Dr. Richard Jaeger, (CDU) Vice President of the Bundestag (with the generous cooperation of the American Council on NATO).
Dr. Edgar Jahn, head of the important Arbeitsgemeinschaft Demokratischer Kreise, Bad Godesberg.
Dr. Rudolf Pechel, Editor of the Deutsche Rundschau, Stuttgart.
Dr. Walter Stahl, Executive Secretary of the Atlantik-Bruecke, Hamburg.
Minister of Defense Franz-Josef Strauss (CSU - Bavarian equivalent of the CDU Party).
Dr. Lorenz Stucki, Editor of Die Weltwoche, Zurich.

One of the Council's chief activities has been the circulation in Germany of the interpretations of events in this country which are of interest to our friends abroad. Into this category falls American reactions to visits by high German Government officials, such as Dr. Ludwig Erhard, architect of Germany's economic miracle, whose tour of the U.S. in April 1958 was widely commented on by the American press. Through the Atlantik-Bruecke, a German organization composed of leading journalists, educators and industrialists, the Council circulated a memorandum on the American reaction to Dr. Erhard's speeches and off-the-record advice in connection with the American recession, which was in full swing at that time. It is interesting to recall that Dr. Erhard took an optimistic line and urged Americans to have greater confidence in their economy, which proved to be good prophecy and good advice.

In the summer of 1958 the threat of war over Quemoy and Matsu arose. This caused alarm in Germany and throughout Europe because America's policy toward Red China and Formosa is by far the most criticized aspect of our whole foreign policy. The Council, therefore, attempted to explain the background of American Far Eastern policy and the attitude of American public opinion on this question. Council member Norbert Muhlen, who appeared just before Christmas on Germany's popular TV equivalent of "Meet the Press" - "International Fruehschoppen" - also commented on this subject, as well as on American domestic developments.

The crisis which broke out in the Middle East over Lebanon, immediately following that in Quemoy, put a similar though less acute strain on German-American relations because many Germans questioned the wisdom of the Eisenhower Doctrine and of America's opposition to President Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism. Extensive German foreign trade with the Middle East makes this area of great importance to the Germans. There was also considerable opposition to the airlift of American troops from West Germany to Lebanon. An exchange of views between the Council and leading Germans, including members of the Atlantik-Bruecke, helped clarify these questions.

The Democratic landslide in the November elections was of particular interest to Germans because of the widespread fear that a Democratic Congress might refuse to back the administration's foreign policy, and so cause paralysis and uncertainty in America's leadership. This was particularly important since many Germans, as was shown in their reaction to the Reith lectures mentioned above, mistakenly believed that George Kennan was a spokesman for the Democratic Party. Although this had been amply disproved by Dean Acheson's

strong statement and subsequent speeches by Democratic leaders, German fears about the uncertainty of U.S. policy were revived by the election landslide. The Council helped correct these impressions in its analysis of the election results.

Senator Mansfield's proposals of February 1959, for negotiations between East and West Germans on an equal footing, and in favor of the Rapacki Plan, provoked similar consternation. A letter analyzing Senator Mansfield's proposals was published in the New York Times of February 25. The fact that the Senator was not speaking for the Democratic Party, as many Germans believed, was made clear by statements of other Democratic leaders.

At the request of the Atlantik-Bruecke, the Council also supplied an analysis of Anastas Mikoyan's "triumphal march" through the United States. Europeans were puzzled and amazed by the apparent cordiality with which Mikoyan was greeted, and wondered if this meant an abrupt change of American policy and public opinion, which they are inclined to regard as much more volatile and unstable than it actually is. (Report available on request.)

The Council also distributed hundreds of copies of the Atlantik-Bruecke's informative brochure, "Meet Germany," to colleges, libraries and interested individuals.

During the summer of 1958, the Council sponsored a seminar in Munich held under the auspices of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., which was attended by participants from the United States, England, Germany, France and the Netherlands, and was devoted to a study of Soviet economy and education. In September, the Council sponsored another conference on "The Soviet Union and Asia," held in Vienna under the auspices of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Osteuropakunde. The expenses of the American delegation to both conferences was financed by the Council, through grants from the Ford Foundation, for which we are deeply appreciative.

The increasing pressure of events abroad led the Atlantik-Bruecke, in the spring of 1958, to suggest that we arrange an American-German Conference along the lines of those which have been held for years between the Germans and the British at Koenigswinter. These meetings are attended by members of Parliament from all the great political parties in each country and by leading citizens, but not by government officials. They are off-the-record.

The American Council on Germany approached the Ford Foundation and a grant was made of $13,500 toward the expenses of such a conference. It was originally planned for the end of 1958, but is now scheduled for October 2 to 4, 1959. Encouraging progress has been made in gathering a distinguished list of American delegates who have agreed to go (see attached list). However, the financing of this conference is still incomplete and new sources of funds to supplement the Ford grant must be obtained if it is to be held on the projected scale, and if the excellent German delegation is to be matched. The Berlin crisis greatly enhances the importance of this effort.

CHRISTOPHER EMMET
Executive Vice President