leaders, while pursuing a reformist line, did not, however, adopt a hostile attitude to the CCP.

The rightists in China opportunistically identified themselves with the great gains made by the Chinese Revolution and its successes in agriculture and industry and blamed all the failures upon the Mao leadership. The bourgeois intelligentsia in China, remnants of the dispossessed ruling classes, and all the forces which sought to limit the proletarian gains of the revolution and to whittle down the dictatorship of the proletariat, leaned almost instinctively in the direction of the "Soviet model."

The Cultural Revolution, therefore, of necessity had to be a struggle primarily against Khrushchevite revisionism, even though, as it had originally developed in China, it was part and parcel of the struggle against internal reaction and against imperialism, at that time considered the main enemy.

But as the Cultural Revolution progressed and the struggle between the factions deepened, the struggle against revisionism became more and more identified with the struggle against the USSR as a whole. The transition from a struggle against an ideological tendency into a struggle against "social imperialism" was a crossing of class lines. It did much harm to People's China and helped to isolate it. The error became more and more compounded as the invective against Soviet revisionism became sharper, until the Soviet Union was actually characterized as a fascist state.

It's important to understand that the origins of this transformation arose from an over-extension of the struggle against the domestic right. The characterization of the USSR as social-imperialist was not the result of an independent investigation of the social system in the USSR nor of a dispassionate analysis of the social character of the Soviet regime.

All the harsh invective used against Brezhnev, and earlier against Khrushchev, was in reality meant more for the likes of Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and their ilk, than for Brezhnev, Kosygin, or Khrushchev. The latter are conservative bureaucrats and not much else.

The struggle against the rightists in China, especially when it became so acute in the late 1960s, posed a difficult problem for Mao and his supporters: how to conduct a relentless, unyielding struggle against the restorationists and the "bourgeoisie in the party," while maintaining a balanced view of the USSR as a workers' state dominated by a revisionist bureaucracy.

Such a problem is not wholly uncommon. One sees in everyday life how political factions and social groupings, in the course of an acute struggle, lose perspective and even lose sight of their objective.

In the course of trying to annihilate the domestic rightists in China, the Mao leadership over-extended itself and carried the struggle against the Soviet bureaucracy much further than was warranted, going to the extent of equating it with imperialism and even further to characterizing the real imperialists as a lesser evil.

FALSE THEORIES WEAKENED CHINA INTERNATIONALLY

This, however, compounded China's foreign affairs problems. By pursuing the false super-power theory, China first of all weakened its international position because it isolated itself. Had the Chinese leadership adopted the super-power theory purely from the point of view of bourgeois, narrow-minded, national interests, it would have been more logical to try to **befriend** both "super-powers" rather than to attack them simultaneously, which isolated China. (Witness the attempt by France, Yugoslavia, India, and earlier Egypt, to utilize the social antagonism between the USSR and imperialism to their advantage by befriending, on occasion, both "super-powers.")

It was inevitable, therefore, that such a policy could not last long and that China would have to lean on one or the other of the so-called super-powers in order to avoid isolation. In the context of the struggle so fiercely fought against the rightists in China, any conciliatory move to the USSR would inevitably be regarded as a boon to the rightists. The course of leaning on U.S. imperialism became more or less inevitable, without it ever really having been a consistently thought-out policy based upon objective reality.

These are the ideological and political roots for what turned out to be and continues to be a disastrous foreign policy for China—one that never had a material basis.

It goes without saying that the policy of the Soviet bureaucracy was of course the main factor leading to the early days of the struggle, and the subsequent errors by the Chinese leadership do not raise the Soviet bureaucracy to heroic revolutionary stature in spite of its