Studying the Effect of Formal Rules on Behavior and Social Norms using Lab and Lab-in-the-Field Experiments

Govindan, Pavitra

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Year:: 2018
Contributor:: Govindan, Pavitra (creator); Dal Bó, Pedro (Advisor); Putterman, Louis (Reader); Foster, Andrew (Reader); Brown University. Department of Economics (sponsor)
Genre:: theses
Subject:: Social policy; Social norms; India; Development economics; Experimental design; Formal rules; Behavioral change; Behavioral Economics; Caste; Dalits; Law and economics; Cultural norms; Dictator Games; lab-in-the-field experiments
Extent:: 13, 148 p.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.26300/7nsq-md83

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Abstract:: I study the effect of formal rules on individual behavior and social norms using lab-in-the-field and lab experiments. I use dictator games in my experiments wherein the first player, “the allocator” decides how she wants to split her money between herself and another person, “the recipient”. First, I use a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural India to (1) measure the effect of rules on norms and behaviors and (2) estimate individuals’ willingness to pay for complying with rules. I study high-caste individuals’ sharing norms towards low-caste individuals in dictator games. Within the dictator games, I (i) influence initial norms of sharing, (ii) vary rules of minimum giving, and (iii) vary fines associated with rule violation. I find that both higher initial norms and radical rules increase sharing in dictator games. Moderate rules do not change average sharing behavior. High-caste individuals are willing to pay significant amounts of money to be compliant with rules. I find that rules change behavior directly via individuals’ preferences to comply with rules and indirectly by changing beliefs about what actions are socially acceptable. Second, I use a lab experiment to show that individuals are less likely to comply with a formal rule when they are part of a group with norms conflicting with the rule. I study sharing norms of a group of “allocators” in dictator games. The allocators share proposals within their group about the appropriate amount to be shared with their respective recipients. After an iterative sharing of proposals, the allocators agree on a guideline of what should be sent. I consider this guideline as the “norm” of each group. This norm significantly affects the sending behavior of allocators despite being non-binding. Next, a formal rule is introduced that requires each allocator to share her money equally. Breaking the rule entails a small sanction. I find that the allocators are 22% less likely to obey the rule of equitable sending if they belonged to a group that had a less-than-equal sharing norm. This confirms that individuals are less likely to comply with a rule if it conflicts with their group’s norm.
Notes:: Thesis (Ph. D.)--Brown University, 2018

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Citation

Govindan, Pavitra, "Studying the Effect of Formal Rules on Behavior and Social Norms using Lab and Lab-in-the-Field Experiments" (2018). Economics Theses and Dissertations. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. https://doi.org/10.26300/7nsq-md83

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Economics Theses and Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations for the Economics department.
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