Now if we were to assume that there were no bosses in China (see the sections on cadres and the army, below), and were further to assume that at the factories the 15% figure cited above was made up solely of workers, that would mean that the Party worker minority of 15% dominated the 85% non-Party worker majority. This is statistical proof (assuming their estimate to be correct) of a dictatorship *over* the proletariat. The ruling committee – the Party committee – is made up solely of Party members. The Revolutionary committees contain *both* Party and non-Party people [14] – thus the stranglehold of the CCP increased. This stranglehold will become all the more evident in the sections below dealing with the cadres, the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA), the type of decisions made by the Revolutionary committees, and the manner of "election" to the two committees.

THE CADRES

Management expert Barry Richman differentiates between factory personnel types: "Cadres are leaders, either Red or Expert, *party or managerial;* technicians are Experts and typically intellectuals; and workers are the masses." [15] The term "cadre" (ganbu, or ganbou) covers a lot of territory, or, as it is said, a multitude of sins: ". . . it now loosely covers anyone in an administrative, professional, intellectual, or white-collar job, in short, *everyone who is not worker, peasant, or soldier.* There is a sharp distinction between lower-echelon cadres called 'staff members' and the upper-echelon 'leading cadre' who is a person in a position of authority: a minister, bureau chief, manager, director, or head of any organization. . ." [16] Goldwasser and Dowty state that a cadre is "anyone who is a leader," and that the concept combines "aspects of civil servants, political and ideological leaders, *managers* and *administrators.*" [17] And further:

> ". . . there is a more specific definition of cadre. Cadres. . . are those 'administrators' assigned to factories by the State. The same is true for cadres on communes. The full-time administrators in factory 'front offices'; the 'responsible person' at a public park in Wuhan; full-time government or Chinese Communist Party leaders – all are cadres." [18]

Most of the cadres are members of the CCP. [19] The odds are pretty high, then, that any cadres that might get onto the Revolutionary Committees will be CCP members.

Apparently these "dedicated revolutionaries" have become a slight problem:

> Since factory cadres work full-time at administrative duties, there is always the danger that they lose touch with actual production, that a gap develops between the cadres and workers. Several methods have been introduced . . . to ensure that cadres do not become 'divorced from the masses.' The general rule is that cadres must regularly take part in manual labour. Within that guideline, there are any number of specific ways to schedule *lao dong* (labour) for cadres.

Goldwasser and Dowty note that in a "few exceptional places" there was a sharp division between the cadres and the workers, analagous to the division of bosses and workers in the U.S. [20] Special camps have been set up for the "re-education" of cadres, the

May 7th Schools, where cadres go for ideological tune-ups. [21] Goldwasser and Dowty's definitions of cadres – once the Maoist sugar-coating is stripped away – boils down to one word: BOSSES.

THE PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY (P.L.A.)

An oft-quoted Thought of Chairman Mao is "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." A bullet in the head effectively ends any argument; the threat of one does almost as well. The above dictum of Big Brother bares Maoist ideology to its State Capitalist core. Now, if – as Goldwasser and Dowty state – "workers and cadres run the factories" [22] – what the hell are PLA representatives doing on the Revolutionary and Party Committees? These soldiers are apparently not factory workers – what are they doing in the factories? Goldwasser and Dowty state that "They play an important role in political education; one cadre (naturally! S.S.) told us, 'The People's Liberation Army is a great school of Mao Tsetung Thought, founded and led by Chairman Mao. They bring a fine tradition with them to the factory.' " [23] A fine tradition, all right – a tradition of breaking strikes with armed force! "Political education" is the key concept – "Political Power grows out of the barrel of a gun" – and the PLA is ever-ready to "educate" rebellious workers. Says Louis Kraar:

> The Army's presence undoubtedly helped the learning process, too. When the Cultural Revolution got out of hand, Mao ordered the People's Liberation Army to move into every enterprise and restore order. Though inconspicuous, the military men still exercise widespread authority – at the Kwangchow machinetool plant, among other places. The "most responsible person" at the plant, (who is also its chairman,) is an Army representative whom I was never able to meet. Confronted with this apparent contradiction in the principle of management by the masses, a member of the committee blandly says: "We can learn what we don't know through practice. After the chairman came to the factory, he integrated himself with the broad masses." [24]

Economist John Kenneth Galbraith notes that even now, after the Cultural Revolution, "In factories, universities and even the secondary schools PLA. . . representatives are still present as a stabilizing force." [25] As of May 1791, 22 out of 29 Chinese provinces had set up provincial Party Committees – all commanded by the PLA. [26]

The role of the PLA – like armies everywhere – is to keep those on the bottom in line. In China the military's basic role is as a tool of class repression. When the army is helping to "lead" the factories (which are of course run by the workers and cadres!), the class-repressive nature of the PLA is obvious. And the class that is being repressed is the Chinese working class.