There is some intuition that rationality gives agents at least some leeway in how they form their beliefs. It seems, for example, that two agents can rationally disagree about some topic even if they both have the same evidence. If this is right, then rationality is permissive. Despite the intuitive appeal of permissivism, there are theoretical obstacles in formulating a plausible version of the view. In this dissertation, I argue that the best way to defend permissivism is to embrace the existence of epistemic supererogation – which allows agents to form one of multiple beliefs, even if some of the beliefs are rationally superior to other rationally permissible ones. Broadly speaking, there are two types of permissive theories. One form of permissivism is interpersonal permissivism – the view that two different agents may be rational in holding different beliefs even on the same evidence. Intrapersonal permissivism is stronger: it holds that the same agent can be rational in holding one of two different beliefs on the same body of evidence. If intrapersonal permissivism is true, then even from the point of view of a particular agent, there are epistemic situations where the agent can go one of two ways, and be rational either way. The most popular form of permissivism is what I call the Epistemic Standard View (ESV) – a form of interpersonal permissivism. My dissertation begins by developing a novel objection to the ESV, ultimately showing that there is a serious obstacle to formulating a complete and satisfying version of the ESV. With the failure of the prominent interpersonally permissive view, I then turn my attention to intrapersonal permissivism. Traditionally, philosophers have thought that this view suffers from a fatal problem: the arbitrariness objection. I argue that there is a way around the arbitrariness objection, but only by embracing the existence of epistemic supererogation. The dissertation ends by developing a positive theory of epistemic supererogation. I argue that the resulting view fulfills theoretical desiderata on both sides of the permissivism debate. Thus, this theory of epistemic supererogation stands as a compelling and plausible form of permissivism.
Li, Han,
"The Demands of Epistemic Rationality: Permissivism and Supererogation"
(2018).
Philosophy Theses and Dissertations.
Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library.
https://doi.org/10.26300/66fw-3w02
